Senior Leadership Training in UN Peace Ops · 2019-02-06 · of leadership training has increased,...

FEBRUARY 2019

Senior Leadership Training in UN Peace Operations

KEVIN S. KENNEDY AND LAURA POWERS

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

KEVIN KENNEDY is a former UN official who served in theDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations, Office for theCoordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and Department ofPublic Information, as well as in several field missions andin the Executive Office of the Secretary-General over thecourse of a thirty-seven-year career in the Secretariat.Among his peacekeeping-related assignments were serviceas team leader for the Integrated Operational Teams forthe Great Lakes Region of Africa and for Mali and as headof the Integrated Training Service for the Departments ofPeacekeeping Operations and Field Support.

LAURA POWERS is a former Research Assistant at IPI.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank the current and formersenior mission leaders and managers of UN peacekeepingoperations, as well as the Secretariat officials who agreedto be interviewed for this paper.

IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its many donors for theirgenerous support. IPI is particularly grateful to the govern-ment of Canada for making this publication possible.

Cover Photo: Senior Mission Leaders

course in Beijing, 2016. Peacekeeping

Affairs Center of China’s Ministry of

National Defense.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this

paper represent those of the authors

and not necessarily those of the

International Peace Institute. IPI

welcomes consideration of a wide

range of perspectives in the pursuit of

a well-informed debate on critical

policies and issues in international

affairs.

IPI Publications

Adam Lupel, Vice President

Albert Trithart, Editor

Gretchen Baldwin, Assistant Editor

Suggested Citation:

Kevin S. Kennedy and Laura Powers,

“Senior Leadership Training in UN

Peace Operations,” International Peace

Institute, February 2019.

© by International Peace Institute, 2019

All Rights Reserved

www.ipinst.org

CONTENTS

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

WHY TRAINING FOR SENIOR MISSIONLEADERS MATTERS

THE TRAINING AUDIENCE: NEWLY APPOINTEDAND PROSPECTIVE SENIOR MISSION LEADERS

The Mission Leadership TrainingArchitecture: Fragmented andUnder-resourced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

INTEGRATED TRAINING SERVICE: THE FOCALPOINT FOR PEACEKEEPING TRAINING

PEER-TO-PEER CONSULTATION, MENTORING,AND ONLINE LEARNING

A PROLIFERATION OF TRAINING INITIATIVES

Gaps in Training for Senior Mission Leaders . . . . . . 12

KNOWLEDGE OF UN PEACEKEEPING DOCTRINE,POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES

KNOWLEDGE OF UN MANAGEMENT

BUILDIING AND MANAGING TEAMS

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

The Current State of Play: Obstaclesto Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

CONTINUED DISCONNECT BETWEEN SELECTIONAND TRAINING

PRE-DEPLOYMENT IN-BRIEFING OF APPOINTEES:ESSENTIAL BUT HURRIED

INSUFFICIENT DEDICATED RESOURCESDESPITE STATEMENTS OF COMMITMENT

LACK OF A SINGLE UNIT RESPONSIBLE FORMISSION LEADERSHIP TRAINING

Conclusion and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Annex 1: UN Trainings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Annex 2: Non-UN Trainings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Abbreviations

A4P Action for Peacekeeping initiative

DFS UN Department of Field Support

DOS UN Department of Operational Support

DPA UN Department of Political Affairs

DPKO UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DPO UN Department of Peace Operations

DPPS UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs

DSRSG Deputy special representative of the secretary-general

HIPPO High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations

IOC Intensive Orientation Course

ITS Integrated Training Service

LSS Leadership Support Section

MAST Mission Advanced Staff Training

MLT Mission leadership team

OHRM UN Office of Human Resource Management

OIOS UN Office of Internal Oversight Services

SLAS Senior Leadership Appointments Section

SLP Senior Leadership Programme

SMART Senior Mission Administration and Resource Training

SML Senior Mission Leaders (course)

SRSG Special representative of the secretary-general

iii

Executive Summary

Due to their unique and complex nature, UNpeacekeeping missions depend on effective leader-ship. The UN Secretariat faces the challenge offinding and rapidly deploying leaders who possessthe requisite mix of skills, knowledge of theoperating environment, political judgment, andphysical and mental stamina. Few, if any, missionleaders can be expected to be fully prepared uponbeing selected, no matter how rigorous theselection process. Senior mission leaders thereforerequire continuous, institutionalized, andsustained training and learning support.

The Secretariat has undertaken a number ofinitiatives to prepare prospective candidates andnew appointees to serve in senior leadershippositions. The Integrated Training Service (ITS) isthe primary provider of formal training for seniorleaders of peacekeeping missions. The Secretariatalso provides ongoing learning support, includingthrough peer-to-peer consultations, mentoring,and online learning. Beyond the UN, a prolifera-tion of non-UN entities independently develop anddeliver training for current or prospective seniormission leaders. However, these efforts do notconstitute a systematic approach that guaranteesappropriate training and learning support to allsenior mission leaders.

As a result, current training for senior leader-ship faces gaps across three broad areas. The first isa gap in knowledge of constantly evolving UNpeacekeeping doctrine, policy, and practice in areassuch as authority, command and control, the use offorce, the roles of police and military components,crisis management, and the protection of civilians.The second is a gap in knowledge of UN policiesand procedures regarding the management offinancial and human resources. The third is a gapin the knowledge, skills, and competencies neededto exercise leadership and—most importantly—tobuild and maintain fully functional, effectivemission leadership teams that can integrate actionacross mission components in response tooperational challenges, including crises and transi-tions. In addition, the capacity of mission leaders tomanage strategic communication is a criticalcrosscutting gap that effects mandate implementa-tion.

Despite these gaps, the UN has made only

limited progress in addressing leaders’ needsthrough training and learning support. There arefour main impediments to progress. First, there is acontinued disconnect between the recruitment andappointment process and training for potentialcandidates or newly appointed senior missionleaders. Second, there is inadequate time budgetedfor pre-deployment trainings. Third, it has becomeincreasingly difficult to meet demands as the scopeof leadership training has increased, while assessedbudgets for leadership training have diminished,leaving it to be funded by voluntary contributionsfrom member states or levies on peacekeepingmissions. Finally, there is no single body in the UNSecretariat responsible and accountable for seniormission leadership training.

In keeping with the secretary-general’s statedcommitment to enhancing leadership, reform, andaccountability in the Secretariat as a whole, andparticularly in field missions, the Secretariat shouldprioritize actions in the following areas:• Centralize responsibility for mission leadershiptraining: The secretary-general should instructthe Department of Political and PeacebuildingAffairs (DPPA) and Department of PeaceOperations (DPO) to assign to the LeadershipSupport Section (LSS) of the Office of theDirector for Coordination and Shared Servicesthe mandate of coordinating all facets of trainingand learning support for senior mission leaders,from recruitment through exit. LSS should workin close partnership with the Integrated TrainingService (ITS), which should take the lead inensuring delivery of relevant training andlearning programs for senior mission leaders.DPPA and DPO, working with the Departmentof Management Strategy, Policy and Complianceand Department of Operational Support, asappropriate, should ensure that LSS and ITS havethe dedicated capacity and resources to fulfillthese responsibilities.

• Integrate training into planning and recruit-ment processes: The Secretariat should considerthe composition of the leadership team whenplanning a new peace operation and, wherepossible, train this team as a group. Newlyappointed senior mission leaders should deployonly after completing the necessary in-briefingand minimum training required as determinedby an individual training needs assessment.

1

Training and in-briefing should be factored intothe succession planning and management ofvacancies in order to allow sufficient lead timefor the selection process, individual trainingneeds assessment, and pre-deployment training.Participation in the Senior Mission Leaders(SML) course should also be more closely linkedto the process for recruiting senior missionleaders.

• Provide more sustained support to training:The Secretariat should work with member statesto devise an alternative that would provide it withgreater flexibility and certainty in forwardplanning of the SML course, include sufficientfunds to support participants from developingcountries and ensure that the course maintainsits UN identity.

• Employ new tools for in-mission training: TheSecretariat should identify ways to employinformation technology to enhance training,including webinars or videoconferences. Itshould also encourage and support the develop-ment and roll-out of scenario-based exercises,drills, and rehearsals in missions.

Introduction

UN peacekeeping faces an increasing array ofchallenges due to the changing nature of conflict,fractious geopolitics, the growing complexity ofmission mandates, and the number of tasks peace -keepers are expected to perform, often in vast,remote theaters. Modern missions with multidimen-sional mandates must address multiple political and security challenges through the integrated actionof their various components while working with the UN country team and an array of other nationaland international actors. This is difficult in contextswhere host-state consent is tenuous and wherepeacekeepers have become high-value targets forarmed groups and extremists that employasymmetric and unconventional tactics. It isespecially difficult in contexts where there is no peaceto keep and peacekeepers are mandated to give toppriority to the protection of civilians and expansionof state authority. No organization can manage suchcomplexity without effective leadership.

This paper aims to identify gaps in training,preparation, and learning support for seniorleaders of UN peacekeeping missions, analyzeobstacles that impede progress in addressing thosegaps, and recommend possible courses of actionthe Secretariat and member states could take toclose the gaps. It begins by examining why trainingis important and who it is intended for, giving abrief overview of the process for identifying andappointing mission leaders. It then reviews thecurrent “training architecture” for prospective andnewly appointed senior mission leaders, includingthe state of implementation of various Secretariatinitiatives and recommendations in response toearlier studies and assessments, and key gaps in theknowledge and skills of senior mission leaders. Italso examines key factors that have hinderedprogress and concludes with recommendations torelevant stakeholders on ways to overcomechallenges and provide better training and learningsupport to senior mission leaders.

This paper is based on a review of recent reportsand studies by the UN and by independent policyand training institutions and on informal, open-ended interviews. Secretariat officials andpeacekeepers at UN headquarters and in the fieldwere interviewed, including current and formermembers of mission leadership teams (MLTs). Thispaper also draws heavily on the 2015 report of theOffice of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) on theevaluation of the senior leadership training of theDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)and Department of Field Support (DFS). The OIOSreport provides a concise overview of leadershiptraining and reflects the results of a formal surveyof senior mission leaders and participants in DPKOand DFS senior leadership training programs.1 Thestatistics and budgetary information in the OIOSreport remains representative of the currentsituation. The OIOS evaluation led to conclusionsand recommendations, some key elements ofwhich are revisited in this paper.WHY TRAINING FOR SENIOR MISSIONLEADERS MATTERS

Incidents involving peacekeepers in South Sudan,the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the

2 Kevin S. Kennedy and Laura Powers

1 As of January 1, 2019, DPKO was replaced by the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and responsibility for DFS senior leadership training programs movedto the new Department of Operational Support (DOS).

SENIOR LEADERSHIP TRAINING IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS 3

Central African Republic in 2016 and 2017demonstrate what can happen when missionleadership teams are unprepared, particularly intimes of crisis. These incidents led to specialinvestigations and other reviews that the UNSecretariat has classified as confidential.Nevertheless, the executive summaries and pressreleases that have been made publicly available, andinformal interviews with Secretariat officials andother individuals familiar with the reports, confirmthat they revealed similar deficiencies. Thesestudies found that peacekeepers often did notunderstand mission mandates (including thecritical mandate for the protection of civilians) andlacked clarity regarding rules of engagement forUN military forces, directives on the use of forcefor UN police, and the policy on authority,command, and control. The studies consistentlyfound that missions suffered from a lack of coordi-nated—much less integrated—efforts across theircomponents. Undisclosed national caveats thatlimited some units’ scope of action, parallel chainsof command both within and outside the UN, andlow morale were all identified as factors thatundermined performance.

