Self as a Violent Other

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Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2002, 47, 437458

00218774/2002/4703/437 2002, The Society of Analytical Psychology

Published by Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

The Self as violent Other:the problem of defining the self

Lucy Huskinson, Colchester, UK

Abstract: This paper identifies the problem of arriving at a solid definition of C. G. Jungsnotion of the Self, and seeks its resolution. The author first demonstrates how this prob-

lem is articulated by scholars of Jungian theory by showing that they have ultimatelydepended upon limited definitions of the Self, where the Self is no more than a tran-scendental postulate, a simple derivative from the internal structure of Jungianargument. She then determines the reason for the problem by arguing that there cannever be a complete definition of the Self for it encompasses that which is unconsciousand is thus irreducible to ego-comprehension. By using a method of philosophicalanalysis (in the guise of Levinas) the author will show that through the Selfs very needto evade comprehension the Self is essentially comprehended as an overpowering andviolent entity. The author will argue that the Self as a force of violence is crucial to itsdefinition, and scholars must not ignore the Self as numinous experience in favour ofpassive functionality. She will thus argue that through the adoption of a Levinasian

critique, the Self can be defined and justified outside of the internally self-consistentsystem from which it is conventionally derived.

Key words: comprehension, creation, destruction, numinous, otherness, Self-experience,submission, symbol.

Introduction

This paper is concerned with the notion of the Self, which is perhaps the

principal notion in C. G. Jungs conception of the psyche. The Self is attributedwith greatness because it forms the innermost nucleus of the psyche (Jung 1964,p. 196) and provides meaning for life: for it is the completest expression ofthat fateful combination we call individuality (Jung 1928, para. 404). But theSelf is much more than a fundamental structure of argument or necessaryinvention to hold the rest of Jungian theory together, it is an affective experi-ence that can bring destruction and transformation to all that was hithertoconsidered secure and fundamental to ego-consciousness. The definition ofthe Self as numinous experience is a far cry from the notion of a rational

function, and scholars of Jung have depended more on the Self as a function,as a passive transcendental postulate, than on Ottos affective idea of theholy (1917). Although excessive use of the concept of the numinous will


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inevitably divest it of effective meaning, it is important to acknowledge thatthis idea is at the very core of the meaning of the Self. Those scholars that do

not acknowledge the Self as an immediate experience of awefulness (ibid.,chap. IV, 1), overpoweringness (ibid., chap. IV, 2), urgency (ibid., chap. IV,3) or, in my terms, violence, are guilty, as Jung found the Christians beforethem, of a one-sidedness that neglects the dark side of the Self.

The term violence is used in this paper to describe the experience of the egoin its encounter with the Self. That is, the ego is exposed to the creative forcesof the Self that seek to destroy the inferior ego-orientation with its tendency toprejudice in order to create a more affluent and well-balanced ego-orientation.The creativity of the Self therefore constitutes a primordial experience of the

visionary mode of artistic creation1

; that is, a Dionysian violence2

in whichthe ego is effectively torn apart in order to be born anew. The violence of theSelf in this context is therefore not malign, as it is not wholly destructive3: itdoes not seek to eradicate all ego-consciousness, but seeks the egos continualimprovement by disrupting its misguided orientations. Violence thereforedescribes the destruction necessary to initiate the vital creative process of indi-viduation, and the Self is violent because it is experienced as an overwhelm-ing force that violates the self-containment of the ego, and forces the ego, oftenagainst its will, into a new identity.

438 Lucy Huskinson

1Jung distinguishes between two types of artistic creation, the psychological and the visionary.

About the visionary type he writes: It is a primordial experience which surpasses mans

understanding and to which in his weakness he may easily succumb. The very enormity of the

experience gives it its value and its shattering impact. Sublime, pregnant with meaning, yet

chilling the blood with its strangeness, it arises from timeless depths; glamorous, daemonic, and

grotesque, it bursts asunder our human standards of value and aesthetic form, a terrifying tangle

of eternal chaos (Jung 1930/1950, para. 141).

Edward Edinger in Encounter with the Self. A Jungian Commentary on William BlakesIllustrations of the Book of Job (1986), also argues that the experience of the Self is a dangerousprimordial experience of artistic creation (pp. 1112). Edinger argues that the Job story is an

archetypal image which pictures a certain typical encounter between the ego and the Self. Thistypical encounter may be called the Job archetype. The chief features of the Job archetype are: 1)

an encounter between the ego and the Greater Personality (God, Angel, Superior Being); 2) a

wound or suffering of the ego as a result of the encounter; 3) the perseverance of the ego which

endures the ordeal and persists in scrutinizing the experience in search of its meaning; and 4) a

divine revelation by which the ego is rewarded with some insight into the transpersonal psyche

(p. 11). In terms of Edingers scheme this paper will expound upon features 2) and 3).2 Dionysus is often associated with creativity as the continuous cycle of violent death and rebirth.

This is explained mythologically in the story of his birth from the incestuous coupling between

Zeus and his daughter Persephone, his horrific murder and mutilation by the Titans, and his rebirth

through Zeus and Semele. The notion of Dionysian creation is fundamental to the philosophy of

Friedrich Nietzsche (18441900), and to his notion of the bermensch, which he describes as:Dionysus torn into pieces apromise of life: it will be eternally reborn and return again fromdestruction (Nietzsche 18838, The Will to Power, Aphorism. 1052). But it has also been usedto describe the Self, (cf. footnote 9), most notably by Paul Bishop in The Dionysian Self, 1995.3 However, as I will argue later, the violence of the Self can be construed as malignant and wholly

destructive when a weak ego becomes inflated and identified with the Self.


