Set of material for the Final Conference participants · Set of material for the Final Conference...

Set of material for the Final Conference participants

prepared by Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group (India)

EURASIA-Net Partners Accademia Europea Bolzano/Europäische Akademie Bozen (EURAC) – Bolzano/Bozen, (Italy), Brunel University – West London (UK) Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität – Frankfurt am Main (Germany) Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group (India) South Asian Forum for Human Rights (Nepal) Democratic Commission of Human Development (Pakistan) University of Dhaka (Bangladesh)

The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community‘s Seventh Framework Programme [FP7/2007-2013] under grant agreement n° 216072.

Table of contents

Programme schedule .......................................................................................... 3 Registration Form .............................................................................................. 7 Muslim Women and Change ............................................................................. 8

Asghar Ali Engineer Note on the Discussion on Possibilities of Trans-Regional Platform for Protection of Minority Rights ......................................................................... 11 Ranabir Samaddar Some European reflections on regional standard setting in Human and Minority Rights in South Asia ......................................................................... 13 Günther Rautz

Study Visits – March 2010 ............................................................................... 21 Harriet Hoffler Media and Minorities -- Issues in Europe and South Asia .......................... 28 Subir Bhaumik Summary of activities organized in the framework of EURASIA-Net Project ................................................................................................................ 30 Samir Kumar Das

ANNEX Nation Building and Minority Alienation in India (Policy and Practices) ....................................................................................... 42 A. S. Narang

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EURASIA-Net Final Conference on

Trans Regional Platform and

Joint Research Agenda on

Protection of Minority Rights

Organized by Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group (CRG)

18-20 March 2010 Venue: Swabhumi, Kolkata, India

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18 March 2010 (Thursday) 17:00-17:30 Tea and Registration 17:30-19:15 Inaugural Session

Chair: Subhas Ranjan Chakraborty, Calcutta Research Group

17:30-17:40 Welcome Address/ Samir Kumar Das, Calcutta Research Group & University of Calcutta

17:40-17:50 EURASIA-Net Project Presentation/ Günther Rautz, European

Academy 17:50-18:05 Address by Guest-in-Chief, I. A. Rehman, Human Rights

Commission, Pakistan 18:05-18:25 Inaugural Remarks/ Ranabir Samaddar, Calcutta Research Group 18:25-19:00 Key Note Address/ Asghar Ali Engineer, Centre for Study of Society

and Secularism . 19:00-19:10 Chairman’s Comments 19:10-19:15 Vote of Thanks/ Paula Banerjee, Calcutta Research Group &

University of Calcutta

19:30 Reception and Dinner

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19 March 2010 (Friday): 09:00-09:30 Opening Remarks: Presentation of a brief review of the entire

programme and formation of the Working Groups (A, B, C, D, E*) / Samir Kumar Das

*Working Groups:

A. Lessons of study visits and summer schools; relevance of educational material and

publications. Moderators: Harriet Hoffler, Brunel Law School and Sanjay Barbora, Panos South

Asia

B. The Media Segment in the EURASIA-Net Project. Moderators: Rita Manchanda, South Asia Forum for Human Rights, and Subir

Bhaumik, BBC, Eastern India

C. Research Policy recommendations and directions; EU sessions and impact of EU Cooperation in South Asia

Moderators: Samir Kumar Das & Joanna Pfaff Czarnecka, University of Bielefeld

D. Regional Instruments of Protection: Comparative Experiences. Moderators: Tapan Bose, South Asia Forum for Human Rights and Giovanni Poggeschi, European Academy

E. Legal Pluralism, National Laws, and Possibilities of Dialogue.

Moderators: Ugo Caruso, Universität Frankfurt and Borhan Uddin Khan, University of Dhaka

09:30-11:00 Working Group Discussion 11:00-11:30 Tea Break 11:30-13:00 Working Group Discussion (Contd.) 13:00-14:00 Lunch Break

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14:00-15:30 Roundtable on: Media and Minorities Participants: Rita Manchanda, Bharat Bhushan, Mail Today, Jehan Perera, National Peace Council, Sri Lanka, and Sanjay Barbora. Chair: Tanveer Jahan, Human Rights Commission, Pakistan

15:30-16:00 Tea break 16:00-17:30 Reports of the working groups placed for discussion

Chair: Sergiu Constantin and Alexandra Tomaselli, European Academy

17:30-18:00 Release of a set of publications on Minority Rights in Europe and

South Asia/ To be released by Bharat Bhushan 18:00-19:30 Evening Reception 20 March 2010 (Saturday): 9:30-11:00 Roundtable on: The Possibilities and Modalities of Trans-regional

Platform [One each from all project partners; Discussion to be held on the basis of a note to be prepared by Calcutta Research Group] Moderator: Sergiu Constantin, European Academy

11:00-11:30 Tea Break 11:30-13:00 Lessons Learnt: Final Reflections by Project Partners: Samir Kumar

Das Chair: Ranabir Samaddar

13:00-14:00 Lunch Break 16:00-17:00 Valedictory Lecture/ Justice Rajinder Sachar/ Chair: Paula Banerjee 17:00-17:15 Concluding Remarks and Vote and Thanks/ Sabyasachi Basu Ray

Chaudhury, Calcutta Research Group & Rabindra Bharati University 19:30 Reception and Farewell dinner Rapporteurs: Geetisha Dasgupta, Ishita Dey, Harriet Hoffler, Sucharita Sengupta, Ugo Caruso, Demelza Jade Jones. .

EURASIA-Net Final Conference

on Trans Regional Platform and Joint Research Agenda on Protection of Minority Rights

Organized By Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group(CRG)

Dates:18-20 March, 2010 Venue: Swabhumi, Kolkata, India

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REGISTRATION FORM

Name: ________________________________________________________________________ Organization: __________________________________________________________________ Address: ______________________________________________________________________ Telephone No: _________________________Mobile No.______________________________ Fax No. ___________________ Email: _____________________________________________

__________________________ Signature & Date

__________________________________________________________________

Please mention the working group you participate in______________

A. Lessons of study visits and summer schools; relevance of educational material and publications. B. The media segment in the EURASIA- Net project. C. Research policy recommendations and directions; EU sessions and impact of EU cooperation

in South Asia. D. Regional instruments of protection ; Comparative experiences E. Legal pluralism, national laws, and possibilities of dialogue.

__________________________________________________________________ For outstation participants (Travel Schedule) Arrival Date & Time: ____________________________ Departure Date & Time: ____________________________

This text is not to be quoted, cited or published in any manner. It is to be used solely for the conference. EURASIA-Net Final Conference



Dates: 18-20 March, 2010 Venue: Swabhumi, Kolkata (India)

Muslim Women and Change

Asghar Ali Engineer

Mostly people think Muslim women are oppressed and forced to wear veil and confined to the four walls of their houses. This is mainly because we read every day in papers that Taliban force women into veil, burn down girls schools and always portray them wrapped completely in black cloth from head to foot. This image of Muslim women was further reinforced by the burqa controversy which erupted in France. This image would be justified if all Muslim women followed the strict dress code propounded by Muslim theologians which was evolved in medieval ages and which they keep on justifying even today. But there is big difference in what is theologically projected and ground reality. It may not be wrong, if I venture to say, Muslim women have been defying theological code for more than a century now. And now a century later, Muslim women have gone even further in their public achievements. It is true even today some Muslim theologians debate whether women are naqisul aql (defective reasoning power) or not but many Muslim women have superseded even Muslim men in several fields. In Saudi Arabia where women are not even permitted to drive cars, a woman became a licensed pilot and has been flying aircrafts. Now we got news from Malyasia that Farah al-Habshi, an engineer by profession, has been appointed deputy of weapons and electrical officer in spanking new Malaysian warship KD Perak. Today she is donned in white and blue Royal Malaysian Navy uniform. What is interesting is that she also wears hijab to cover her head though not her face. She feels her hijab in no way comes in the way of performing her duties. Malaysia is an Islamic country and orthodox ulama exercise great deal of control over people’s lives. Recently even the Government of Malaysia chickened out when Ulama took stand that Christians in Malaysia cannot use the word Allah in their religious literature or in their newspaper. Muslim women face several problems in that country at the hands of conservative ulama in respect of family laws. It is in the same country that a woman has been appointed naval officer on combat duty. Even in India women have not won the right to be on combat duty in navy or are not permitted to fly fighter planes or serve in combat arms. They are also not allowed

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seafaring in warships. Ms. Farah al-Habshi, on the other hand, recently participated in Milan naval exercise along with some other women. Ms. Farah is also highly articulate and answered all the questions put to her by the journalists. And it is not only one example out of many. There are several other examples. Many Muslim women have excelled even in theological fields and quite independently of the traditional theologians. They have shown courage to challenge orthodox ulama. Here I can give example of Amina Wudud of USA who teaches Islamic Studies in Washington. She believed women can lead mixed congregation in prayer and she led around 100 persons, men and women in prayer a few year ago and that too on Friday and delivered Friday khutba (sermon), quite unthinkable in traditional Muslim world. It raised storm of controversy and even Yusuf Qardawi, otherwise a moderate theologian from Qatar, wrote an article, opposing a woman leading nixed congregational prayer. Some Kuwaiti women, elected to Kuwaiti parliament after great deal of struggle, refused to wear hijab and fought for their right to go to parliament sessions without wearing one and fought their case up to Supreme Court of Kuwait and won. Many more examples can be cited of Muslim women daring authorities for their rights. But media, which is interested in sensationalizing issues, refuses to highlight Muslim women’s achievements and continues to portray them as submissive to traditional authorities and meekly accepting their situation. This image of Muslim women has to change and reality, which is much more complex, has to be understood. This is not to deny that in many countries Muslim women are facing difficult problems and their liberation is not a foregone conclusion. However, it is also true that many of them are fighting and refusing to submit meekly. What gives us hope is their continued struggle and defiance of traditional authorities. It should also be mentioned here that many ‘ualam and jurists also have realized that medieval shari’ah formulations about women cannot be enforced easily any more and some of them like Muhammad Abduh of Egypt, Maulavi Mumtaz Ali Khan of India and Maulana Umar Ahmed Usmani of Pakistan have expressed their serious reservations about traditional theological formulations on women. The determined struggle on the part of Muslim women will force many more theologians to revise their position and take Qur’an, and not medieval theology, more seriously on women issues.

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************************************************************************ Further information at: Centre for Study of Society and Secularism Mumbai [email protected]





Note on the Discussion on Possibilities of Trans-Regional Platform for Protection of Minority Rights

Ranabir Samaddar

1. We should take into account the earlier attempts to build such platforms at both inter-governmental and societal levels. The inter-governmental efforts have been around UN bodies on human rights and UN Conventions, also regional inter-governmental organs, while human rights groups too have participated in many of these initiatives.

2. Human rights groups have independently tried also in creating such platforms.

3. We have to take lessons from these efforts and understand their strength and weakness.

4. One feature marking these efforts is the wide divide in perceptions and reality between the developed world and the post-colonial world. These differences are around issues, such as modalities of dialogues and reconciliation, individual rights and group rights, the notion and practices of legal pluralism, the effect of anti-terrorism drive by the states on minorities, the depletion of common property resources, the impact of globalization, emergence of new minority groups, immigrants as new minorities, the principle of autonomy, etc. These issues have not only reinforced the global reality of discrimination, they have rendered some of the earlier legal understandings (as encoded in municipal and international law) inadequate. Similarly the process of marginalization has worsened the conditions of minorities. The root question that this programme has brought to light is: will the language of rights be enough to work as the basis of a trans-regional platform, or do we need justice as the language of claim making, fairness, and dialogue?

5. One more issue remains cardinal to this discussion. The principle of autonomy is linked to issues of federalism, decentralization, and devolution of power. It is also linked to the issue of subsidiarity. In short we may call it the federal idea – federalization of social, cultural, and political life based on horizontal linkages and not vertical alignments. The present programme has brought to light these lessons – namely, the need to think of new ways to protect rights of minority groups in diverse socio-cultural and political fields, such as media, representative organs, special methods to protect vulnerable sections, etc.

6. One good way to build such a platform may be to put as its basis the lessons we have learnt from this programme, and accordingly identify the possible constituents of such a

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platform – media activists, jurists, human rights thinkers and campaigners, political activists and representatives, and relevant institutions.

7. How to sustain such a platform will be a big issue. Mere virtual links through web-based means may not be enough. Can we have an annual register on exchange of experiences on minority rights? Can we begin with modest goals and build on that? Can the office of the moderator of such an institutional network move after six months/one year from one region to another? Can we have an inventory of relevant resources? Can we have a web-based trans-regional journal of minority rights?

8. Finally what are the already existing international networks with which this initiative can align? It is important to identify them when we begin this effort.

9. It will be pity if this work ends without creating such a network, which will be the core of the dividends of this work, and if it is not supported by the EU. Already existing institutional efforts of the network members can be the other resource.

10. Individuals involved in this programme should also be counted as resources of the network.

11. The network can decide to meet annually, run a web-based journal and a discussion portal, send information to relevant places, attend the relevant sessions in Geneva, give inputs to other relevant networks, run a media programme, and most important highlight the distinct experiences of different regions in this field.

