September 2003 FEMA 386-7 Version 2...2013/09/08 · Version 2.0 September 2003 i T he Federal...

September 2003FEMA 386-7

Version 2.0

STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNINGhow-to guide

Version 2.0 September 2003

foreword

introduction

PHASE ONE organize resources

PHASE TWO assess risks

PHASE THREE develop a mitigation plan

PHASE FOUR implement the plan and monitor progress

afterword

appendix a acronyms

appendix b glossary

appendix c library

appendix d worksheets

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Contents

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STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

thehazard

mitigationplanningprocess

Hazard mitigation planning is the pro-cess of determining how to reduce oreliminate the loss of life and propertydamage resulting from natural andmanmade hazards. This diagramshows the four basic phases of thehazard mitigation process.

For illustration purposes, this diagramportrays a process that appears to pro-ceed sequentially. However, the miti-gation planning process is rarely lin-ear. It is not unusual that ideasdeveloped while assessing risksshould need revision and additional in-formation while developing the mitiga-tion plan, or that implementing the planmay result in new goals or additionalrisk assessment.

foreword

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The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hasdeveloped this series of mitigation planning “how-to” guides to

assist states, communities, and tribes in enhancing their hazardmitigation planning capabilities.

These guides are designed to provide the type of information stateand local governments need to initiate and maintain a planningprocess that will result in safer communities. These guides areapplicable to states and communities of various sizes and varyingranges of financial and technical resources.

This how-to series is not intended to be the last word on any of thesubject matter covered; rather, it is meant to provide clear guid-ance for the field practitioner. In practice, these guides may besupplemented with more extensive technical resources and the useof experts when necessary.

The series consists of four guides covering the core aspects of theplanning process, and additional guides addressing special topicsin hazard mitigation. The “core four” guides cover:

� Getting started with the mitigation planning process,including important considerations for how you canorganize your efforts to develop an effective mitigationplan (FEMA 386-1);

� Identifying hazards and assessing losses to your commu-nity or state (FEMA 386-2);

� Setting mitigation priorities and goals for your commu-nity or state and writing the plan (FEMA 386-3); and

� Implementing the mitigation plan, including projectfunding and maintaining a dynamic plan that changesto meet new developments (FEMA 386-4).

Special topics covered include:

� Evaluating potential mitigation actions through the useof benefit-cost analysis and other techniques (FEMA386-5);

foreword

mit-i-gate\ 1: to cause to be-come less harsh or hostile;2: to make less severe orpainful

plan-ning\ : the act or process of mak-ing or carrying out plans; specif: the es-tablishment of goals, policies and proce-dures for a social or economic unit

ii STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

� Incorporating special considerations into hazard mitiga-tion planning for historic properties and culturalresources (FEMA 386-6);

� Incorporating mitigation considerations for manmadehazards into hazard mitigation planning, the topic ofthis how-to guide (FEMA 386-7);

� Using multi-jurisdictional approaches to mitigationplanning (FEMA 386-8); and

� Finding and securing technical and financial resourcesfor mitigation planning (FEMA 386-9).

Why should you take the time to readthese guides?

� It simply costs too much to address the effects of disas-ters only after they happen;

� State and federal aid is usually insufficient to cover thefull extent of physical and economic damages resultingfrom disasters;

� You can prevent a surprising amount of disaster damageif you understand where and how these phenomenaoccur;

� You can lessen the impact of both natural and techno-logical hazards and speed the response and recoveryprocess; and

� The most meaningful steps in avoiding the impacts ofhazards are taken at the state and local levels by officialsand community members who have a personal stake inthe outcome and/or the ability to follow through on asustained program of planning and implementation.

The guides focus on showing how mitigation planning:

� Can help your community become more sustainable anddisaster-resistant through selecting the most appropriatemitigation actions, based on the knowledge you gain inthe hazard identification and risk assessment process;

� Allows you to focus your efforts on the hazard areas mostimportant to you by determining and setting priorities formitigation planning efforts; and

foreword

iiiVersion 2.0 September 2003

This special-topicguide, IntegratingManmade HazardsInto Mitigation Plan-ning, is not designed to

help you establish procedures to re-spond to disasters, write an emergencyoperations plan, or create a counter-terrorism program for your community;rather, it assumes that your communityis engaged in the mitigation planningprocess and serves as a resource tohelp you expand the scope of your planto address terrorism and technologicalhazards. It provides information tosupplement your community’s hazardmitigation planning efforts. Becauseeach of the four mitigation planningphases is covered comprehensively inits own how-to guide, references to otherpublications in the series are often usedin lieu of full explanations of a processor activity. Furthermore, the guide is in-tended not as a highly technical manualbut rather as a source of general guid-ance for the broad audiences that arelikely to comprise state and local miti-gation planning teams, including partici-pants from government agencies, com-munity interest groups, industrialpartners, and others.

� Can save you money by providing a forum for engaging inpartnerships that could provide technical, financial,and/or staff resources in your effort to reduce theeffects, and hence the costs, of natural and manmadehazards.

These guides provide a range of approaches to preparing a hazardmitigation plan. There is no one right planning process. However,there are several elements that are common to all successfulplanning endeavors, such as engaging citizens, developing goalsand objectives, and monitoring progress. Select the approach thatworks best in your state or community.

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introduction

Manmade HazardsFor the purpose of this guide, “manmade hazards”are technological hazards and terrorism. Theseare distinct from natural hazards primarily in that

they originate from human activity. In contrast, while the riskspresented by natural hazards may be increased or decreasedas a result of human activity, they are not inherently human-induced.

The term “technological hazards” refers to the origins ofincidents that can arise from human activities such as themanufacture, transportation, storage, and use of hazardousmaterials. For the sake of simplicity, this guide assumes thattechnological emergencies are accidental and that their con-sequences are unintended.

The term “terrorism” refers to intentional, criminal, maliciousacts. There is no single, universally accepted definition of ter-rorism, and it can be interpreted in many ways. Officially, ter-rorism is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as “...the

Disasters are events that can cause loss of life and property,environmental damage, and disruption of governmental,

social, and economic activities. They occur when hazards impacthuman settlements and the built environment. Throughout theCold War, the focus of emergency management planning was onresponding to and recovering from nuclear attack by foreignenemies. During the 1990s, this emphasis shifted to address naturaldisasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods.

Yet again, the need to incorporate new threats into emergencymanagement planning—this time, manmade hazards such asterrorism and technological disasters—has become all too appar-ent, as demonstrated by the September 11, 2001 attacks on NewYork City and Washington, DC and the July 2001 hazardous mate-rial train derailment and fire in Baltimore, Maryland. Additionally,the 2001 anthrax attacks, the 1996 bombing at the summer Olym-pics in Atlanta, the 1995 destruction of the Murrah Federal Build-ing in Oklahoma City, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, andscores of smaller-scale incidents and accidents reinforce the needfor communities to reduce their vulnerability to future terroristacts and technological disasters.

unlawful use of force and violence against persons or prop-erty to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian popula-tion, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or so-cial objectives.” (28 CFR, Section 0.85). The Federal Bureauof Investigation (FBI) further characterizes terrorism as eitherdomestic or international, depending on the origin, base, andobjectives of the terrorist organization; however, the origin ofthe terrorist or person causing the hazard is far less relevantto mitigation planning than the hazard itself and its conse-quences.

For the purposes of this guide, “terrorism” refers to the use ofWeapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), including biological,chemical, nuclear, and radiological weapons; arson, incendi-ary, explosive, and armed attacks; industrial sabotage andintentional hazardous materials releases; and “cyber-terrorism.” Within these general categories, however, thereare many variations. Particularly in the area of biological andchemical weapons, there are a wide variety of agents andways for them to be disseminated.

vi STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

Although this series of mitigation planning how-to guides—as wellas mitigation planning mandates such as the Disaster MitigationAct of 2000 (DMA 2000)—grew out of a focus on planning fornatural hazards, recent events suggest that an all-hazard mitigationplan should also address hazards generated by human activitiessuch as terrorism and hazardous material accidents. While theterm “mitigation” refers generally to activities that reduce loss oflife and property by eliminating or reducing the effects of disasters,in the terrorism context it is often interpreted to include a widevariety of preparedness and response actions. For the purposes ofthis how-to guide, the traditional meaning will be assumed; that is,“mitigation” refers to specific actions that can be taken to reduceloss of life and property from manmade hazards by modifying thebuilt environment to reduce the risk and potential consequencesof these hazards.

To better structure the way in which we manage disasters, theconcept of the “four phases of emergency management” wasintroduced in the early 1980s after the similarities between naturaldisaster preparedness and civil defense became clear. This ap-proach can be applied to all disasters.

� Mitigation is defined as any sustained action taken toreduce or eliminate long-term risk to life and propertyfrom a hazard event. Mitigation, also known as preven-tion (when done before a disaster), encourages long-term reduction of hazard vulnerability. The goal ofmitigation is to decrease the need for response asopposed to simply increasing the response capability.Mitigation can save lives and reduce property damage,and should be cost-effective and environmentally sound.This, in turn, can reduce the enormous cost of disastersto property owners and all levels of government. Inaddition, mitigation can protect critical communityfacilities, reduce exposure to liability, and minimizecommunity disruption.

� Preparedness includes plans and preparations made tosave lives and property and to facilitate response opera-tions.

� Response includes actions taken to provide emergencyassistance, save lives, minimize property damage, andspeed recovery immediately following a disaster.

� Recovery includes actions taken to return to a normal orimproved operating condition following a disaster.

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FEMA developed the Integrated Emergency Management System(IEMS) using an all-hazards approach. While the IEMS was estab-lished as an “all-hazard” approach, responding to the threat ofterrorism (referred to as counterterrorism) came to be viewed as theresponsibility of law enforcement, defense, and intelligenceagencies. Furthermore, defensive efforts to protect people andfacilities from terrorism (referred to as antiterrorism) were gener-ally limited to the government sector, the military, and someindustrial interests. However, both technological disasters andincidents of domestic and international terrorism on United Statessoil during the past decade have made it clear that emergencymanagers, first responders, and planners must now work togetherto build better and safer communities in the 21st century.

While you may not be able to prevent every accident or deliberateattack, it is well within your ability to reduce the likelihood and/orthe potential effects of an incident through mitigation. The pro-cess of mitigating hazards before they become disasters is similarfor both natural and manmade hazards. Whether you are dealingwith natural disasters, threats of terrorism, or hazardous materialsaccidents, you will use a process of 1) identifying and organizingyour resources; 2) conducting a risk or threat assessment andestimating potential losses; 3) identifying mitigation actions thatwill reduce the effects of the hazards and creating a strategy toplace them in priority order; and 4) implementing the actions,evaluating the results, and keeping the plan up-to-date. This four-phase process is known as mitigation planning.

In one form or another, planning is an element of almost every-thing that individuals, institutions, corporations, and governmentsdo. Planning helps to coordinate actions, determine the order inwhich goals are accomplished, leverage opportunities, and identifypriorities for allocating resources. Hazard mitigation planning isthe integration of these activities into a community’s emergencymanagement programs in order to reduce or eliminate losses oflife and property due to disasters.

The terms counterterrorismand antiterrorism are often usedinterchangeably. When using theseterms, you should be careful to distin-guish their meaning. Counterterrorism

deals with offensively man-aging the threat of terrorism,while antiterrorism refers todefensive efforts to protectpeople and property.

Hazard Mitigation PlanningThe hazard mitigation planning processconsists of four basic phases as shownbelow. The first phase, Organize Re-sources, addresses the creation of aplanning team with representatives fromthe public and private sectors, citizengroups, higher education institutions,and non-profits. The second phase, As-sess Risks, explains identifying hazardsand assessing losses. The third andfourth phases, Develop a Mitigation Planand Implement the Plan and MonitorProgress, discuss establishing goalsand priorities and selecting mitigationprojects, and writing, implementing, andrevisiting the mitigation plan, respec-tively.

viii STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

How do you use this and the other how-to guides?Integrating Manmade Hazards into Mitigation Planning, the seventhguide in the how-to series, provides information that will help youincorporate manmade hazards into the four phases of the mitiga-tion planning process in your community or state, from organizingyour resources to updating your plan. This how-to guide followsthe four-phase mitigation process. Each section corresponds to oneof the phases.

The planning process is as individual as the jurisdiction thatengages in it. Each community or state approaches growth andchange in a unique way, and the process of planning for the futureshould fit your particular community’s or state’s “personality.” As aresult, you should not consider the step-by-step sequence includedin this and other how-to guides to be the only way to pursue mitiga-tion planning. However, the process illustrated here is based oncertain steps common to successful planning.

Types of Information Found in the How-to Series

The how-to series contains several types of information. Someinformation is highlighted with icons. Additional information canbe found in Appendix C, Library.

Icons

The “States” icon identifies guidance focused solely on the role ofthe state. Although much of the information will be the same forlocal, tribal, and state governments, there are different require-ments for state and local mitigation plans. Furthermore, stateshave additional responsibilities to assist local entities in theirplanning efforts. Guidance focusing on local governments appliesto tribes as well.

The “Caution” icon alerts you to important information and waysto avoid sticky situations later in the planning process.

The “DMA” icon provides information relating to the mitigationplanning requirements outlined in the Disaster Mitigation Act of2000 (DMA 2000) regulations.

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The “Glossary” icon identifies terms and concepts for which adetailed explanation is provided in Appendix B, Glossary.

The “Tips” icon identifies helpful hints and useful informationthat can be used in the planning process.

Library

A mitigation planning “Library” has been included in Appendix C.The library has a wealth of information, including Web addresses,reference sources, and other information. All of the Web sites andreferences listed in the how-to guide are included in the library.