The studies also attributed lack of performanceto the inadequate preparedness and training ofpersonnel. Mission-specific training ofpeacekeepers up to the command level, in partic-ular, was found to be either inadequate orcompletely lacking. While training cannot addressall performance issues, each investigation andstudy identified significant gaps in training—notably with regard to the protection of civilians,the use of force, and soldiering skills suited to theoperational and threat environment. These investi-gations and evaluations invariably recommendedspecific training initiatives, including for missionleaders and leadership teams.

The importance of leadership to effective peaceoperations was also a key focus of these studies.The challenges faced by civilian, military, andpolice mission leaders in forming effective MLTs

are well documented. Nongovernmental andgovernmental policy institutes, academicresearchers, and UN officials themselves havepublished extensively on the role of leadership inpeacekeeping.2 Moreover, the International Forumfor the Challenges of Peace Operations, a partner-ship among some twenty states and more thanforty organizations devoted to the improvement ofpeacekeeping, is currently revising its landmarkwork “Considerations for Mission Leadership inUnited Nations Peacekeeping Operations,”originally published in 2010. This documentprovides mission leaders with authoritative,practical insight into the unique work of seniormission leaders.

For nearly two decades, assessments ofpeacekeeping operations have routinely citedleadership as key to their success. In 2000, theseminal report of the Panel on United NationsPeace Operations chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi (the“Brahimi report”) stated that “effective, dynamicleadership can make the difference between acohesive mission with high morale and effective-ness despite adverse circumstances, and one thatstruggles to maintain any of those attributes. Ineffect, the tenor of an entire mission can be heavilyinfluenced by the character and ability of those wholead it.”3 Fifteen years later, the report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations(HIPPO) echoed the Brahimi report, stating,“Throughout the Panel’s consultations, all partnersand stakeholders identified the quality of leader-ship as one of the most crucial factors in the successor failure of UN peace operations.”4 The SpecialCommittee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34)routinely discusses the full gamut of training issues,and its annual reports include numerous calls fortraining initiatives. Likewise, leadership is arecurrent issue in the committee’s discussions, andits 2018 report highlighted “leadership andperformance and accountability at all levels”among the factors critical to the improvedperformance of peacekeeping operations.5

2 See, for example, recent publications from the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations: Robert Gordon, “Leading United Nations PeaceOperations,” 2017; Jibecke Joensson, “Strengthening the Selection, Preparation, Support and Appraisal of Senior Leadership in United Nations Peace Operations,”2017; Joensson, “Taking Leadership to the Next Level: Leading Peace Operations in a Complex World,” 2017; and “Considerations for Mission Leadership inUnited Nations Peacekeeping Operations by International Challenges Forum,” 2010.

3 UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305–S/2000/305, August 21, 2000, para. 92.4 UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations—Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership

and People, UN Doc. A/70/95–S/2015/446, June 17, 2015, para. 268.5 UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. A/72/19, 2018, para. 100.


In September 2017, the Security Councilrequested an update from the secretary-general onefforts to improve peacekeeping performance,“including through more effective and efficienttraining and capacity building.”6 In the letter hesubmitted three months later, Secretary-GeneralAntónio Guterres noted, “The generation ofcapabilities for United Nations peacekeeping…focuses increasingly on all of the factors that lead toeffective performance, including agility, training,equipment, technology, doctrine, leadership,discipline, interoperability, welfare and mindset,and gender balance, as well as the absence ofoperational caveats” (emphases added).7 Inaddition to the highlighting of gender balance as astrategic and operational priority, the references to“training” and “leadership” are encouraging.

The HIPPO report, as well as the review of theUN peacebuilding architecture and the review onwomen, peace, and security, have all stressed theimportance of a gender perspective and the needfor women to play leadership roles in UN peaceoperations. The Secretariat has stepped up effortsto redress the long-standing gender imbalance insenior leadership appointments, both at headquar-ters and in the field. While progress toward genderparity in MLTs is slow, it has implications for howsenior leaders are prepared and trained. Missionleaders need training and learning support toevolve beyond traditionally male-dominatedmodels of collaboration and decision making. Suchsupport is also needed to prepare more prospectivewomen candidates for leadership positions and tohelp those appointed to roles in MLTs that hadrarely, if ever, been occupied by women in the past.

Virtually all other factors that contribute toeffective peacekeeping performance, from politicalsupport to the effective use of resources, ultimatelyrely on both leadership and training (crosscuttingand generic as well as mission-specific and special-ized). With some 200,000 annual personnelrotations, 20,000 national and international civilian

staff, and extraordinary diversity of functions,personnel, and nationalities, UN peacekeeping is aunique enterprise. Effective leaders workingtogether in MLTs are needed to provide missionswith an overarching direction and ensure effortsare integrated, as well as to seize opportunities andmanage risks. Mission personnel also need trainingto ensure they operate both effectively and in amanner consistent with UN principles and theessentially political nature of UN peacekeeping.Such training must be continuous, institutional-ized, and sustained across every aspect and phase ofpeacekeeping and for all categories of peacekeepingpersonnel—including senior mission leaders.

UN peacekeeping does not operate in an institu-tional vacuum. The UN’s heightened focus onleadership goes beyond peacekeeping. In April2017, the Chief Executives Board, at the initiative ofGuterres, adopted an official “LeadershipFramework” that sets out “defining characteristicsof UN leadership.”8 This is meant to guide andmotivate UN leaders and provide a framework foroperationalizing a new leadership culturethroughout the UN system. The framework expectsUN leaders to demonstrate “a commitment tocontinuous learning and professional/leadershipdevelopment” and exhorts them to understand theintegrated nature and root causes of the issues andproblems the UN is called upon to address.9 TheLeadership Framework is not an administrativeinstruction or mandatory regulation but has beenpresented as an essential part of the secretary-general’s overall efforts to reform and revitalize theUN.

Although the framework does not explicitlyreference UN peacekeeping or peace operations, ithas direct implications for MLTs, which mustfunction as part of a broader system. UNpeacekeeping plays a time-bound but pivotal rolein developing and implementing strategies fordealing with violent conflict and its aftermath atthe national, subregional, and regional levels.

6 UN Security Council Resolution 2378 (September 20, 2017), UN Doc. S/RES/2378, para. 10.7 UN Security Council, Letter Dated 15 December 2017 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2017/1079,

December 20, 2017, Annex, para. 4.8 The UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, chaired by the secretary-general, is the highest-level coordination forum in the UN system. Its members

are the thirty-one executive heads of the UN and its funds, programs, and specialized agencies, the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Trade Organization, theUN Office for Project Services, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Chief Executives Board, United Nations System Leadership Framework, UN Doc.CEB/2017/1, April 18, 2017, paras. 10–12.

9 Ibid., para. 17.


Toward this end, senior mission leaders mustensure their efforts are complementary—if notfully integrated—with those of the rest of the UNsystem. They need to understand the system inorder to leverage the comparative advantages ofdifferent entities and to manage crises and transi-tions. This requires rigorous preparation, particu-larly for senior mission leaders without previousUN field experience.

The secretary-general’s initiatives to reform theUN peace and security architecture, UN manage-ment structure, and UN development systemcreate both an opportunity and an obligation forthe Secretariat to intensify efforts to better preparemission leaders for their political, operational, andmanagerial roles. The new peace and securityarchitecture aims to streamline work across depart-ments, place conflict prevention and sustainingpeace at the center of the UN’s work, and shiftdecision making, accountability, and responsibilitycloser to the delivery point. The overhaul of theSecretariat’s management structure also signifi-cantly raises the stakes for all senior UN managers,especially those on MLTs. Reform of the develop-ment system emphasizes unity of vision and effortamong UN actors as well as the empowerment andaccountability of leaders in the field. In particular,it emphasizes the central importance of the UNDevelopment Assistance Framework (UNDAF),which engages all UN entities in-country as well asthe host government, making it essential for MLTsand the UN country team to share a commonunderstanding of roles and responsibilities.

Peacekeeping is among the most visible anddramatic of UN undertakings. It would seemlogical that peace operations should occupy animportant place in the secretary-general’s efforts toinstill a new organizational culture and project animage of dynamic, effective, and principled leader-ship. In 2016, nearly half of the $49 billion spent bythe UN system at the country level was spent inplaces with an integrated UN presence, and thelion’s share in places where UN peace operationswere deployed.10 Providing training and learningsupport to leadership teams responsible for these

operations should be part of overall UN reformefforts and is essential to managing risk.THE TRAINING AUDIENCE: NEWLYAPPOINTED AND PROSPECTIVESENIOR MISSION LEADERS

There are currently around fifty-five senior-mostcivilian and uniformed positions across fifteenmissions led by the Department of PeaceOperations (DPO, which has taken the place ofDPKO as of January 1, 2019) and twelve led by theDepartment of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs(DPPA, which has replaced the Department ofPolitical Affairs, or DPA).11 This paper concen-trates primarily on the challenges faced by MLTs inmultidisciplinary peacekeeping missions, althoughleaders in other peace operations may face similarchallenges. For multidisciplinary peacekeepingoperations, the MLT normally consists of thespecial representative of the secretary-general(SRSG), one or two deputy special representativesof the secretary-general (DSRSG, often with onepolitical DSRSG and one “triple-hatted” DSRSG/resident coordinator/humanitarian coor di nator), aforce commander or head of military component, apolice commissioner or head of police component,a director or chief of mission support, and amission chief of staff. This small group of high-level personnel is responsible for setting and articu-lating mission strategy and integrating the work ofmission components to deliver on complexmandates with limited resources.

Members of MLTs are senior civilian, military,and police professionals with a variety of profes-sional and cultural backgrounds and perspectives.Many have no previous UN experience, and evenUN veterans appointed as senior mission leadersmay have no prior peacekeeping experience. As ofNovember 2018, nearly 90 percent of deputy headsof mission (twenty-two out of twenty-five) wereconsidered “internal” appointees, havingpreviously served within the UN system at the D2level or below. However, just 32 percent of heads ofmission are “internal” appointees. The majority ofheads of mission and deputy heads of missionappointed from outside the UN system have

10 This refers to the total estimated expenditure at the country level relating to humanitarian assistance, peace operations, development, and other areas. ExecutiveOffice of the Secretary-General, unpublished slide presentation, slides 5–6.

11 Statistics in this section are drawn from a March 2018 internal briefing note by the Senior Leadership Appointments Section (SLAS) of DPKO and DFS andupdated quarterly. These figures are illustrative and do not include heads of military and police components in integrated missions or mission chiefs of staff anddirectors of mission support.


previously served as diplomats or in a nationalgovernment. The remainder have served in anotherinternational organization, the military, academia,or an NGO.

In line with the Secretariat’s objective to improvegender representation in senior ranks, the searchfor women candidates for appointment as seniormission leaders has intensified. Progress towardredressing the longstanding gender imbalance insenior leadership positions is making MLTs morediverse. The number of women appointed as headof mission or deputy head of mission has increasedfrom 2 percent of the sixty serving in 2006 to 38percent of the fifty serving as of November 2018.12As of November 2018, five women have beenappointed head of mission, and womenrepresented approximately 60 percent of allappointed heads of mission and deputy heads ofmission. This is the largest percentage appointed tosuch positions in a single calendar year (theprevious high was 54 percent in 2017). Thisprogress is in line with initiatives such as thesecretary-general’s strategy to achieve parity atsenior levels by 2021 and DFS’s strategy to increasethe proportion of women serving as head or deputyhead of mission at the end of each year until 2021.In 2017, DFS reached its end-of-year target of 30percent, and it again reached its target of 41 percentfor 2018.