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Some European reflections on regional standard setting in Human and Minority Rights in South Asia

Günther Rautz

Basic approaches towards a regional mechanism in South Asia The International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES) published a draft South Asian Charter on Minority and Group Rights (2008).1 The draft Charter once in force, would apply to members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and any other State which has been invited by SAARC to become a member”.2 Most of the SAARC member states signed and ratified almost all International Human Rights Treaties which would ensure that a regional human rights instrument would remain under the international frame and not threaten so far reached minimum standards in each South Asian country. The draft Charta would therefore complement the basic international standards and could accelerate the ratification process of international treaties, especially in countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan or Bhutan which show significant gaps to engage with legal international instruments. In terms of fulfilling obligations under regional and/or international human rights systems there is still a huge lack of implementation and executing mechanisms on the national level in politically comparable neighboring regions.3 Overall there appears to be a gap between ratification and effective implementation even through soft mechanism like monitoring and reporting instruments. When it comes to the monitoring of the states’ performance regarding the implementation of international treaties, the situation in all South Asian countries seems to be comparable. In India, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) did not provide input nor participated in deliberations during the process of preparing the country’s periodic reports to various UN treaty bodies. In Nepal, the Commission regrets in its 2004 Annual Report that several reports to UN treaty monitoring bodies had been sent by the government without inviting the council of the NHRC.4 Countries like Sri Lanka and the Maldives has still to empower their NHRC to carry out monitoring activities. Furthermore as it happens to all International Human

1 International Centre for Ethnic Studies is based in Sri Lanka (www.ices.lk). The draft Minority Rights Charter is available on the EURASIA-Net website: http://www.eurac.edu/Org/Minorities/eurasia-net/index.htm 2 Actually eight member states: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (http://www.saarc-sec.org) and seven observer status countries or supranational organizations: China, the European Union, Iran, Japan, Korea, Mauritius and the United States of America. 3 An overview of similar initiatives in the Pacific Region and ASEAN in David Keane’s article, “Draft South Asian Regional Charter on Minority and Group Rights: A Comparative Regional Analysis”, in European Yearbook of Minority Issues (Vol. 8), Leiden 2010 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), forthcoming. 4 NHRC of Nepal, Annual Report 2004, 77.

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http://www.ices.lk/

http://www.eurac.edu/Org/Minorities/eurasia-net/index.htm

http://www.saarc-sec.org/





Rights Treaties, SAARC member states have submitted declarations and reservations which allow a certain “flexibility” in fulfilling human rights standards. As long as there is no instrument or mechanism dedicated to the protection of human rights and minority issues in the frame of SAARC, it is worth to have a look on the ongoing legal developments as such as the SAARC Social Charter which has to be implemented through National Coordination Committees (NCC) or appropriate national mechanisms and especially through the NHRCs in each SAARC member state. The future elaboration of a regional monitoring system could be based on politically independent national human rights institutions which closely cooperate among each other. Exchange of information’s on a regular base and a formally established consultation mechanism could be the starting point of a minimum standard setting. A first meeting of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) for the countries belonging to SAARC took place on 16-18 April 2009 in Delhi and agreed to:5

• work towards national capacity building through sharing of experience, information and best practices on human rights;

• take steps to promote human rights awareness, and towards this end, hold conferences at least once in two years, apart from exchanges of visits, training programs and bilateral or regional cooperation between the NHRIs;

• work together to identify and cooperate on capacity building for dealing with human rights issues like human rights awareness, human trafficking and migrant labour;

• work collectively at UN fora, including the Human Rights Council, for an independent status for NHRIs, distinct from NGOs;

• appeal to the respective Governments to support and provide necessary wherewithal to NHRIs to ensure that they become fully compliant with Paris Principles, which includes administrative and financial autonomy.

As for the time being there is no regional mechanism for the protection of human rights it is particularly important to cooperate independently from any state interference. But constitutional safeguards are not sufficient how it shows the example of the National Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities (NCLM) in India. The organ established by the Constitution has the task of overseeing the fulfillment of linguistic minority rights but has only powerless functions. Despite of its status as a constitutional authority, the NCLM has no instrument to directly intervene or receive information’s. NCLM reports are not discussed neither on State nor on Union level or have any impact on political affairs or judicial authorities.

5 Emma Lantschner, “National Human Rights Commissions in India and Nepal: State of Affairs and Challenges Ahead”, in European Yearbook of Minority Issues (Vol. 8), Leiden 2010 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), forthcoming.

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First attempt towards supra-national instruments in Europe and South Asia Comparing European experiences with future SAARC developments, one has to elaborate on the regional security architecture and the economic cooperation.6 As from the European experience, the concept of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the end of the Cold War included the objective to reduce the probability of military conflicts by promoting economic cooperation and integration alongside democracy and human rights. The institutional development of SAARC shows the understanding of economic development and security issues although no significant initiatives for a regional security policy was undertaken. The geo-politic important area situated between powder kegs like Afghanistan and Pakistan, quite recently terminated civil wars in Nepal and Sri Lanka and finally the political interests of two super-powers, China and India, do not easily enforce a common regional security perspective. Although with the essential support of India, SAARC could be a neutral regional player in the field of crises management generating a win-win situation for South Asian states if some lessons from the OSCE experience would be taken in consideration:7

• Security related activities or studies have to be undertaken and the political and economic dimension of SAARC should be completed by a more “glocal” approach including environmental, democratic and human rights issues;

• The principle of unanimity in the decision making process should be replaced by the European principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the OSCE procedure “consensus minus one” (in case of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of OSCE commitments, decisions could be taken without the consent of the State concerned);

• The OSCE, just upon political commitments linked peace and security to the respect of human rights and created organs like the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), in contrast SAARC was unable to implement policy summit declarations and standards developed in its several SAARC Regional Conventions;

• The soft law approach should facilitate the participation of civil society (NGOs) in the future framework of a human rights and minority protection system elaborated by a Working Group of Eminent Persons of South Asia who should be officially asked to draft a South Asia Human Rights Convention with full and active participation of civil society groups and other stakeholders;

6 Ugo Caruso, “The international standard setting in human and minority rights in South Asia”, in European Yearbook of Minority Issues (Vol. 8), Leiden 2010 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), forthcoming. 7 Caruso, op.cit. note 6.

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• SAARC’s secretariat, regional headquarters and administrative units should be strongly reinforced to ensure satisfactory acceptance by member states, minority representatives, civil society and citizens in South Asia.

Only after the experiences of the two World Wars, Europe developed effective forms of bi- and multilateralism and achieved so a new concept of sovereignty. On the other hand, South Asian countries still stick to the traditional concept of sovereignty by a strong central state with a certain amount of internal power-sharing. In Europe, multilevel sovereignty provided the frame for supranational politics on EU level and power shifting to the regions, which are enabling Europe to promote cultural diversity, language rights and different forms of minority protection. South Asian states are still working on this conception of a supranational top-down and bottom-up approach in the frame of SAARC. Finally European human rights and minority protection mechanisms in the frame of the Council of Europe (CoE), especially the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages have to be taken into consideration. From a formal point of view their soft law approach and their monitoring mechanism could be an example of best practice for SAARC, and from a conceptual point of view, opinions of the monitoring bodies on Central Asian states could be of certain relevance for human and minority rights dimension in South Asia.

First analysis towards working modern regional territorial autonomies A federal system or regional territorial autonomy has been in a number of cases the peaceful solution for the territorial integrity of a state and the right to internal self-determination of a minority. But autonomy, namely cultural or personal autonomy, can be established also without a precisely defined territory, namely for all members of a group living dispersedly or intermingled with other groups. Both forms of autonomy are born out of the requirement of granting minority protection in some or one part of the territory of a democratic state and is driven by the request of collective self-determination based mostly on a ethno-linguistic, historically grown group identities.8 Thomas Benedikter elaborates at least 4 criteria in order to determine a modern working autonomy system:9

8 Thomas Benedikter (ed.), “Solving Ethnic Conflict through Self-Government – A Short Guide to Autonomy in Europe and South Asia, Bolzano/Bozen 2009 (EURAC), 5ss. 9 Thomas Benedikter, “The concept of modern autonomy systems and a short look on territorial autonomies in South Asia and Europe”, Working paper for the EU-FP7 project “My Science” presented in Bolzano/Bozen, 23 February 2010.

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• A state with rule of law and with an independent judiciary as well as an division of legislative and executive powers;

• The permanent devolution of legislative powers to freely elected regional assemblies of the autonomous entity and not only decentralization of powers to small elites within a non democratic system;

• A working pluralist democratic system with free and fair elections; • The equality of fundamental political and civil rights to all citizens legally residing

on the territory of the autonomous entity. These criteria do allow us to check if autonomous entities do fully respect the minimum requirements or not. In 2009 worldwide at least 20 independent states have established about 60 such autonomous regions with a special legal status. Europe has been the cradle of territorial autonomy, since the first modern autonomy system in a democratic framework was created in 1921 by Finland on the Aland Islands, mostly inhabited by Swedish people. Later, 10 other European states adopted regional autonomy as a means of solving ethnic conflicts, among those states Spain is a special case as it has endowed all of its regions with different levels of autonomy, transforming itself in a “State of Autonomous Communities”. Including the most recently reestablished autonomy of Serbia's Province of Vojvodina we can count 37 autonomous regions in Europe. On contrary, using the above mentioned criteria, regional autonomy in South Asia is not widely applied today.10 Only India by constitutional provision has established already in the 1950ies so called “Autonomous District Councils” (ADCs) which fulfill the above listed criteria. Other states as Pakistan and Bangladesh do have one or some autonomous entities, but these entities do not fully respect the minimum requirement. Bhutan, Nepal, the Maldives and Sri Lanka are unitary States so far and do not have any territories with autonomy. This may change this year, when Nepal is going to adopt a new constitution providing for some regional decentralization. Also Afghanistan, which is composed by provinces, does not attribute them legislative powers by constitutional means, although the local governors do in fact retain a large amount of power. Bangladesh is a unitary state with Islam and the Bengali language as the two fundamental features of the State. In 1997 Bangladesh granted certain rights to the tribal population of the Chittagong Hill Tracts with the obligation to establish autonomy, which was continuously delayed and applied in a very restricted form. Sri Lanka, too, is a unitary state with its binational character. Since the very first years of independence Sri Lanka had to come to terms with the presence of one major ethnic minority,

10 See, for example, Thomas Benedikter, “The world’s working regional autonomies, an introduction and comparative analysis”, New Delhi 2007 (Anthem Press),.

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the Tamils asking for self-government and equal rights. But neither the first nor the second Constitution did take it into account and provided some territorial power sharing. Pakistan, with a population of 160 million, would require efficient forms of territorial power sharing, in symmetrical and asymmetrical form to accommodate the basic issue of democratic government in the whole state's territory. Another challenge to accommodate a particular situation given by historical and ethno-geographical facts is the unsolved Kashmir issue. India is the only country in South Asia that has enshrined some forms of territorial autonomy in its constitution and which has established working regional autonomies fully comparable with autonomous regions in Europe. India has enshrined two forms of autonomy within the 5th and 6th schedule of the Constitutions. The first one accommodates some smaller tribal peoples with limited self-administration. This resembles rather to cultural autonomy then territorial. The second one, the 6th schedule provides rights to self-government to some districts (13 ADCs), mostly in the Northeastern states of Assam, Tripura, and West Bengal. In India’s 330 districts, about 50 have a majority language which is not equivalent to the State's official languages, nevertheless there are no autonomies in most of those cases. Finally talking about autonomy in India we should also bear in mind the case of Jammu and Kashmir, which for just 6 years had the most advanced form of autonomy leaving just defense, foreign affairs and telecommunication issues to the central state. This autonomy has been curtailed and abolished in the 1950ies and is one of the root factors of the ongoing unrest and conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. In Nepal 60 ethnic and caste groups speak 91 autochthonous languages. On district level, only in 54 out of 75 districts Nepali is the mother tongue of the majority of the population. There have been many decades of ethnic discrimination in Nepal, which along with social injustice and extreme poverty fuelled the civil war from 1996 to 2006. This Maoist rebellion was also caused by the centralized structure of the Nepali state and the dominance of the upper caste Nepali Hindu who constitute only 31% of the population but occupied 70% of the state dominant posts. The present constitutional transition includes not only an ethnic based federalism but even the right of self-determination. Article 138 of the interim Constitution of 1990 already states that in order “to bring an end to discrimination based on class, caste, language, gender, culture, religion and region by eliminating the centralized and unitary form of the state, the state shall be made inclusive and restructured into a progressive, democratic federal system”. No agreement has so far been reached on the concrete model of federalism and even though federalism can be the best technique to avoid ethnic conflicts in diverse societies, it is not a magic formula per se for very small minorities.11 Nepal’s experience with decentralization goes back to the 1960ies when the country was structured in 14 zones and 75 development districts. Criteria for demarcating the

11 Giovanni Poggeschi, Nepal: “Its past and (maybe) its future constitution”, EURASIA-Net Study Visit Report, Bolzano/Bozen 2009 (EURAC).

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districts were economic self-sufficiency, comparable population size, access to infrastructure but also preservation of cultural identity and recognition of historical tradition. In 1970 the zones were grouped in 5 development regions but failed to reduce the centralist tradition. On the basis of past experiences in decentralization, the drafters of the constitution agreed upon a federal structure based on a functional federalism or an ethnic one. The first approach could be called geographical federalism dividing the country in 3 areas: Himalayan north, hilly center including the Katmandu valley and the South plain Terai; or in 9 districts based on economic features, both appreciated by the Hindu elite.12 Maoist and numerically stronger ethnic groups like the Newars prefer an ethnic based federalism. A combination of both could be a compromise for the drafters of the constitution as listed by Giovanni Poggeschi:13

• 15-20 units based on economic criteria could get strong devolved powers from the centre which is more than the 5 existing development regions but less than the 75 districts;

• Each of those units should have a Council vested with competences relating to linguistic and cultural issues;

• Democratic rights should replace the caste privileges and a proportional system on central and federal level should protect minority groups and preserve their culture, especially of the smaller minority groups;

• The Central Parliament should consist of a First Chamber with general competences and a Second Chamber for minority rights and cultural issues.

