Seminar One Introduction to Safety Case
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Date 11 April 2006 Seminar One Introduction to Safety Case
description
Seminar One Introduction to Safety Case. Date 11 April 2006. Seminar One is a basic introduction to Safety Case and the MHF Regulations 2000. Its timing has been triggered by the commencement of Round 2 Licencing activity It has been developed for the following purposes: - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Transcript of Seminar One Introduction to Safety Case
Date 11 April 2006
Seminar One
Introduction to Safety Case
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Introduction
Seminar One is a basic introduction to Safety Case and the MHF Regulations 2000. Its timing has been triggered by the commencement of Round 2 Licencing activity
It has been developed for the following purposes:
-To provide a brief and simple overview of the main parts of a safety case
-To be suitable for new MHF Operators-Examples of incidents-Context of MHF Regulations-Outlines the reason for a safety case
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Why is a Safety Case Needed?
Port Kembla Ethanol Tank Fire, NSW, Australia, 28th January 2004
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Why is a Safety Case Needed?Coode Island, Australia – storage terminal fire,
August 1991, no injury.
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Why is a Safety Case Needed?
Longford, Australia – explosion and fire, September 1998, 2 dead, led to the development of Victorian MHF legislation
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Why is a Safety Case Needed?
Texas City, USA – fire and explosion, March 2005, 15 dead, over 170 injured
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Why is a Safety Case Needed?
• Entschede, Holland – fireworks factory explosion, May 2000, 22 dead, 947 injured
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Why is a Safety Case Needed?
Tosco Avon Refinery•23rd February,1999.•Crude Unit, Tosco Corporation’s Avon oil refinery, Martinez, California.•Workers were attempting to replace piping attached to an online 150-foot-tall distillation column•Piping released naphtha which ignited. The flames engulfed fire workers who were located at different heights on the column• Four men were killed and one seriously injured.
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Why is a Safety Case Needed?
Tosco Avon Ref. – Contributing Causes
1. Tosco Avon refinery management did not conduct an MOC review of operational changes that led to excessive corrosion rates in the naphtha piping.
• Above design rates• Feed contained high water levels• Prolonged operation on LV bypass valve
caused ineffective line isolation
2. The crude unit corrosion control program was inadequate.
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Why is a Safety Case Needed?
Bhopal, India – Dec 1984
Toxic release – methyl isocyanate
3000 to 8000 deaths, $0.3b to $3b
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Why is a Safety Case Needed?
Buncefield Incident – 11th December 2005(Currently under investigation by UK HSE)
40 injured, no fatalities
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Why is a Safety Case Needed?
• There is a need for specific control of major hazards due to:- Changing scale and complexity of specific
facilities- Housing encroachment into MHF buffer
zones- Changing community perceptions- Loss of Corporate Knowledge associated
with ageing plant and mobile workforce- Range of major accidents that have
occurred- Prescriptive approach has proven
inappropriate
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Why do we need a Safety Case?