The process for selecting and appointing heads ofmission and other members of the leadership teamfocuses on recruiting individuals with the requiredskill sets and who demonstrate the higheststandards of efficiency, competence, and integrity,as required by Article 100 of the UN Charter.Selection criteria are driven by job profiles andinclude the right mix of professional knowledgeand experience, solid reputation, strength ofcharacter, and political considerations (accept-ability to or influence over parties to a conflict andother influential actors or international stature).With the support of the Leadership SupportSection (formerly the Senior Leadership

Appointments Section, or SLAS), DPO and DPPAidentify candidates and recommend them to thesecretary-general for appointment.13 The Leader -ship Support Section manages a large database ofpotential candidates for head and deputy head ofmission, which is an important tool for identifyingcandidates for specific positions. The databasecontains profiles of potential candidates identifiedthrough proactive searches conducted by thesection or received through a variety of channels,including suggestions from internal and externalpartners and UN entities, direct nominations bymember states, recommendations from regionalorganizations, and self-nominations by interestedindividuals. Appointments across missions aretracked to help identify outreach priorities that takeinto account requirements in terms of skill sets,geographic distribution, and gender.

Secretariat officials familiar with the process whowere interviewed for this paper cited continuingefforts to make the appointment process moretransparent, rigorous, and systematic. TheLeadership Support Section has developed astandardized competitive assessment procedurethat incorporates several candidate-screeningmechanisms, interviews, and reference checks.Proactive searches, development and maintenanceof databases, and initiatives like the “global call” forcandidates that encourage member states and otherentities to nominate candidates and invite individ-uals to self-nominate have enriched the selectionpool. A similar call for women nominees for a“senior women talent pipeline” at the director levelhas shown promise as a means of addressing thelongstanding, severe gender imbalance in MLTs.

Recruitment and selection of senior missionleaders is not solely a technical process butinevitably involves political calculus. Politicalconsultations with key actors can influence theentire process, affecting timelines for fillingvacancies as well as the ultimate appointments.Beyond the qualifications or experience ofindividual candidates, the interests of member

12 Interview, New York, March 2018.13 DPO’s Office of Military Affairs and Police Division normally conduct the search for candidates to head military and police components. The selection of “multi-

hatted” DSRSGs is conducted by the Inter-Agency Assessment Panel under the auspices of the UN Development Operations Coordination Office. This limits the“leadership team approach” to selecting MLT members in integrated missions. With the restructuring of the Secretariat’s peace and security architecture, a“Standing Principals’ Group” of the under-secretaries-general for political and peacebuilding affairs and for peace operations was established. Its tasks includesupporting senior leadership appointments in missions. UN General Assembly, Restructuring of the United Nations Peace and Security Pillar—Report of theSecretary-General, UN Doc. A/72/525, October 13, 2017, para. 42.


states, parties to a conflict, or regional actors mayneed to be taken into account. This political realitycomplicates succession planning and, dependingon the background of the person ultimatelyappointed, may also affect the kind and extent oftraining and learning support a newly appointedsenior mission leader might need from theSecretariat.

In addition to ensuring that individualsappointed as senior mission leaders have or canreadily acquire the knowledge and skills requiredfor peacekeeping, the Secretariat faces the challengeof bringing together individuals with the rightcombination of professional and personal strengthsto form effective MLTs. Rarely are entire teamsrecruited or deployed at the same time, andturnover of individual team members is frequentover the life of a mission. To facilitate the integra-tion of new MLT members and reinforce teamsalready deployed, the Leadership Support Sectionsupports DPO and DPPA in developing terms ofreference for recruitment purposes that considerthe existing team, permitting a more targetedcandidate search. MLT members, particularlyheads of mission, must nonetheless contend withthe near constant challenge of establishing andmaintaining relationships with other teammembers to ensure effective, coherent leadership ofthe mission as a whole. The Secretariat faces thechallenge of finding and rapidly deploying leaderswho possess the requisite mix of “hard” and “soft”skills, as well as extensive knowledge of theoperating environment, sound political judgment,and the stamina to bear the physical and mentalstrains of an extremely demanding job.

Training cannot always substitute for experienceor compensate for an unsuitable appointment, butlearning support is essential, given the complexityof peacekeeping. As one DPKO veteran withextensive experience at headquarters and in thefield put it, “You shouldn’t be hired if you don’thave the skills, but there’s value in ongoingeducation.”14 Many mission leaders have servedwith distinction, overcoming challenges bydrawing on their own experience and strengthswith little or no leadership training or preparation

from the UN. However, few, if any, candidates canbe expected to be fully prepared upon beingselected for their role as mission leaders in complexpolitical, security, and management environments,no matter how rigorous the selection process.

The Mission LeadershipTraining Architecture:Fragmented and Under-resourced

The Secretariat provides several types of trainingand learning support for prospective and currentsenior mission leaders. The overall foundation forpeacekeeping training was laid in 1995 by GeneralAssembly Resolution 49/37, which covered allaspects of peacekeeping. The resolution’sprovisions on training focused primarily onuniformed personnel and provided for collabora-tion between member states and the Secretariat. Itset out a basic division of labor: training ofpeacekeeping personnel is the responsibility ofmember states, while the UN Secretariat is respon-sible for establishing basic guidelines and perform-ance standards and providing “descriptivematerials” and other support to member states’training efforts. The resolution contained only tworeferences to civilian training and just one toleadership: it encouraged the establishment ofpeacekeeping training centers “for military andcivilian personnel” and requested the secretary-general “to investigate the means to strengthen theleadership cadre available for peace-keeping, interalia, by coordinating relevant training for potentialForce Commanders and other senior military andcivilian personnel.”15

Since 1995, the scope of peacekeeping trainingand of the Secretariat’s related activities hasexpanded considerably as missions have grown insize, number, and complexity. Nonetheless, thebasic division of responsibilities for peacekeepingtraining has remained unchanged. The develop-ment of training for civilian peacekeepingpersonnel and for senior mission leaders has beenprimarily driven by the Secretariat.

14 Interview with Secretariat official, New York, April 20, 2018.15 UN General Assembly Resolution 49/37 (December 9, 1994), UN Doc. A/RES/49/37, para. 49.


INTEGRATED TRAINING SERVICE: THEFOCAL POINT FOR PEACEKEEPINGTRAINING

The Integrated Training Service (ITS), establishedin 2007 as a shared service of DPKO and DFS, is theSecretariat unit with principal responsibility forpeacekeeping training.16 Given the size andcomposition of the constituency it serves—allpeacekeeping personnel—ITS is relatively lightlystaffed with thirty-five personnel (twelve profes-sional civilian staff, nine general service staff,eleven seconded military personnel, and threepolice officers). ITS is funded from thePeacekeeping Support Account, for which allmember states are assessed and whose size isdetermined by the General Assembly and scaled toreflect the resources needed at headquarters for allareas of support to current missions.

Most of ITS’s budget and staff are devoted todeveloping and rolling out peacekeeping trainingstandards and materials, mainly for use by memberstates, and to supporting pre-deployment trainingconducted by troop- and police-contributingcountries and in-mission training led by DPO. ITScollaborates with other DPO offices and with thewider Secretariat to develop and support traininginitiatives directly related to peacekeeping. ThePeacekeeping Support Account included$1,059,916 for ITS for the two-year period 2018–2019 (down from $1,441,200 for 2014–2015). TheITS budget has been cut by 55 percent since 2009–2010 and includes no program funding for leader-ship training.

Most of the Secretariat’s capacity-building activi-ties related to peacekeeping are funded not by thePeacekeeping Support Account but by voluntarycontributions from member states. ITS receivessignificant voluntary contributions for specifictraining-related activities from some fifteen donorcountries, as well as in-kind contributions fromcountries that host training activities. Seniorleadership training is among the activitiessupported by voluntary contributions, primarilythe Senior Mission Leaders (SML) course, whichcosts an average of approximately $250,000 per

course.17

Member states and regional organizations haveaccess to UN peacekeeping training materials andcan use them freely to prepare uniformedpersonnel and contingents for peacekeepingoperations. To improve the operational readinessof uniformed peacekeepers, in recent years DPKOand DFS have worked with member states to devisea certification process to ensure that uniformedpersonnel have been trained to UN standards andwith UN training materials.

From 2016 to 2017, ITS’s LeadershipManagement and Communications Training Teamcomprised four staff members (three professionaland one general service). ITS, particularly theleadership team, is responsible for designing anddelivering the SML course, Senior LeadershipProgramme (SLP), Senior Mission Administrativeand Resource Training (SMART), and MissionAdvanced Staff Training (MAST). In collaborationwith the Office of Military Affairs and PoliceDivision, it is also responsible for the IntensiveOrientation Course (IOC) for heads of militarycomponent. In addition, in conjunction with thePolice Division, ITS has completed the first UNPolice Commanders Course. Only travel costs forstaff, mentors, and facilitators for the SML courseand Senior Leadership Programme are covered byDPO’s assessed budget. All other costs of the SMLcourse, SLP, IOC, and UN Police CommandersCourse are covered by voluntary and in-kindcontributions from member states.

ITS, the Office of Military Affairs, and the PoliceDivision are currently developing two additionalleadership programs: a course for peacekeepinginfantry battalion commanders and a course forformed police unit commanders. These wereprioritized largely as an outcome of the dos SantosCruz report. Both courses are supported byvoluntary contributions. Since 2016, DPKO andDFS have expanded pre-deployment briefings forthe incoming SRSG of the UN mission in SouthSudan (UNMISS), the DSRSG/resident coordi-nator/humanitarian coordinators for the missionsin South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the

16 For a brief background on ITS and peacekeeping leadership training, see OIOS, Evaluation of the Senior Leadership Training of the Department of DPKO and DFS,December 29, 2015, pp. 8–10.

17 The amount fluctuates depending on how many SML courses are delivered in one year. For 2014–2015, it was $775,000, but for 2017–2018 it was $500,000, withonly two SML courses being delivered.

Congo (MONUSCO), and the new head of themission in Lebanon (UNIFIL). These briefings,which include former senior mission leaders orresource persons, are not yet an established policyor practice.

Since 2013, the SML course has trained 203potential civilian and uniformed senior missionleader candidates, of whom 75 (37 percent) havebeen women. Since the first SML course in 2005,some eighty participants have gone on to serve inUN peacekeeping, political, or other field missions,and many others have assumed national positionsdealing with the UN.18 The SLP is mandatory for

current senior mission leaders, who are required tocomplete it within six months of deployment. The2015 OIOS evaluation report showed that 62percent of current mission leaders eligible for thecourse (forty-two out of sixty-eight) had completedit (see Box 1 for more on this evaluation).19

The two other ITS leadership and managementcourses—the SMART and the MAST—aim todevelop a cadre of potential senior leaders in peaceoperations among mid-level managers. Both arefunded by a combination of funds drawn frommission budgets and, for the MAST, voluntarycontributions.