Worksheets

Finally, to help track your progress, worksheets have been devel-oped to correspond with the activities in this guide. These areincluded at the end of each section, where applicable, and inAppendix D, Worksheets. You can duplicate these forms and usethem to organize your work as you implement the mitigationplanning process.

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organizeresources

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Overview

Phase 1, Organize Resources, involves getting started in thehazard mitigation planning process by identifying and pulling

together resources such as funding, staff, and political support.These resources will be necessary both to get the process off theground and to achieve maximum effectiveness in the long term.

This section supplements the guidance provided in the GettingStarted: Building Support for Mitigation Planning how-to guide (FEMA386-1). Step 1 involves establishing community support for inte-grating manmade hazards into the mitigation planning process.Step 2 includes developing a list of stakeholders with expertise inhazardous materials, security issues, and law enforcement, amongother disciplines, that you may want to add to your planning team.Step 3 discusses special considerations relevant to public participa-tion activities.

Step 1Assess Community SupportTo be successful, a mitigation planning initiative requires thesupport of public officials, agency personnel, business owners andoperators, citizens, and other community members. Getting Starteddiscusses defining the planning area; gauging how much thecommunity knows about mitigation planning; educating publicofficials on the hazards and risks in your community; using existingplans as a base from which to start; and organizing funding, techni-cal, and human resources.

Inform the Public

One of the fundamental differences in planning for manmadedisasters versus natural disasters is that most people have had littleor no firsthand exposure to them. Even in light of the alarmingincrease in terrorist activity directed against the United States, theaging infrastructure, the persistence of security shortfalls in somesectors, and the proximity of industrial hazards to populationcenters, the public’s perception of risk varies widely. This percep-

1-2 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

tion is influenced by many factors, such as media portrayal ofevents, the level of public education available, and an individual’sexperience with various hazards. Because the United States has arelatively short history of dealing with manmade hazards, discus-sions on this subject may be characterized by elements of uncer-tainty and even fear. Therefore, to gain public support, it is impor-tant to educate public officials, citizens, and the private sectorabout the manmade hazards that may affect the community andabout the prevention and mitigation actions that can help addressthem. The planning team must present a realistic assessment of thepotential consequences of such disasters while taking care to avoidoverstating or inflating the risk.

Promote the Benefits of Mitigation Planning

You can further educate people and build support by emphasizingthe value added by mitigation planning and building on planningopportunities that already exist. Although manmade hazards maynot be as easy to identify and predict as some natural hazards, thebenefits of planning for such events are the same: improveddisaster resistance, community involvement in the process, partner-ships with sectors you may not have interacted with before, andmore sustainable communities. Building on existing opportunitiesis a good way to create momentum for mitigation planning.

Many people are concerned about manmade hazards since theattacks of 2001, and the media have focused intensely on thesedisasters. You can use this high visibility to show why your commu-nity should plan for such contingencies. Getting Started examinesways to implement natural hazard mitigation planning throughexisting plans; now you can reexamine those plans with a focus onhow to integrate planning for manmade disasters into them.

You may want to point out the following benefits as you educateothers:

1. Mitigation helps local, tribal, and state governmentsfulfill their responsibility to protect their citizens,property, and environment by reducing the potentialimpacts of manmade disasters.

2. Mitigation can enhance a community’s ability to recoverfrom the impacts of a manmade disaster.

3. Mitigation can reduce exposure to civil or criminalliability in the event of a terrorist attack or technologicalaccident.

Summary of thebenefits of mitigationplanning

� Reduces future lossesfrom disasters

� Builds partnerships

� Facilitates funding priorities

� Contributes to sustainable commu-nities

Planners shouldrecognize that address-ing manmade hazards mayrequire that more attentionbe paid to dealing with arange of potentially strong personal re-sponses, and they should be preparedto address potential concerns that maynot have arisen during natural hazardsplanning such as security, unknownrisks, and civil liberties. Thus, it is criti-cal that planners develop a realistic,comprehensive picture of the hazardspresent in their communities to bettereducate the public and be prepared torespond to their concerns.

Depending on the nature ofthe incident, the impacts of amanmade hazard can be localized—even limited to a single building—or theycan be widespread, encompassing ametropolitan area, a watershed, or atransportation corridor. Additionally, theextent of the physical damages gener-ated by an incident can be surpassedby its associated economicimpacts, as demonstratedby the national-level eco-nomic effects of the Septem-ber 11, 2001 attacks.


organize resources 14. Mitigation actions may help reduce insurance premi-

ums.

Capitalize on Planning Opportunities

As mentioned previously, manmade hazards can be integrated intoexisting planning efforts. The following opportunities should beconsidered:

1. Planning during post-disaster recovery. Following theSeptember 2001 attacks, the increased risk of manmadehazards became a topic of conversation in the main-stream media and across the nation. This widespreadinterest can serve as an impetus to enhance a mitigationplan with actions that can reduce the effects of futureattacks.

At the time of thiswriting, the long-termconsequences of the insur-ance industry’s response tothe events of September 11,

2001 are not clear. To date, the industryis having difficulty estimating the fre-quency and magnitude of future terror-ism risks and is concerned about en-suring adequate capital to absorb thepotential costs of another catastrophicattack. As a result, many insurers areestablishing coverage limitations andraising premiums and deductibles forcommercial customers. Risk is beingshifted from insurers to property own-ers and business operators, and futureattacks may lead to greater direct lossesto those impacted—further emphasiz-ing the importance of taking actions toreduce vulnerability and minimizelosses.

(Source: General Accounting Office,Terrorism Insurance: Rising UninsuredExposure to Attacks Heightens Poten-tial Economic Vulnerabilities)

The results of the Insti-tute for Business & HomeSafety’s 2001 study Are WePlanning Safer Communi-ties? Results of a National

Survey of Community Planners andNatural Disasters show that the safestcommunities are located in states wherehazards are a required consideration incomprehensive planning. In many states,however, this “best practice” is not fol-lowed. Ideally, hazard considerations arean integral part of state and local com-prehensive planning; if they are not, stateand local governments should considerrequiring that comprehensive planninginclude all-hazard considerations.

Planners are encouraged to link together as many plan-ning opportunities as possible to maximize coordination, thorough-ness, information sharing, and cost-effectiveness. Relevant planningactions may be ongoing or may already have been accomplished inyour jurisdiction as part of other emergency management planning

initiatives. For example, some jurisdictions completed a community vulnerabilityassessment as part of the Department of Justice’s State Domestic Prepared-ness Support Program (equipment grant program – now within DHS); this infor-mation is directly transferable from first responder planning to mitigation planning.

The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 provides an impe-tus for state and local governments to undertake mitigation planning.The Act does not mandate that terrorism or technological disastersbe addressed in hazard mitigation planning; however, it does encour-age and reward state and local pre-disaster planning and promote

sustainability as a strategy for reducing the effects of disasters. Naturally, thisobjective can only be fully achieved through incorporating not only natural haz-ards but also the full spectrum of manmade disasters. Interim final regulations onhazard mitigation planning were published in the Federal Register on February26, 2002 (see 44 CFR Parts 201 and 206).

2. Comprehensive and other community-oriented planningactivities. If your community has begun developing orupdating its comprehensive plan, capital improvementplan, urban design guidelines, land developmentregulations, growth management or sustainability plans,or other community-oriented guidance, this is a primeopportunity to incorporate planning for manmadedisasters. For example, if your community is planning tobuild a new city hall or hospital, you can incorporatedefensive architecture, site planning, and design ap-proaches into the facility planning process to reduce thehazards to the facility from manmade events.


3. Update of existing mitigation plans or other emergencymanagement plans. In order to keep plans up-to-date,state and local governments must perform periodicreviews of existing plans. During these reviews, plannersshould re-evaluate the hazards that can affect theircommunities and update their plans as appropriate toincorporate manmade hazards.

Step 2Build the Planning TeamAssuming you have already set up your planning team, expandingits scope to incorporate terrorism and technological disasters willrequire enhancing the team’s capabilities by acquiring expertise ina number of disciplines. To ensure that the composition of themitigation planning team contains the right mix of members, thecapabilities of the existing team should be assessed and any gapsfilled. To prevent the team from becoming so large as to be un-wieldy, a committee/subcommittee approach may be imple-mented. You may wish to use the categories listed below to definethe various subgroup areas of the planning team.

A community’s hazard mitigation planners are itsprimary resource for leading and coordinating efforts to re-duce vulnerabilities in the built environment. In any given community,however, there may be a variety of other entities operating to the sameend, either in concert with mitigation planning or independently. These

may comprise public, private, or partnered initiatives; they may cut across local,state, and/or federal jurisdictions; and they may address planning, security, safety,engineering, and other aspects of hazard reduction. While projects such as theseare often undertaken in a vacuum—that is, without relation to the community asa whole—their key personnel may possess or have access to expertise and re-sources that will enhance the ability of the hazard mitigation planning team tomeet the state’s or community’s goals. The importance of thinking inclusively andholistically when recruiting team members becomes especially clear when plan-ners are confronted with new and generally unfamiliar challenges such as inte-grating manmade hazards into mitigation planning.

Getting Started: Building Support for MitigationPlanning (FEMA 386-1) outlines methods for identifying stake-holders for a natural hazard mitigation planning process. Existinggroups, such as natural hazard mitigation planning teams or emer-

gency planning committees, can serve as ideal bases for manmade hazard miti-gation efforts. Such teams should have a broad-based membership that includes,at a minimum, representatives of elected officials, emergency management, firstresponder agencies, healthcare, local environmental and transportation groups,the media, community groups, and representative owners and operators of pri-vate facilities.

The size and com-position of the plan-ning team will dependon the community or state,size of the planning area,planning needs, and resources avail-able. A team approach is optimal be-cause:

a. It encourages participation and getsmore people invested in the process

b. It enhances the visibility and statureof the planning process

c. It provides for a broad perspective onthe issues

d. It provides the widest possible rangeof expertise and experience

e. It ensures the use of resources in acoordinated fashion to maximizebenefits


organize resources 1Expertise that will be helpful in addressing manmade hazards maybe lacking from a purely natural-hazards oriented team. Suchexpertise includes the following:

� Chemical emergency planning

� Counter- and antiterrorism (law enforcement andmilitary)

� Crime prevention planning, including situational crimeprevention and Crime Prevention Through Environ-mental Design (CPTED)

� Electrical engineering

� Emergency management

� Explosives/blast characteristics

� Fire protection engineering

� Force protection (protection of military personnel andfacilities)

� Industrial security

� Mechanical engineering, including heating, ventilation,and air conditioning (HVAC)

� Protective/defensive architecture

� Site planning, urban design, and landscape design

� Structural engineering, design, and construction

Specialized expertise in these fields can be found at a number ofsources, even in communities with modest resources. Additionally,technical assistance from the federal government may be availableto communities. Among the many federal organizations offeringrelevant support are the Department of Homeland Security(DHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and theDepartment of Justice (DOJ). See Appendix C for Web links tothese agencies’ programs.

See Worksheet #1: Build the Planning Team at the end of thissection (also included in Appendix D) to help you identify addi-tional team members.

Although situational crimeprevention and Crime Pre-vention Through Environ-mental Design (CPTED) areclosely related, the two are not synony-mous. Situational crime prevention en-compasses many CPTED principles but

focuses more on manage-rial and user behavior fac-tors that affect opportunitiesfor criminal behavior in thespecific setting for the spe-cific crime(s) being ad-

dressed. CPTED, on the other hand,focuses more on changing the physicaldesign aspects of environments to de-ter criminal activity.

The planning team shouldwork with elected officials toformalize the community’s commitmentto planning and to promote an atmo-sphere of cooperation by “authorizing”the planning team to take the steps nec-essary to develop a mitigation plan forterrorism and technological hazards. Ata minimum, this authority can be estab-

lished through a resolutionor proclamation recognizingthe team as an authorizedagent of the community.


Step 3Engage the PublicGiven the dramatic nature of terrorism and technological hazards,the community will expect to be involved in and informed aboutthe mitigation planning process. Getting Started discusses develop-ing a schedule or program for involving the public throughout themitigation planning process. Adding a manmade hazard elementto your public participation program will simply be another step.Keep in mind, however, that care must be taken when presentingcertain types of information.

Because citizens may be fearful or upset about recent events andapprehensive about publicized threats, they may want to engagepublic officials in talking about such issues. The planning teamshould encourage the public to focus on what they can realisticallydo to protect their community and limit the time spent discussingissues that are outside the scope of their influence. For example,they may be concerned about travel safety and would like to seechanges in airport security, but federal government agenciescontrol these issues—not the local planning team. To alleviateconcerns about issues the community has no authority over, theplanning team should be informed enough to provide an overviewof who the various authorities are and what their responsibilitiesare for addressing manmade hazards. Including as many stakehold-ers as possible in the planning process can help turn these con-cerns into productive considerations and enhance rather thanhinder the process.

There are several stages in the mitigation planning process atwhich you can inform the public about your efforts to bringmanmade hazards into your program. These stages are:

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment. The planning teamshould inform the community of the complete spectrum of naturaland manmade hazards it identifies and the risks they present,emphasizing that terrorism and technological disasters can strikenot just in large cities, but in any community of any size. Althoughin some cases it will be necessary to limit the kinds of informationshared, it is nevertheless important to provide the community witha realistic picture of the hazards and risks and to understand whatthe community considers to be an acceptable level of risk. It shouldbe emphasized that while no amount of planning and mitigationcan remove 100% of the risk from terrorism or technologicalemergencies, a thorough hazard identification process will help in

Planners shouldnote that some issues in-volved with technologicalhazards, such as industrialsiting, hazardous materialstransportation, or chemical storage andprocessing techniques, may be conten-tious and can cause friction among citi-zens, industry leaders, emergency plan-ners, and other decision makers. LocalEmergency Planning Committees(LEPCs) will likely already be involvedwith these issues and should be able toprovide insight into how they can be ad-dressed.


organize resources 1prioritizing the community’s needs and allocating its resourceseffectively.

