Sellars_Three Essays on Kant

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THE ROLE OF THE IMAGINATION IN KANT'S THEORY OF EXPERIENCE

Wilfrid Sellars

Editor's Note: This article was originally published in Categories: A Colloquium , edited by HenryW. Johnstone, Jr. (Pennsylvania State University, 1978), and appears here with the kind permissionof Professor Johnstone. Edited in hypertext by Andrew Chrucky.

1. My aim in this paper is to give a sympathetic account of Kant's theory of the role played by whathe calls the productive imagination in perceptual experience. My method, however, will not be thatof textual exegesis and commentary, but rather that of constructing an ostensibly independenttheory which will turn out, it just so happens, to contain the gist of the Kantian scheme. Proceedingin this way will enable me to avoid the tasks involved in coping with Kant's terminology,architectonic, and polemical orientation. By concentrating attention on the subject matter itself, thisapproach will make possible a relatively brief treatment of what would otherwise be a time-consuming enterprise.2. By referring to the theory I am about to construct as "ostensibly independent," I also mean toimply that although I shall stick reasonably close to what I think to be the truth, I shall not be abovewarping and slanting the argument to fit the role of a sympathetic interpretation of the Critique . Theextent to which I succeed in capturing the spirit of Kant's thought must be measured by the degreeto which it illuminates the letter of the text.3. Our access to the external world and to the nature and variety of the objects (in a suitably broadsense) of which it consists is through perception. Phenomenological reflection on the structure of

perceptual experience, therefore, should reveal the categories, the most generic kinds or classes, towhich these objects belong, as well as the manner in which objects perceived and perceivingsubjects come together in the perceptual act.4. I shall therefore begin my reflections on Kantian themes with a careful account of the relevantfeatures of perceptual (in point of fact, visual) experience. An initial survey will provide aframework of working distinctions which will subsequently be refined. These distinctions, in oneform or another, are familiar tools of the philosopher's trade. It is the subsequent refinements thatwill lead into the arena of controversy.5. In the first place there is the distinction between the act of seeing and the object seen. Visualexperience presents itself as a direct awareness of a complex physical structure. It also presentsitself as having a point of view, as perspectival. Opaque objects present themselves as endowedwith facing colored surfaces. I do not mean by this that they present themselves as complexstructures of color expanses (visual "sense data"), but rather that they present themselves as three-

dimensional physical objects which stand in such and such relations to each other and to the perceiver's body.6. In the second place, there is the distinction, already alluded to, between the objects perceived andwhat they are perceived as . Thus in veridical perception occurring in optimum circumstances--Ishall have nothing to say about illusions, misperceptions, or hallucinations--the object is not only,for example, a brick which is red and rectangular on the side facing me, it is seen as a brick whichis red and rectangular on the facing side. How is this to be understood?7. Traditionally a distinction was drawn between the visual object and the perceptual judgmentabout the object. The latter was construed as a special kind of occurrent believing. Occurrent acts of

belief were, in their turn, construed as propositional in form; as having, so to speak, a syntacticalform which parallels or is analogous to the syntactical form of the sentence which would express it

in overt speech. Believings, so to speak, occur in Mentalese.



8. This suggested to some philosophers that to see a visual object as a brick with a red andrectangular facing surface consists in seeing the brick and believing it to be a brick with a red andrectangular facing surface:

This is a brick which has a red and rectangular facing surface

where the judgment has a demonstrative component analogous to the linguistic demonstrative,"this," in the sentence by which it would be expressed.9. Now I think that there is something to the idea that seeing as involves an occurrent act of belief,

but I also think that the standard account misconstrues the structure of the believing. Notice that thesubject term of the judgment was exhibited above as a bare demonstrative, a sheer this , and thatwhat the object is seen as was placed in explicitly predicative position, thus "is a brick which has ared and rectangular facing surface."10. I submit, on the contrary, that correctly represented , a perceptual belief has the quite differentform:

This brick with a red and rectangular facing surface Notice that this is not a sentence but a complex demonstrative phrase. In other words, I suggest thatin such a perceptually grounded judgment as

This brick with a red and rectangular facing side is too large for the job at handthe perceptual belief proper is that tokening of a complex Mentalese demonstrative which is thegrammatical subject of the judgment as a whole. This can be rephrased as a distinction between a

perceptual taking and what is believed about what is taken. What is taken or, if I may so put it, believed in is represented by the complex demonstrative phrase; while that which is believed about the object is represented by the explicitly predicative phrase which follows. Perceptual takings, thusconstrued, provide the perceiver with perceptual subject-terms for judgments proper.11. From this point of view, what the visual object is seen as is a matter of the content of thecomplex demonstrative Mentalese phrase.

II

12. I shall prepare the way for the next major step in the argument by changing my example.Consider the visual perception of a red apple. Apples are red on the outside (have a red skin) butwhite inside. Other features of apples are relevant, but this will do to begin with. The initial point to

be made about the apple is that we see it not only as having a red surface but as white inside. This,however, is just the beginning. Notice that the experience contains an actual quantity of red. By

"actual quantity of red" I mean a quantity of red which is not merely believed to exist as did theFountain of Youth for Ponce de Leon. The Fountain of Youth does not actually exist. By contrast,the quantity of red which is a constituent of the visual experience of the apple not only actuallyexists but is actually or, to use a familiar metaphor, bodily present in the experience.13. But what of the volume of white apple flesh which the apple is seen as containing? Many

philosophers would be tempted to say that it is present in the experience merely by virtue of being believed in. It has, of course, actual existence as a constituent of the apple, but, they would insist, itis not present in its actuality. Phenomenologists have long insisted that this would be a mistake. Asthey see it, an actual volume of white is present in the experience in a way which parallels the red.We experience the red as containing the white .14. But if what is experienced is red-containing-white as red-containing-white, and if both the red

and the white are actualities actually present, how are we to account for the fact that there is alegitimate sense in which we don't see the inside of the apple ? To be sure, we see the apple as whiteinside, but we don't see the whiteness of the inside of the apple.



15. We must add another distinction, this time between what we see and what we see of what we see . The point is a delicate one to which justice must be done if we are not to be derailed. Thuswhen I see a closed book, the following are all typically true.

(a) I see the book.

(b) The book has pages inside.(c) I see the book as having pages inside.(d) I do not see the inside pages.(e) The book has a back cover.(f) I see the book as having a back cover.(g) I do not see the back cover.16. How can a volume of white apple flesh be present as actuality in the visual experience if it isnot seen? The answer should be obvious. It is present by virtue of being imagined . (Notice that toget where we have arrived, much more phenomenology must have been done than is explicitly

being done on this occasion. We are drawing on a store of accumulated wisdom.)17. But notice where this leads us. The actual volume of white is experienced as contained in theactual volume of red. Yet if the actuality of the white apple flesh consists in it being imagined , itmust be dependent for its existence on the perceiver; it must, in a sense to be analyzed, be "in" the

perceiver.18. Before following up this point, it should be noticed that the same is true of the red of the other side of the apple. The apple is seen as having a red opposite side. Furthermore, the

phenomenologist adds, the red of the opposite side is not merely believed in ; it is bodily present inthe experience. Like the white, not being seen, it is present in the experience by being imagined.19. Notice that to say that it is present in the experience by virtue of being imagined is not to saythat it is presented as imagined. The fruits of careful phenomenological description are not to beread from experience by one who runs. Red may present itself as red and white present itself as white; but sensations do not present themselves as sensations, nor images as images. Otherwise

philosophy would be far easier than it is.20. The phenomenologist now asks us to take into account a phenomenon frequently noted, but asfrequently misinterpreted. Consider the snow seen on a distant mountain. It looks cool. Do we see the whiteness of the snow, but only believe in its coolth. Perhaps this is sometimes so; but surelynot always. Sometimes actual coolth is present in the experience, as was the white inside the appleand the red on the opposite side. Once again, we do not see the coolth of the snow, but we see thesnow as cool; and we experience the actual coolth as we experience the actual whiteness of thesnow. An actual coolness is bodily present in the experience as is an actual volume of white.21. Let us combine our results into one example. We see the cool red apple. We see it as red on thefacing side, as red on the opposite side, and as containing a volume of cool white apple flesh. We

do not see of the apple its opposite side, or its inside, or its internal whiteness, or its coolness, or its juiciness. But while these features are not seen , they are not merely believed in. These features are present in the object of perception as actualities. They are present by virtue of being imagined.22. We must introduce a further refinement. We see an apple. We see it as an apple. Do we see of itits applehood ? We see a copper penny. We see it as a copper penny. Do we see of it its consisting-of-copperness? We see a lump of sugar. We see it as white and as soluble. We see of it itswhiteness. Do we see of it its solubility? The answer to the last question is surely negative, as arethe questions concerning applehood and copperness, and for the same reason. Aristotle would put it

by saying that we see of objects only their occurrent proper and common sensible features. We donot see of objects their causal properties, though we see them as having them.23. To draw the proper consequences of this we must distinguish between imagining and imaging,

just as we distinguish between perceiving and sensing. Indeed the distinction to be drawn isessentially the same in both cases. Roughly imagining is an intimate blend of imaging andconceptualization, whereas perceiving is an intimate blend of sensing and imaging and



conceptualization. Thus, imagining a cool juicy red apple ( as a cool juicy red apple) is a matter of (a) imaging a unified structure containing as aspects images of a volume of white, surrounded byred, and of mutually pervading volumes of juiciness and coolth, (b) conceptualizing this unifiedimage-structure as a cool juicy red apple. Notice that the proper and common sensible features enter in both by virtue of being actual features of the image and by virtue of being items thought of or

conceptualized. The applehood enters in only by virtue of being thought of (intentional in-existence). {1} 24. On the other hand, seeing a cool juicy red apple (as a cool juicy red apple) is a matter of (a)

sensing-cum-imaging a unified structure containing as aspects images of a volume of white, asensed half-apple shaped shell of red, and an image or a volume of juiciness pervaded by a volumeof white; (b) conceptualizing this unified sense-image structure as a cool juicy red apple. Notice thatthe proper and common sensible features enter in both by virtue of being actual features of the senseimage structure and by virtue of being items conceptualized and believed in. As before, theapplehood enters in only by virtue of being thought of (believed in).

III

25. The upshot of the preceding section is that perceptual consciousness involves the constructing of sense-image models of external objects . This construction is the work of the imaginationresponding to the stimulation of the retina. From this point on I shall speak of these models asimage-models, because although the distinction between vivid and less vivid features of the modelis important, it is less important than (and subordinate to) the perspectival feature of the model (itsstructure as point-of-viewish and as involving containing and contained features).26. The most significant fact is that the construction is a unified process guided by a combination of sensory input on the one hand and background beliefs, memories, and expectations on the other.The complex of abilities included in this process is what Kant calls the "productive" as contrastedwith the "reproductive" imagination. The former, as we shall see, by virtue of its kinship with bothsensibility and understanding unifies into one experiencing the distinctive contributions of thesetwo faculties.27. Notice once again that although the objects of which we are directly aware in perceptualconsciousness are image-models, we are not aware of them as image-models. It is by

phenomenological reflection (aided by what Quine calls scientific lore) that we arrive at thistheoretical interpretation of perceptual consciousness.28. Notice also that the construction of image-models of objects in the environment goes hand inhand with the construction of an image-model of the perceiver's body, i.e., what is constructed in animage-model of oneself-in-one's environment. The perspectival character of the image model is one

of its most pervasive and distinctive features. It constitutes a compelling reason for the thesis of thetranscendental ideality of the image-model world. Image-models are "phenomenal objects." Their esse is to be representatives or proxies . Their being is that of being complex patterns of sensorystates constructed by the productive imagination.29. Still more important is the fact that although the image-models are perspectival in character, theobjects in terms of which they are conceptualized are not. Thus, apples are not perspectival incharacter. The concept of an apple is not the concept of a perspectival entity. Apples are seen from a

point of view. Apples are imagined from a point of view. A spatial structure is imagined from a point of view. Yet the concept of a spatial structure, e.g., a pyramid, is not the concept of a point-of-viewish object. Thus we must distinguish carefully between objects, including oneself, as conceived

by the productive imagination, on the one hand and the image-models constructed by the productive

imagination, on the other.30. We are now in a position to put the elements of visual perception which we have beendistinguishing together.



31. In the first place, the productive imagination is a unique blend of a capacity to form images inaccordance with a recipe, and a capacity to conceive of objects in a way which supplies the relevantrecipes. Kant distinguished between the concept of a dog and the schema of a dog. The former together with the concept of a perceiver capable of changing his relation to his environment impliesa family of recipes for constructing image models of perceiver-confronting-dog .

32. The best way to illustrate this is by a very simple example, for our perceptual experience doesnot begin with the perception of dogs and houses. The child does not yet have the resources for suchexperience. But though the child does not yet have the conceptual framework of dogs, houses,

books, etc., he does, according to Kant, have an innate conceptual framework--a proto-theory, so tospeak, of spatio-temporal physical objects capable of interacting with each other; objects--this is thecrux of the matter--which are capable of generating visual inputs which vary in systematic wayswith their relation to the body of a perceiver.33. Consider the example of a perceiver who sees a pyramid and is walking around it, looking at it.The concept of a red pyramid standing in various relations to a perceiver entails a family of concepts pertaining to sequences of perspectival image-models of oneself-confronting-a-pyramid.This family can be called the schema of the concept of a pyramid.34. Notice that the pyramid schema doesn't follow from the concept of a pyramid alone . It followsfrom the complex concept of pyramid in such-and-such relations to a perceiver . This accounts for the fact that whereas the concept of a pyramid is not a point-of-viewish concept, the associated

schemas concern sequences of perspectival models of a pyramid.

