Seven paradoxes of voting systems
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Transcript of Seven paradoxes of voting systems
1
F.P. TarassenkoTomsk State University
Seven Paradoxes of Voting Systems:
Pitfalls in Collective Decision Making
Seven Paradoxes of Voting Systems: Pitfalls in Collective Decision Making
RESULTS OF ELECTIONS
DEPEND ON:
1) Pre-election campaign running
2) Approved election procedure fulfillment
3) Honest counting votes
We will consider peculiarities of collective decision making beyond of all that:
only those that are hidden in the procedure of voting itself.
Seven Paradoxes of Voting Systems: Pitfalls in Collective Decision Making
X = {x1, x2, … ,xk} – a ballot-list.
Ci (X) – a choice of i-th voter on X in a form requested by election rules.
C1(X), C2(X), … ,Ci(X), … ,CN(X) – all ballot-lists filled in.
C0(X) = f {C1(X), C2(X), … ,Ci(X), … ,CN(X)} – a
collective choice.
f(.) – an election procedure, or vote rule.
Seven Paradoxes of Voting Systems: Pitfalls in Collective Decision Making
Paradox 1: COLLECTIVE DECISION IS NOT
OBLIGATORY CORRECT
Voting does NOT guarantee the rightness of the decision made.
Examples:
Galileo, Jordano Bruno, Kopernikus.
Seven Paradoxes of Voting Systems: Pitfalls in Collective Decision Making
Paradox 1: COLLECTIVE DECISION IS NOT (cont.) OBLIGATORY CORRECT
CAUSE: Ability of any human entity (including the electorate) to estimate anything, is accompanied by a
liability to mistakes and errors in its estimation.VIRTUES OF VOTING:
1) Collective decision is STATISTICALLY more reliable than an individual one
2) Its ULTIMATE goal is: to make all, INCLUDING THOSE DISAGREED, to act according to the decision.
Seven Paradoxes of Voting Systems: Pitfalls in Collective Decision Making
Paradox 2: ANY ELECTION PROCEDURE CAN HOVER
Although the voting is intended to arrive to a decision, it may result in NOT making it
CAUSE: A procedure is defined by certain constraints. If any of them is NOT met, - the procedure is
inapplicable: decision is not made.
Examples:Simple majority (50%+1), qualified majority (2/3), etc.
Seven Paradoxes of Voting Systems: Pitfalls in Collective Decision Making
Paradox 3: THE CONDORSET’S PARADOX
CAUSE: When preferences make up a circle
B’sP’s
B1 B2 B3
P1 1 2 3
P2 3 1 2
P3 2 3 1
C1(B)
C2(B)
C3(B)
1
3 2
Graph of Preferences
Seven Paradoxes of Voting Systems: Pitfalls in Collective Decision Making
Paradox 3: THE CONDORSET’S (cont.)PARADOX
Examples: Treatments of the paradox
1
3 2
3
5 4
1
2a) negligible,insignificant
b) Induce some votersto change their
preferences between lower alternatives
(“black” or “white” PR)
Seven Paradoxes of Voting Systems: Pitfalls in Collective Decision Making
Paradox 4: MINORITY CAN WIN IN ANY MAJORITARIAN VOTING SYSTEM
- and there are several possibilities for that
Examples:
1.
2.
voters nonvoters evading the polls, turnout
obligation to vote
30% 30% 40% 100% of attendance!
splitting votes
<50% >50%
60% 40%
Seven Paradoxes of Voting Systems: Pitfalls in Collective Decision Making
Paradox 4: MINORITY CAN WIN IN ANY
(cont.1) MAJORITARIAN VOTING SYSTEM
- and there are several possibilities for that
3. multistage elections
Necessary conditions:
1) Multistage rule for elections
2) Critical proportion of minority (2 - 44%, 3 – 33,7%, …)
3) Discipline of minority voters
Examples: 4 Presidents of USA; soviet leaders, etc.
Seven Paradoxes of Voting Systems: Pitfalls in Collective Decision Making
Paradox 4: MINORITY CAN WIN IN ANY
(cont.2) MAJORITARIAN VOTING SYSTEM
- and there are several possibilities for that
4. 100% attendance, no splitting, one-stage election!
Australian Constitution: Australian voter fills in his/her ballot-paper only once. But he/she must rank the candidates in order of
preference.
Then the procedure uses all abovementioned conditions
Seven Paradoxes of Voting Systems: Pitfalls in Collective Decision Making
Paradox 5: EVEN the OVERWHELMING MAJORITY RULE IS NON DEMOCRATIC
CAUSE: the concept of “US and THEM”, “own and alien” has nothing to do with the concept of democracy.
Example: The voting procedure with two only,
looking very “democratic”, rules:
1) (N-1) – “pro”, 1 – “contra” decision. N is ANY: if 2 or more voters are “against” alternative is rejected.
2) Voter is voting “pro” if the alternative is beneficial or not harmful to him/her.
This is the end of democracy (a case example follows).
VOTING BY MAJORITY AND DEMOCRACY
ARE NOT THE SAME THINGS
Seven Paradoxes of Voting Systems: Pitfalls in Collective Decision Making
Paradox 6: THE ONLY DEMOCRATIC VOTING IS UNANIMOUS ONE. BUT IT IS SUBJECT TO PARADOX TWO,TOO
CAUSE: Defending interest of everyone, this procedure can not avoid possibility of hovering.
Example: some parliament decisions; Security Council of UNO; election of the next Pope; verdict
of jurors; joint-stock companies with unlimited responsibility; idealized design.
Seven Paradoxes of Voting Systems: Pitfalls in Collective Decision Making
Paradox 6: THE ONLY DEMOCRATIC VOTING
(cont.) IS UNANIMOUS ONE. BUT IT IS SUBJECT TO PARADOX TWO,TOO
Paradoxical Situations about Unanimity
1) Substitution of unanimity principle (all are “for”) by principle of consensus (nobody is “against”).
2) Failure to collect 100% of votes.
Ways out:
a) looking for compromise;
b) a “ladder” principle.
Seven Paradoxes of Voting Systems: Pitfalls in Collective Decision Making
Paradox 7: THE ARROW’S THEOREM OF IMPOSSIBILITY
C0(X) = f {C1(X), C2(X), … ,Ci(X), … ,CN(X)}
Conditions of “right”, “just”, “reasonable” choice:1) Condition of general right to vote and undesirability of “the
dictator’s choice” - C0(X)C1(X).
2) Condition of monotony of f(.).
3) Condition of independency of alternatives.
4) Condition of sovereignty.
THEN: The given requirements are incompatible. For any election procedure there exists such a set of alternatives, on which the choice can not be made, but the “dictator’s choice” is an exclusion.
Seven Paradoxes of Voting Systems: Pitfalls in Collective Decision Making
ALL AFORESAID HAS NOTING
TO DO WITH POLITICS:
it is purely logical study of the formula
C0(X) = f {C1(X), C2(X), … ,Ci(X), … ,CN(X)}