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Definitions of the Self that are derived from its role as a necessary postulatewithin Jungs model of the psyche

As I will later argue, the Self is Other4 and as such it fails to comprise acomplete systematic theory, only partial representative elements of the wholecan be examined. It may be for this reason that scholars of Jung have tendedto be selective in their examination of Jungian theory and refer to differentelements of the role of the Self as the principal aspect of the archetype. Thus,Humbert regards the Self primarily as an ethical postulate. He writes: If youwere to ask what the self signifies for me, I should reply that it is, aboveall, the inner voice which tells me frequently and precisely how I am to live(Humbert 1980, p. 38). Indeed, Jung describes the Self as a high moral

instinct, in religious terms as the will of God (Jung 1951, para. 49), and asan inner absolute which one must learn how to handle correctly (ibid., para.51). The Self, as a God-image, provides the individual with an ethicalchallenge to confront his projections and resolve the issues that confront himfrom within. Samuels also talks of this religious challenge; he writes:

The self involves the potential to become whole or, experientially, to feel whole a part of feeling whole is feeling a sense of purpose, of sensing a goal. Part of whole-ness is to feel that life makes sense and of having an inclination to do somethingabout it when it does not, thus, to have a religious capacity.

(Samuels 1985, p. 91)

In support of his claim about a religious capacity Samuels cites Jung as saying:The self, though on the one hand simple, is on the other hand an extremelycomposite thing, a conglomerate soul (Jung 1950, para. 634). Hubback inThe dynamic self (1998), takes a different stance on the Self and suggeststhat the Self is principally associated not with its capacity to motivate butwith that very movement it also inspires. Hubback thus focuses on the Selfspropensity to action and dynamism, an interpretation that takes us away from

the structural interpretation of the Self as symbolic imagery. She notes thatJungs descriptions of the Self in Aion culminate in numerous nouns and verbs(powerful ones) containing the elements of energy and psychological action.She proceeds to list these in their chronological order as follows:

integration and assimilation (para. 43), discrimination (para. 44), energetictension (para. 53), confronts (para. 59), affected (para. 61), relate (para. 65). In

The Self as violent Other 439

4 Indeed, R. Papadopoulos, in his paper Jung and the concept of the Other (1984/

1991), examines the development of the notion of the Other throughout Jungs work and

concludes that: Having achieved a direct contact with the Self, Jung had experientially completedhis search for the Other (p. 80). Papadopoulos defines the Self as the higher Other, the ultimate

form of the Other, the higher Anticipated Whole Other (pp. 80, 84, 86, 88). The unconscious

Other is perhaps most associated with the Lacanian psychoanalytic tradition and its structuralist

approach to language and the subject; this paper is, however, not a discussion of Lacanian

thought.


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the later chapter The Structure and Dynamics of the Self there are: the self a dynamicprocess (para. 411), move (para. 413) and Sooner or later nuclear physics and the

psychology of the unconscious will draw closer together as both of them pushforwardinto transcendental territory (para. 412)

(Hubback, 1998, p. 279; Hubbacks italics)

These elements of energy and psychological action culminate in the notionof the Self as the unification of opposite forces, the great struggle to harnessthe energy created through contradictions. Jung writes: there is no energyunless there is a tension of opposites Life is born only of the sparkof opposites (Jung 1917/1926/1943, para. 78), and: In the end we have to

acknowledge that the self is a complexio oppositorum precisely because therecan be no reality without polarity (Jung 1951a, para. 423). Indeed, Redfearn,in The self and individuation (1977) regards the Self as the meeting placeof opposites (p. 139) and, as such, Jungs notion of the Self goes straight tothe heart of the matters of the ultimate source of psychic energy, the trans-formation of this energy, and the inspiring effect of symbols [it is] the ultimatesymbol, or the symbol of the symbolic or creative process (p. 140).

By taking Jungian theory as a self-justified premiss and the Self as anecessary postulate of this premiss it is clear that the Self can be easily defined.

Such definitions are made secure as long as the premiss upon which they arederived is also secure. However, this does not mean that these internallyconsistent definitions of the Self are free from dispute. Indeed, Fordham bringsto light an apparent contradiction between two definitions of the Self thathave developed. These are: the Self as totality and the Self as archetype(Fordham 1985, pp. 204). Fordham begins by examining the concept of Selfas a totality, which he maintains first makes an appearance in PsychologicalTypes (1921), where Jung discriminates between the ego and the Self andstates that the Self is the subject of my total psyche which also includes theunconscious. In this sense the self would be an ideal entity which embraces theego (p. 20). Fordham notes significant implications of this, for if the self isthe whole psyche, then it cannot be observed intrapsychically since the ego iscontained in it as a part and cannot function as an observer. It is only whensome part of the ego stands separate from or only participates up to a point inthe rest of the whole that data about the self can be collected (1985, p. 21).Next Fordham examines the concept of the Self as an archetype, whichcontradicts the totality thesis. Here he quotes Jung as stating that the Self isthe real organizing principle of the unconscious, the quaternity, or squaredcircle of the self (Jung 1951b, para. 318), and again refers to places where Jung

defines or implies that the Self is the archetype of order, whose special functionis to balance and pattern the other archetypes (Jung 1944; 1942/1954, para. 433;1958, paras. 624 & 805). Fordham makes clear that the archetype thesisdoes not contradict the fundamental notion from the totality thesis: that theSelf is unknowable, for the archetype itself is purely unconscious. What it does

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contradict in the totality thesis is the fact that if the Self is the totality of thepsyche including all the archetypes, how can it also be one of these archetypes?