35. It is in terms of these considerations that Kant's distinction {2} between (a) the concept of anobject, (b) the schema of the concept, and (c) an image of the object, as well as his explication of the distinction between a house as object and the successive manifold in the apprehension of ahouse is to be understood. "The object is that in the appearance which contains the condition of thisnecessary rule of apprehension." {3} 36. To sum up, the productive imagination generates both the complex demonstrativeconceptualization

This red pyramid facing me edgewiseand the simultaneous {4} image-model , which is a point-of-viewish image of oneself confronting ared pyramid facing one edgewise. We are now in a position to understand Kant's distinction

between the productive and the reproductive imaginations. {5} The principle of the reproductiveimagination is the "association of ideas"; more exactly, the association of objects. The connection

between the associated items is contingent, and dependent on the happenstances of experience. Asan association of objects it presupposes the constitution of objects by the productive imagination.And the principle of such constitution is not happenstance, but conformity to the recipe--schemata

derived from concepts. We are also in a position to understand the precise sense in which the productive imagination mediates between "the two extremes, . . . sensibility and understanding . . ."(A124) and is ". . . an action of the understanding on the sensibility" (B152).

IV

37. In the preceding section of the paper I emphasized a distinction between what we perceive theobject as and what we perceive of the object. I related this distinction to the distinction between thecomplex demonstrative thought component and the complex-image component of the perceptualexperience. I now want to do this in a more systematic way and to relate it to Kant's theory of

categories.38. The basic idea Is that what we perceive of the object in visual perception consists of thosefeatures which actually belong to the image-model, i.e., its proper and common-sensible qualities



and relations. Also its perspectival structure. On the other hand, what we perceive the object as is amatter of the conceptual content of the complex demonstrative thought. I pointed out that thesensible features belong in both contexts. Thus the phrase "cube of pink (from a certain point of view)" refers both to an actual feature of the image-model and (in second intention) a component of the conceptual center of the demonstrative thought. Thus,

39. Now I emphasized that we do not perceive of the object its causal properties . What we see of itare its occurrent sensible feature. This can now be generalized as follows. We do not perceive of theobject its character as a substance having attributes , its character as belonging with other substancesin a system of interacting substances, its character as conforming to laws of nature. In short, we donot perceive of the object what might be called "categorial" features. For the image construct doesnot have categorial features. It has an empirical structure which we can specify by using wordswhich stand for perceptible qualities and relations. But it does not have logical structure; not-ness,or-ness, all-ness, some-ness are not features of the image-model. They are feature of judgment.More generally we can say that the image-model does not have grammatical structure. (It will beremembered that we are construing mental judgments as analogous to sentences . A judgment, wesaid, is, as it were, a Mentalese sentence episode. And, of course, Kant's categories are grammaticalclassifications. They classify the grammatical structures and functions of Mentalese.40. Thus the category of substance-attribute is the structure 'S is P', the form of subject-attribute

judgment. The category of causality is the form 'X implies Y'. The category of actuality is the form'that-p is true'. More accurately, the categories are these forms or functions specialized to thoughtabout spatio-temporal object.41. In the preceding section we were concerned with the distinction between concepts of empiricalobject and the schemata of these concepts, i.e., the rules for image-model sequences which aredetermined by the concept of object-in-various-successive-relations-to-perceiver. But Kant alsouses the term schema in connection with the categories. The categories do not specify image-models. There is no image of causality as there is an image of a house. Yet they do have in their own way schemata, i.e., rules specified in terms of abstract concepts pertaining to perceptiblefeatures of the world. Thus the schema for causality is the concept of uniform sequence throughoutall space and time.42. The Humean concept could be said to have images in an extended sense. Thus a person in athunderstorm who experiences a finite stretch of lightning-thunder uniformity could be said to haveexperiences an image of causality. Kant, of course, does not say this, and I introduce it only to showthat this new use of "schema" is not completely foreign to the previous one.43. The schematized category of causality, then, is the ground-consequence category where theground (antecedent) concerns the occurrence of one kind of event, K1, at t and the consequenceconcerns the occurrence of another kind event, K2, at t + (delta t). Since the ground is an event

being of kind K1 it must be true that whenever K1 occurs, K2 also occurs.44. The categories are in first instance simply identical with the forms of judgment, a point whichmust be grasped if traditional puzzles about the metaphysical deduction of the categories are to beavoided. These forms of thought would be involved in thinking about any subject matter from

perceptual objects to metaphysics and mathematics.45. The so-called pure categories are these forms of thought specialized to thought about objects (matter-of-factual systems) in general. Such objects need not be spatio-temporal, as are the objectsof human experience. The full-blooded categories with which Kant is concerned in the Critique arethe pure categories, specialized in their turn to thought about spatio-temporal objects. The relationof the forms of thought to the pure categories is that of genera to species, as is the relation of the

pure categories to schematized categories.

V



46. Let me conclude with some remarks on Kant's concept of an intuition. Consider the statements

This is a pyramidThis pyramid is made of stone

The first has the explicit grammatical form of a sentence. So does the second. But notice that thegrammatical form of a sentence is lurking in the subject of the second sentence. From the standpointof transformational grammar we would think of it as derived from the deep structure.

This is a pyramid and it is made of stone47. One might be tempted to think of "this" as a pure demonstrative having no other conceptualcontent than that involved in being a demonstrative. Kant does think of an act of intuition as ademonstrative thought, a Mentalese "this." However he does not think of this Mentalesedemonstrative as a bare Mentalese "this." An example of an act of intuition would be the Mentalesecounterpart of

This cube facing me edgewise.where this is not to be understood as, so to speak, a Mentalese paraphrase of

This is a cube which faces me edgewise.48. The role of an intuition is a basic and important one. It is the role of bringing a particular object

before the mind for its consideration. Thus, though there is a close relationship between

This cube facing me edgewise . . .and

This is a cube which faces me edgewise.the former is an irreducible kind of representation. It is a demonstrative representation which hasconceptual content and grammatical form. As noted above it contains the form and content of the

judgment "This is a cube."49. Thus for Kant intuitions are complex demonstrative thoughts which have implicit grammatical(and hence categorial ) form.50. However thin--as in the case of the child--the intuitive representation may be from thestandpoint of the empirical concept involved, it nevertheless contains in embryo the concept of a

physical object now , over there , interacting with other objects in a system which includes me. Itembodies a proto-theory of a world which contains perceivers of objects in that world. (The reader should ponder A127-8.)

51. Kant emphasizes the difference between intuitions on the one hand and sensations and imageson the other. He emphasizes that it is intuitions and not sensations or images which containcategorial form. When he speaks of synthesis in connection with perception, he has two things inmind:

(1) the construction of image-models(2) the formation of intuitive representations (complex demonstratives)There is also the synthesis which is the formation of the explicit judgment, thus

(3) (This cubical substance) is a piece of ice52. Since intuitions have categorial form, we can find categorial form in them. In this sense we can

arrive at categorial concepts by abstracting from experience--but only because experience containsintuitions which have categorical form. We cannot abstract the categories from sensations or images.



53. To sum up. Kant's categories are forms and functions of judgment. They are grammatical summa genera . From Kant's point of view, Aristotle's theory of categories was a failure because,failing to distinguish between intuition and image-model, his list of categories is haphazard (thoughguided obscurely by grammatical intuitions); and Aristotle confuses them with generic concepts of entities in the world. There is a legitimate place for a theory of such concepts. But it must be

carefully distinguished from the grammar of thought.

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NOTES{1} The essential point is that the experience involves the actual rather than merely believed in existence of the volume of white. The phenomenologist thinks of this volume as an image-volumeof white. A tough-minded contemporary might insist that while the actuality is a three-dimensionalneuro-physiological process of the kind correlated with stimulation by white objects, it need not beconstrued as an image in a more traditional sense. Nothing in the argument of this paper hinges onthis controversy. One can think of the neuro-physiological process as occasionally generatingimage-samples of white. On the other hand, when we look, not at an opaque object but, for example, at a pink ice cube, the neuro-physiological process involves the actual existence of avolume of sensory pink. [Back] {2} A140ff.; B179ff. That Kant does not emphasize the role of the concept of the perceiver's bodyand sense organs in determining the rules of the successive apprehension of the manifold of anobject (e.g., a house) is, presumably, to be accounted for by the fact that the concept of the

perceiving subject and its faculties is a constant factor in the generation of all object-schemata. Thesource of the difference between different object-schemata is the difference between the object-concepts involved (e.g., house , dog , etc.). The reader should ponder Kant's examples of the houseand the ship in explaining the distinction between subjective and objective succession (A192;B237). [Back]

{3} A191; B236. For a more detailed explication of this Kantian thesis, which plays a central role inthe transcendental deduction--most explicitly in the first edition (A104, A120)--see my paper,"Kant's Transcendental Idealism," Proceedings of the International Kant Congress , Ottawa, 1976.[Back]

{4} A momentary image-model is, of course, an abstraction from the image-model sequence whichrealized the schema for a particular sequence of relations between perceiver and object. [Back]

{5} See A120-4. The discussion of the role of the productive imagination in the second edition

transcendental deduction is very abstract and emphasizes the self-consciousness involved in theconstruction and awareness of perceptual representations (but see B138; B150ff.). The specificswere left to the Analytic of Principles , where the account coincides with the first edition. [Back]



Is There a Synthetic A Priori?Wilfrid Sellars

Published in American Philosophers at Work: The Philosophic Scene in the United States , ed.Sidney Hook (New York: Criterion Books, 1956): 135-159. A revision of a paper published in the

Philosophy of Science , 1953. (The paper has been further revised for inclusion in the presentvolume.)

Introduction. A Divergent Usage: C. I. Lewis. Linguistic Rules and Ordinary Usage. Explicit and Implicit Definition. Implicit Definition: X Traditional Defense. Implicit Definition: The Attack Continued. Concept Empiricism: The Conservative Approach. Concept Empiricism, Syntactics, Semantics and Pragmatics. Conceptual Status and Implicit Definition. The Synthetic A Priori: A Terminological Decision.

1. Introduction. A survey of the literature on the problem of the synthetic a priori soon reveals that the term"analytic" is used in a narrower and a broader sense. In the narrower sense, a proposition is analyticif it is either a truth of logic or is logically true . By saying of a proposition that it is logically true, Imean, roughly, and with an eye on the problem of the relation of logical categories to naturallanguages, that when defined terms are replaced by their definientia, it becomes a substitutioninstance of a truth of logic. And a truth of logic can be adequately characterized for present

purposes as a proposition which occurs in the body of Principia Mathematica , or which would properly occur in a vermehrte und verbesserte Auflage of this already monumental work. If we nowagree to extend the convenient phrase "logically true" to cover truths of logic as well as propositionswhich are logically true in the sense just defined, we can say that an analytic proposition in thenarrower sense is a proposition which is logically true.

On the other hand, we find many philosophers using the term "analytic" in the sense of true byvirtue of the meanings of the terms involved . These philosophers seem, for the most part, to beunder the impression that this sense of "analytic" coincides with that defined above. And if "p islogically true" did entail and were entailed by "p is true by virtue of its terms," little damage wouldresult from this ambiguity. Unfortunately, this is not the case, as will be argued in a later section of

this paper. Indeed, the more interesting examples given by these philosophers of propositions whichare analytic in their sense turn out on examination not to be logically true. From which it followsthat unless they are mistaken in applying their own criteria, "analytic" in their sense can not belogically equivalent to "analytic" in the sense defined above. That true by virtue of the meanings of the terms involved is indeed a broader sense of "analytic" than logically true -- broader in that it hasa greater denotation -- will be a central theme of this paper.

To avoid possible misunderstanding, let me make it clear that I shall use the term "analytic"only in the first or narrower of the two senses distinguished above, and that where I want to refer tothe views of philosophers who use the term in the broader sense, I shall make the appropriatetranslation of "analytic" into "true by virtue of the meanings involved." Accordingly, "synthetic"will be used to mean neither logically true nor logically false , and the question under discussion

becomes: Are there propositions which are a priori yet not logically true?To answer this question even provisionally, we must next decide on a meaning for "a priori."

Here the going is more difficult, and we shall have to be content with a rather schematic discussion.



By and large, philosophers have given (or have believed themselves to give) four different butclosely related senses to this phrase. In the first place we have Kant's joint criteria of universalityand, necessity. The propositions traditionally characterized as a priori, with the possible exceptionof the proposition "God exists" (in the context of the ontological argument) have been universal

propositions -- a priori knowledge about individuals presupposing a minor premise of subsumption.

Now when he explicates the criterion of universality, Kant makes it clear that it is intended toexclude such universal judgments as are true merely as a matter of fact, so that universality mergeswith the criterion of necessity. If our knowledge that all A is B is to be a priori, it must be correct tosay "All A must be B."

But while we should all agree that a person cannot properly be said to know a priori that all A isB unless he can also be said to know that all A is necessarily B -- so that knowing that all A isnecessarily B is a necessary condition of knowing a priori that all A is B -- it does not, at least atfirst sight, seem to be a sufficient condition. There is no immediate appearance of contradiction inthe statement, "It is highly probable that all A is necessarily B." so that there would seem to be noabsurdity in speaking of knowing a posteriori that all A must be B, though just what account might

be given of such knowledge is another, and extremely perplexing, matter to which we shall return atthe conclusion of our argument.