18 Data provided by ITS. The figure includes staff from DPKO and DPA who were promoted to a D2 position or higher after attending the SML course.19 OIOS, Evaluation of the Senior Leadership Training of the Department of DPKO and DFS, December 29, 2015, pp. 15-16. According to ITS, this percentage rises to

nearly 75 percent when taking into consideration leaders of special political missions and those appointed internally from the Secretariat.20 Ibid., p. 821 See footnote 14, above, regarding the statistical “snapshot” prepared by SLAS

Box 1. 2015 OIOS evaluation of DPKO and DFS’s senior leadership trainingIn 2015 OIOS’s Inspection and Evaluation Division issued a report on training provided by DPKO and DFSto senior mission leaders. The evaluation narrowly aimed

1. to determine, as systematically and objectively as possible, the extent to which current DPKO/DFSsenior leadership training programmes in general, and the Senior Mission Leaders (SML) course inparticular, result in the provision of personnel more capable of meeting the complex challenges facingsenior mission leaders in the field; and

2. to enable the Secretariat and Member States to engage in systematic reflection, with a view to increasingthe effectiveness of DPKO/DFS senior leadership training.20

The report examined in detail the objectives and intended target participants in the SML course and SeniorLeadership Programme organized by the Integrated Training Service (ITS), as well as their outcomes andstatistics on levels of participation and costs. The report also examined other learning support for newlyappointed senior mission leaders provided by various offices of DPKO and DFS, notably the initial in-briefing of newly appointed leaders and the Intensive Orientation Course for heads of military componentorganized by the Office of Military Affairs in collaboration with ITS.The population of senior mission leaders and participants in the SML course surveyed by OIOS for its 2015report did not differ markedly from the current population, despite some variations, including more womencurrently in senior mission posts.21 In addition to a review of relevant documents and interviews of seniormission leaders and other UN- and non-UN personnel, OIOS conducted a formal survey of senior missionleaders, as well as a formal survey of participants in the SML course. It was not possible to replicate theOIOS’s survey methodology for this paper, nor is it possible to review all of the evaluation’s findings.However, the documentary research and semi-structured interviews conducted for this paper broadlyreconfirmed the overall findings of the OIOS evaluation and highlighted several salient points that deserveto be mentioned:• A significant number of current leaders did not complete mandatory training within the required time

period (p. 14).• Mission-specific briefings at UN headquarters and in-mission briefings were much more likely than any

training to have been undertaken [by questionnaire respondents]. Despite this, compliance rates were still


PEER-TO-PEER CONSULTATION,MENTORING, AND ONLINE LEARNING

Beyond formal trainings, the Secretariat also offersmore informal support, including to better prepareand support newly appointed women seniormission leaders. In March 2017, DFS’s SeniorLeadership Appointments Section (SLAS, now theLeadership Support Section) organized the first“Female Heads and Deputy Heads of MissionRetreat” to bring together the growing communityof women leaders of peace operations and providethem with a platform to engage on issues unique totheir positions. This retreat included peer-to-peerconsultations on redefining leadership beyondpreconceived, male-oriented notions; meaningfulgender parity; and further avenues for leadershipsupport. In order to maintain the momentum,SLAS launched a modest web-based forum forwomen heads and deputy heads of missionfollowing the retreat.

Based on the principle that all senior leadersshould have ready access to learning support

throughout their service, the Leadership SupportSection manages a leadership support programcalled the Leadership Partnering Initiative. Thisinitiative aims to provide newly appointed headsand deputy heads of mission the opportunity topartner with a veteran mission leader to serve as amentor or a “sounding board.” Launched as a pilotin 2014, the program has been funded throughextra-budgetary resources since March 2017. As ofNovember 2018, twenty-seven partnerships havebeen administered under the program, which hasrecently been extended to military heads ofmission. The Leadership Support Section alsooffers professional leadership coaching to thosewho may be interested in additional tools. It iscurrently exploring the potential for using moreadvanced web-based platforms for additional peer-to-peer knowledge and experience-sharing amongleaders in the field. The possibility has been raisedof using information technology to establish a“virtual” discussion group to bring togetherSecretariat officials and mission leaders, helping

well below the expected 100 per cent (p. 18).• Headquarters-based interviewees suggested that attitudes to training… accounted for some of the ambiva-

lence towards it among some new appointees; there was no compulsion to complete training, and nosanction for non-completion (p. 18).

• Peacekeeping leaders… valued the training they received, with a clear correlation between the number oftrainings and preparations taken and the subjective sense of increased capacity. Among the leaders whohad undertaken training and other preparatory activities almost all found them useful, with 90 percent ofquestionnaire respondents reporting that the support they had received had increased their capacity todeal with challenges they subsequently faced. Those who had completed the SML course, which is not amandatory training, were particularly likely to regard their training outcome positively (pp. 18–19).

• The SML course received consistently positive comment, with 65 percent of current leaders responding tothe survey reporting that they found the SML course very useful for their subsequent leadership role (p.19).

• There was similar positive feedback regarding the Intensive Orientation Course for force commandersand for the SMART, and a judgment by leaders who participated in briefings with peers and counterpartsthat their capacity had increased “a great deal” (although this effect was higher among non-militaryleaders) (p. 20).

• Leaders valued post-deployment support in the form of opportunities to share insight and best practiceswith peers and advice from UNHQ staff on mandate related or operational matters (p. 21).

• Despite the primacy DPKO and DFS policy accorded to ITS for directing and coordinating peacekeepingtraining, no single office or division had responsibility for, or oversight of, the overall preparation of anyparticular individual. Every Office and Division within DPKO/DFS had some responsibility in relation tothe identification, selection, training, induction, briefing and continuing support of senior peacekeepingleaders (p. 25).


them exchange ideas and experience and shareknowledge.

Other UN programs not specifically designed forsenior mission leaders might also offer learningsupport to newly appointed members of MLTs ifintegrated into the training architecture. TheSecretariat’s Office of Human ResourceManagement (OHRM) collaborates with ITS andintegrated mission training centers in the field ondelivering Secretariat-mandated managementtraining for peacekeeping personnel. As part ofthis, it offers some learning and training support tosenior personnel, including the InductionProgramme for Senior Leaders at UN headquar-ters. Although such sessions are not geared specifi-cally toward the challenges mission leaders face inthe field, they may introduce those without priorUN experience to unfamiliar aspects of the UNenvironment. To date, however, it appears that nomembers of MLTs have taken part in the InductionProgramme for Senior Leaders. A Secretariatofficial familiar with the program indicated thatOHRM operated on the assumption that “the SMLcovers mission leaders.” It should be noted thatOHRM also faces resource constraints: due to staffreductions in 2017, it was limited to running acondensed induction program (two half-days) atUN headquarters for incoming under-secretaries-general and assistant secretaries-general.A PROLIFERATION OF TRAININGINITIATIVES

ITS develops and maintains a broad network ofcollaborators, partnering with member states andothers. However, many UN and non-UN entitiesindependently develop and deliver training forcurrent or prospective senior mission leaders.These institutions offer both training topeacekeeping personnel at all levels and trainingtargeted to specific members of senior leadershipteams. Some national and nongovernmentaltraining institutions also offer courses andtrainings intended for prospective or current seniorleaders of peace operations. The African Union,Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS), and Southern African Development

Community (SADC) have all run SML coursesbased on the UN course but with content tailoredto their own requirements. Serving and former UNmission leaders and Secretariat personnel havecontributed to these courses as presenters andfacilitators. No centralized database or depositoryexists to track the content or participants in suchcourses, nor is there any capacity within or outsidethe UN to evaluate their impact on senior missionleaders.

As of November 2018, over 110 national andregional peacekeeping training centers andindependent nongovernmental or quasi-nongovernmental training centers offer trainingfor peacekeepers, while a number of policyinstitutes and think tanks also provide suchtraining.22 Some 200 representatives of trainingorganizations and training experts attend theInternational Association of PeacekeepingTraining Centres each year.23 The most successfulplatform for web-based distance learning forpeacekeepers is run by an NGO, the PeaceOperations Training Institute (POTI), whose workhas been acknowledged by the Special Committeeon Peacekeeping Operations but which has noformal link to the UN.24

Information made publicly available by memberstates and organizations engaged in peacekeepingtraining indicates that many peacekeepers receivetraining through this highly decentralized system.However, it is difficult to consider this proliferationof training activities and institutions a “trainingarchitecture” where priorities are clear, content ismonitored, and impact is measured. ITS, memberstates, and independent institutions engage insignificant ad hoc collaboration, but no authorita-tive, overarching body sets priorities, coordinatesactivities and calendars, or tracks expenditures andoutcomes. Under existing DPKO-DFS policy, ITSis responsible for the direction and coordination ofpeacekeeping training. However, ITS’s remit andcapacity do not match the scope and scale of thecurrent peacekeeping training requirements or thefragmented nature of the peacekeeping trainingsystem.

22 Data from Center for International Peace Operations.23 Ibid.24 The Peace Operations Training Institute initially operated under the umbrella of the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), but the organizations

ended their relationship in 2009.


25 Paraphrased from a “strictly confidential” note from the under-secretary-general for DFS to the secretary-general’s transition team, December 2016.26 As noted in OIOS’s 2015 evaluation report of DPKO and DFS’s senior leadership training, the 2008 strategic assessment of current and future training needs for

UN peacekeeping found that UN peacekeeping staff and partner institutions perceived leadership as one of the main crosscutting skills gaps. OIOS also noted thatthe 2012–2013 Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment referred to training as a “strategic investment in peacekeeping” and recommended strengtheningsenior management training. Citing the secretary-general’s 2008 report on the financing of peacekeeping operations, OIOS also noted that in 2008 ITS stated itsintention to develop a senior leadership training strategy for peacekeeping that would “also be a part of the DPKO/DFS approach to senior leadership selection.”The OIOS report adds that “this strategy never materialized and remained an informal ITS document.” OIOS Inspection and Evaluation Division, Evaluation ofthe Senior Leadership Training of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS), December 29, 2015, p. 9.

Given this fragmentation, it is particularlyimportant that the UN Secretariat has the capacityto manage an authoritative architecture thatguarantees training and learning for prospectiveand current senior leaders of UN peacekeepingmissions. Such training needs to align squarelywith UN peacekeeping doctrine and operationalrequirements and to advance UN principles andreform efforts.

Gaps in Training for SeniorMission Leaders

UN officials maintain that significant progress hasbeen made toward improving the way theSecretariat selects, appoints, supports, andmanages senior mission leaders. Nonetheless, theyacknowledge that challenges remain, including theneed to enhance support to newly appointedleaders and define a robust performance-manage-ment system that holds leaders to account in thefield, in headquarters, and at the level of memberstates.25

Secretariat officials acknowledge that it hasbecome increasingly difficult to meet the demandfor support to peacekeeping training, as thedemand for and scope of training have grown andassessed funding has shrunken. Ongoing issueswith performance indicate that gaps in knowledgeand skills remain, despite the wide range of traininginitiatives developed and supported by DPO’sIntegrated Training Service (ITS, part of theDivision of Policy, Evaluation and Training). Since2008, ITS has conducted three global trainingneeds assessments to determine peacekeepingtraining requirements for all categories and levelsof personnel, including senior mission leaders. Themost recent of these, the 2016–2017 assessment,focused on training needs with respect to theprotection of civilians, reflecting the paramountimportance of this mandate.26 All three needsassessments have found persistent gaps in thecrosscutting knowledge and skills leaders need to

address peacekeeping challenges.Broadly, the skills and knowledge gaps identified

in this paper with respect to civilian and uniformedmembers of MLTs fall into three areas: The first isa gap in knowledge of doctrine, concepts, policies,and processes that are often unique to UNpeacekeeping. The second is a gap in knowledge ofthe UN management structure and proceduresunique to the UN system. The third is a gap in theknowledge, skills, and competencies needed toexercise leadership and—most importantly—tobuild and maintain fully functional, effective MLTsthat can integrate action across missioncomponents in response to operational challenges,including crises and transitions. In addition, thecapacity of mission leaders to manage strategiccommunications is a critically important gap.

