Senior Seminar Thesis

1

Ogoni Oil: Economic and Political

Underrepresentation, and Environmental

Degradation

Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development, 2014

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Title Page

SPRING 2015

GLOBAL STUDIES CAPSTONE SEMINAR

SONOMA STATE UNIVERSITY

TITLE OF REPORT Ogoni Oil: Economic and Political

Underrepresentation, and Environmental

Degradation

GROUP The Underrepresented Ones

HAND-IN DATE April 30th, 2015

SUPERVISOR Rheyna Laney and Jeff Baldwin

TOTAL NORMAL PAGES 57.45 pages (137,888 characters with

spaces)

Rebekah Cryderman

________________

Lauren Silveira

________________

Jackson Stogner

________________

Taylor Vitangeli

________________

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Acknowledgments and Dedication

Our research team is grateful for the opportunity to learn from our peers and our professors at

Sonoma State University throughout our academic career. We would like to take the time to

thank our Senior Capstone Thesis advisors: John Nardine, Dr. Jeff Baldwin, and Dr. Rheyna

Laney. We would also like to express our appreciation to the authors from whom we have used

throughout our research to gain extensive knowledge on the topics of the resource curse,

corruption, political ecology, environmental degradation, and social movements. Lastly, we

would like to vocalize our gratitude and reverence to the local communities of the Niger Delta

who continue to strive for their improved well-being despite structural hindrances.

Cover photo of a protest by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in

River State in 2014.

Photo courtesy of the Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development

(http://cehrd.com/our-environment-is-our-life-clean-up-and-pay-up-now/).

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Abstract

Nigeria’s government, through corrupt practices, has excluded, politically and economically,

many ethnic communities in the Niger Delta. These same corrupt practices that have resulted in

the underrepresentation of local communities have also caused the marginalization and neglect

of the local environment. This neglect of the local environment has further marginalized the

local people who rely on the environment as a way of life. The Ogoni community of the Niger

Delta serves as a case study for this all-too-common path of developing regions of the world that

concentrate on resource extraction. They also represent a community that is mobilizing to

address these concerns, and though significant strides at the federal level are yet to be made,

there continues to be advocacy for progress on economic, political, and environmental issues.

The global context of resource extraction allows the broad themes and salient patterns found

through this research to become applicable for further research on other communities, and their

social movements, across the globe.

Key Words: Niger Delta, Underrepresentation, Social Movements, Oil, Resource Curse,

Corruption, Political Ecology.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

2. Methodology and Research Design

2.1 Approaches

2.2 Case Boundaries

2.3 Frameworks

2.4 Key Terms

3. Literature Review

3.1 The Resource Curse

3.2 Corruption

3.3 Political Ecology

3.4 Local People of the Niger Delta and Oil

3.5 Oil Industry and the Environment

4. Case Study

4.1 Petrol and Layered Logistics

4.2 Impaired Institutions

4.3 Facts about The Ogoni

4.4 The Economic Context of Development

4.5 The Story of Shell Oil

4.6 Environmental Degradation

4.6.1 Environmental Degradation

4.6.2 Environmental Regulations

4.7 Forms of Representation in the Delta

4.7.1 MOSOP

4.7.2 MEND

4.7.3 Local NGOs and Civil Organizations

4.7.4 Regional NGOs

5. Analysis


5.2 Corruption

5.2.1 The Role of Shell Oil

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6. Conclusion

7. Perspectives

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Abbreviations

AGRA: The Associated Gas Re-injection Act 1979

ANEEJ: African Network for Environment and Economic Justice

DPR: Department of Petroleum Resources

EEFC: [Nigerian] Economic and Financial Crimes Commission

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

IRIN: Integrated regional Information Networks

MEND: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

MNEs: multinational enterprises

MOCs: multinational oil companies

MOSOP: Movement for the Survival of he Ogoni People

NDDC: Niger Delta Development Commission

NEITI: Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

NER: Nigeria Economic Report

NGO: Non- Governmental Organization

NNOC: Nigerian National Oil Corporation

NNPC: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation

OEL: Oil Exploration License

OGEPA: Ogoni Environmental Protection Agency

OML: Oil Mining Lease

OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

OPL: Oil Prospecting License

PPT: Petroleum Profit Tax

PSCs: Production Sharing Contracts

PWYP: Pay What You Publish

RMAFC: Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission

RSSDP: Rivers State Sustainable Development Program

SPDC: Shell Petroleum Development Company

TNOCs: Transnational oil companies

TPH: Total petroleum hydrocarbon

UN: United Nation

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UNEP: United Nations Environment Program

UNPO: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization

BBC 2015

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UNEP 2011

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Ogoni Oil: Economic and Political Underrepresentation, and Environmental Degradation

1. Introduction

The topic of minority underrepresentation and its potential effects upon the environment

arose through a classroom brainstorming session dedicated to drawing out the different focuses

our Global Studies major. We then synthesized multiple ideas into a single topic in order to

reveal a new path of exploration for our research project. With our concentrations differing

between Social, Political and Economic Development and Global Environmental Policy, we

realized the potential in covering a topic that allows us all to delve into each of these realms. The

interdisciplinary nature of Global Studies allows us to come into contact with similar issues of

resource extraction and indigenous empowerment in developing areas of the world, expanding

our case study options. Each of our group members has had some exposure to this topic through

a variety of courses such as World Regions in a Global Context and Liberation Ecologies. To

further focus our topic on a specific region and situation, we discussed options at length

involving nearly every continent. After a period of meditation on the exact circumstance to write

about, we decided on the oil extraction industry of Nigeria and its local community members

who are not involved with, or benefiting from, those processes. This option appeals to our group

because of personal commitments to social justice, current reports of Nigeria in international

media regarding instability, and our own observations of falling oil prices while understanding

from scholastic backgrounds that International Political Economy is what is at play.

As a group, we have discussed several key topics that are generally known about

underrepresentation and oil in Nigeria. Nigeria is a major oil producing country and a member of

the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).1 Despite the vast oil wealth in

Nigeria, there is great economic inequality due to inequitable resource allocation.2 The lack of

just resource allocation has led to the underrepresentation of many groups within oil producing

communities, and has impacted their political and socioeconomic well-being. We also know that

1 Chris Nwachukwu Okeke. 2008. “The Second Scramble for Africa's Oil and Mineral Resources: Blessing or

Curse?” .International Lawyer. 42, no. 1. p. 200. 2 Chris Nwachukwu Okeke. ibid., p. 199.

11

the Nigerian government has been accused of corruption. Another generally known fact is that

Nigeria was once colonized by Great Britain up until their independence in 1960.3

We have made one main assumption throughout our research of this topic: oil production

is, in itself, degrading to the environment. With that said, we will explain in more detail the

damage that is done by oil spills and gas flaring.4 However, we believe that the detailed

discussion of the harm caused by carbon emissions on a global scale is better left to the plethora

of existing literature specifically on that topic. At this juncture, we believe that this is the extent

of our assumptions. We have recognized that the other ideas that we thought we might be

assuming are actually going to be addressed in our research as we move forward.

In the areas that have great economic gains to be garnered from mineral or resource

mining, there are many dimensions to explore. There is often an associated favoritism of certain

shareholders and a neglected interest of undervalued stakeholders in these situations, typically a

socio-economic, ethnic, or political minority who goes unheard or unheeded. The political

systems in place have embedded social relations into their structures, sometimes referred to as

Godfatherism5, which enables a politician to be chosen based on their strategic alliances and

promises to those who have helped them gain the position.6 It is the neglected groups which

require mobilization as civil society in order to have their interests advocated for, and which

must make sustained efforts to effectively partake in that processes of the planning and

extraction.7 Although some progress has been made, the detrimental environmental and social

effects of mining endeavors are partly due to the inability of communities to act as partners in

these projects and have their wisdom, interests, or input embodied.8 The relation between this

disregard and environmental degradation is what our group is hoping to explore through our

capstone research project. Our main research question is as follows: "In a country whose

economy has relied heavily on mineral resource extraction, how is the political and

3 Jesse Salah Ovadia. 2013. The Nigerian 'One Percent' and the Management of National Oil Wealth Through

Nigerian Content. Science & Society. 77, no. 3: 47-75. 4 C.O. Opukri, and Ibaba S. Ibaba. 2008. "Oil induced environmental degradation and internal population

displacement in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta’." Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 10, no. 1: 173-193. 5 Okoye, I. 2007. "Political Godfatherism, Electoral Politics and Governance in Nigeria." In Annual Conference of

the Mpsa Held In Chicago, USA. p. 3 6 Sarah Chayes. 2015. Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security. WW Norton & Company:

pp.125-126 7 Julia Maxted. 2006. Exploitation of Energy Resources in Africa and the Consequences for Minority Rights.

Journal of Developing Societies. 22, no. 1. p. 35. 8 Julia Maxted. ibid.

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economic underrepresentation of local communities related to the presence of

environmental problems in the Niger Delta?"

In addition to the main research question and in order to comprehensively explore the

topic, other questions must be asked and researched. These questions include: How has

corruption in the government and unequal resource allocation contributed to underrepresentation

of local communities in the Niger Delta? How has the theft of crude oil impacted the

environment in the Niger Delta? What role does development, or lack there of, play in the

economy and underrepresentation in Nigeria? How does the environmental degradation of the

Niger Delta affect local populations? How do local politics and social movements in the Niger

Delta affect oil extraction in the region? How can the government encourage or discourage the

oil industry?

The purpose of our research is to explore these connections in a thorough manner and

obtain a greater understanding of the current circumstances in the Niger Delta. Our research has

the possibility of shedding light upon the crucial environmental leveraging points in the region,

across the continent and in other parts of the globe subjected to similar situations. We have the

opportunity to impact how others, in academic circles and in less formal arenas, may see both

underrepresentation and environmental issues in local and in global scopes. By providing an

inclusive contextual framework and a complementary perspective for viewing these themes, we

hope to be able to breakthrough the biases surrounding the African continent in popular

discourse and create a platform for future research, individual learning, and organizational action

to build upon.

2. Methodology and Research Design

In this section, we will discuss the approaches we chose in answering our research

question. We will also explain the process by which we chose our case study. The case we have

chosen is a single instrumental case9–we can look at this case and use it as an example of a larger

problem plaguing many developing countries. The issue of the resource curse, environmental

degradation, and corruption are all issues that are by no means confined to the Niger Delta. For

this very reason, we have not classified this as an intrinsic case10

–we deem it not to be unique to

9 John W. Creswell. 2013. Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches. Sage. p. 99

10 Creswell ibid., p. 100

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the region. However, an in-depth look at the situation in the Niger Delta could potentially be

generalizable to the greater issues of the resource curse, environmental degradation, and

corruption in other states around the world.

We have elected to narrow our research to a single case study as opposed to to a multiple

case study.11

Due to time constraints, our aim is to fully understand the situation in a single case,

rather than weaken our investigation through the task of examining multiple cases with

comparable depth. However, in a different setting, a multiple case study could illuminate

similarities between cases and provide additional data for future research. A single case study

will provide a substantial example to illustrate the multifarious character of our approach and to

produce solid findings that lend themselves as pattern-building for other works. The case of the

Ogoni people in the Niger Delta can be classified as what Alan Bryman would call an

exemplifying case–it demonstrates the circumstances of a situation prevalent around the world.12

This classification also makes a justification for the implementation of a single-case study. We

are approaching this study by applying a holistic analysis, rather than an embedded analysis,13

because there will not be a focus on a particular subunit within this case. Rather, we will be

examining this case entire case in a more general way.

We will be using complex reasoning for our research, applying inductive reasoning to

reach conclusions about information gathered, as well as using deductive reasoning to construct

themes and compare them with data collected.14

As Creswell suggests, we will be using multiple

methods for our research.15

Forms of data will include secondary sources such as books and peer

reviewed articles, as well as reliable sources from news outlets. By using multiple sources, we

can triangulate evidence and remove any inconsistencies presented in single-source data. The

validity of these document sources have been investigated by our group through the critical

examination of primary sources for first-hand account evidence, and secondary sources to

reiterate main points we make, and find differing points of view. Tertiary sources will only be

used to remain up to date on current activities occurring in the Niger Delta.16

We have been

11

Creswell ibid., p. 99 12

Alan Bryman. 2008. Social Research Methods. Oxford University Press. p. 56 13

Creswell op. cit., pp. 100-101 14

Creswell ibid., p. 45 15

Creswell ibid. 16

Kate L. Turabian. 2013. A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations. University of

Chicago Press. pp. 25-27

14

adamant to use the works of respected field experts, university-affiliated professors, reliable local

organizations, and other credible authors who are part of reputable publishers and institutions.

2.1 Approaches

We are using an emergent design for this research paper; in other words, as we accrue

information and gather an increasing understanding of the topic, our research plan will evolve

accordingly.17

Our intent is to produce a paper that is credible, transferable, dependable and

confirmable.18

To ensure a final work that has internal validity, our explanation of the causal

effects will show a strong relationship between the independent variable of government activity

and the dependent variables of environmental degradation and underrepresention.19

External

validity will be established through our global framework which reflects upon the greater

application of findings from this common case, and ecological validity will be addressed through

the localized analysis of how indigenous groups are affected daily by the reality of their

situation.20

Constructing comprehensive qualitative research requires an awareness of researcher

roles in interpretation and the involvement of natural viewpoints which are “sensitive” to the

subjects being considered.21

A quantitative approach is unable to capture the intricacies of people

on the ground who are experiencing their lives within such a living, breathing context. Our data

is no less credible than numbers and because our focus is on the well being of humanity, the

situation may provide a more suitable occasion for analysis using epistemologies like social

constructivism rather than more rigid or reductionist methods like postpositivism.22

The

interpretivism embodied in our research is a logic utilized to seek an understanding of the

experience for marginalized communities rather than only looking for confined explanations of

the situation in the Niger Delta removed from human ascription. The subjects of our analysis are

essential to the hermeneutic approach we plan to employ; the hermeneutic approach recognizes

the significance of individual thought and processes that may impact a situation or

environment.23

Through the interpretation of data from the perspective of participants, we

17

Creswell op. cit., p. 47 18

Bryman. op. cit.,. p. 34 19

Bryman ibid., p. 32 20

Bryman ibid., p. 33 21

Creswell. op. cit., p. 44 22

Creswell. ibid., p. 24 23

Bryman. op. cit., p. 15

15

acknowledge that our subjectivity may be a source of analysis but we will actively make it a

point to convey the meanings of our research by people actually living the experiences we

describe.

Upon a group reflection, we have discovered several predispositions engendered by our

academic and social experience which may lead to a perspective on the topic that differs from

those of other researchers. One major potential partiality is our feelings about the prospect of oil;

we all agree that the production of oil is a dead end road that should not gather continuing

investments in the future. For this reason, our perspective on oil production, and thus, the issue

of environmental degradation as a result of said production, may inherently be perceived as

negative. The other main potential bias which might be found in our research paper is that we are

all partial to local perspectives over foreign or corporate perspectives. For this reason, our

perception of conflicts between the two may lean towards favorable outcomes for local

communities. Our feelings on these topics stem primarily from our academic background. The

lifeblood of the Global Studies major is the desire for the understanding of global issues. Three

of our members have a concentration in global environmental policy. Thus, environmental

degradation is a sensitive subject. The fourth member of our group has a concentration on social,

political, and economic development of developing nations, so naturally, conflicts between local

communities and outside forces are of particular concern. These are the two main biases among

our group.