This brings us to the second of the four interpretations of apriority. According to this approach,we have a priori knowledge that all A is B. when we know for certain that all A is B. If we ask whatis meant by "knowing for certain," we are told that this is not a mere matter of feeling confident thatall A is B. It must be reasonable to assert "All A is B" where this reasonableness is not grounded onknowledge that on such and such evidence e is probable that all A is B, nor on an argument of which one of the premises is of this form. Furthermore, not only must it be reasonable to assert "AllA is B" but it must in some sense be asserted because it is reasonable. In traditional terminology,knowing for certain is contrasted with both probable opinion and taking for granted .

This second approach leads smoothly and easily into the third and fourth explications of apriority. The third arises by scarcely more than a minor reformulation of what we have just said.For to say that the reasonableness of asserting "All A is B" does not rest on knowledge of the form"It is probable on e that all X is Y" is but a pedantic way of saying that the reasonableness of asserting "All A is B" does not rest on, or is independent of experience. And according to the thirdapproach, our knowledge that all A is B is a priori, if it is independent of experience .

But if the reasonableness of asserting "All A is B" doesn't rest on experience, on what does itrest? The answer to this question brings us to the fourth approach. This reasonableness, we are told,rests solely on a correct understanding of the meanings of the terms involved. In short, a priori truthis truth ex vi terminorum .

Now, in sketching these familiar explications of a priori knowledge of universal truths, asknowledge independent of experience, and as knowledge ex vi terminorum -- I have made it clear

that to my way of thinking there is a general confluence of these four criteria, such that each, onreflection, leads to the others. Much more would have to be done before we could claim to havedisentangled the various meanings which have traditionally been given to the term "a priori," andwe shall have to return to this topic before this paper is complete. But schematic though the abovediscussion may be, it provides a useful background for a provisional choice of a sense of this termfor the interpretation of the question: Is there a synthetic a priori? Accordingly, I shall select thefourth of the above criteria as the defining property of the a priori. Our question thus becomes, "Arethere any universal propositions which, though they are not logically true, are true by virtue of themeanings of their terms?"2. A Divergent Usage: C. I. Lewis. It will prove useful to contrast our provisional explication of the original question with what one

gets if one adopts the conventions implicit in C. I. Lewis' use of the terms "synthetic" and "a priori."Since he appears to use "analytic" as we are using "a priori" and "a priori" to mean holding of all possible objects of experience , in his hands the question "Is there a synthetic a priori?" becomes



"Are there any universal propositions which, though they are not true by virtue of the meaning of their terms, hold of all possible objects of experience?" To this question Lewis answers "no." Thathe is correct in doing so becomes clear once it is realized that Lewis picks his meanings for both"analytic" and "a priori" from our list of four traditional criteria of a priori knowledge. In other words, if we are justified in speaking of a confluence of these criteria, and given Lewis'

interpretation of the terms "synthetic" and "a priori," he is on solid ground in claiming that it islogically impossible that there be any propositions which are both synthetic and a priori.3. Linguistic Rules and Ordinary Usage. I shall open the next stage of my argument by pointing out that the phrase "true by virtue of themeaning of its terms" can reasonably be said to have the same sense as "true by definition." This

brings us face to face with a sticky issue. Human knowledge is presumably the sort of thing thatfinds its fitting expression in the ordinary usage of expressions in natural languages . Have we nottherefore reached a point at which the horsehair couch is a more appropriate instrument of

philosophical clarification than the neat dichotomies and tidy rule books of the professionallogicians? I do not think so. Not, however, because I frown on philosophical therapeutics (on thecontraryl), but because it seems to me that the successes achieved in recent decades by puttingordinary language on the couch were made possible by the brilliant use of tools developed in

Principia Mathematica ; and I believe that recent logical theory has developed new tools which havenot yet been put to adequate use in the exploration of philosophical perplexities.

Now I submit that the logician's concepts of formation rule , transformation rule and rule permitting the substitution of one expression for another , have legitimate application to naturallanguages. By this I mean not that it is possible for the logician to construct such rules for naturallanguages, but rather that rules of these types are embedded in natural languages themselveswithout any help from the logician. That the vague, fluctuating and ambiguous character of ordinaryusage extends to these rules is, indeed, granted. But does not the same hold true with respect to thelogician's concept of a sentence? or of a predicate? Yet we do not hesitate to discuss naturallanguages in these terms. I see no reason in the Heraclitean character of ordinary usage to rejectwhat would seem to be the obvious implication of the fact that natural languages can be illuminated

by confronting them with artificial languages obeying explicitly formulated rules of transformationand synonymity.

Indeed, can we make sense of critical appraisals of linguistic phenomena as correct or incorrect by persons uncorrupted by scrutiny of esoteric rule books, without supposing that linguistic rulesare embedded in ordinary usage? And the fact that rustics playing a game handed down for generations without benefit of Hoyle would be hard put to it to formulate a set of rules for the game,is surely not incompatible with the idea that when they play the game they do what they do becauseof the very rules they would find it so difficult to formulate! One wonders when philosophers willfinally abandon the fiction that rules exist only in public utterance of phonemes or displays of

printers ink.4. Explicit and Implicit Definition. The purpose of the preceding section has been to restore some semblance of plausibility to thenotion that the concepts analytic and true by definition can usefully be applied to natural languages.If we have succeeded we have shown that in the sense in which ordinary usage contains predicates,it may also be said to contain propositions which are analytic and true ex vi terminorum , and whichcan therefore be said to formulate analytic a priori knowledge. But a synthetic a priori proposition,on our account, is one that is both synthetic and true ex vi terminorum . Can there be such a thing?

Now it is at once clear that the "definition," if such it can be called, by virtue of which asynthetic a priori proposition would be true ex vi terminorum cannot be explicit definition; for the a

priori truth to which these give rise is analytic. If anything that has been called definition can serve

this purpose, it is what, following Schlick, we shall call implicit definition -- to an examination of which we now turn.



In rough and ready terms, a number of predicates without explicit definition are said to beimplicitly defined if they appear in a set of logically synthetic general propositions which arespecified as axioms or primitive sentences by the rules of the language to which they belong. To saythat these propositions are axioms or primitive sentences is to say that they are specified to beunconditionally assertable by syntactical rules of the language. This account is deliberately skeletal,

and is intended to gain flesh from the argument which follows shortly.If we use the familiar illustration of a geometry, the following points may be noted:

Neither the axioms nor the theorems are logically analytic, though the implicative propositionwhose antecedent is the conjunction of the axioms, and whose consequent is one of the theorems, islogically analytic.If the geometry should be of the Euclidian type, then the theorem "The area of a triangle is l/2bh,"which is logically synthetic, must not be confused with the proposition "The area of a Euclidean triangle is l/2bh," which is indeed an analytic proposition, but one which presupposes both thetheorem, and an explicit definition of "Euclidean triangle" in terms which specify that an objectdoesn't belong to this category unless the axioms and therefore all their logical consequences holdof it. 1 Similarly, the axiom "A straight line is the shortest distance between two points," which islogically synthetic, must not be confused with "A Euclidean straight line is the shortest distance

between two points," which, though analytic, depends on an explicit definition of "Euclideanstraight line."The nonlogical terms of an uninterpreted calculus should not be interpreted as variables. Theinterpretation of such a calculus by establishing translation rules correlating its nonlogical termswith expressions in actual use must not be confused with the assigning of values to variables.The postulates of a Euclidean geometry do not constitute an implicit definition of its nonlogicalterms unless they are specified as unconditionally assertable (and hence as more than generalizedmaterial implications, equivalences, etc.) by the syntactical rules of the calculus.A deductive system can gain application either bytranslating its nonlogical terms into expressions in actual use, or

by building it onto language in actual use by establishing rules of inference to take one fromsentences in the calculus to sentences in actual use (and vice versa); or

by a combination of (a) and (b) .But what of expressions which do not belong to a contrived calculus which has gained a use by

being coordinated with a preexisting language? Does the notion of implicit definition have anyapplication to them? Instead of dealing directly with this question, I shall wait until other dimensions of the problem have been brought into view.

Perhaps the most common complaint against the idea of implicit definition is that a set of termsmay be "implicitly defined" and yet have no "real" or extralinguistic meaning. 2 "Implicitdefinition," it is argued, is a purely syntactical affair, and to expect it to give rise to extralinguistic

meanings is as sensible as expecting a number of people to lift each other by their bootstraps.That this objection calls attention to an essential feature of meaningful language is doubtlesslytrue. But its force as an argument against the definitional character of implicit definition issomewhat less keenly felt when one realizes that when explicit definition is conceived in purelysyntactical terms, exactly the same objection can be raised against it. Both explicit and implicitdefinition are matters of syntax. The difference is that whereas in the case of explicit definition thedefiniendum and the definientia are distinct, and the "giving extralinguistic meanings" -- however this is done -- to the definientia fixes the extralinguistic meaning of the definiendum; in the case of implicit definition the extralinguistic meaning must be "given" to all the predicates"simultaneously," as they are all both definienda and definientia rolled into one.

A second objection points out that a set of predicates may be implicitly defined in terms of one

another, and yet admit a multiplicity of real meanings.3

But, as before, the same is true of anexplicitly defined term and its definientia. To the set consisting of "man," "rational" and "animal"could belong either the real meanings man , rational and animal , or the real meanings brother , male



and sibling . It may be granted that to the extent that the definientia themselves are explicitly definedin terms of other predicates, and the definientia of these in turn, and so on, the alternative realmeanings capable of belonging to the terms in the chain are increasingly restricted. But it is by nomeans obvious that the terms in however long a definition chain couldn't possess any one of anumber of sets of real meanings. In any event, to the fact that the syntactical structure of a chain of

explicit definitions limits the number of alternative real meanings which can be possessed by the predicates in the chain, corresponds the fact that the number of possible "interpretations" of a set of implicitly defined terms can frequently be narrowed by adding a new axiom to the original set. Inneither case would the utility of the definition seem to depend on its admitting only one set of realmeanings. The purposes of unambiguous communication require only that where one and the sameabstract syntactical structure is associated with two different sets of "extralinguistic meanings," thisstructure be embodied in two sets of visually and audibly different symbols.

But the above is but prelude to the most searching of the objections to the notion of implicitdefinition. The objection is based on broad philosophical considerations, and takes us to the heart of our problem. Its point of departure is the above familiar distinction between the "linguisticmeanings" of an implicitly defined set of predicates, and the "real meanings," the properties andrelations, which are correlated with these predicates. As its first step it reminds us that what theimplicit definition does is specify that certain sentences containing these predicates areunconditionally assertable. In other words, that we are authorized by the rules of the language toassert these sentences without either deriving them from other sentences, or establishing probabilityrelations between them and observation sentences. But, the objection continues, even though theimplicit definition may permit us unconditionally to assert certain sentences involving the

predicates "A," "B," "C," etc., the truth of what we assert depends solely on the relation of the real meanings of these predicates to the world. Thus, even should there be a syntactical rule (implicitdefinition) authorizing us to assert "All A is B" unconditionally (and therefore to derive "x is B"from "x is A") might there not be an object which conforms to the real meaning of "A" withoutconforming to the real meaning of "B"? If this were the case, then as far as its real meaning wasconcerned, "All A is B" would be false, even though the rules of the language blandly authorized usto assert it. There would be a tension between what was authorized by the linguistic meanings of "A" and "B," and what was appropriate to their real meanings. On the other hand, the objectioncontinues, no such contretemps can arise in the case of explicit definition, for it is not logically

possible that something conform to the real meaning of "C" and yet not to the real meaning of "D"where "C" is explicitly defined in terms of "D."

To this the objection adds that even though as a matter of fact all items which conform to thereal meaning of "A" did conform to the real meaning of "B," we could nevertheless conceive of objects conforming to the real meaning of "A" but not that of "B." If, therefore, we were to adopt asyntactical rule authorizing us to derive "x is B" from "x is A," we should be tailoring the verbal

clothing of our thought to be shorter than its reach.The objector grants that it might, in some circumstances, be sensible or convenient to adopt alanguage in which "x is B" is syntactically derivable from "x is A," even though something mightconceivably exemplify the real meaning of "A" without exemplifying the real meaning of "B,"

provided that one were extremely confident on inductive grounds in the truth of the generalization"If anything exemplifies the real meaning of 'A' than it exemplifies the real meaning of 'B.'" But, hecontinues, it just wouldn't do to say that "All A is B" is true by virtue of the meaning of its terms.Implicit definition, he concludes, is a pale imitation of explicit definition, for it lacks the power toyield statements which are true by definition.5. Implicit Definition: X Traditional Defense.

Now the above is only one prong of the attack on implicit definition. But before we develop the

other prong, we must take into account the classic counter to this first offensive. For the defendersare ready with an equally venerable reply.



It will have been noticed that lurking in the premises of the above critique was the idea that evenshould it be true that everything which exemplified the real meaning of "A" also exemplified thereal meaning of "B," it would be so as a matter of fact . So that it would be conceivable thatsomething might conform to that of "A" without conforming to that of "B." If pressed, the criticswould give the following reason for this supposition. After all, they would say, since the statement

"All A is B" is admittedly synthetic , it must be logically possible and hence possible and henceconceivable that something might exemplify the real meaning of "A" without exemplifying that of "B."