Furthermore, as an archetype, the Self cannot be the totality (for Jung statesthat the ego and the archetypes are to be distinguished) and neither can itever be experienced (since it excludes the ego which is the agency of perceptionand is itself structured by the Self). Nevertheless, the symbolic images whichrepresent the Self in consciousness are clearly archetypal and thereforepresumably structured by the archetype which they represent, that is, thearchetype of the Self. By way of conclusion Fordham conceives the Self not asan archetype, but beyond archetypes and ego, which are then seen as arisingout of or deintegrating from the Self; furthermore, he suggests that a distinc-

tion in terminology be made so that the term Self would only be used to referto a psychic totality, otherwise the term central archetype of order would bepreferred (Fordham 1973). In accordance with this view, Jung himself rewrotehis definition of the Self (Jung 1921, paras. 78991), taking into account thisapparent contradiction and emphasizing the Self as a special transcendentalconcept (Samuels 1985, p. 106). This new definition strengthens the notion ofthe Self as a totality, but its transcendental element also enables the Self tofunction as the archetype of unity.

By way of further response and possible resolution to this seeming paradox,

Jacoby, in Reflections on Heinz Kohuts concept of narcissism (1981),feels that although there may be a logical contradiction in this, there is noexperientialcontradiction in seeing the Self both as part of the totality and asthe totality itself. Furthermore, Colman, in Models of the self (2000), definesthe Self as a process which views the Self as both totality and archetype,as both an organizing principle and that which is organized. Colman main-tains that there is no principle or archetypal structure which is anywayseparate from that which it is organizing, the structure is inherent in itself.Thus he regards the Self as both a tendency towards organization (the processof individuation) and the structure of that organization (the Self as archetype).In other words, the psyche is self-structuring and the name for that process isthe self (p. 14). Colman continues to say that an artificial paradox is createdwhen we are inclined to isolate elements of thought into contents so that theSelf-as-archetype becomes a content within the psyche-as-the-total-self.If instead we think of the self as the process of the psyche, this paradoxdisappears (ibid.).

These definitions of the Self provide little insight into Jungian theory as theyare merely derivative of it; that is, we know that the Self is the reconciliationof opposites because the Self is the ultimate goal of the psyche (Jung 1928,

para. 404), and the psyche, by its very nature, seeks equilibrium within itsconflicting material (Jung 1934, para. 330). However, it is when inconsistencyis found between these derivative definitions that real insight into Jungiantheory can be revealed. Fordhams discussions on the inconsistency of Self astotality and Self as archetype are regarded as showing insight for they have



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highlighted the need for further understandings of the Self and have encouragedsharper definitions of the Self from both Jung himself and others.

The Self beyond theory

In this paper I will attempt to define the Self away from the implications of itsrole as a necessary postulate in Jungs model of the psyche. I will use themethod of a philosophical critique to provide justification for the conceptoutside of the internally self-consistent system in which it is conventionallyderived. A Levinasian5 critique has proved useful in the evaluation of thepremisses of Jungian analysis (see: L. Huskinson 20006), and in this paper I will

extend this approach to show why we can never arrive at a complete definitionof the Self and how there is indeed no such concrete theory of the Self. Andyet in the very act of the Selfs refusal to permit its comprehension I will inferand recover the essential character of the Self that has often been neglected,thereby reuniting the Self with its darker side. Thus through its very need toevade comprehension I will show that the Self is essentially comprehended asan overpowering and violent entity. That is, the Self is violent because itviolates the boundaries of ego-consciousness; it must interrupt and effectivelydestroy the self-containment of the ego in order to express its hitherto uncon-

scious meaning and creative capacity. The notion of the Self as violence is asignificant notion, and, as I will show, a notion that cannot be neglected, forit is defined through the only definite characteristic of the Self that has hithertobeen secured, i.e., through the fact that it is unknowable.

A critique of the notion of the Self using arguments that are not solelyderived from Jungian theory would also provide insight into Jungian theoryfor it would remove the concept from its self-justifying framework and would

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5 Levinas introduced phenomenology into France in the 1930s after studying with Husserl and

Heidegger, who profoundly influenced his thought. In his major work Totality and Infinity

(1969) he attempts to determine an ethical face-to-face relation with the Other, which whilstimmediate and singular remains wholly transcendent. In his examination of such a possibility

Levinas arrives at the limits of phenomenology; which leads him to criticize many philosophers

for their preoccupation with ontology. Levinas wants to escape from the traditional concern with

ontology; he is interested not in the relationship between Being and beings but with that which

lies outside totality or Being, with the religious or ethical relationship with the Other. For a

thorough and lucid explanation of Levinas key ideas see: Colin Davis, Levinas: An Introduction(1996).6 In The Relation of Non-Relation: The Interaction of Opposites, Compensation, and Teleology

in C. G. Jungs Model of the Psyche a Levinasian critique is used to show that the two elements

of opposition and compensation do in fact complement one another in the overall efficient

workings of the psyche despite their apparent logical discrepancy. That is, despite the fact that inabstract and ontological terms, opposites, in their very essence, cannot be compensated and

reconciled, neither can they be united to a mutual whole in the realization of the totalized psyche.