Nepal's politicians and political forces now have acknowledged the urgent need of decentralizing the power, but rather than special autonomy, almost all proposal on the table focus on symmetric power sharing or decentralization, either as full fledged federalism or as an advanced form of regionalism. In South Asia’s big federal states federalism is the key to manage ethnic diversity through power sharing. India, Pakistan and to some instance also Bangladesh have to improve or reinforce their federal structure. Historic specific cases like Jammu and Kashmir, Chittagong Hill Tracts or Assam should be entitled to establish a far reaching autonomy fulfilling the right of internal self-determination. The 28 Indian States have not established sub-state units (e.g. regions) between the federal state level and the elected municipality and village council level. Some of the minority conflicts and forms of life of indigenous and tribal people could be accommodated through the establishment of a democratically governed sub-state unit.14

12 Poggeschi, op.cit. note 11. 13 Poggeschi, op.cit. note 11. 14 Benedikter, op.cit. note 8.

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But as the European experience shows, if just one or a few minority groups settling on a smaller part of the national territory have to be accommodated, federalism – as one option of multilevel government - may not be entirely necessary. In some cases, the very particular nature of one ethnic national minority and region might acquire a particular arrangement which is neither claimed nor necessary for other units of the state. This has happened with some islands of Scandinavia (e.g. Aland Islands) as well as with historically distinct regions of unitary states (Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom, Sicily, Sardinia, South Tyrol, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Aosta Valley in Italy), all located in the EU.

The European systems of modern autonomy are a success story although we cannot pretend to export models to other regions in the world. But we have to consider single instruments of autonomy regimes and analyze them why they are peacefully implemented in some cases and failed in other one’s. Finally the outcomes of these analyzes have to be applied in ethnic conflict areas in order to find peaceful solutions for co-existence.

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Study Visits – March 2010

Harriet Hoffler

WP1, for which Brunel University was responsible, included the study visit programme and ran from month 1 – month 29. The implementation plan for the study visits was agreed at the Kick-Off Meeting at Brunel University in month 1 [please see attached appendix 1] and the agreed version [deliverable no.3, WP1] was sent to all partners in March 2008. The Plan gave an overall frame to ensure geographical and multidisciplinary balance. Minimum requirements for the participation were set, as were indicative expected outputs. Implementation of Study Visits took place between month 4 and month 25 (date changed due to date changes for other WP at the Project Steering Group Meeting in Bolzano) under the supervision of Brunel University as WP1 Leader and with the support of MCRG from the South Asian side. In total, 24 study visits took place with 75% of all total visits occurring by June 2009 and all 24 visits completed by January 2010 as per the agreement reached at the Project Steering Group Meeting in Bolzano, August 2008. Report The rationale of the Study Visits was to achieve the objectives of WP 1 and the project as a whole. The rationality of this activity can be underlined by examining the specific objectives of WP 1, which are as follows: (a) To improve cooperation and exchange between European and South Asian scholars in the field of supra-national instruments for the promotion of human and minority rights, with the goal of developing a common agenda for future research. (b) To improve circulation of South Asian research results in the selected field within the European scientific community and vice versa. Topics There was a wide variety of research topics relating to minorities as agreed in the implementation plan. The overall analysis of study visit topics shows that a variety of research interests were supported, creating a wide pool of knowledge and of research into this area which can be fed back into the overall aims and objectives of Eurasia-Net. The Study Visit implementation plan which contained a wide variety of research topics enabled scholars to retain autonomy in refining their topics to contain a wider overview of the issues impacting on minorities. All visits broadly fell under the topic: Investigation of the following

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issues: religious-based discrimination, discrimination against linguistic and cultural minorities (South Asia and Europe). Topics covered [as per the implementation plan]

- Investigation and exploring possibilities for the drafting of a South Asian regional human rights convention (modeled upon the European Convention on Human Rights) - CARUSO, LANTSCHER

- Investigation into the role of religion in the constitutional and legislative frameworks of states of Europe and South Asia – DIMITRIOS, CHAUDHURY, KINNVALL, MANCHANDA, REHMAN

- Exploration of the external relations role of the European Union (with particular emphasis on human rights)- HOFFLER, GERHARZ, DIMITRIOS

- Investigating and examining cases of autonomy and minority accommodation (e.g. South Tyrol, Northern Ireland etc) and their possible application in South Asia – POGGESCHI, DAS, KHAIR, KHAN, BENEDIKTER, PFAFF, BHAUMIK, CHAKRABATY, BARBARA

- Comparing and contrasting European and South Asian approaches towards rights of indigenous or tribal peoples and devising possible models of application – HOFFLER, GERHARZ,

- Exploring and critically examining the limitations within SAARC (South Asian

Association for Regional Cooperation) as a regional organization – CARUSO,

- Investigation of the following minorities: Biharis, Tamils, Ahmaddiyyas (South Asia); linguistic minorities of India (South Asia); Muslims (Europe), BENEDIKTER, MANCHANDA, CHAUDHURY, RAHMAN, BHUIYAN

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Topics not directly covered

- Investigating and exploring possibilities for drafting of a South Asian treaty aimed at the

protection of religious sites of worship - Investigation into the setting up of a regional inter-governmental human rights

commission (possibly similar to the former European Commission on Human Rights or the current Inter-American Commission on Human Rights or the African Commission on Human Rights) with emphasis on political or friendly settlements between parties

- Investigating the possibilities of a European Directive for the protection of minorities

- Critically examining the limitations as well as appropriateness of Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights, Framework Convention on National Minorities and Charter for Regional Minorities as possible models of applications for South Asia

Institutional Balance A proportional geographical balance between Europe and South Asia was pursued (indicatively the same number of Study Visits was realized in both areas taking into consideration a balanced gender quota). Appropriate balance between Partners’ and Associates’ institutions/ organizations and themes was ensured in order to avoid a concentration of Study Visits in one or few institutions. All partner countries were visited. Eurac hosted 5 visits, Brunel hosted 4 visits, Frankfurt hosted 1 visit, the University of Paris hosted 1 visit, MCRG hosted 5 visits, Dhaka hosted 3 visits, DCHD hosted 1 visit and SAFHR hosted 2 visits. Gender Balance: As per b.5 of the Appendix, geographical, gender and research area balance has been achieved in the completed study visits. Please see the attached Spreadsheet [appendix 2] for a breakdown of gender, geographical balance and research area. In total, 8 female scholars and 16 male scholars participated overall. To break this down further, there were 6 female scholars and 5 male scholars from Europe and 2 female scholars and 11 male scholars from South Asia. There was a low percentage of female researchers from South Asia. As the existing figures confirm there was a positive gender balance from Europe: more women from Europe undertook visits as compared to women. However, and notwithstanding every possible efforts to encourage and facilitate study visits from females from South Asia, there is a lower portion of women participating in the study visits. That said, in the context of South Asia, with its continuing cultural, social conservatism such a low figure is not unduly surprising.

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Positive impact Autonomy of the researchers and research interests were varied. The programme enabled a wide body of research to be undertaken with eminent scholars participating in the programme. It was especially beneficial for the dissemination of information between south asian and European scholars and enabled the translation of effective EU policy into foreign policy and supranational cooperation at a higher education level. Networking, exchange of information between theoretical and practical knowledge (academic scholars and NGOs / organisations working directly with minority groups) was successfully enabled. **** Brunel University is currently awaiting feedback from the attached questionnaire [appendix 3] with regards to those who participated in the study visit programme. Results will be collated, presented and circulated prior to the Final Conference [appendix 4- to be sent].





Name Gender Home Institution Host Institution Topic Notes

Giovanni Poggesschi M Eurac MCRG A Comparative Study of Religious Minorities; complete

Harriet Hoffler F University of Birmingham Dhaka

Investigation into the CHT Peoples with a focus on the effectiveness of current legislation in protecting their human rights (United Nations, domestic- whether regional would work using a comparative model from Europe) complete

Anne Marie AutissierF F France MCRG Promoting Linguistic Diversity complete

Javaid Rehman M Brunel Dhaka Aspects of Cultural and Religious Relativism in International human rights law complete

Joanna Pfaff F University of Bielefeld MCRG Forced Migration complete

Catarina Kinvall F Lund University DCHD Comparative Analysis of Reilgious Minorities complete

Dimitrios Dimitrios M Brunel University MCRG

“Transborder collaboration as a factor of positive potential for conflict solving: lessons from the European experience ( Euregio “Meuse-Rhine “Ireland-Wales”, Italy-Austria” and “Bavaria-Austria”) complete

Kamran Arif M DCHD Brunel Tribal Rights and Legal remedies incomplete

Professor Ijaz Khan M DCHD Eurac The South Tyrol Model as a Blueprint for Pakistan complete

Prof. Dr. Sumaiya Khair F University of Dhaka Eurac Of Migration and Minorities: Status of Migrant Workers in Europe complete

Prof. Dr. Nazrul Islam M University of Dhaka Eurac Special minority rights: Can SAARC learn from Europe complete

Mahbubur Rahman M University of Dhaka Eurac Protection of Minorities: A South Asian Discourse complete

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Mr. Nazmunnaman Bhuiyan M University of dhaka / SOAS Eurac

Protection of Kin-minorities: An Appraisal of European Developments complete

Thomas Benedikter M EURAC MRCG Minority Language Rights in the European and Indian Union complete

Emma Lantschner F EURAC SAFHR Which Role in Monitoring Human and Minority Rights for National Human Right Commissions complete

Ugo Caruso M University of Frankfurt SAFHR Using the OSCE as a blueprint for SAARC complete

Eva Gerharz F University of Bielefeld Dhaka “Between Marginalisation and Self-Assertion: Bangladeshi Indigenous People’s Activism” complete

Samir Das M MRCG EURAC Principles of 'shared sovereignty' and Minorities complete

Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury M MCRG Brunel Multiculturalism & Conflict Resolution: A Comparative Study complete

Subir Bhaumik M MCRG Frankfurt Theme: Media, Migration and Minority Issues in a European setting complete

Suman Chakrabarty M MCRG University of Paris Minorities, Politics of Integration and Media in France complete

Stephen Wright incomplete Sanjay Barbara M MCRG Brunel Trajectories of Minority Discourse complete

Rita Manchanda F SAFHR Brunel A comparative analysis of the role of the media in racial /minority profiling complete

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Current Gender Balance: 2 Current Host Balance BRUNEL: 4 6 MCRG: 5 5 EURAC: 7 11 Dhaka: 2 SAFHR: 2 DCHD: 2 Frankfurt: 1

University of Paris: 1





Media and Minorities -- Issues in Europe and South Asia

Subir Bhaumik

Geographic and symbolic boundaries are being increasingly challenged by information and communication developments across the world-- both within nation-states and across regions. The mass media explosion in our times has provided unique opportunities in local, national and transnational spaces to communicate in cheaper and quicker ways and while having the opportunity to get access to different media settings and communication flows. While a free media is normally expected to reinforce democracy and empowerment of populations, usually disadvantaged, it suffers from majoritarian bias in content and representation, leading to ever evolving patterns of media use . The media's biased portrayal of minorities in Europe and South Asia has been studied by many researchers, including by some under the EURAC program. It persists not only at the level of recruitment, where journalists and producers from minority communities find huge entry-level problems and hence their numbers in media happen to be low. It also persists more viciously in the way the media constructs images of minorities that often leads to greater social schism between the majority and the minority, specially if the minorities are from an entirely different ethnic and religious backgrounds. And if the mainstream national media stereotypes and vilifies minorities , the minority populations tend to withdraw into community boundaries and create their own media -- or reproduce , as is done by the Turks in Germany, their home-country by using modern technology. Emerging communication and information opportunities can allow minority communities to produce, distribute and consume alternative to the mainstream images and sounds; they can reconfirm co-presence and feed imagination of belonging in their shared media cultures. All these can have diverse consequences regarding minorities’ participation, inclusion, empowerment or even isolation. The development and the implications of minority media cultures for ethnic communities, for social exclusion and participation and for the shaping of multicultural Europe was at core of the two day European workshop Minority Media in Europe: A Revolution from Below? that took place in September 2002. and NGOs to discuss key issues that relate to minority media cultures. But such a conference or workshop has not taken place in South Asia so far -- though the issues have been broadly debated in piecemeal fashion even in TV shows -- the recent televised debate on "Muslim constructs in Bollywood films" that was moderated by Barkha Dutt of NDTV is a good example.

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This session intends to look at the following issues that relates to media and minorities in Europe and South Asia:

• How culture – and media in particular – relate to minorities’ cultural and social inclusion?

• Whether minority communities sustain separatist cultures or participate in an emerging European and South Asian multi-ethnic culture (or diverse multi-ethnic cultures)?

• How particular media cultures participate in creating new conditions for social inclusion and exclusion?

• How minorities’ experience with the media reflects a particular relation to media and communication technologies; whether media technologies change conditions within minority media cultures and the broader media environment?

• How national policies in South Asia and EU policies in Europe about minorities and the media further or obstruct their social inclusion?

The key questions that needs to be addressed are as follows: • To what extent are media playing a role in maintaining cultural particularity? • How do minority media cultures get involved in processes of minority inclusion

in multi-ethnic, multi-national social spaces? • How do the member-states and the EU allow/obstruct the emergence of particular

and multiethnic (mediated) cultures? • What can be learned from particular minority media experiences regarding

participant and democratic communication across Europe? • Does "national media" in South Asia and Europe provide enough minority

representation in recruitment policies? Both policies and trends should be discussed.

• Does "national media" in South Asia and Europe promote broader understanding between majorities and minorities -- or is there a conscious vilification of minorities specially in the post 9/11 context?

What impact does all this has on media trends -- is there a tendency of media ‘ghettoisation’ in either of these regions?