It is here that the defense, clothed in the dignity of philosophia perennis , quietly adds that for "All A is B" to be synthetic yet true ex vi terminorum , it is not sufficient that "x is B" besyntactically derivable from "x is A", there must also be an extralinguistic or real connection

between the real meaning of "A" and the real meaning of "B." In other words, given real meaningsfor "A," "B," "C," etc., an implicit definition of these predicates in terms of one another will beadequate only if to the syntactical derivations authorized by the definition, there correspond

synthetic necessary connections between the properties which are the real meanings of these predicates. Indeed, the defense continues, it will be appropriate to give an implicit definition of these terms only to the extent that one apprehends these necessary connections. For only to thisextent could we exclude, merely on the basis of what we mean by, say "A" and "B," the possibilitythat something might conform to the real meaning of "A" but not to that of "B."6. Implicit Definition: The Attack Continued. The opposition to implicit definition now develops the second prong of its offensive, focusingattention on the notion of real or synthetic, necessary connection. It reveals itself to be an"empiricist" opposition, claiming that this notion is incompatible with the most elementary

principles of the empiricist tradition.Historically, the characteristic doctrines of empiricism have been grounded in a theory, or better

a type of theory, of concept formation. Theories of this type form a spectrum which at one endtouches and is easily confused with a radically different approach (to be developed at the close of our argument) which can also with some justice claim the title "empiricism" though it is committedto few if any of the dogmas associated with this term. Let us begin by reflecting on theconsequences for our problem of a characteristic (if somewhat oversimplified) formulation of whatwe shall call concept empiricism. It goes as follows: Concepts of qualities and relations are formedfrom particulars. We can, indeed, have concepts of qualities and relations of which we haveencountered no instances; but only if these concepts "consist" of concepts which have been formedfrom instances.

Now, from this theory, together with certain appropriate assumptions concerning thecomposition of concepts, it follows that we can have no concepts of universals which are notsatisfied by particulars. "Satisfied by particulars" here means "would be satisfied by particulars if

satisfied at all." In this sense the property Centaur is satisfied by particulars, even though it actuallyhas no instances.The implication of concept empiricism with respect to the concept of real connection is

immediate and murderous. There is no such concept. Yet here we must be careful. It is sometimesthought that when Hume and his followers are criticizing rationalistic discourse about necessaryconnections, their application of concept empiricism consists in pointing out that they find noinstances of necessary connection among sensibly experienced particulars, and predict that we shallfind none. If this were the heart of the matter, the obvious comeback would be "You are either looking in the wrong place, or are necessary-connection-blind." The truth, of course, is that if thereis such a thing as necessary connection, it is a relation satisfied by universals (a relation whoseterms are universals), and not by particulars. Thus, for the concept empiricist, our failure to have

such a concept is not a mere matter of failing to find any particulars which exemplify it; we couldn'tfind particulars which exemplify it.



It should be noted that unqualified concept empiricism equally entails that we have no conceptof logical necessity, not to mention conjunction, disjunction, negation and class-membership,though concept empiricists have not been quite as assiduous in pointing this out as they have beenin scoffing at real connection. And even should the concept empiricist seek to define logicalnecessity in psychological terms, or, perhaps, give an emotivist analysis of such terms as

"necessary" and "must," denying them cognitive meaning, he can scarcely treat such useful terms as"and," "or," "not," and "is a member of" in either of these ways. Sooner or later he is led todistinguish between two types of cognitively meaningful expression:those which "have extralinguistic meaning," e.g. "red," and "centaur"; andthose which, while they do not "have extra linguistic meaning," have a legitimate (and indeedindispensable) syntactical function in language.

But more of this later. For the moment it is sufficient to note that whatever else he may becommitted to, the concept empiricist can have no truck with a relation of real connection betweenextralinguistic or real meanings. As a result, if he has any use at all for the phrase "implicitdefinition," it can mean nothing more to him than the building of empirical generalizations of whichwe are highly confident into the very syntactical structure of our language. The concept empiricist isthus in a position to return to the first prong of the attack on the notion of implicit definition byinsisting once again, this time on explicit empiricist grounds, that even should an "implicitdefinition" authorize us to derive "x is B" from "x is A" at the linguistic level, it nevertheless cannot

prevent us from conceiving of something which exemplifies the real meaning of "A" withoutexemplifying that of "B."7. Concept Empiricism: The Conservative Approach. The moral of the argument to date is that only if concept empiricism is rejected is it possible to holdthat there are nonlogically true propositions which are true ex vi terminorum .

There are many to whom this would be the end of the matter, as they find some version of concept empiricism to be beyond dispute. Indeed, there was a time, not too long ago, when I myself was a convinced concept empiricist -- though I was not as aware of its implications and

presuppositions as I should have been. For a number of years, however, I have been a renegade, andin the following pages I shall indicate some of the considerations which led me to abandon conceptempiricism, as well as the resulting changes in my interpretation of the synthetic a priori.

In the preceding section it sufficed for our purposes to introduce concept empiricism by meansof a studiously vague formulation. We must now call attention to the fact that the phrase denotestwo radically different lines of thought which agree, however, in concluding that the basic conceptsin terms of which all genuine concepts are defined are concepts of qualities and relationsexemplified by particulars in what is called "the given" or "immediate experience."

In its more traditional and conservative form, concept empiricism distinguishes sharply betweenthe intellectual awareness of qualities and relations, and the formulation of this awareness by the

use of symbols. In short, it accepts without question a venerable but, at present, unfashionabledistinction between thought and its expression in language (or, as it is sometimes put, between "realthinking" and "symbolic thinking"). Thus the concept empiricist of this brand conceives of suchsymbols as "red" and "between" as acquiring meaning by virtue of becoming associated with suchabstract entities as redness and between-ness, the association being mediated by our awareness of these entities. His attention is thus focused on the question, "How, and in what circumstances, dowe become aware of abstract entities?"

Now it is characteristic of the concept empiricist to be convinced that an essential role in the process whereby we come to be aware of universals is played by particulars which exemplify theseuniversals. In its more coherent form, the primary ground of this conviction seems to have been ametaphysical conviction to the effect that abstract entities exist only in rebus , that is, in particulars,

so that only through particulars could mind enter into relations with them. This was usually coupledwith the claim that our ability to be aware of even the most complex and recondite universal can beexplained on the hypothesis that in the last analysis all awareness of universals is derived from the



awareness of instances, together with a more or less crude attempt to fill in the psychologicaldetails.

In its classical form, concept empiricism can be dramatized as follows: A mind is about to learnthe meaning of the word "red." The abstract entity in question is lurking in the manifold of sense.But so are many others. This one stands out clearly. Here! and here! No, that can't be it! Aha! a

splendid specimen. By the methods of Mill! That must be what mother calls "red!" No one, of course, would recognize a theory of his own in such an absurd picture. Empiricism is

notoriously a tough-minded theory, whereas the above is soft-headed. Nevertheless, it is myconviction that although most philosophers who call themselves empiricists would reject it out of hand, they fail to appreciate the extent to which it is part and parcel of the empiricist inheritance, aswell as the extent to which some of the most characteristic dogmas of empiricism are expressions of the hold it still has on the empiricist imagination.

This is not the occasion for a detailed discussion of this first main type of concept empiricism.Our present concern is rather with its underlying presupposition of a distinction between the pureawareness of an abstract entity on the one hand, and the linguistic or, in general, symbolicexpression of this pure awareness on the other. That I regard this distinction as a mistake willscarcely cause surprise. The proposal to abandon it has lost its revolutionary ring. Once a radicalinnovation, the notion that thought is a "symbolic process" has become a commonplace, almost atruism. Unfortunately, as is the case with many contentions that have become truisms, itsimplications are no longer as passionately scrutinized as they were when it was new, and it is oftencombined with modes of theorizing with which it is radically incompatible. In view of thewidespread acceptance of the thesis in question, there is little need to construct one more argumentin its defense. Instead I shall concern myself with certain of its implications which bear on thesynthetic a priori.

Let us assume, then, that the situation which obtains when it is true to say that Jones is aware of a quality or relation or possibility or, even, a particular, can (in principle) be exhaustively describedin terms of episodes and dispositions relating to the use of linguistic symbols 4 (predicates,sentences, names, descriptions). Indeed, since the tidy, socially stabilized structures we calllanguages are continuous with more rudimentary conceptual mechanisms, let us assume that theabove Jonesean situations can (in principle) be exhaustively described in terms of habits anddispositions relating to the use of symbols. Now, this assumption has an obvious implication of great importance for our problem. If what occurs when we are "aware of a universal" is the use of asymbol, it follows that learning to use a symbol cannot be based on the awareness of universals. Inother words, we are committed to the abandonment of what has happily been called the metaphor of the mental eye, which is so deeply rooted in the grand tradition of western philosophy (and is one of the major points on which East Meets West) that its influence crops up where least expected.

If we put this implication in a slightly different way, we immediately establish contact with a

characteristic contention of Professor Lewis. All classification of objects, however confident and pre-emptory, is a venture, a venture which at no point finds its justification in a presymbolic visionof generic and specific hearts on the sleeves of the objects of experience. Classification resemblesthe grasping tentacles of an octopus, now tentative, now confident, rather than a salesman'sselection of a suit for a customer after a glance at his build. I am afraid, however, that our agreement with Lewis is more shadow than substance. For while he writes in this manner of theinterpretation of the given by means of concepts whose implications transcend the given, he alsoholds that the sensible appearances of things do wear their hearts on their sleeves, and that we dohave a cognitive vision of these hearts which is direct, unlearned and incapable of error -- thoughwe may make a slip in the expressive language by which these insights are properly formulated. Inother words, the assumption to which we are committed requires us to extend to all classificatory

consciousness whatever, the striking language in which Lewis describes our consciousness of objects.8. Concept Empiricism, Syntactics, Semantics and Pragmatics.



We distinguished above between two radically different lines of thought which lead to theconclusions characteristic of concept empiricism. Of these we have taken a brief look at the first or mental eye variant. Before turning to the second, let one point out that although for analytical

purposes we are drawing a sharp distinction between these two approaches, historically they haveusually been blended into one confused argument.

The concept empiricism we are now defining arose pari passu with the development of association theories of learning in psychology, and has felt as much at home in more recent

behavioristic formulations as in the earlier (mentalistic) varieties of this psychological movement.In its traditional form, this second approach, although it agrees verbally with the more conservativeform of concept empiricism that such words as "red" acquire meaning by becoming associated withuniversals (though it tends to stress classes rather than qualities and relations), insists that thisassociation develops, unmediated by awareness of abstract entities, by the joint occurrence of instances of the word and instances of the characteristic in question. In other words, while it isredness that is associated with "red," the mechanism whereby this association is created does notinvolve awareness of redness, but only the joint occurrence in experience of instances of rednesswith tokens of "red." In this respect it differs radically from the first approach, for which theformation of the association involves awareness of the universal. In short, the concept empiricismwhich develops in this context, if it does not entirely escape from the metaphor of the mental eye, atleast does not include abstract entities within its visual field.

Now, if we do not limit ourselves to the account thus crudely sketched, but embrace in our viewthe more sophisticated theories of this general type, there is clearly something to them. A

philosopher who rejects the mental eye approach and all its implications is indeed committed to theview that it is by the causal interplay of the individual and his physical and social environment,without benefit of a prehension of eternal objects, whether in re or extra rem , that concepts,meaningful symbols, arise. However, while there is indeed something to theories of the above type,they are guilty of a radical confusion, and are in large part responsible for the more implausiblefeatures of contemporary empiricism.

Our first comment on the theory sketched above is a restatement and pressing of a point madeearlier in this paper. It is simply that unqualified concept empiricism is patently incapable of accounting for many of our most familiar concepts, among others those of logic and mathematics.To remedy this defect, the theory is usually modified by introducing a radical dualism into itsaccount of concepts and concept formation. The theory now recognizes a second mode of conceptformation, namely the learning to use symbols in accordance with rules of logical syntax. Theconcepts of logic and mathematics are held to be symbols which gain meaning in this second way,rather than by association with empirical phenomena.

It is even more important to note that even those terms, such as "red," which are supposed bythe theory to gain meaning by association, share in the second mode of concept formation, for only

by being used in accordance with rules of logical syntax can they perform the functions by virtue of which a concept is a concept.Clearly, then, the learning to use symbols in accordance with rules is a pervasive feature of

concept formation. Up until now the rules we have considered in this paper have been syntacticalrules, rules according to which assertable expressions are put together, and properly derived fromone another. However, some proponents of the second approach to concept empiricism have beenso impressed with the philosophical power of the concept of rule, that they have applied it to theassociation of a term with an extralinguistic class of objects, which association, as we have seen, isthe core of their theory. Thus we find them characterizing the learning to use a language or systemof concepts as the learning to use symbols in accordance with two types of rule:rules of syntax, relating symbols to other symbols;

semantical rules, whereby basic factual terms acquire extralinguistic meaning.It takes but a moment, however, to show that this widespread manner of speaking involves a radicalmistake. A rule is always a rule for doing something in some circumstance. And a rule is the sort of



thing that one follows . But following a rule entails recognizing that a circumstance is one to whichthe rule applies. If there were such a thing as a semantical rule by the adoption of which adescriptive term acquires meaning, it would presumably be of the form "Red objects are to bedesignated by the word 'red.' " But to recognize the circumstances in which this rule has application,one must already have the concept of red! Those who speak in this sense of semantical rules,

therefore, are committed to the view that an awareness of abstract entities is a precondition of learning the intelligent use of symbols.