• This has led to Regulations where:
- the Operator is expected to know what technical and human activities occur
- The Operator decides on the appropriate means of major hazard control for the facility, and prepares a SC explaining this
- The Regulator assesses and audits performance adequacy against the SC
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Background - The MHF Regulations
Flixborough 74, Seveso 76, Bhopal 84, Piper Alpha 88
Longford Explosion Sep 98
Longford Royal Commission Report Jul 99
Introduction of MHF Regulations Jul 00
Safety Case Submissions Rd 1 2002
Safety Case Submissions Rd 2 2007
Australian National Standard for Control of MHFs 96
Coode Island Fire 91
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Overview - Key Principles of MHF Regs
• Focus on major hazards (catastrophic events involving Sched 1 materials i.e. high consequence and low frequency)
• Proactive risk based approach
• Places the responsibility on the facility Operator
• Facility Operator actively has to demonstrate safe operation
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Overview - Key Principles of MHF Regs
• Consultation with different parties required at all critical stages
• Addresses both on-site and off-site safety
• Regulator ‘ review’ of this, tied to a licence
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Increasing risk
Consequence - Severity
Rela
tive F
req
uen
cy o
f Occu
rren
ce
MinorRisks
Very high risksshould alreadybe eliminated
after risk assessment within
SC process
OHS risks already
regulated
Overview - Focus of MHF Regulations
Focus of MHF Regulations is
high consequence (catastrophic)
but low frequency incidents
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Incident Notification
Haz Substances Regulations
Dangerous Goods (S&H) Regulations
Victorian Acts/Regulations
DG Act
OH&S Act
Asbestos Regulations
Certification Regulations
Confined Spaces Regulations
Issue Resolution
Manual Handling
Noise Regulations
Major HazardFacility
Regulations
Main Parts
HCDG Regulations
Plant Regulations
Explosive Regulations
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Overview – MHF Regulations
Objective of the Regulations
To provide for safe operation of major hazard facilities in order to reduce the likelihood of a major incident (MI) occurring and to reduce the consequences to health and safety and damage to property
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Overview – MHF Regulations
Specific parts of the MHF Regulations for this seminar series are:
• Safety management system (R301)• Hazard identification (R302)• Safety assessment (R303)• Control measures (R304)• Emergency planning (R305) • Review of risk controls (R306, R404)• Consultation - HSRs, employees, community
(R501, R505, OHS Act)
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What is the Safety Case?
The SC must address all hazardous events that could result in:
• An uncontrolled incident that involves schedule 1 materials; and
• Poses a serious and immediate risk to health and safety
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What is the Safety Case?
A Safety Case is a detailed document that outlines: • hazard identification and control mechanisms in
place to prevent and mitigate all MIs for the facility• the types of safety studies undertaken • the results obtained from such studies• the management arrangements in placeto ensure the continued safety of the facility, itspeople and the surrounding community
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What must the Safety Case do?
• Document the state of safety arrangements for the facility
• Demonstrate to the satisfaction of WorkSafe, through content and supporting material, that: the operator knows what technical and
human activities occur how hazards are managed how safety will be managed in the event of
an emergency
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Identify methods to be used for monitoring and reviewing all activities for continuous improvement of the safety arrangements of the facility over its lifetime.
What must the Safety Case do? (cont’d)
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Safety Case Content?
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Main Components of a Safety Case
• Summary of the SMS prepared under R301
• Documentation of the Safety Assessment -outcome R302, R303
• Schedule 4 Information- Facility Description- Safety Information
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Main Components of a Safety Case
Summary of SMS prepared under R301
The Safety Case must contain a summary of the SMS elements including:>Safety policy and objectives>Organisation and structure>Operational controls>Means to achieve Part 3 (Safety Duties) and 5 (Consulting, Informing) compliance
>Management of change>Principles and standards>Performance monitoring>Audit
Ref Sched 2
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Main Components of a Safety Case
Documentation of the Safety Assessment – R302, R303
• Identification of all the major incidents which could occur.
• Identification of all the hazards that could cause or contribute to causing a major incident.
• Risk Assessments.
• Methods and criteria for identifying and assessing the above.
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Main Components of a Safety Case
• Process or activity description
• Schedule 1 and Dangerous Goods materials and their characteristics
• Facility layout drawings
• Future facility changes
• Plan of facility and surrounding area.
Schedule 4 Information - Facility Description
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Main Components of a Safety Case
Schedule 4 Information - Safety Information
• Control measures that prevent or limit consequences of MI’s
• Performance monitoring
• Safety Management System cross reference
• Incorporation of safety and reliability into design and construction
• Incident history – last 5 years
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Break
More on Safety Assessment follows…..