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Summary of activities organized in the framework of EURASIA-Net Project

Samir Kumar Das

The final conference is being held as per the project terms and the tentative dates suggested at the project planning meeting on 15 April 2008 in Bolzano, Italy. It was suggested that the final conference scheduled on the 29th month of the project should be advanced by two/three months. Subsequently the dates were finalized in course of the Delhi Review meeting on 22 February 2009 and Kathmandu PSG meeting on 21 August 2009. The idea was that CRG should start organizing the final conference enough in advance. It was decided that the final conference should be the occasion where entire findings of the programme will be fruitfully discussed. The conference committee was expected to provide CRG with sufficient time for the preparation of the report, arrive at conclusions and make final recommendations. The key objectives of the conference were decided to be: (a) to bring together the outcomes of all project activities; (b) to provide an occasion for presenting and discussing the Joint Research Agenda prepared by Ranabir Samaddar and Samir Kumar Das, and discussed and finalized in the project steering group meeting held in Bolzano in August-September 2008; (c) to make recommendations for its effective implementation, (d) to sensitize the media to the promotion of human rights and the significance of existing democratic values in South Asian societies concerning the protection of minorities and (e) finally to evolve a transnational and trans regional platform for the protection of minority rights in Europe and South Asia. It was decided that the conference will consist of panel and working group discussions, roundtable and plenary sessions, presentation of research reports and policy recommendations, etc. The organization of the conference would coincide with the publication of a series of books, mentioned below.

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Work Packages The work plan was organized in 5 Work Packages and has a total duration of 30 months, which would enable the partners to adequately prepare all activities.

WP1 – Eurasia Scholar Exchange WP2 – Summer Schools WP3 – EU Officials Information Sessions and Exchange WP4 – Trans-Regional Platform WP5 – Project Management

The focus of WP1 was mutual learning and exchange among scholars. This aim was pursued by a variety of means: seminars, joint publications, study visits and exchanges. WP2 intended to widen the scope of research cooperation by engaging researchers, stakeholders and decision-makers, who would participate in two trans-regional Summer Schools. Participation of young researchers and civil society activists in Summer Schools was considered as fundamental towards the maximisation of the impact of cooperation in the long term. In the Summer Schools South Asian and European experts and young researchers and activists participated. WP3 was designed to make information on analysis of trends in South Asian regional integration and human and minority rights issues relevant to the development and implementation of EU policies available to EU officials and institutions. At the same time, the aim was to expose South Asian researchers to current EU strategic issues in the region so that policy needs could be incorporated in future joint research with South Asian partners. The aim of WP4 was to create a Trans-regional Platform as a forum for the exchange of knowledge and best practices between all stakeholders (scholars, universities, media, decision makers, activists, coordinate the dissemination of results, and prepare the ground for future joint research activities. Finally, WP5 had the mandate to accompany the whole project to ensure the smooth management of the different activities. The Kick-off Meeting (WP1) The kick-off meeting of the Eurasia-Net project was held in London on 18 February 2008. Dr Rautz in his brief introduction identified the consortium partners and the outline of the project (EURASIA-NET). Analyzing the strategies of a successfully funded project underlined the importance of transfer of knowledge in both directions (e.g. Europe-South Asia Scholar Exchange, Summer Schools), implementation of research (e.g. Training of EU officials and media) and setting up of a multidisciplinary consortium (e.g. Universities, Research Institutes, NGOs, Regional Organisations). He also noted the three

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pillars on which EURAC is based, these being the Research/training, the consultation (applied research) and the publications. Stock Taking Report and the Proposals for Research Initiatives (WP1) In aiming to define a common academic engagement between the Eurasia-Net partner organizations, the following issues were identified as the possible inputs to the current state of the art on research in Europe and South Asia. The analysis of these issues was expected to provide us with further exploratory themes for future research and examination during the course of the project:

1. Standard Setting instruments on Minority Protection and Human Rights on a National and Supranational Level in Europe;

2. Standard Setting Instruments on Human Rights Protection and Minorities on Supra-National Level within South Asia

3. European view on South Asia in the field of Human Rights, Minority Protection and Conflict Solution

4. South Asian views on Europe in the field of Human Rights, Minority Protection and Conflict Solution

5. Differing or Conflicting Views Emerging from States within South-Asia vis-à-vis Europe or European Regional Organizations

Research Material (WP2 and WP4) The project generated a formidable corpus of research material circulated during the summer schools. CRG is the lead partner of WP4 in the frame of which SAFHR prepared and disseminated a set of materials for South Asian NGOs and University of Dhaka prepared a set of material on South Asian and regional cooperation for higher education institutions. All these materials were used for the preparation of the ground for the implementation of the Joint Research Agenda, the final conference and the platform (round table exchange and recommendations). CRG created a corpus of instruction material for the purpose of the Summer Schools. More than 21 items consisting of books, excerpts and papers running several hundred pages formed part of the course patch provided to the participants of the First Summer School held in Bolzano in August-September 2008 by EURAC and of the Second Summer School held in Dhulikhel and Kathmandu (Nepal) in August 2009 by DCHD. CRG’s in-house research material was also used generously in the Summer School.

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Assessment of Research Policies and Resources (WP4) CRG was primarily responsible for the preparation of the ‘Assessment of research policies and resources’ (Deliverable 16). The assessment is expected to (a) lend to our researches and studies conducted under the project some kind of a collective focus; (b) help in devising South Asian, European and Eurasian instruments for the protection of minority rights; (c) derive and disseminate the lessons from the model cases and ‘best practices’ relating to the solution of minority problems and (d) critically assess their possible applicability across culturally and politically diverse regions. Deliverable 16 was prepared (in the form of a Discussion Paper on Research Policy) through a series of in-house meetings held during July-August 2008 and sent to EURAC for circulation amongst the project partners before the Project Steering Group meeting held on 29 August 2008. The oral presentation was made by Samir Kumar Das and it was followed by discussion. The paper was presented and praised as a valuable analysis of the state-of-the-art of research policies and trends in India and South Asia in general. Partners Meeting, New Delhi (February 22, 2009) (WP4) The meeting hosted by SAFHR discussed in detail the progress made in respect of publications, summer school and study visits among other things and made important recommendations for meeting the project objectives within the stipulated time frame. Public Dialogue, Kolkata (August 8, 2009) (WP4) A public dialogue on ‘Minorities and Their Alienation’ was organized by CRG at Rang Durbar, Swabhumi in Kolkata on 8 August 2009. The Programme was attended by 30 participants from diverse walks of life including academics and researchers, feminist scholars and representatives of indigenous people, legal activists, minority and human rights activists from all over India. The meeting raised such questions as: a) should a regional charter be signed by the nation-state or should it be treated as guidelines to be followed by them? b) will it make sense to speak of a model national law than regional charter? c) do regional charters in the present scenario derive inspiration from the European experience since Europe has a history of the formation of the charters including people’s charters? In this connection, it was also felt that sovereignty needs to be reinterpreted as responsibility that the States owe to their citizens. It was commented that the draft charter on Minority Rights framed by Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury in this

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context was not a panacea but can be a step towards improving the conditions of the minorities. It was also suggested that a much wider database is required, a little more forthrightness and rules of objectivity. The entire preoccupation with the minority issue stems from a moral position. Hence as a methodology, while delving into minority issues objectivity is required. It was also decided that there is need for an ethnographic exploration of the dialogues taking place in everyday life with regard to minority rights. Partners Meeting, Dhaka (November 1, 2009) (WP4) The meeting hosted by University of Dhaka discussed in detail the draft publication prepared by Borhan Uddin Khan and Muhammad Mahbubur Rahman. Although not part of the project, it was suggested that the possibilities for its publication by a prestigious publisher should be explored. Detailed discussions were also held on SAFHR and CRG publications. The draft schedule of the final conference was circulated and discussed by members who attended the meeting. The members also addressed the students of the Faculty of Law as a panel and responded to the questions from them regarding the protection of minority rights in South Asia and Europe. Study Visits (WP1) About 25 participants drawn from different parts of South Asia and Europe have undertaken study visits. A proportional geographical balance between Europe and South Asia was pursued (indicatively the same number of Study Visits was realized in both areas taking into consideration a balanced gender quota). Appropriate balance between Partners’ and Associates’ institutions/ organizations and themes was ensured in order to avoid a concentration of Study Visits in one or few institutions. All partner countries were visited. There was a low percentage of female researchers from South Asia- as the existing figures confirm there was a positive gender balance from Europe: more women from Europe undertook visits as compared to women. EURAC hosted five visits, Brunel hosted four visits, Frankfurt hosted one visit, the University of Paris hosted one visit, MCRG hosted five visits, University of Dhaka hosted three visits, DCHD hosted one visit and SAFHR hosted two visits. The rationale of the study visits was to achieve the objectives of WP 1 and the project as a whole. The specific objectives of WP 1 are as follows:

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(a) To improve cooperation and exchange between European and South Asian scholars in the field of supra-national instruments for the promotion of human and minority rights, with the goal of developing a common agenda for future research.

(b) To improve circulation of South Asian research results in the selected field within the European scientific community and vice versa.

There was a wide variety of research topics relating to minorities as agreed in the implementation plan. The overall analysis of study visit topics shows that a variety of research interests were supported, creating a wide pool of knowledge and of research into this area which can be fed back into the overall aims and objectives of Eurasia-Net. Since there is no specific budget allotted to the special programme for media sensitization and this has not been visualized in terms of deliverables, the participants in the meeting held in Bolzano on 15 April 2008 discussed ways about how to implement this programme. There was discussion about how EURAC could help CRG in this. The media workshops and the 3 media fellows are expressly described under WP4. CRG accordingly prepared a draft proposal for the media programme entitled “Media and the Protection of Minorities in South Asia (with emphasis on the reporting of administrative responses to riots, legal interventions, court decisions, application of international standards, functioning of human rights institutions such as the NHRC, constitutional interpretations, jurisprudence and working of citizens’ enquiry commissions etc.)” on the basis of which discussions were held with EURAC. CRG again raised the issue of “media fellowships” in the PSG meeting held on 29 August 2008 and how to insert it into the frame of the programme. Guenther Rautz suggested considering specialized journalists in the selection of candidates for Summer Schools and Study Visits. Finally, a media workshop could be arranged in the context of the final conference.

Subir Bhaumik, Sanjay Barbora and Sumon K. Chakrabarti conducted study visits under the programme. While Subir and Sumon have been practising journalists working with two very prestigious news agencies, Sanjay works with Panos South Asia and is concerned with monitoring and strategizing media activity in South Asia. CRG has received the feedback that their studies have been highly appreciated. Summer School (Bolzano July-August 2008) (WP2) The First Trans Regional summer school took place in Bolzano/Bozen (Italy), between 25 August and 6 September 2008. Out of almost 100 applications, 18 candidates (researches, civil servants, media fellows, human rights activists) dealing with human and minority rights issues from Europe (Finland, United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Romania,

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Denmark, Ukraine and Turkey) and South Asia (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal) were selected and invited to participate in the summer school. During the 10 working days of the Summer School the participants were offered a wide range of activities: lectures, workshops, case studies, group work, study visit as well as an excursion. In the frame of the summer school programme, two public events were organized: 1) Public Lecture on “Monitoring racism and discrimination against ethnic and religious groups across the European Union: the work of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)” by Mr. Ioanis N. Dimitrakopoulos (Head of FRA Unit on Research & Data Collection) on Thursday, 28 August. 2) Panel discussion on “South Asian cultural, religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity as a field of experience for future diversity management in Europe? (Giovanni Poggeschi, Gabriel N. Toggenburg, Tapan Kumar Bose, Samir Kumar Das) on Tuesday, 2 September. Summer School (Kathmandu August 2009) (WP2) About 25 participants drawn from Europe and South Asia have taken part in the Summer school organized by DCHD. The picturesque Dhulikhel provided the ideal landscape for very dense interaction amongst the participants. Besides lectures, there were interactive sessions in which resource persons from Europe and South Asia addressed the participants. The Summer school generated a good deal of material concerning minority rights and the materials were circulated amongst the participants and partners.

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Project Publications (WP1, WP2, WP4)

• Thomas Benedikter (ed.), Europe’s Ethnic Mosaic, (EURAC, Bolzano 2008) • Thomas Benedikter (ed.), Solving Ethnic Conflict through Self-Government. A

Short Guide to Autonomy in Europe and South Asia, (EURAC, Bolzano 2008) • Rautz, Tomaselli and Zabielska (eds.), Material for Specialized Media, (EURAC,

Bolzano 2008) • Rautz, Tomaselli and Constantin (eds), Update version of Material for specialized

media, (EURAC, Bolzano 2009) • Samir Das and Ranabir Samaddar, Assessment of Research Policies and

Resources,(MCRG, Kolkata 2008) • Subir Bhaumik & Sumon K. Chakrabarti, View from India: Media and Minorities

in Europe, Policies and Practices 27 (MCRG, Kolkata 2010) • Text Book Reader – Borhan Uddin Khan and Muhammad Mahbubur Rahman

coauthored the text on Protection of Minorities: A South Asian Discourse. It was meant to be a text book targeted at the University level, and given the diversity of situations across South Asia, the volume was organized around country specific chapters.

