1. G.R. No. 184058. March 10, 2010PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee vs. MELISSA CHUA,

appellant

DOCTRINE: (a) An employee of a company engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal together with his employer if it is shown that he, as in the case of appellant, actively and consciously participated therein.(b) Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale penalized under Republic Act No. 8042, or "The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," is a special law, a violation of which is malum prohibitum, not malum in se. Intent is thus immaterial.

FACTS: An Information alleged that MELISSA CHUA violated Article 38 (a) PD 1413, amending certain provisions of Book I, PD 442 (Labor Code) in relation to Art. 13 (b) and (c ) of said Code, as further amended by PD Nos. 1693, 1920 and 2019 and as further amended by Sec. 6 (a), (1) and (m) of RA 8042 committed in large scale as follows:… willfully, unlawfully and knowingly for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to ERIK DE GUIA TAN, MARILYN O. MACARANAS, NAPOLEON H. YU, JR., HARRY JAMES P. KING and ROBERTO C. ANGELES for overseas employment abroad without first having secured the required license from the Department of Labor and Employment as required by law, and charge or accept directly payment; that amounts are in excess of or greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees as prescribed by the POEA, and failed to actually deploy them and failed to reimburse expenses incurred in connection with their documentation and processing for purposes of their deployment.

Tan and King testified that they later on found out that Golden Gate’s (recruitment agency) license had already expired.

Appellant claimed having worked as a temporary cashier at the office of Golden Gate, owned by one Marilyn Calueng and maintained that Golden Gate was a licensed recruitment agency.

The RTC convicted appellant for Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and three (3) counts of Estafa.

The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision holding that appellant’s defense that, as temporary cashier of Golden Gate, she received the money which was ultimately remitted to Marilyn Calueng is immaterial, she having failed to prove the existence of an employment relationship between her and Marilyn, as well as the legitimacy of the operations of Golden Gate and the extent of her involvement therein. Citing People v. Sagayaga the appellate court ruled that an employee of a company

engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal together with his employer if it is shown that he, as in the case of appellant, actively and consciously participated therein.

Respecting the cases for Estafa, the appellate court, noting that a person convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of Estafa as penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the RTC’s decision of convicting appellant for Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and three (3) counts of Estafa.

HELD: YES. In the present case, Golden Gate, of which appellant admitted being a was initially authorized to recruit workers for deployment abroad. Per the certification from the POEA, Golden Gate’s license expired and it was delisted from the roster of licensed agencies.

Appellant was positively pointed to as one of the persons who enticed the complainants to part with their money upon the fraudulent representation that they would be able to secure for them employment abroad. Even if appellant were a mere temporary cashier of Golden Gate, that did not make her any less an employee to be held liable for illegal recruitment as principal by direct participation, together with the employer, as it was shown that she actively and consciously participated in the recruitment process. 

Assuming arguendo that appellant was unaware of the illegal nature of the recruitment business of Golden Gate that does not free her of liability either. Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale penalized under Republic Act No. 8042, or "The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," is a special law, a violation of which is malum prohibitum, not malum in se. Intent is thus immaterial. And that explains why appellant was, aside from Estafa, convicted of such offense.

2. G.R. No. 187730 June 29, 2010PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES versus RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT, FIDES PACARDO y JUNGCO and PILAR MANTA y DUNGO

DOCTRINE:To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements must be established: (1) the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of “recruitment and placement” defined under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and

placement of workers; and (3) the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.

Even with a license, however, illegal recruitment could still be committed under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (“R.A. 8042”), otherwise known as the Migrants and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

FACTS:Originally, accused-appellant Gallo and accused Pacardo and Manta, together with Mardeolyn and nine (9) others, were charged with syndicated illegal recruitment and eighteen (18) counts of estafa committed against eighteen complainants, including Dela Caza, Guantero and Sare. The cases were respectively docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 02-2062936 to 02-206311. However, records reveal that only Criminal Case No. 02-206293, which was filed against accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta for syndicated illegal recruitment, and Criminal Case Nos. 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308, which were filed against accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta for estafa, proceeded to trial due to the fact that the rest of the accused remained at large. Further, the other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 02 206294 to 02-206296, 02-206298 to 02-206299, 02-206301 to 02-206307 and 02-206309 to 02-206311 were likewise provisionally dismissed upon motion of Pacardo, Manta and accused-appellant for failure of the respective complainants in said cases to appear and testify during trial.It should also be noted that after trial, Pacardo and Manta were acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. 02-206293, 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308 for insufficiency of evidence. Likewise, accused-appellant Gallo was similarly acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. 02-206300, the case filed by Guantero, and 02-206308, the case filed by Sare. However, accused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case Nos. 02-206293 and 02-206297, both filed by Dela Caza, for syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa, respectively. Thus, the present appeal concerns solely accused-appellant’s conviction for syndicated illegal recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 and for estafa in Criminal Case No. 02-206297.

Version of the Prosecution (for purposes of recitation)On May 22, 2001, Dela Caza was introduced by Eleanor Panuncio to

accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes, Yeo Sin Ung and another Korean national at the office of MPM Agency located in Malate, Manila. Dela Caza was told that Mardeolyn was the President of MPM Agency, while Nelmar Martir was one of the incorporators. Also, that Marcelino Martir, Norman Martir, Nelson Martir and Ma. Cecilia Ramos were its board members. Lulu Mendanes acted as the cashier and accountant, while Pacardo acted as the agency’s employee who was in charge of the records of the applicants. Manta, on the other hand, was also an employee who was tasked to deliver documents to the Korean embassy. Accused-appellant Gallo then introduced himself as a relative of Mardeolyn and informed Dela Caza that the agency was able to send many workers abroad. Together with Pacardo and Manta, he also told Dela Caza about the