Now, once the concept empiricist acknowledges the force of these considerations, he iscommitted to a revision of his theory which, in effect, changes its whole spirit and orientation, and,indeed, deprives it of many of the philosophical implications which are so dear to traditionalempiricism. But before developing this point let us briefly review the fundamentals of conceptformation as they appear in this new perspective. The learning of a language or conceptual frameinvolves the following logically (but by no means chronologically) distinguishable phases 5:The acquisition of habits pertaining to the arranging of sounds and visible marks into patterns andsequences of patterns. The acquisition of these habits can be compared to the setting up that part of the wiring of a calculating machine which takes over once the "problem" has been "punched in." 6 The acquisition of thing-word connections. This can be compared to the setting up of that part of thewiring of a calculating machine which permits the "punching in of information." These connectionsare a matter of being conditioned to respond to kinds of situation with kinds of verbal patterns, e.g.to respond to the presentation of a green object with "This is green"; it is not a matter of "learning tosay '. . .' when one observes that the situation is thus-and-so." Observing that the situation is thus-and-so already involves the use of a conceptual frame. 7

Let us refer to these two dimensions of (descriptive) concept formation as the learning of intralinguistic moves and language entry transitions .8 Now, it might be thought that while adescriptive word like "red" wouldn't be a word unless it played the syntactical role of a predicate inintralinguistic moves, its possession of empirical meaning, indeed the fact that it is the word it is, isconstituted by its role as a conditioned response to red things. And, indeed, there is a certain

plausibility to the idea that to say of the German word "rot," for example, that it means red , is to saythat this vocable is associated (by Germans) with red things. Certainly, if they did not (tend to)respond to red things with "rot," it could not be true that this German word means red . But, as weshall see, to grant the latter point is by no means to concede the former.

Sentences of the form " ' Rot ' means red " have had no less a hypnotic and disastrous effect onempiricists engaged in formulating theories of concept formation, than on the most naive mentaloculists. Such sentences, which appear to present meaning as a tete-a-tete relation between a wordand a universal, have been misinterpreted as entailing what might well be called a "matrimonial"theory of the meaning of primitive or undefined descriptive predicates according to which the factthat these terms have meaning is constituted by the fact that they are associated with (married to)

classes of objects. Yet that these sentences entail no such consequences becomes obvious once wereflect that it is just as legitimate and, indeed, true to say "The German word ' und ' means and " as itis to say "The German word ' rot ' means red "; where it is clear that " und " gains its meaning not by a

process of association with conjunction or a class of conjoined objects, but rather by coming to beused with other symbols in accordance with familiar syntactical rules.

Let us examine the force of the form " '. . .' means --." Suppose Smith says, "When Schmidt says'und' it means and ." This statement clearly conveys the information that Schmidt has habits withrespect to "und" which parallel his own (Smith's) with respect to "and." Yet it must not be assumedthat if it is the business of a statement to convey information of a certain kind, this information must

be asserted by the statement in the sense that a definitional unpacking of the statement would reveal it . "Jones ought to do A" conveys the information that Jones can do A; yet it is a mistake to suppose

that a definitional unpacking of the former would reveal a sentence asserting the latter. Thus, Smithis not mentioning his habits, or the habits of English-speaking people generally, with respect to"and." He mentions the German vocable "und" but uses the English vocable "and." He uses it,



however, in a peculiar way, a way which is characteristic of semantical discourse. He presents uswith an instance of the word itself, not a name of it, and, making use of the fact that we belong tothe same language community, indicates to us that we have only to rehearse our use of "and" toappreciate the role of " und " on the other side of the Rhine. 9

Now suppose Smith to say, 'When Schmidt says 'rot' it means red ." Once again this statement

conveys the information, i.e. in some sense implies, that Schmidt has habits with respect to aGerman word which parallel his own (Smith's) with respect to an English word. But whereas if onesupposes that Smith's statement mentions habits, the fact that it mentions " rot " but uses "red" isnaturally taken to imply that the habits in question are of the word-thing variety, we now see thatthe statement has no such implication. Smith's statement conveys the information that Schmidt hasword-thing habits with respect to " rot " only in the course of conveying the global information thatin all relevant respects Schmidt's habits with respect to "rot" parallel his own (Smith's) with respectto "red."

Thus, instead of leading us to adopt a matrimonial theory of "the meaning relation between ' rot 'and red ," the explication of " ' rot ' means red " makes it clear that this sentence is not a relationsentence at all, or, at least, that it is a relation sentence only in a purely grammatical sense of thisterm. For its business is not to describe " rot " and red as standing in a relation, but rather to conveythe information characterized above. 10

Now, the moral of all this is that we need no longer be hypnoized by the facile contrast betweenthe "linguistic meaning" and the "real meaning" of a word. For to say that " rot " has real meaning,and, indeed, the real meaning red , is merely to convey the information that "rot" is the subject(beyond the Rhine) of a full-blooded set of habits sufficient to constitute it a word in actual use,and, indeed, a use which parallels our own use of "red." Consequently, to come to the point, if our use of "red" involves extralogical syntactical rules ("P-rules") as well as "L-rules," it follows that"rot" couldn't have the "real meaning" it does unless it, too, were subject to "P-rules" and, indeed,"P-rules" which parallel those obeyed by "red."

I shall suppose, then, that the conceptual status of descriptive predicates can correctly beattributed to the fact that they are governed by rules of usage. These rules of usage includeextralogical rules (about which we shall say more in a moment) as well as logical rules in thenarrow sense (Carnap's L-rules). Those descriptive predicates which are conditioned responses tosituations of the kind they are correctly said to mean, are called observation predicates . If alanguage did not contain observation predicates it would not be applied . Descriptive predicatesother than observation predicates gain application through rules tying them to observation

predicates. However, only if one supposes that for an undefined descriptive predicate to havedescriptive meaning is for it to be associated with an extralinguistic class of objects, is one forced tohold that all primitive descriptive predicates are observation predicates. One can, indeed, say that allthe other descriptive predicates of language must be "defined" in terms of observation predicates;

but it would be a mistake to suppose that in every case these definitions will be explicit definitions.9. Conceptual Status and Implicit Definition .The above dialectical examination of concept empiricism has been so designed as to bring me to the

position I wish to defend, a position which, as I see it, represents a meeting of extremes, a synthesisof insights belonging to the two major traditions of Western philosophy, "Rationalism" and"Empiricism." Stated summarily, it claims that conceptual status, the conceptual status of descriptive as well as logical -- not to mention prescriptive -- predicates, is constituted, completely constituted, by syntactical rules. Notice that I am not saying that " ' rot ' means red " is true merely byvirtue of the intralinguistic moves proper to "rot" (in German). For " ' rot ' means red " can be trueonly if in addition to conforming to syntactical rules paralleling the syntax of "red," it is applied byGermans to red objects, that is, if it has the same application as "red." Thus, the "conceptual status"

of a predicate does not exhaust its "meaning." The rules on which I wish to focus attention are rulesof inference. 11 Of these there are two kinds, logical and extralogical (or "material") . I can bestindicate the difference between them by saying that a logical rule of inference is one which



authorizes a logically valid argument, that is to say, an argument in which the set of descriptiveterms involved occurs vacuously (to use Quine's happy phrase), in other words, can be replaced byany other set of descriptive terms of appropriate type, to obtain another valid argument. On theother hand, descriptive terms occur essentially in valid arguments authorized by extralogical rules.

Let me now put my thesis by saying that the conceptual meaning of a descriptive term is

constituted by what can be inferred from it in accordance with the logical and extralogical rules of inference of the language (conceptual frame) to which it belongs. (A technically more adequateformulation would put this in terms of the inferences that can be drawn from sentences in which theterm appears.)

Finally, let me make the same claim in still another way by pointing out that where "x is B" can be validly inferred from "x is A," the proposition "All A is B" is unconditionally assertable on the basis of the rules of the language. Our thesis, then, implies that every primitive descriptive predicateoccurs in one or more logically synthetic propositions which are unconditionally assertable -- inshort, true ex vi terminorum ; or as it was put at the end of the preceding section, true by implicitdefinition. But a logically synthetic proposition which is true ex vi terminorum is, by theconventions adopted at the opening of the paper, a synthetic a priori proposition. 12 10. The Synthetic A Priori: A Terminological Decision. If I had the courage of my definitions, then, it seems that I should proclaim myself a proponent of the synthetic a priori. Yet I feel uncomfortable. Is the synthetic a priori described above a realsynthetic a priori? Would those who have fought and suffered fot the cause of the synthetic a priori(and one has only to speak to a "believer" to realize that it is a cause) welcome me to their ranks? Iam afraid that the answer is No; that they would spurn my support and say that if this is all thesynthetic a priori amounts to, it is not worth the name, and is probably a peculiar kind of a

posteriori.It does not take long to discover the reasons for their discontent, and the results throw new light

on a venerable controversy. At the beginning of the paper we considered four traditional criteria of a priori knowledge:It is knowledge of necessary truth;It is certain knowledge;It is knowledge independent of experience ;It is knowledge of truth ex vi terminorum .We found it plausible to say that ultimately these four criteria coincide -- after which we moved intothe detail of our argument. I want now to bring out a certain ambiguity in the second and third of these criteria, and by so doing, make clear that whether or not the position I have sketched iscommitted to a synthetic a priori is a matter for terminological decision.

Consider, to begin with, the third criterion, namely, independent of experience . Let us supposethat in our language "All A is B" is one of the propositions which implicitly define the predicates

"A" and "B" so that it is true ex vi terminorum that all A's are B. Using, as we do, this language or conceptual structure, we know that all A's must be B, that something which is not B cannot be A.This knowledge is independent of experience in the perfectly straightforward sense that it is afunction of the very concepts with which we approach the world. As long as we continue to usethese words in the same sense, continue, that is, to use the same concepts, we can never find aninstance of A which fails to be B.

But though in this sense our knowledge that all A's are B is independent of experience, there isanother sense in which it most certainly does depend on experience. After all, the learning of aconceptual frame, the learning to use symbols in accordance with certain logical and extralogicalrules is a psychological process essential elements of which are sensory stimuli together with therewards and punishments which the environment (including the social environment) brings to our

motivations. The conceptual frame we have developed is only one of a vast number of alternativeframes any one of which we might have been brought to adopt by a more or less radical shift in thecourse of our environment. The claim that our conceptual frame is only one among many possible



conceptual frames, and that our adoption of it is to be explained in terms of learning theory rather than of insight into abstract entities, is what led our true-blue proponent of the synthetic a priori tosay that our synthetic a priori is a peculiar kind of a posteriori.

Next, a closely related remark on the second criterion, namely certainty . Let us suppose that a person has acquired a firmly embedded conceptual frame. In employing this frame, he will

distinguish between those propositions which are certain , and those which are at best merely probable on the evidence. The former will coincide with propositions which, in his frame, are trueex vi terminorum . Notice, however, that when the learning process begins to bring about amodification of his conceptual frame, he will admit to being "uncertain" of even those propositionswhich, in that frame, are true ex vi terminorum . It is clear from this description that we are dealing with two different senses of the contrast between certainty and uncertainty . The first may be calledthe "intraconceptual," the second the "extraconceptual" sense. Thus, it makes good sense to say "Iam uncertain about its being certain that all A's are B." Uncertainty in this second sense is notsomething that can be remedied by "paying closer attention to what we mean." It can be overcome(should this be desirable) only by more firmly learning to apply the conceptual system in questionto experience, without hesitation or uneasiness.

But is this the goal of wisdom? Not if we are correct in maintaining that to all conceptualstructures there are alternatives; and that no conceptual frame carries the imprint "sterling"certifying it to be the conceptual frame to which all others, to the extent that they are "coherent,"approximate. The essence of scientific wisdom consists in being uncertain 2 about what is certain 1, ina readiness to move (in circumstances the discussion of which belongs rather to a paper onInduction) from one conceptual frame to another. For not only can we be caused to modify our linguistic frame, we can deliberately modify it -- teach ourselves new habits -- and give reasons for doing so. It is the idea that because (in terms of our present use of "A" and "B") we have found allobserved A's to be B, it would be reasonable to adopt "All A is B" as an unconditionally assertiblesentence, which finds expression in "It is probable that all A is necessarily B." 13 Now, the use of aconceptual frame is the awareness of a system of logical and extralogical necessities. The essence of scientific wisdom, therefore, lies in being tentative about what one takes to be extralogicallynecessary.

In conclusion, if one means by synthetic a priori knowledge, knowledge which is logicallysynthetic, yet true ex vi terminorum , then indeed, there is synthetic a priori knowledge. If one means

by it, synthetic knowledge to which there is no significant alternative, then synthetic a prioriknowledge is a myth, a snare and a delusion. The question "Is there a synthetic a priori?" calls,therefore, for a decision, before it calls for an answer. What the decision should be, that is, whichmeaning (if any) should be attached to the term "a priori," it is by no means easy to say. Manyfactors are involved, by no means the least of which is a sense of belonging to one or other of thetwo major traditions of Western philosophy. If one's overall loyalty is to Sextus and to Hume, one

will be moved to say "There is no synthetic a priori" and, hence, to choose a sense of "a priori"which will make this statement true. If one's heart beats with the rationalists, one will long to say"There is a synthetic a priori," and will make the corresponding terminological decision. If one istired of philosophical shibboleths, and finds important insights on both sides of the fence, one willcontent oneself with pointing out that while every conceptual frame involves propositions which,though synthetic, are true ex vi terminorum , every conceptual frame is also but one among manywhich compete for adoption in the market place of experience.