For Opposites are defined as such because they are absolutely and inherently incommensurable

and to say they can merge and interact is to introduce similarity between them and thus to deny

their essential contrast.


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examine it from a more objective perspective. The philosophical critique thatI will use will arrive at a definition of the Self as an entity of violence; it will

also provide further confirmation and an external justification for some of thederivative definitions of the Self that have been made.

We know that Jung formulated his concept of the Self primarily fromeastern mysticism which frequently refers to notions of totality (Jung 1951c,para. 350), and from out of his concept of the transcendent function7 (Jung1916/1957, para. 189), but we do not have a substantial and precise theory ofthe Self, because Jung did not develop one. In The undiscovered self,he swiftly states that Since self-knowledge is a matter of getting to know theindividual facts, theories are of very little help (Jung 1957, para. 493). We

know that the Self is the ordering and unifying centre of the total psyche, andthat whilst the ego is the centre of the conscious personality, the Self is thecentre of both the conscious and unconscious personalities (Jung 1936, para.44), but this description leads only to an inadequate and limited analysis ofSelfhood. This is because the Self is only partly capable of being perceiveddirectly in consciousness as its totality encompasses every psychic manifesta-tion, including those unconscious processes that remain ineffable and foreverout of reach to ego comprehension and understanding.8 A rigorous and rationaltheory based on empirical data is thus irrelevant in the depiction of the Self,

not simply because the Self is a concept of individuality but because the Self,as a composition of unconscious elements, cannot be reduced to the limits ofintellectual knowledge. Intellectual knowledge is thus inadequate for express-ing the wholeness of the Self; scientific discourse relies too heavily on abstracttheorizing about strictly defined data and seeks to exclude the symbolic meta-phors through which the unconscious finds expression. Indeed Jung writes:

The Self is experienced as having a value quality attached to it, namely its feelingtone. This indicates the degree to which the subject is affectedby the process or howmuch it means to him In psychology one possesses nothing unless one has experi-enced it in reality a purely intellectual insight is not enough.

(Jung 1951, para. 61)


7 The transcendent function is part of the symbol-forming aspect of the unconscious which

possesses a purposive tendency to hold both conscious and unconscious together (Jung 1916/

1957, para. 132). It is thus a process that unites oppositions thereby creating a synthesis and

dynamism within the psyche allowing it movement to progress towards its goal: the realization of

the Self, the ultimate psychic balance where all oppositions are resolved. In 1916Jung writes: The

shuttling to and fro of arguments and affects represents the transcendent function of opposites.

The confrontation of the two positions generates a tension charged with energy and creates a living

third thing a movement out of the suspension between opposites, a living birth that leads to a

new level of being, a new situation (Jung 1916/1957, para. 189). This living third thing and newlevel of being, in which culminates the unification of opposites, is the Self.8 Indeed, Aion, the title of Jungs Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self(1951, CW9ii),refers to the transcendent aspect of the Self, for it is taken from the ancient religion of Mithraism

in which Aion is the name of the god that rules over the astrological calendar and thus over time

itself.


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Trying to explain the Self is thus akin to explaining God. God, or the abstractidea of God, is not understood through rational thought or empirical sense

data, God is found through metaphors and symbols, as a force primarily to beexperienced rather than to be understood on a reductive level of intellect:

you cannot say anything definite about it [the Self] because it is greater than you.You can only stammer as if in the presence of a greater one. And you are right if youstammer and are embarrassed, not finding suitable terms or analogies. Then you dojustice to it.

(Jung 19349, p. 432)

The Self as infinite Other

The experience of the Self is an affective experience of immense proportion(Jung 1951, para. 53). The Self is Other to the ego, it is unconscious, it is anexperience of the not-me in the me, a religious experience, an experience ofinfinity. Levinas takes up these ideas in Totality and Infinity (1969).

The central aim of Levinas work is to define the ego in Cartesian terms asa subject that exists in relation to infinity, and is founded by that relationrather than destroyed by it. In the third of his Meditations (1641), Descartes

questions whether or not the subject can regard itself as the author of all theideas it contains. Descartes argues that an effect is not greater than its cause,and from this premiss he concludes that the subject cannot be the author of anyidea that is greater or more perfect than itself. The idea of God is such an idea:it cannot have been conceived independently of the subject. Thus, accordingto Descartes, belief in God can be justified on the basis of the subjects exist-ence: the Cartesian subject sees itself as subject by reference to the non-self.Levinas adapts the Cartesian argument to show that the ego is not primary butis dependent on the Other (the Self) for its constitution. Levinas thus wants toundermine the ontological authority of Western thought which is essentiallyan egology that asserts the primacy of the ego, the Same, the subject or Being.In Western philosophy the infinite Other is acknowledged only in order to besuppressed or possessed by the ego, it thus claims that the totality of the egois without flaw and is all-encompassing, and that the subject receives nothingand learns nothing that it does not know or cannot possess. Levinas entitleshis book Totality and Infinity and not Totality or Infinity to express thebreak with ontology and the preservation of both Same and Other. It is forthis reason that Descartes Third Meditation occupies a significant place inTotality and Infinity and why the Levinasian model provides a significant

parallel to that of Jung: all three provide a model of the subject existing inrelation to that which is infinite (the Cartesian God, the Levinasian Other,and the Jungian Self), and founded by that relation rather than destroyed byit. The Levinasian model of Same and Other can therefore provide insightinto the Jungian model of ego and Self; indeed, it will show that the Self is