placement fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP 150,000) with a down payment of Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (PhP 45,000) and the balance to be paid through salary deduction. Dela Caza, together with the other applicants, were briefed by Mardeolyn about the processing of their application papers for job placement in Korea as a factory worker and their possible salary. Accused Yeo Sin Ung also gave a briefing about the business and what to expect from the company and the salary. With accused-appellant’s assurance that many workers have been sent abroad, as well as the presence of the two (2) Korean nationals and upon being shown the visas procured for the deployed workers, Dela Caza was convinced to part with his money. Thus, on May 29, 2001, he paid Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (PhP 45,000) to MPM Agency through accused-appellant Gallo who, while in the presence of Pacardo, Manta and Mardeolyn, issued and signed Official Receipt No. 401. Two (2) weeks after paying MPM Agency, Dela Caza went back to the agency’s office in Malate, Manila only to discover that the office had moved to a new location at Batangas Street, Brgy. San Isidro, Makati. He proceeded to the new address and found out that the agency was renamed to New Filipino Manpower Development & Services, Inc. (“New Filipino”). At the new office, he talked to Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes and accused-appellant Gallo. He was informed that the transfer was done for easy accessibility to clients and for the purpose of changing the name of the agency. Dela Caza decided to withdraw his application and recover the amount he paid but Mardeolyn, Pacardo, Manta and Lulu Mendanes talked him out from pursuing his decision. On the other hand, accused-appellant Gallo even denied any knowledge about the money. After two (2) more months of waiting in vain to be deployed, Dela Caza and the other applicants decided to take action. The first attempt was unsuccessful because the agency again moved to another place. However, with the help of the Office of Ambassador Señeres and the Western Police District, they were able to locate the new address at 500 Prudential Building, Carriedo,Manila. The agency explained that it had to move in order to separate those who are applying as entertainers from those applying as factory workers. Accused-appellant Gallo, together with Pacardo and Manta, were then arrested.

Version of the Defense (for purposes of recitation)For his defense, accused-appellant denied having any part in the recruitment

of Dela Caza. In fact, he testified that he also applied with MPM Agency for deployment to Korea as a factory worker. According to him, he gave his application directly with Mardeolyn because she was his town mate and he was allowed to pay only Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP 10,000) as processing fee. Further, in order to facilitate the processing of his papers, he agreed to perform some tasks for the agency, such as taking photographs of the visa and passport of applicants, running errands and performing such other tasks assigned to him, without salary except for some allowance. He said that he only saw Dela Caza one or twice at the agency’s office when he applied for work abroad. Lastly, that he was also promised deployment abroad but it never materialized.

RTC rendered its Decision convicting the accused of syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa.CA affirmed with modification to the sentence in the the estafa case.

ISSUE:WON CA gravely erred in finding appellant guilty of illegal recruitment and estafa.

HELD:NO. Accused-appellant avers that he cannot be held criminally liable for illegal recruitment because he was neither an officer nor an employee of the recruitment agency. He alleges that the trial court erred in adopting the asseveration of the private complainant that he was indeed an employee because such was not duly supported by competent evidence. According to him, even assuming that he was an employee, such cannot warrant his outright conviction sans evidence that he acted in conspiracy with the officers of the agency.

The Court disagree.

To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements must be established: (1) the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of “recruitment and placement” defined under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.

When illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large scale, i.e., if it is committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group, it is considered an offense involving economic sabotage. Under Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code, “recruitment and placement” refers to “any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not”.

After a thorough review of the records, we believe that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of the offense sufficiently. The evidence readily reveals that MPM Agency was never licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.

Even with a license, however, illegal recruitment could still be committed under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (“R.A. 8042”), otherwise known as the Migrants and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

Sec. 6. Definition. – For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall, likewise, include the following act, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:

(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance;

x x x x

(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment; and(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker’s fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.

In the instant case, accused-appellant committed the acts enumerated in Sec. 6 of R.A. 8042. Testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution clearly shows that, in consideration of a promise of foreign employment, accused-appellant received the amount of Php 45,000.00 from Dela Caza. When accused-appellant made misrepresentations concerning the agency’s purported power and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and in the process, collected money in the guise of placement fees, the former clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment.

Essentially, Dela Caza appeared very firm and consistent in positively identifying accused-appellant as one of those who induced him and the other applicants to part with their money. His testimony showed that accused-appellant made false misrepresentations and promises in assuring them that after they paid the placement fee, jobs in Korea as factory workers were waiting for them and that they would be deployed soon. In fact, Dela Caza personally talked to accused-appellant and gave him the money and saw him sign and issue an official receipt as proof of his payment. Without a doubt, accused-appellants’ actions constituted illegal recruitment.

Additionally, accused-appellant cannot argue that the trial court erred in finding that he was indeed an employee of the recruitment agency. On the contrary, his active participation in the illegal recruitment is unmistakable. The fact that he was the one who issued and signed the official receipt belies his profession of innocence.

This Court likewise finds the existence of a conspiracy between the accused-appellant and the other persons in the agency who are currently at large, resulting in the commission of the crime of syndicated illegal recruitment.

In this case, it cannot be denied that the accused-appellent together with Mardeolyn and the rest of the officers and employees of MPM Agency participated in a network of deception. Verily, the active involvement of each in the recruitment scam was directed at one single purpose – to divest complainants with their money on the pretext of guaranteed employment abroad. The prosecution evidence shows that complainants were briefed by Mardeolyn about the processing of their papers for a possible job opportunity in Korea, as well as their possible salary. Likewise, Yeo Sin Ung, a Korean national, gave a briefing about the business and what to expect from the company. Then, here comes accused-appellant who introduced himself as Mardeolyn’s relative and specifically told Dela Caza of the fact that the agency was able to send many workers abroad. Dela Caza was even showed several workers visas who were already allegedly deployed abroad. Later on, accused-appellant signed and issued an official receipt acknowledging the down payment of Dela Caza. Without a doubt, the nature and extent of the actions of accused-appellant, as well as with the other persons in MPM Agency clearly show unity of action towards a common undertaking. Hence, conspiracy is evidently present.