Filling these gaps requires both mission-specificand non-mission-specific training tailored to theneeds of individuals and teams. Training andlearning support should help mission leaders adaptand apply doctrine and leadership skills appropri-ately by providing them with knowledge of themission itself, including its configuration, assets,posture, challenges, and initiatives. It should alsogive them an in-depth understanding of thepolitical and security environment in which theyoperate. Non-mission-specific training should becontinually updated to ensure it is relevant to allcurrent peace operations.KNOWLEDGE OF UN PEACEKEEPINGDOCTRINE, POLICIES, ANDPROCEDURES

UN peacekeeping doctrine has evolved signifi-cantly since the Brahimi report. Based on hard-learned lessons in the field and the demands of theSecurity Council, DPKO and DFS produced morethan 170 separate guidance materials (policies,guidelines, standard operating procedures,manuals, etc.) to aid the overall direction andmanagement of peace operations. These span theentire range of issues and activities of concern to


27 These materials include: the policy on authority, command and control; guidelines on the use of force by military components; policies and guidelines on jointoperations centers and joint mission analysis centers; standard operating procedures on integrated reporting to UN headquarters; policies on crisis management,the protection of civilians, and human rights in UN peacekeeping; the policy governing requests from field missions for delegation of authority; manuals onmilitary units in peacekeeping; the peacekeeping intelligence policy; guidelines on police capacity building and development; standard operating procedures onboards of inquiry and notification of casualties; and the policy on accountability for conduct and discipline and on detention in UN peacekeeping.

28 UN Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, briefing to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on best practices and training in peacekeepingoperations, December 2017.

29 UN DPKO and DFS, evaluation of contingency planning and crisis management (internal document).

missions’ civilian, military, and police componentsin the field and to UN headquarters.27

Doctrine continues to evolve as new guidance isissued to respond to new mandates and operationalchallenges and as existing policies and practices areupdated and revised. In 2017 alone, DPKO andDFS released twenty-three new and revisedguidance materials. In the same year, they collectedor developed seventy “best practices” materials thatcapture experiences that could be valuable forcurrent and future missions. These included after-action reviews and other reports, lessons-learnedstudies, and end-of-mission and end-of assignmentreports.28 The development of peacekeeping policyand guidance has been welcomed and encouragedby the Special Committee on PeacekeepingOperations, troop- and police-contributingcountries, and member states in general, despiteoccasional intense debates over specific policies.

Progress in the development of UN peacekeepingdoctrine presents both opportunities andchallenges for senior leadership training. On theone hand, policy and guidance are invaluable fordecision makers in the field. They are intended tobring consistency and coherence to decisionmaking, to integrate action across missioncomponents, and to promote efficient use ofresources and risk management while alsopreserving the legitimacy and credibility ofoperations by promoting adherence to the princi-ples of the UN Charter. Building on best practicesidentified across missions, peacekeeping policy andguidance offer cautionary advice as well as modelsand potential courses of action that mission leaderscan adapt to respond to challenges. On the otherhand, the sheer volume of policy and guidance isdifficult for any training to cover thoroughly, andeven more difficult for any one member of a leader-ship team to retain and implement.

In order to make the best use of such guidanceand to apply policy effectively, mission personnelmust be familiar with and share a common

understanding of key elements, particularly wherethe objective is to integrate action across missioncomponents. Familiarity with policy and guidance,clarity about “who does what” in the mission—andabout whom senior mission leaders can rely on foradvice and support on policy procedures—areespecially important for MLT members.

Sometimes, however, peacekeeping policy andguidance are not applied or fail to bring aboutimproved performance, timely, coherent, and well-informed decision making, effective integration ofplanning and efforts, and prioritization in the useof resources. Investigations, evaluations, studies,and training needs assessments have revealed thatthis often happens because key missionpersonnel—including, in a number of instances,members of MLTs—were unfamiliar with policies,lacked a shared understanding of them, or had notbeen sufficiently trained, drilled, or rehearsed inapplying them. They have also found that whenleaders are unaware of or uncertain about theimplications of policies and procedures, theirdecisions can lead to disconnects, confusion, orconflicting actions. In this way, well-intentionedactions initiated under different policies orstandard operating procedures can inadvertentlybecome drivers of crises or impede appropriateresponses by mission personnel. For example, earlyin the deployment of the UN mission in the CentralAfrican Republic (MINUSCA), a general instruc-tion issued to all mission personnel to shelter inplace in Bangui delayed key personnel fromcarrying out their responsibilities under crisismanagement procedures.29

One expert interviewee familiar with command-and-control issues in multiple UN missions notedthat there were many examples of individuals orcomponents (both uniformed and civilian) “justdoing their own thing” and not followingprocedures, directions, or orders. This phenom-enon was aggravated when senior mission leadersdid not understand their role or the extent of their


30 Interview, New York, September 19, 2017.31 Interview, New York, November 9, 2018.32 UN DPKO and DFS, Evaluation Report: Evaluation of Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (internal document), March 2018, p. 21.33 Alexandra Novosseloff, “Keeping Peace from Above: Air Assets in UN Peace Operations,” International Peace Institute, October 2017, p. 24.

authority or were unfamiliar with the relevantmission structures. The interviewee noted thatthere was a sharp difference in understandingbetween senior civilian and uniformed leaders withprevious experience in senior UN positions or whohad been thoroughly trained and prepared andthose who lacked such support or previous experi-ence. The command structure of UN peacekeepingis decentralized, making thorough training, ashared strategic vision, and an effective frameworkfor accountability essential for leaders in the field.30

A Secretariat interviewee cautioned that difficul-ties in command and control were not solely atraining problem, noting that factors like caveats,second reporting lines back to capitals, and strainedrelationships between MLT members can createissues. Implementation of policy and adherence toprocedures should not be treated as ends inthemselves. Compliance does not necessarily equateto performance, and policy does not prescribe howto deal with every situation. “Out-of-the-box”thinking and the ability to improvise are importanttraits for peacekeepers at all levels, including inMLTs. “Doing your own thing,” the official added,“otherwise known as ‘initiative,’ pays off wheneverything else is going badly.”31

However, incidents such as those in theDemocratic Republic of the Congo and CentralAfrican Republic have repeatedly demonstrated thepotential consequences of failing to provide seniormission leaders and personnel with the trainingand learning support necessary to understandwhen and how to apply policies and procedures.Various internal reviews and investigations havehighlighted cases where confusion or lack of clarityamong senior mission leaders and command-levelsubordinates over the chain of command and theroles of different components prevented themission from acting effectively. Such confusion intimes of crisis has had serious consequences for theprotection of civilians and the security ofpeacekeeping personnel.

A prime example of a critical gap is the frequentlack of clarity, even among senior mission leaders,regarding the respective roles of military and

police. A March 2018 internal DPKO evaluation offormed police units found a frequent misunder-standing of their role and purpose. According tothose familiar with the evaluation, peacekeepersreported that mission leaders did not alwaysunderstand the role and capabilities of these units.One example cited was an instance when the forcecommander considered formed police units to beakin to light military units. A related issue is thelack of understanding that the police component isindependent from the military component, whichhas implications for both the civilian nature ofpolicing and the conduct of operations that involveboth the police and military components.32

There is often a particular lack of clarity amongmilitary personnel who have not previously servedin UN peacekeeping operations. As noted byAlexandra Novosseloff, “Working in a UNpeacekeeping operation is often a culture shock formilitary personnel,” as “procedures, policies andmindsets differ from other military settings andcivilians have a greater and more controlling rolethan in other military operations.”33 Makingdecisions and implementing mandates can bedifficult and a source of conflict if a forcecommander and director of mission support havenot been adequately prepared to work together onsuch issues. Lack of a common understanding ofeven basic issues such as the level of authorityexercised by the military and support componentsover decisions and procedures governing the use ofmission resources (e.g., aviation or engineeringassets) can generate contention, friction, and, in theworst case, paralysis.

In addition to training that provides the founda-tional knowledge needed to manage missions,members of MLTs also need to be sensitized to theimportance of in-mission training, particularly infields such as crisis management, the protection ofcivilians, and other areas that require integratedplanning and action by different missioncomponents. In this regard, DPKO and DFS calledon members of MLTs to support in-missiontraining, including by participating in scenario-based exercises and drills designed to test missions’


34 UN Integrated Training Service (ITS), Final Report: Training Needs Assessment of Protection of Civilians, 2016– 2017, p. 34.35 Ibid., Annex, key recommendations nos. 3, 4.36 Interview, New York, September 10, 2018.

crisis preparedness and response and to ensureconsistent after-action review and follow-up (seeBox 2).

The need for ongoing mission-specific training atall levels is demonstrated by the challenge ofpreparing peacekeepers to implement their protec-tion of civilians mandate. For at least a decade,DPKO, DFS, other Secretariat entities, and non-UN institutions have devoted sustained effort todeveloping policy, guidelines, procedures, and

training to enhance peacekeepers’ ability to protectcivilians in accordance with their mandates.Despite these efforts, the 2016–2017 global trainingneeds assessment conducted by ITS concluded that“there is often a lack of coherent vision and defini-tion of what [the protection of civilians] means foreach Mission, including amongst senior leader-ship.”34 The assessment recommended moreextensive use of tabletop exercises and mission-specific training on the protection of civilians,specifically for senior leaders.35

Box 2. Scenario-based exercisesSeveral Secretariat initiatives attempt to reinforce the teamwork and leadership skills needed in situationsthat may arise in real-world peacekeeping through scenario-based training and simulations. ITS hasdeveloped a Senior Mission Leaders (SML) course for senior-level participants, including both internal andexternal participants (i.e., current staff members and potential candidates nominated by member states orculled from lists). The SML course uses multiple scenario-based exercises set in the fictional post-conflictcountry “Carana” to allow participants to explore a variety of operational and leadership issues. Leadershipwithin the mission leadership team (MLT) is the central theme throughout the course. Over two weeks ofintensive discussions and exercises, the course requires participants to carry out specific roles in the CaranaMLT. The SML course capitalizes on the expertise of former SRSGs, DSRSGs, force commanders, policecommissioners, and directors of mission support as mentors, facilitators, and subject-matter experts. ITShas recently added two scenario-based exercises to its Senior Leadership Programme (SLP) that bringtogether currently serving MLT members from different missions. It has also integrated scenario-basedtraining into the Intensive Orientation Course (IOC) and the newly developed Mission Advanced StaffTraining (MAST).36

Scenario-based exercises such as tabletop exercises are widely seen as effective for enhancing the perform-ance of MLTs and missions as a whole. They provide a means for developing and testing contingency andother plans, drilling participants on crisis-management procedures, and identifying weaknesses andpotential corrective measures. In response to the findings and recommendations of recent investigations,after-action reviews, and other studies, the under-secretary-general for peacekeeping issued a directivecalling for all missions to conduct at least one tabletop exercise each year. DPKO, DFS, and several missionssignificantly stepped up their efforts to build internal capacity to design and run scenario-based trainingexercises and drills. The missions in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo (MONUSCO), and South Sudan (UNMISS) have undertaken scenario-based exercises withsenior leadership teams at mission headquarters and, in some cases, at the sector level. DPKO and DFS haveled tabletop exercises for the UN missions in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and Liberia (UNMIL).Secretariat officials note, however, that some missions have still not initiated scenario-based drills orexercises. They cite continuing difficulty securing the buy-in and participation of some members of seniorleadership teams in such exercises. Scenario-based exercises are not one-off events but must be repeated andrefreshed to reflect rotations of senior personnel as well as shifting operational realities and mission priori-ties. Their aim should be to test and strengthen the ability of missions to integrate efforts across componentsto deal with likely crises and operational challenges.