Mitigation Strategy Development. When developing a strategy forthe hazard mitigation process, you should hold public meetings orworkshops to discuss mitigation actions. The planning team shouldobtain public input into non-sensitive mitigation decisions, espe-cially if the actions will have a long-term effect such as a change intraffic patterns or an increase in the surveillance of public places.The community should also have input into how to fund somemitigation actions, such as through taxes, bonds, loans, or grantprograms. While citizens may be willing to pay for some actions,they may not be willing to support others.

Implementation and Monitoring of the Mitigation Plan. Theplanning team should keep the community informed of the imple-mentation schedule and progress, although once again, it may benecessary to limit the kinds of information released to the public.The public should also be notified when the mitigation plan isreviewed and updated.

Once you have established community support, expanded theplanning team to include manmade hazard experts, and engagedthe public in the planning process, you will be ready to perform ahazard identification and risk assessment for your jurisdiction.Phase 2 will guide you through this process.

When addressingantiterrorism andother manmade hazard miti-gation actions, you shouldrecognize that many of

these are sensitive and that informationabout them should be restricted to avery limited number of people. You mustcarefully consider whether each part ofthe process will be open to the public orwhether for security reasons you willhave only the planning team and per-haps a limited number of outside stake-holders (such as key public officials noton the planning team) discuss the bestactions for certain critical facilities. SeePhase 4 for sensitive information issuesto consider.


Specialists for Manmade Hazards

Bomb and Arson Squads

Community Emergency Response Teams

Hazardous Materials Experts

Infrastructure Owners/Operators

National Guard Units

Representatives from facilities identifiedin Worksheet #2: Asset IdentificationChecklist

Local/Tribal

Administrator/Manager’s Office

Budget/Finance Office

Building Code Enforcement Office

City/County Attorney’s Office

Economic Development Office

Emergency Preparedness Office

Fire and Rescue Department

Hospital Management

Local Emergency Planning Committee

Planning and Zoning Office

Police/Sheriff’s Department

Public Works Department

Sanitation Department

School Board

Transportation Department

Tribal Leaders

Worksheet #1 Build the Planning Team phase 1, step

Step 2 of Getting Started (FEMA 386-1) discusses establishing a planning team with a broad range ofbackgrounds and experience represented. This worksheet suggests additional individuals, agencies, andorganizations that should be included on a team to plan for manmade hazards. State organizations can beincluded on local teams when appropriate to serve as a source of information and to provide guidance andcoordination.

You should use the checklist as a starting point for expanding your team.

page 1 of 2

Special Districts and Authorities

Airport and Seaport Authorities

Business Improvement District(s)

Fire Control District

Flood Control District

Redevelopment Agencies

Regional/Metropolitan PlanningOrganization(s)

School Districts

Transit/Transportation Agencies

Others

Architectural/Engineering/Planning Firms

Citizen Corps

Colleges/Universities

Land Developers

Major Employers/Businesses

Professional Associations

Retired Professionals

State

Adjutant General’s Office (National Guard)

Board of Education

Building Code Office

Climatologist

Earthquake Program Manager


ONTEAM

ADD TOTEAM

ONTEAM

ADD TOTEAM


page 2 of 2

Emergency Management Office/State Hazard Mitigation Officer

Environmental Protection Office

Fire Marshal’s Office

Geologist

Homeland Security Coordinator’s Office

Housing Office

Hurricane Program Manager

Insurance Commissioner’s Office

National Flood InsuranceProgram Coordinator

Natural Resources Office

Planning Agencies

Police

Public Health Office

Public Information Office

Tourism Department

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

American Red Cross

Chamber of Commerce

Community/Faith-Based Organizations

Environmental Organizations

Homeowners Associations

Neighborhood Organizations

Private Development Agencies

Utility Companies

Other Appropriate NGOs

ONTEAM

ADD TOTEAM

ONTEAM

ADD TOTEAM

phase 2phase 2

2


assessrisks

Overview

Phase 2 of the mitigation planning process, Assess Risks,involves identifying hazards and estimating potential losses.

The results of these efforts will later be linked to estimates of theeffectiveness of the mitigation projects you may be considering.There are some unique aspects to hazard characteristics, assetidentification, and vulnerability assessment that will affect the waya risk assessment for terrorism and technological hazards is carriedout. This how-to guide addresses these special considerations;please refer to Understanding Your Risks: Identifying Hazards andEstimating Losses (FEMA 386-2) for information on the more gen-eral aspects of the risk assessment process.

Step 1Identify HazardsThe first step in any risk assessment is to identify the hazards thataffect your community or state. Most manmade hazards fall intotwo general categories: terrorism (intentional acts) and technologi-cal hazards (accidental events). These two categories include thefollowing hazards:

Terrorism

� Conventional bomb/improvised explosive device

� Biological agent

� Chemical agent

� Nuclear bomb

� Radiological agent

� Arson/incendiary attack

� Armed attack

� Cyberterrorism

� Agriterrorism

� Hazardous material release (intentional)


Research ExistingRecords, Plans,and ReportsTerrorist attacks and techno-logical disasters occur infrequentlyenough in the United States that theremay be few relevant records that canhelp determine what manmade hazardsmay affect the area being studied. Boththe Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)and the U.S. Department of State (DOS)issue annual reports on terrorist activi-ties domestically and around the world,and Local Emergency Planning Com-mittees, State Emergency ResponseCommissions, and the United StatesEnvironmental Protection Agency aresources for historical data on hazard-ous material incidents throughout theU.S. Also, in many communities, plansare in place to respond to numeroustypes of technological hazards, andthese plans—and the people who de-velop them—may be valuable sourcesof information about human-inducedrisks. In researching existing documen-tation, remember to consider informa-tion available from other levels ofgovernment whenever possible.

The following list identifies just a few ofthe documents that may be of use tothe planning team:

� Existing mitigation plans

� Comprehensive plans

� Emergency operations plans

� Continuity of operations andother contingency plans

� Radiological emergency plans(nuclear power plants)

� Chemical stockpile emergencyplans

� SARA Title III / hazardous mate-rial facility emergency plans

� Toxic Release Inventory Reports

� Statewide Domestic Prepared-ness Strategy

Technological Hazards

� Industrial accident (fixed facility)

� Industrial accident (transportation)

� Failure of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition(SCADA) system or other critical infrastructure compo-nent

Within these various types of incidents, there are many variations,which illustrates one of the fundamental differences betweennatural and manmade hazards. The types, frequencies, and loca-tions of many natural hazards are identifiable and even, in somecases, predictable. They are governed by the laws of physics andnature. Malevolence, incompetence, carelessness, and otherbehaviors, on the other hand, are functions of the human mindand, while they can be assumed to exist, they cannot be forecastwith any accuracy. There is, therefore, the potential for most, if notall, types of manmade hazards to occur anywhere.

Your community or state’s planning team should tap into availableexpertise in the areas listed earlier to develop a comprehensive listof the potential manmade hazards in your jurisdiction. You mayalso want to review reports and obtain briefings on the variousplans government agencies and private companies have preparedin the event of an emergency. These may include radiologicalemergency plans, SARA Title III/hazardous material facility emer-gency plans, and chemical stockpile emergency plans, amongothers.

Weapons of Mass DestructionLike terrorism itself, the term “Weapons of Mass Destruction” (WMD)has various definitions. Common to all of them is the assumption thatWMDs comprise incendiary, explosive, chemical, biological, radioac-

tive, and/or nuclear agents.

50 U.S.C., § 2302 defines WMD as follows:

“The term ‘weapon of mass destruction’ means any weapon or device that isintended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a signifi-cant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of

(A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors;

(B) a disease organism; or

(C) radiation or radioactivity.”

The United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Op-erations Plan (CONPLAN) considers a WMD to be “any device, material, or sub-stance used in a manner, in a quantity or type, or under circumstances evidenc-ing an intent to cause death or serious injury to persons or significant damage toproperty.”

assess risks 2


Step 2Profile Hazard EventsIn the area of hazard profiling, there are significant differencesbetween natural and manmade hazards, particularly those relatedto terrorism. Foremost among these is that terrorists have theability to choose among targets and tactics, designing their attackto maximize the chances of achieving their objective. Similarly,accidents, system failures, and other mishaps are also largelyunforeseeable. This makes it very difficult to identify how andwhere these hazards may occur. Notwithstanding the difficultyinvolved with predicting the occurrence of manmade disasters, thevarious consequences of these disasters are generally familiar tothe sectors of the emergency planning and response communitythat already specialize in them: injuries and deaths, contaminationof and/or damage to buildings and systems, and the like. Numer-ous authoritative sources exist that can provide detailed informa-tion on the nature of all of these hazards; however, more importantfor the purposes of hazard mitigation than details about thevarious agents’ characteristics are the ways in which they canimpact the built environment and what actions can be taken toreduce or eliminate the resulting damage.

Whether intentional or accidental, manmade disasters—as withnatural disasters—involve the application of one or more modes ofharmful force to the built environment. For the purposes of thishow-to guide, these modes are defined as contamination (as in thecase of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear hazards),energy (explosives, arson, and even electromagnetic waves), orfailure or denial of service (sabotage, infrastructure breakdown,and transportation service disruption). The planning team shouldinclude expertise in these areas in order to develop a comprehen-sive list of the manmade hazards in your jurisdiction and identifythe full spectrum of ways in which they might occur.

One-Stop Shopping Resources for GeneralInformation on Manmade Hazardshttp://www.fema.gov/hazards(FEMA: links to authoritative sources of hazard information)

http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/terrorisminfor/ctrt.asp(FEMA: terrorism-related training and resources)

While these information sources are primarily oriented toward emergency re-sponse, they can provide valuable insight to mitigation planners on how manmadehazards can impact communities.


The following table, Event Profiles for Terrorism and Technologi-cal Hazards, is not intended to replace the expertise and knowl-edge of planning, security, or design professionals, but rather tohelp guide the planning team in understanding some of the waysin which these hazards can interact with the built environment. Foreach type of hazard, the following factors are addressed:

� Application mode describes the human act(s) or unin-tended event(s) necessary to cause the hazard to occur.

� Duration is the length of time the hazard is present onthe target. For example, the duration of a tornado maybe just minutes, but a chemical warfare agent such asmustard gas, if unremediated, can persist for days orweeks under the right conditions.

� The dynamic/static characteristic of a hazard describes itstendency, or that of its effects, to either expand, con-tract, or remain confined in time, magnitude, andspace. For example, the physical destruction caused byan earthquake is generally confined to the place inwhich it occurs, and it does not usually get worse unlessthere are aftershocks or other cascading failures; incontrast, a cloud of chlorine gas leaking from a storagetank can change location by drifting with the wind andcan diminish in danger by dissipating over time.

� Mitigating conditions are characteristics of the target andits physical environment that can reduce the effects of ahazard. For example, earthen berms can provide protec-tion from bombs; exposure to sunlight can render somebiological agents ineffective; and effective perimeterlighting and surveillance can minimize the likelihood ofsomeone approaching a target unseen. In contrast,exacerbating conditions are characteristics that can en-hance or magnify the effects of a hazard. For example,depressions or low areas in terrain can trap heavyvapors, and a proliferation of street furniture (trashreceptacles, newspaper vending machines, mail boxes,etc.) can provide concealment opportunities for explo-sive devices.

The FBI’s annualreport Terrorism inthe United Statescontains profiles and chro-nologies of terrorism inci-

dents in America. The 1999 edition in-cludes a comprehensive review ofterrorist activities in the United Statesover the past three decades. This infor-mation is helpful to planners as data forhazard profiling; it also illustrates thatmanmade hazards impact not onlylarge cities but commonly strike smallto mid-sized communities as well—animportant point when building publicsupport for mitigating terrorism andtechnological hazards. The Terrorism inthe United States reports can bedownloaded from http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terroris.htm.

assess risks 2


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assess risks 2


Step 3Inventory AssetsAs discussed in Step 1, the probability of manmade hazards occur-ring cannot be quantified with as great a level of accuracy as that ofmany natural hazards. Furthermore, these incidents generallyoccur at a specific location such as a building rather than encom-passing a wide area such as a floodplain, and potential locations forterrorist attacks and technological disasters are likely to be distrib-uted widely throughout your community. Thus, translating mostmanmade hazard profiles into meaningful geospatial informationis difficult at best.

Instead, the planning team should use an asset-specific approach,identifying potentially at-risk critical facilities and systems in thecommunity. Once a comprehensive list of assets has been devel-oped, it should be prioritized so that the community’s efforts canbe directed to protect the most important assets first. Then, begin-ning with the highest priority assets, the vulnerabilities of eachfacility or system to each type of hazard should be assessed. Adiscussion of each of these steps follows.

As part of the haz-ard mitigation plan-ning process, youshould develop a base mapshowing the assets in your

jurisdiction. You can overlay this mapwith information representing manmadehazards and their potential conse-quences. Maps may not be able to ac-tually predict where manmade hazardsare most likely to strike, but they canhelp planners understand the interrela-tionships between assets and hazards.Through functions like buffering and dis-persion modeling, planners can identifyhow proximity and clustering of assetsmay exacerbate the impacts of a par-ticular type of attack, and even evalu-ate the implications of multiple vulner-abilities.

The initial inventory can be done veryquickly and easily using the baselinedata contained in HAZUS (“HazardsUS”), FEMA’s hazard loss estimationsoftware that uses building stock, eco-nomic, geologic, and other data to pro-vide loss estimates for earthquakes. Youcan identify medical care facilities; emer-gency response facilities; schools;dams; hazardous material sites; roads,airports, and other transportation facili-ties; electric power, oil, and gas lines;and other infrastructure. Refer to page2-3 of Understanding your Risks: Iden-tifying Hazards and Estimating Losses(FEMA 386-2) for help in creating a basemap.