ESTAFA

The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.[15] Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury.

All these elements are present in the instant case: the accused-appellant, together with the other accused at large, deceived the complainants into believing that the agency had the power and capability to send them abroad for employment; that there were available jobs for them in Korea as factory workers; that by reason or on the strength of such assurance, the complainants parted with their money in payment of the placement fees; that after receiving the money, accused-appellant and his co-accused went into hiding by changing their office locations without informing complainants; and that complainants were never deployed abroad. As all these representations of the accused-appellant proved false, paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is thus applicable.

3. GR NO. 179532CLAUDIO S. YAP VS. THENAMARIS SHIP'S MANAGEMENT (TSM) and INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC. (IMAI)

FACTS:

Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel M/T SEASCOUT by IMAI in behalf of its principal, Venture Shipping Ltd.

Contract of employment was for 12 months After 3 months, the vessel was sold Yap received different kinds of bonuses but he did not accept the payment

of one-month basic wage. The petitioner insisted that he was entitled to the payment of the unexpired

portion of his contract since he was illegally dismissed from the employment.

The respondent alleged that Yap's employment contract was validly terminated due to the sale of the vessel and no arrangement as made for Yap's transfer to TSM vessels.

LABOR ARBITER (LA):

The petitioner filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal before the LA The petitioner claimed that he was entitled to the Salaries corresponding to

the unexpired portion of his contract Decision: In favor of the petitioner. The respondent acted in bad faith when

they assured the petitioner of the re-embarkation and required him to produce an electrician certificate during the period of his contract, but actually he was not able to board one despite of the respondents numerous vessels.

The petitioner made several follow-ups for his re-embarkation but respondent failed to heed his plea; thus, petitioner was forced to litigate in order to vindicate his rights.

The LA opined that since the unexpired portion of the petitioner’s contract was less than one year, petitioner was entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract for a period of nine months.

NLRC: The respondents filed a petition to the NLRC The NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision With modification : Instead of nine months, the NLRC ruled that it should

be for 3 months, pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) 8042. The respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration (MPR) The petitioners also filed a MPR to reinstate the decision of the LA that it

should be nine months. Decision: The MPR of the respondents has been DENIED. The MPR of the

petitioners has been GRANTED. The respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR), but the same was

DENIED.

COURT OF APPEALS (CA) The respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA Decision: The CA affirmed the decision of NLRC and LA’s findings and

rulings. With modification: 3 months only Both the petitioners and respondents filed a MR. Decision: DENIED

ISSUE: WON Section 10 of RA 8042 to the extent that it affords an illegally

dismissed migrant worker the lesser benefit of --- “salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” – is constitutional.

RULING: The Court held that Section 10 of RA 8092 is unconstitutional, as what is

provided under the case of Serrano.

Verily, we have already declared in Serrano that the clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” provided in the 5thparagraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is unconstitutional for being violative of the rights of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) to equal protection of the laws. In an exhaustive discussion of the intricacies and ramifications of the said clause, this Court, in Serrano, pertinently held:

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a

3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

Following Serrano, the court held that the case should not be included in the aforementioned exception. After all, it was not the fault of petitioner that he lost his job due to an act of illegal dismissal committed by respondents. To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law.    

As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 7.     Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.

4. GR NO. 167614

ANTONIO M. SERRANO vs. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO. INC.

FACTS:• Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime and Marlow Navigation under POEA-approved Contract of Employment with the following terms and conditions:Duration of Contract : 12 monthsPosition: Chief OfficerBasic Monthly Salary: US$ 1,400.00Hours of Work: 48 hours per weekOvertime: US$ 700 per monthVacation leave with pay: 7 days per month• On the date of his departure, the Petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of 2nd Officer with a

monthly salary of US$ 1,000.00• The Respondent did not deliver on their promise to make Petitioner Chief Officer• Petitioner refused to stay on as 2nd Officer and was repatriated.• Petitioner served only two (2) moths and seven (7) days of his contract. UNEXPIRED PORTION: nine (9) months and 23 days

LABOR ARBITER (LA):• Petitioner filed a complaint against the Respondent for constructive dismissal and for payment of money claims as well as moral and exemplary damages.• Decision: The LA ruled that the dismissal of the Petitioner is illegal and awarding him monetary benefits.• With Modification: Computation of Money Claims is based on the three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment• With regards to moral and exemplary damages were dismissed.

NLRC:• Respondent appealed to question the finding of the LA that Petitioner was illegally dismissed• Decision: Modified - The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to Petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$ 2,590 to US$ 1,400 because Republic Act (RA) No. 8042 "does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually performed, and for vacation leave with pay".• Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration questioning the constitutionality of the subject clause•Decision: DENIED

COURT OF APPEALS (CA):• Petitioner filed Petition for Certiorari reiterating the constitution challenge against the subject clause• The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate

ISSUE:WoN the subject clause (Section 10, RA 8042) violates Section 10 of Article III of the Constitution.WoN the subject clause violates Section 1 of Article III, Section 18 of Article II and Section 3 of Article XIII.

Subject Clause: "salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,

whichever is less"

RULING:

1. No. The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly there recruitment and deployment of Overseas and Filipino Workers (OFWs), with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.

Section 10 of Article III~No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.~

2. Yes. The subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.

Further, there would be certain misgivings if one is to approach the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the subject clause from the lone perspective that the clause directly violates state policy on labor under Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution.

While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-executing, there are some which the Court has declared not judicially enforceable, Article XIII being one, particularly Section 3.

Therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of a positive enforceable right to stave off the dismissal of an employee for just cause owing to the failure to serve proper notice or hearing. As manifested by several framers of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions on social justice require legislative enactments for their enforceability.