In response to this need for training on theprotection of civilians, new DPO polices require allmissions to conduct at least one mission-level crisismanagement exercise and one casualty evacuationexercise each year. In addition, with the support ofmember states, and with added impetus from the2017 report from Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruzon improving the security of UN peacekeepers (the“dos Santos Cruz report”), DPO has initiated aprogram of mission stress testing, and a force-levelcommand-post exercise program is underway.KNOWLEDGE OF UN MANAGEMENT

In addition to training in UN peacekeepingdoctrine, interviews with Secretariat and seniormission personnel reveal a growing conviction thattraining for senior mission leaders must addressUN management issues and processes. The intensescrutiny peacekeeping operations face over sexualexploitation and abuse (and other disciplinaryissues), plus pressure to use scarce resourcesefficiently, have increased this sentiment. Likeother aspects of preparing leaders, this issue is notnew. Writing in the Annual Review of Global PeaceOperations in 2008, Lakhdar Brahimi and SalmanAhmed noted that “SRSGs ignore at their peril theadministrative and logistics aspects of missionscomprised of tens of thousands of military, police,and civilian personnel, with budgets of up to onebillion dollars per year.”37

A current senior leader, a veteran of multiplemissions, noted the challenge of making seniorleaders understand the importance of managementprocesses, particularly budgeting, and speculatedthat management reforms may change this:

The issue in the past has been how to convince headsof mission to take ownership [of the budget]. In thepast, one problem has been their inability to influenceit: ‘If I can’t change it, why get involved?’ They need tobe educated to see the budget as a strategic tool andenabler of the mandate. You can’t get them interestedunless they know that it benefits them. They need tounderstand budgets and the overall thrust of the[results-based budgeting] framework.38

A core element of the management reformlaunched by Secretary-General Guterres is thedelegation of authority to the field level, with acorresponding increase in accountability.Implementation of the reform presupposes thatheads of mission and their colleagues in MLTs willunderstand the UN system’s complex managementprocesses and procedures. They should at leastknow what questions to pose when makingoperational decisions that have resource implica-tions, involve potential reputational risk for theorganization, or put at risk the safety and securityof personnel. Member states expect the UN tooptimize the use of scarce resources and expectmission leaders to be responsible and capablemanagers:

MLTs must ensure the efficiency of large and complexmissions, operating as a tight unit with coordinationacross the military, police and civilian pillars of themission. Heads of Mission must understand the UN’sprocesses and operating model in order to effectivelymanage, support and motivate their staff, and ensuresound financial and resource management. Thisrequires strong organizational management skill fromthe [head of mission], and resource and projectmanagement experience within the MLT.39

In his report on the restructuring of the UNpeace and security pillar, the secretary-generalnoted the General Assembly and Security Council’scalls for progress across a number of core areas,“including the need to enhance policy andoperational coherence within and across theUnited Nations system; improve internal leader-ship, accountability and capacities; and strengthenpartnerships among the United Nations and keystakeholders” (emphasis added).40 The secretary-general has proposed putting in place a robustperformance management and evaluation systemthat holds leadership and staff at headquarters andin the field accountable for delivery of theirmandates and for upholding UN norms and values,including a 360-degree evaluation mechanism. Hehas also proposed investing more in staff trainingand development, providing more leadership

37 Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed, “In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation,” Center on International Cooperation, May 2008, p. 12.

38 Interview, New York, May 28, 2018.39 Quinary Consultations on Peacekeeping Operations, December 6–8, 2016, “Supporting Effective Mission Leadership,” unpublished discussion paper, p. 2. The

“quinary consultations” are periodic informal meetings of representatives of the governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and theUnited States.

40 UN General Assembly, Restructuring of the United Nations Peace and Security Pillar—Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/72/525, October 13, 2017, para. 5.


41 DPKO and DFS developed a mentoring/development program for a group of potential future mission chiefs of staff. They conducted a 360-degree evaluation andprovided coaching sessions to approximately fifteen senior leaders (from D1 to the under-secretary-general level) both at headquarters and in the field.

42 International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, “Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” 2010, p. 16.43 Telephone interview with former SRSG for several peacekeeping operations, June 19, 2018.44 OIOS, Evaluation of the Senior Leadership Training of the Department of DPKO and DFS, December 29, 2015, para. 59.

coaching for key managerial personnel, andincreasing opportunities for mid-level staff tobenefit from leadership and management training.It remains to be seen what resources the Secretariatwill devote to these initiatives and how it will tailorthem to meet the specific needs of leadership teamsin peacekeeping missions, given the downwardpressure on budgets.41

BUILDING AND MANAGING TEAMS

Effective leadership in peacekeeping depends notonly on competent and well-prepared individualsenior mission leaders but also on effective MLTs,particularly where peacekeeping environments arevolatile and crisis-prone. The study on“Considerations for Mission Leadership in UnitedNations Peacekeeping Operations” put thechallenge succinctly: “The individual leadershipqualities of the MLT membership are of crucialimportance, but can be optimized only if personal-ities complement each other and the MLT operatescompatibly as an inclusive, coherent team in whichthe members are respectful of each other’scompetencies and mandates.”42 Good workingrelationships within leadership teams are necessaryto capitalize on each member’s strengths andcompensate for any weaknesses. MLTs are almostconstantly evolving, with high turnover in theirmembership and frequent changes in theoperational environment.

The prospects for building effective teamsimprove when senior mission leaders have theknowledge and skills to fulfill their own responsi-bilities and receive adequate preparation tounderstand how those responsibilities dovetail withthose of other members of their MLT. This washighlighted by an interviewee who stated,“Leadership doesn’t get together until they’re in-mission. It will always be a catch-up effort. You canarrange early on to have a team-building exercise,but it will only take you so far at the end of theday…. We need continuous learning.”43

The diversity of MLT members is one of UNpeacekeeping’s greatest strengths, but it also poses

a challenge to forming effective teams and devisingtraining and learning support to reinforce them.SRSGs or heads of mission in multidisciplinaryintegrated missions face the task of forging teamspirit among a diverse group of individuals who arethemselves leaders with extensive experience intheir own professions. This task would be dauntingin any organization as large as some UN peaceoperations, but the multicultural, multinationalnature of UN missions and the complex politicaland security environments in which they operatemagnify the difficulty.

Mission personnel frequently cite the differentorganizational cultures of mission components—particularly the civilian-military divide but also thedivide between substantive and support sections—as an impediment to integrated action andmandate implementation. In interviews, membersof MLTs often point to the challenge of seniormission leaders reaching consensus on the overar-ching strategy for implementing the mandate andoperational priorities. Senior-level interviewees inthe Secretariat and the field cited several recentsituations where relations between members ofMLTs were so poor as to render the teams virtuallydysfunctional. The 2015 OIOS report highlightedthis phenomenon:

Many leaders reported tensions and misunder-standing within their teams, often related to roles,responsibilities and procedures. Navigating relation-ships across the uniformed-civilian pillars waschallenging for many new appointees and was thesource of considerable frustration, especially wherethe input of one pillar (e.g. mission support) wascritical to the output of another (e.g. militaryredeployments).44

The OIOS evaluation concluded that trainingoffered by the Secretariat did not adequatelyaddress team-related challenges: “Attempts to trainand exercise leadership teams in crisis managementthrough scenario-based training were initiated byDPKO/DFS on several occasions, with variedresults.” There was reportedly “difficulty inachieving buy-in from mission leadership teams”

for such exercises.45

As a former senior mission leader noted, “Peoplemanagement and team-building skills are verycritical for mission leaders…. Training shouldfocus more on teamwork and collective responsi-bility of mission leadership.”46 Most current andformer MLT members interviewed for this paperexpressed similar views, ranking leadership andteam building among the highest priorities fortraining. If an individual has serious deficiencies inthese areas, training is unlikely to remedy theproblem. However, training and learning supportcan help leaders enhance and adapt their skills tonavigate the unique UN peacekeeping environ-ment.STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

The capacity of mission leaders to manage strategiccommunications is a critically important gap thatcuts across the above gaps, affecting implementa-tion of peacekeeping mandates and performanceacross the full spectrum of mission activities. Toeffectively engage in strategic communication,senior mission leaders need to be able to establishand maintain open channels of two-way communi-cation with key interlocutors, advocate with keyaudiences on behalf of the mission, manageexpectations, and mitigate reputational risk.

The Secretariat has included modules onstrategic communications in the SML course,Mission Advanced Staff Training (MAST), andSenior Mission Administration and ResourcesTraining (SMART). However, these efforts areinadequate to prepare mission leaders to effectivelymanage strategic communications in peacekeepingenvironments. No consistent effort is made toassess and address individual mission leaders’needs for training and coaching in areas such asmedia relations. Nor are they prepared to deal withthe explosion of social media and other digitalplatforms, which are both drivers of conflict andpotential tools for mission leaders to implementmission mandates.

The Current State of Play:Obstacles to Progress

Despite multiple reports and assessments thatidentify similar gaps and comments by former andcurrent senior leaders that reinforce these findings,the UN has made only limited progress inaddressing leaders’ needs through training andlearning support. In order to identify potentialmeasures to improve the situation, it is necessary toreview positive initiatives already under way, aswell as major impediments to progress. In additionto the ongoing training for senior mission leadersdelivered by ITS, the Office of Military Affairs, andthe Police Division as described above, DPKO andDFS also engaged in additional, less formalmeasures to prepare candidates for and appointeesto senior mission posts.CONTINUED DISCONNECT BETWEENSELECTION AND TRAINING

The Leadership Support Section approaches fieldleadership as a life-cycle that commences withinitial contact with and support to prospectivecandidates and continues with sustained supportduring their appointment, induction, in-briefing,early deployment, and through the duration oftheir field posting. By identifying these steps, theSecretariat acknowledges the need to prepare andsupport newly appointed mission leaders. But asidefrom the DPO guidelines for in-briefing anddebriefing—which fall short of a policy require-ment—training and preparation of senior leadersare not treated as integral to the recruitmentprocess. Moreover, these different stages are notlinked through a serious accountability mechanismwith terms of reference that are used not only tohelp select senior mission leaders but also toappraise them and determine whether to renewtheir appointment.47

Individuals continue to be appointed to leader-ship positions without any systematic individual


45 Ibid., para. 61.46 Email exchange, April 11, 2018.47 United Nations, System-wide Strategy on Gender Parity, 2017.

assessment of the training or other support theymight need before or during their deployment. Noformal pre-deployment training requirements havebeen established to ensure that newly appointedsenior mission leaders are at least familiar with keyUN and peacekeeping policies and practices andwith mission-specific issues. The normal in-briefing for civilian mission leaders consists of acompressed series of meetings over five to sevendays, while incoming force commanders take theIntensive Orientation Course, which takes roughlythe same amount of time. Under the securitymanagement system, designated officials are alsorequired to receive pre-deployment training fromthe UN Department for Safety and Security.However, the Secretariat’s principal focus is almostinvariably on deploying new appointees as quicklyas possible. No time is budgeted in the selectionand on-boarding process for more in-depth orformal mission-specific pre-deployment prepara-tion tailored to the needs of a new appointee.