With that said, we will apply a holistic account24

–we will make it a priority to

acknowledge and address the various perspectives in this complex case in order to help us

understand the situation as a whole. These ethical leanings are situated within a research format

which applies a constructivist approach, meaning that we recognize how the significance and

understanding of situations are socially constructed by individuals as well as researchers, and we

have left our questions intentionally open in order to receive a more varied response from all

angles.25

We will analyze the relevance of theories that build our framework as well as those that

disagree with it in order to cultivate an objective outlook. The avenues mentioned will elucidate

24

Creswell. op. cit., p. 47 25

Creswell. ibid., p.24

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the exploration of our case with multiple perspectives without shaping our understanding in a

narrow direction colored by purely personal views.26

2.2 Case Boundaries

The boundaries of our study manifest in different levels according to our specific

research concentrations: social, environmental, economic, and political. The social dimensions of

our study will refer to the Ogoni ethnic group, local activists and other stakeholders living within

the Niger Delta in Nigeria. Because of the nature of interstate networks and connections, we

cannot confine our research of the Ogoni to a solitary spatial zone, despite the existence of an

area designated as Ogoniland. Instead, we have chosen to stipulate our social realm as the entire

Niger Delta, a relatively small, 70,000 km²27

portion of the state of Nigeria located where the

mouth of the Niger River meets the Atlantic Ocean. The environmental element of our research

will arrange itself within the region of the Niger Delta and its surrounding bodies of water

affected by Niger Delta oil activity. Our choice to limit the environmental aspects in this manner

allows for our work to spotlight the problems incurred by oil extraction, and not other industries,

and the difficulties endured by oil producing communities, not other localities which may have a

smaller impact from resource extraction practices. To the extent possible, we will attempt to

focus our research on the Niger Delta explicitly to provide an unambiguous insight into the

current situation. This being noted, we also recognize that the range of economic and political

circumstances in the Delta is greatly impacted by the actions of the national government. Hence,

for these intertwining yet separate realms of analysis, economy and politics, we will widen our

scope to the federal level and delineate our restrictions to the conduct of the Nigerian

government, institutions and markets.

In regards to temporal limitations, the scope of the case study will be limited to the last

twenty years–the time following Ken Saro-Wiwa’s death. We will look at changes and

developments in the political and economic status of the Ogoni people from 1996 onward, while

comparing it to changes in environmental degradation in the area over the same time period. The

focus, though, will be more on recent years than in the few years immediately following Saro-

Wiwa’s death. This paper will reference the history of oil in Nigeria, starting at its discovery in

26

Creswell. ibid., p. 60 27

World Wildlife Foundation. 2015. Niger River Delta.

17

1956, to encompass the full connotation of what has occurred over time. We feel it is important

to look at the past in order to understand the present situation in the Niger Delta. The colonial

context and continuous accounts of exploitation provide a more nuanced discernment of current

conditions, and demonstrate why communities have felt the need to organize against oil

extraction as their needs have been relentlessly ignored.28

This historical information will be

used exclusively for the purpose of providing background. We have placed these spatial and

temporal limitations for our case study, but we will relate our findings to their significance in a

global setting in our paper.

Our decision to research this topic was driven by our curiosity to delve into one of the

most highly politicized commodities of the global market: oil. Industrialized nations consume

this nonrenewable resource at a rapid rate, wars have been fought, and local people conveniently

forgotten in order to procure this commodity.29

We have collectively chosen to explore the

ongoing struggle for environmental, social, and economic justice in the face of transnational oil

corporations and corrupt governments in the Niger Delta through the example of the Ogoni

people. Our decision stems from the immense level of activity that has occurred in Ogoniland for

decades and the inspiration that has come from learning about the tragedy surrounding Ken Saro-

Wiwa and the execution of the Ogoni Nine which gained global infamy in 1995.30

This ethnic

group has become a focal point within the Niger Delta and a representation of what can go awry

when local peoples endeavor to achieve equality within an unequal system. The Ogoni people

have remained active in the Niger Delta as they continue to demand agency regarding their lands

and livelihoods.31

2.3 Frameworks

For the qualitative research indicative of social sciences like Global Studies, the

perspective of the various participants are essential to include and strengthen the work’s worth in

the wider world.32

In the instance of our specific research case the topic in question is the

underrepresentation of local groups in the Niger Delta and so the largest mistake we could make

28

Maxted. op. cit., p. 33. 29

Julia Maxted. ibid., p. 29. 30

Human Rights Watch. 1996. Nigeria Permanent Transition 1996. 31

Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People. 2015. 32

Creswell op. cit., p. 47

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would be to leave out the voices we have found that need to be heard. Because we have not had

the opportunity to travel to Nigeria and observe these circumstances first-hand, we cannot speak

from a place of understanding in the way indigenous people of the area are able to. The meaning

given and interpretations ascribed to the occurrences in the Delta are most significant when they

are provided by those participating in the struggle and advocacy discussed. Stakeholders in the

extraction of natural resources in the Niger Delta are multi-level and include: both local and

national governments and politicians, state judiciary structures, transnational oil corporations,

international bodies, non-governmental organizations, state civil society, and local communities

of the Niger Delta that include individuals such as activists, militants, and agrarians. Each

contributor plays a significant role in either the perpetuation or prevention of harmful systems.

As parties with different concerns, they do not always agree on strategies or even goals. Some

citizens have been assimilated into the current markets in a sustainable way but some

communities have also been taken advantage of and had to defend their rights to land, livelihood

and life from the encroachment of multinational corporations, government mandates and

interests that do not represent them.

Our research has been guided under a series of related frameworks such as political

ecology33

and the resource curse.34

Political ecology is a complex term, the meaning of which we

have gathered from Garry Peterson. Peterson defines political ecology as “combining the

concerns of ecology and political economy that together represent an ever-changing dynamic

tension between ecological and human change, and between diverse groups within society at

scales from the local individual to the Earth as a whole.”35

This framework will provide a path of

multidimensional understanding as it relates to our study and the heavy leverage that politics

have upon an environment. The resource curse which has been outlined by Michael Ross will be

an important aspect of our analysis as we explore how the economic climate of the Niger Delta

can impact the political circumstances in local communities.36

The resource curse can be

described as an instance in which states who have incredible wealth in the form of natural

resources are adversely affected by this plenty through a subsequent narrowed focus of policies,

33

Garry Peterson. 2000. "Political Ecology and Ecological Resilience:: An Integration of Human and Ecological

Dynamics." Ecological Economics 35, no. 3: 323-336. 34

Michael L. Ross. 1999. "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse." World politics 51, no. 02. p. 298. 35

Peterson. op. cit. 36

Ross. op. cit.

19

resulting in nonreciprocal economic remunerations and therefore a slower route to sustainable

development. The framework of the resource curse is useful for our research because of its direct

relation to the circumstances of extraction-concentrated economies in a developing country like

Nigeria. It is also useful for the illustration of the consequences borne by oil producing

communities who do not receive equitable compensation for their land productivity and who

instead bear political, social, and environmental costs.

2.4 Key Terms

There are several key terms that we wish to define, as they will appear frequently

throughout this paper. The first key term is corruption. It is a common word, but a clear

description of how we interpret it will be beneficial. By corruption, normally referring to

government corruption, we mean the illegal and intentionally secret behavior that leads to

personal gain at the cost of society as a whole, often in terms of public revenues. Kleptocracy is

synonymous with our working definition of corruption, and is a term that may be used

throughout the paper to refer to this phenomenon. The next key term is environmental

degradation. By this we mean anthropogenic damage to air, land, water, and the ecosystems that

benefit from them. Another key term is underrepresentation. In this context, underrepresentation

means the lack of a proportional contribution to decision-making regarding social, political,

economic and environmental matters. A word we will use synonymously with

underrepresentation is exclusion. We are using these words with intent, and define them in a

specific fashion, because these concepts are the essence of our research and will arise frequently

throughout this paper. They are the most indispensable terms in our study, and it is important for

the reader to be able to clearly understand our meaning of these terms as our study unfolds.

3. Literature Review

3.1.The Resource Curse

Our two frameworks, political ecology and the resource curse, have guided us in our

exploration of applicable literature. We will be able to explore a variety of works by experts in

these fields, along with different perspectives concerning the circumstances which the country of

20

Nigeria is facing, in order to enhance our understanding and capacity to critically assess those

circumstances properly.

Chris Nwachukwu Okeke, an accomplished Nigerian professor who has been the dean of

two Faculties of Law at Nigerian institutions, calls the present day foreign presence in Africa the

“Second Scramble”, a reference equating the colonial era of infiltration and imperialism of

African lands to the “modern oil craze” of Western countries and corporations.37

The association

of these two time periods has the suggestion of immense exploitation, though the second round

has the central difference of increased private sector and international financial institution

involvement. Also, compared to the first round which was comprised of mainly government

action, the clamber is grasping for not only physical minerals but the control of state-owned

enterprises of African administrations as well. Despite the escalation of investment in the natural

extraction industry by affluent transnational companies, “little of the proceeds from the oil

wealth eventually get to the majority of the people who need help most.”38

This manipulation is echoed in Julia Maxted’s article, which covers multiple cases across

Africa and has an entire section on the situation occurring in Nigeria. Similar to Okeke, she

states that there is a “current scramble” for African resources, especially those necessary to

generate power, and that this “new imperialism” has left the social, economic, environmental,

health, and human rights issues of local communities in the Niger Delta “unfulfilled”.39

Influential state economies such as those of the United States depend heavily on oil for the

maintenance of their public and private lifestyles, including an increasingly large percentage

imported from West African states like Nigeria so as to lessen their reliance on states from the

contentious Middle East.40

Despite this growing demand and income accrued by the Nigerian

Federal Government, basic needs are not met in Nigerian communities such as potable water

sources, viable opportunities for livelihoods, and functional health or educational facilities,

particularly those in the Delta who were promised development by oil companies. This is blamed

on the prevalence of corruption and the equivocal reports on profits and local apportionment by

state administrations, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and international

37

Okeke. op. cit., p. 194. 38

Okeke. ibid., p. 199. 39

Maxted. op. cit. 40

Maxted. ibid. p. 29.

21

extraction corporations.41

Maxted emphasizes the damage done to Nigerian communities facing

prevailing transnational corporations who consistently leave the population out of essential

decision-making processes about their own land. As Section 7 of the Environmental Impact

Assessment Decree states, “before the Agency gives a decision on an activity … the Agency

shall give opportunity to government agencies, members of the public, experts in any relevant

discipline and interested groups to make comment on environmental impact assessment of the

activity.”42

Regrettably, tactics are utilized that make public participation of indigenous

communities difficult, traditional political structures are obstructed with policies of ‘divide and

conquer’, and violent strategies have been employed in order to quell voices of protest in areas of

unrest.43

Modern linkages between the governments of less developed nations and the commercial

interests of foreign states, which benefit both foreign powers and local elites more than

indigenous populations, demonstrate how state resources and policies disregard local interests.

The influence of multinational oil companies on economies is strong in the region but the

situation has also taken on a local quality in which extraction is supported by elite politicians and

officials who stand to gain personally from agreements and unenforced laws.44

This perspective

is helpful to our analysis because it encourages a critical view of the actions undertaken by

natural extraction industries and the governments who allow them to operate in their territories

by framing those arrangements with the historical continuation of profits bought at the cost of

human well being. This outlook is necessary to transcend other vested arguments which state that

certain economic practices are for the betterment of all; we have seen through our research and

through the lens of local peoples that this is not the case.

A foundational framework within our research has been the resource curse, which has

been a major part of the international discourse since the 1990s, though it has been building in

backgrounds since the 1970s.45

Scholars such as Michael Ross and Terry Lynn Karl have

elucidated the resource curse, which is also called the “paradox of plenty” and the “King Midas

problem” considering the juxtaposition of natural wealth and economic poverty within some

41

Maxted. ibid. p. 34. 42

International Centre for Nigerian Law. 1992. "Environmental Impact Assessment Decree No. 86 1992." 43

Maxted. op. cit., p. 34. 44

Terry Lynn Karl. 2005. "2. Understanding the Resource Curse." Covering Oil. Open Society Institute, New York.

p. 116. 45

Angela V. Carter. "Escaping the resource curse." Canadian Journal of Political Science 41, no. 01. p. 216.

22

states.46

In Ross’ pioneering article “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse”, he

addresses the strong indications that countries which depend heavily upon the extraction of a

single resource have a correlative and corrosive relationship with myopic economic strategies.

He claims a few reasons for the presence of the resource curse which fall into either the political

realm or economic realm. When he wrote this article in 1999, Ross found that of the countries

that were immensely in debt and impoverished, 27 out of 36 had economies concentrated on

natural resource extraction.47

Economic causes include volatile world markets, deteriorated trade provisions for natural

resources, “Dutch Disease” and the feeble support among multiple sectors of the economy.48

Political explanations for detriment involve the poor capacity of government leaders to see

beyond the momentary riches to be made, plans that ignore the property rights of locals, policies

that encourage the depletion of resources, and the creation of unaccountable rentier states.49

A

rentier state is one which “lives from the profits of oil,” or other locally-situated natural

resources sold to foreign powers, to a significant extent for its economic stability.50

Because of

this concentrated income a dynamic can arise that blends political action and economic policy to

a indiscernible and convoluted point. The Mahdavy commentary found in Ross postulated that

rentier states damage democracy as the dependence of governments on primary commodity

exportation to bolster coffers left them unconcerned with attempts to gather taxes for revenue,

and hence allowed them to remain unanswerable to the people of the state.51

When governments

become uncaring about their citizens, violence can erupt from clashes with public soldiers,

especially when locals attempt to assert their agency. Nigeria is listed as one of the countries

where “the rest of the economy, and the rule of law, have largely broken down” due to causes

such as those of the political and economic dimensions mentioned above.52

Karl aims to help readers in comprehending the resource curse and its manifestations by

first defining what it is not, and then by the parameters of what it is. The resource curse is

explained to not be an idea subject to the fluctuating misconceptions which surround it. Some

46

Karl. op. cit., p. 21. 47

Ross. op. cit., p. 322. 48

Ross. ibid., p. 306. 49

Ross. ibid., p. 308. 50


Ross. op. cit., p. 312. 52

Ross. ibid. p. 321.

23

interpretations conceive that the unfortunate effects of the resource curse, such as substandard

rates of social well-being, are endured by any state with any amount of natural abundance. In this

article Karl discusses the numerous societal ailments that accompany the failing policies of

struggling extraction states, generating environmental degradation, poverty, and intolerable

health conditions for local communities.53

But, contrary to the idea that all natural commodities are an offense, states without a

substantial economic concentration on extraction do not suffer from the same consequences as

those that do. She clarifies the confusion of the term by mentioning that “in its narrowest form,

the resource curse refers to the inverse relationship between high natural resource dependence

and economic growth rates.”54

Reliance is typically demarcated by comparing the proportion of

primary resource exports to the aggregate state exports; if these amounts show that oil or other

extracted resources account for 60 to 95 percent of all state exports then the state is considered

dependent.55

Her work has found that “oil- and mineral-driven resource-rich countries are among

the weakest growth performers, despite the fact that they have high investment and import

capacity”56

and the “crux of the problem” is found in the incapable structures of governance.57

She asks a provoking question in her article that highlights the unequal standing of developed

and developing countries on the world stage: “If sophisticated governments in the more

developed world have trouble executing ambitious interventionist policies, how can governments

in less developed countries be expected to administer even more ambitious and complicated

policies?”58

This leaning on natural resources is in agreement with Ross by identifying it as a result of

rentier states, but differs in outlook by commenting that “not all resources are created equal.”59

Oil is one of the resources considered a specialty “‘point source’” export because of its origins in

constricted geological and fiscal jurisdictions.60

For countries which “[look] powerful but [are]

hollow” the democratic will of the people is subverted beneath the material aspirations of

53


Karl. ibid., p. 23. 55

Karl. ibid. p. 22. 56



Karl. ibid. 59


Karl. ibid.

24

government officials who aim to personally profit from the state’s natural oil endowment.61

The

corruption that arises from the shadows of greed and mismanagement have come characterize

many resource-wealthy, economically poor countries like Nigeria, and led to the present

deplorable situation in local communities of the Niger Delta.62

Authors like Karl often speak of a “reality” where “countries that depend on oil for their

livelihood are among the most economically troubled, the most authoritarian, and the most

conflict-ridden in the world”, but these absolute insinuations are challenged by other studies in

the field.63

In the research conducted by Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo, the affiliation

between authoritarianism and primary resource exporters is calculated. Through the design of

numerous models and tests which account for variable factors in 168 countries with data ranging

from the years 1800 to 2006, they strive to determine how polity has altered in times before and

after production.64

With the assortment of differing states, results were categorized by the

strength of the association and many were surprisingly recognized as having democratic

circumstances improve once financial prosperity was acquired through natural resource exports.