Thus, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot be treated as a principal source of direct enforceable rights, for the violation of which the questioned clause may be declared unconstitutional. It may unwittingly risk opening the floodgates of litigation to every worker or union over every conceivable violation of so broad a concept as social justice for labor.

Along the same line of reasoning, the Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid

governmental purpose.

The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner's right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution.

The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

Section 18 of Article II~The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.~

Section 1 of Article III~No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.~

Section 3 of Article XIII~The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments.~

5. People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Panis 

GR No. L–58674–77, July 11, 1990

FACTS: On January 9, 1981, four information were filed in the in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that herein private respondent Serapio Abug, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals. Abug filed a motion to quash contending that he cannot be charged for illegal recruitment because according

to him, Article 13(b) of the Labor Code says there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee.” 

Denied at first, the motion to quash was reconsidered and granted by the Trial Court in its Orders dated June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981. In the instant case, the view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two or more persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code provides for the innocence or guilt of the private respondent of the crime of illegal recruitment 

HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the CFI’s Orders and reinstated all four information filed against private respondent. 

The Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was merely intended to create a presumption, and not to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto. 

Where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create the said presumption. 

6. Transaction Overseas Corporation vs DOLE SecretarySeptember 5, 1997

Facts: From July 24 to September 9, 1987, Trans Action Overseas Corporation scoured Iloilo City for possible recruits for alleged job vacancies in Hongkong. Private respondents sought employment domestic helpers and paid placement fees to the petitioner ranging from 1K to 14K but petitioner failed to deploy them. Private respondents demanded refund but their demands were ignored so they instituted complaints against the petitioner.

On April 5, 1991, Labor Usec Confesor ordered that the petitioner refund the payments of the 33 private respondents. The petitioner was also held liable for 28 counts of violation of Article 32 of the Labor Code and 5 counts of Articles 34 with corresponding suspension in aggregate period of 66 months. Since the petitioner’s suspension exceeded 12 months, the penalty of cancellation of license was also ordered.

Petitioner filed for Motion for Temporary Lifting of Order of Cancellation alleging that such would jeopardize its operations and affect the interests of the workers about to leave for their respective assignments. It manifested its willingness to post a bond to insure payment to the 33 private respondents. Cancellation was lifted on May 1991 but cancellation was reinstated in April 1992. Thus, the petitioner filed this case. Petitioner contends that the Secretary Confesor acted with grave abuse of discretion because it believed that the POEA has the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide illegal recruitment cases, including authority to cancel recruitment licenses.

ISSUE: WON the Secretary of Labor has the authority to cancel recruitment license?

HELD:

YES The power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit

employees for overseas employment is vested upon the Secretary of DOLE under Article 35 of the Labor Code.

In Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp vs Secretary of Labor, the Court held that the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 to apply the penalties of suspension and cancellation of license.

In People Diaz, the Court held that: “A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary.”

The power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment is concurrently vested with the POEA and the Secretary of Labor.

7. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ADMINISTRATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), vs PRINCIPALIA MANAGEMENT AND

PERSONNEL CONSULTANTS, INCORPORATED G.R. No. 167639 April 19, 2006

This case stemmed from two separate complaints filed before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against Principalia Management and Personnel Consultants, Incorporated (Principalia) for violation of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations.

The first complaint dated July 16, 2003 filed by Ruth Yasmin Concha (Concha) The second complaint dated October 14, 2003 filed by Rafael E. Baldoza (Baldoza)

Concha alleged that in August 2002, she applied with Principalia for placement and employment as caregiver or physical therapist in the USA or Canada. Despite paying P20,000.00 out of the P150,000.00 fee required by Principalia which was not properly receipted, Principalia failed to deploy Concha for employment abroad. the Adjudication Office of the POEA found Principalia liable for violations of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations, particularly for collecting a fee from the applicant before employment was obtained; for non-issuance of official receipt; and for misrepresenting that it was able to secure employment for Concha. Principalia’s license was ordered suspended for 12 months or in lieu thereof, Pricipalia is ordered to pay a fine of P120,000.00 and to refund Concha’s placement fee of P20,000.00.

Baldoza alleged that Principalia assured him of employment in Doha, Qatar as a machine operator with a monthly salary of $450.00. After paying P20,000.00 as placement fee, he departed for Doha, Qatar but when he arrived at the jobsite, he was made to work as welder, a job which he had no skills. He insisted that he was hired as machine operator but the alternative position offered to him was that of helper, which he refused. Thus, he was repatriated on July 5, 2003. On November 12, 2003, Baldoza and Principalia entered into a compromise agreement with quitclaim and release whereby the latter agreed to redeploy Baldoza for employment abroad. Principalia, however, failed to deploy Baldoza as agreed hence, in an Order dated April 29, 2004, the POEA suspended Principalia’s documentary processing. Principalia moved for reconsideration which the POEA granted on June 25, 2004. The latter lifted its order suspending the documentary processing by Principalia after noting that it exerted efforts to obtain overseas employment for Baldoza within the period stipulated in the settlement agreement but due to Baldoza’s lack of qualification, his application was declined by its foreign principal

Meanwhile, on June 14, 2004, or before the promulgation of POEA’s order lifting the suspension, Principalia filed a Complaint8 (Complaint) against Rosalinda D.

Baldoz in her capacity as Administrator of POEA and Atty. Jovencio R. Abara in his capacity as POEA Conciliator, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City for "Annulment of Order for Suspension of Documentation Processing with Damages and Application for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction." Principalia claimed that the suspension of its documentary processing would ruin its reputation and goodwill and would cause the loss of its applicants, employers and principals. Thus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a writ of mandatory injunction must be issued to prevent serious and irreparable damage to it.

The Trial Court grant the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the defendant[s] Rosalinda D. Baldoz and Atty. Jovencio R. Abara, from implementing the Orders of Suspension.