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principally an overpowering violent entity and thus the definition of the Selfas numinous should not be neglected by scholars of Jungian theory.

In Totality and Infinity Levinas expresses the idea that the Self is Other tothe ego for the contradictory elements of Same (ego) and Other (Self) cannever exist as a totality in union. The Same exists because the Other is irrecon-cilable with it, otherwise both Same and Other would be part of a greatertotality or whole which would invade and invalidate their separateness.Levinas therefore paradoxically says they are related as a relation withoutrelation (ibid., pp. 7980). It is a relation because an encounter does takeplace; but it is without relation because that encounter does not establish anyunderstanding: the Other remains resolutely Other. This does not invalidate

the Jungian interpretation where the Self encompasses the ego in a totality forthe ego remains at all times an element separate from it; if the ego was to beidentified with the Self inflation would result (Jung 1951, para. 44). TheLevinasian discourse continues to parallel that of Jung and thereby offersinsight into the nature of the Self. In his text Levinas proceeds by stating thatthe encounter between the Same and Other is essentially of a violent nature.He writes: Violence consists in welcoming a being to which it is inadequate(Levinas 1969, p. 25). The encounter with the Other causes the Same to realizeits impotence; it creates a surplus value of infinity within the Same which then

disrupts the totality and self-containment of the Same. The Same simplycannot integrate the Other and is thus reconditioned by it: The I loses its holdbefore the absolutely Other (it) can no longer be powerful (ibid., p. 17).The Other therefore overturns the very egoism of the individual and putsconsciousness into question; consciousness must answer to the Other andmust realize that it is not in total possession of the world (ibid., p. 173). Jungdescribes this encounter with the unconscious Other as a wounding:

Whoever has suffered once from an intrusion of the unconscious has at least a scarif not an open wound. His wholeness, as he understood it, the wholeness of his egopersonality, has been badly damaged, for it became obvious he was not alone; some-thing which he did not control was in the same house with him, and that is of coursewounding to the pride of the ego personality, a fatal blow to his own monarchy.

(Jung 19349, p. 1233)

The individual must, therefore, ethically acknowledge that he is a being ofboth consciousness and unconsciousness, of Same and Other. Experienceof the unconscious directly affects the conscious ego of the individual; theego remains but is reformulated by the damage created by the ethical demandplaced on it in the presence of the Other. Jung himself warns of this potential

danger many times. According to Jung, individuation, the process that leads tothe Self and the eventual balance and unification of conscious and unconsciousattitudes, is often experienced as dangerous and violent. Jung writes:

the rediscovered unconscious often has a really dangerous effect on the ego Inthe same way that the ego suppressed the unconscious before, a liberated unconscious



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can thrust the ego aside and overwhelm it. There is a danger of the ego losing itshead, so to speak, that it will not be able to defend itself against the pressure of

affective factors.(Jung 1916/1957, para. 183).

The danger and pressure arises because the individual must incorporate intohis conscious attitude characteristics of a contrary nature that have previouslybeen unconscious within him; these may appear alien or even morally repre-hensible to him. The rebirth of the ego into the Self is a powerful numinousexperience that is both dangerous and violent.9 The Self forces the ego torealize its impotence and through its affects it inflicts a radical change in the

attitude of the ego. The ego is no longer situated within its own petty andoversensitive personal world, as it was prior to individuation, rather, the egoof the individuated being now participates freely in the wider world of object-ive interests. It sheds its limited subjectivity for a consciousness detached fromthe world, i.e., an experience of objectivity, an experience that is detachedfrom painful as well as from joyful events [and] an attitude that is beyondthe reach of emotional entanglements and violent shocks (Jung 1929, paras.678). But it is only through the violent Other and

only through extreme pain [that] you experience yourself; you believe then that you

are a unit. Before that, you can imagine that you are anybody you are not neces-sarily yourself. Afterwards when you have undergone this extraordinary experienceof the self, there are no illusions any longer. You know exactly who you are.

(Jung 19349, p. 449)

The Self, as the unknowable Other, appears as a violent entity to ego-consciousnessbut it is not wholly destructive. The Self does not seek to eradicate all ego-consciousness for ego and Self are of equal importance, indeed unconsciouscompensation is only effective when it co-operates with an integral conscious-ness. Assimilation is never a question of this or that, but always of this and

446 Lucy Huskinson

9 The rebirth of the ego into the Self as a dangerous and violent experience is also expressed by

Jung in his alchemical works as a significant stage of transformation in the alchemical process.