The Senior Mission Leaders (SML) course is onlyinformally linked to the selection and appointmentprocess for senior mission leaders. SeniorSecretariat officials involved in the appointmentprocess do not appear to routinely consider acandidate’s participation in the SML course as afactor in selection or to treat it as necessary. The2015 OIOS evaluation concluded that the SMLcourse is “not functioning as a career pipeline asoriginally intended.”48 Member states are nonethe-less eager to place individuals in the course, andparticipants consistently rate it highly.49 As the onlytraining that DPO offers to potential seniorappointees, the SML course is a logical tool toprepare potential leaders prior to deployment andto generate interaction between candidates and theUN to aid in the appointment process, albeitinformally. But because it is disconnected from theselection process, the SML course fails to deliver itsfull benefits to either prospective senior missionleaders or to Secretariat officials engaged in the

selection process. While many participants in theSML course have gone on to serve in senior missionleadership posts, many former participants are notnominated by member states or otherwise consid-ered for appointment.PRE-DEPLOYMENT IN-BRIEFING OFAPPOINTEES: ESSENTIAL BUTHURRIED

While not a formal “training,” the in-briefing ofnewly appointed senior mission leaders is animportant part of preparing them for deployment.In 2016, DPKO and DFS issued new Guidelines onIn-briefings and De-briefings for Civilian andUniformed Senior Mission Leaders, noting that thesecretary-general has emphasized the need forsenior mission leaders to receive “the supportnecessary to provide political direction andexecutive management of often large and complexoperations.”50 These briefings, received on appoint-ment and on exit, are mandatory for all members ofMLTs.51

The guidelines prescribe an in-briefing programof meetings at UN headquarters of five to sevenworking days for newly appointed leaders, prefer-ably pre-deployment, and provision of a resourcepackage tailored to individuals, their specificfunctional responsibilities, and the countrycontext. The relevant integrated operational teamcoordinates the briefing program in collaborationwith the Leadership Support Section, the Office ofMilitary Affairs, and the Police Division, asappropriate, while the Knowledge ManagementTeam (part of the Division of Policy, Evaluationand Training’s Policy and Best Practices Service)assists in preparing the resource package. Theguidelines specify that the program and package“must provide an overview of all UN-internalpolicies and guidance material as well as bestpractices and lessons learning resources that arerelevant to the mission mandate and countrycontext.”52


48 OIOS, Evaluation of the Senior Leadership Training of the Department of DPKO and DFS, December 29, 2015, para. 78.49 Ibid., para. 43. “A majority of SML course participants reported a high degree of its utility.… Regardless of whether participants did nor did not subsequently take

up senior leadership positions in peacekeeping, they reported gaining utility form the course, with 33.3 per cent claiming that they had been able to apply the SMLlearning in their work to a great extent and 53.8 per cent somewhat.”

50 UN DPKO and DFS, Guidelines on In-briefings and De-briefings for Civilian and Uniformed Senior Mission Leaders, DPKO/DFS Doc. No. 2016.01, para. 6.51 These briefings are provided to SRSGs, DSRSGs, heads of military component, police commissioners, and others as determined by the under-secretaries-general

of DPO or DOS or the office arranging the in-briefing. In-briefings may also be provided for newly appointed mission chiefs of staff or directors of missionsupport.

52 Ibid., para. 11.

Most headquarters personnel and newappointees consider pre-deployment briefingprograms essential, though they frequentlydescribe them as too rushed, with too many tightlycompressed, disparate elements to be addressed intoo little time. Newcomers to the UN systemfrequently indicate that they are overwhelmed bythe volume and unfamiliar nature of the materialpresented in rapid-fire meetings. Reactions to theresource packages (which usually contain forty ormore policy and guidance documents, reports, andmanuals or reference materials) vary. Some newlyappointed officials (mostly UN veterans) report-edly show little interest, while others (frequentlythose without previous UN or peacekeepingexperience) cite them as being integral to theirpreparation. One former Secretariat staff membernoted that DPPA has a Special Political MissionStart-Up Manual designed for senior leaders, but infive years it has never been used for a mission start-up, and most senior leaders are unaware of it.INSUFFICIENT DEDICATED RESOURCESDESPITE STATEMENTS OFCOMMITMENT

Member states and successive secretaries-generalhave highlighted the need to strengthen andempower mission leaders. Secretary-GeneralGuterres has emphasized his commitment “toenhance leadership capacities and furtherstrengthen the organizational culture” by placinggreater emphasis on investing in staff training anddevelopment. He has specified that “this includesoffering leadership coaching for key managerialpersonnel and increasing the opportunities formid-level staff to benefit from leadership andmanagement training.”53 Such expressions ofsupport and diverse initiatives to enhance trainingare welcome but have not yet translated into asystematic approach or a sustained commitment ofresources to training and supporting missionleaders and leadership teams.

It is difficult to reconcile expressions of commit-ment and persistent calls for better mission leader-ship and more effective leadership teams with the

secretary-general’s explanation to the SecurityCouncil in December 2017 that “the reduction infunding has removed all institutionalized supportfor peacekeeping leadership training, which is nowfunded by voluntary Member State contributionsor levies on peacekeeping missions.”54

As noted above, donors and host countries makeit possible for the Secretariat to deliver the SMLcourse and Intensive Orientation Course for senioruniformed peacekeeping leaders. But memberstates and the Secretariat appear unwilling to assigna high priority to establishing and sustaining aninstitutional framework in the UN dedicated totraining senior mission leaders. Without such aframework funded by assessed contributions, theSecretariat is unable to provide MLTs with guaran-teed learning support from pre-deploymentthroughout their service. Voluntary contributionsare welcome but uncertain and address only tightlydefined initiatives that attract donor support. Theycannot permanently fill this institutional gap.Levies on mission budgets for leadership trainingcover only the costs of the Senior MissionAdministration and Resources Training (SMART)and Mission Advanced Staff Training (MAST)programs, which, though essential, are limited to arelatively small number of mid-level civilians,mostly support personnel.

The 2015 OIOS evaluation report noted that the“limitation of resources allocated to senior leader-ship training could only be increased at the expenseof those available for the totality of otherpeacekeeping training.”55 The report also noted thatin 2007 the Special Committee on PeacekeepingOperations requested the secretary-general tosubmit a funding proposal for the SML course forconsideration by the General Assembly but thatsuch a proposal was never submitted. Thissituation remains essentially unchanged. In hisDecember 2017 letter to the Security Council, thesecretary-general acknowledged that “the lack ofsustainable resources continues to curtail ourefforts to support training and capacity building”and reduces the capacity of ITS to support member


53 UN General Assembly, Restructuring of the United Nations Peace and Security Pillar—Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/72/525, October 13, 2017, para. 59.

54 UN Security Council, Letter Dated 15 December from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2017/1079, December 20,2017, Annex, para. 12.

55 OIOS, Evaluation of the Senior Leadership Training of the Department of DPKO and DFS, December 29, 2015, para. 71.

states and field missions. Faced with relentlesspressure to reduce overall UN spending, memberstates and the Secretariat have failed to guaranteeadequate resources for leadership training.LACK OF A SINGLE UNIT RESPONSIBLEFOR MISSION LEADERSHIP TRAINING

Although the Secretariat initiatives highlighted inthis paper are useful, the central dilemma remains:the UN Secretariat has not established a center withthe mandate and resources needed to preparemission leaders. Neither has it devised a system toensure that those appointed to senior positions inMLTs are provided the training and learningsupport they need from pre-deployment throughto the conclusion of their service. The 2015 OIOSevaluation’s finding that “no single office ordivision had responsibility for, or oversight of, theoverall preparation of any particular individual” toassume their functions as a member of an MLTcompounds the problem. As a result, training andpreparation for senior mission leaders are notsufficiently prioritized in the recruitment orappointment process, and no one is accountable forensuring that the content and nature of the trainingand learning provided are timely and relevant.

Conclusion andRecommendations

Although the secretary-general’s reform agendaoffers an opportunity to take decisive action tostrengthen the current system for preparing seniormission leaders to assume their roles, immediateprospects for major improvements do not appearpromising. In the wake of the HIPPO report and theinvestigations and reviews mentioned above, in2017, the secretary-general launched the Action forPeacekeeping initiative (A4P). A4P aims to solidifythe political will of member states to strengthenpeace operations. It is striking that despite HIPPO’sconclusions and recommendations, reviews andinvestigations by dos Santos Cruz and othersregarding the need to enhance the preparedness andquality of peacekeeping leadership—both civilianand military—the Secretariat’s action planfollowing up on the dos Santos Cruz report includesvirtually no measures to improve leadershiptraining and preparation Likewise, the A4P initia-tive exclusively addresses training for uniformedpeacekeepers. A new version of the action plan isbeing developed by DPO’s Office for Peacekeeping


Box 3. The contrast between peace operations and humanitarian operationsThe low priority accorded to leadership training and learning for senior leaders and leadership teams in UNpeace operations contrasts with the Secretariat’s more structured approach to donor-financed learningsupport for humanitarian coordinators and humanitarian country teams. The Geneva-based HumanitarianLeadership Strengthening Section (HLSS) of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs(OCHA) provides dedicated support to those fulfilling humanitarian coordination leadership functions(humanitarian coordinators, resident coordinators, regional humanitarian coordinators, and deputies) aswell as to leadership teams. It also organizes mentoring and coaching by veteran humanitarian leaders forfirst-time humanitarian coordinators, as well as for individuals identified as potential future humanitariancoordinators. The section has devised a pilot initiative to bring together several humanitarian coordinatorswith members of their teams to exchange practices and lessons learned. Conceived as a “training-of-trainers,” the workshop would support the development of an action plan at the field level.This is not to suggest that peacekeeping could adopt the humanitarian community’s model as is, since thestructural and policy frameworks for humanitarian coordination differ sharply from those of peaceoperations. Not all aspects of the Humanitarian Leadership Strengthening Section would necessarily applyto a peacekeeping mission’s MLT. But the concept of a program dedicated to preparing field-based leadersto fulfill their responsibilities both pre- and post-deployment, and especially to help with team building, isa model worth considering.

Strategic Partnership, but it remains to be seen how,or indeed if, it will prioritize improvement toleadership training and preparation.

The need for stronger MLTs and the deficits inthe preparation of senior mission leaders are welldocumented and widely known, and therecommendations in the 2015 OIOS evaluationreport remain valid and largely unimplemented. Inkeeping with the secretary-general’s statedcommitment to enhancing leadership, reform, andaccountability in the Secretariat as a whole, andparticularly in field missions, the Secretariat shouldprioritize actions in the following areas. These areaddressed in particular to the Executive Office ofthe Secretary-General, the Department of PeaceOperations (DPO), Department of Political andPeacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), and theDepartment of Operational Support (DOS).CENTRALIZE RESPONSIBILITY FORMISSION LEADERSHIP TRAINING

1. Designate clear responsibility for missionleadership training and learning support andprovide dedicated resources: As part of thereform of the Secretariat’s peace and securityarchitecture, the secretary-general shouldinstruct DPPA and DPO to assign to theLeadership Support Section (LSS) of the Officeof the Director for Coordination and SharedServices the mandate to coordinate all facets oftraining and learning support for seniormission leaders, from recruitment throughexit. LSS should work in close partnership withthe Integrated Training Service (ITS), whichshould take the lead in ensuring delivery ofrelevant training and learning programs forsenior mission leaders. DPPA and DPO,working with the Department of ManagementStrategy, Policy and Compliance and DOS, asappropriate, should ensure that LSS and ITShave the dedicated capacity and resources tofulfill these responsibilities. The Secretariatshould evaluate the effectiveness of thisarrangement with a view to determining if, inthe next budget cycle, a specific unit for seniormission leadership training and learningshould be created within LSS. In this case,resources should be made available to ensurethey have the expertise and capacities requiredto guarantee support to all senior missionleaders and their teams.

INTEGRATE TRAINING INTO PLANNINGAND RECRUITMENT PROCESSES

2. Consider the composition of the leadershipteam when planning a new peace operation:In planning for new peace operations, theExecutive Office of the Secretary-General andthe lead department, with the support of theLSS, should give early consideration to thecomposition of a MLT with a view todetermining a pool of potential candidates. Tothe extent possible, the senior mission leader-ship team should undergo training as a group.Such group training should be designed andorganized by ITS in consultation with therelevant regional office and the LeadershipSupport Section. As part of the group training,ITS and the UN Operations and Crisis Centre(UNOCC) should collaborate in organizing atleast one scenario-based exercise on crisisresponse and management that reflects theprospective mission’s likely mandate andchallenges.