• Readings on Minority Rights in South: New Challenges, edited by Tapan Bose and Rita Manchanda. The volume has been planned as a second phase work, beyond the primary task of mapping the status of minorities. It addresses the changing and more difficult environment for minority rights in South Asia in the wake of cultural doctrines on the march that reinforce xenophobia and racism, (Islamic, Hindutva, Christian and Buddhist fundamentalisms), globalization which has increased structural inequalities and disproportionately shifted the burden onto vulnerable (often minorities) stigmatized (e.g. new minorities: migrants) as responsible for security problems and unemployment; and securitization of minority rights public discourse. The volume addresses thematic and new cross cutting regional challenges. It looks at new conflict fault lines - pitting minorities within minorities as well as the possibility of new alliances. It includes a “survey” that maps the status of minorities in Sindh and Baluchistan. It audits the experience of the various pathways (e.g. reservations, ethnically determined territorially focused autonomies, etc) and posits policy prescriptions. The structure of the book remains dominated by largely country specific chapters and therefore the Introduction bears the burden to mapping a South Asian and comparative canvas. As the book is targeted at a mixed readership including activists and policy makers – the essays have a strong policy orientation. The introduction will also suggest that the post colonial ‘nationalizing’ state system of South Asia, of kith and kin state network in which a minority is a majority across

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the border, predicates a regional framework of policy and structure. However, given the political dynamics of South Asia state interactions, these states have been particularly resistant to widening the mandate of its regional mechanism e.g. the SAARC or sub regional frameworks like the BIMSTEC. At this stage the emphasis shifts to revitalizing civil society and regional networking.

• “Scientific” Volume: MCRG - Samir Kumar Das edited the volume on Minorities in South Asia and in Europe: A New Agenda. The volume is structured in two segments, one focusing on South Asia and the other Europe. While country-specific researches on minorities of South Asia are by no means rare, study of minorities on a regional scale and their comparisons with the European experience is not. Such comparisons are expected to (a) coordinate the country-specific studies by way of providing them with a focus; (b) enable us to learn from each others’ experiences and develop the much-needed synergy between them; (c) throw light on the evolving global and transnational nature of minority networks and mobilizations and (d) explore into the possible frameworks of policies to be followed towards them. Since EURASIA-NET project comprises a wide variety of Partners and Associates cutting across different countries and geopolitical regions (Europe and South Asia are under review), it is ideally suited to undertake such a study. The papers being of comparative nature will be written by authors who will draw lessons from the ongoing project and bring them together in the form of this publication

• EYMI Special Issue(s) on South Asia Website (WP4) EURAC maintains a segment of its website providing latest information and updated details about the progress of the project. Similarly other partners in their sites provide information about the project. Besides furnishing information, CRG also posts invitations and online registration forms for those who are willing to participate in the public events under the Programme.

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Information Sessions and Exchange (WP3) The Universität Frankfurt am Main is the lead partner of Work Package 3 (WP3) of the project. Objectives of this work package are:

• To make information on analysis of trends in South Asia regional integration and human and minority rights issues relevant to the development and implementation of EU policies available to EU officials and institutions.

• To better understand which strategic topics are high on the EU agenda to incorporate policy needs in future joint research with South Asian partners.

The work package is expected to complement the research efforts realised in the other Work Packages and provide the occasion to present project’s results and achievements to EU officials and institutions. Furthermore, researchers are expected to be exposed to current EU strategic issues in the region so that policy needs can be incorporated in future joint research with South Asian partners. The organizer, the University of Frankfurt am Main, with support from the EC Delegation to Pakistan, EURAC Institute for Minority Rights, Brunel University and the Pakistan Democratic Commission for Human Development, successfully organized the first of the two EC Delegation sessions to be held in South Asia in the frame of the EURASIA-Net project. Designed to make project results available to EC officials and institutions, the focus of the informative session was on the analysis of trends in South Asian regional integration and human and minority rights issues relevant for the development and implementation of EU policies. However, the planning and the execution of the event have been largely affected by the security conditions of the country. The organizers were therefore unable to confirm the meeting well in advance; this unfortunately prevented the South Asian partners from a timely visa application for Pakistan. Consequently, most of the South Asian partners were in fact unable to participate and contribute to the meeting. Although the PSG at Kathmandu agreed to hold the second EU Session in New Delhi with the Delegation of the European Commission to India, Bhutan and Nepal, in concomitance with the Final Conference to be held in Kolkata on 23 March 2010, this could not be organized for reasons known to us all.

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Transregional Platform for the Protection of Minority Rights (WP4) CRG has been instrumental in bringing the lessons of the current programme together, to build a platform that cuts across nations and regions across Europe and South Asia and most importantly make it sustainable. One feature marking the current efforts aimed at protecting minority rights is the wide divide in perceptions and reality between the developed world and the post-colonial world. These differences are around issues, such as modalities of dialogues and reconciliation, individual rights and group rights, the notion and practices of legal pluralism, the effect of anti-terrorism drive by the states on minorities, the depletion of common property resources, the impact of globalization, emergence of new minority groups, immigrants as new minorities, the principle of autonomy etc. These issues have not only reinforced the global reality of discrimination, they have rendered some of the earlier legal understandings (as encoded in municipal and international law) inadequate. Similarly the process of marginalization has worsened the conditions of minorities. The root question that this programme has brought to light is: will the language of rights be enough to work as the basis of a trans-regional platform, or do we need justice as the language of claim making, fairness, and dialogue? One more issue remains cardinal to this discussion. The principle of autonomy is linked to issues of federalism, decentralization, and devolution of power. It is also linked to the issue of subsidiarity. In short we may call it the federal idea – federalization of social, cultural, and political life based on horizontal linkages and not vertical alignments. The present programme has brought to light these lessons – namely, the need to think of new ways to protect rights of minority groups in diverse socio-cultural and political fields, such as media, representative organs, special methods to protect vulnerable sections, etc. The project is nearing completion. Three of the major achievements that the partners can be proud of at this stage are:

(a) Successful establishment of a network of partners on a sustainable basis expected eventually to lead to the formation of a trans-regional platform;

(b) Comparative research and collective learning from each others’ fund of knowledge and experience particularly in relation to the policies of minority protection, and

(c) Orientation and training, dissemination and circulation of knowledge across national and regional boundaries.

For these tangible gains, the design of the WPs proved crucial. The coordinating activities of the programme led by EURAC were of immense importance. Likewise, the information sessions under WP3 are crucial to its dissemination and the translation of the

40





41

research findings into policy recommendations. The summer schools, study visits, research findings, and collation of appropriate study material, summer workshops, and different publications – all have proved interconnected in their relevance and gains. CRG while preparing this short summary of the activities under the programme takes opportunity to thank all the partners and wishes to let all know that these activities were successful because they were of network nature. The experience shows how the design of a programme is important in terms of strategizing the implementation of a set of objectives. Likewise it thanks SAFHR and University of Dhaka for helping the fulfillment of the WP4 mandate.





ANNEX

Nation Building and Minority Alienation in India (Policy and Practices)

A. S. Narang

42

2

Nation Building and Minority Alienation in India

A.S. Narang

2010

3

March 2010

Published by:

Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group

GC-45, Sector - III, First Floor

Salt Lake City

Kolkata - 700 106

India

Web: http://www.mcrg.ac.in

Printed by:

Timir Printing Works Pvt. Ltd.

43, Beniapukur Lane

Kolkata - 700 014

The research leading to these results have received funding from the European Community's

Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no. 216072

4

Nation Building and Minority Alienation in India

A.S. Narang

Commenting on the Sachar Committee report an editorial in the Economic and Political Weekly

observed that for more than 50 years, we followed policies shaped in the era of post-

independence innocence and hope, policies that embody our commitment to a state blind to

differences of caste, and community. But the events of the last decade and a half have shown that

these policies have served to mask the largely uninterrupted continuation of traditional

inequalities and exclusion in modern garb. Somehow, refusing to count caste and creed could not

prevent our civil services, police, educational institutions and private industry- in short, almost

every position of privilege- from being disproportionately dominated by the upper castes and the

majority community (Editorial, 2006: 535). Needless to say that these developments have serious

implications both for the rights of minorities and for certain basic features of the constitution and

a plural and democratic polity. Of course Indian state seems to have been extremely sensitive to

the need to protect the distinct cultural, linguistic and religious practices of various communities

and has for this purpose enacted a number of provisions that protect the private sphere of

communities from violation. However, it has not been so sensitive in making the public sphere

reflect the diversity and cultural plurality of the country. As Amir Ali points out, the Indian state

and polity have thus been wary of encroaching upon the private spheres of community and

religious practices, the boundaries of which have been jealously guarded by community leaders

and representatives.

Despite the constitutional provisions of non-discrimination and equality in matters of

state policies and programmes, not only a gap persists between the legal precepts and actual

practices but also in many ways minorities have been disempowered by state policies, of course

without the violation of their individual civil and political rights. These includes settlement

policies, official language policies, lack of proper notion of distributive justice, a mechanical way

of dealing with ethno-regional and religion-cultural identities. Such policies, as Will Kymlicka

observes, have been a common element in the “nation-building” programmes which Western

States have engaged in. While they are less coercive than the policies in nineteenth-century

France, and do not involve violating basic individual rights, they are no less nation destroying in

their intentions or results (Kymlicka, 2001: 231). Somehow, India also followed almost the same

path of state and nation building. On attaining independence the great diversity of India was

almost ignored. Nehru and his colleagues pinned their hopes on the possibility, in their view

inevitability, that with the development of communication and industrialization India would

increasingly become a polyglot. The zeal with which unitarist nationalism tried to brush political

differences, social contradictions and identity assertion under the carpet proved counter-

productive. The more it sought to create uniformity, the more it actually sharpened the claims

made by linguistic, cultural and religious minorities or even caste and tribal communities. That in

turn led to further majoritarian assertions (Jodhka 2001:20). A long suppressed sense of

5

deprivation, frustration and alienation felt by minority groups in society is causing religious

renaissance with a strong socio-political component which is questioning the modernist and

secularist ideologies as these have been practiced so far. Therefore there is a need to relook the

process of nation- building that has been practiced so far and mend the same not only for

accommodating minority aspirations but for the harmonious, just accelerated socio-economic

development of the country as a whole.

II

In terms of diversity India can be described as one of the most complex societies. In fact it is the

most diverse, most complex, most persistent and most authentic plural society in the world.

India’s plural character is apparent in practically every major aspect of its collective life, be its

social systems, economic formations, cultural patterns; or language dialect groupings, religious

communities, castes, sub-castes and sects; or local variations of commonly prevalent mythologies

and commonly revered deities; or ethnic identities, regional alignments and sub regional

attachments; or diversities of history marked by moments of triumphs and tragedies and

differences in heroes and villains, and in the rich tapestry of folk lore, folk dance, music, cuisine,

crafts and artifacts of life. (Khan, 1992: 9)

Of course within this vastness of diversity and medley of religious caste and linguistic

groups the sense of belonging to a minority, as Myron Wiener puts it, depends upon where one

lives, how much power and status one has, and one’s sense of community threat. It is not only

religious groups who regard themselves as minorities. Caste, tribal, linguistic as well as religious

groups can be self-defined minorities for any one or for a number of reasons: they have a distinct

group of identity that they fear is eroding: they either regard themselves as socially and

economically subordinate to others; or they believe that they suffer from discrimination, either

from others in the society or from the state itself. (Weiner 1985:128). It is also important to note

that in India social and cultural inequalities defined in terms of caste, tribal or religious identity-

overlap strongly with economic and material inequalities. Members of the scheduled castes, for

instances, are not only targets of caste prejudice, untouchability and violence by higher castes,

they are also victims of exploitation and oppression that takes very real, material forms. They

constitute the poorest sections of Indian society, with per capita incomes well below the national

average. Indeed the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are the worst off in terms of most

social indicators e.g. literacy rate, gender disparities, infant mortality, and so forth. Likewise a

comparison of Hindus and Muslims in respect to social indicators shows a larger proportion of

Muslims than of Hindus to be subsisting below the poverty line. Muslims also register lower

literacy rates, lower work participation rates, lower rates of access to electricity and piped water

and so on. Indeed with the exception of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, they are

poorest of all inscriptively- defined population groups. Of course, it must be added that the same

is not true of other religious minorities; Christians, for instance, register a literacy rate of 81%

considerably higher than the national average, while Sikhs are on the whole much more

prosperous than other minorities. (Jayal, 2006: 85-80)

In view of the above mentioned diversity and identity perceptions which in many cases

also coincide with geographical territories there have been differences of opinion with regard to

whether India is a nascent nation or nation in the making. What emerges out of these debates in

general can be summarized as: first, there is no doubt that there has been a consciousness of India

6

as country through the centuries. As Irfan Habib points out, partly this is due to geography, that is

the Himalayas and the Western and Eastern ranges separating it from the rest of the world. Partly

the Brahmanical culture, with Sanskrit as the lingua franca, has given it a unity in the eyes of the

upper strata of society. Second, while India is a country certainly, it is not a nation because it

meets the requirements of neither a common language nor a culture. It is a country which

contains a number of emerging nationalities with different languages and cultures of their own.

(Habib, 1987: 30)

During the British colonial rule, particularly, there were both fission and fusion. The

British created a national market and unified the various nationalities by building a centralized

state structure. The historical civilization administrative unity under colonialism also generated

sentiments of an all Indian nationalism among the masses, especially in the wake of the national

movement. It is no exaggeration to support that the “India consciousness, as we understand it to-

day civilized for the first time during the national liberation movement.” In this context,

T.K.Oommen suggests that “national” is a political and not a cultural reference in India. And yet,

the Indian freedom movement was totalistic in its orientation. (Oommen; 1990:39) Above all, it

was the common enemy in the form of colonialism and the struggle against it which provided

new unifying bonds to the Indian people. The very existence of foreign rule that oppressed all the

Indian people irrespective of their social class, caste, religion and language acts as a unifying

factor.