After the hearing on the preliminary injunction, the trial court held that the issue on the application for preliminary mandatory injunction has become moot because POEA had already released the renewal of license of Principalia. It however issue the Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction prayed for by the plaintiff, upon posting of a bond in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php 500,000.00), stressing that the Order of Suspension dated March 15, 2004 is still pending appeal before the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and that the said Order dated March 15, 2004 does not categorically state that the suspension of Plaintiff’s License is immediately executory contrary to the contention of the defendants.

Counsel for POEA argued that the basis for the immediate implementation thereof is Section 5, Rule V, Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulation, which is quoted hereunder, as follows: "Section 5. Stay of Execution. The decision of the Administration shall be stayed during the pendency of the appeal; Provided that where the penalty imposed carried the maximum penalty of twelve (12) months suspension o[r] cancellation of license, the decision shall be immediately executory despite pendency of the appeal."

The Order dated March 15, 2004 decreed Plaintiff as having violated Section 2 (a) (d) and (e) of Rule I, Part VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations and the Plaintiffs was imposed the penalty of twelve (12) months suspension of license (or in lieu, to pay fine of P120,000, it being it[s] first offense).

Violation of Section 2 (a) (d) and (e) Rule I, Part VI of POEA Rules and Regulations imposes a penalty of two (2) months to six (6) months suspension of license for the FIRST offender (sic). And in the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the medium range of the imposable penalty which is four (4) months shall be meted out. Being a first offender, the plaintiff was imposed suspension of license for four (4) months for each violation or an aggregate period of suspension for twelve (12) months for the three (3) violations.

POEA avers that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction when the requirements to issue the same have not been met. It asserts that Principalia had no clear and convincing right to the relief demanded as it had no proof of irreparable damage as required under the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction? Held: No. The trial court did not decree that the POEA, as the granting authority of Principalia’s license to recruit, is not allowed to determine Principalia’s compliance with the conditions for the grant, as POEA would have us believe. For all intents and purposes, POEA can determine whether the licensee has complied with the requirements. In this instance, the trial court observed that the Order of Suspension dated March 15, 2004 was pending appeal with the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Thus, until such time that the appeal is resolved with finality by the DOLE, Principalia has a clear and convincing right to operate as a recruitment agency.Furthermore, irreparable damage was duly proven by Principalia. Suspension of its license is not easily quantifiable nor is it susceptible to simple mathematical computation, as alleged by POEA.

If the injunctive writ was not granted, Principalia would have been labeled as an untrustworthy recruitment agency before there could be any final adjudication of its case by the DOLE. It would have lost both its employer-clients and its prospective Filipino-applicants. Loss of the former due to a tarnished reputation is not quantifiable.

Moreover, POEA would have no authority to exercise its regulatory functions over Principalia because the matter had already been brought to the jurisdiction of the DOLE. Principalia has been granted the license to recruit and process documents for Filipinos interested to work abroad. Thus, POEA’s action of suspending Principalia’s license before final adjudication by the DOLE would be premature and would amount to a violation of the latter’s right to recruit and deploy workers.

8. G.R. No. 156029 November 14, 2008SANTOSA B. DATUMAN vs. FIRST COSMOPOLITAN MANPOWER AND PROMOTION SERVICES, INC.

Facts:

Sometime in 1989, respondent First Cosmopolitan Manpower & Promotion Services, Inc. recruited petitioner Santosa B. Datuman to work in Bahrain as a saleslady with basic monthly salary of US$370.00. The duration of the contract of employment was for one year and the foreign employer is identified as Mohammed Sharif Abbas Ghulam Hussain.

On April 17, 1989, petitioner was deployed to Bahrain after paying the required placement fee. However, her employer Mohammed Hussain took her passport when she arrived there; and instead of working as a saleslady, she was forced to work as a domestic helper with a salary of Forty Bahrain Dinar (BD40.00), equivalent only to One Hundred US Dollars (US$100.00), contrary to the agreed salary of US$370.00 indicated in her Contract of Employment signed in the Philippines and approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).

On September 1, 1989, her employer compelled her to sign another contract, transferring her to another employer as housemaid with a salary of BD40.00 for the duration of two (2) years. She pleaded with him to give her a release paper and to return her passport but her pleas were unheeded. Left with no choice, she continued working against her will. Worse, she even worked without compensation from September 1991 to April 1993 because of her employer's continued failure and refusal to pay her salary despite demand.

In May 1993, she was able to finally return to the Philippines through the help of the Bahrain Passport and Immigration Department

May 1995: Petitioner filed a complaint before the POEA Adjudication Office against respondent for underpayment and nonpayment of salary, vacation leave pay and refund of her plane fare; while the case was pending, Datuman filed the instant case before the NLRC for underpayment of salary for a period of one year and six months, nonpayment of vacation pay and reimbursement of return airfare.

The parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement before the Labor Arbiter

Respondent: Contends the following – 1) Petitioner actually agreed to work in Bahrain as a housemaid for one (1) year because it was the only position available then. However, since such position was not yet allowed by the POEA at that time, they mutually agreed to submit the contract to the POEA indicating petitioner's position as saleslady;2) It was actually petitioner herself who violated the terms of their contract when she allegedly transferred to another employer without respondent's knowledge and approval;

3) Respondent raised the defense of prescription of cause of action since the claim was filed beyond the three (3)-year period from the time the right accrued, reckoned from either 1990 or 1991.

Labor Arbiter decision: (April 29, 1998) Labor Arbiter Jovencio Mayor, Jr. rendered a Decision finding respondent liable for violating the terms of the Employment Contract and ordering it to pay petitioner: (a) the amount of US$4,050.00, or its equivalent rate prevailing at the time of payment, representing her salary differentials for fifteen (15) months since the record is bereft of any evidence to show that complainant Datuman is either not entitled to her wage differentials or have already received the same from respondent

(From January 1992 April 1993 (15 months)US$370.00 - agreed salary; US$100.00 - actual paid salary; US$270.00 - balanceUS$270.00 x 15 months = US$4050.00);(b) the amount of BD 180.00 or its equivalent rate prevailing at the time of payment, representing the refund of plane ticket.