Nigeria is classified as an inconclusive C category: Neither Blessed nor Cursed, which denotes

the absence of evidence for a significant pattern of autocratic politics before exportation that

would indicate resource reliance as the cause of dictatorial governments.65

We found this result

surprising as the history of Nigerian government constitutes a picture of inveterate

authoritarianism and military rule that has existed for the majority of time since independence

and throughout its dealings with mineral extraction. When Olusegun Obasanjo came to office in

1979 he installed an election format and a small stint of civilian rule lasted from 1979 to 1983,

but then domineering coups re-emerged and continued until 1999 when civilian rule was again

restored and Olusegun Obasanjo became the first democratic elected official voted into the

presidency of Nigeria.66

With this timeline demonstrating Nigerian polity, the uncertain

impression imparted by Haber and Menaldo seems unsuitable for the reality of past political

patterns in Nigeria and their study did not account for these features in a practical way.

61


Karl. ibid. 63


Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo. 2011. "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the

Resource Curse." American Political Science Review 105, no. 01: 1-26. 65

Haber and Menaldo. ibid. 66

Reuters. 2011. “Timeline: Nigeria's road to democracy.”

25

While they conclude that the assumption of the ties among the resource curse and

tyrannical regimes are more about correlation than causation in most cases, the “resource

blessing” proposed for some states is characterized to be, in fact, quite minimal.67

They even

suggest that “the weight of the evidence indicates that scholars might want to reconsider the idea

that there is a resource curse.”68

The authors’ capacity to troubleshoot strange outcomes drives

them to run assessments for a multitude of scenarios, but also admit to their own shortcomings

such as the difficulty of allowing for conditions like revenues supporting dictatorships afterward

or how weak states may be prior to the introduction of natural resource trade. These authors are

rigorous in their methods, but the lack of definite quality to such quantitative data leaves readers

wondering how applicable their conclusions are. It can be understood that not all cases of

resource wealth have a direct consequence of autocracy, but these findings don’t reveal much

about the actuality of current situations in states who are resource reliant and non-representative.

When they state that there may not be a resource curse, they do not provide an alternative

approach to understanding the correlation that they agree upon with other scholars. Although we

agree on the uncertain nature of social research, we have chosen to place our trust in a larger

body of academic work and believe that the resource curse is an actuality in resource-reliant

states.

3.2 Corruption

Government corruption is, and historically has been, a prominent issue in Nigeria. O.T.

Omololu points out that corruption is demonstrated in every aspect of government.69

The aspect

that will dominate our research is public revenues. The Government of Nigeria has a reputation

for allowing large sums of money to vanish. Accusations and charges of various politicians have

materialized, but the issue of embezzlement remains. Richard A. Joseph also tackles this topic.

Joseph uses the term “prebendalism” to explain this phenomenon. Joseph describes the term

“prebendal” to “refer to patterns of political [behavior] which rest on the justifying principle that

such offices should be competed for and then utilized for the personal benefit of office holders as

67



Omolulu. ibid., p.31

26

well as of their reference or support group.”70

In other words, prebendal politics is a scenario

where the motive for becoming a politician is the monetary gain to be had. Granted, Joseph does

not explicitly state that the “personal benefit” from holding a position in office is a monetary

one, but the examples of alleged embezzlement are rampant. He goes on to explain that the

(ideally) primary use of the office tends to be neglected in a prebendal situation; the focus is the

pursuit of financial gain, and the importance of justice and order is forgotten.71

Omololu cites the National Planning Commission, who claims that corruption and poor

transparency have helped to stifle development. He notes how poorly Nigeria ranks in terms of

corruption according to Transparency International. As of 2014, Nigeria ranked 136th in the

Corruption Perceptions Index out of 175 countries ranked.72

This is an improvement from the

2007 rank of 147 out of 179.73

With that said, these rankings change each year–for example, in

2008, Nigeria jumped up to a rank of 121st out of 180,74

and then back to 130th out of 180

countries ranked in 2009.75

Thus, we are not necessarily seeing a pattern of improvement, but

rather merely small shifts not associated with any major governmental improvements. The one

consistent pattern is that Nigeria remains in the bottom half of the world in terms of

transparency. Omololu specifically notes fraudulent trade, bribery, and abuse of office, among

others, as problematic forms of corruption in Nigeria. Embezzlement may fall under the umbrella

of abuse of office, and there have been plenty of charges of politicians concerning stolen public

revenues.

Omololu claims that “corruption and bad governance” were the main justifications for the

military when they decided to step into governmental power in Nigeria in 1966. Ironically, the

military rule showcased a similar amount, if not a greater amount, of corruption76

–an idea that

was similarly explained by Joseph.77

Eventually, Omololu believes, corruption became the norm.

What came with this standard of government was a stagnation of development and a drop-off in

70

Richard A Joseph. “Democracy and prebendal politics in Nigeria.” Vol. 56. Cambridge University Press, 2014. p. 8 71

Joseph. ibid. 72

Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index 2014. 73




Omololu. op. cit., p.31 77

Joseph. op. cit., p.70

27

education.78

The recurring point that Omololu makes throughout this paper is that corruption in

Nigeria has been the cause for a lack of any development whatsoever. Furthermore, it has also

exacerbated the issue of political instability in the country.

Sarah Chayes, author of Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security,

has some interesting notions that are valuable inclusions in our discussion. Chayes considers the

1980s, when major growth in oil production occurs, as “the first tipping point on the road to

acute, systemic corruption.”79

Chayes ties corruption tightly with the growth of oil production in

Nigeria. She goes on to note, as Omololu also noted, that while oil production has produced so

much wealth, social developments like education and healthcare have not grown at a

proportional rate. Chayes also notes that average income is lagging as well. She explains that the

wealth from oil production is shared between the federal government and each state government,

as well as hundreds of local governments. But this does not do as much good for the state and

local governments as it should, because not all of the wealth ends up being accounted for, she

explains. She includes some stifling numbers: total sales of crude oil between January 2012 and

July of 2013 were missing an estimated US $11 billion, with one estimate of the missing funds to

actually be near US $20 billion. Chayes’ findings imply that President Goodluck Johnathan is

linked to corrupt practices.80

With all of these political issues, Chayes mentions that the

agriculture industry in Nigeria has been troublingly stagnant over the last several decades. She

refers to Nigeria as an “oil ‘monoculture,’” pointing out that the manufacturing industry has also

slowed down, and as such, the oil industry overshadows all others. According to Chayes,

senators in Nigeria make over a million dollars each year, not including any money that may or

may not have been embezzled.

Chayes identifies a second tipping point of corruption in Nigeria’s history: the switch to

civilian rule in 1999. Chayes points out the irony that the first tipping point was partly driven by

the lack of accountability caused by military rule in the 1980s.81

Corruption in a civilian

government as well as a military government makes for a dilemma that must be acknowledged

when discussing solutions for the problem of corruption in Nigeria.

78

Omololu. op. cit. 79

Sarah Chayes. 2015. Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security. WW Norton & Company:

p.122 80

President Johnathan will be in office until May of 2015, just after the completion of our paper. The successor,

President Muhammadu Buhari, will not make his way into our study as acting president. 81

Chayes. ibid., pp.122-125

28

It is perplexing that civilian rule can accommodate a level of corruption similar to that of

military rule, but one unquestionable contributor to corruption in a democratically ruled Nigeria

is election rigging. Christian Opukri contributes information about election rigging in his paper

titled “Electoral Crisis and Democracy in Nigeria.” According to Opukri, all the elections that

have taken place in Nigeria since it became independent have been controversial.82

Joseph gives

a similar attestation regarding Nigerian elections.83

Opukri also states, not unlike Chayes, that,

“[while] the many years of military rule are significant, the years of democratic governance are

perhaps more significant, due to the near total lack of democratic values and principles in

governance.”84

This is similar to Chayes’ argument, which is essentially that the beginning of

civilian rule–her “second tipping point” –is at the very least comparable to, if not more

significant than, the growth of oil production, which coincided with military rule as a landmark

for corruption. The only difference is that Opukri does not specify the point of oil production

growth; he merely compares the time of military rule to the time of civilian rule. Opukri

expresses the importance of elections to a democratic system, and that election rigging has run

rampant in Nigeria, and, essentially, because of this, democracy has been compromised.85

He

points out the 2003 elections specifically as an example: 42 different forms of rigging were

recognized. These forms of election rigging varied widely; all were reprehensible, and some used

the threat of violence.86

As a result of the corrupt election, several political parties refused to

accept the results as legitimate.87

The 2007 election is his second example of an illegitimate

election. He draws attention to the failure of some polling stations to ever open at all, as well as

others having shortened hours of operation. The list of 2007 polling flaws goes on, once again

including violent behavior. Opukri indicates that these practices convinced voters that their

participation was irrelevant.88

Chayes describes this situation in the same way, noting the

violence associated with the elections as well as the consequential decrease in participation.89

Opukri goes on to note the overwhelming official results of the 2007 presidential elections.

82

Christian O. Opukri. 2013. "Electoral Crisis and Democracy in Nigeria." Journal of Research in National

Development 10, no. 3: pp. 178-187 83

Joseph. op. cit., p. 171 84

Opukri. ibid., p. 180 85

Opukri. ibid. 86

Opukri. ibid. 87

Opukri. ibid., p. 181 88

Opukri. ibid., pp. 181-182 89

Chayes. op. cit., p. 126

29

Perhaps the most important aspect (as it pertains to our study) of Opukri’s entire paper is his

explanation of the relevance of ethnicity. He argues, “It is an acknowledged fact that the

Nigerian electoral system is tainted by ethnic considerations and to claim that some of these

ethnic leaders scored no more than a few thousand votes even in the states and backyards where

their ethnic majority commands the electoral stakes is hard to believe.”90

To put it in a different

way, Opukri is noting that these rigged elections are making it so that certain ethnic groups’

votes are not being counted. This point is of the utmost relevance to our research. The corruption

present in Nigeria is marginalizing certain ethnic groups.91


The term political ecology has been around since the 1970s “as a way of thinking about

questions of access and control over resources … and how this [is] indispensable for

understanding both the forms and geography of environmental disturbance and degradation, and

the prospects for green and sustainable alternatives.”92

According to Richard Peet and Michael

Watts, political ecology is a combination of ecological concerns with those of political economy.

As a result, political ecology provides a perspective that includes the discussion of communities

as well as natural resources.93

These authors use this lens to examine the situation in Nigeria. They point out the

tremendous amount of wealth generated from oil, and compare it to the per capita annual

income, which (as of 2004) was US $290. The point that they are trying to make is that the

amount of oil wealth generated should translate to a wealthier society, but such a translation has

been lacking. They also point out the estimate of about US $50 billion that has “disappeared”

from government revenues as well, implying issues with corruption. Not surprisingly, they claim

that living standards have not improved over a span of 44 years–from Nigeria’s independence to

the time of publishing.94

Furthermore, they make the claim that the oil producing communities

“have benefited the least from oil-wealth.”95

Lastly, these communities, which are all in the

90

Opukri. op. cit., p. 184(1) 91

Opukri. ibid. 92

Richard Peet and Michael Watts. 2004. “Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development, Social Movements.”

p. 6 93

Peet & Watts. ibid., p. 7 94

Peet & Watts. ibid., pp. 274-275 95

Peet & Watts. ibid., p. 275

30

Niger Delta, suffer the consequences of oil spills and gas flaring, which occur at a greater rate

than anywhere else in the world. These authors make it clear that Niger Deltans suffer from

“marginalization” and “neglect”.96

3.4 Local People of the Niger Delta and Oil

Ken Saro-Wiwa was an activist working for justice of the Ogoni people in regards to

issues surrounding the production of oil. He was dedicated to a non-violent movement for

ecological and and social justice, which ultimately resulted in the creation of the Movement for

the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP).97

In 1994 Ken Saro-Wiwa along with eight others,

who together formed the Ogoni Nine, were arrested for the involvement in the murder of Ogoni

leaders. After eight months of imprisonment without access to lawyers, medical care, or family

members the Ogoni Nine were brought before a special tribunal. In October 1995 the Ogoni Nine

were sentenced to death then executed in November of 1995. MOSOP continues to work for

justice under the original vision of Saro-Wiwa. 98

A major aspect of our research is to develop an understanding concerning the relationship

between the extraction of oil and the local people of the Niger Delta. “Oil Conflict and

Accumulation Politics in Nigeria” written by Kenneth Omeje begins with an overview of the

history of oil and conflict in the Niger Delta. It details important facts regarding where the

transnational oil companies (TNOCs) operate and whom the companies affect. The article also

provides some details on the politics of Nigeria and who is benefiting from the oil profits99

.

Other articles do not tend to provide as much basic background information and we believe it is

an important aspect in understanding the complex relationship between local people and TNOCs.

While this article centers on local ethnic groups generally, “Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni:

A Study in Unsustainable Development I” written by Richard Boele, Heike Fabig and David

Wheeler, is focused on the Ogoni people specifically. The Ogoni people are the main ethnic

group that we are researching because they are still currently active in conflict with oil

companies. Although Omeje’s article has general background information, this article details the

history of oil extraction specific to the Ogoni people. This article concentrates on the

96

Peet & Watts. ibid. 97

Remember Saro-Wiwa. 2014. “The Life of Ken Saro-Wiwa.” 98

Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People. 2015. “Ogoni” 99

Kenneth Omeje. 2006-2007.“Oil Conflict and Accumulation Politics in Nigeria” ECSP Report: Issue 12: pp. 44-

49.

31

environmental issues that have come with the rise in oil extraction. It also explains how the

conflict lead to the execution of Ken Sara-Wiwa and the Ogoni Nine, which was a factor in our

group choosing to focus on the Ogoni people.100

The article written by Boele et al. also outlines the lack of, and need for, sustainable

development. This is a very important issue for the Ogoni people as well as other local

communities.101

Another article discussing local peoples, written by Gabriel Eweje, also

highlights the need for sustainable development. The article argues that development is the

responsibility of the multinational enterprises and they are both socially and economically

responsible for the development to be sustainable.102

Omeje also claims that if the state fails to

aid communities in development it is the obligation of oil companies to provide this aid.103

While

we believe that the state should be responsible for development and there is a need for

sustainable development, we agree that should the state fail, oil companies should be held

responsible, to an extent. Given that oil companies have such a large presence and effect on

communities, they should provide some aid in the development of communities.

Omeje’s article refers to transnational oil companies, however the article by Boele et al.

specifically references the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), and the article by

Eweje discusses multinational enterprises (MNEs) and multinational oil companies (MOCs). It is

important to recognize and separate what each article is referring to and the differences between

each. Multinational enterprises is the broadest of these terms and includes oil companies as well

as other companies.104

Omeje gives examples of TNOCs such as Royal Dutch Shell,

ExxonMobile, and ChevronTexaco,105

indicating that TNOCs can include any oil company

working in Nigeria. Multinational oil companies are essentially the same thing as transnational

oil companies. SPDC is a single company operating in Nigeria but can be considered a TNOC,

MOC and a MNE.

100

Richard Boele, Heike Fabig, and David Wheeler. 2001. "Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni: A Study in

Unsustainable Development I.” Sustainable Development 9, no. 2: pp. 74-86. 101

Boele. ibid. 102

Gabriel Eweje. 2007. "Multinational Oil Companies' CSR Initiatives in Nigeria: The Scepticism of

Stakeholders in Host Communities." Managerial Law 49, no. 5/6: 218-235. 103 Boele, op. cit., p.45 104

Eweje, op. cit., p.218-219 105

Omeje. op. cit.