The term “mitigation” in the context of this how-to guide refers to the physical aspects of vulnerability reduction.Thus, in identifying the areas of interest for the purposes of terrorismand technological hazards, planners should focus on specific placesin their community where opportunities exist to reduce exposure to,

and the potential consequences of, the various types of malevolent acts andaccidental incidents that could occur. While this does require a highly facility-specific approach (e.g., the protection of a utility system, communications infra-structure, or government building), planners must be sure to consider theinterconnectivity of all of the elements in the built environment such as buildings,infrastructures, and aggregations of human activity when determining the physi-cal or geographic constraints of their planning activities.

Expand the Asset List

In expanding an existing asset list, the planning team should startby referring to the community’s Emergency Operations Plan(EOP) to identify specific critical facilities, sites, systems, or otherlocations that could potentially be targeted for attack or that are atrisk of being the site of an accident that could produce significantconsequences. This process should take into account the dynamicnature of manmade events: while the physical consequences ofsome types of incidents generally remain localized (as with thebombing of a building), the impacts of others may spread wellbeyond the location of origin (as with a chlorine gas leak).


Critical Infrastructure ProtectionCritical infrastructures are systems whose incapac-ity or destruction would have a debilitating effecton the defense or economic security of the nation.

The critical infrastructure categories include:

Agriculture & food

Water

Public health

Emergency services

Defense industrial base

Telecommunications

Energy

Transportation

Banking & finance

Chemicals & hazardous materials

Postal & shipping

The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Pro-tection (PCCIP) was established in July 1996 by PresidentialExecutive Order 13010 to formulate a comprehensive na-tional strategy for protecting the infrastructures we all dependon from physical and "cyber" threats. The PCCIP includedsenior representatives from private industry, government, andacademia, and was divided into five teams representing thecritical infrastructures. Each team evaluated the growing risks,threats, and vulnerabilities within its sector. The sector teamsand their industries included:

� Information & Communications – telecommunications,computers & software, Internet, satellites, fiber optics

� Physical Distribution – railroads, air traffic, maritime,intermodal, pipelines

� Energy – electrical power, natural gas, petroleum, pro-duction, distribution & storage

� Banking & Finance – financial transactions, stock &bond markets, federal reserve

� Vital Human Services – water, emergency services,government services

Threats to critical infrastructures can be posed by anyonewith the capability, technology, opportunity, and intent to doharm. Potential threats can be foreign or domestic, internalor external, state-sponsored or a single rogue element. Ter-rorists, insiders, disgruntled employees, and hackers are in-cluded in this profile. The fact that most of the nation's vitalservices are delivered by private companies creates a sig-nificant challenge in determining where the responsibility forprotecting our critical infrastructures falls; the PCCIP ad-dressed this challenge by bringing the private and public sec-tors together to assess infrastructure vulnerabilities and de-velop assurance strategies for the future, consulting withindustry executives, security experts, government agencies,and private citizens. State and local mitigation planning teamsare encouraged to draw on this model as a basis for theirown efforts to incorporate terrorism and technological haz-ard mitigation into their planning processes.

Source: Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office at www.ciao.gov.

References and background information on critical infrastructureprotection can be found on the Critical Infrastructure AssuranceOffice’s web site at http://www.ciao.gov/resource/pccip/pccip_documents.htm.

In addition to your EOP, Worksheet #2: Asset Identification Check-list at the end of this section (also included in Appendix D) isintended as an aid for identifying critical facilities, sites, systems,and other assets in your community or state. Step 3 provides someapproaches for determining the importance of each asset to thecommunity.

Assess Vulnerabilities

The vulnerabilities of a given facility, site, system, or other asset can beidentified based on two distinct but complementary approaches. First,any given place in the built environment has a certain level of inherentvulnerability that exists independent of any protective or mitigationactions that are applied to it. For example, a football stadium is asetting where thousands of people gather, and a terrorist may find

assess risks 2


such a target very attractive in that many people would be hurt in anattack. An assessment of such inherent vulnerabilities must be con-ducted for each asset to determine its weaknesses. Second, the secu-rity, design, and other mitigation tools used to protect a place deter-mine its tactical vulnerability. For example, if an HVAC system is de-signed so that its components are not visible to the public and hassecurity cameras aimed at it, a terrorist may be less likely to attempt touse the system as a weapon to release poisonous gas. A tactical vulner-ability assessment should be completed for each asset to determinehow well it is protected from an attack.

Inherent Vulnerability. Using the asset inventory you assembled inStep 3, the planning team can assess the inherent vulnerability ofeach asset based on:

� Visibility: How aware is the public of the existence of thefacility, site, system, or location?

� Utility: How valuable might the place be in meeting theobjective(s) of a potential terrorist or saboteur?

� Accessibility: How accessible is the place to the public?

� Asset mobility: Is the asset's location fixed or mobile? Ifmobile, how often is it moved, relocated, or reposi-tioned?

� Presence of hazardous materials: Are flammable, explosive,biological, chemical, and/or radiological materialspresent on site?

� Potential for collateral damage: What are the potentialconsequences for the surrounding area if the asset isattacked or damaged?

� Occupancy: What is the potential for mass casualtiesbased on the maximum number of individuals on site ata given time?

Completing Worksheet #3: Facility Inherent Vulnerability Assess-ment Matrix at the end of this section (also included in AppendixD) will help you determine how vulnerable each asset is and howvulnerable the assets are relative to each other.

In conducting thevulnerability as-sessment, it is impor-tant to ensure that the focusis not only on hazard reduc-

tion but also includes preparedness, re-sponse, and recovery considerations.For example, allowing unrestricted ve-hicle access to a building may createsome risk of a vehicle bomb attack, butit also helps ensure easy fire apparatusaccess for emergency response pur-poses. Thus, just as it is important tobalance security and openness in plan-ning and design, it is critical to considerthe secondary hazards that could arisefrom well-intended efforts to reduce vul-nerabilities.


Tactical Vulnerability. The following list will help the planningteam assess the tactical vulnerability of the assets in the community.The tactical vulnerability of each asset is based on:

Site Perimeter

� Site Planning and Landscape Design: Is the facility de-signed with security in mind—both site-specific and withregard to adjacent land uses?

� Parking Security: Are vehicle access and parking managedin a way that separates vehicles and structures?

Building Envelope

� Structural Engineering: Is the building’s envelope de-signed to be blast-resistant? Does it provide collectiveprotection against chemical, biological, and radiologicalcontaminants?

Facility Interior

� Architectural and Interior Space Planning: Does securityscreening cover all public and private areas? Are publicand private activities separated? Are critical buildingsystems and activities separated?

� Mechanical Engineering: Are utilities and HVAC systemsprotected and/or backed up with redundant systems?

Tactical Vulnerability Considerations

assess risks 2


� Electrical Engineering: Are emergency power and telecom-munications available? Are alarm systems operational? Islighting sufficient?

� Fire Protection Engineering: Are the building’s water supplyand fire suppression systems adequate, code-compliant,and protected? Are on-site personnel trained appropri-ately? Are local first responders aware of the nature ofthe operations at the facility?

� Electronic and Organized Security: Are systems and person-nel in place to monitor and protect the facility?

A list of mitigation actions that correspond to the factors describedabove can be found in Phase 3, Develop a Mitigation Plan, in thisguide.

Establish Mitigation Priorities

For the purpose of developing a realistic prioritization ofmanmade hazard mitigation projects, three elements should beconsidered in concert: the relative importance of the variousfacilities and systems in the asset inventory, the vulnerabilities ofthose facilities, and the threats that are known to exist.

Asset criticality. The first element, asset criticality, is a measure ofthe importance of the facility or system to the community. Consid-erations in determining asset criticality include:

� Is it an element of one of the community’s criticalinfrastructures?

� Does it play a key role in your community’s government,economy, or culture?

� What are the consequences of destruction, failure, orloss of function of the asset in terms of fatalities and/orinjuries, property losses, and economic impacts?

� What is the likelihood of cascading or subsequentconsequences should the asset be destroyed or itsfunction lost?

Vulnerability. The second factor was addressed in the previoussection, Assess Vulnerabilities. By identifying the most exploitableweaknesses of each asset, the planning team can identify vulner-abilities in greatest need of attention. This, in effect, gives theplanning team a criterion to use in establishing mitigation priori-ties so that the community can focus its efforts on addressing themost critical issues.


Threat. The last element, threat, is fundamental to theprioritization process but very difficult to quantify. Itanswers the question “what must we mitigate against?”The frequency of a hazard’s occurrence is an importantfactor in establishing mitigation priorities, but unfortu-nately it is impossible to determine with any precision inthe case of terrorism (for technological hazards, “threat”can be interpreted to mean the likelihood of some typeof human-induced unintentional event). Instead ofbeing influenced by predictable, quantifiable naturalforces, terrorism—and to some degree, other techno-logical hazards—is the result of human behavior thatoften lies outside conventional ideals of appropriatenessand rationality and is thus difficult to predict.

In understanding the threat of terrorism, historical datacan be of some value in that it illustrates the types oftactics that have been used previously (and thus may beused again); however, the historical approach is far fromdefinitive because, in addition to the fact that threatinformation lacks the predictive accuracy needed formaking decisions of this type, the origin and nature ofthe threats constantly change with technology, politicalissues, and other factors that compel and enable terror-ist activity. Further complicating the use of threat infor-mation in determining relative risk, once a protectiveaction is applied to an asset and its vulnerability reducedrelative to that of a comparable target, the balance oftarget attractiveness—and thus the likelihood of attack—may be altered, displacing some risk onto another assetthat has become relatively more vulnerable.

The most useful application of threat information formitigation planning purposes, then, will be as a guide tothe types of incidents that are relatively most likely tooccur. Clearly, the level of detail that can be provided tothe planning team will be determined by the sensitivityof the threat information. The broadest threat estimatesmay be so vague as to be of little use, while the mostcurrent and specific information may be part of ongoingcriminal and/or intelligence investigations and thus notavailable for mitigation planning purposes. However, itshould be possible to obtain a useful level of understand-ing through consultation with local, state, and federallaw enforcement agencies that can provide the planning

Prioritizing MitigationRequirements: The GeneralServices AdministrationApproach to SecurityStandards

The General Services Administration (GSA) is theUnited States government’s landlord. As such, it isresponsible for security at more than 1,000 federalfacilities, both owned and leased. To meet this need,GSA uses a standards-based approach that involvesassessing and categorizing facilities and assigningminimum security standards to each category.

Facility Security Levels

In order to determine the appropriate package of se-curity measures for each facility, a five-level classifi-cation system is used to rate facilities based on oc-cupancy, size, level of public contact, type ofoperations, and the nature of the agencies presentin the facility.

You can adapt this model to help prioritize mitigationprojects by establishing criteria based on the assetspresent in your community. In a small town, for ex-ample, a three-level system may be adequate: theCity Hall complex, containing the offices of electedand administrative officials as well as Police Head-quarters and an Emergency Operations Center,would qualify as a Level III facility; the city’s mainte-nance yard might fall within Level II; and a remotesewage lift station would be assigned Level I status.

Recommended Minimum Security Standards

The GSA list of security standards can serve simplyas a list of recommended measures; however, to bet-ter allocate resources, measures can be linked tofacility security levels. For example, the most basicmeasures may be mandated for all facilities, whilethe most stringent or sophisticated measures maybe required only for the highest level facilities, rec-ommended for middle-level facilities, and unneces-sary for the lowest-level facilities. The following crite-ria are among those considered for each category ofsecurity measures:

� Perimeter security – parking, closed-circuittelevision, lighting, physical barriers

� Entry security – receiving & shipping, accesscontrol, entrances & exits

� Interior security – employee & visitor identifi-cation, utilities, occupant emergency plan, daycare centers

� Security planning – tenant assignment, con-struction & renovation (this category also in-cludes intelligence-sharing, training, andadministrative procedures, which are outsidethe scope of this guidance)

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Vulnerability Assess-ment of Federal Facilities


assess risks 2team with a general characterization of terrorist and other suchgroups known to be active in your community, the tactics they mayemploy or have employed in the past, and projections of potentialand emerging threats.

In addition to asset criticality, vulnerability, and threat, the plan-ning team may also take the following considerations into accountwhen prioritizing projects:

� What assets were of concern during your community’sY2K planning?

� What assets support the continuity of your jurisdiction’sgovernmental operations and essential functions?

� What assets support the implementation of yourjurisdiction’s EOP, Emergency Support Functions(ESFs), and Incident Command/Unified Commandsystems?

� What political priorities may be relevant?

� To what extent will funding constraints limit mitigationoptions?

The following diagram illustrates the prioritizing process.

The list you develop of the assets most important to protect willhelp you focus your loss estimation analysis in Step 4.


Step 4Estimate LossesAs with natural hazard risk assessment processes, the potentiallosses from manmade hazards are generally grouped into threecategories: people (death and injury), assets (structures and theircontents), and functions (provision of services and generation ofrevenue). However, terrorism and technological disasters presentsome unique implications for loss estimation. As previously dis-cussed, for example, the key issue of frequency of occurrence (alsocalled “recurrence interval”) is elusive in the case of manmadehazards because of the difficulties associated with predictinghuman behavior and with acquiring and applying appropriatethreat data.

For some hazards, worst-case scenarios can be generated and lossesestimated if the hazard can be characterized with some precision.CAMEO (Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Opera-tions) software is one application that has been used extensively forpreparedness and response activities relating to hazardous materi-als. For example, using the location of rail lines and the kinds andquantities of hazardous materials transported over them, modelscan be used to estimate the consequences of various chemicalrelease scenarios. Particular attention can be paid to consider-ations such as evacuation of residential areas and critical facilitiesas well as mechanisms such as streams and winds that can dispersecontaminants beyond the primary incident scene. Similarly, flooddamage curves provide information about the extent of damageexpected in a given flood event, and HAZUS provides loss esti-mates for earthquakes.