However, in the absence of a full-fledged development of different regions and their

economies, cultures and languages, nationalities (along regional, economical, cultural and

linguistic lines) also started emerging, particularly during and after the second half of the

nineteenth century. A sense of distinct identity and an urge for a separate compact territorial unit

had begun to take root and grow among several linguistic groups. The factors that contributed to

this trend included: adoption, under British rule ,of local languages as a medium of instruction in

schools so that people instructed in common medium began to see themselves as a single entity

distinct from people using a different medium, the availability of newspapers, literature and other

reading materials and use of regional Indian languages: concepts and modes of thought imported

from Western Europe where the nation-state had become the predominant form of state

organization.

As far as Indian nationalism is concerned since the 19th century, one can discern two

distinctive and contrasting strands. One may be characterized as ethno nationalism or Hindu

nationalism, which is premised on a conflation of nationalism and ethnicity, particularly religious

revivalism. The other is based on shared political discourse, as reflected in equality, citizenship

and fundamental rights. The nation however, was increasingly being imagined in Hindu terms.

The language of political discourse, the symbols and tropes through which the collective was

represented, and the sites of political mobilization, all invoked the culture of the majority

population. From Aurbindo to Tilak, Bankim Chandra Chattopdhaya to Swami Vivekanada the

most influential social and political leaders were concerned with the fate and health of Hinduism.

They alluded to Hindu Rashtra and sought to energize the subjugated people by making the

grandeur of the ancient Hindu civilization. (Mahajan, 2006: 169)

The Indian National Congress, however, maintained that it was its primary duty as well

as its fundamental policy to protect the religious, linguistic, cultural and other rights of minorities

in India so as to assure for, in any scheme of the government to which the Congress would be a

party, the widest scope for their development and their participation in the fullest measure in the

7

political, economic and cultural life of nation. In the resolution on fundamental rights at the

Karachi Congress in 1930,looking forward to a free India, Nehru incorporated clauses providing

that every citizen should enjoy freedom of conscience and the right to freely to profess and

practice any religion, subject to public order and morality, that all citizens were equal before the

law, irrespective of religion, creed, caste or sect that no disability would be attached to citizens on

basis of these reasons in regard to public employment and in the exercise of any trade or calling,

and that the state should observe neutrality in regard to all religions. (Gopal 1988: 2465) His

understanding of communal question in India, however, was basically Marxist. For him,

therefore, poverty, backwardness, caste, religion and region were all viewed as different faces of

the same retrograde phenomenon, which could be transcended only by the alliance of science,

reason and economic development. (Jayal 2006:3)

Nehru himself suggested that the problems of the minorities were not suited to his

temperament and cast of mind. “ I just confess to you”, he wrote to Jinnah after some rounds of

talk with him soon after the outbreak of war, “that in this matter I have lost confidence in myself,

though I am not usually given that way. But the last two or three years have had a powerful effect

on me. My own mind moves in a different plane and most of my interests lie in other directions.

And so, though I have given much thought to the problem and understand most of its implications

I feel as if I was an outsider and alien in spirit”. (Gopal 1988: 2465)

In the above mentioned background once the independence was attained, the Indian

National Congress which has spearheaded this movement and was now dominating the

Constituent Assembly with regard to minorities took an ambivalent attitude. It seems that there

was a failure of nerve on the part of the leadership in 1946-47. With the exception of Gandhi,

they were unable to rely on their own capacity to compose the outburst of communal rioting

accompanying partition; the attempts of the larger princely states to remain independent; the early

hostilities over Kashmir, and the administrative problems associated with the initial period of

independence. For them,“ the circumstances following the partition of India made stability more

important than autonomy: efficiency more important than initiative and expediency more

important than federalism or any ism.” (Kumar, 1983: 265). It has been argued well by many

scholars that while Gandhi put his faith in the reformed, ethnically refined individual, in creating

a better, if not ideal, society. Nehru and his associates considered the shaping of suitable

institutions as the best means to achieve the same goal. And of the modern institutions it was the

centralized nation-state which they believed would be the principal engine of social change. Thus,

the leaders of the independence movement and the largely middle class intellectuals who

supported and gave strength to these leaders were all imbued with resurgent nationalism. The

prospects for linguistic and other minorities within the ethno-lingual states looked worrisome to

them.

III

In the Constituent Assembly discourse on minorities was not based only on the nature of Indian

society, expectations of various ethnic groups, and commitments made by the Congress, but also

by the historical experience of partition. As such free India according to Mushiral Hassan, was

confronted with a troubled legacy, as also with the task of devising a strategy to deal with

religious minorities, especially the Muslims who stayed put in the country of their birth. Should

the Constitution, being hammered out in the Constituent Assembly, reflect the broadly secular

8

language of Indian nationalism, or move towards the goal of a Hindu Rashtra (nation) especially

when Pakistan was refurbishing its Islamic image! Why, it was asked should Hindus (numbering

300 millions out of a population of 310 million in 1951) deny themselves a pre-eminent position

merely for the sake of placating Muslims? Why should minority rights be generated in

Bharatvarsha and not across the border where Non-Muslims were treated as second-class

citizens? There was, finally, the highly precisian theory that the Muslims having led, conducted

and supported the clamour for Pakistan, must be made to pay a price for their betrayal (Hassan,

2006:1991).

In the prevailing atmosphere, the Constituent Assembly in general did not view

minorities issues from the perspective of human rights, but defined them within the parameters of

the discourse of communalism versus secularism and nationalism versus separation. In fact, as

Shefali Jha brings out in the Constituent Assembly there were not only differences of opinion but

also totally opposed positions. When the right to religious freedom was first discussed in the

Fundamental Rights sub committee of the Constituent Assembly in April 1947 members

disagreed sharply over whether religious freedom was to be defined as freedom to worship or as a

freedom to the ‘practice’ of religion.

One view was statist. According to this view Indians were constituting themselves into a

nation by becoming members of the same state. The new Indian citizen was to be identified as

just that – a citizen of India, with all markers of an extra-political identity, like sex, religion,

language and culture being attenuated by conscious state policy. In this the extra-political aspects

of one’s person could be highlighted by giving cultural and educational rights to minorities or by

consciously placing religion on the public domain by defining religious freedom widely as a right

to the practice of religion. (Jha, 2003: 1579) Opposed to this statist approach were members who

were insisting on the broader right to religious practice, on the inclusion of the list of fundamental

rights of the right to be governed by the personnel laws of one’s religion, and on all kinds of

cultural, educational and political safeguards for religious minorities. The third position was of

those who while advancing a broad right to the “practice” of religion, as well as educational and

cultural rights for religious and linguistic minorities, rejected outright any reservations for these

minorities in any legislative bodies of the new state on the grounds that such a step would

dangerously strengthen extra-political identities (Jha, 2003:1579).

Rochna Bajpai on the basis of her study of Constituent Assembly debates points out that

for the nation-building project in the complex, multi layered society, the dominant opinion

usually conceived the nation in terms of biological metaphors referring to it, for instance as an

organic whole, a ‘body politic’ a natural entity whereas minorities were artificially created.

Minorities were referred to as ‘disfigurements’ ‘cancerous’, ‘poisonous’ for the body politic.

Minority safeguards in such utterances were referred to variously as ‘privileges’, ‘concessions’

and ‘crutches’. (Bajpai, 2000:1839). Bajpai further points out that the dominant opinion in the

house also regarded minority safeguards as undesirable since they compromised the nationalist

ideal of secularism. In terms of the state’s stance towards religion most arguments in the

Constituent Assembly emphasized that secularism did not imply state antagonism to religion. A

secular state was not a state that denied the importance of religious faith or sought to inculcate

scepticism about religious belief among its citizens. Rather secularism was most commonly

constructed for implying that the state would not identify with or give preference to any particular

religion. Secularism in this sense was regarded as being required to give effect to the idea of

equal citizenship in a situation in which citizen’s preferred a variety of faiths. State’s neutrality in

9

matters of religion was explicitly proposed as a means of giving effect to the stipulations of

equality. (Bajpai, 2000:1839).

The objection based on considerations of national unity was unusually accompanied by a

particular understanding of the history of minority safeguards. Such safeguards were regarded as

instruments of the colonial ‘divide and rule’ policy, deliberately fashioned by the duplicitous

colonial rulers to misguide the minorities, to create strifes between different sections of the

nation, to deny Indian nationhood and to delay the transfer of power once it became inevitable.

These strategies were seen to have facilitated the legitimization and the perpetuation of colonial

rule and to have culminated in the dismemberment of the country. ( Bajpai, 2000: 1839)

By not accepting the demands for separate electorates and reservation of seats on

religious consideration, the Constituent Assembly, thus, sought to do away with any protective

principle which, it was thought, could further damage the cause of national unity. Of course

concerns of minorities with regard to safeguarding of their identity and culture were not ignored.

The Constitution attempted to balance the demands of universalist citizenship with the special

needs for communities. It took the form first of a recognition that, along with equal civil and

political rights for all citizens, it is important to secure and guarantee the rights of religious,

linguistic and cultural minorities. The debate on minority rights in the Assembly centered around

two issues. One regarding the right of religions and linguistic minorities to their culture and

thereby to establishing and managing their own educational and cultural institutions. These rights

were granted to minorities, though the only right given to them exclusively was the right to

establish educational institutions. The rest of the rights were granted to all cultural groups. These

may be considered as rights given to preserve the identity of groups. Moreover, many of them are

in the nature of rights against discrimination in public employment on grounds of race, religion or

caste. Article 25 of the Indian Constitution gives to all individuals the right to practice and

profess religion subject to public order and morality. Article 29(1) gives to all citizens right to

conserve their distinct language, script or culture. Article 350 A directs the state to provide

facilities for primary education in their mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic

minorities. Article 29(2) prohibits discrimination in admission to state educational institutions on

grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. Article 30(1) is the right to religious and

linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions. Article 30(2) prohibits

discrimination in the grant of aid to minority educational institutions. Provisions were also made

for separate personal laws for members of minority communities, alongside a universally

applicable criminal law. The promise of equality, secondly, was given greater content through

constitutional provisions for affirmative action for the scheduled castes and tribes, both in public

employment as well as in the central and state legislative. Finally at the macro institutional level,

a federal structure based on linguistic boundaries, was legislated. (Jayal, 2006:4).

With regard to adoption of Federalism also the approach was primarily influenced by

events of partition and dominant leaderships, preference for the centralized nation state which

they believed would be the principal engine of social change. The prospects for linguistic and

other minorities within the ethno-lingual states looked worrisome to them. They were thus

induced to move towards a Constitution with strong unitary features because (a) they felt that

once the Muslim majority areas has opted out of the Indian republic, the major reason for having

a loose federal structure had vanished; and (b) they feared that fissiparous tendencies might be

fostered by outsiders or generated within some of the constituent units which had to be

10

safeguarded against. This attitude is expressed in a letter written by Jawahar Lal Nehru on 5 July

1947 to the President of the Constituent Assembly. “Now that the partition is settled fact, we are unanimous of the view that it would be injurious to

the interests of the country to provide for a weak central authority which would be incapable of

ensuring peace, of coordinating vital matters of common concern and of speaking effectively for

the whole country in the international sphere.”

Similarly in power in a free India, the Congress was notably less happy about the prospect of

reconstructing the country on a linguistic basis than when it sought mass support for the

overthrow of the British. It tried every technique of diversion available to avert the redrawing of

state’s boundaries on linguistic lines. Under pressure from those advocating the creation of

linguistic states Andhra, Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra, the Committee of Constituent

assembly responsible for drafting of the Constitution appointed a special committee to look into

the question of the linguistic provinces (Known as Dhar Commission). The Committee in its

report submitted in 1948 argued against the formation of linguistic states. The Jaipur meeting of

the Congress (December 1948) appointed a committee consisting of Jawahar Lal Nehru,

Vallabhai Patel and Pittabhi Sittaramaya (known as JVP committee) to look into the report of the

Dhar Commission and put forward final recommendations. This committee also rejected the

principle of linguistic states with reference to the fact that the consolidation of language

communities after the recent partition of the country would give rise to new separatist trends in

internal policy. The basis for federalism in India thus was the product of the conflicting cultures,

one representing the national leaders’ normative concerns for India’s unique personality as

shaped by the course of history and geography, and rooted in the infinite variety of local

situations and the other reflecting their new concerns for unity, security and administrative

efficiency. While the former led to the establishment of a basic framework of federalism, the

latter resulted in the setting up of several centralized and authoritarian institutional arrangements

in the tradition of the earlier colonial rule. (Ray; 1988:1131). Thus the Constituent Assembly

though convinced that in a vast country characterized by cultural and religious diversity a federal

governmental structure alone could work, felt that a fortified central authority was imperative to

maintain the unity and integrity of the nation. Phrases like “ the Indian Union’ was meant to help

promote such a view of Indian Nationalism was that a strong central government was necessary

to ensure India’s survival as a national entity. This view has been, and continues to be dominant

in the minds of many persons who shape India’s domestic and foreign policy.

Linked with the question of minority rights and federalism the other serious issue of

concern, particularly for linguistic minorities was about the official national language of

independent India. During the period of British colonial rule, the nationalist demand for freedom

was associated with a demand for the replacement of colonial language of administration by a

national language as a unifying symbol or nationalism. This demand as Jyotindra Das Gupta

points out, was made at the more visible level of nationalist politics, and it appeared to represent

the aspirations of an inter-ethnic national coalition. However, there were other levels of language

demands where the relation between ethnicity was more direct and visible. One of those levels

can be identified as the demand for the recognition of the regional languages as the media of

education, administrative transaction and judicial proceedings at the relatively lower levels of the

operation of law courts. The demand for elevating the status of regional languages to a level of

functional importance and prestige ran parallel to sustained efforts made by regional leaders to

standardize the regional languages. The duality of these two processes of mobilization and

11

integration sometimes led to convergence but relatively this often created a tension and conflict

between them. For example, the emergence of Tamil Nationalism in the south around the turn of

this century can be seen as a story of success in cementing various lower caste groups into a

United Dravidian Movement including diverse religious and other groups within it, but at the

same time one may detect in the same process a challenge to Indian nationalism. (Das Gupta

1988; 473). Indian nationalist movement however, long before independence, had settled that

Hindi should replace English.