32

All three articles bring up the issue of local people not seeing any of the benefits from the

extraction and production of oil. Omeje states that despite Nigeria’s oil resources, 80 percent of

the revenues only benefit 1 percent of the population and 70 percent of the population lives in

poverty, off of less than US $1 a day.106

Boele et al. state that revenue distribution is an issue for

many communities including the Ogoni people. The vast majority of the revenue went to the

state government whose responsibility was to distribute the wealth, but most communities never

saw these benefits.107

Since 1999, the 13% derivation principle states that no less than 13% of oil

revenue must go to the oil producing state. As of the year 2000 this revenue refers only to on-

shore oil production. The remaining 87% of revenue would go to the central government, which

could be distributed to other regions.108

Although this has been the practice since the 1999

Constitution, there has been dissatisfaction among oil producing communities regarding the

allocation of funds. There is a call from several communities for the creation of national and

state derivation committees to properly manage the funds.109

Eweje goes on the argue that local

communities have the right to other benefits such as social services, welfare programs, and

community development programs but never saw such benefits.110

Each article makes the point

that local communities are suffering from consequences of oil extraction without receiving any

benefits.

3.5 Oil Industry and the Environment

While we will be focusing on more present issues related to the Nigerian oil industry, it is

important to look at the history of Nigerian oil to understand the present. In “Indigenization

Versus Domiciliation: A Historical Approach to National Content in Nigeria’s Oil and Gas

Industry,” Jesse Salah Ovadia writes about the history of the oil industry in order to help the

reader gain an understanding behind current Nigerian oil content laws. Previous content laws

theoretically promoted revenues being spent by the Nigerian government in order to empower

106

Omeje. ibid. 107

Boele, Fabig, and Wheeler. op. cit. 108

Ehtisham Ahmad and Raju Singh. 2003. “Political Economy of Oil-Revenue Sharing in a Developing Country:

Illustrations from Nigeria.” IMF Working Paper.pp. 1-26. 109

Festus Owete . 2014. “Delta, Ondo Oil Communities Demand Control of Derivation Money.” Premium Times. 110

Eweje. op. cit., 218-235.

33

Nigerians with new economic opportunities and give Nigeria control over the oil industry.111

As

we have seen in current history, these laws were not successful. In later years, decrees were

passed aiming to increase indigenous Nigerian participation in the economy by transferring

foreign capital to indigenous hands.112

We will be able to use past Nigerian history to discuss

how it has negatively impacted the present.

Plundered Nations?: Successes and Failures in Natural Resource Extraction, edited by

Paul Collier and Anthony J. Venables, also looks into the history of the Nigerian oil industry.

Unlike Ovadia’s literature, the authors look at the management of oil resources throughout

history and analyze what decisions were made that ultimately led Nigeria to become a struggling

oil state.113

We already know that some of oil revenues are reinvested into infrastructure in

Nigeria. During the 1970s, the Nigerian government was focused on reconstruction and the

development of human capital, health services, and infrastructure like roads and sea ports.114

Nseabasi S. Akpan, author of “From Agriculture to Petroleum Oil Production: What Has

Changed about Nigeria’s Rural Development?,” has different viewpoints on how oil revenues

were reinvested back into society. Akpan claims that rural infrastructure has typically been

neglected and that infrastructure was, and currently is still focused on major cities. It will be

important to look at expenditures of government money to clarify where and how oil revenues

were reinvested into Nigerian infrastructure.

A major component to our research is the negative environmental effects that come as a

result of oil production. Prior to reading, we already knew that oil spills, gas flaring, and land

degradation were all harmful impacts oil production have on the environment. In “Coping with

Climate Change and Environmental Degradation in the Niger Delta of Southern Nigeria,” gas

flaring and oil spills are discussed in depth and their ultimate consequences to farmlands, rivers,

and the ocean.115

We found that oil spills, gas flaring, and acid rain not only affect the

111 Jesse Salah Ovadia. 2012. "Indigenization vs. Domiciliation: A Historical Approach to National Content in

Nigeria's Oil and Gas Industry." African Political Economy: The Way Forward for 21st Century Development. 112

Jesse Salah Ovadia. ibid. 113 Paul Collier and Anthony J. Venables, eds. 2011. Plundered nations?: successes and failures in natural resource

extraction. Palgrave Macmillan. 114 Collier and Venables. ibid 115

Etiosa Uyigue, and Matthew Agho. 2007. "Coping with climate change and environmental

degradation in the Niger Delta of southern Nigeria." Community Research and Development Centre

Nigeria (CREDC).

34

environment, but the livelihood of local peoples as well.116

The book Oil, Environment and

Resource Conflicts in Nigeria, edited by Augustine Ikelegbe asks interesting questions in the

introductory section:

Since oil and gas are exhaustible resources, what happens when they are exhausted and

when no revenue inflows would be expected to the region?...what would happen as the

land and waters of the region are devastated, livelihood sources have been destroyed,

social lifestyles have been perverted and productive orientations have been

disoriented?117

While this paper is about the facts of the oil industry in Nigeria, it poses interesting “what-if”

scenarios, should the oil industry not make strides to better its infrastructure and environmental

regulations. Along with posing consistent statistics with other works of literature, this will enable

us to draw conclusions on our own, on the negative impacts of oil production.

116

Uyigue and Agho. ibid. 117

Augustine Ikelegbe ed. 2013. Oil, environment and resource conflicts in Nigeria. Vol. 7. LIT Verlag Münster: 4.

35

4. Case Study

4.1 Petrol and Layered Logistics

The Federal Government of Nigeria and the multinational oil companies that operate in

Nigeria are conspicuously intertwined, resulting in an obscure partnership, multi-level financial

arrangements, and a system of property rights that values the state as an entity more than

individual indigenous stakeholders. Oil discovery in 1956 brought a new and powerful

dimension to the colonial economy and after Nigeria gained independence, it continued to be an

important factor in fiscal security. Tenure systems for land and the ownership of mineral wealth

was realized to be crucial in these processes, and the new government began to pass laws

regarding these issues. In 1969 the Petroleum Decree was enacted, placing the gas and oil

supplies of the country under the authority of the federal government. In a related legislation, the

1978 Land Use Decree placed all land of any type under national control, essentially using

nationalization as a substitute for the long-standing rules of customary land ownership.118

Rather

than “negotiating directly with oil companies over access to land and compensation” as was done

before the decrees, the power of bargaining for communities was usurped by local and state

institutions.119

Claims of “overriding public interest” after the 1978 statute also enabled the

federal government to easily appropriate lands for the construction of pipelines and extraction

projects.120

Many communities struggle with these laws which do not recognize the land that

members live and work on, and therefore the minerals beneath the land, as territories owned by

those who have inhabited it for generations. These decrees, by allowing the state to have absolute

proprietary rights, leave communities living on resource-rich lands subject to the complete

control of state economic interests, and the uncertainty of a stable residence if their area is seen

as too valuable for just human occupancy.

The Federal Government of Nigeria began to seek dominion within all oil industry

aspects, beyond only mineral rights. Nigeria joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC) in 1971, becoming part of an exclusive group of countries with the ability to

regulate oil output and influence prices around the world.121

OPEC insists that member states

118

P. Francis and S. Sardesai. 2008. “Republic of Nigeria Niger Delta Social and Conflict Analysis.” World Bank. p.

12. 119

P. Francis and S. Sardesai. ibid. 120

P. Francis and S. Sardesai. ibid. 121

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 2015. “Nigeria Facts and Figures.”

36

engage in all stages of petroleum production as a majority associate as much as possible.

Therefore, in order to begin taking back privileges from foreign companies, the federal

government created the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) in 1971.122

“The NNOC was

empowered to acquire any asset and liability in existing oil companies on behalf of the Nigerian

government,” and throughout the 1970s, the NNOC recovered allowances from numerous

transnational oil corporations.123

The federal establishment managing petroleum commerce

became the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in 1977 and “inherited the

commercial activities of the NNOC.”124

Although the NNPC has some oversight capacity, the

majority of regulation is under the jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources

and their Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR).125

Joint ventures solidified between the

NNPC and transnational oil corporations ensure that the state government has a 55% to 60%

“participatory interest,” and therefore some say in the procedures performed by oil companies.126

Agreements such as these joint ventures are the most common type of business agreement in the

Nigerian oil industry, and are so prevalent that they constitute 95% of Nigerian petroleum and

natural gas activities.127

The most prominent multinational corporations, which make up almost 97% of

production endeavors, include well-known names like Shell, Chevron/Texaco, and

ExxonMobil.128

Before companies can operate in a way that earns profits they must obtain three

permissions granted by the Minister of Petroleum Resources. The authorizations encompass the

Oil Exploration Licence (OEL) which is “necessary to conduct preliminary exploration surveys,”

the Oil Prospecting Licence (OPL) which begins contract agreements with the government, and

the Oil Mining Lease (OML) which allows commercial extraction in an area for 20 years.129

Since 1973, deals with conglomerates have had another common aspect: they are considered to

be Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) that place the risk of exploration on companies, whether

122

Olajumoke Akinjide-Balogun. 2001. “Nigeria: Legal Framework Of The Nigerian Petroleum Industry.” Mondaq. 123

Olajumoke Akinjide-Balogun. ibid. 124


15. 125

Olajumoke Akinjide-Balogun. op. cit. 126

Olajumoke Akinjide-Balogun. ibid. 127


33. 128

Olajumoke Akinjide-Balogun. 2001. “Nigeria: Legal Framework Of The Nigerian Petroleum Industry.”

Mondaq. 129

Olajumoke Akinjide-Balogun. ibid.

37

oil is found or not.130

Theses types of agreements also split discovered oil into a few categories

with varying importance: "Royalty Oil" pays concession rents and royalties, "Cost Oil" covers

the cost of operations, "Tax Oil" gives to the government through the Petroleum Profit Tax

(PPT), and "Profit Oil" leaves what is left to divide as percentages between all partners of an

agreement.131

Royalties and the Petroleum Production Tax are amassed by the Federation Inland

Revenue Board as an act of government and, with profits made, comprise the total oil income for

Nigeria.132

Revenues are apportioned among many parties and the numerous layers to agreement

and payment processes have not been successful in distributing income effectively, or improving

the lives of most Nigerians.

The equitable allocation of revenues gathered from the oil industry has been a point of

contention for many communities in the Delta for many years. A derivation formula was

established from the outset of oil production in 1958 which set revenues to be distributed to

extraction communities at a rate of 50%, the Federal Government of Nigeria at 20% and the

Distributable Pool Account, created to apportion funds to states from the federal sphere, at a rate

of 30%. Since that time the percentages have been erratic as more states have been created,

transitions of government rule have occurred, and offshore drilling has become the domain of the

federal administration.133

In 1999 the new constitution, under the category of Public Revenue

section 162, speaks to a ‘Federation Account’, previously the Distributable Pool Account, which

accumulates all revenue by the federal government, apart from certain officials’ income taxes,

and allocation is decided after the President councils with the Revenue Mobilization Allocation

and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC). The President and his council then consider “population,

equality of States, internal revenue generation, land mass, terrain as well as population density”

into choices of disbursement. The article goes on to state that “the principle of derivation shall be

constantly reflected in any approved formula as being not less than thirteen per cent of the

revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any natural resources.”134

The

arguments surrounding this number only serve to hinder the formation of an improved system,

130

Akinjide-Balogun. ibid. 131




27. 134

The Federal Republic of Nigeria. 1999. “Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.”

38

and obscure other issues of marginalized communities, mismanaged distribution and inadequate

well-being which persist despite large profits of the oil industry.

4.2 Impaired Institutions

The legacies of colonialism have left their mark upon the political and social structures

that dominate Nigeria today, and the formation of a resource dependent state since independence

has not enabled an internally stable government to be built. The indirect model of colonization

exercised by the British meant that although they pulled strings in the capital, local chieftaincies

and leaders who were friendly to the interests of Britain were bestowed the privilege to continue

acting as authority figures in communities, thereby blurring the understanding of the situation for

rural communities.135

Identities held dear by local peoples and nationalistic ideologies under

colonial rule brought some civil rights, but also a disconnect with the definition of who was the

bearer of customary rights. Nigeria was then made to create statutory regulations to “decide

which ethnic groups were indigenous and which were not [as] a basis for political

representation.” This process is said to have “convert[ed] ethnicity into a political force”,

although one may argue that such systems had been instigated from the beginning of British

rule.136

In the post-independence era the three states of the federation, which had been created

under colonial rule and favored the three most prominent ethnic groups, were still the only

officially acknowledged regions, but disagreement over these lines came soon after liberation.

The Ogoni Central Union had arisen prior to independence and formed the Ogoni Native

Authority in 1947 to advocate for separate space, and was reluctantly lumped into the Eastern

Region where the Ogoni people suffered “tremendous neglect and discrimination” at the hands

of the prevailing Igbo people in the area.137

In order to address the worries of smaller ethnic

groups in the region who were being underrepresented, the Willink Commission was entrusted

with the task of exploring local concerns stemming from this issue in 1958 as the prospect of

Independence approached.138

Despite the proposal for the outlining of new states, the

135


57. 136

Michael Watts. 2004. "Resource curse? Governmentality, oil and power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria." p. 73. 137

Watts. ibid. p. 67. 138

Francis and Sardesai. op. cit., p. 30.

39

Commission chose instead to install the Niger Delta Development Board in 1961 to work on the

problems voiced in that locality. The proceedings of this board were “largely ineffective” as it

lasted less than a decade and was spoiled during its term by the outbreak of the Biafran War, a

conflict from 1967 - 1970 that was rooted in the secessionist movement of the Eastern Region.139

Although during the war, the Rivers State was created in order to “appease the minorities of the

Niger Delta”, other concerns of minority communities fell by the wayside as the region strained

its energies on the efforts of war rather than working to the solutions that could prevent similar

cases in the future.140

The marginalization of minority communities across Nigeria manifested as interethnic

tensions as well as intra-ethnic issues of which examples can be found even in the clans of

Ogoniland. Ogoniland became incrementally integrated into the Rivers State, but cohesion was

still being constructed among its community members. As Ogoniland defined itself, certain

subgroups gained a dominance of political persuasion within the Ogoni, and others such as the

Eleme clan refused to sign the Ogoni Bill of Rights because of their connection to clan loyalty

first.141

These instances demonstrate Watts’ point of nuanced inconsistencies between vying

identities such as local and national. Ken Saro-Wiwa hoped for a more unified Ogoni people

despite tensions, and Watts described Saro-Wiwa’s “crowning moment of glory” as the inception

of the Ogoni anthem and the Ogoni flag on January 4, 1993–Ogoni National Day–which

represents the solidarity he had always yearned to see in his homeland.142

The past disagreements

seem to have dissipated as communities have come together in the creation of organizations

seeking to improve the living conditions of humans and nature in Ogoniland.

4.3 Facts about The Ogoni

The Niger Delta is comprised of nine states with five such states considered to be “core”

to the region, including: Bayelsa, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, and Rivers.143

Ogoniland is in

the Rivers state of the South-South geopolitical zone, a Southeastern region of the Niger Delta

near Port Harcourt with an area of approximately 1,000 square kilometers. There is evidence

139

Francis and Sardesai. ibid., p. 57. 140


Watts. op. cit., p. 69. 142

Watts. ibid. p. 70. 143

Francis and Sardesai. op. cit., p. 14.