For other manmade hazards such as bombs, however, damageanalysis capabilities are still evolving and are not yet widely avail-able within state and local governments. Software can be used tomodel blast effects on structures, but tools that can easily translatethis information into loss estimates for mitigation purposes are notyet available. When dealing with these difficult-to-quantify risks, theplanning team may wish to assume worst-case scenarios and esti-mate losses based on those scenarios using the techniques dis-cussed in Step 3 of Understanding Your Risks (FEMA 386-2).

Using the results of your vulnerability analysis and your best esti-mates of potential losses, you can now formulate mitigation goalsto drive the development of a mitigation strategy.


page 1 of 2

Worksheet #2 Asset Identification Checklist phase 2, step

This worksheet is intended as an aid for identifying critical facilities, sites, systems, and other assets in your communityor state. Check all the boxes that apply to your jurisdiction.

Local, state, and federal government offices(list all in your jurisdiction)

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

Military installations, including Reserve and NationalGuard component facilities (list all in your jurisdiction)

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

Emergency services

Backup facilities

Communication centers

Emergency operations centers

Fire/Emergency Medical Service (EMS) facilities

Law enforcement facilities

Politically or symbolically significant sites

Embassies, consulates

Landmarks, monuments

Political party and special interest group offices

Religious sites

Transportation infrastructure components

Airports

Bus stations

Ferry terminals

Interstate highways

Oil/gas pipelines

Railheads/rail yards

Seaports/river ports

Subways

Truck terminals

Tunnels/bridges

Energy, water, and related utility systems

Electricity production, transmission, and distribution systemcomponents

Oil and gas storage/shipment facilities

Power plant fuel distribution, delivery, and storage

Telecommunications facilities

Wastewater treatment plants

Water supply/purification/distribution systems

Telecommunications and information systems

Cable TV facilities

Cellular network facilities

Critical cable routes

Major rights of way

Newspaper offices and production/distribution facilities

Radio stations

Satellite base stations

Telephone trunking and switching stations

Television broadcast stations

Health care system components

Emergency medical centers

Family planning clinics

Health department offices

Hospitals

Radiological material and medical waste transportation,storage, and disposal

Research facilities, laboratories

Walk-in clinics


Financial services infrastructures and institutions

Armored car services

Banks and credit unions

Agricultural facilities

Chemical distribution, storage, and application sites

Crop spraying services

Farms and ranches

Food processing, storage, and distribution facilities

Commercial/manufacturing/industrial facilities

Apartment buildings

Business/corporate centers

Chemical plants (include facilities having Section 302Extremely Hazardous Substances on-site)

Factories

Fuel production, distribution, and storage facilities

Hotels and convention centers

Industrial plants

Malls and shopping centers

Raw material production, distribution, and storage facilities


Shipping, warehousing, transfer, and logistical centers

Mobile assets

Aviation and marine units

Mobile emergency operations centers/command centers

Portable telecommunications equipment

Red Cross Emergency Response Vehicles, Salvation Armymobile canteens, etc.

Other (Bloodmobiles, mobile health clinics, etc.)

page 2 of 2

Recreational facilities

Auditoriums

Casinos

Concert halls and pavilions

Parks

Restaurants and clubs frequented by potential targetpopulations

Sports arenas and stadiums

Theaters

Public/private institutions

Academic institutions

Cultural centers

Libraries

Museums


Events and attractions

Festivals and celebrations

Open-air markets

Parades

Rallies, demonstrations, and marches

Religious services

Scenic tours

Theme parks


Increments may be adjusted to better reflect your response capabilities or to be consistent with other guidance such as Mass Casualty Incidentplans. Note that different risks may exist at a facility depending on whether it is occupied or vacant.

Adapted from: FEMA Emergency Management Institute, Terrorism Planning Course

Worksheet #3 phase 2, step Facility Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix

The Facility Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix provides a way to record how vulnerable each asset is andenables the planning team to compare how vulnerable the assets are relative to each other. Make a copy for each assetand fill in the facility name or other identifier in the space provided. Select the appropriate point value for each criterionbased on the description in each row. Then add the point values to get the total for each asset. When you have done thisfor each asset you identified, compare the total scores to see how the assets rank in relation to one another.

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3develop amitigationplan

Goals are general guidelines that identify what you want to achieve.They are usually long-term in nature.

Objectives define measurable strategies or implementation steps toattain a goal. They are shorter in range and more specific than goals.

Overview

The hazard identification and risk assessment described inPhase 2 will determine what facilities and systems in your

jurisdiction are at highest risk. In Step 1 of Phase 3, you will de-velop goals and objectives for the protection of these assets toprevent or avoid an attack and to reduce losses in the event anattack occurs. Step 2 discusses the issues unique to identifying andprioritizing mitigation actions for terrorism and technologicalhazards. These actions primarily focus on creating a resilient,protective built environment. Step 3 highlights special consider-ations in developing an implementation strategy. Step 4 summa-rizes the important components to include in your terrorism andtechnological hazard mitigation plan. Cross-references are made toDeveloping the Mitigation Plan: Identifying Mitigation Actions andImplementation Strategies (FEMA 386-3).


Sample Mitigation Goals and Objectives forTerrorism and Technological Hazard MitigationGoal 1: Reduce the community's risk of exposure to hazardousmaterials.

Objective 1: Install security measures at the anhydrous ammonia transfer andstorage facility.

Objective 2: Increase the level of security of the facility using landscape design,lighting, and vehicle barriers.

Objective 3: Assess feasibility of hardening product storage and handlinginfrastructures.

Goal 2: Protect the community's water supply.

Objective 1: Install security measures at the city water treatment plant.

Objective 2: Secure all remote pump facilities.

Objective 3: Monitor for radiological, biological, and chemical contaminants.

Goal 3: Ensure that the city government has reliable communicationssystems.

Objective 1: Update the telecommunications capabilities of city governmentoffices.

Objective 2: Create redundant/backup capability for landline telephone system.

Objective 3: Develop off-site backup of information technology systems.

Goal 4: Reduce risk to critical government facilities.

Objective 1: Increase vehicle standoff distance from the Emergency OperationsCenter.

Objective 2: Restrict parking and vehicle access to the underground parkinggarage at City Hall.

Goals and objec-tives help determinewhere efforts and resourcesshould be focused to maxi-mize the effectiveness ofmitigation-related activities. Wheneverpossible, mitigation goals and objectivesshould be multi-hazard in nature in or-der to provide the most comprehensiveprotection to your community or state.In addition to brainstorming, the plan-ning team can identify additional goalsand objectives in the following ways:

� Review existing plans. Reviewexisting mitigation, comprehensive,and emergency plans, buildingupon and/or modifying existinginitiatives to maximize coordinationbetween plans and minimizeconflicts and duplication of effort. Tothe extent possible, existing plansshould be used to address thespecial problems posed bytechnological and other manmadehazards rather than generatingnew, stand-alone documents.

� Solicit public opinions. Includingthe community in identifying goalsand objectives will help ensure buy-in when mitigation actions areselected, and both the media andthe Internet can be valuablecommunication tools. There are anumber of methods for gaugingpublic opinion:

� Establish working groups or ad-visory committees

� Hold town hall meetings

� Administer surveys

� Hold facilitated meetings withcommunity representatives

While all of these methods can be ef-fective on their own, it may be advanta-geous to combine multiple strategies,such as surveys and town hall meet-ings, in order to obtain the advantagesof both a structured questionnaire aswell as a free-flowing discussion.

Step 1Develop Mitigation Goals andObjectivesThe process for developing the mitigation goals and objectives thatwill shape your implementation strategy is the same whether youare addressing natural or manmade hazards. As discussed inDeveloping the Mitigation Plan: Identifying Mitigation Actions andImplementation Strategies (FEMA 386-3), you will review the riskassessment and loss estimation findings to identify assets at greatestrisk. Manmade risk information should be combined with thefindings for natural hazards to create a comprehensive picture ofyour community or state's vulnerabilities to both natural andmanmade hazards. Your terrorism and technological disastermitigation goals, as with those for natural disasters, should strive toprotect lives and property, reduce the costs of disaster response,and minimize disruption to the community or state following adisaster. See Developing the Mitigation Plan for more details onformulating and prioritizing your goals.

develop a mitigation plan 3


Step 2Identify and Prioritize Mitigation ActionsOnce you have developed goals and objectives for mitigation, youshould identify specific actions to help you achieve them. As youconsider mitigation options, keep in mind that attacks andaccidents are functions of human activity, and the risk of suchevents is a characteristic of the target itself rather than of itsgeographic location. Clearly, there are areas in most communi-ties where the chances of an attack or accident are considerablydifferent from other parts of the jurisdiction—higher at indus-trial parks and critical facilities than in suburban residentialneighborhoods, for example—but there is no such thing as adefinable "terrorism zone" or "accident district" in the samesense as there are identifiable floodplains and seismic fault lines.Thus, it is not effective to protect people, buildings, and systemsfrom manmade hazards by simply relocating them as one couldfor some natural disasters.

Rather than removing potential victims from the hazard, then,mitigation strategies for manmade hazards focus primarily oncreating a built environment that is difficult to attack, resilient tothe consequences of an attack or accident, and protective of itsoccupants should an incident occur. This can be accomplishedthrough target hardening and other actions. Additional actionssuch as public awareness and education initiatives are not dis-cussed in this guide but should be considered when formulatingyour mitigation strategy.

Target hardening actions range from small-scale projects, such asinstalling security fencing around an HVAC system's air intake, tocommunity-wide initiatives, such as altering land use patterns torequire buffer zones around campuses of high-risk buildings.Also, while some actions are highly specific in nature and func-tion, others can meet multiple goals. For example, designing abuilding to resist the force of a bomb blast will also offer protec-tion from windstorms, and requiring buffer zones around criticalfacilities can help meet open space requirements and protectwetlands. The planning team is encouraged to take advantage ofthese complementary approaches whenever possible.

Target hardening actions draw from a wide variety of disciplines,all of which, as discussed in Phase 1, should be represented on(or at least accessible to) the mitigation planning team. Potentialhardening techniques and strategies are numerous, and a listing

Taking Advantage of ExistingProcesses, Strategies, andToolsSome actions and techniques used for miti-gating natural hazards may also provideprotection against manmade hazards,such as:

Earthquake mitigation techniques thatprovide structural strengthening of buildingsmay help resist impact/explosion effects ofbombs. Examples of such techniques includeadding steel moment frames, shear walls,cross bracing, stronger floor systems, wallsreinforced with shotcrete/fiber materials, col-umns reinforced with fiber wraps/steel jack-ets, tension/shear anchors, vibrationdampers, and strengthening or providing ad-ditional detailing of the building's connec-tions.

Fire mitigation techniques may help pro-tect facilities against the effects of bombs andincendiary attacks. Examples of such tech-niques include improved sprinkler systems,increased use of fireproofing and/or fire-re-sistant materials, redundant water supplies

for fire protection (day-to-dayand alternative), and site set-backs.

High wind mitigation tech-niques that provide building en-velope protection and structural

strengthening may also help mitigate againstimpact/explosion effects of bombs. Examplesof such techniques include openings usingwindows with impact-resistant laminatedglazing, improving connections and the loadpath of the building, and adding/reinforcingshear walls.

Terrorism mitigation is becoming an inte-gral part of multi-hazard mitigation, in pro-cess and often in practice. Additionally, anaction that addresses the fullest possiblespectrum of natural and manmade hazardswill likely show the most cost-effectiveness.

The planning team should draw onall available sources of exper-tise when selecting specificactions, keeping in mind theoverall objectives of maximiz-ing opportunities for multi-haz-ard mitigation; promoting

sustainability through choosing socially,economically, and environmentally benefi-cial solutions; supporting preparedness,response, and recovery; and ensuringcost-effectiveness.


of every possible action lies beyond the scope of this guidance. Thelist of potential actions provided below gives an overview of thetechniques and strategies available. The Library in Appendix Ccontains references to many sources of information on thesetopics. The following section will discuss special considerationswhen evaluating actions to meet your goals and objectives.

Terrorism and Technological Hazard Mitigation ActionsThe list of actions below is by no means exhaustive or definitive; rather, it is intended as a point of departure foridentifying potential mitigation techniques and strategies in your community or state.

Site Planning and Landscape Design

� Implement Crime Prevention Through EnvironmentalDesign (CPTED)

� Minimize concealment opportunities in landscapingand street furniture, such as hedges, bus shelters,benches, and trash receptacles

� Design grounds and parking facilities for naturalsurveillance by concentrating pedestrian activity,limiting entrances/exits, and eliminating concealmentopportunities

� Separate vehicle and pedestrian traffic

� Implement vehicle and pedestrian access controland inspection at perimeter (ensure ability toregulate flow of people and vehicles one at a time)

� Design site circulation to minimize vehicle speedsand eliminate direct approaches to structures

� Incorporate vehicle barriers such as walls, fences,trenches, ponds/basins, plantings, trees, sculptures,and fountains into site planning and design

� Ensure adequate site lighting

� Design signage for simplicity and clarity

� Locate critical offices away from uncontrolled publicareas

� Separate delivery processing facilities fromremaining buildings

� Maintain access for emergency responders,including large fire apparatus

� Identify and provide alternate water supplies for firesuppression

� Eliminate potential site access through utility tunnels,corridors, manholes, etc.