The Labor Arbiter noted that respondent admitted that it had entered into an illegal contract with complainant by proposing the position of a housemaid which said position was then not allowed by the POEA, by making it appear in the Employment Contract that the position being applied for is the position of a saleslady. It is indubitably clear that the foreign employer had taken advantage to the herein hopeless complainant and because of this ordeal, the same obviously rendered complainant's continuous employment unreasonable if not downright impossible.

However, claim for vacation leave pay and overtime pay cannot granted for failure on the part of complainant to prove with particularity the months that she was not granted vacation leave and the day wherein she did render overtime work.

Award of damages and attorney's fees are also denied for lack of factual and legal basis.NLRC Decision: The NLRC affirmed with modification the Decision of Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr., by reducing the award of salary differentials from US$4,050.00 to US$2,970.00.

(Basis: The claims for salary differentials accruing earlier than April of 1993 had already prescribed. This is so as complainant had filed her complaint on May 31, 1995 when she arrived from the jobsite in April 1993. Since the cause of action for

salary differential accrues at the time when it falls due, it is clear that only the claims for the months of May 1993 to April 1994 have not yet prescribed.)

CA Decision: The CA agreed with the respondent Commission in declaring that claims of private respondent "for salary differentials accruing earlier than April of 1993 had indeed prescribed." The CA noted that petitioner company is privy only to the first contract. Granting arguendo that its liability extends to the acts of its foreign principal, the Towering Recruiting Services, which appears to have a hand in the execution of the second contract, the same would, at the most, extend only up to the expiration of the second contract or until 01 September 1991. Clearly, the money claims subject of the complaint filed in 1995 had prescribed.

However, this Court declares respondent Commission as not only having abused its discretion, but as being without jurisdiction at all, in declaring private respondent entitled to salary differentials. After decreeing the money claims accruing before April 1993 as having prescribed, it has no more jurisdiction to hold petitioner company for salary differentials after that period. The provisions in number 2, Section 10 (a), Rule V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code Section 1 (f), Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations were not made to make the local agency a perpetual insurer against all untoward acts that may be done by the foreign principal or the direct employer abroad. It is only as regards the principal contract to which it is privy shall its liability extend.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in not holding respondent liable for petitioner's money claims pursuant to their Contract of Employment.

Ruling:On whether respondent is solidarily liable for petitioner's monetary claims - Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations states that the private employment agency shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer. Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. The SC disagrees with the view of the CA that the solidary liability of respondent extends only to the first contract (i.e. the original, POEA-approved contract which had a term of until April 1990). The signing of the "substitute" contracts with the foreign employer/principal before the expiration of the POEA-approved contract and any continuation of petitioner's employment beyond the original one-year term, against the will of petitioner, are continuing breaches of the original POEA-approved contract. Republic Act No. 8042 explicitly prohibits the substitution or alteration to the prejudice of the worker of employment contracts

already approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the DOLE. The diminution in the salary of petitioner from US$370.00 to US$100 (BD 40.00) per month is void for violating the POEA-approved contract which set the minimum standards, terms, and conditions of her employment. Consequently, the solidary liability of respondent with petitioner's foreign employer for petitioner's money claims continues although she was forced to sign another contract in Bahrain. It is the terms of the original POEA-approved employment contract that shall govern the relationship of petitioner with the respondent recruitment agency and the foreign employer. Respondent's evident bad faith and admitted circumvention of the laws and regulations on migrant workers belie its protestations of innocence and put petitioner in a position where she could be exploited and taken advantage of overseas, as what indeed happened to her in this case.

On whether petitioner's claims for underpaid salaries have prescribed - The SC agreed with the NLRC ruling that the right to claim unpaid salaries (or in this case, unpaid salary differentials) accrue as they fall due. Thus, petitioner's cause of action to claim salary differential for October 1989 only accrued after she had rendered service for that month (or at the end of October 1989). Her right to claim salary differential for November 1989 only accrued at the end of November 1989, and so on and so forth.

To determine for which months petitioner's right to claim salary differentials has not prescribed, we must count three years prior to the filing of the complaint on May 31, 1995. Thus, only claims accruing prior to May 31, 1992 have prescribed when the complaint was filed on May 31, 1995. Petitioner is entitled to her claims for salary differentials for the period May 31, 1992 to April 1993, or approximately eleven (11) months.

The NLRC correctly computed the salary differential due to petitioner at US$2,970.00. However, it should be for the period May 31, 1992 to April 1993 and not May 1993 to April 1994 as erroneously stated in the NLRC's Decision.

9. Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group, Inc. and Chung Gai Ship Mgt. v.Sulpecio Medequillo, Jr.

January 18, 2012

FACTS:

On March 6, 1995, respondent Sulpecio Medequillo filed a complaint before the Adjudication Office of the POEA against petitioners for illegal dismissal under a first contract and failure to deploy under a second contract.

In his complaint-affidavit, respondent Medequillo alleged the ff.:

1. Respondent was hired by Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group, Inc. on behalf of the principal Chung Gai Ship Management as Third Assistant on board the vessel “Stolt Aspiration” for a period of 9 months for $1,212.00 per month;

2. He then joined the vessel MV Stolt Aspiration, but only after 3 months, he was told by the ship's master to disembark the vessel. He was repatriated back to Manila for no reason or explanation.

3. Upon his return to Manila, he proceeded immediately to the petitioner's office. He was transferred employment to another vessel MV “Stolt Pride” under the same terms and conditions as the First Contract.

4. POEA approved the Second Contract, however, respondent was not deployed by petitioners despite the commencement of the contract. POEA subsequently certified the Second Employment Contract without the knowledge that petitioners failed to deploy the respondent.