40

showing that the Ogoni people have inhabited the area for over 500 years, and were not fully

under British colonial rule until 1901, when British forces arrived in the region. A resistance

against British rule lasted for 13 years until Ogoniland was finally subjugated in 1914. In regards

to Nigeria as a whole, the British grouped Nigerians into a mere few ethnic groups, ultimately

leaving the Ogoni without proper representation and effectively stratifying ethnic interactions.144

The traditional government of Ogoniland simultaneously operates within the current

structure of the Federal government of Nigeria. Ogoniland encompasses six kingdoms: Tai,

Eleme, Ken-Khana, Nyo-Khana, Gokana, and Babbe, with the town of Bori acting as the capital

of Ogoniland.145

Each kingdom has individually ruling chiefs, and often councils of elders,

though there is Paramount Ruler that presides over all kingdoms titled His Majesty King Godwin

N.K. Gininwa. Ogoniland incorporates four local administrative districts including: Tai, Eleme,

Khana, and Gokana, which each control diverse ranges in the area as well as the diverse cultures

that live within their boundaries. Although each of the four zones are considered to be Ogoniland

and the area has some shared history, the indigenous groups who reside in each area are unique

unto themselves with distinguishing characteristics which generate variances not just in language

but in their traditional arrangements of power, politics, and decision-making.146

These differing

qualities of over 250 linguistic and indigenous communities were largely ignored during the

colonization of Nigeria by the British Empire; only a few ethnic groups gained formal

recognition by the British when the territory was split into three federal regions: the Yoruba, the

Igbo and the Hausa-Fulani.147

The British decision to discount these smaller cultural groups

would begin the socially-accepted downgrading and relegation of these groups to a realm of less

importance that became apparent in colonial administrations and within interethnic relations.148

4.4 The Economic Context of Development

Prior to the discovery of oil in Ogoniland, fishing and agriculture was the primary means

to make a living in this region. Subsistence agriculture satiated local consumption and was so

144

Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. 2008. “Ogoni.” UNPO. 145

Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. 1995. “Report of the UNPO Mission to Investigate the

Situation of the Ogoni of Nigeria” UNPO. 146

United Nations Environment Programme. 2011. “Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland.” p. 24. 147

Francis and Sardesai. op. cit., p. 54. 148


Situation of the Ogoni of Nigeria” UNPO.

41

fruitful that the region began to produce enough food to provide for the demands coming from

foreign industrialized nations.149

After the discovery of petroleum in 1957, concentration on the

agricultural and fishing sectors of the economy diminished and the new focus became oil. In the

period between 1973 and 1981 this transition became increasingly apparent as records indicate

farmed commodities dropped from US $1.5 billion to almost US $300 million in terms of

economic worth.150

The extraction activities within the region have severely limited the ability of

farmers to produce as large corporations have seized territories and oil spills have damaged the

surrounding land and bodies of water, making a hostile condition to foster crops.151

To this day,

there are numerous environmental and social problems stemming from the oil industry still

facing Ogoniland and its inhabitants, damaging traditional ways of life.

Nearly 60% of people in the area remain reliant on their surrounding environment for

income generation, and World Bank research from a 2003 study discovered that if crops were

counted as part of livelihood as well, then 100% of family economic power was dependent on

the environment. This fact is compounded by the high rates of underemployment and joblessness

in the Delta compared to all other state constituencies. The labor market in the oil sector is

unable to meet the supply provided by local community members because its formal work

typically requires technology and capital, and therefore there is less of a desire for the unskilled

laborers which are mostly available.152

Because Delta residents are unable to compete with

transnational corporate efforts, there has been a consistent failure to financially support social

capital and indigenous economies, characterizing the circumstance of low local content.153

Policy

moves on the part of government to encourage local content, or ‘Nigerian Content’, in smaller oil

industry ventures owned by indigenous businesses have made “very little positive impact”

overall. However, there is hope for a future of greater connectivity among differently sized and

spatially oriented companies in the national petroleum economy with the enactment of more firm

149

United Nations Environment Programme. 2011. “Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland.” p. 20.

150United Nations Environment Programme. ibid. p. 20.

151 Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. 2008. “Ogoni.” UNPO.

152 Francis and Sardesai. op. cit., p. 17.

153 Ugwushi Bellema Ihua, C. Ajayi, and K. N. Eloji. 2009. "Nigerian Content Policy in the Oil and Gas Industry:

Implications for Small and Medium-sized Oil Services Companies." In Proceedings of the 10th Annual Conference.

p. 163.

42

legislation.154

According to Shell Nigeria’s website, it “directly” employs 4,500 people, 95

percent of whom are Nigerian, and 66 percent of whom are from the Niger Delta specifically.155

These numbers equate to 4,275 people from Nigeria, and 2,970 of those from the Niger Delta

who are directly employed by Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. The number

of Shell-employed individuals from the Delta is not very impressive, nor indicative of

inclusivity, when the total population of the Delta is considered to be over 31 million.156

Some

local people have also reported being discriminated against when seeking work in the petroleum

industry; their applications are ignored in favor of other ethnic groups.157

A lack of economic

inclusion into the oil industry formal sector, and the absence of local employment for petrol

firms, reinforces a downward spiral of unemployment and the futile search for jobs in the area.

Youth between the ages of 15 and 24 have an especially difficult time finding work to support

themselves and their families; beyond the statistics of all other geopolitical zones, a level of non-

working youth estimates being upwards of 40% for the Delta, show a need for gainful

employment not being met.158

With limited occasions to branch into lucrative activities or stable

incomes, the informal and illegal sectors become the most prominent alternatives, and insecurity

becomes a reality for many families.159

The Gini coefficient, which measures the equality of income shared throughout a society,

when applied to the Niger Delta, finds numerical data that shows a pronounced inequality of

wealth distribution. In Rivers State in particular the coefficient of 2004 was 0.479160

as compared

to the coefficient for all of Nigeria in 2003, 0.437.161

The closer the coefficient is to zero, the

more evenly the wealth is distributed. Despite an improvement from 1997’s coefficient of 0.506,

the numbers symbolize a vast economic gap that still exists.162 Surveys completed in the Niger

Delta found that 77% of the people residing there view themselves as ‘living in poverty’, with

154

Ugwushi Bellema Ihua, C. Ajayi, and K. N. Eloji. 2009. "Nigerian Content Policy in the Oil and Gas Industry:

Implications for Small and Medium-sized Oil Services Companies." In Proceedings of the 10th Annual Conference.

p. 168. 155

Shell Nigeria. 2015. “Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria.” Shell. 156






Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 2014. “Nigeria.” The World Factbook. 162

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). ibid.

43

around 30% of the entire population self-evaluated as ‘very poor’.163

Although these findings

have inconsistencies when compared to some national accounts, due to the subjective nature of

personal assessments, they demonstrate the perspective of Delta peoples on their own

circumstances. With capricious definitions of the poverty line demarcated by countries, which

can be based upon their own conceptions of poverty and may be able to sway the significance of

statistics, the exact numbers may be difficult to determine. In 2010, however, there was an

estimate that 70% of all Nigerians lived below the poverty line.164

This major percentage of their

population, from an already an impressive 172 million, represents a serious proportion of

Nigeria’s citizens who do not have an adequate means of income. The World Bank’s Nigeria

Economic Report (NER) from 2014 shows some progress in the living conditions of the poor but

these efforts have been almost entirely concentrated on urban cities rather than where levels of

poverty are most persistent in rural localities.165

Income inequality breeds extreme discontent

among citizens who suffer most poignantly from a maldistribution of wealth, leading their self-

perceptions to reflect the appalling systemic nature of their suffering, especially when looking to

how others may be living affluent lifestyles elsewhere in the nation.

As for the federal derivation principle, in 1979 the government eliminated the practice of

derivation funding and even though it had made its way into the economic sphere again in 1992

the portion for oil producing communities was a meager 3%.166

Because Ogoniland stopped

producing oil in 1993, their years of operation endured an unstable allocation of revenue, before

the constitution had solidified agreements for extraction communities. The Ogoni peoples were

not able to profit extensively from the derivation principle while it was in effect due to a

tumultuous history of changing percentages, and certainly not directly from the post-

constitutional 13% minimum.

Current revenues are distributed to the federal government, as well as state and local

governments, and are then meant to make their way to local residents. Audits on government oil

revenues for the years of 2007 to 2011 have demonstrated that “from the sharing formula under

the Nigerian fiscal federal principle, the Federal Government took 56% of the total revenue,

163


Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). op. cit., 165

The World Bank. 2014. “Nigeria Economic Update: World Bank Cites Positive Economic Trends and Progress in

Poverty Reduction.” World Bank Group. 166

Francis and Sardesai. op. cit.,. p. 28.

44

states 24%, while the local governments collected 20%.”167

Though these portions are above the

13% minimum for states and local administrations, the development that is meant to accompany

these funds is still not present, making the increased percentage ineffective in providing more

positive results. The local administrations often collaborate with chiefs who are then charged

with the responsibility to dole out these funds properly to individuals and to sustainable

development projects. Unfortunately these community leaders are sometimes seen as self-

seeking and untrustworthy, causing tensions within communities.168

Research into the Ogoni

people and their milieu depicts a setting where development projects, as of 2004, were found to

be lacking. Dismal figures such a health care system with a doctor to patient ratio of 1:100,000,

illiteracy for four out of five individuals, and infrastructure such as electricity being present in

very few homes.169

Reports also show that Rivers State is a rarity in the Delta due to its over

70% allocation of funding set for “capital projects” in its vicinity, but still only 10% of this

amount was destined for important social amenities such as health, education, infrastructure and

employment in the period between 2007 and 2011.170

The progress missing from Ogoniland

speaks to the disproportionate benefits and revenue results which were supposed to have been

ensured since the start of extraction, but are not apparent in the present day.

Because Ogoniland sees no money from oil production, the area relies on the funding

given to Rivers State to provide for development. In 2007 Rivers State was given US $1.7 billion

by the Federal Government of Nigeria, a number which exceeds the GDP of some neighboring

West African nations.171

As Ogoniland has lost its status as a host community where extraction

takes place, the area is no longer “entitled to development goods and payments” from oil

corporations which are given to other petroleum production sites.172

These additional

compensations provide a sort of ‘social license to operate’ but can also be a “divisive and

exclusionary” force between local communities.173

Here, the state government has failed to

allocate such a large financial support to localities transparently or equally, leaving many people

167

Zainab Ahmed.. 2014. “Deepening Knowledge About How Oil Money is Spent.” Extraction Industries

Transparency Initiative (EITI). 168



Zainab Ahmed. op. cit. 171



Francis and Sardesai. ibid., p. 20.

45

of Ogoniland without basic needs met. The actual amount of money acquired through oil

production or derivation can only provide a partial explanation of the situational absence of

public works in the Niger Delta. The issue being raised today more often concerns the manner in

which these funds are spent and how they are managed by state and national officials.174

It is not

clear where the funds that the states receive are actually going.

The insufficient development in the region has prompted the creation of organizations to

address concerns over allocation uses, which bear impacts on local communities. In 2000 the

Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was formed at the federal level while

organizations such as the Rivers State Sustainable Development Program (RSSDP) were started

at the state level a few years later. Both the federal government, through “ecological fund

allocations” and a portion of the 13% derivation, and transnational oil companies have

contributed to the NDDC, who then provides funds to Delta states.175

But in 2007 the NDDC

spoke out about a deficit discrepancy in their fiscal backing from the Nigerian Federal

Government throughout the seven years since its inception, amounting to US $1.9 billion.176

In

addition to this admittance, audits of the NDDC for 2007 to 2011 found that US $41.4 million

that was promised to projects in the Delta went unaccounted for, and could only partially be

explained by falsified completions and duplicated reports.177

Other federal funds to improve the

quality of life in the Delta such as the Stabilization Fund and the Natural Resources

Development Fund were exposed as “anything but close to its original objectives” because

money provided was utilized for unrelated activities, and there was even debt which accumulated

for the work of these inappropriate projects.178

Because members of the commission are chosen

by federal level politicians, residents of the Delta perceive the dealings of the commission to be

more invested in the transnational oil companies and politics funding them, rather than the

locals.179

Although the two phases of project implementation have produced some income

generation through cassava processing and aquaculture, efforts of the RSSDP are also often

thought of as a “political instrument with limited concrete benefits for the people of Rivers

174




Zainab Ahmed. op. cit. 178

Zainab Ahmed. ibid. 179

Francis and Sardesai. ibid., p. 31.

46

State.”180

Cries for transparency have attempted to be heard as part of the dialogue due to

occasions such as these where oil revenues travel through many hands and disappear before they

are able to reach local peoples. The civil society groups that have arisen to meet the demands of

indigenous communities in the Niger Delta and within Ogoniland are putting forth efforts to

create more accountability, local integration, informed awareness, and civic engagement with the

issue.

4.5 The Story of Shell Oil

For the last several decades, Shell Oil Company has been closely tied with the story of

Ogoniland. In 1957, Shell Oil Company began drilling for oil in Ogoniland.181

After 36 years,

protests eventually drove Shell to discontinue oil production in the region in 1993. It was

reported that the Nigerian government would find a replacement for Shell that met the Ogoni

people’s standards by the end of 2008.182

As of Spring of 2015, however, oil production in

Ogoniland has yet to resume; most of the Ogonis remain opposed to any oil drilling at this

juncture,183

although reports of support from Ogoni leaders did surface.184

Two years after the suspension of oil production, the then military government of Nigeria

executed poet and Ogoni activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. This event shook Ogoniland as well as the

entire country, and gained international attention. Allegedly “complicit” in the death of Ken

Saro-Wiwa was none other than Shell Oil. In 2009, Saro-Wiwa’s family was ready to take Shell

to court over the supposed wrongdoing, but Shell settled the case at a price of US $15.5 million.

Shell denied that the payout was an admission of guilt. Instead, they called it a “‘humanitarian

gesture,’” although the Ogonis do not believe the settlement took away from the malicious role

Shell played in Saro-Wiwa’s death. However, they did count it as a success to receive this

payment from Shell.185

Around the same time as this settlement, in 2008 and 2009, two major oil spills

devastated Bodo, Ogoniland, for which Shell Oil took responsibility.186

Shell does claim that

180


Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People. 2015. “Ogoni.” 182

“Nigeria’s removal of Shell hailed.” 2008. BBC News. 183

Press Release. 2015. “Stay away from the Ogoni oil - MOSOP writes Belema Oil.” World Stage News. 184

Okafor Ofiebor. 2015. “Ogoni Again: Trouble Over Oil.” The News. 185

Andrew Walker. 2009. “Will Shell payout change Niger Delta?” BBC News. 186

John Vidal. 2011. “Shell accepts liability for two spills in Nigeria.” The Guardian.

47

Nigerian government is partially responsible as well, because at least a portion of the oil spilled

(Shell says it is the majority of the oil spilled) is caused by “theft by armed gangs hacking into

pipelines.”187

Shell claims that less than 952 barrels of oil have spilled. On the other hand,

experts who studied video footage of the spills estimate that the total amount of oil spilled could

be upwards of 238,000 barrels.188

With that said, Shell later admitted that the quantity spilled

actually went beyond their initial estimate.189

The Ogonis affected by the spills were preparing

for a court case in London with Shell Oil to pay for the damage caused by the spills, when in

January of 2015 the case was settled for US $83.5 million.190191

As it turned out, Shell actually

received a warning in 2002 from Shell staff members about the pipeline that ended up bursting in

2008. According to The Guardian Newspaper, Shell was warned that the pipeline “continually

leaked and was a major risk,” but did nothing.192

Following the 2015 settlement, another oil spill case concerning Shell is being brought to

court. At the end of 2014, in Bonny, a region that neighbors Ogoniland, a spill occurred which

was, according to Shell, caused by bunkering193

– the illegal tapping of oil infrastructure in order

to illegally procure oil.194

Incidentally, spills around Bonny Island can actually make their way

into the Ogoniland region.195

An investigation by Shell as well as government officials

concluded that the amount of oil spilled was 3,800 barrels. This makes it one of the biggest spills

in recent years, based on Shell’s estimates.196

However, a human rights group called Social

Action, according to an employee of the group named Celestine Akpobari, estimated the size of

the spill at 20,000 barrels. Akpobari also mentioned that locals have lost faith in Shell’s oil spill

inquiry procedure that is undertaken, due to the sloppy approach; Akpobari claims that it is

standard procedure for Shell to offer feeble compensation before investigations are sufficiently

completed. A community leader on Bonny Island named Amasenibo Abere said, “‘[Shell] is

187

Cocks, Tim. 2012. “Insight: A year on, Nigeria’s oil still poisons Ogoniland.” Reuters. 188

Vidal 2011 op. cit. 189

John Vidal. 2014. “Shell ignored internal warnings over Nigeria oil spills, documents suggest.” The Guardian. 190

John Vidal. 2015. “Shell announces £55m payout for Nigeria oil spills.” The Guardian. 191

AP. 2015. “Shell to Pay $83.5m for Nigeria Oil Spill.” Aljazeera. 192


John Vidal. 2015. “Niger delta communities to sue Shell in London for oil spill compensation.” The Guardian. 194

United Nations Environment Programme. 2011. “Assessment of Contaminated Soil and

Groundwater.” UNEP. p. 101. 195

UNEP. “Background to Environmental Degradation in Ogoniland.” 196

Julia Payne. 2014. “Shell pipeline leak spills thousands of barrels into Niger delta.” Reuters.