When the British threat disappeared and the Constituent Assembly began to deliberate,

many non-Hindi speaking groups perceived that in case Hindi replaced English, the Hindi

speakers would enjoy a natural advantage in dominating the economic institutions and political

authorities of the nation. After an intensive debate in the Constituent Assembly, a compromise

formula was arrived and the present Part XVII of the Constitution was adopted. Chapter 1 of this

part deals with “ Language of the Union”. In Article 343 it is declared that the official language

of the Union shall be Hindi in Devnagari script. The term “Official Language” was deliberately

used to specifically distinguish it from the more popular term “ National Language” implying that

in a multi-lingual country like India no language existed which could be regarded as a “National

Language” used by all sections of people all over India. In addition Articles 120 and 210 stated

about the language to be used in Union Parliament and State legislatures respectively. Articles

29,30,350,351 gave some protection to minority languages. But in general language provisions

were not dictated by the multi-lingual reality of India.

Article 343 of the Constitution also, inter alia provided for the continued use of English

for all official purposes of the Union for a period of fifteen years from the commencement of the

Constitution. Clause (3) of this Article further empowered Parliament to provide for the use of

this for a period of fifteen years. The Constitution gave the States freedom to adopt any language

as their official language. The Constitution did not restrict the choice of the official languages for

the states to the Schedule VIII which now contains 18 languages. Article 345 explicitly provided

that “ subject to the provisions of articles 346 and 347, the legislature of a state by law adopt any

one or more of the languages in use in the states or Hindi as languages to be used for all or any of

the official purposes of that state’.

The states Re-organization Commission, while recommending the organization of states

on linguistic lines also recommended that the Government of India should in consultation with

state governments lay down a clear policy in regard to instructions in mother language at the

secondary stage. This recommendation was approved by the Parliament. Certain amendments

were made in the Constitution which provides adequate facilities for instruction to children

belonging to linguistic minorities in the mother tongue at the primary level of education. Article

350B provided for the appointment of a special officer by the President for linguistic minorities.

On the other hand, the Official Language Commission appointed by the President of

India in 1955 under a constitutional provision reported strongly in favour of replacing English by

Hindi. Indeed with this recommendation the long-smoldering discontent and fears of non-Hindi

speakers burst forth. Vociferous southern critics bitterly opposed this recommendation. The threat

at the Congress Annual Session of 1958 of a split within the party led finally to a compromise by

which to satisfy the Hindi zealots, the formal change over to Hindi would still occur in 1965, but

the non-Hindi sections were to be placated by the promise that English might be used as an

“Official Language” after 1965. The issue, however, remained very much alive. The counter

persuasions of the Hindi advocates, time after time, induced the Union Government to postpone

12

the legal enactment of the promised compromise, and this procrastination in turn provoked

growing discontent and even active resistance. When in April 1963 the Official Languages Bill

was finally introduced, Lok Sabha witnessed some of the rowdiest scenes in its history. The bill

allowing for the continued use of English for official purposes without a time limit, but also

providing for a committee of Parliament to review in 1975 the progress of Hindi’s acceptance as

the official language, came under fire both from Hindi’s zealots opposed to any continued use of

English, and from southerners, who were disappointed on the status and safeguard for English to

be incorporated in the bill. The then Prime Minister of India, JawaharLal Nehru, tried to allay the

fears by assuring the non-Hindi speakers that Hindi would not be imposed on them without their

consent.

The Government of India seems to have settled upon what amounts to an indefinite

policy of bilingualism with English and Hindi being alternative official languages at the Centre

and the states. The ideal of transforming Hindi into the sole official language of the country

continues to exist in the Official Language Act 1963. In practical terms, it means that

Government of India has no language policy. The three-language formula is merely a face-saver

for a non-policy and is a dead letter for all practical purposes. As Achin Vaniak points out, Hindi

will no longer be imposed anywhere. But left to itself, its use will almost certainly grow.

Regional languages will also grow. (Vaniak 1990; 124). But an apprehension keeps on growing

amongst minorities that the language of one section of the population is being imposed on others

who have different mother tongues. There are several reasons for that.

The Hindi area ranks first among all the other languages areas of India both in size of its

territory and population. It embraces many states while other linguistic areas are limited normally

by the borders of one state, e.g. Tamils- Tamilnadu , Malayalam- Kerala, Gujarati etc, situated

inside the Hindi belt is the capital and one of the largest cities of India- Delhi. Moreover, the

development of economic ties accelerates urban growth in the region where new economic,

political and cultural centers spring up. After independence north western and central India have

surprised southern India in this respect. Urbanization is also conducive to the replacement of

dialects by a generally accepted language closest to the literacy language .The introduction of

universal suffrage with principle of proportional (to population) representation in both houses of

parliament has consolidated the position of Hindi belt states in politics.

The framers of the Indian Constitution, while engaged in the task of balancing Nation-

state building and maintaining the pluralist character of Indian society, thus, on the one hand

visualized the nation-state as a community of communities. The members of the decolonized

polity were perceived not just as individuals or citizens, but as groups and communities. As

Gupreet Mahajan points out, the Indian Constitution took note of these and registered their

concerns and attempts to delineate a framework in which ethnically diverse communities as well

as vulnerable and previously segregated groups would exist as equals. (Mahajan, 2006; 167). On

the other hand to deal with majority minority issues the Constitution makers relied mainly on two

means (1) fundamental rights; and (2) abolition of separate communal electorate as well as

communal reservation. Though they accepted certain corporate rights such as cultural and

religious rights, yet their main concern was the rights of individual citizens. In addition the new

state also embodied two key principles: a commitment to secularism and democracy. Whereas the

former was viewed as symbolic of India’s modernism and indicative of its determination to reject

religiously based separatism, the latter introduced corrosive political participation which, it was

hoped with time would undermine solidified ethnic opposition. This becomes clear from the fact

13

that while issues related to minorities figured prominently in the Constituent Assembly in all its

facts, no attempt was made on any occasion even to define the term in precise words. The term

‘minority’ is mentioned in only two Articles of Constitution namely Article 29 and Article 30.

Here too the use of the term is not for definitional purposes. So much so in one of the Articles it is

used only in the subheading of the Article and not in the text of the Article. More so Article 366

which is exclusively used to give the meaning of words and terms used in the text of the

Constitution, gives meaning to 30 such expressions. But here too the term “Minority is not

covered. All these suggest that the Constitution makers wanted to keep the door open for the

assimilation of the minority in the so-called and undefined national mainstream. No less a man

than B.R. Ambedkar made the intention of the Constitution makers clear on the floor of the

Assembly. While moving the Draft Constitution for the consideration of the House, he said: “In this country both the minorities and the majority have followed a wrong path. It is wrong for

the majority to deny the existence of minorities. It si wring for the minorities to perpetuate

themselves. A solution must be found which will serve a double purpose. It must recognize the

existence of minorities to start with. It must also be such that it will enable minorities to merge

some day into one.”

Thus, India’s new rulers viewed creation of a national society, the necessary concomitant of a

modern state, as the task of devising an overarching political arrangements for a people divided

along the lines of religion, language and other ethnic attributes which had become sharper during

the colonial regime. As D.L. Sheth observes that in rejecting the ethnic principle of nationhood

the Indian state sought to base its legitimacy on political ideas, all new to the Indian society, of

secularism, egalitarianism, and political equality. This was to be achieved by extending equal

citizenship rights to all through universal franchise. The Constitution ensured that the state shall

not discriminate among citizens on the grounds of religious affiliation, ethnicity, race caste, creed

or gender. Having emerged fresh from the experience of the Independence movement, it sought to

develop a new ethics for the national life of its people. National integration and democratic

participation became the watchwords for policies in the first two decades after independence,

economic growth and development occupying a relatively lower priority. ( Sheth, 1989: 624)

This system based on the attempt for an inclusive agglomeration of myriad identities and

groups through intergovernmental and inter-factional adjustments and changes, Rajni Kothari

points out, proved inadequate when it encountered the large currents of the era of mass politics

and large scale politicization of the masses following a steady working of the system and its

diffusion of democratic norms. (Kothari, 1988: 2224) The zeal with which unitarist nationalism

tried to brush political differences, social contradictions and identity assertions under the carpet

proved counter-productive. The more it sought to create uniformity, the more it actually

sharpened the claims made by linguistic, cultural and religious minorities, or even caste and tribal

communities. That in turn led to further majoritarian assertions. (Jodhka 2001:20) As a result

from the mid-1980s, an aggressive form of Hindu communalism has been at work in Indian

politics seeking to hijack the Indian polity to a direction opposed to what was established at

independence.

14

IV

It is now quite clear that India began its democratic experiment with greater politicized diversity

than any other democracy in the world. As discussed above the primary project of the new rulers

was the creation of a society where citizens shared a strong sense of national identity despite

cultural diversity, the protection of historically disadvantaged ethnic groups; and the management

of diversity within the Constitution through the conception of universal citizenship, perceived as a

critical dimension of the project of nation building. At the same time it consciously sought to

accommodate the claims of minorities and disadvantaged groups on the ground of protection or

compensation for the disadvantaged, rather than on the ground of their representation in the

political system. The normative weight, as between the universalist and particularist dimension of

citizenship as Neerja Jayal points out, belongs to the former, with the latter merely facilitating the

realization of the background conditions of equality and so advancing the eventual

accomplishment of the universal ideal. (Jayal, 2006:3) The Nehruvian project of nation-building

thus chose to construct an all India identity by promoting secular nationalism while negotiating

with the complex, multilayerd and democratic fabric of India (Harshe, 2008:248). Somehow

Nehru and others believed that all relations active in Indian society could be erased out and

entirely new ones could be written down through industrialization and mass education of the type

that would dissolve dogma and the dogmatic, mentality. Accordingly Secularism was made the

basis of a uniform and national identity.

Shaped in the Nehruvian framework the new state thus embedded two key principles: a

commitment to secularism and democracy. Whereas the former was viewed as a symbol of

India’s modernism and indicative of its determination to reject religiously based separatism the

latter introduced corrosive political participation, which it was hoped in time, would undermine

solidified ethnic opposition. In this respect Gurharpal Singh observes that soon after 1947 four

guidelines were established for regulating ethnic conflicts. First, no secessionist movements were

to be tolerated, if necessary they would be suppressed by force. Second given the compliment to

secularism no demand for political recognition of a religious group would be considered, third, no

capricious concession would be made to the political demands of any linguistic, or other

culturally defined group. Finally, no political concessions to cultural groups in conflict would be

made unless they had support from both sides. (Singh, 1993: 85)

After independence some early steps were also taken which appeared to lead the country

towards the goal of becoming a multicultural polity. These included reorganization of provinces

on a linguistic basis, the provision of considerable autonomy to these provinces as administrative

units, and the adoption of three languages formula for both education and governance. Some

observers viewed this as a very a positive trend which they called it a process of building a state

nation rather than a nation-state. The state nation policies according to these observers stand for a

political-institutional approach that respects and protects multiple but complementary socio-

cultural identities. State nation policies recognize legitimate public and even political expression

of active socio-cultural cleavages, and they also evolve mechanisms to accommodate competing

or conflicting claims made on behalf of those divisions without privileging or imposing any one

claim. State nation policies involve creating a sense of belonging with respect to the state wide

Political Community, while simultaneously creating institutional safeguards for respecting and

15

protecting Politically salient socio-cultural diversities. The ‘we feeling’ may take the form of

defining a tradition, history, and shared culture in an inclusive manner by attaching to common

symbols of the state and/or inculcating some form of constitutional patriotism. (Linz, Yadavl,

2007:54). While India in spirit might have been this but in practice in the peculiar relationship

between the ideals of nation- building and secularism, democracy and secularism were defined by

nationalism rather than the other way around. Indian nationalism recognized diversity but

emphasized unity. So multiculturalism gave way to what can at best be described as pluralism.

The difference between Pluralism and Multiculturalism, as Baljit Mann points out, is crucial.

Pluralism merely acknowledges the existence of different identities. Having recognized diversity,

it attempts to establish political arguments that would ensure peaceful co-existence. This

coexistence does not have to be based on principles of equality and justice. The rules of

coexistence could in fact be laid down by a dominant majority, which defines the codes of

conduct in public spheres. Minorities or marginal identities have to comply with these codes.

Their compliance earns them the grant of cultural rights within the overall framework of the

established codes, while questioning the established codes could invite a majoritarian backlash

and withdrawl of cultural rights. Coexistence established by pluralism is therefore, always

tenuous and uneasy. Multiculturalism, on the other hand flows directly from the principles of

equality and justice, which are believed to operate not only among individuals, but also among

communities. It would, therefore, be unacceptable if the codes in the public spheres are defined

by a dominant or majority community. These codes have to be sensitively evolved and delicately

nuanced. A common ground has to be found in the firm belief that minorities and marginal

communities are not ‘granted’ rights; they simply have them as a form of human rights. (Mann,

2008:68) As already mentioned that while Constitution of Indian granted educational and cultural

rights to minorities, neither in the constitution nor in later policies there were clear efforts for

effective empowerment of minorities. While individual civil and political rights of persons

belonging to minorities were not violated, the Indian democracy basically became majoritarian.