Thus, the final and highest stage of the alchemical process, which corresponds to the realization of

the Self, is called the rubedo, and this is symbolically expressed as the rebirth of the king, born tohimself and his mother in their incestuous marriage (cf. the Dionysian Self, footnote 2: Dionysusis born from the incestuous coupling between Zeus and his daughter Persephone). The king, in

alchemical symbolism, represents the ego (Jung 1945/1954, para. 471), he is considered to be

imperfect, old and obsolete (ibid., para. 368; 19556, para. 169; 19556a, para. 427), and must

die so that he can be reborn in a complete form. But, what I want to emphasize here is that before

this rebirth can occur (and thus before the Self can be realized), the king (and thus the ego) must

undergo various sufferings and fatalities. The king must thus experience immersion in the[queens] bath or in the sea [the unconscious overwhelming the ego], dissolution and decompo-

sition, extinction of his light [his power and domination over all] in the darkness, incineration in

the fire, and renewal out of chaos. These symbols of violence, Jung tells us, are derived by the

alchemists from the dissolution of the matter in acids, from the roasting of ores, the expulsion of

sulphur or mercury, the reduction of metallic oxides, and so forth (Jung 1945/1954, para. 468).


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that (Jung 1934, para. 338). Thus, the Self cannot kill the ego, for the egois the Selfs feet (Jung 19349, p. 978). Nevertheless, the Self makes terrible

demands (ibid.) upon the inferior ego as it attempts to balance its prejudicedorientation. Such demands constitute a violence that effectively destroys theprevious ego-orientation, thereby disabling the ego as an effective regulatingcentre of the personality and imposing upon it a new and enriched orientation,one that can satisfy the Selfs demand. Thus, through the act of destructioncomes creation. Indeed, Jung writes:

the invisible things cannot come into being without torture and destruction forthe collective man you always kill and destroy in order to bring something newinto existence. Whatever you do, if it is of any importance, also means destruction.

(Jung 19349, p. 614)

The violence of the Self is, however, malignant and wholly destructive to theego that is inflated and is identified with the Self. In this case the argumentabove does not apply, for the ego is too weak to be the Selfs feet and destruc-tion does not imply creation. Inflation both enlarges the ego to the extent thatit is almost extinguished (Jung 1946, para. 472), and denies conscious inte-gration of the shadow (that deflationary experience) (Jung 19349, pp. 7023),thereby making the individual capable of great violence and destructiveness

towards his fellow neighbour. Moreover, by identifying with the Self the egocan no longer experience the Self as Other (cf. Jung 19349, p. 1174). The egohas therefore effectively cut itself off from the vital regulating powers whichthe Self possesses, for according to Jung, creative processes are not generatedby the ego, they originate from outside of it, that is, from the Other (Jung19349, p. 61; cf. p. 675). The inflated ego escapes that violence of the Selfthat imposes upon the ego its productive growth and rebirth, for its identi-fication with the Self means that the ego fails to be overwhelmed and violatedby its essential Otherness. However, this does not mean that the ego remainsself-contained and, in Levinasian terms, in total possession of the world; theSelf is still affective and violent, but without its faculty to create (i.e., withoutits prima materia: the strong enough ego). Thus, the inflated ego will beoverwhelmed and effectively destroyed (and dismembered; Jung 19349,pp. 7034) by the violent Self, with no potential for further development andrebirth. I am arguing here that the Otherness of the Self is crucial to thedevelopment of the ego and its on-going process of individuation; it is the Selfas Other that inspires the sense of awe-fulness and destruction necessary forthe process of creation that ensues.10


10 Renos Papadopoulos, in Jung and the concept of the Other (1984/1991), also argues that the

Other encourages individual growth. He writes: Therefore the problematic of the Other which

Jung embarked on in an attempt to isolate and identify the Other gradually grew to reveal the

whole dialectical process of the individuals striving at the Self. Like the Wittgensteinian ladder,

this problematic provides the necessary steps of the earlier formulations (p. 88).


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Symbols protect the ego from further violence from the Other

On the one hand, the ego cannot escape from the violent Self and it must tryto accept its rebirth (Jung 1951, para. 51). On the other hand, the egocannot understand the Self; hence it must try to ground its experience of theOther in some kind of framework to which it can relate. Both the rationalfunctions of thinking and feeling are required to secure this kind ofunderstanding (ibid., para. 52), but this is difficult to achieve (ibid., para.58) and takes a being that has already achieved a sufficient degree ofindividuation to have developed both capacities. If the ego does not try toaccept its rebirth and tries instead to ignore the experience of the Other ortries to explain the experience away as illusion or reduce it to the level of the

intellect, it will instead have to deal with the consequential onslaught ofinsanity (Jung 1929, para. 53), and in a word, to destructive masspsychoses (ibid., para. 52). Thus, the Self initiates destruction to enable it tocreate a more affluent ego and it initiates further destruction if the ego failsto acknowledge its reformulation. When the ego is at a loss to understand, thepsyche spontaneously produces a symbol. This symbolic framework enablesthe ego to relate to the unconscious experiences within it and protects it fromthe onslaught of insanity that would otherwise overcome it: You see, bymeans of a symbol, such dangers can be accepted: one can submit to them,