48

desperate to hide the truth so as [to] avoid payment of compensation.’”197

Furthermore, while

Shell claimed that the spill was caused by thieves, locals have said that “they had video evidence

that it was not sabotage but a Shell contractor working in a buggy which struck the pipeline.”198

This spill, as with many spills in the area, remains unremediated. This case is being taken to

London, as the Bodo case in 2009 was. This is because English courts are perceived, at least by

English law firm Leigh Day (who represented Bodo in the 2008/2009 case),199

and Akpobari, to

be more fair than Nigerian courts. Other cases may end up being taken to London for this reason

as well.200

Although oil has not been extracted from Ogoniland since 1993, the problems

associated with oil are still painfully present even today.

4.6 Environment

4.6.1 Environmental Degradation

In 2011, the United Nations published and environmental assessment report on

Ogoniland. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) released a statement shortly

after the assessment report was published claiming that it would take up to 30 years and a start-

up fund of US $1 billion to clean the area. Despite having not drilled for oil since 1993 in

Ogoniland, oil spills are continuing to harm freshwater supplies, mangrove ecosystems, and

ultimately, the local peoples’ livelihoods.201

Oil facilities in the region have not been

decommissioned and in some cases, improperly maintained pipelines continue to pass through

Ogoniland carrying oil produced elsewhere in Nigeria.202

Mangrove ecosystems are considered one of the world’s most productive ecosystems, and

the tree itself is a very important keystone species in said ecosystems. Not only do other plant

and animal species rely on mangroves for survival, but the surrounding communities do as well.

The numerous oil spills in the Delta have resulted in the destruction of mangrove forests. The oil

from these spills have accumulated in the waters and have coated the leaves, branches, and roots

of the mangrove trees, causing extreme stress or destruction of the trees. An invasive mangrove

species known as nipa palm capitalizes on the death of the native mangroves and is quickly

197

Vidal 2015. op. cit. 198

Vidal 2015. ibid. 199

Vidal 2015. op. cit. 200

Vidal 2015. ibid. 201

United Nations Environment Programme. 2011. “Press Release.” UNEP. 202

United Nations Environment Programme. 2011. “Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland.” P. 25.

49

changing the composition of mangrove ecosystems. It has also been noted that this invasive

species of mangrove tree is much more resilient to oil pollution in comparison to the native tree.

Nipa palm is considered a “nuisance palm” and lacking in fiscal possibilities because unlike the

native mangrove trees, local peoples cannot gather fruit from the trees, nor use the wood for

construction or firewood. 203

Past oil spills that were never properly taken care of have left fishing waters with a layer

of floating oil. With fishing being a way to make a living to many peoples, oil spills have left

fish habitats extremely polluted and fisherman without a way to make an income. As a result,

more fishermen are traveling to bodies of water that are less polluted to catch fish to sell and feed

their families, thus, resulting in overfishing in the cleaner areas of the Delta region.204

Along

with changing habitats, fish are also affected by the changing composition of the water. In some

areas, oxygen levels are decreasing from 8.4 mg/l to 8.1 mg/l due to water temperatures

increasing from 25º C to 28º C. As temperatures further increase, oxygen levels will further

decrease. If levels reach 5 mg/l fish populations can become distressed; at 2 mg/l fish

populations will begin to die off.205

Groundwater has been severely contaminated by the oil spills in Ogoniland and the

surrounding Niger Delta. The high number of abandoned oil fields not properly maintained,

leading to the corrosion of oil pipelines, has caused an increase of ground contamination from

heavy metals. During their study, UNEP dug 180 groundwater monitoring wells to investigate

groundwater contamination. In Ejama-Ebubu, home of a large-scale oil spill in the 1970s, UNEP

reported that the observed levels of water contamination are higher than the standards set forth

by the Nigerian government and the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC). The

spilled oil of this event flowed through a lagoon, and then into creeks in downstream areas. The

main pollutants in groundwater are total petroleum hydrocarbon (TPH).206

TPH is the broad

203

United Nations Environment Programme. 2011. “Assessment of Vegetation, Aquatic and Public Health Issues.”

UNEP. P. 125 204

United Nations Environment Programme. 2011. “Assessment of Vegetation, Aquatic and Public Health Issues.”

UNEP. P. 173. 205

United Nations Environment Programme. 2011. “Assessment of Vegetation, Aquatic & Public Health Issues.”

UNEP. 206

United Nations Environment Programme. 2011. “Assessment of Contaminated Soil and Groundwater.” UNEP.

P. 173.

50

categorization of the different families of the chemical compounds found in crude oil.207

Due to

the high amount of different TPH compositions, there are different effects it has on the human

body. The compounds that contain benzene can affect the nervous system, and if exposed to high

amounts, death can occur. Other compounds can cause respiratory distress, nausea, issues with

fetus development, and immune system problems.208

At a second site, an SPDC-suspended

facility in Bomu-Manifold, UNEP found that despite the facility being fenced in, there is oil

seeping through the fence, into the soil, and into the groundwater in the areas surrounding the

facility. In Nsisioken Agbi, drinking water in the area is heavily contaminated with benzene, a

known carcinogen. Water samples also showed methane and methane tertiary butyl ether, both of

which pose serious health risks for humans. Not only are the oil contaminants leaching into

groundwater in close proximity to the Nsisioken Agbi oil site, but also being transported to other

community wells within a half kilometer radius from the site itself. As a whole, UNEP

recommended at numerous study sites within Ogoniland to, put simply, clean up the mess left by

oil spills. In regards to other past oil spills, UNEP states numerous times that these spills were

not properly taken care of; cleanup efforts were deemed unsuccessful or abandoned before

completion.209

Gas flaring, a technique used at oil refineries which separates crude oil from the

associated gases that are extracted with it,210

is a practice by oil companies that negatively

impacts the environment and jeopardizes the health of surrounding communities. The UN reports

that gas flaring has made Ogoniland one of the most polluted areas in the world.211

Although gas

flaring no longer occurs within the confines of Ogoniland, active gas flaring sites are located

near Ogoni communities, therefore some Ogoni still feel the effects of gas flaring.212

Not only

do the gas flares increase the surrounding temperatures by 13-14℃, but also releases methane,

207 Environmental Protection Agency. 2014. “What Are Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons (TPH)?” EPA.

208 Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry. 1999. “Public Health Statement for Total Petroleum

Hydrocarbons (TPH).” ATSDR. 209

United Nations Environment Programme. 2011. “Assessment of Contaminated Soil and Groundwater.” UNEP. P.

98.

210Integrated Regional Information Networks. 2007. “NIGERIA: Gas flaring wrecking Delta communities.” IRIN.

211Legborsi Saro Pyagbara. 2007. “The Adverse Impacts of Oil Pollution on the Environment and Wellbeing of a

Local Indigenous Community: The Experience of the Ogoni People of Nigeria.”United Nations Department of

Economic and Social Affairs. 212

Ratical. 2015. “Factsheet on the Ogoni Struggle.” Ratical.

51

sulphurous oxides, and Nitrogen oxide, all harmful to the human body and can lead to

bronchoconstriction, increased asthma symptoms,213

and airway inflammation for healthy

people.214

Flaring is also linked to acid rain, which corrodes roofs and increases acidity in soil;

some local peoples believe gas flaring is the cause of their skin irritation, respiratory problems,

and poor eyesight.215

Lastly, gas flaring causes light pollution, giving surrounding organisms a

sense of 24-hour daylight and affecting their daily activity and sleeping patterns. Fish

populations have been known to alter their reproductive habits and change their new migration

patterns to deeper seas, where it is darker.216

4.6.2 Environmental Regulations

While there are Nigerian agencies for environmental management, they are seemingly

ineffective when it comes to cleaning up oil spills and other oil-related hazards. There is often an

overlap of local, state, and federal authority, and the resources needed to fix the environmental

problems are either lacking, or nonexistent. In December 2011, the Movement for the Survival of

the Ogoni People, a local NGO, created their own environmental protection agency, Ogoni

Environmental Protection Agency (OGEPA). The president and spokesperson of MOSOP states,

“the task of OGEPA is to coordinate efforts to protect the inherent rights and means of livelihood

of the Ogoni people, [and] ensure [a] healthy and safer environment.”217

OGEPA’s main goal is

to ensure that Ogonis do not participate in activities that are harmful to the environment.218

Similar to the majority of countries worldwide, Nigeria has a Federal Environmental

Protection Agency responsible for federal water and air quality standards, the discharge of

hazardous substances, spillage, etc. The main function of the agency is to preserve and protect

the environment and advise the Nigerian Federal Government. It also requires all future

development schemes to engage in an environmental impact assessment. All water quality

standards apply to the following: public water supplies, fish and wildlife, water used for

recreation, and lastly, industrial and agricultural uses. Air quality standards must be met to

213

Environmental Protection Agency. 2015. “Health.” EPA. 214

Environmental Protection Agency. 2014. “Health.” EPA. 215

Integrated Regional Information Networks. 2012. “Nigeria: Gas flares still a burning issue in the Niger Delta.” 216

Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. 2008. “Ogoni.” UNPO. 217

John Ahni Schertow. 2011. “Ogoni Establish Their Own Environmental Protection Agency.” Intercontinental

Cry. 218

John Ahni Schertow. ibid.

https://intercontinentalcry.org/author/administrator/

https://intercontinentalcry.org/author/administrator/

52

ensure the health of nature and the public. Despite these rules and regulations to protect and

preserve the environment, oil spills are continuously left untouched, oil companies are not fined

for gas flaring or other harmful impacts on the environment, and the diverse ecosystems

surrounding the Niger Delta continue to suffer degradation. In regards to oil spills, the Federal

Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for the immediate clean up and habitat loss

restoration, unless the spill was deemed unavoidable as a result of a natural disaster, war, or

sabotage.219

Nigerian legislation also provides important environmental law under EGASPIN,

Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum. Two important provisions under

EGASPIN clearly states after and oil spill, “‘Any operator or owner of a facility that is

responsible for a spill that results to impact of the environment shall be required to monitor the

impacted environment alongside the restorative activities.

It is widely known that gas flaring is harmful to the environment and to the people

exposed to it, which is why Nigeria outlawed flaring in 1984.220

In 1996, the federal government

agreed to end flaring in the Niger Delta by 2008, with Shell agreeing to comply to this law by

2009. Yet, these laws are not enough, and gas flaring remains a prevalent issue in Niger Delta

today. The NNPC claims that Nigeria flares 40% of its yearly natural gas production, while the

World Bank claims it flares 75%. The World Bank and the Integrated Regional Information

Networks (IRIN) agree that the monetary penalties for those who flare are too small to truly

make a change in this practice.221

222

Some have stated that any attempts to improve oil company

practices have been for show, and they have not seen these laws and regulations in place.

Interestingly enough, the claims that the federal government occasionally grants flaring

exemptions to oil companies. As Isaac Osuoka, the 2007 director of Social Action states, “‘the

gas flare-out target or deadlines have not been backed by any legislation, so they are more or less

voluntary targets that the government and the oil companies agreed to and which they violate at

will.’”223

The Associated Gas Re-injection Act 1979 (AGRA), Nigeria’s primary gas flaring

legislation, “[allows] exploration [companies] to continue to flare gas on prescribed terms and

219

Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre. 2015. “Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act.” PLAC. 220

Monika Mark. 2012. “Nigeria's Penalty for Gas Flaring Will Not Curb Emissions, Say Campaigners.” The

Guardian. 221


Integrated Regional Information Networks. 2012. “Nigeria: Gas Flares Still a Burning Issue in the Niger Delta.” 223

Integrated Regional Information Networks. 2012. ibid.

53

conditions in relation to specified oil fields.”224

By not having a clear and firm set of laws and

regulations, there will only continue to be an exacerbation of environmental degradation in the

Niger Delta.

4.7 Forms of Representation in the Delta

4.7.1 MOSOP

The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) is a non-violent, democratic

social movement founded in 1990. The goals of MOSOP are to:

promote democratic awareness, protect the environment of the Ogoni people, seek

social, economic and physical development for the region, protect the cultural rights

and practices of the Ogoni people, and seek appropriate rights of self-determination

for the Ogoni people.225

Their first action was presenting the Ogoni Bill of Rights to the people and Government of

Nigeria. The Ogoni Bill of Rights calls for social, economic and environmental justice by means

of political autonomy for the Ogoni people. This autonomy includes political control of affairs,

control of economic resources for development, direct representation in Nigerian national

institutions, and protection of the environment and ecology from further degradation.226

At first,

MOSOP did not receive a reply regarding the Bill of Rights; a year later MOSOP leaders came

together to add a section to the Bill of Rights that would allow MOSOP to bring the campaign to

the international community and reiterate its commitment to nonviolence. In 1992 they presented

the Bill of Rights to the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations. Later that

year, MOSOP brought their demands to the oil companies stating they had to pay back royalties

and compensation to the people within 30 days. This led to the Ogoni Day March in January of

1993 to celebrate the United Nations Year of the Indigenous People.227

Later that month,

MOSOP joined the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO).228

After joining

224

Practical Law. 2015. “Oil and Gas Regulation in Nigeria: Overview.” Practical Law: a Thomson Reuters Legal

Solution. 225

Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People. 2015. “Ogoni.” 226

Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People. 2015. “Ogoni Bill of Rights.” 227



Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People. 2015. “Ogoni.”

54

the organization, MOSOP and the Ogoni case began receiving international attention through

media outlets. 229

After gaining more attention and expanding MOSOP needed to reorganize to properly

represent individuals which lead to the creation of smaller committees.230

These committees

represented by MOSOP include the National Youth Council of Ogoni People, the Federation of

Ogoni Women’s Associations, the Council of Ogoni Professionals and more. Decisions made at

village and organization levels are all reached democratically then taken to MOSOP to be used in

policy making decisions. Currently MOSOP is made up of over 200,000 Ogoni members.231

MOSOP is still active in advocating for the rights of the Ogoni people. Earlier this year it

has been announced that an indigenous oil and gas company, Belema Oil Producing Limited,

will take over oil production in Ogoniland.232

Although some reports have been made claiming

MOSOP support of the oil company, MOSOP has since spoken out against Belema Oil in

Ogoniland. Belema Oil claims to obtain properties that have already been in production but are

under-developed. They are currently only working in Nigeria but hope to expand further into

Africa. According to their corporate responsibilities Belema is working to minimize

environmental effects, conduct business fairly, and positively contribute to local communities.233

The company also states that part of their vision is to conduct business with optimal wealth

creation for stakeholders which includes the host communities.234

Despite these seemingly ideal claims made by the company, MOSOP has openly spoke

out against Belema operations in Ogoniland. They have chosen to speak out in the form of a

letter written to the CEO of Belema Oil. The letter states their disapproval of any oil related

activities in Ogoniland, specifically oil mining, regardless of the company involved. It states that

the companies presence in Ogoniland will disrupt the prevailing peace and could bring more

crisis to the area. The letter brings up issues of past violence, human rights violations, and

environmental degradation brought about by Shell and the Nigerian government, which remain

229



Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. ibid. 231

Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People Canada. 2014. “The Story of the Movement for the Survival of

the Ogoni People” 232

Taneh Beemene. 2015. “Oil Exploration Resumes in Ogoni Soon...As Belema Oil Replaces Shell. ” The Tide. 233

Belema Oil Producing. 2015. “Corporate Responsibility” 234

Belema Producing. 2015. “Our Business, Vision and Core Values”

55

unreconciled with the Ogoni. MOSOP urges Belema not to enter Ogoniland because it threatens

the living conditions of local communities and will cause conflicts. They state that the Ogoni

people reject any and all oil mining until the issues with Shell and the Nigerian government are

solved. The letter ends with a final plea for the company to stay away from Ogoni oil.235

MOSOP and the Ogoni are openly and clearly against any mining in Ogoniland and are still

active in speaking out against it.