Notes1. Unless I am much mistaken, C. I. Lewis thinks of his "categorial principles" as

unquestionably analytic, because he thinks of them as analogous to "The area of a Euclidean triangle is 1/2 bh." Now, if he intends this analogy, then his categorial principles are indeedlogically true. But then, if the above discussion is sound, must there not be a corresponding set of



propositions which are not logically true, and which contain a set of predicates which are notexplicitly defined in terms of these propositions? predicates which correspond to "triangle" asoccurring in Euclidean axioms, rather than to "Euclidean triangle?"

2. Let me make it clear from the beginning that my willingness to use the phrase "real or extralinguistic meaning" in building up the dialectical structure of my argument does not reflect an

acceptance on my part of a Platonic or Meinongian metaphysics of meaning. My purpose in this paper is to explore the controversy over the synthetic a priori sympathetically and from within, inthe conviction that the truth of the matter lies separated from itself in the opposing camps. Somelight will be thrown on the status of "real meanings" by the discussion of " '. . .' means ---" insection 8 below .

3. See footnote 2 above .4. It should not be assumed that in calling an event a symbol we are describing the event. We are

rather serving notice that our discussion of the event will be in semantical terms. (For a moreadequate formulation of the idea that thoughts are linguistic episodes, and are yet distinguishable

from and expressed by overt linguistic episodes, see my essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science , Vol. 1, published by the University of Minnesota Press, 1956.)

5. I leave out of account, as a topic too large to be introduced into this discussion, though of equal importance for the understanding of the nature of conceptual systems, the prescriptive or conduct guiding aspect of language. But see footnote 7 below .

6. Note that while the activation of these habits results in verbal behavior which conforms tosyntactical rules, it cannot be the following of syntactical rules unless the subject has learned the

prescriptive syntactical metalanguage which permits the formulation of these rules. For anelaboration of this point, see my paper, "Some Reflections on Language Games," Philosophy of Science , 1954.

7. Just as an intralinguistic move is not in the full sense an inference unless the subject not onlyconforms to, but follows, syntactical rules (though he may conceive them to be rules justifying thetransition not from one linguistic expression to another, but from one thought to another); so alanguage entry transition is not in the full sense an observation unless the subject not only (innormal circumstances) tokens "This object is green" if and only if a green object is present to hissenses, but is able to infer (in a pragmatic metalanguage) from "Jones uttered 'This object is green'(or the thought 'This object is green' occurred to Jones) at time t in place s in circumstances c" to "agreen object was present to Jones' senses at t in s." For a more complete analysis of the role of aconceptual framework in seeing that p is the case, and of the relation between thoughts and overtlinguistic behavior, see the essay referred to in footnote 4 .

8. That the acquisition of a conceptual frame also involves language departure transitions , andthat this notion is the key to the status of prescriptive discourse is argued in the paper on "language

games" referred to in footnote 6 .9. Descriptive discourse, prescriptive discourse and semantical discourse are three differentmodes of speech. Nevertheless, by virtue of what is presupposed by their correct utterance,statements in one of these modes may convey information properly formulated in another mode.

10. The fact that such a statement as " ' rot ' means red " conveys descriptive information about"rot " but does not describe it, undercuts the traditional problem of universals (and abstract entitiesgenerally). If one misunderstands the function of such statements, and supposes that " ' rot ' meansred " describes " rot " as standing in a relation to red , then, if one is anti-Platonist, one will bereluctant to use the semantical mode of speech, and will be particularly unwilling to allow aninference from " ' rot ' means red " to "There is a quality which ' rot ' means." Statements of the latter kind appear to make bold assertion of the factual existence of abstract entities which are suspected

to infect the former. The truth of the matter is that the "There is a quality (relation, possibility, particular . . . .) . . ." of the latter is a purely logical device which has no connection with "factualexistence." To say, "There is an obligation more stringent than promise keeping," is not to attribute



"factual existence" to obligations! [For an elaboration of this and related points, see my essay"Empiricism and Abstract Entities" in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap , edited by P. A. Schilpp,Library of Living Philosophers, Open Court Publishing Co., Wilmette, Illinois, 1963. (added inSPR)]

11. A more detailed statement and defense of my thesis will be found in "Inference and

Meaning," Mind , 1953.12. Note that, strictly speaking, one can only say that a sentence of L is true ex vi terminorum ,

as one can only say that a sentence of L is true simpliciter, if one's own language contains atranslation of these sentences, which will not be the case if expressions occurring in these sentencesconform to different P-rules from those obeyed by their closest counterparts in one's own language.See "Some Reflections on Language Games," Philosophy of Science , Vol. 21, 1954, pp. 224ff.

13. For an account of induction which views it as a matter of having reasons for revising one'sconceptual framework, which recognizes that to have reasons is to be in a conceptual framework,and which, in the spirit of the above analysis, denies that any conceptual framework is given , see"Some Reflections on Language Games," loc. cit. , pp. 225ff. [In SPR, the following note issubstituted: "For an account in the spirit of the above argument of the causal modalities and thenature and rationality of induction, see my essay on "Counterfactuals, Dispositions and the CausalModalities" in Volume II of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science , edited by HerbertFeigl and Michael Scriven, Minneapolis, 1957."]



Kant's Transcendental Idealismby Wilfrid Sellars

University of Pittsburgh

Published in Collections of Philosophy 6 (1976): 165-181.[Note by editor: This surely must be one of the most difficult of Sellars' articles to find. I myself was unsuccessful in finding a copy until two years ago when both David Rosenthal and WillemdeVries sent me copies of the typescript and published versions. There are minor differences

between these. In this transcript, I have favored the typescript over the published version. AndrewChrucky]

1. When Kant mobilizes the position which he calls 'transcendental idealism' to resolve theantinomies, he describes as the doctrine that "everything intuited in space and time, and therefore allobjects of any experience possible to us, are nothing but appearances, that is, mere representationswhich, in the manner in which they are represented, as extended beings or as series of alterations,have no independent existence outside our thoughts." He contrasts this thesis with that of the"realist, in the transcendental meaning of the term" who "treats these modifications of our sensibility as self-subsistant things, that is, treats mere representations as things in themselves" (A490-1; B 518-9).

2. Since Kant calls his idealism 'transcendental' in order to indicate that it enables him toaccount for the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge concerning objects in space and time, hehas, strictly speaking, no use for the term 'transcendental realism,' since on his account of synthetica priori knowledge we could have no such knowledge of spatio-temporal objects if they were thingsthemselves. Nor did realists, as he sees it, claim that their realism accounted for the existence of such knowledge, although at least some of them would have taken realism to be compatible with it.

3. The title of this essay is, of course, overly ambitious. In particular, it seems to promise asmuch discussion of 'transcendental' as of 'idealism.' My primary concern, however, is with theontological aspects of Kant's idealism, and only incidentally (and by implication ) withepistemological issues concerning synthetic a priori knowledge. I note in passing, however, thatsince the ontological aspects of Kant's idealism concern in large part the ontology of mental states,and since, although epistemology is not psychology, it is mental states which are the proper subjectsof epistemic appraisal, Kant's ontology of mental states is directly relevant to his epistemology and,consequently, to his transcendental philosophy.

4. I shall be primarily concerned with the views Kant expresses in the first edition. I am,however, in whole-hearted agreement with his claim that there is a fundamental identity betweenthe views expressed in the two editions. In the Preface to the second edition (B xxxvii ff.) he

explains the changes he has made as a matter of removing "difficulties and obscurity" which "not, perhaps, without my fault, may have given rise to misunderstandings," and of omitting or abridging,to make room for new material, "certain passages which, though not indeed essential to thecompleteness of the whole may yet be missed by many readers as otherwise helpful." He suggeststhat the "loss . . . can be remedied by consulting the first edition," thus implying that the deletedmaterial coheres with the new material. As regards ''the propositions themselves and their proofs,"however, he claims that he has ''found nothing to alter," a statement which he shortly repeats witheven greater force by characterizing the new edition as altering absolutely nothing in thefundamentals of the propositions put forward or even in their proofs," though he does grant that this[he hopes] more intelligent exposition . . . "here and there departs so far from the previous methodof treatment that mere interpolations could not be made to suffice" (B xlii).

5. It is surely implied by these claims that in Kant's eyes the refutation of idealism which wasadded in the second edition is not only compatible with the teachings of the first, but is implied bythem. I think this is correct. The 'new' refutation simply applies the content of the Analytic of



Principles , and, in particular, the Analogies to the topic of idealism, an application which is presentin, though not highlighted by, the first edition refutation. And when Kant explains why he hasrelocated the refutation in the Postulates of Empirical Thought , his reason is a good one rather than,as Bennett characterizes it, a "silly" one. 1 Anyone who studies the fourth Paralogism must feel theawkwardness involved not only in classifying the theses of Rational Psychology in terms of

'relation,' 'quality,' 'quantity' and 'modality,' but, in particular, the treatment of problematic idealismas the modal counterpart of the substantiality, simplicity and personal identity of the soul. Therelation of our knowledge of material things to our perceptual experiences is far more at home in asection devoted to the thesis that "that which is bound up with the material conditions of experience,that is, with sensation, is actual.'' For this bound-up-ness, when one spells it out does have aninferential aspect and therefore does lead naturally to the Cartesian problem.

6. I shall not, therefore, discuss the second edition refutation as such, since I hope to convinceyou that its familiar claims are indeed contained in the first edition, indeed in the first editionrefutation itself. For in spite of its 'subjectivist' flavor, the latter contains a reference to and, indeed,a summary of the answer to the question "What is an object of representations?" raised first in theintroductory passages of the first edition Transcendental Deduction, answered in highly schematicform, raised again is the Second Analogy, and this time given a fleshed-out answer which isrepeated in the text of the second edition. And it is Kant's answer to this question which is central tothe contrast he draws between his idealism and the idealisms he calls 'dogmatic' and 'problematic.'II

7. In the passage from the Dialectic with which I began, transcendental idealism is characterizeddirectly as the view that "everything intuited in space and time, and therefore all objects of anyexperience possible to us, are nothing but appearances, that is mere representations which . . . haveno independent existence outside our thoughts." It is characterized indirectly by its contrast withrealism "in the transcendental sense," according to which these objects are "self-subsistant things,"or "things in themselves." In a key footnote which occurs in the fourth Paralogism (A 375n) Kantwrites

We must give full credence to this paradoxical but correct proposition, that there is nothing inspace save what is represented in it. For space is itself nothing but representation, and whatever is init must therefore he contained in the representation. Nothing whatsoever is in space, save insofar asit is actually represented in it. It is a proposition which must indeed sound strange, that a thing canexist only in the representation of it, but in this case the objection falls, in as much as the thingswith which we are concerned are not things themselves, but appearances only, that is,representations.Kant here does not use the contrast between existence 'inside' or 'outside' our 'thoughts,' but it isclear that he is treating the relevant sense of 'representation' as equivalent to 'thought,' for he has just

written that while "something which may be (in the transcendental sense) outside us" -- i.e. whichexists in itself -- "is the cause of our outer intuitions . . . this is not the object of which we arethinking in the representations of matter and of corporeal things; for these are merely appearances,that is mere kinds of representation, which can never be met with save in us . . ." (A 372). It is clear that to 'represent' is here a case of to 'think' and that Kant, who is elaborating the definition he has

just given of 'transcendental idealism' as

the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being one and all representations only and notthings in themselves (A 369)is introducing in his comments on this definition the formula of the later definition in the Dialectic according to which the objects of intuition "have no independent existence outside our thoughts."

8. Intuitions, in the relevant sense, are a species of 'thought' and when Kant says thatappearances are ''mere kinds of representation", we certainly should not interpret this as meaningthat appearances are mental acts of thinking. They are items which exist 'in' our thoughts, i.e. which



are, in an appropriate sense, represent eds rather than acts of represent ing . And when he adds that"appearances are not to be met with save in us" this must, of course, be construed in terms of hisdistinction between the 'empirical' and the 'transcendental' senses of 'in us' and 'outside us.'

9. Now mental acts which are intuitings are not, of course judgings . But they are neverthelessthoughts . In the important classification of representations ( vorstellungen ) which Kant gives in an

introductory passage of the Dialectic (A 319; B 376) Kant includes sensations as well as intuitionsas representations. A sensation however is a "mere modification of the mind," whereas an intuition(though not a general concept) is an '' erkenntnis " (" Cognitio "). Its distinctive feature is thatalthough, like a general concept, a cognitio , it is a singular one and does not refer to an object"mediately by means of a feature which several things may have in common" as do generalconcepts.

10. Kant holds the interesting and important view which I have explored elsewhere, 2 that an'intuition of a manifold' as contrasted with a sheer 'manifold of intuition' is an 'erkenntnis' which

presents as much as does an Aristotelian 'phantasm' ( tode-ti ) as a this-such, though it is not a judgment of the form '(this) is (such).' 3 In a paragraph (A 79; B 105) of the Metaphysical Deductionof the Categories, which can almost be described as the Transcendental Deduction and theSchematism in embryo, Kant tells us, in effect, that intuitions of manifolds contain the verycategories which can be found m the general concepts which we apply to these intuitions (andwhich we have, indeed, by "analytic thinking", derived from them) (A 78-9).