digest them. Otherwise it is a very dangerous situation: one is exposedwithout protection to the onslaught of the unconscious (Jung 19349,p. 1249). When this symbol makes its appearance, the balance between theego and the unconscious is restored. The presence of such symbols thusprovides an empirical grounding for Jungs theory of the Self, for althoughwholeness seems at first sight to be nothing but an abstract idea (like animaand animus), it is nevertheless empirical in so far as it is anticipated bythe psyche in the form of spontaneous or autonomous symbols (Jung 1929,para. 59). An empirical grounding, however, does not necessarily mean

that Jung is on his way to establishing an objective theory of the Selfthat can be tested and qualified, this is because these Self-symbols (or tran-scendent functions) remain numinous; they are the archetypal imagesof the unknown archetypal Self. Thus, these symbols are clothed within afinite image that is accessible to the ego, an image that is subjectively definedby that ego according to its response to the a priori archetype and accordingto its conscious attitude11 (Jung 1951c, para. 355), but the true essencebehind this clothing can never be attained and therefore can never beencapsulated within an objective testable theory. The symbols are not

the actual Self, they are merely approximations representing states of relativewholeness or Self-ness, they can never be complete totality or wholeness in

448 Lucy Huskinson

11 The features of the Self-symbol will therefore change as the conscious attitude changes


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itself.12 It is impossible to arrive at the archetype-in-itself; this can only beexperienced with the subsequent symbol created to express its effects, and

there are an infinite number of symbols to choose from. Such limitless uses inwhich the Self is conveyed suggests to me that the Self is perhaps not such anunbroken and coherent entity as is often thought; its many different faadescauses it to blend even further into oblivion. Thus, it is not a theoreticalstatement that refers to images as the Self but a metaphorical statement, afinite expression of something infinite.

Symbols have a subjective power; they can therefore be effective for oneindividual but merely appear as a sign for another. Likewise, from an objectivelevel, one symbol is only as appropriate as the next.13 The subjective power


12 This is further explained by Fordham whom I noted earlier as saying: if the self is the whole

psyche, then it cannot be observed intrapsychically since the ego is contained in it as a part and

cannot function as an observer. It is only when some part of the ego stands separate from or only

participates up to a point in the rest of the whole that data about the self can be collected

(Fordham 1985, p. 21). The symbol is a finite image of something infinite, thus it is grounded in

both the ego and the Self and must therefore stand separate from the essence of wholeness itself

if it is to communicate the experience of the Self to the ego.13 Indeed, the subjective power of analogies of the Self is aptly demonstrated in the discourse

between Redfearn and Booth in the Journal of Analytical Psychology, 1990, vol. 35. The

disagreement between the two scholars revolves around the analogy Redfearn uses to describe thenotions of the many selves, the many feelings of I, implemented across the psychoanalytic

traditions, and thus also for the notion of the Jungian Self. Booth first tries to enlarge Redfearns

analogy to include further connotations of the Self which he feels have been ignored, and then

offers a different analogy, which he personally feels more appropriately encapsulates the notion

of the Self. Thus, In My Self, My Many Selves (1985) Redfearn uses an analogy of the theatre toprovide a general model of the self/Self, he writes: This I migrates hither and thither to various

locations in the total personality, like the spotlight at a theatre picking out first one actor then

another, or, even more pertinently, like a pilgrim on his journey of life visiting one place, then

another, in his universe I call these various actors in ourselves sub-personalities (p. xii).

Booth, however, in A Suggested Analogy for the Elusive Self (1990) argues against this analogy.

He states that words such as theatre and pilgrim are loaded words and as such these wordconnotations point our understanding in certain directions (p. 335). Booth says that it

specifically leaves open the question of governance: who is providing the integration is there a

personality co-ordinating the activities of the sub-personalities? Or, if the feeling of I as

pilgrim merely visits places in the self, what authority does it carry as a visitor, or find there

as it arrives? (p. 336). Booth then proceeds to offer his own analogy of the self/Self, that of a

committee of the whole which, like Booths criticism of Redfearns analogy, is guilty of using

loaded words. Thus Booths committee has innumerable members who each have equal

authority and can seize the floor at any time, thereby taking the position of the I with the other

parts of the self acting as aides or advisers. Booth regards his own subjective analogy to be more

appropriate for expressing the objective self/Self than Redfearns. However, Redfearn quickly

responds to Booth maintaining that the analogy of the committee is no better than that of thetheatre; he writes: His picture strikes me as one way in which the self and the sub-personalitiesof the self interact. But of course it is only one way If we remember that the sub-personalitiesare meant to denote the archetypal as well as the complex figures, then the notion of a

committee seems hardly more adequate than the picture of a company of actors (ibid., p. 339,

italics added).


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of symbols means that they must be experienced on a personal level if they areto promote growth within the individual and enrich his personality, and, as

we have seen, an intellectual theory or classification of these symbols willtherefore achieve little. Jung, however, is intent on making more out of hisempirical theory (Jung 1951, para. 59) to the extent that he is guilty ofobjectifying the subjective by predetermining what is personal by givingspecific examples and an overall schematization of Self-imagery. Jung thus triesto establish a concrete theory of one aspect of the Self, a theory of its objectivesymbolic form; he tries the very thing he maintains should not be done, andattempts that which is of very little help (Jung 1957, para. 493) and thatwhich is not enough (Jung 1951, para. 61). He states that the Self will appear

in dreams as anelephant, horse, bull, bear, white and black birds, fishes, and snakes tortoises,snails, spiders, and beetles. The principal plant symbols are the flower and the tree.Of the inorganic products, the commonest are the mountain and the lake.