4.7.2 MEND

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is a militant group that

emerged in January of 2006. Their attacks are focused on oil companies, based on their

dissatisfaction with environmental degradation, underdevelopment of local communities, and

lack of benefits communities have received from the country's oil resources and revenues. Their

main goal is to get resource control and thus a share of the revenue from the oil. Such groups

often begin with young men frustrated with lack of jobs available. Many aspects surrounding

MEND are unknown. The number of members could be anywhere from several hundred to

several thousand and is largely composed of young men. Ike Okonta, a researcher of African

politics at the University of Oxford claims MEND is more of an idea than organization.236

MEND does not have a united structure and experts claim this organizational structure of the

group allows for flexibility and secrecy. The leadership remains opaque as well and several

members have claimed or been referred to as leaders. The secrecy has been successful for the

group because of the support from locals.237

Because of all the unknown aspects surrounding

MEND their exact location is also unknown but their attacks take place throughout the Niger

Delta.238

MEND first emerged in 2006 with the capture of four foreign oil workers. Throughout

the year, MEND continued with attacks on oil pipelines and several car bombings. The attacks

have had an immense impact on the oil exports, causing a reduction of more than 25%. This

gained the attention of the oil companies, the Nigerian government, and the United States

235

Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organization. 2015. “Ogoni: Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni

People Rejects Take-over of Oilfields by Belema Oil.” 236

Stephanie Hanson. 2007. “MEND: The Niger Delta’s Umbrella Militant Group.” The Council on Foreign

Relations. 237

Hanson 2007, op. cit. 238

Reuters. 2010. “Timeline- Conflict in Nigeria’s Oil Delta.”

56

government who are concerned about MEND disrupting global oil supply. MEND’s main tactic

involves the kidnapping of foreign oil workers who are typically released unharmed after

negotiations with both oil companies and the Nigerian government.239

Since 2006 MEND has continued to be active. After the suspected leader Henry Okah

was arrested, MEND decided to no longer participate in the ongoing peace talks with the

government. In September of 2008 MEND declared an “oil war” which in May 2009 became an

“all out war,” during which MEND repeated their earlier calls for oil firms to remove their staff

from the area. Later that year in June, President Yar’Adua granted amnesty to several gunmen

previously involved in pipeline bombings and other attacks, including Henry Okah. Then in

July, MEND attacked another oil pipeline but five days later called for a ceasefire. The 60-day

ceasefire was an effort by MEND to start new peace talks with the government in response to

the amnesty for Okah. When the 60 days were up, MEND extended the ceasefire for 30 more

days to continue peace talks, but warned that key issues were not being addressed. In October of

2009 MEND called off the ceasefire and threatened to attack but the ceasefire was reinstated

nine days later. Later in January 2010 MEND ended the ceasefire, again threatening an all out

war. Throughout 2010 more oil workers were kidnapped, car bombs were detonated, and other

attacks were carried out.240

Through the kidnappings and attacks, MEND managed to reduce oil exports by 28%

from 2006 to 2009. Although attacks continued in 2010 and 2011, violence greatly declined

after the amnesty attempt in 2009.241

At the end of 2011 MEND claimed responsibility for a

bomb that went off at a celebration, killing 12 people and threatened for more attacks to come.

This was a sign of MEND’s return.242

In the beginning of 2015 a spokesperson for MEND,

Jomo Gbomo issued a statement claiming responsibility for an attack earlier in the year and

regarding MEND’s upcoming plans. These plans include larger attacks, dealing with the

occupying government forces, and within the year, reducing Nigeria’s oil exportations until

239

Hanson 2007, op. cit. 240

Reuters. 2010, op. cit. 241

Elisha Bala-Gbogbo. 2015. “Nigeria’s MEND Rebels Threaten Future Attack on Oil Industry.” Bloomberg

Business. 242

David Francis. 2010. “Move Over Boko Haram, Nigeria’s MEND Rebels Set to Restart Oil War in Niger Delta.”

57

there are none. 243

MEND is still currently working towards their original goal of justice for

local communities from the oil companies and reducing oil production and exportation.

4.7.3 Local NGOs and Civil Organizations

African Network for Environment and Economic Justice (ANEEJ) is an NGO based in

Benin City, Edo. Their mission is working towards a just and equal African society through the

protection of socio-economic and environmental rights, strengthening institutions, and

empowering individuals.244

Their objectives are to create platforms for civil society to

communicate with individuals on issues and build up civil society to better help with local

governance issues and how they connect to poverty and resource conflicts.245

ANEEJ also works

with Publish What You Pay (PWYP),246

a global network of over 800 organizations calling for

extractive sectors to be more transparent and accountable. PWYP hopes more transparency will

improve the lives of individuals and local communities in resource rich countries.247

Niger Delta Watch is a program that uses text messages, emails, or online forms to

document what is happening around the Niger Delta. NGOs, civil society groups, communities,

and individuals can submit reports on incidents, which brings a greater awareness of issues at a

local level. Niger Delta Watch then checks, approves, categorizes, and posts the reports online.

The current categories for the reports are cultural events, peace building initiatives, community

empowerment, infrastructure projects, oil spills, gas flares, human rights abuses, and

displacement. The purpose of this program is to keep people informed and eventually help build

a stronger civil society. The information can be used to monitor the government to hold them

accountable, oversee military activity, expose the abuses and issues with oil, and show the

positive progress that is being made.248

These programs, managed by local people, are working

towards bringing justice and equality to local communities in the Niger Delta from the ground

up.

4.7.4 Regional NGOs

243

Bala-Gbogbo, 2015. op. cit. 244

African Network for Environment and Economic Justice. 2014. “Our Vision” 245

African Network for Environment and Economic Justice. 2014. “Our Objectives” 246

Publish What You Pay. 2011. “Members of Publish What You Pay.” 247

Publish What You Pay. 2011. “About Us.” 248

Niger Delta Watch. 2009. “About Niger Delta Watch.”

58

Social Action is an organization working in Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea, but primarily

focuses its effort in Nigeria. As an organization they are working towards education,

mobilization, and cohesion for communities. They work with activists dedicated to

environmental justice, social change, and democracy. Social Action also works to promote

individual and group contribution to addressing the issues associated with energy, mining, trade,

and investments, which affect their call for democracy and human rights. Their beliefs and work

generates from impoverishment, lack of social structure, lack of democracy, and corruption.

They also focus on how these things contribute to underdevelopment. Their forms of action

include: encouraging public debate on policies, mass communication, monitoring, community

support, community and democratic action, and global movement.249

Social Action has several

programs to address these issues, including one focused on energy and climate. The basis of this

program is global reliance on oil and gas leading to expanding production and exportation and its

implications. This leads to negative social and environmental effects such as environmental

degradation, community conflicts, and corruption. Social Action, along with community

volunteers, works to monitor the practices used by the government and oil companies to protect

local communities and their environments.250

5. Analysis


The 1956 premier unearthing of oil reserves in Oloibiri of the Bayelsa State in the Niger

Delta began an era of petroleum extraction that continues in the Niger Delta today.251

Nigeria has

been declared the leading and largest national economy on the African continent with

approximations from 2013 showing a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US $502 billion, and an

annual growth rate of 6.2% for the same year.252

The GDP of the nation has been divided into

compositions for the origins of contributions. When separated into three groups, agriculture

accounts for 30.9%, industry–which includes mineral extraction–is 43%, and services is listed as

26% of the GDP estimate.253

These numbers at first glance seem to display an economy that may

249

Social Action. 2009. “About Social Action.” 250

Social Action. 2009. “Energy and Climate.” 251

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 2015. “Nigeria Facts and Figures.” 252

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 2014. “Nigeria.” The World Factbook. 253


59

be more varied than previously thought as agriculture, an essential sector for many Nigerian

communities’ livelihoods, appears to still be a major aim of government efforts. This national

scale of GDP may not provide a specialized view of what is occurring in smaller oil producing

communities such as Ogoniland, and therefore Delta communities who generate income mostly

from oil may not be represented in this statistic well. Industry is still the most prominent of the

three and other estimates for export revenue in relation to total income illustrate a case of

reliance, rather than mere abundance. Increasing economic gain from sources such as petroleum

further solidifies justifications for the consolidation of economic policies that reflect a rentier

state. The industrial sector contains endeavors such as the production of crude oil, chemicals,

steel, ceramics, tin, rubber and construction supplies, and contains 10% of the labor force as

compared to the agricultural sector which consists of 70% of the labor force.254

This arena is

growing annually, exemplified by a rate of 0.9% for 2013.255

The exportation revenues for 2014

reached over US $93 billion, and the portion of total exports derived from petroleum and its

products reached 95% in 2012.256

This export revenue percentage denotes the presence of

dependence as defined by Karl, which is noted in the literature review section. Though the

Federal Government of Nigeria may not be considered an obvious rentier state due to a partly

diverse GDP, the case for this type of state may be more applicable to the individual regional

states of the federation. The World Bank’s NER for 2014 has an emphasis placed on the

“macroeconomic risks [which] remain due to uncertainty about future oil output, oil prices, and

short term capital flows”, pointing to the larger economic vision of the country which is still

chiefly reliant on the oil industry.257

Reliance on a single aspect of economic income leads many state leaders to develop the

condition of myopia during their policy pursuits.258

This ailment leads fiscal directors and

national management to become short-sighted in their actions by concentrating entirely on a

prized and precious sector, leaving other dimensions of the economy to waste away as state

funds, economic policies, and capital investment are provided only to the chosen segment.

Exhibits of this type of behavior can be seen in the greater economic system of the Federal

254

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). ibid. 255



The World Bank. “Nigeria Economic Update: World Bank Cites Positive Economic Trends and Progress in

Poverty Reduction.” World Bank Group. 258

Michael L. Ross. 1999 "The political economy of the resource curse." p. 309.

60

Government of Nigeria, where oil has become the dominant division of the national economy.

This illness of narrow vision will beget another, often dubbed “Dutch disease,” which refers to

the situation when combined factors such as an appreciated local currency and devalued exported

products that are not the focused resource generate financial dependence on the select sector by

the entire state, and by heavily supporting other sectors, it creates a challenging atmosphere for

economic diversification.259

Reports collected between 2007 and 2011 have indicated that Rivers

State is 76% dependent on oil revenue.260

Though this fares better than other states in the Delta,

with the highest being 96% in Bayelsa State, “the trend is unlikely to be different in all the 36

states of the Federation.”261

In general, with opportunities dwindling in aspects of the economy

like labor-intensive work in manufacturing and agriculture, which most Nigerians participate in,

the average citizen is being crowded out of national and local economies by oil industry,

especially those in rural areas with limited access to education or the ability to enter the formal

sector. Migration from rural regions into urban centers in search of work, by youth especially,

disturbs the social dynamic of families and smallholder farms whose heads of households expect

to pass down their legacy of growth to their children, but are unable to when relations become

fragmented. It has been estimated that nearly half of Ogoni youth have moved with this intent of

greater economic possibility.262

With the acknowledgement that most communities in Ogoniland

and the rest of the Delta engage in farming for subsistence and additional income, they are also

then profoundly susceptible to these market forces and fiscal policies which degrade the

prospects of agricultural and fishmonger livelihoods.

Theoreticians of the resource curse claim that a state’s dependence on the revenue of a

single industry, specifically extraction activities, contribute to an effect that disables other sectors

of the economy and leaves leaders making hasty decisions which favor lucrative extraction

commerce. Impacts of this resource dependence also displace the power of people to command

agency in the decision-making processes that affect their communities through the formation of

rentier states. This can be seen as a framework for viewing the statistics that have come from

Nigeria about their GDP in relation to the percentage of it derived from citizen taxation and other

259

Terry Lynn Karl. "2. Understanding the Resource Curse." p. 23. 260

Zainab Ahmed. 2014. “Deepening Knowledge About How Oil Money is Spent.” Extraction Industries

Transparency Initiative (EITI). 261

Zainab Ahmed. ibid. 262

Watts. op. cit., p. 67.

61

revenues collected by the government. The proportion of Nigeria’s GDP contributed by taxes,

from sources such as “personal and corporate income taxes, value added taxes, excise taxes, and

tariffs” as well as public ventures and “social contributions” like insurance and grants, is one of

the lowest ratios to be found anywhere in the world, ranking in at 212 of the 215 countries

assessed.263

The rate of 3.8% of GDP in 2014 is significantly contrasted to developed nations

such as Denmark which acquired 55.5% of their GDP from taxation for the same year, or a

nearby neighbor Ghana which had 23.2% for that year.264

If oil is considered to be a ‘public enterprise’ due to NNPC involvement and if profits

from investment in oil company shares are typified as a government revenue, these numbers

should reflect not only citizen taxation but also the types of returns on public ventures like oil.265

This means that while the data may not clearly affirm a rentier state formation, the low

proportion of Nigeria’s taxes to GDP ratio denotes a troubling taxation arrangement that does not

incur high yields from oil operations and state-owned enterprises. The small fraction of funding

from total taxes is still indicative of the conditions of a state in which governments focus on

industry revenues rather than viewing citizens as a social capital to extract from and hence to

invest in. By perceiving the local population as inconsequential to the prosperity of the central

economy, the federal government does not see the objective benefit to negotiating matters by

concerned groups of indigenous peoples. Locals become excluded from the political process at a

federal level and so they must advocate for themselves and their causes in their locality, hoping

to eventually gain true recognition by the wider national government. Inclusion within political

procedures regarding petroleum production, the management of oil revenue, and the protection

of ecological stability are crucial elements to improving the quality of the everyday lives of

Ogoni peoples and other marginalized groups.

5.2 Corruption

Corruption is part of the political history of Nigeria. In the review of the literature on the

matter, we learned that both military rule as well as civilian rule were hosts of corruption in

263

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 2014. “Nigeria.” The World Factbook 264


265 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). ibid.

62

Nigeria.266

Corruption manifests itself at the state level as well as the federal level, and this truth

has dramatic effects on said states’ constituencies. Persistence of corruption, both at the federal

and state level, has been attributed to a lack of government accountability; as Emmanuel Obuah,

author of “Combating Corruption in Nigeria: The Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes

Commission (EFCC),” points out, a functional checks and balances system seems to be

missing.267

Obuah explains that a major cause of corruption is that, “the governors and

chairpersons claim that the 1999 Nigerian constitution bestowed immunity from prosecution

while in office.”268

One example of this is that of former Vice President Atiku Abubakar. The

Senate Committee accused him of the involvement in theft of US $145 million worth of public

funds. This case, however, was never taken to court.269

Obuah’s key example of “abuse of

power” is that of Rivers State–the state in which Ogoniland is situated–in 2006. According to

Obuah, “the governor of Rivers State in 2006 budgeted [US] $33.2 million for unspecified

‘grants, contributions and donations’; [US] $77 million for unspecified ‘special projects’; [US]

$65,000 per day for transport and travel for his office; and [US] $11.5 million for purchasing

new government vehicles.”270

The particular concern here is that the uses of these large sums of

money are “unspecified”. There is reason to be suspicious about the actual location of these

unspecified sums, and that reason is the glaring lack of development anywhere outside of a few

select cities. Money that could be allocated to various communities, for any kind of

development, is certainly being spent recklessly; we can speculate that those funds are being

used in an outright corrupt manner. In total, the above values make up about US $140 million. If

this sort of value accrued annually, untouched by corrupt politicians, over sixteen years–from the

start of the new civilian rule until now–it could equate to a considerable level of development in

the area. We might speculate that the amount of state allocated money intended to benefit the

public ends up in the pockets of the politicians responsible for it. Without intervention by corrupt

politicians, there could be significant strides in various developmental elements such as

healthcare, education, and infrastructure, as well as environmental remediation and protection.