It is now well accepted that in the functioning of a majoritarian democracy, majority

individuals are relatively advantaged and minority individuals concomitantly penalized. In the

competitive process for socio economic benefit, which is governed by a wide range of implicit

socio-cultural preferences, processes, nuances and attitudes, the relative advantages and

privileges of majority individuals are assured. Focusing only on the members in a host of social

benefit indicators, such an income levels, educational levels, professional standing, etc, and then

attention to improve the numbers ratio solely by affirmative action does not speak to the

structural and systemic causes. Rather, it facilitates the operation of these politico-structural

causes of minority inequality by leaving them obscure and unchallenged. The basis of Indian

nation-building, nationalist ideology and sources of political mobilization have been majoritarian

centric. What Indian constitution prescribes for post-British India was a polity that could have

succeeded in a society of individuals. Preambulary principles and constitutional vision were

always vulnerable in a country where the nationalist discourse, governing responsibilities and

patriotism were bracketed with the majoritarian consciousness and minority members were

framed as undesirable and unreliable socio-political element of the formers consciousness.

Therefore, roots of majoritarian nationalist discourse and glorification of identity and ideology

have influenced and indoctrinated leadership at national and sub-national levels. In this, as Arshi

Khan observes even federalism has become a subject of bargaining between the Union and state

governments and both of them have so far maintained deliberate ignorance to the violation of

16

fundamental rights of minorities and their exclusion in the structure of power. Most of the Indian

political scientists and other scholars have also taken a simplistic picture of federalism and its

responsibility to the needs of the people of the country. First of all, they take the Indian

Constitution as the non-defective part of the Indian Political system, particularly in the realm of

the rights of minorities under federalism. Similarly they view Indian society of communities more

as a civic community and very ‘public’ in character for fulfilling the need of liberal democracy.

When they are faced with the agenda of criticism they either blame pronounced leftists, rightist or

fanatics for the political ills. As a result, such kind of criticism of some political parties and

organizations on the one hand and glorification of others, on the other, have only consumed our

educational texts, research papers and discourse on governance. For example, in the case of

massive violence against the Muslims in the state of Gujarat, many have categorized a particular

party and its organization by ignoring other basic factors which encouraged to indulge into this

crime against humanity. In other words, the factor of their exclusion and marginalisation in

structures of power has not been raised at the minimum level of civic understanding. The final

result is quite visible as the largest minority which constitute about 13 percent of Indian

population and is 15 to 24 percent in some states are not only excluded in power structure but also

has been vulnerable victims of ethnic violence, discrimination and deprivation. (Khan, 2002: 35)

A number of independent studies, NSS data, Gopal Singh committee report 1983 and finally

Sachhar Committee report all show that Muslims have been consistently under-represented in

almost all walks of public life and benefits of development. They have been consistently under-

represented in Parliament at about 5%. The highest representation achieved by Muslims was in

1980 when they constituted 9.2% of Lok Sabha. (Jayal, 2006:115) Their representation in the

country’s highest civil service has been about 3.5 percent. They are behind also in literacy. Their

enrolment in elementary schools is lower, and even lower in secondary schools,35 percent of

what would be a share equal to their percentage of the population. They do better in enrolment in

universities 83 percent of expected share. But they lag behind in the preferred business courses

and engineering courses. Similarly with representation in administration and faculties. The

numbers of company directors is minuscule. Muslims do sit on major judicial benches, hold posts

as ministers in central and state government, have served as president are leading journalists and

academics, but there is no question their presence in India’s elites is much less than might be

expected on the basis of their numbers. (Glazar, 2009:186)

The reasons for the above are traced to economic marginalization, physical segregation,

social discrimination and cultural isolation faced by Muslims. The communally prejudiced

attitude of administration, law enforcement agencies, including judiciary at times, and sections of

political class has been there overtly and covertly. Several judicial commissions of inquiry,

official reports and human rights groups have brought out instances of partiality and even open

collusion against minority in situations of conflicts or communal riots on part of administration

and police. Some studies have shown that there is a close linkage between anti-Muslim prejudice

and the way Pakistan, as a perfidious Muslim neighbour, is perceived by sections of the Indian

public and politicians.

The tendency has been to vilify the minorities as traitors of the nation, who act at the

behest of hostile countries, for example, some leaders of the recent anti-Muslim violence in

Gujarat went to the extent of calling for the dismemberment of Pakistan. (Subramanian, 2006:

123) The perception of Pakistan as a hostile Muslim neighbouring state in the Hindu mind has led

to the development of a negative stereotype of Indian Muslims. Popular literature in India on

17

partition, including some text books, present the issue in such a way that it makes every Muslim

responsible for the genesis of Pakistan. The historical fact is that not more than 5 percent

Muslims had supported the creation of Pakistan while 95 percent had either nothing to do with

Pakistan or they were politically and emotionally opposed to it. Moreover, the present generation

of Indian Muslims, who were not around at that time could not have anything to do with the

creation of Pakistan: How can they be held responsible for the partition? But they and for that

matter Muslims in general remain suspect as loyal to Pakistan. S.M. Murshed, a former senior

civil servant’s statement speaks a lot in this: “In 1969, I was in the home department of the government of West Bengal. Jyoti Basu of the CPM

was my minister and also deputy chief minister. One day I drew his attention to a copy of a

circular issued by the center which suggested that I should be removed from my post. It said, in

effect that Muslims should not hold any sensitive post in government. There was a companion

circular to the effect that Muslim applications of passports should be subjected to severe scrutiny.

These were first issued in the 1950s and reiterated from time to time. The infamous circulars were

obviously based on the premise that the integrity of Muslims in India was suspect. The same

nation manifested itself in West Bengal in 1965 during the Indo-Pak war. Thousands of innocent

Muslims were arrested and kept in detention without trial on no other ground than their religion.”

(Khan, 2006: 153)

A number of reports bring out that internal security laws and anti-terror laws are used against

communities that do not fall in line with state policies. According to India’s former Minister of

State for Home Affairs, M.M. Jacob, a total of 26,915 people had been detained under TADA

between 1988-91. Surprisingly, the highest figure were recorded in Gujarat (9,569 persons) where

the menace of terrorism was very low compared to Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and Assam.

According to Amnesty International’s report TADA was disproportionately used against tribals

and Muslims. In Gujarat, three quarters of those held under TADA at the end of 1989 were

Muslims.

One may like it or not but one has to recognize the unpleasant fact that widespread

discrimination and intolerance based on religion and ethnicity continue to exist and minority

rights are unlikely to be taken seriously in such an environment. Will Kymlicka and others who

have challenged the suggested neutrality of liberal democracies seem to be quite right in their

observation that what appears on the surface to be a neutral system of common rights turns out, on

inspection, to be a system that is heavily weighed in favour of the majority group (Kymlick

2001:43) In India, what has happened in addition during recent decades is the rise of a strong

rightwing Hindu ideological tendency, usually characterized as Hindutava, which is openly

hostile to minorities. From the mid 1980s, an aggressive form of Hindu communalism has been at

work in Indian politics seeking to hijack the Indian polity in a direction opposed to that

established at independence. An official report mentions that 40 major communal riots took place

during 1990 in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, and

Maharashtra. Since then, communal violence has been one of the main features of internal

disruption and disorder in Indian politics. The rise of ‘Hindu Nationalist’ political forces under

the rubric of the Sangh Parivar (the BJP, VHP, RSS and the Bajrang Dal) and their acquisition of

state power in New Delhi in the late 1990s appears to have strengthened the ‘ institutionalized’

riot system’ in certain cities (Brass, 1997). This system was clearly in the Gujarat carnage of

2002. By mobilizing public opinions around issues such as the construction of Ram temple in

Ayodhya, the abolition of the article 370 in case of Kashmir the promotion of uniform civil code,

18

and the abolition of special rights of minorities the BJP and Sangh Parivar have transformed the

pattern of political discourse in India forever. (Harshe, 2008:252).

The remarkable convergence that has developed between the representatives of this

tendency and the state, has alarmed the minorities, more so Muslims and Christians. They are

perceived as a threat and are regarded as not belonging. Muslims ought to be in Pakistan,

Christians ought to be in the West. These minorities hardly differ racially from the majority. All

are Indians. No one came much later, or much earlier than any one else, although their religions

did. It is the identification of ‘ Indianess’ with ‘ Hinduness’ that must reduce the non-Hindus to

subservient status. The charge here is of cultural betrayal. The perception is that Muslim and

Christian loyalties lie elsewhere, just as the loyalties of Catholics in England were perceived as

belonging to Rome, and not to the Crown. The overall result is that secularism, equality before

law, protection against violations of due process, affirmative action for the disadvantaged and

minorities are affirmed again and again in the Constitution and the laws, but the national

commitment in the matter of protecting civil and human rights of the minorities and extending

social justice to disadvantaged social communities by the measures provided has weakened. This

has given rise among the minorities and other disadvantaged communities to the feeling that

Martin Kind Jr. articulated in the context of the Negroes in the United States. (Ahmad, 2000: 53).

Having already suffered from the unitarism of state nationalism and homogenizing

tendencies of majoritarian nationalism, minorities face further marginalization under the impact of

globalization. Globalization has engendered deep insecurities in the more vulnerable countries

and communities. What would seem “exciting and empowering” to some would be “disquieting

and disempowerment” to others. Economic opening up has brought industrial scale exploitation to

traditional habitats and unsettling long-established ways of life. When resource conflicts have

arisen, nation states have failed to defend the rights of indigenous people. Minorities cultures and

languages are under threat because of market forces favouring international and major national

languages as also encouraging western lifestyles. May be it is a coincidence that during about last

three decades intended or unintended, state policies or lack of them, emergence of rightwing

Hindutava, international terrorism and its projected religious links and processes of globalization

all have resulted in a feeling of deprivation, frustration and alienation of minorities, particularly

the Muslims. It is obvious that if members of a community are distrusted, if their loyalty to the

country is held under suspicion, if they are demoralized and discriminated against, they are bound

to feel aggrieved, alienated and anguished. The lessons of history are clear. More the unitarist

nationalism tries to brush political differences, social contradictions, and identity assertions under

the carpet more it proves counter-productive Jawaharlal Nehru himself made this point clear as far

back as 1930. In the young India of 15 May 1930, he wrote: “The history of India and of many of the countries of Europe has demonstrated that there can be

no stable equilibrium in any country so long as an attempt is made to crush a minority or to force

it to confirm the ways of the majority. There is no sure method of rousing the resentment of the

minority and keeping it apart from the rest of the nation than to make it feel that it has not got the

freedom to stick to its own way. Repression and coercion can never succeed in coercing a

minority. They but make it more self-conscious and more determined to value and hold fast to

what it considers its very own. It means little whether logic is on its side or whether its own

particular brand of culture is worthwhile or not. The mere fear of losing it makes it dear. Freedom

to keep it would itself lesson its value…”

The Indian experience, as of many other multi-ethnic societies, tends to reject the need for any

single or uniform pattern of identities for a nation-state to take effect. Indeed, as Rajni Kothari

19

argues, that if the national elite in India had sought to impose one kind of identity on the whole

people of India, it would most likely have failed, and if it had succeeded it had only turned the

country into pieces. Unfortunately the ideology of Hindutava is mobilizing the majority in favour

of constructing such a single and seamless “ Bhartiya identity”. This ideology, premised on the

conflation of nationalism and ethnicity, is elitist, exclusivist and hegemonic. In fact, it, as A.R.

Momim puts it, seeks to impose the world view and ideology of a minority group, namely the

Brahmis and other upper castes, on the majority of India’s population composed of the lower

castes, dalits, minorities and tribals. It essentializes Indian civilization by disregarding its

characteristics diversity. It aims at de-ethnicizing the minorities and other groups and to

disempower them by coercing them to assimilate in the Hindu mainstream. Majoritarian

nationalism, camouflaged as Hindutava, has exacerbated inter-religious and inter caste tensions

and conflicts. (Momin 2001:14).

It is therefore important, first of all, for both civil society and state in India to recognize

that despite the provisions of non-discrimination and equality in matters of state policies and

programmes, a gap persists between the legal percepts and actual practices. Also contrary to

assumptions made only a few decades ago by liberal, socialist and Marxist theoreticians issues

involving culture, language and religion in general related to identity have not progressively

faded away in India, as in most parts of the world. The task of nation-building is arduous and

ticklish and no royal road can be prescribed to achieve it. However, to begin with public

institutions must demonstrate and not simply assert their commitment to a non-discriminating

mode of functioning, offering genuine equality of opportunity to all.

The constitutional and legal framework is one aspect of the matter; social behaviour and

state practice is another. Quite some time back Permanent Court of International Justice said, the

objective of minority rights was two fold: to secure for minority groups the possibility of living

peacefully along side the rest of the population and cooperating with them while at the same time

preserving the characteristics which distinguish them from the majority and ensuring special

needs to them. It held that these two characteristics are indeed closely interlocked, for there

would be no true equality between a majority and a minority if the latter was deprived of its own

institutions and was consequently compelled to renounce that which constitutes the very essence

of its being a minority. The court, therefore, held that: “Equality in law precludes discrimination of any kind, whereas equality in fact may involve the

necessity of different treatments in order to attain a result which establishes a equilibrium between

different situations. It is easy to imagine cases, in which, equality of treatment of the majority and

the minority, whose situations and requirements are different, would result in inequality.” (Ansari,

2007: 3) It is in the interest of India’s social stability, socio-economic development and meaningful

security that we accept that the provisions and observance of minority rights in letter and spirit.

Concerns for minority interests and safety are not “minorityism” as is some time projected by

Hindutava forces. Agenda for social and political development cannot be set by one group or

community, may that be majority. It has to be inclusive, fair and just, providing the scope to

marginalized groups and minorities for participation in the decision making process, share in

political power and enjoy benefits of development.

20

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Riverdale 1986

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