5. Because of petitioners alleged non-compliance with the Second Contract, respondent Medequilla demanded for the return of his passport and other employment documents from the petitioners. He claimed that he was made to involuntarily sign a document in order to recover his employment papers.

Medequilla asked for payment of damages for illegal dismissal (First Contract) and non-compliance in bad faith with the Second Contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners have the obligation to deploy the respondent by virtue of the perfected contract, and thus will be held liable for damages in case of non-deployment.

HELD:

Yes, petitioners are liable for damages. The petitioners argue that under the POEA Contract, actual deployment of the seafarer is a suspensive condition for the commencement of the employment. The Court agreed with petitioners on such point. However, even without actual deployment, the perfected contract gives rise to obligations on the part of petitioners. Parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.

Thus, even if by the standard contract employment commences only “upon actual departure of the seafarer”, this does not mean that the seafarer has no remedy in case of non-deployment without any valid reason.

The Court further made a distinction between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee relationship would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party.

10. G.R. No. 121777       January 24, 2001THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant.

ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT:Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur. First, the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. Second, he or she undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.38 In case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element is added: that the accused commits said acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group. 

FACTS:

Carol M. dela Piedra is convicted for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime.

On January 30, 1994, at exactly 10:00 in the morning, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa.

Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an applicant; She received a bio-data form from a Carol Fegueroa

Ramos contacted a friend, Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go to No. 26-D, Tetuan Highway, Sta. Cruz, Zamboanga City, where the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken

A raiding team was planned between POEA and CIS team led by Capt. Mendoza to commence the next day with SPO2 Fermindoza posing as a would-be-applicant

Fermindoza talked personally with Carol and as the latter was filling up the application form, Fermindoza signaled to the raiding party waiting outside the house. Carol Fegueroa was caught holding filled up application forms

The CIS asked Figueroa if she had a permit to recruit. Figueroa retorted that she was not engaged in recruitment. Capt. Mendoza nevertheless proceeded to arrest Figueroa. He took the application forms she was holding as the raiding party seized the other papers on the table.

The CIS team then brought Figueroa, a certain Jasmine Alejandro, and the three women suspected to be applicants, to the office for investigation.

In the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that Carol Figueroa had many aliases, among them, Carol Llena and Carol dela Piedra. The accused was not able to present any authority to recruit when asked by the investigators. A check by Ramos with the POEA revealed that the acused was not licensed or authorized to conduct recruitment. A certification dated February 2, 1994 stating thus was executed by Renegold M. Macarulay, Officer-in-Charge of the POEA.

Accused was charged before RTC of Zamboanga in an information alleging:1. That on or about January 30, 1994, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines,

Carol dela Piedra, having no POEA license or authority to engage in recruitment and overseas placement of workers – willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, offered and promised for a fee an employment in Singapore to: Maria Lourdes Modesto [y] Gadrino, Nancy Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn Baez y Timbol

2. Maria Lourdes had already advanced P2k to accused in consideration of the promised employment.

The accused denied in court that she went to Jasmine's residence to engage in recruitment. She claimed she came to Zamboanga City to visit her friends, to whom she could confide since she and her husband were having some problems. She denied she knew Nancy Araneta or that she brought information sheets for job placement. She also denied instructing Jasmine to collect P2,000 from alleged applicants as processing fee.

RTC: finds the accused Carol dela Piedra alias Carol Llena and Carol Figueroa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment committed in a large scale and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P100,000.00, and also to pay the costs. Being a detention prisoner, the said accused is entitled to the full time of the period of her

detention during the pendency of this case under the condition set forth in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code

Appellant submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining "recruitment and placement" is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause

ISSUES: 1. Constitutionality of Sec 13(B) of PD 442, as amended “Illegal Recruitment

Law”2. Absence of illegal recruitment in the alleged “victims” of Carol dela Piedra3. Alleged crime of illegal recruitment was not committed on a Large Scale,

hence penalty should not be life imprisonment

HELD: IT IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

In the first assigned error, appellant maintains that the law defining "recruitment and placement" violates due process. Appellant also aver, that she was denied the equal protection of the laws.

Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.We added, however, that:x x x the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction.

As we see it, the proviso (see ARTICLE 13(B) of the Illegal Recruitment Law) was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers."

The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing

with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create that presumption.

2. In this case, the first element of illegal recruitment is present. The certification of POEA Officer-in-Charge Macarulay states that appellant is

not licensed or authorized to engage in recruitment and placement. The second element is also present. Appellant is presumed engaged in

recruitment and placement under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. Both Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified that appellant promised them employment for a fee. Their testimonies corroborate each other on material points: the briefing conducted by appellant, the time and place thereof, the fees involved. Affirmative testimony of persons who are eyewitnesses of the fact asserted easily overrides negative testimony.

That appellant did not receive any payment for the promised or offered employment is of no moment. From the language of the statute, the act of recruitment may be "for profit or not;" it suffices that the accused "promises or offers for a fee employment" to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.

Considering that the two elements of lack of license or authority and the undertaking of an activity constituting recruitment and placement are present, appellant, at the very least, is liable for "simple" illegal recruitment.

3. NO, She is not guilty of illegal recruitment in a “large scale” A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in

each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group. In this case, only two persons, Araneta and Modesto, were proven to have been recruited by appellant. The third person named in the complaint as having been promised employment for a fee, Jennelyn Baez, was not presented in court to testify.

It is true that law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial; nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons. In this case, evidence that appellant likewise promised her employment for a fee is sketchy. The only evidence that tends to prove this fact is the testimony of Nancy Araneta, who said that she and her friends, Baez and Sandra Aquino, came to the briefing and that they (she and her "friends") filled up application forms.

Baez’ affidavit executed with Araneta cannot support Araneta’s testimony. Insofar as it purports to prove that appellant recruited Baez, therefore, the affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible. 