266

Opukri op. cit., p. 180 267

Emmanuel Obuah. "Combating Corruption in Nigeria: The Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes

Commission (EFCC)." African Studies Quarterly 12, no. 1 (2010): p. 21 268

Obuah ibid., p. 21 269

Ogundiya, Ilufoye Sarafa. 2009. "Political corruption in Nigeria: theoretical perspectives and some

explanations." The Anthropologist 11, no. 4. p. 289 270

Obuah op. cit., p. 21

63

Godfatherism, an idea briefly discussed in the literature review, is a form of corruption in

many regions around the world, but not least of which Nigeria.271

Godfatherism, according to

Ilufoye Sarafa Ogundiya, is the idea of that a particular person has the ability to decide who runs

and/or wins an election; it also encompasses the practice of the politician finding a godfather to

help with an election process. The godfather will use his power to make sure his godson is

elected. This is done with violence and bribery, particularly of electoral officials and police

officers. After being ‘elected,’ the godson–and new politician–pays the godfather back

substantially more than the godfather put in. It is a profitable set-up for both parties. Because of

this relationship, the godfather achieves an extreme level of power. As Ogundiya says, “to the

godfathers, electoral politics is one huge investment opportunity with considerable promise of

massive returns.”272

Electoral politics–elections meant to be for the people–has been made into a

business by godfathers, and indeed it is a booming business.

Ogundiya also attempts to explain why corruption has been allowed to persist in Nigeria.

Over the years, different laws and institutions have been put in place, but corruption is still

rampant in Nigeria. He first explains that the punishments are much too tame; the example of

Vice President Abubakar is an example of this, but politicians who are convicted still see far too

tame of a punishment.273

It is difficult to convey a concrete reason corruption persists in Nigeria.

With that said, a true desire to eliminate corruption is necessary, and politicians have

traditionally lacked this trait. This could be attributed to the probable truth that corruption is a

necessary force for a politician to thrive. So, even though there have been laws and institutions

put in place, they lack a backbone, rendering them ineffective.274

The oil industry has contributed to the way this government situation has unfolded. The

revenues from oil wealth are undeniable; the government relies heavily on the wealth from oil. It

is for this reason that it is important that the oil industry is monitored in order to make progress

in that direction. The Nigerian Extraction Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) has helped

to expose industry discrepancies and has publicized their findings, helping the public to be more

271

O. Akinola Adeoye. 2009. "Godfatherism and the future of Nigerian democracy." African Journal of Political

Science and International Relations 3, no. 6. p. 269 272

Ogundiya op.cit., p. 287 273

Ogundiya ibid., p. 287 274

Ogundiya ibid., p. 290

64

aware of the situation.275

In 2007, the Nigerian government implemented the Nigeria Extractive

Industries Transparency Initiative Act, which established the NEITI. NEITI’s objectives are all

centered around increasing transparency and thus decreasing corruption in the extractive industry

as well as the government.276

This can be considered a bold step in the direction of more

transparency. Since 2011, NEITI has been working to expose and hold accountable companies in

the extraction industry. One example of a positive result brought on my NEITI is that, according

to their website, an unnamed oil company owed US $8.3 billion in taxes between 2009 and 2011,

which is actually a greater value than the government spent on education in that time277

–yet

another indicator that commitment to development is lacking. In July 2013, after the 2007-2011

audit by NEITI was published, Mobil Nigeria was commanded by the Tax Appeal Tribunal to

provide a penalty of US $83.4 million for an “unremitted education tax” that was never paid.278

This example of retroactive compensation shows that federal courts have the potential to enforce

compliance of proper payment upon transnational oil companies if they are made aware of

concrete proof of disparities, and may be able to make both corporations and the state more

responsible in development efforts.

5.2.1 The Role of Shell Oil

In the last eight years, Shell Oil has been damaging Ogoniland and the people that inhabit

it, even though oil production ceased 22 years ago. What is left out of the scope of our case study

is all the damage done while oil production in Ogoniland was still prevalent. Not only have the

effects from the oil drilling from earlier years remained, but also the oil drilling in nearby areas

today are impacting Ogoniland as well.

Why are these negative impacts on the environment allowed to occur? We could deduce

that the government, namely state and federal governments, and Shell together would like to

avoid cutting into their revenues. That is one of the major problems with Nigeria right now: the

government is not (at least entirely) in place for the people. As we gathered from our literature

review, government officials generally take office not from a desire to do good for the public, but

275

Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. “Nigeria Overview.” 276

Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. “Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

(NEITI) Act, 2007 Explanatory [Memorandum]”. 277

Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. 2014. “Progress Report 2014.” 278

Zainab Ahmed. ibid.

65

for the benefit of taking public revenue for themselves. It would seem that Shell is guilty of

seeking revenue without much of a second thought about the local communities as well. The

general view concerning Shell, as represented by the quote from Bonny community leader

Abere, is that Shell is intentionally hiding facts and evidence so as to avoid losing money. The

argument could be made that that is indirectly the reason for settling cases before they go to trial,

as was the case with the Saro-Wiwa family and with the Bodo community. In the Saro-Wiwa

situation, Shell settled the case, and was then free to claim that it was not an admission of guilt.

To some, this might be the same as claiming that they were not guilty; they are free to do that

because now they are free from ever being found liable. Furthermore, they can turn it into a

positive press release. They can claim responsibility for an oil spill, or they can make a

“humanitarian gesture,” which is undoubtedly a great way to appear to be a respectable

company. These actions save face for the company, and avoid, to the extent they can, the risk of

losing money in the future due to sympathetic consumers taking their business elsewhere. These

events resurfacing in the news every week can eventually lead people all over the world to be

moved by what they see in the news, and thus avoid Shell gas stations. In other words,

ultimately, Shell could be losing less money by settling than they would going to trial.

The same argument could be made for the Bodo settlement. If Shell settles the case now,

they could gain three things: the first is that they can get closure, knowing exactly where it ends

and how much they owe. Secondly, it is very possible, or even probable, that Shell could be

found liable for more money than would be paid in a settlement, not including fees associated

with a trial, which can be very steep. The third is that they can avoid continuing coverage of the

case, which would undoubtedly portray them in a bad light. They can even turn the incident into

a public relations success by claiming they are taking responsibility and taking action to fix the

problem (whether they are actually helping or not). So a settlement can be a calculated move that

actually saves them money in the end.

Along the lines of dishonesty from Shell, John Vidal of the Guardian Newspaper cites

Amnesty international in saying that Shell’s estimates of all of the previous spills in the Niger

Delta are questionable due to their underestimation of the major 2008 spills, due to the fact that

66

all the “spill investigations are conducted in the same manner.”279

All Shell oil spills all over the

world should be questioned as well, as a result of their gross underestimation.

Shell representatives do claim that most of the spills are caused by bunkering,280

and

there is some validity to those claims, which must be made explicit to be fair. The answer to the

question of how much is caused by thieves, though, remains uncertain. As previously stated, on

one occasion when Shell claimed a spill was caused by thieves, the opposition claimed to have

video evidence proving the contrary. This occasion was the Bodo case, in which Shell ultimately

settled for US $83.5 million. Also, the question of whether or not Shell is liable for the damage

done by theft has been raised; they could have potentially been deemed liable if it was proven

that Shell “failed to take reasonable steps to protect its infrastructure.”281

Whether or not theft

from their pipelines is a foreseeable risk is relevant in that case. Furthermore, Shell has proven

its lack of accountability due to the gross negligence in its maintenance of a thirty year-old

pipeline that caused, and continues to cause, so much environmental harm.282

Amnesty

International reports that, beyond the inaccurate spill estimate, Shell claims “‘that sites are

cleaned up when they are not,’”283

and that Shell is not nearly as transparent as it claims to be.

They also reported that “Shell is being disingenuous about the devastation caused by its Niger

Delta operations.”284

Shell’s actions do not completely match our working definition of corruption. With that

said, however, its behavior is parallel to that of corrupt government officials because its actions

are at the expense of the local community and, as Abere claims, it is trying to hide the truth.

Furthermore, Shell is so tightly associated with the Nigerian government that it is inherently tied

with government corruption in Nigeria as well. In 2010, The Guardian Newspaper reported that

Shell “had inserted staff into all the main ministries of the Nigerian government, giving it access

to politicians’ every move in the oil-rich Niger Delta.”285

The report from The Guardian was

gathered from statements made by “the company’s top executive in Nigeria.”286

Akpobari was

279


Vidal 2014 ibid. 281



John Vidal. 2013. “Shell made false claims about Niger delta oil pollution, says Amnesty.” The Guardian. 284


David Smith. 2010. “WikiLeaks cables: Shell’s grip on Nigerian state revealed.” The Guardian. 286

Smith ibid.

67

quoted as saying, “‘Shell is everywhere. They have an eye and an ear in every ministry of

Nigeria. They have people on the payroll in every community, which is why they get away with

everything. They are more powerful than the Nigerian government.’”287

The NNPC denied this

report, and Shell opted not to comment, but a representative of Platform–an activist group based

in London–named Ben Amunwa agrees with Akpobari’s statement. He was quoted as saying,

“‘in reality, Shell works deep inside the system, and has long exploited political channels in

Nigeria to its own advantage.’”288

The fact that two separate parties see this report in the same

light implies a level of truth, at least in the eyes of observers. In addition, the SPDC of Nigeria is

the leading producer of the country’s oil, and is 55% owned by the NNPC.289

The profits of this

company directly translate to revenues for the federal government. Another example of the

importance of Shell’s revenue is that just in 2014, Shell paid US $3 billion in taxes to the

Nigerian government.290

It can quite comfortably be inferred that Shell has a major influence on

the Nigerian government.

What we are looking for in our research is what comparisons can be made between the

causes of the political and economic exclusion of Niger Delta communities and the causes of

environmental degradation. The government’s actions have engendered these exclusions. There

is a powerful tie between Shell Oil and the Nigerian government. Shell’s activity is largely

responsible for the tremendous amount of environmental damage in the Delta, and they are not

held accountable because they are fused with the government. As such, the same factors that

have caused the exclusion of communities like the Ogoni have simultaneously been the cause for

so much environmental damage.


The importance of identity in nation formation is purported by Michael Watts as being

crucial to the analysis of administrations that have been infiltrated with ‘petro-capitalism’ and

established an ‘oil complex’.291

Those systems engender a variety of “governable spaces”, which

are an amalgamation of elements such as affiliation, control, and territory; and which emerge as

287

Smith ibid. 288

Smith ibid. 289

Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. op. cit. 290

Phillip Oladunjoye. 2015. “Shell pays 3b as taxes, royalties to Nigeria govt in 2014.” Daily Independent. 291

Watts. op. cit., p. 54.

68

internal discrepancies among traditional leadership, indigenous loyalty, and nationalist

aspirations.292

As the revenue from oil production forced the Nigerian Federal Government to

further centralize, “what was true under colonialism became more so in the post-colonial oil

era.”293

The disagreements on which groups had sovereignty was made more tense by ethnic

strife based on resource claims, and the use of militant youth and national security forces to quiet

community unrest by transnational oil companies under the guise of government bodies. Violent

strategies employed to secure and control rents by oil producing communities and state

institutions resulted in the appearance of glaring differences in the aims of stakeholders, and the

disintegration of traditional networks of power.294

Especially after the Biafran civil war, the

increased militancy of governmental regimes ensured that communities and states had even less

input than before.295

Joint ventures between the NNPC and international oil corporations created

monetary flows that led directly to the federal government which redistributed funds to states in

a manner that mirrored the colonial nepotism of the three dominant ethnic majorities.296

Unfortunately the “weak institutions and a charged, volatile federal system produced an

undisciplined, corrupt and flabby oil-led development that was to fragment, pulverize,

disintegrate and discredit the state and its forms of governance.”297

With incapable governmental

structures and missing egalitarian political representation of local indigenous groups, the quality

of life and of the surrounding environment diminish.

Movements toward a brighter future in the face of injustice by transnational oil

companies may have strengthened some people’s connection to their community. Watts contends

that although they were “marginalized and excluded from the benefits of oil”, Niger Delta

peoples like the Ogoni used oil as an opportunity to begin discussions on community rights to

resources, expectations of administrative accountability, and other topics in which the Ogoni

represented a revolutionary frame of mind.298

The entrenched systems that have excluded the

Ogoni and other peoples in the Niger Delta from effective political participation demonstrate

292

Watts. ibid., p. 53 293

Watts. ibid., p. 59. 294

Watts. ibid., p. 64. 295




Watts. ibid., p. 51.

69

how the environment has been robbed of their management, and they also reveal an enduring

dissonance among minority groups as well as the three dominant ethnic groups.

Peet and Watts claim that with oil production comes a presence of violence and

criminality. They also state that the petro-capitalism in Nigeria has brought about territory,

community authority and inner-ethnic relation issues.299

These claims are shown through the

local social movements in Ogoniland. Every social movement is working towards political,

economic and environmental representation regarding the issues of oil corporations working in

their territory and undermining their community authority. As a militant group, MEND’s main

tactic for achieving justice is carried out through violence and crimes. Their attacks are based on

their dissatisfaction with oil production in their area and illustrates Peet and Watts’ idea that with

oil comes violence and criminality. Although MOSOP is dedicated to nonviolence they have

dealt with crimes and violence present in the area through the arrest, trial and death of Ken Saro-

Wiwa. The other local NGOs mentioned in this research are also nonviolent but it can be

assumed that the violence and crime in Ogoniland has an impact on the local communities.

6. Conclusion

Throughout our investigation, the perspective of the resource curse has been a tool to

critically assess our case. We did not seek to prove or disprove the existence of a resource curse,

but instead used this lens to better understand our research. We have found that the concentration

in the oil industry has raised the question of a rentier state where petroleum is the primary

commodity, and other sectors of the economy are largely ignored. The taxation of citizens has

not played a substantial role in federal income, which contributes to the marginalization of the

people that the government is supposed to represent. Economic and political exclusion are

coupled with inadequate state efforts for development and the lack of improvements on degraded

environments. These factors of underrepresentation are caused by a general proclivity for

corruption in the government, both at the national and state levels. This proclivity is at the same

time the cause of environmental degradation in the area. The desire of government officials as

well as Shell Oil to maximize their revenues has led to a negligence of both society and the

environment. The collusion between the government and Shell Oil–and even the fusion of the

299

Richard Peet and Michael Watts. 2004. “Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development, Social Movements.”

293.

70

two entities– exacerbates these issues. The presence of oil and its industry is not the contentious

issue, but rather what has been done by the industry in relation to local economic integration,

why revenue funds and economic planning have been improperly handled, and how the

ecological crisis forced upon communities of the Niger Delta impacts the daily lives of the

individuals living there. Organizations within civil society have formed to address issues such as

resource allocation, transparency, and environmental degradation. While the formation of these

groups within society can be equated to progress, there are still strides to be made before true

economic and political inclusion can be achieved. The movements of local communities that

gather around political representation, economic inclusion, and environmental concern are not

unique to the Niger Delta. Resource extraction regions can be found in many countries

worldwide, and these areas are subject to similar processes of marginalization and

underdevelopment. Indigenous communities in resource-rich states around the globe may have

identical issues, but they may also have comparable–potential or actual–action by civil societies.

Our findings may be useful for the analysis of other extraction areas in the developing world, and

may allow insight into the political, economic, and environmental context of present-day reliant

states.

7. Perspectives

The time and resource restraints upon our group research leaves us unable to address the

future avenues of exploration which have been discovered. One of these paths that other

researchers might follow is the implication of the informal economy in Ogoniland and

throughout the Niger Delta. We have found some works that discuss the bunkering of oil and its

surreptitious sales, but a source of interest would be to discover how else communities are

participating in local economies that produce oil, whether within informal or formal sectors, and

how some income generators may be more beneficial to the population than others. Another

subject of future interest is how the issue of election rigging changes over time. Our research

enabled us to briefly study the electoral issues of the past. It will be crucial, however, for these

elections to be conducted with more transparency in the future. Fairly conducted elections will

be a key ingredient in the recipe that makes for a more transparent government and therefore a

government accountable to its constituents. More work on the prevalence of grassroots

organizations in developing areas of the world subject to characteristics of the resource curse

71

would also be interesting to note, as well as the variances of institutionalization for those groups

into their state or international circuits. The global applicability of our findings for comparative

studies or further investigations will hopefully lead to a better understanding of societies where

mineral extraction occurs, the structural exclusion of marginalized indigenous groups, and how

people adapt and change systems in order to create more agency for themselves.

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