Architectural and Interior Space Planning

� Collocate/combine staff and visitor entrances;minimize queuing in unprotected areas

� Incorporate employee and visitor screening areasinto planning and design

� Minimize device concealment opportunities such asmailboxes and trash receptacles outside screenedareas

� Prohibit retail activities in non-secured areas

� Do not locate toilets and service spaces in non-secured areas

� Locate critical assets (people, activities, systems)away from entrances, vehicle circulation and parking,and loading and maintenance areas

� Separate high-risk and low-risk activities

� Separate high-risk activities from areas accessible tothe public

� Separate visitor activities from daily activities

� Separate building utilities from service docks, andharden utilities

� Locate delivery and mail processing facilitiesremotely or at exterior of building; prevent vehiclesfrom driving into or under building

� Establish areas of refuge; ensure that egresspathways are hardened and discharge into safeareas

� Locate emergency stairwells and systems away fromhigh-risk areas

� Restrict roof access

� Ensure that walls, doors, windows, ceilings, andfloors can resist forced entry

� Provide fire- and blast-resistant separation forsprinkler/standpipe interior controls (risers) and keyfire alarm system components

� Use visually open (impact-resistant, laminated glass)stair towers and elevators in parking facilities

� Design finishes and signage for visual simplicity

Structural Engineering

� Create blast-resistant exterior envelope

� Ensure that structural elements can resist blast loadsand progressive collapse

� Install blast-resistant exterior window systems(frames, security films, and blast curtains)

� Ensure that other openings (vents, etc.) are secureand blast-resistant

� Ensure that mailrooms are secure and blast-resistant

� Enclose critical building components withinhardened walls, floors, and ceilings

(continued)



Mechanical Engineering

� Locate utility and ventilation systems away fromentrances, vehicle circulation and parking, and loadingand maintenance areas

� Protect utility lifelines (water, power, communications,etc.) by concealing, burying, or encasing

� Locate air intakes on roof or as high as possible; if notelevated, secure within CPTED-compliant fencing orenclosure

� Use motorized dampers to close air intakes when notoperational

� Locate roof-mounted equipment away from buildingperimeter

� Ensure that stairways maintain positive pressure

� Provide redundant utility and ventilation systems

� Provide filtration of intake air

� Provide secure alternate drinking water supply

Electrical Engineering

� Locate utility systems and lifelines away fromentrances, vehicle circulation and parking, and loadingand maintenance areas

� Implement separate emergency and normal powersystems; ensure that backup power systems areperiodically tested under load

� Locate primary and backup fuel supplies away fromentrances, vehicle circulation and parking, and loadingand maintenance areas

� Secure primary and backup fuel supply areas

� Install exterior connection for emergency power

� Install adequate site lighting

� Maintain stairway and exit sign lighting

� Provide redundant telephone service

� Ensure that critical systems are not collocated inconduits, panels, or risers

� Use closed-circuit television (CCTV) security system

Fire Protection Engineering

� Ensure compliance with codes and standards,including installation of up-to-date fire alarm andsuppression systems

� Locate fire protection water supply system criticalcomponents away from entrances, vehicle circulationand parking, and loading and maintenance areas

� Identify/establish secondary fire protection watersupply

� Install redundant fire water pumps (e.g., one electric,one diesel); locate apart from each other

� Ensure adequate, redundant sprinkler and standpipeconnections

� Install fire hydrant and water supply connections nearsprinkler/standpipe connections

� Supervise or secure standpipes, water supply controlvalves, and other system components

� Implement fire detection and communication systems

� Implement redundant off-premises fire alarm reporting

� Locate critical documents and control systems in asecure yet accessible place

� Provide keybox near critical entrances for secure fireaccess

� Provide fire- and blast-resistant fire command center

� Locate hazardous materials storage, use, andhandling away from other activities

� Implement smoke control systems

� Install fire dampers at fire barriers

� Maintain access to fire hydrants

� Maintain fire wall and fire door integrity

� Develop and maintain comprehensive pre-incident andrecovery plans

� Implement guard and employee training

� Conduct regular evacuation and security drills

� Regularly evaluate fire protection equipmentreadiness/adequacy

Security

� Develop backup control center capabilities

� Secure electrical utility closets, mechanical rooms, andtelephone closets

� Do not collocate security system wiring with electricaland other service systems

� Implement elevator recall capability and elevatoremergency message capability

� Implement intrusion detection systems; provide24-hour off-site monitoring

� Implement and monitor interior boundary penetrationsensors

� Implement color closed-circuit television (CCTV)security system with recording capability

� Install call boxes and duress alarms

� Install public and employee screening systems (metaldetectors, x-ray machines, or search stations)

Parking

� Minimize off-site parking on adjacent streets/lots andalong perimeter

� Control all on-site parking with ID checks, securitypersonnel, and access systems

� Separate employee and visitor parking

� Eliminate internal building parking

� Ensure natural surveillance by concentratingpedestrian activity, limiting entrances/exits, andeliminating concealment opportunities

� Use transparent/non-opaque walls whenever possible

� Prevent pedestrian access to parking areas other thanvia established entrances


Prioritize Mitigation Actions

When prioritizing natural hazard mitigation actions, a benefit-costanalysis is generally conducted for each proposed action. Severalfactors are considered, including:

� Cost(s) of the mitigation action;

� Dollar value of risk reduction (i.e., loss of life, structure,content, and function) each time the hazard occurs(discussed in detail in Understanding Your Risks: Identify-ing Hazards and Estimating Losses [FEMA 386-2]);

� Frequency with which the benefits of the action will berealized (i.e., frequency of hazard occurrence); and

� Time value of money (i.e., the fact that benefits andcosts in the future are worth less than benefits and coststoday).

These factors are then combined by calculating the net presentvalue of aggregate future benefits and costs over the life span ofthe action. For more details, see Using Benefit-Cost Analysis in Mitiga-tion Planning (FEMA 386-5).

Three challenges arise when applying this benefit-cost frameworkto terrorism and technological disaster mitigation actions: (1) theprobability of an attack or frequency of the hazard occurrence isnot known; (2) the deterrence rate may not be known; and (3) thelifespan of the action may be difficult to quantify.

First, the frequency factor is much more complex in the case ofmanmade hazards than for natural hazards. While it is possible toestimate how often many natural disasters will occur (for example,a structure located in the 100-year floodplain is considered to havea 1 percent chance of being flooded in any given year), it is verydifficult to quantify the likelihood of a terrorist attack or techno-logical disaster. Quantitative methods to estimate these probabili-ties are being developed but have not yet been refined to the pointwhere they can be used to determine incident probability on afacility-by-facility basis. Therefore, the planning team must use aqualitative approach based on threat and vulnerability consider-ations to estimate the relative likelihood of an attack or accidentrather than the precise frequency. Such an approach is necessarilysubjective but can be combined with quantitative estimates of cost-effectiveness (the cost of an action compared to the value of thelives and property it saves in a worst-case scenario) to help illustratethe overall risk reduction achieved by a particular mitigationaction.

While manybenefits can beachieved through imple-menting mitigation actions,planners should be sensitive

to potential negative impacts as well. Forexample, altering traffic patterns may in-crease commute times and distances,and reducing on-street parking may im-pact retail activity. Such considerationscan be pivotal in determining the feasi-bility, viability, and potential for successof mitigation planning initiatives.



It is possible to determine fairly accurately how effectivemitigation efforts will be in preventing damages from a given type ofattack. The performance of many security and mitigation actions canbe modeled using established engineering techniques. For example,structural engineers can determine how a hardening action will pro-

tect a building's envelope. Naturally, the effectiveness of actions that rely on per-sonnel or complex hardware can be more difficult to ascertain. For example, whatis the probability that a security guard will fall asleep or that lightning will disablea perimeter sensor system?

Second, the deterrence or preventative value of an action cannotbe calculated if the number of incidents it averts is not known.Deterrence in the case of terrorism may also have a secondaryimpact in that once a potential target is hardened, a terrorist mayturn to a less protected facility—changing the likelihood of anattack for both targets.

Third, the lifespan of a mitigation action presents another prob-lem when carrying out a benefit-cost analysis for terrorism andtechnological hazards. Future benefits are generally calculated fora natural hazard mitigation action in part by estimating the num-ber of times the action will perform successfully over the course ofits useful life. However, some protective actions may be damagedor destroyed in a single manmade attack or accident. For example,blast-resistant window film may have performed to 100% effective-ness by preventing injuries from flying glass, but it may still needreplacement after one "use." Other actions, such as a buildingsetback, cannot be "destroyed" or "used up" per se. This is incontrast to many natural hazard mitigation actions, where theeffectiveness and life span of a structural retrofit or land use policyare easily understood and their value over time quantifiable.


Step 3Prepare an Implementation StrategyAs stated in the Foreword, this how-to guide assumes that yourcommunity or state is engaged in a natural hazards mitigationplanning process and is intended to serve as a supplementalresource to help you address the unique risks associated withterrorism and technological hazards. If you have incorporatedterrorism and technological hazards into a well-managed process,the implementation strategies and tools you use should enable youto effectively reduce your community or state's vulnerability tomanmade disasters as well. Developing the Mitigation Plan (FEMA386-3) provides more details on preparing an implementationstrategy.

Step 4Document the Mitigation PlanningProcessThe mitigation plan for manmade hazards will be based on the riskassessment conducted in Phase 2 and will include a comprehensivestrategy to address the mitigation priorities developed in Phase 3,Step 2. This information, which should be integrated into thenatural hazard mitigation plan, should include:

� A summary of the planning process, including thesequence of actions taken and a list of the team mem-bers and stakeholders who participated;

� The results of the risk assessment and loss estimation;

� Mitigation goals and objectives aimed at reducing oravoiding the effects of manmade hazards;

� Mitigation actions that will help the community or stateaccomplish the established goals and objectives; and

� Implementation strategies that detail how the mitiga-tion actions will be implemented and administered.

The hazard mitigation plan should serve as the focal point andbasis for mitigation decisions for all hazards—natural andmanmade. As such, it should be written so that anyone who reads itcan gain an understanding of current and future hazards and risksas well as the community's or state's intended solutions to thoseproblems.



Ideally, terrorism and technological hazards willbe incorporated into your existing mitigation plan;a single comprehensive plan is generally easier to manage and imple-ment than a collection of stand-alone documents. However, some in-formation may be of such high sensitivity that it should not be included

in publicly available mitigation planning documents. Examples of such informa-tion include vulnerability studies of critical infrastructure and data on securityplans and systems. This material should be treated as an addendum to the miti-gation plan so that it is still part of the plan, but access to it can be controlled. Forguidance on protecting sensitive information, see Phase 4, Consideration 1, Com-munity Interest and Information Sensitivity.

phase 4phase 4


4implementthe planandmonitorprogress

Overview

The fourth phase of the mitigation planning process, Implementthe Plan and Monitor Progress, describes how to bring the mitiga-

tion plan to life. The implementation and monitoring phase islargely the same across the entire spectrum of hazards and isdiscussed in detail in Bringing the Plan to Life: Implementing theHazard Mitigation Plan (FEMA 386-4). This section will addressspecial considerations for implementing mitigation actions uniqueto manmade hazards and should serve as a supplement to theprocess described in Bringing the Plan to Life.

Consideration 1Community Interest and InformationSensitivityAs a result of the heightened level of interest in the vulnerability ofAmerican communities to terrorism following the events of Sep-tember 11, 2001, the public is likely to be keenly interested inefforts to protect people, buildings, and systems from terrorismand technological disasters. The planning team should understandthat this presents both benefits and challenges, because much ofthe same information that can be used to rally public support formitigation planning can also be of use to potential terrorists,saboteurs, or others with malevolent intent. For that reason, theplanning team must carefully maintain the security of any informa-tion that pertains to vulnerabilities, security measures, and re-sponse plans. Jurisdictions' legal counsels should be able to provideguidance on how best to protect such sensitive information withinthe provisions of applicable freedom of information laws.

This constitutes a significant departure from the open and inclu-sive way in which mitigation planning has historically been con-ducted. However, new security realities demand that we re-evaluatethe way we think about information sensitivity, in particular how,where, when, and with whom we discuss risks, vulnerabilities, andprotective (mitigation) actions. In addition to the overarching


public safety rationale for protecting this information from thosewho would use it against us, the planning team should be sensitiveto the fact that the owners and operators of many communityassets may be reluctant to reveal their own security shortcomingsdue to concerns about liability, perception of vulnerability orweakness, and general security-consciousness. For communitiesand states to work effectively with the people, facilities, and systemsthey are tasked with protecting, working relationships must bebased on trust. All project partners should be committed to main-taining the integrity of the planning process as well as the prin-ciples and ultimate goal of the process: a more secure built envi-ronment.

Thus, managing sensitive information will be a new challenge formany communities and states. The federal government has theoption to classify information when appropriate to protect theinterest of national security, but most state and local governmentscurrently lack adequate authorities and tools for preventing theinappropriate disclosure of every kind of sensitive data with anycertainty. Communities and states should address this problem intwo ways: first, they will need to ensure that sensitive information ishandled in such a way as to maintain its security, and second, theywill need to have adequate protections in place to ensure thatsensitive information is not released when it is requested by mem-bers of the public who have no justifiable reason (or "need toknow") for seeing the information. The following sections elabo-rate on these two ways to protect sensitive information whilemaintaining an appropriate level of public involvement in theplanning process.

� Internal handling procedures. State and local govern-ments may have the ability to assign "For Official UseOnly" (FOUO) status or a similar designation to infor-mation that is privileged, sensitive, or otherwise shouldbe protected from circulation or disclosure to thepublic. However, such actions often lack formal infor-mation handling procedures and enforceability. Com-munities are encouraged to review their handlingprocedures to ensure that sensitive information in theirpossession can be authoritatively designated as such andprotected appropriately, and once proper proceduresare in place they should be applied and adhered torigorously.

� Withholding sensitive information. In keeping with thedemocratic tradition, federal and state laws generally


implement the plan and monitor progress 4require that government proceedings and documentsbe accessible to the public. These laws, often called"sunshine laws" or "freedom of information" laws,usually require public access to meetings whenever acommission, committee, board, task force or otherofficial group meets to discuss public business. They alsorequire that most government documents and recordsbe made available to the public upon request.