Neither can appellant be convicted for recruiting CIS agent Eileen Fermindoza or even the other persons present in the briefing of January 30, 1994. Appellant is accused of recruiting only the three persons named in the information — Araneta, Modesto and Baez. The information does not include Fermindoza or

the other persons present in the briefing as among those promised or offered employment for a fee.

 Section 19 (1), Article III of the Constitution states: "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted."The penalty of life imprisonment imposed upon appellant must be reduced. Because the prosecution was able to prove that appellant committed recruitment and placement against two persons only, she cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale, which requires that recruitment be committed against three or more persons.

Appellant can only be convicted of two counts of "simple" illegal recruitment, one for that committed against Nancy Araneta, and another count for that committed against Lourdes Modesto. Appellant is sentenced, for each count, to suffer the penalty of four (4) to six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the regional trial court is MODIFIED. Appellant is hereby declared guilty of illegal recruitment on two (2) counts and is sentenced, for each count, to suffer the penalty of four (4) to six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

11. ESTATE OF NELSON R. DULAY, represented by his wife MERRIDY JANE P. DULAY,

Petitioner,- versus –

ABOITIZ JEBSEN MARITIME, INC. and GENERAL CHARTERERS, INC.,Respondents.

THIRD DIVISION, Justice J. Peralta

FACTS:  Nelson R. Dulay was employed by General Charterers Inc. (GCI), a

subsidiary of co-petitioner Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime Inc. since 1986. He initially worked as an ordinary seaman and later as bosun on a

contractual basis. From September 3, 1999 up to July 19, 2000, Nelson was detailed in petitioners’ vessel, the MV Kickapoo Belle.

After the completion of his employment contract, Nelson died due to acute renal failure secondary to septicemia.

At the time of his death, Nelson was a bona fide member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seaman’s Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), GCI’s collective bargaining agent.

Nelson’s widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for death benefits through the grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between AMOSUP and GCI.

However, the grievance procedure was “declared deadlocked” as petitioners refused to grant the benefits sought by the widow. Merridy Jane filed a complaint with the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Board in General Santos City against GCI for death and medical benefits and damages.

The amount claimed by Nelson’s widow is $90,000 however GCI awarded P20,000 in favor of the deceased’s brother. Merridy claims the remaining amount less the P20,000 her brother-in-law received.

Respondent on the other hand refused to award the same on the ground that there is no employer-employee relationship between GC and Nelson at the time of his death. His contract with respondent was already completed upon his death.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, ordering respondents to pay the $90,000 death benefits less the P20,000 already received.

NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter during appeal. When the matter was brought before the Court of Appeals for certiorari, the CA granted the petition and referred the case to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for the designation of the Voluntary Arbitrator. The CA ruled that since the case involve interpretation of the CBA, the Voluntary Arbitrator has jurisdiction and not the CA.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case. YES, the Voluntary Arbitrator must take cognizance of the case.

RULING:The Court agrees with the CA in holding that this issue clearly involves the

interpretation or implementation of the said CBA. Thus, the specific or special provisions of the Labor Code govern. Articles 217(c) and 261 of the Labor Code are very specific in stating that voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements.

In any case, the Court agrees with petitioner's contention that the CBA is the law or contract between the parties. Article 13.1 of the CBA entered into by and between respondent GCI and AMOSUP, the union to which petitioner belongs, provides as follows:

The Company and the Union agree that in case of dispute or conflict in the interpretation or application of any of the provisions of this Agreement, or enforcement of Company policies, the same shall be settled through negotiation, conciliation or voluntary arbitration. 

 In the same manner, Section 29 of the prevailing Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels, promulgated by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), provides as follows: Section 29. Dispute Settlement Procedures.  −  In cases of claims and disputes arising from this employment, the parties covered by a collective bargaining agreement shall submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.

   It is clear from the above that the interpretation of the DOLE, in consultation with their counterparts in the respective committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, as well as the DFA and the POEA is that with respect to disputes involving claims of Filipino seafarers wherein the parties are covered by a CBA, the dispute or claim should be submitted to the jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. It is only in the absence of a CBA that parties may opt to submit the dispute to either the NLRC or to voluntary arbitration.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that the voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction over the instant case.

12. Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management Inc.

FACTS:Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent) for about five (5) years. He signed a new contract of employment with the duration of 9 months on Feb 3 1998 and he was to be deployed 10 days after. This contract was approved by POEA. A week before the date of departure, the respondent received a phone call from petitioner’s wife and some unknown callers asking not to send the latter off because if allowed, he will jump ship in Canada.

Because of the said information, petitioner was told that he would not be leaving for Canada anymore. This prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondent. The LA held the latter responsible. On appeal, the NLRC ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent, hence, the claims should be dismissed. The CA agreed with the NLRC’s finding that

since petitioner had not departed from the Port of Manila, no employer-employee relationship between the parties arose and any claim for damages against the so-called employer could have no leg to stand on.

On the other hand, respondent argues that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to award petitioner’s monetary claims. His employment with respondent did not commence because his deployment was withheld for a valid reason. Consequently, the labor arbiter and/or the NLRC cannot entertain adjudication of petitioner’s case much less award damages to him. The controversy involves a breach of contractual obligations and as such is cognizable by civil courts.

ISSUES: 1) When does the employer-employee relationship involving seafarers commence?2) Assuming that there is no employer-employee relationship, does the Las of the NLRC have jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:#1A distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee relationship by virtue of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels (POEA Standard Contract) states that the employment contract shall commence upon actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport at the point of hire and with a POEA-approved contract. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party.

Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.

Respondent’s act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and boarding "MSV Seaspread" constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to petitioner’s cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual damages he suffered.

Despite the fact that the employer-employee relationship did not commence, the perfection of the contract between petitioner and respondent gave birth to certain contractual obligations which were clearly violated in the case at bar.

#2Despite the absence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent, the Court rules that the NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employer-employee relationships. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), provides that:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship OR by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. x x x