The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also givesunity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition ; and this unity, in its mostgeneral expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. The same understandingthrough the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced thelogical form of a judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, bymeans of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general. On this account we are entitledto call these representations pure concepts of the understanding, and to regard them as applying a

priori to objects -- a conclusion which general logic is not in a position to establish.Thus singular judgments which express basic perceptions have the form

(This-such) is so and so and the categories which are implicit in the general concept so and so can be true of the subject of the judgment, i.e. the object intuited, because the intuition of the this-such also contains thecategories.

11. It is essential to see that intuition is a species of thought , for any sense-datum like approachmakes essential features of Kant's theory of knowledge unintelligible, e.g. the Schematism . Thus thecategories apply to intuitions, because, although the content of sensations does not contain the

categories, the content of intuitions (of manifolds ) does. This is the point of Kant's problem abouthomogeneity and of his solution.

III12. Let us take seriously then, the thesis that intuitions of manifolds are thoughts. And let us

apply to them the ontological categories which the Cartesian tradition, rooted in scholastic traditionhad applied to thoughts. An adequate discussion would call for a whole cluster of distinctions inwhich themes from Husserl, the early Brentano, Meinong, and the later Brentano would beinextricably involved. I shall use a bare minimum of distinctions and resolutely avoid probing intothe deeper metaphysical issues involved.

13. Descartes distinguishes between the act and the content aspects of thoughts. The content, of

course, 'exists in' the act. And, of course, contents as contents exist only 'in' acts. On the other hand,there is a sense in which something which 'exists in' an act can also exist, to use Kant's phrase,



'outside' the act. In Descartes terminology, that which exists 'in' the act as its 'content' can have'formal reality' in the world. 4

14. The concept of 'existence in thought' is, of course, a metaphor. So, of course, is the idea thata thought is true if its content 'corresponds' to something actual in the world. In the Cartesiantradition, this account of truth holds both of thoughts of individuals and thoughts of states of affairs.

Thus a thought of an individual is true if there corresponds to it an actual individual, i.e. if theindividual exists not only 'in the thought' as its content, but in the actual world. Similarly, thethought of a state of affairs is true if there 'corresponds' to it an actual state of affairs, i.e. if the stateof affairs which exists in the thought as its content, also exists in the actual world.

15. I have spoken of actuality where Descartes speaks of 'formal reality.' In Kant's terminologywhat Descartes means by 'formal reality,' and which Cartesians would equate with actuality, is'existence in itself' or, to use the latinate term of the Prolegomena , existence ' per se .' Kant clearlyaccepts the Cartesian contrast between 'existence in thought' and 'existence per se ,' -- so much sothat he takes it for granted, as did most of his predecessors. 5

16. One final terminological point: The content of the thought of an individual was consideredto be, in an important sense, an object of the thought. Indeed the thought would have in this sensean object even if nothing in the actual world corresponded to it. Later philosophers drew tidydistinctions between 'immanent objects' and 'transcendent objects,' and we are all familiar with theintuitive appeal of these metaphors. Philosophical terminology consists largely of metaphor addedto metaphor in the hope that the mixture will crystalize out into clear and distinct categories.

17. For Kant, then, an act of intuiting a manifold is a thinking of a this-such in space and/or time. The this-such is something that exists 'in' the act. The problem with which Kant is dealing can

be characterized initially as that of whether individuals in space and/or time also have existence per se. Kant's answer, to anticipate, is that these intuited items exist only 'in' acts of intuition. 6 That is,no items in space and/or time exists per se . He will nevertheless insist that some items which existin acts of intuition are actual . This obviously requires a distinction between actuality and existence

per se , which were conflated by his predecessors.

IV18. It will be useful to connect Kant's concept of the 'intuition of a manifold' with that strand of

contemporary perception theory which operates with fairly traditional concepts of intentionality. Afamiliar notion is that of a perceptual taking. Perceptual takings are, so to speak, thinkings whichare evoked in our minds by our environment or, in limiting cases, by abnormal states of our nervoussystem. Perceptual takings are usually thought to have propositional form. One takes there to be acat on a mat. I suggest that what is taken is best expressed by a referring expression, thus 'this cat onthis mat.' We should think of perceptual takings as providing subjects for propositional thought,rather than already having full-fledged propositional form.

19. Again, if we think of a taking as a special case of a believing , it is best to think of it as a'believing in' rather than a 'believing that.' In a perceptual taking one believes in this cat on this mat ,and may believe, for example, that this cat on this mat is a siamese. Thus construed, perceptualtakings are in many respects the counterparts of Kant's 'intuitions of manifolds.' They represent this-suchs; and it is worth noting that although they are not explicitly propositional in form, theyobviously contain propositional form in the sense in which 'that green table is broken' contains 'thattable is green.'

V 20. Little needs to be said at this stage of the argument about the 'problematic idealism' Kant

attributes to Descartes. Problematic idealism regards the claim that material things and processes

exist per se as a coherent one, but one which can be established only by an inference from our perceptual states; an inference from effect to cause. Mental states have a privileged position in that



they not only can have existence per se . but at is known, indeed 'directly' known, that some mentalstate exist per se .

21. Before looking at Kant's refutation of problematic idealism, it is worth pausing to ask: If thisis 'problematic' idealism, what might 'dogmatic' idealism be? One would expect it to be the viewthat material objects in space and time could not have existence per se , i.e. that there was an

absurdity or contradiction in the idea of the existence per se of material objects. Berkley certainlyheld this position, a fact which might strengthen the temptation to interpret dogmatic idealism alongthese lines.

22. It is also worth noting that Berkeley did not deny that in a sense we (and a fortiori God) canconceive of material objects in space and time, where by the phrase 'material objects' I mean, so tospeak, Lockean objects and not patterns of actual and counterfactual perceptual experiences. 7 Berkeley can be construed as holding that our actual and counterfactual perceptual experiences aregrounded in God's plan to cause us to have those experiences we would have if (a metaphysicalcounterfactuai) there were material objects including human bodies with sense organs, and mindsand bodies were able to interact. In less theological terms, this can be formulated as the view thatwhat exists per se other than our minds is the causal ground of our actual and counterfactual

perceptual experiences.23. To return to the main line of argument, it is only too clear that if we mean by 'dogmatic

idealism' with respect to material objeots the view that they cannot have existence per se , then Kantis a dogmatic idealist of the first water. Indeed as we have seen, Kant makes dogmatic idealism inthis sense the very corner stone of his transcendental idealism.

24. What then does Kant mean by dogmatic idealism? And is any such view to be found inBerkeley? It should be clear that the only answer to the first question which satisfies therequirements of the argument to date is that Kant means by dogmatic idealism the view that nothingspatial can be actual , where actual does not mean 'exists per se .' Indeed Kant's own idealism, whiledenying that material objects exist per se , nevertheless insists that some at least of the spatialobjects which exist 'in our thoughts' and, in particular, in our acts and intuitions, or perceptualtakings, are, in the critical sense, actual .

25. But what of the second question? To what extent is Kant justified in attributing to Berkeleythe view which he (Kant) would express by saying that no spatial items are actual? 8 After all, if , asis often claimed, Kant in the first edition and on occasion in the second edition construes physicalobjects in terms of actual and counterfactual perceptual experiences, is he not in essential agreementwith Berkeley? 9

Vl26. At this point we must retrace our steps in order to advance. My discussion of Descartes'

ontology of mental acts was not only schematic but radically incomplete. For Descartes had two

paradigms of what it is to be a mental state. Let me begin with the one I have neglected. Sensationis a mental state, though one in which the body is intimately involved, and his paradigm of asensation is a feeling of pain. 10 To us, the obvious feature of a feeling of pain is that a feeling of

pain simply is a pain. The existence of a feeling of pain is identical with the existence of a pain.Much more would need to be said to nail this point down, 11 but after all the analytic work has beendone, the fact remains that a pain is a kind of feeling. If we put this by saying that a pain is a'content' or 'object' of feelings, this should be regarded simply as a (misleading) paraphrase of theabove. The danger arises from the fact that this usage would tend to assimilate feelings of pain toDescartes' second paradigm, the clear distinct thought of an object. It is in connecton with the latter that he elaborates the distinctions which were inherited by Kant.

27. It was obvious to Descartes that the mental state of thinking of a cube is not (at least in any

ordinary sense of 'is') a cube. Thus, whereas a feeling of pain is a pain, a thinking of a cube is not acube. Now in his systematic account of sensation, Descartes construes visual sensation on the modelof pain. In terms of this paradigm, a sensation of red would be a case of red as a feeling of pain is a



case of pain. His construal, however, as Gassendi saw, 12 confronted Descartes with a problem.Surely the colors we experience have shape. But if the colors we experience have shape, then, if they are sensations construed on the model of pain, mental states can have shape. To getexperienced color and shape together, Descartes, it seems, must either

give experienced colors the same status as shapes (deny that either can be a modification of themind);give the shapes of experienced colors the same status as colors (admit that modifications of themind can have shape, as Gassendi thought we should).

28. Descartes gives no clear account of the matter. His official account is that while thesensation of red as such is unextended, the shape we perceive, and which has existence 'in thought',is confusedly believed to be the shape of something which resembles the sensation of red. Such

beliefs date from early childhood. They are confused, because nothing can be like a sensation of redwithout being a sensation of red, and hence a modification of the mind 13. In effect, Descartes gives

perceived red the status of believed in red, and by doing so gives it the existence 'in thought' whichthe shape also has. This move requires a distinction between the sensed red which we introspect,and which is not extended, and the perceived shaped red, which is a content rather than amodification of the mind.

29. Now Berkeley, as is well known, also assimilated color to pain. What, then, of shapedcolors? When one feels a pain, there is an actual case of pain. When one senses a color, there is anactual case of color. But when the mind senses a triangle of red, is there an actual case of shape?When directly confronted with this question, 14 Berkeley's answer is no . The shape exists only 'byway of idea,' and it is clear that here the operative conception is a Cartesian cogitatio of which theshape is a content in a sense which does not entail that a mental state has a shape. But thoughBerkeley gives this answer, he is simply not clear about the status of shapes, and what stands out ishis assimilation of the status of shape to that of color and, ultimately, to that of pain. 15

30. Now if Berkeley had consistently held that perceived shapes are not features of mentalstates, but have existence only 'in our thoughts' (in the Cartesian sense) he could nevertheless haveargued ( perhaps on proto-Kantian grounds ) that no shapes have existence per se . Shapes would notexist 'outside the mind' in what Kant called the transcendental sense. They would exist only 'in' themind, not as features of its states but as immanent objects. Berkeley, however, because of theslippery slope pain-color-shape, makes the quite different claim that shapes can not exist 'outsidethe mind' in the sense in which pains can not exist outside the mind. Even though he is not preparedto say in so many words that shapes are essentially features of mental states, he actually commitshimself to this position.

31. Thus it is not unfair on Kant's part to attribute to Berkeley the view that the concept of shaped items which are not mental states is an incoherent one, as incoherent as would be the

concept of a pain which was not a mental state.32. Now it is as evident to Kant as it was to Descartes that neither space itself nor any spatialobject can be a modification of the mind or of a mental state. Thus, while Kant denies that either space or any spatial object has existence per se, and argues that the idea that they do is anincoherent one, he also argues that the idea of shapes which are not features of mental states is itself a coherent one. Thus, if shapes which are not features of mental states do not exist per se it is not

because shapes are essentially features of mental states, but because shapes belong in space, andneither space nor anything in space can exist in itself.

33. We can now begin to appreciate why in Kant's sense of the term Berkeley was a 'dogmaticidealist' and to interpret the following passage:

Berkeley . . . maintains that space, with all the things of which it is the inseparable condition, isin itself impossible and he therefore regards the things in space as merely imaginary entities (B274).



Given that Kant is clearly aware that on his own view neither space nor objects in space can exist inthemselves, the gravamen of the charge against Berkeley must be that the latter's reason for holdingthis is such as to require, as his (Kant's) reasons do not, that ''things in space are merely imaginaryentities." For, once again, Kant dearly has up his sleeve the view that material things, though theynecessarily lack existence per se , which was the traditional concept of actuality, can in the critical

sense be actual. On my interpretation Kant would be recognizbng that Berkeley's reason for rejecting the existence per se of space and spatial objects would be that shape and extension areessentially features of mental states. The concept of spatial items which are not mental states would

be a figment of the philosophical imagination. They would be radically imaginary, not justimaginary in the empirical sense.

34. Kant obscures the justice of his characterization of Berkeley's position in the remark whichfollows, in which he claims that

Dogmauc idealism is unavoidable if space be interpreted as a property that belongs to things inthemselves. For in that case, space and everything to which it serves as a condition, is a non-entity(B 274).Here the direct connection with Berkeley is lost. But that is as it should be, for Kant is merely

pointing out that one can arrive at the conclusion that the concept of actual spatial items other thanmental states is incoherent by a route other than Berkeley's. For if space is a property which must

belong to things in themselves, then, Kant has argued, there can be no such thing. Hence, given theclassical interpretation of actuality as existence per se , it would follow that the concept of an actual spatial object is incoherent. And if the only alternative to hoping that space is a property of things inthemselves were, as Berkeley thought it was, the view that spatial items are features of mentalstates, then the concept of actual spatial items which are not features of mental states would also beincoherent. We would be faced by a dilemma.

Either space is by nature a thing in itself or a property of things in themselves or the spatialitems which underlie our concepts of space and spatial items are (features of) mental states(sensations). On either alternative the concept of actual spatial items which are not mental states isincoherent.Kant has prepared the way for an escape through the horns of this dilemma. He points out that theargument of the Aesthetic enables him to avoid the view that space is either a thing in itself or a

property of things in themselves without agreeing with Berkeley that the concept of spatial itemswhich are not mental states is incoherent.