While these laws seek to keep governmental processes inthe open, many of them establish disclosure exemptionsfor various types of sensitive information. Plannersshould work with their jurisdiction's legal staff to care-fully review the applicable laws and to determine howthese laws may impact their ability to protect sensitiveplanning information. Furthermore, they should alsounderstand the specific procedures required to with-hold documents and hold closed meetings as necessaryto protect sensitive information from disclosure toanyone without a "need to know."

Suggested Elements and Sample Language for a “For Official Use Only”(FOUO) Policy

� Document marking requirements

Information that has been designated FOUO should beplainly marked as such for ease of recognition. Topromote proper protection of information, markingsshould be applied at the time documents are drafted oras soon as FOUO information is added. Materialscontaining FOUO information should be marked

'PROPERTY OF (JURISDICTION NAME)FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY'

at the bottom of the front cover, title page, first page andoutside of the back cover. Additionally, each pagecontaining FOUO information should be similarly markedat the bottom. Material other than paper documents suchas slides, computer media, films, etc., should also bearthese markings. Electronically transmitted messages(e.g., e-mails) containing FOUO information should havethe abbreviation 'FOUO' before the beginning of the text.

� Handling instructions

FOUO material should never be left unattended, andreasonable steps should be taken to minimize the risk ofaccess by anyone without a "need to know." Afterworking hours, FOUO information should be stored in alocked desk, file cabinet, bookcase, or similar location.Restrictions may also be placed on the duplication andtransmission of FOUO information.

� Definition of FOUO

The term 'For Official Use Only' should applyto information which is sensitive and requires protectionfrom disclosure to the general public, and for which asignificant reason, statutory requirement, or regulatoryinstruction exists to preclude general circulation. FOUOstatus is not a security classification level.

� Guidelines for determining sensitivity

Information that may qualify for FOUO status includesthe design, construction, security, and protection ofgovernment facilities and critical infrastructures; assess-ments of the vulnerabilities of facilities and systems;plans, procedures, and protocols for responding toterrorist attacks or other criminal events; or any otherinformation that could be used for the purposes ofdamaging or destroying any facility or disrupting anyoperations.

� Designation of authority

Authority to assign and remove FOUO status should begranted to designated personnel based on position and/or responsibilities.


Federal Funding forManmade HazardMitigation ProjectsAt the time of this writing,there is little federal fundingspecifically earmarked forstate and local use in miti-gating against manmadehazards. When dealing with multiplesources of funding, ensure that you seekfunding from the most directly appro-priate and relevant program beforeseeking assistance from other sources.That said, mitigation against terrorismand technological hazards will requirecreative funding strategies that incorpo-rate a variety of non-traditional sources.Three reasons for this are:

1. Terrorism can potentially occuralmost anywhere and can affect awide range of facilities andsystems;

2. As with natural hazard mitigation,the development and implementa-tion of antiterrorism strategies canbe complex and expensive; and

3. Comprehensive antiterrorism andtechnological hazard mitigationincludes security measures andother techniques that may not beeligible for FEMA funding undercurrent regulations.

Consideration 2Project FundingIncreasingly, communities are challenged by budget constraintsthat require "doing more with less." While many pre- and post-disaster funding sources exist that can help communitiesstrengthen themselves against natural disasters, creativity will bethe key to identifying how mitigation plans and actions for terror-ism and technological hazards can be funded.

� Local governments have a good opportunity for incor-porating mitigation funding into long-range planning,especially in the capital improvement budget process.For example, planning for a new municipal building isan ideal opportunity to site a critical facility in a lowhazard area, to ensure that it is built with seismic, highwind, or other appropriate hazard resistance as appli-cable, and to incorporate security systems and security-oriented design principles into the facility's planningand design.

� State governments can implement incentive programsusing tax rebates and budget surpluses to promotemitigation actions and strengthen building codes. Theycan also incorporate all-hazard mitigation consider-ations into the processes, guidance, and requirementsthat they develop for comprehensive planning, capitalimprovement planning, urban design, land develop-ment regulation, growth management, andsustainability.

� Federal government funding for terrorism-relatedactivities is rapidly expanding following the events ofSeptember 11, 2001. Many funding streams that may beof use to states and communities working to reducetheir vulnerability to manmade hazards are not yet inplace, but other established funding mechanisms notpreviously used for this purpose can be leveraged toprovide assistance. Detailed information on availablefederal funding can be found in the Catalog of FederalDomestic Assistance at www.cfda.gov.

� Private sector organizations, businesses, and individualhomeowners have much to gain from reducing theirown risk by implementing cost-effective actions toincrease security and survivability. Industrial partnersand other private interests may be willing to contributetime, labor, materials, or other support if they are

Security consider-ations should be a prior-ity in all capital improvementprojects including bothrenovation and new devel-opment.

implement the plan and monitor progress 4


convinced that the mitigation effort will benefit theirorganization as part of an overall community improve-ment.

Consideration 3Monitoring and EvaluationThere are significant challenges to monitoring and evaluating theimplementation of mitigation strategies for terrorism and techno-logical hazards. Given the relatively low likelihood of manmadedisasters occurring in most communities (particularly in contrast tomany naturally occurring events), the value and effectiveness ofmitigation actions such as structural blast-resistance retrofits andland use regulations may never be realized. Other actions such asthe application of Crime Prevention Through EnvironmentalDesign techniques may indeed function to their full level of perfor-mance but their deterrent or preventative value may go unrecog-nized if they averted an incident that was, as a result, undetected.Still others such as guards and intrusion sensors may be put to thetest regularly, either as part of a routine testing, training, andmaintenance program or in "real world" events. Should an inci-dent or accident occur, however, there will likely be significantinterest on the part of the government, engineering, design, andstandards communities in the performance of various actions, andthe resulting inquiries and studies can provide valuable input intosubsequent mitigation planning initiatives.

The monitoring and evaluation of the manmade hazards portionof the mitigation plan should correspond with the schedule estab-lished for the natural hazards portion of the plan. The plan shouldbe revisited, and if necessary updated, on a regular basis to ensurethat it is still relevant and accurate. If a disaster occurs, the planshould be revisited, and perhaps revised, then as well.

afterword

afterwordVersion 2.0 September 2003

afterword

The basics of mitigating hazards before they become disastersare similar for both natural and manmade hazards. Whether

you are confronting wind, water, seismicity, terrorism, hazardousmaterials, or sabotage, you can use the same four-phase mitigationplanning process to reduce the consequences should these hazardsimpact the built environment. While communities of all sizes areincreasingly aware of their vulnerability to manmade hazards, thisawareness is of no value unless it is translated into action.

You may not be able to prevent every accident or deliberate attack,but a well planned and effectively implemented mitigation pro-gram will help to reduce the consequences of such incidents. Ofcourse, the reality is that natural hazards may indeed present amuch greater risk than terrorism and technological disasters dueto their higher frequency of occurrence. By using this guide andthe other how-to guides in the series, you will be able to identify,prioritize, and implement mitigation actions across the full spec-trum of hazards and maximize the efficient allocation of publicresources.

appendices

Version 2.0 September 2003 a-1

Benefit-Cost Analysis

Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations

Closed-Circuit Television

Community Emergency Response Team

Code of Federal Regulations

Critical Infrastructure Protection

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000

Department of State

Emergency Operating Plan

Emergency Support Function

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Federal Emergency Management Agency

For Official Use Only

General Services Administration

Hazards US

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment

Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning

Integrated Emergency Management System


Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection

Supervisory, Control, and Data Acquisition

Weapons of Mass Destruction

appendix a

acronymsBCA

CAMEO

CCTV

CERT

CFR

CIP

CPTED

DMA

DOS

EOP

ESF

FBI

FEMA

FOUO

GSA

HAZUS

HIRA

HVAC

IEMS

LEPC

NBC

PCCIP

SCADA

WMD

Version 2.0 September 2003 b-1

appendix b

glossaryAntiterrorism

Counterterrorism

Crime Prevention ThroughEnvironmental Design (CPTED)

Critical Infrastructure

Domestic Terrorism

Goals

International Terrorism

Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals, forces,and property to terrorist acts. (Source: US Department of Defense, Reportof the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, 2000.)

Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.(Source: US Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of Defense to thePresident and the Congress, 2000.)

A crime prevention strategy based on evidence that the design and formof the built environment can influence human behavior. Specifically,CPTED seeks to create a physical environment that discourages criminalactivity. CPTED’s basic principles are territoriality, access control,surveillance, activity support, and property maintenance.

System whose incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impacton the defense or economic security of the nation.(Source: U.S. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office athttp://www.ciao.gov/resource/index.html.)

The unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group orindividual based and operating entirely within the United States orPuerto Rico without foreign direction committed against persons orproperty to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population,or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.(Source: FBI, Terrorism in the United States 1998.)

General guidelines that identify what you want to achieve. They areusually long-term in nature.

Violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of thecriminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be acriminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the UnitedStates or any state. These acts appear to be intended to intimidate orcoerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government byintimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government byassassination or kidnapping. International terrorist acts occur outside theUnited States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means bywhich they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended tocoerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate orseek asylum. (Source: FBI, Terrorism in the United States 1998.)

STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazardsb-2

To cause to become less harsh or hostile; to make less severe or painful.

Measurable strategies or implementation steps to attain a goal. They areshorter in range and more specific than goals.

The act or process of making or carrying out plans; the establishment ofgoals, policies, and procedures for a social or economic unit.

A crime prevention strategy based on reducing the opportunities forcrime by increasing the effort required to commit a crime, increasing therisks associated with committing the crime, and reducing the targetappeal or vulnerability (whether property or person). This opportunityreduction is achieved by management and use policies such asprocedures and training, as well as physical approaches such as alterationof the built environment.

The unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property tointimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or anysegment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. (Source:28 CFR Section 0.85.)

Explosive, incendiary, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Asdefined in 18 U.S.C., Section 2332a,

"the term 'weapon of mass destruction' means –

(A) any destructive device as defined in section 921 of this title;

(B) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death orserious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, orimpact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors;

(C) any weapon involving a disease organism; or

(D) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivityat a level dangerous to human life."

Furthermore, a 'destructive device' is defined in 18 U.S.C., Section 921 as:

"any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas –

(i) bomb,

(ii) grenade,

(iii) rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces,

(iv) missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more thanone-quarter ounce,

(v) mine, or

(vi) device similar to any of the devices described in the precedingclauses."

Mitigate

Objectives

Planning

Situational Crime Prevention

Terrorism

Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMD)

Version 2.0 September 2003 c-1

appendix c

libraryResearch and Publications

American Planning Association. 1995. Integrating Emergency Manage-ment and the Planning Process. City Planning and Management News,Winter 1994-95: 3-4.

American Society of Civil Engineers. 1999. Structural Design for PhysicalSecurity: State of the Practice. Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engi-neers.

Archibald, Rae W., et al. 2002. Security and Safety in Los Angeles High-RiseBuildings after 9/11. Santa Monica, California: RAND. (Online) Availableat http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB381.

Britton, Neil R. and John Lindsay. 1995. Demonstrating the Need toIntegrate City Planning and Emergency Preparedness: Two Case Studies.International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 13,2: 161-178.

Clarke, Ronald V., ed. 1997. Situational Crime Prevention: Successful CaseStudies (2nd ed.). Guilderland, N.Y.: Harrow and Heston.

Coleman, Michael A. 1997. The Influence of Traffic Calming Devices upon FireVehicle Travel Times. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Transportation Engi-neers.

Crowe, Timothy D. 2000. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design:Applications Of Architectural Design And Space Management Concepts (2nd ed.).Stoneham, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2002. World Trade CenterBuilding Performance Study: Data Collection, Preliminary Observations, andRecommendations (FEMA 403). Washington, D.C.: Federal EmergencyManagement Agency.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2001. Mitigation Resources forSuccess (CD-ROM) (FEMA 372). Washington, D.C.: Federal EmergencyManagement Agency.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2000. Planning for a SustainableFuture: The Link Between Hazard Mitigation and Livability (FEMA 364).Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency. (Online)Available at http://www.fema.gov/fima/planning_toc.shtm.

STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazardsc-2

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 1997. Radiological EmergencyManagement Independent Study Course (IS-301). Washington, D.C.: FederalEmergency Management Agency. (Online) Available athttp://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is301.htm.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 1996. The Oklahoma CityBombing: Improving Building Performance through Multi-Hazard Mitigation(FEMA 277). Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency ManagementAgency.

Fehr, Stephen C. 1996. Parking Under Siege in D.C.: U.S. Anti-TerrorismPlan Threatens 360 Spaces. The Washington Post, July 13, 1996.

Fleissner, Dan and Fred Heinzelmann. 1996. Crime Prevention ThroughEnvironmental Design and Community Policing. Washington, D. C.: U.S.Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute ofJustice. (Online) Available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/crimepre.pdf.

Gordon, Corey L. and William Brill. 1996. The Expanding Role of CrimePrevention Through Environmental Design in Premises Liability. Washington,D. C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, NationalInstitute of Justice. (Online) Available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/cptedlia.pdf.

Hart, Sara. 2002. In the aftermath of September 11, the urban landscapeappears vulnerable and random: Architects and consultants focus on riskassessment and security through design. Architectural Record, March 2002.

Hinman, Eve E. and David J. Hammond. 1997. Lessons from the OklahomaCity Bombing: Defensive Design Techniques. Reston, VA: American Society ofCivil Engineers (ASCE Press).

Lasley, James. 1998. “Designing Out” Gang Homicides and Street Assaults.Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Pro-grams, National Institute of Justice. (Online) Available athttp://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/173398.pdf.