3. Assess the training needs of all candidates: Allcandidates under active consideration forpossible appointment as a senior missionleader should undergo a thorough individualknowledge and training needs assessmentbased on the profile and terms of reference ofthe posts for which they are being considered.The LSS should oversee this assessment incollaboration with ITS. The content andduration of the tailored in-briefing should takethis needs assessment into account, and initialpre-deployment training should be determinedthrough consultation among the LSS, ITS, andthe relevant substantive office at headquarters(i.e., the integrated operational team or officeof the assistant secretary-general for the regionwhere the mission is deployed, as well as theMLT of the mission concerned, asappropriate).

4. Factor the time needed for training into therecruitment process: Training and in-briefingshould be factored into the successionplanning and management of vacancies toallow sufficient lead time for the selectionprocess, individual training needs assessment,and pre-deployment training.

5. Encourage all mission leadership candidatesto participate in the SML course: Participation


in the SML course should be more closelylinked to the process for recruiting seniormission leaders. While participation should beopen to all with suitable profiles, candidatesunder active consideration for appointment orincluded in the pool of potential appointees tocurrent or near-term vacancies should bestrongly encouraged to participate in the SMLcourse. Toward that end, Secretariat officialswho interview candidates for appointmentshould prompt them to share insights orobservations gained from the course.Moreover, member states that nominateindividuals to participate in the SML courseshould be strongly encouraged to nominateonly those at the appropriate level and with theright professional profile for MLTs, with anemphasis on nominating qualified womenparticipants. Finally, the Office of MilitaryAffairs and Police Division should intensifytheir systematic, proactive search for qualifiedcandidates, particularly women, for positionsas head of military and police component toparticipate in the SML course.

6. Certify that new leaders have completedtraining requirements before deployment:Newly appointed senior mission leaders shoulddeploy only after completing the necessary in-briefing and minimum training required, asdetermined by the individual knowledge andtraining needs assessment. Directors of therelevant divisions should be required to certifythat these steps have been satisfactorilycompleted. Organization and execution of in-briefings and pre-deployment training shouldformally include performance evaluations ofthe relevant personnel.

7. Provide all new senior mission leaders with amentor: All newly appointed senior missionleaders should be accompanied during their in-briefing by a mentor or resource person withthe experience and knowledge to complementor supplement information provided inbriefings.

PROVIDE MORE SUSTAINED SUPPORTTO TRAINING

8. Provide more sustainable funding to the SMLcourse: DPO, DPPA, and DOS should workwith member states to devise an alternative to

the current course-by-course funding of theSML course through ad hoc voluntary contri-butions and hosting arrangements. Such analternative should provide the Secretariat withgreater flexibility and certainty to allow forforward planning, include sufficient funds tosupport participants from developingcountries and ensure that the course maintainsits UN identity.

EMPLOY NEW TOOLS FOR IN-MISSIONTRAINING

9. Use information technology to enhancetraining: DPO, DPPA, and DOS shouldidentify ways to employ informationtechnology to enhance training and learningsupport intended for senior mission leaders.For example, it could initiate a program ofwebinars or videoconferences exclusively formembers of MLTs to improve theirunderstanding of key issues relevant to theirmissions and share best practices. In the firststage of such a program, priority should begiven to preparing senior mission leaders todeal with the implications of the reforms of theUN’s peace and security architecture, manage-ment, and development system.

10. Expand the use of scenario-based training:DPO, DPPA, and DOS should encourage andsupport the development and roll-out ofscenario-based exercises, drills, and rehearsalsin missions. To that end, they should enhancethe capacity of missions and the Secretariat tocarry out such exercises and ensure thatmissions have the necessary resources andpersonnel. To meet the current requirementfor all members of MLTs to participate in atleast one major scenario-based exerciseannually, DPO, the Department of Manage -ment Strategy, Policy and Compliance, and theDepartment of Safety and Security shouldensure that they are formally consolidatedunder the new management structure. Inaddition, they should be required to conductafter-action reviews and share the resultingreports with UN headquarters. Such reportsshould describe any weaknesses or deficienciesidentified and measures taken to remedythem.


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police commis-

sioners/head of

police component

Current heads and

senior sta< of

relevant Secretariat

departments and

o=ces and subject

matter-experts,

accompanied by

mentors/resource

persons (former

heads of

military/police

component)

Brie>ngs and

presentations

Issues and

processes relevant

to military and

police

components; UN

policies and

procedures; roles

of and relation-

ships between

mission

components;

mission-speci>c

challenges

O)ce of

Operatio

ns (in

collaboratio

nwith

Depart-

ment of P

olicy

and Training)

In-brie>ng

Pre-deployment

at headquarters

Varies,

normally 5–7

days

Newly appointed

senior mission

leaders (uniformed

and civilian)

Sta< of the O=ce

of Operations and

other relevant

o=ces and services

Brie>ngs

General UN

peacekeeping-

related policies

and procedures;

mission-speci>c

challenges


O)ce/

Departm

ent

Training

Nam

eTiming and

Locatio

nDuration

Participants

Facilitators

Methodology

Focus A

rea

Departm

ent of

Safety and

Security (in

collaboratio

nwith

security

focal point)

Designated

o=cial training

Pre-deployment

at headquarters

3 days

Designated

o=cials of the UN

security manage-

ment system

(usually heads of

mission)

Security focal point

and Department of

Safety and Security

sta<

Brie>ngs;

rehearsals and

drills

UN Operatio

nsand Crisis

Centre

Crisis

management

training

Pre-deployment

at headquarters

2 hours

Newly appointed

senior mission

leaders (uniformed

and civilian)

Operations and

Crisis Centre sta<

Brie>ngs

Departm

ent of

Political and

Peacebuilding

A(airs (DPPA)

Mediation

training

On request

Varies

Mission leaders

and senior

personnel

Mediation Support

Unit sta< within

DPPA and external

experts

Tailored one-on-

one coaching for

mediators and

training for

mediation teams

Mediation and

negotiation

techniques and

skills; strategy

development;

process design;

thematic issues

O)ce for the

Coordination of

Hum

anitarian

A(airs (in

collaboratio

nwith

the Inter-

Agency

Standing

Com

mittee)

Humanitarian

coordinator

professional

development

and mentoring

Varies

Current and

prospective

humanitarian

coordinators and

deputy special

representatives of

the secretary-

general/resident

coordinators/

humanitarian

coordinators

Humanitarian

Leadership

Strengthening

Section and

subject-m

atter

experts

Team workshops

and exercises;

mentoring and

network building

Development and

implementation

of strategies for

humanitarian

action in complex

emergencies and

con?ict and post-

con?ict environ-

ments


Org

aniz

atio

n/In

stitu

tion

Trai

ning

Title

Tim

ing

and

Loca

tion

Dur

atio

nPa

rtic

ipan

tsSp

eci/

c to

Peac

eO

pera

tions

?M

etho

dolo

gyFo

cus A

rea

UN

Sys

tem

Sta.

Col

lege

UN Leaders

Program

During tenure

o=-site

5 days

Director-level

UN managers

No

Brie>ngs and

discussions

Leadership

qualities; adaptive

leadership

UN

Sys

tem

Sta

.C

olle

ge(U

NSS

C)

UN System

Executive

Managem

ent

Programme

Remote and

o=-site

19 weeks

UN managers at P5

level and above and

managers for NGOs

and member states

with work related to

the U

N

No

Mixed method-

ology including

coaching and case-

based training

Managem

ent,

planning, and

communication

skills

Folk

eBe

rnad

otte

Aca

dem

y

Viking 18/

Bogaland

Pre-deployment

and on retreat

(during mission

but o=-site)

10 days plus

pre-training

Civilian, military,

and police at the

strategic,

operational, and

tactical levels in

peace operations

No

Civil-military-

police coopera-

tion and

coordination in

peace operations;

protection of

civilians, leader-

ship, and gender

(for the 2018

exercise)

Folk

eBe

rnad

otte

Aca

dem

y

Ad hoc senior

leadership

training for EU

peace operations

In-mission

Varies

Senior leaders for

European Union

peace operations

Yes

Leadership and

management

skills, as requested

by mission

Nor

weg

ian

Def

ence

In

ter n

atio

nal

Cen

ter

(NO

DEF

IC)

Field Crisis

Managem

ent

Course

Pre-deployment

and on retreat

(during mission

but o=-site)

5 days

Leaders in

DPO

-led >eld

missions,

Secretariat m

ission

support sta=, and

UN country team

s

Yes

Scenario-based

exercises

Crisis manage-

ment policies and

preparation

An

nex 2

: N

on

-UN

Tra

inin

gs56

56 This list is not exhaustive.


Org

aniz

atio

n/In

stitu

tion

Trai

ning

Title

Tim

ing

and

Loca

tion

Dur

atio

nPa

rtic

ipan

tsSp

eci/

c to

Peac

eO

pera

tions

?M

etho

dolo

gyFo

cus A

rea

Cen

ter f

orIn

tern

atio

nal

Peac

eO

pera

tions

(ZIF

)

Lead

ersh

ipC

ours

ePr

e-de

ploy

men

t/pr

e sel

ectio

n1

wee

kPr

ospe

ctiv

e le

ader

sN

oA

ttitu

des a

ndsk

ills o

f le

ader

ship

Org

aniz

atio

n fo

r Sec

urity

and

Co-

oper

atio

n in

Eur

ope

Lead

ing

for

Succ

ess

Rem

ote

lear

ning

with

som

e in

-pe

rson

, o=-

site

lear

ning

6 m

onth

sH

eads

of m

issio

n,de

puty

hea

ds o

fm

issio

n, d

irect

ors,

and

thos

e with

maj

or su

perv

isory

func

tions

No

Cas

e-ba

sed

exer

cise

s;w

ebin

ars;

self-

re?e

ctio

n as

sign-

men

ts; f

ace-

to-f

ace

wor

ksho

p

Lead

ersh

ip a

ndm

anag

emen

tsk

ills

Afr

ican

Uni

onSe

nior

Miss

ion

Lead

ers (

SML)

cour

se

Indu

ctio

n/o=

-site

lear

ning

1 w

eek

Hea

ds o

f miss

ion

and

head

s of

civi

lian,

pol

ice,

and

mili

tary

com

pone

nts

Yes

Mix

ed

met

hodo

logy

incl

udin

g sc

enar

io-b

ased

exer

cise

s

Afr

ican

Uni

onpe

ace

oper

atio

nsco

mpl

ianc

e,m

anag

emen

t and

arch

itect

ure,

asw

ell a

s lea

ders

hip

and

man

agem

ent

skill

s

The INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI) is an independent,international not-for-profit think tank with a staff representing more than twenty nationalities, with offices in New York, facing United Nations headquarters, and in Vienna. IPI is dedicated to promoting the prevention and settlement of conflicts between and within states by strengthening international peace and security institutions. To achieve its purpose, IPI employs a mix of policy research, convening, publishing, and outreach.

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and building resilience to promote peace, security, and sustainable

development. To achieve its purpose, IPI employs a mix of policy

research, strategic analysis, publishing, and convening. With staff

from around the world and a broad range of academic fields, IPI has

offices facing United Nations headquarters in New York and offices

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Senior Leadership Training in UN Peace Ops · 2019-02-06 · of leadership training has increased,...

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