35. Yet even after he has established to his own satisfaction that the concept of an actual spatialitem which is not a mental state is coherent, he still has to make the essential point that the conceptof actuality does not coincide, as it traditionally did, with that of existence per se .

36. I take it to be clear, then, that Kant holds that no spatial item (notice the cautious use of theterm 'item' as contrasted with the richer term 'object') is a mental state. It can, however, be arguedthat in the first edition and on occasion in the second edition Kant held that material objects are, touse an anachronistic turn of phrase, logical constructions out of mental states which, though notspatial, are representations of spatial items -- i.e. of which spatial items are the content or immanentoojects. After all, he does write that

In our system, on the other hand, these external things, namely matter, are in all their configurations and alterations nothing but mere appearances, that is, representations in us, of thereality of which we are immediately conscious (A 371-2).I think that this interpretation is a mistake, though it must be confessed that because of his failure to

make it clear when he is using 'representation' (and, in particular, 'intuition') in the sense of act of representing, and when he is using these terms in the sense of content represented, it has someinitial plausibility.



37. The crux of the matter as Kant clearly saw is his account of what it is to be an object of actsof representing. He formulates this account schematically in a passage (A 104) which prepares theway for the first edition Transcendental Deduction, and develops it in a more full-bodied way in akey passage in the Second Analogy which occurs in both editions. 16

38. Our primary concern is with perceptual acts or takings. But in the first passage referred to

above, Kant makes his key point in a way which abstracts, as the passage in the Second Analogydoes not, from essential aspects of perceptual takings. Nevertheless, the concepts for which Kant is

preparing the way is that of rules for generating perceptual takings .17 39. The term 'rule' is a dangerous one, for it suggests deliberate activity or, at least, activity

which would be deliberate if it weren't so hasty and, in the ordinary sense, thoughtless. Actually themost useful concept is that of a sequence of acts of representing which can reflectively be classifiedas conforming to a rule which is (at least in principle) graspable by thought. The rules in questionmust, according to Kant, be available, if one is to recognize that one's acts of representing belongtogether as an intelligible sequence. 18

40. Now it might be thought that by introducing the concept of a rule-governed sequence of perceptual representings, i.e. acts of perceptual taking, I am giving hostages to the view thatmaterial objects consist of rule-conforming sequences of perceptual takings. That I am not isimplied by the fact (which I hope to make clear) that even the most tough-minded transcendentalrealist grants that veridical perceptual takings have the coherence which Kant is attempting toclarify by the concept of rule-conforming sequences. Roughly, Kant's transcendental realist thinksof the perceiver as deriving these rules by induction from experience, whereas Kant thinks thatinduction itself presupposes an antecedent grasp of these rules.

VII41. We can now turn our attention to Kant's initial explanation of what it is to be an 'object of

representations.' He asks us to consider the intuitive representation of a triangle. Here the richimplications of the concept of a perceptual taking are laid aside, for the moment, and we are givenan explanation which could concern a construction in pure geometry. For the essential point hewants to make is that while the object of the intuitive representing is indeed a triangle , the triangleis not an existent per se , and that although the content triangle specifies sequences of representingwhich count as coming to represent a triangle , the object of the representing of a triangle is not thesequence of representings which culminate in the representing of the triangle. A triangle is neither amental act of representing a triangle, nor is it a sequence of mental acts each of which represents a

part of a triangle.42. Before turning to the passage in the Second Analogy which is essentially a development of

the passage on which I have been commenting but one which does take into account the specificcharacter of perceptual takings, let me elaborate briefly on the triangle example in a way which will

make for a smooth and easy transition. After all, Kant's account of 'drawing figures in thought' i.e.in pure intuition, is an idealised version, ascribed to the mind, of drawing figures on paper. Now if we take seriously the three-dimensionality of space, it strikes us that to represent a triangle in spaceis always to represent it from a point of view. Thus, what we represent is

this equilateral triangle facing me straight onor

this equilateral triangle at such and such an angle to my (metaphorical) line of sight43. Now it is by no means an original idea on my part that intuitive representings of figures in

three-dimensional space are essentially point-of-viewish. But its importance has been

underestimated. For it means that we must distinguish between the figures -- which are not point-of-viewish -- and the total content of the representing of the figure, which total content is point-of-viewish, thus



equilateral tnansle facing me straight onLet me repeat. Equilateral triangles are not point of viewish, but they are, so to speak, intuited in

perspective. The representing has a content which specifies a point of view.44. Thus, the object of a representing of an equilateral triangle from a certain point of view is

simply the equilateral triangle. But, according to Kant's position, according to which we 'construct'or 'draw' figures in space, the concept of an equilateral triangle must specify not only a sequence of representings in which we represent one line, then, continuing to represent that line representanother line at a sixty degree angle, then, continuing to represent these we represent the third side. Itmust also specify in an intelligible way what it means for two representings to be representings of an equilateral triangle from different points of view, i.e. representings which have the contents

equilateral triangle face onequilateral triangle at such and such an angle to my 'line of sight'

45. The notion of representings which have contents of this form obviously builds on pervasivefeatures of perceptual takings. I do not simply perceptually accept a house; the content of my

perceptual acceptance is something like

this house over there facing me left-edge-of-front-wise.46. The point I am makung is simple, but it is so essentially a part of a larger story that I shall

have to disguise the torn edges to put it across. When, in the Second Analogy, Kant says (A 191; B236) that "the object is that in the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension," he is commenting on the example of a house which he has just introduced:

. . . immediately I unfold the transcendental meaning of my concepts of an object, I realize that thehouse is not a thing in itself but only an appearance that is a representation . . . (A 190-l; B 236).Here it is dear that he means by 'representation' something represented i.e. a content or immanentobject of an act of representing.

47. Nevertheless, although he calls the house an appearance, where this clearly does not meanthat the house is an act of representing , he does say that

The appearance . . . is nothing but the sum of these representations (of apprehension)and it might be thought that Kant is characterizing the house as a sum of acts of representing. It istherefore important to note that he characterized the representations in question as '' that which liesin the successive apprehension." (A 191; B 236, emphasis mine) This must surely be his way of warning us that 'representation' here means represented rather than representing i.e. Kant is relatingthe content house to the contents of successive acts of apprehension.

48. Kant is answering the question 'in what sense is the house the object of successive acts of apprehension.' His negative answer is that it is not qua house in itself. The actuality of the housequa object is not its existence per se . What is his positive answer? As I see it, he is telling us thatthe house qua object is that aspect of the content of the perceptual takings which explains (together with certain other factors) the belonging together as state of the perceiver of certain perceptualtakings (apprehendings). But that aspect of the content of these perceptual takings is simply thecontent house which they share , thus

house over there left-front-edgewise to mehouse over there facing meleft side of house over there facing me

etc., etc.49. As in the geometrical example, all the representings are reprersentings of a non-point-of-viewish object -- the house -- from a point of view, i.e. representings of house-from-a-certain-point-



of-view. It is, in this sense, that the house is the sum of the point of viewish appearances. But if thetotal content of a perceptual act is point-of-viewish, it is because it is the content of a perceptual act. Thus, while the content house is nod a point-of-viewish content, it explains (together withcertain other factors) why such and such perceptual represent ings with contents which can besubsumed under the rubric

house-from-such-and-such-a-point-of-viewtake place. Thus, the concept of a house as a perceptible object essentially involves a reference to

perceptual acts, i.e. to the perceptual takings of a perceiver.50. Nevertheless the concept of a house as perceptible object is not the concept of the sequences

of perceptual takings (actual and counterfactual) which (together with other factors) it explains. To pull my points together in one sentence,

The object of a perceptual representing of a house is the non-perspectival content house ; yet asthe sort of item that can be the object of a perceptual representing, it must provide rules for explaining (together with other factors) why such and such sequences of perceptual takings with

perspectival contents were necessary.51. It will have been noticed that I have written in several passages above that the content house

is the source of rules which explain together with other factors why such and such sequences of perceptual takings were necessary. What do I mean by 'other factors'? The answer should beobvious, and peeks out from almost every page of the Analogies . House by itself can generate noexplanation of the occurrence of a sequence of perceptual takings. It is only house in such and suchrelations to a perceiver which can do this. And this, obviously, means to a perceiver's body, and, of course to sense organs. The essential structure of the content of perceptual takings is not just

house from a certain geometrical point of view but, to make a complicated point in a simple way

house in front of my sightful eyes ship in water moving to the left of my sightful eyes .In my argument I have thinned out this mutual involvement of object, circumstances and embodied

perceiver into a ghostly 'object from a point of view.' But Kant took seriously the fact that perceivers are embedded in a spatio-temporal system of interacting substances. In other words thedoctrine of the double affection of the self, far from being a problematic feature of Kant's criticalidealism is an essential feature of it, and is present in and, indeed, an essential feature of theargument of the Second Analogy. 18

52. Kant denies that material things and processes exist per se , but he holds that in the critical

sense they can be actual as contents which make an essential contribution to the explanation of the patterns in which perceptual experiences occur. But the deeper thrust of Kant's transcendentalidealism is the thesis that the core of the knowable self is the self as perceiver of material thingsand events . And if it is relatively easy to see that the distinction between actual and non-actualmaterial things and events is tied to the concept of an actual sequence of perceptual takings, it has(until recently) proved less easy to see that the distinction between actual and non-actual sequencesof perceptual takings, i.e. between perceptual takings which are correctly and those which areincorrectly taken to have occurred in one's mental history, is tied to the concept of actual materialthings and events.

53. Kant saw that the concept of an object of perception contains a reference to the perceptualtakings which are the criteria for its actuality. He also saw that the concept of a perceptual taking, as

the taking of an object , contains a reference to material things and events which, if actual, wouldimply its own actuality. The actuality of perceptual takings and the actuality of material things and processes are not logically independent. And since, for Kant, the concept of matter-of-factual truth



concerns the agreement of what we represent with what is, in the critical sense, actual, rather than,as traditionally with what exists per se, he can pay his respects to what he calls "the nominaldefinition of truth" while giving it a radically new interpretation.

Notes1 Kant's Analytic , p. 166.2 Science and Metaphysics , London and New York, 1968, Chapter 1.3 One should also bear in mind Ockham's concept of a perceptual intuition, and his claim that

God could bring it about that the object intuited not exist.4 I have avoided Descartes use of the phrase 'objective reality' in connection with contents, since

it has, of course, a quite different meaning in Kant and in contemporary philosophy.5 Including the British Empiricists who, in the process of muddling through to important

philosophical insights, muddied many classical distinctions.6 A more complete discussion of this point would have to comment on those passages in which

Kant allows that things in themselves are objects of perceptual intuitions. After all, if the latter contain the pure categories, and if the latter constitute 'the pure concept of an 'object' ["The pureconcept of this transcendental object which . . . (concept) in all our knowledge is always one and thesame" (A 109)], then things in themselves would 'correspond' (in the Cartesian sense) to intuitions,though not qua intuitions of spatio-temporal items. see A 490-l; B 518-9 quoted in the first

paragraph; see also Science and Metaphysics pp. 42 ff.7 I deliberately use this vaguer expression 'perceptual experiences' instead of 'perceptual

takings,' since one of the essential differences between Kant and Berkeley concens the analysis of what it is to be a perceptual experience.

8 Notice that to pinpoint the issue I have retreated from the phrase 'material object' to 'spatialitem.'

9 Notice once again that I deliberately used the vaguer phrase 'perceptual experience,' for in thelast analysis everything will hinge on how this phase is interpreted.

10 Another paradigm is to be found in his use of 'sensation' in connection with seeming to see inthe second meditation. But while there is clearly a close connection between sensing and seeming tosee an object, they are not identical, nor does Descartes equate them m his developed philosophy of mind.

11 I have discussed this topic in "Metaphysics and the Concept of a Person," in The Logical Wayof Doing Things , edited by Karel Lambert, New Haven, 1969 (reprinted as chapter XI in Essays in

Philosophy and its History published by Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland, 1974).12 Philosophical Works of Descartes , eds. Haldane and Ross, Dover, 1934. Vol. II, pp. 196-7.13 Principles of Philosophy , LXVII-LXX.14

Principles of Human Knowledge , section 49 (Fifth Objection).15 A more penetrating account would demonstrate that Berkeley initially conceved of all'perceptions' as in the 'understanding' a move which, by taking thoughts as the paradigm of mentalstates, constituted exactly that blurring of the distinction between sensibility and understanding soobviously present in Spinoza, Leibnitz and the Wolffians -- which Kant was to regard as a key

philosophical error.16 I have in mind the passage (A 190; B 235) introduced as follows: ". . . it is a question for

deeper inquiry that the word 'object' ought to signify in respect of appearances when these areviewed not in so far as they are (as representations) objects, but only in so far as they stand for anobject."

17 It might be helpful, here, to think of rules for generating sequences of acts of imagining which

would be the counterparts of perceptual takings, if they had their source in outer sense.18 An elaboration of this theme would require an exploration in detail of Kanl's conception of the transcendental unity of apperception as a necessary correlate of the intuition of objects.



19 As noted above ( paragraph 22 ) even Berkeley came to see that the intelligibility of the patterns in which perceptual experiences occur involves the concept of embodied perceivers in amateria world. However, since he was convunced that material objects could not exist per se , hegave them existence in God's Understanding and Providence as essential features of his plan for causing us to have the experiences we do.

Sellars_Three Essays on Kant

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