La Vigne, Nancy G. 1997. Visibility and Vigilance: Metro’s Situational Ap-proach to Preventing Subway Crime. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department ofJustice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. (Online)Available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/166372.pdf.

Mulder, Kathy. 1998. Split Speed Bump. Washington, D.C.: Institute ofTransportation Engineers.

National Capital Planning Commission. 2002. The National Capital UrbanDesign and Security Plan. (Online) Available athttp://www.ncpc.gov/publications/UDSP/final%20UDSP.pdf.

National Capital Planning Commission. 2001. Designing for Security in theNation’s Capital. (Online) Available at http://www.ncpc.gov/planning_init/security/designingsec.pdf.

appendix c – library


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. 2002. Guidance forProtecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radio-logical Attacks (DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2002-139). Cincinnati,Ohio: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. (Online)Available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/bldvent/2002-139.html.

National League of Cities. 2000. Domestic Terrorism: Resources for LocalGovernments. Washington, DC.: National League of Cities.

National Research Council. 2001. Protecting Buildings and People fromTerrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation. Washington, D.C.:National Academy Press.

Newman, Oscar. 1996. Creating Defensible Space. Washington, D.C.: U.S.Department of Housing and Urban Development. (Online) Available athttp://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/def.pdf.

Schneider, Richard H., and Ted Kitchen. 2002. Planning for Crime Preven-tion: A Transatlantic Perspective. New York, New York: Routledge.

Schwab, Jim, et al. 1998. Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery and Reconstruc-tion (Planning Advisory Service Report Number 483/484). Chicago,Illinois: American Planning Association.

Sidell, Frederick R., et al. 1998. Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook. Alexandria,Virginia: Jane’s Information Group.

Smith, Keith. 1992. Environmental Hazards: Assessing Risk and ReducingDisaster. New York, New York: Routledge.

Smith, Mary S. 1996. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design inParking Facilities. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office ofJustice Programs, National Institute of Justice. (Online) Available athttp://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/cptedpkg.pdf.

Steinberg, Michele and Burby, Raymond J. 2002. Growing Safe. Planning68,4: 22-23.

Taylor, Ralph B. and Adele V. Harrell. 1996. Physical Environment andCrime. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of JusticePrograms, National Institute of Justice. (Online) Available athttp://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/physenv.pdf.

U.S. Air Force. Installation Force Protection Guide. (Online) Available athttp://www.afcee.brooks.af.mil/dc/dcd/arch/force.pdf.

U.S. Army. 2001. Field Manual 3-19.30, Physical Security. Washington, D.C.:Headquarters, Department of the Army. (Online) Available athttp://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-19.30/fm3-19.30.pdf.

U.S. Department of Justice. 1995. Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facili-ties. (Online) Available at http://www.oca.gsa.gov.


U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco andFirearms. 1999. Vehicle Bomb Explosion Hazard And Evacuation DistanceTables. This publication is no longer available online. To request a copy,write to Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Exposives, Arson andExplosives Programs Division, 800 K Street, NW, Tech World Suite 710,Washington, DC 20001.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2001. LEPCs and DeliberateReleases: Addressing Terrorist Activities in the Local Emergency Plan. (Online)Available at http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/factsheets/lepcct.pdf.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 2002. Terrorism Insurance: Rising Unin-sured Exposure to Attacks Heightens Potential Economic Vulnerabilities (GAO-02-472T). (Online) Available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02472t.pdf.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 2001. Homeland Security: A Risk Manage-ment Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts (GAO-02-208T). (Online)Available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02208t.pdf.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 2001. Homeland Security: Key Elements of aRisk Management Approach (GAO-02-150T). (Online) Available athttp://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02150t.pdf.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 2000. Combating Terrorism: LinkingThreats to Strategies and Resources (T-NSIAD-00-218). (Online) Available athttp://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ns00218t.pdf.

U.S. General Services Administration. 2002. GSA Occupant EmergencyProgram (OEP) Guide. (Online) Available at http://www.gsa.gov/attach-ments/GSA_PUBLICATIONS/extpub/GSA_OEP_Guide_6.doc.

U.S. House of Representatives. 1996. Impacts of the closure of PennsylvaniaAvenue on the District of Columbia. Hearing before the Subcommittee onthe District of Columbia of the Committee on Government Reform andOversight, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress,second session, June 7, 1996. Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office.

appendix c – library


Web Sites

American Institute of Architects:Building Security Through Design

American Lifelines Alliance

American Society for Industrial Security

Building Owners and Managers Association:BOMA International Emergency Resource Center

Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance

Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance:terrorism-related funding

Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office

Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office:Critical Infrastructure Protection

Federal Emergency Management Agency: EmergencyManagement Institute, Terrorism Training and Resources

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Mitigation Planning

Federal Emergency Management Agency:Information on manmade hazards

General Services Administration: Facilities Standards for thePublic Buildings Service (note: certain information is excludedfrom public access for security reasons, but a vast amount of

helpful guidance is available)

General Services Administration: Office of the Chief Architect

General Services Administration, Public Buildings Service:First Impressions – Streamlining Security

International Facility Management Association

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Advice forSafeguarding Buildings Against Chemical or Biological Attack

National Capital Planning Commission:Security and Urban Design

National Infrastructure Protection Center

National Institute of Building Sciences

http://www.aia.org/security

http://www.americanlifelinesalliance.org

http://www.asisonline.org

http://www.boma.org/emergency

http://www.cfda.gov

http://www.cfda.gov/911.htm

http://www.ciao.gov

http://www.ciao.gov/resource/pccip/pccip_documents.htm

http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/terrorisminfor/ctrt.asp

http://www.fema.gov/fima/planning.shtm

http://www.fema.gov/hazards

http://hydra.gsa.gov/pbs/pc/facilitiesstandards

http://www.oca.gsa.gov

http://hydra.gsa.gov/pbs/firstimpressions/takingaction/streamline_security.html

http://www.ifma.org

http://securebuildings.lbl.gov

http://www.ncpc.gov/planning_init/security/security.html

http://www.nipc.gov

http://www.nibs.org


Penn State University, Protective Technology Center:Modern Protective Structures course

Public Entity Risk Institute

The Infrastructure Security Partnership

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Center of Expertise forProtective Design: Blast Mitigation Action Group

U.S. Army Soldiers' and Biological Chemical Command:Basic Information on Building Protection

U.S. Department of Defense:Force Protection Equipment Demonstration IV

U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State:Technical Support Working Group

U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories:Architectural Surety Program

U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories:Critical Infrastructure Protection initiative

U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation:Terrorism in the United States reports

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency:Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office

U.S. Fire Administration

U.S. General Accounting Office:Special Collections – Terrorism

U.S. Navy, Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center,Security Engineering Division: Systematic Approach for

Reviewing Projects for Protection Against Terrorism3-day workshop

Whole Building Design Guide: Provide Security to Assets

http://www.cde.psu.edu/C&I/ProtectiveStructures/default.html

http://www.riskinstitute.org

http://www.tisp.org

http://bmag.nwo.usace.army.mil

http://buildingprotection.sbccom.army.mil/basic

http://www.fped4.org

http://www.tswg.gov

http://www.sandia.gov/archsur

http://www.sandia.gov/LabNews/LN02-11-00/steam_story.html

http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terroris.htm

http://yosemite.epa.gov/oswer/ceppoweb.nsf/content/index.html

http://www.usfa.fema.gov

http://www.gao.gov/terrorism.html

http://atfp.nfesc.navy.mil/training.htm

http://www.wbdg.org(click “Design Guidance” then “Design Objec-tives” then “Secure/Safe”)

d-1Version 2.0 September 2003

appendix d

worksheets

Worksheet #1 Build the Planning Team

Worksheet #2 Asset Identification Checklist

Worksheet #3 Facility Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix

Worksheet #1 Build the Planning Team phase 1, step

page 1 of 2

Specialists for Manmade Hazards

Bomb and Arson Squads

Community Emergency Response Teams

Hazardous Materials Experts

Infrastructure Owners/Operators

National Guard Units

Representatives from facilities identifiedin Worksheet #2: Asset IdentificationChecklist

Local/Tribal

Administrator/Manager’s Office

Budget/Finance Office

Building Code Enforcement Office

City/County Attorney’s Office


Emergency Preparedness Office

Fire and Rescue Department

Hospital Management


Planning and Zoning Office

Police/Sheriff’s Department

Public Works Department

Sanitation Department

School Board

Transportation Department

Tribal Leaders

Step 2 of Getting Started (FEMA 386-1) discusses establishing a planning team with a broad range ofbackgrounds and experience represented. This worksheet suggests additional individuals, agencies, andorganizations that should be included on a team to plan for manmade hazards. State organizations can beincluded on local teams when appropriate to serve as a source of information and to provide guidance andcoordination.

You should use the checklist as a starting point for expanding your team.

ONTEAM

ADD TOTEAM

ONTEAM

ADD TOTEAM

Special Districts and Authorities

Airport and Seaport Authorities

Business Improvement District(s)

Fire Control District

Flood Control District

Redevelopment Agencies

Regional/Metropolitan PlanningOrganization(s)

School Districts

Transit/Transportation Agencies

Others

Architectural/Engineering/Planning Firms

Citizen Corps

Colleges/Universities

Land Developers

Major Employers/Businesses

Professional Associations

Retired Professionals

State

Adjutant General’s Office (National Guard)

Board of Education

Building Code Office

Climatologist

Earthquake Program Manager


of 2

Emergency Management Office/State Hazard Mitigation Officer

Environmental Protection Office

Fire Marshal’s Office

Geologist

Homeland Security Coordinator’s Office

Housing Office

Hurricane Program Manager

Insurance Commissioner’s Office

National Flood InsuranceProgram Coordinator

Natural Resources Office

Planning Agencies

Police

Public Health Office

Public Information Office

Tourism Department

ONTEAM

ADD TOTEAM

ONTEAM

ADD TOTEAM

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

American Red Cross

Chamber of Commerce

Community/Faith-Based Organizations

Environmental Organizations

Homeowners Associations

Neighborhood Organizations

Private Development Agencies

Utility Companies

Other Appropriate NGOs

of 2

Worksheet #2 Asset Identification Checklist phase 2, step

This worksheet is intended as an aid for identifying critical facilities, sites, systems, and other assets in yourcommunity or state. Check all the boxes that apply to your jurisdiction.

Local, state, and federal government offices(list all in your jurisdiction)

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

Military installations, including Reserve and NationalGuard component facilities (list all in your jurisdiction)

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

Emergency services

Backup facilities

Communication centers

Emergency operations centers

Fire/Emergency Medical Service (EMS) facilities

Law enforcement facilities

Politically or symbolically significant sites

Embassies, consulates

Landmarks, monuments

Political party and special interest group offices

Religious sites

Transportation infrastructure components

Airports

Bus stations

Ferry terminals

Interstate highways

Oil/gas pipelines

Railheads/rail yards

Seaports/river ports

Subways

Truck terminals

Tunnels/bridges

Energy, water, and related utility systems

Electricity production, transmission, and distribution systemcomponents

Oil and gas storage/shipment facilities

Power plant fuel distribution, delivery, and storage

Telecommunications facilities

Wastewater treatment plants

Water supply/purification/distribution systems

Telecommunications and information systems

Cable TV facilities

Cellular network facilities

Critical cable routes

Major rights of way

Newspaper offices and production/distribution facilities

Radio stations

Satellite base stations

Telephone trunking and switching stations

Television broadcast stations

Health care system components

Emergency medical centers

Family planning clinics

Health department offices

Hospitals

Radiological material and medical waste transportation,storage, and disposal


Walk-in clinics

Financial services infrastructures and institutions

Armored car services

Banks and credit unions

Agricultural facilities

Chemical distribution, storage, and application sites

Crop spraying services

Farms and ranches

Food processing, storage, and distribution facilities

Commercial/manufacturing/industrial facilities

Apartment buildings

Business/corporate centers

Chemical plants (include facilities having Section 302Extremely Hazardous Substances on-site)

Factories

Fuel production, distribution, and storage facilities

Hotels and convention centers

Industrial plants

Malls and shopping centers

Raw material production, distribution, and storage facilities


Shipping, warehousing, transfer, and logistical centers

Mobile assets

Aviation and marine units

Mobile emergency operations centers/command centers

Portable telecommunications equipment

Red Cross Emergency Response Vehicles, Salvation Armymobile canteens, etc.

Other (Bloodmobiles, mobile health clinics, etc.)

page 2 of 2

Recreational facilities

Auditoriums

Casinos

Concert halls and pavilions

Parks

Restaurants and clubs frequented by potential targetpopulations

Sports arenas and stadiums

Theaters

Public/private institutions

Academic institutions

Cultural centers

Libraries

Museums


Events and attractions

Festivals and celebrations

Open-air markets

Parades

Rallies, demonstrations, and marches

Religious services

Scenic tours

Theme parks

Increments may be adjusted to better reflect your response capabilities or to be consistent with other guidance such as Mass Casualty Incident plans.Note that different risks may exist at a facility depending on whether it is occupied or vacant.

Adapted from: FEMA Emergency Management Institute, Terrorism Planning Course

Worksheet #3 phase 2, step Facility Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix

The Facility Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix provides a way to record how vulnerable each asset isand enables the planning team to compare how vulnerable the assets are relative to each other. Make a copy foreach asset and fill in the facility name or other identifier in the space provided. Select the appropriate point valuefor each criterion based on the description in each row. Then add the point values to get the total for each asset.When you have done this for each asset you identified, compare the total scores to see how the assets rank inrelation to one another.

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Facility _____________________________________________________________________________________________

September 2003FEMA 386-7

Version 2.0

September 2003 FEMA 386-7 Version 2...2013/09/08 · Version 2.0 September 2003 i T he Federal...

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Transcript of September 2003 FEMA 386-7 Version 2...2013/09/08 · Version 2.0 September 2003 i T he Federal...