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Safety Assessment
• Hazard identification – for determining MIs• Risk reduction studies – for determining controls• Emergency scenarios– for training and controls• Risk evaluation - for determining risk acceptability• Recommendations and review – for continuous
improvement
Main Components of Safety Assessment
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• Using Hazop/What If, RA and specialist reviews, the MI’s and their causes (of MIs) are determined
Risk Assessment
(RA) Process
Process Hazard
Identification(HAZOP/What
If)
Unit Technical
Review Input(Specialist
Review)
Major Incident Event
Grouping
Safety Assessment
Hazard Identification
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Safety Assessment
Risk Assessment
-Analysis and Assessment of the hazards and potential MIs on site using
LOPA Risk matrixFTA/ETA QRA
-Provides a more detailed analysis of causes/frequency/outcomes/controls for each identified MI
-Can enable risk offsite to be assessed
-Enables comparison of risk reduction options
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• Analysing the safety measures and controls that are between an uncontrolled release and the worst potential consequence - risk reduction study
Layer of Protection Analysis
Safety Assessment
PROCESSDESIGN
BPCS
CRITICAL ALARMS ANDOPERATING PROCEDURES
AUTOMATIC SIS
PHYSICAL PROTECTION &MITIGATION SYSTEMS
PLANT EMERGENCY RESPONSE
COMMUNITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE
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Safety AssessmentThe information for assessment can be presented as a bow-tie diagram.
Hazards Controls
Preventative Controls
Controls
Mitigative Controls
MI
Cau
ses
Out
com
es
Consequences
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Safety Assessment
Hazards Controls
Preventative Controls
Controls
Mitigative Controls
MI
Ca
use
s
Ou
tco
mes
Consequences
•Corrosion - vessel wall thinning
•Vessel design/ const•Inspection•Process control (eg pH)
•Vessel rupture -LoC
•Bunding•Ignition controls•Deluge•Emerg Plan
•Fire•Injury•Plant damage•Loss of business
MI
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Emergency Plans
• Promote preparation for response to emergencies
• Ensure necessary equipment available and maintained
• Ensure personnel are trained and prepared to respond
• Identify communication methods required
• Identify community resources required
• Consultation with emergency services and local council
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Emergency Incident Scenario Plans
• Analysis of the explosion, heat flux for the pool fires or jet fires or toxic consequence levels to determine fire fighting access and to identify affected impact areas
• Determination of the fire water and foam requirements for extinguishing the fire and/or protecting affected equipment
• Available as a resource for training in specific scenarios
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Occupied Buildings Risk Assessment
-Analysis of the impact of MIs on occupied buildings
-Mainly risks (due to flame impingement, explosions, toxic gas) from other buildings/operations
What Else is in a Safety Case Report?
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Plastics Factory 2004
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Continuous Improvement
-Opportunities to reduce risk are identified
-Recommendations are assessed and prioritised
-An action plan is developed and implemented SFARP
What Else is in a Safety Case Report?
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SC Review & Revise
• Operators must review (and revise) hazard identifications, risk assessments and control measures to ensure risks remain reduced to SFARP:
-at the direction of the Authority-prior to modification-after a major incident-when a control measure is found to be deficient-Upon licence renewal or at least every 5 years-New information becomes available regarding possible MI hazards previously unknown
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Summary
• The SC must demonstrate adequacy of all Safety Duties required by the MHF regulations
• Safety Duties are ongoing requirements
• An Operator of a major hazard facility who fails to comply with the MHF regulations could jeopardise the continuation of their licence.
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Safety Case Seminar Series 2006
Seminar 2 HAZID, MI and Safety Assessment
26 April 2006S
Seminar 3 Control Measures and Adequacy
9 May 2006
Seminar 4 Emergency Response and Consultation
23 May 2006
Seminar 5 Safety Management Systems
6 June 2006
Seminar 6 Preparing and Managing a Safety Case
20 June 2006
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Sources of Additional Information
• Occupational Health and Safety (Major Hazard Facilities) Regulations 2000, Victoria
• Major Hazard Facilities Regulations – Guidance Notes, WorkSafe
• WorkSafe Victoria www.workcover.vic.gov.au• NSW Major Industry Hazard Advisory Papers 1 to 9• Centre for Chemical Process Safety• UK Health and Safety Executive,
www.hse.gov/comah
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Seminar 1
Questions ???????