(Jung 1951c, para. 356)

Here Jung is limiting Self-symbols to rigid, perhaps merely personal, examples,and consequently fails to acknowledge the subjective rule of symbolism wheresuch a specific image of an elephant or a snail may not necessarily express to

every individual the presence of the Self. It would be more appropriate for Jungto express his theory with such abstract statements as: Since the definingfeature of the self as a totality is that it is infinitely greater than the ego, anysymbol which is greater than the individual may be a symbol of the total self(Jung 1942/1948); and: the self can appear in all shapes from the highestto the lowest, inasmuch as they transcend the scope of the ego personalityin the manner of a daimonion (Jung 1951c, para. 356). These statements aredetailed and yet flexible enough to be applicable to every subjective symbolicformulation of the Self.

Jung is content to give many examples of Self-symbols which can be foundmostly within Aion (Jung 1951). Edinger dramatically summarizes theseimages and themes of the Self as follows:

Such themes as wholeness, totality, the union of opposites, the central generativepoint, the world navel, the axis of the universe, the creative point where God andman meet, the point where transpersonal energies flow into personal life, eternity asopposed to the temporal flux, incorruptibility, the inorganic united paradoxicallywith the organic, protective structures capable of bringing order out of chaos, the

450 Lucy Huskinson

Booths later responds: Dr. Redfearns generous acknowledgement that the committee analogy

might show one way in which parts of the self interact, gives about as much recognition as oneanalogist can hope for from another (ibid., p. 341, italics added). The subjective power of

symbolic imagery is at play here. Both scholars are more content to uphold their own analogy,

and any attempt to persuade and communicate their analogy to another requires a great deal of

justification. No one symbol can be universally accepted because symbols are subjectively

determined.


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transformation of energy, the elixir of life all refer to the Self, the central source oflife energy, the fountain of our being which is most simply described as God.

(Edinger 1972, p. 4)

The God-image and the mandala sacred circle are the two most prominentSelf-images to fascinate Jung. The former led Jung to his somewhat contro-versial response to the problem of theodicy by explaining God in terms ofcompletion rather than perfection, of thus harbouring an evil shadow side: forChrist, as a Self-symbol represents a personality greater than the averageindividual (Jung 1942/1954, para. 414), but to be a fuller symbol of integra-tion and unity Christ must be linked with the Antichrist, to convey evil as well

as good. And the latter led Jung to his experience and discovery of the Self, forthrough the drawing of these mandalas every morning in 19181919 he cameto realize that they are cryptograms concerning the state of the Self (Jung1961, p. 221), an illustration of his inner situation at that time. In these man-dalas he saw his whole being actively at work and through them he acquireda living, working conception of the Self, for every circumambulation is aversion in miniature of the individuation process. These principal Self-symbolsserve to protect the ego from the overwhelming destructive nature of the Self.In terms of the God-image Jung writes that in the Old Testament the fear of

God is the very first principle.

14

Thus, as the Self is identified with the God-image, it follows that the Self too must be feared, and yet Jung notes that suchfear of God is overcompensated in the New Testament by the idea that Godis love and one must not be afraid of Him. He thereby highlights the fact thatas God is both love and terror, the Self too is capable of magnificent creationas well as destruction (Jung 19349, p. 128). Likewise, the mandala is a symbolof a protective circle, a symbol with an eternal boundary, which would, inLevinasian terms, enable the ego to contain the surplus value of infinity (theSelf) and thus attempt to reduce the violence brought about with the encounterof the unconscious Other, and to prevent the outflowing and to protect theunity of consciousness from being burst asunder by the unconscious (Jung1929, para. 47).

Conclusion: the violent Self as experience

A satisfactory definition of the Self can never be arrived at. When one triesto seek a definition of the Self one is trying to intellectualize the Other andto reduce that which is unconscious and infinite into the finite terms of con-sciousness. This cannot be done, it is an abuse of the Levinasian ethic, which

stipulates that Other and Same must relate but in a such way that no notion


14Jung is quoted as saying: God is the name by which I designate all things which cross my path

violently and recklessly, all things which upset my subjective views, plans and intentions and

change the course of my life for better or worse (Interview in Good Housekeeping Magazine,December 1961; cited in Edinger 1986, p. 32, footnote 14).


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of similarity or familiarity can ever take place. I have tried in this paper toshow that this ethical relation cannot be neglected and that when a complete

definition of the Self is still sought, the Self will react in an overpowering wayagainst the attempt to reduce it to intellectual terms. That is, the Self will alwaysevade the egos grasp and it is this supremacy over the egos control that causesa wounding to the ego (Jung 19349, p. 1233), for the ego is forced to realizeits impotence and is forced to step down from its governing position of beingin total possession of the world (Levinas 1969, p. 173). Thus the very fact thata complete definition of the Self cannot be obtained is an expression of thesupremacy of the Self, the violence that it inflicts in us, and the realization ofour impotence. The Self evades us and by doing so undermines our authority

and wounds our pride.The Self is therefore an elusive entity, one that is defined by infinity and that

which remains irreducible to intellectual terms. It is essentially a transcen-dental postulate which, although justifiable psychologically, does not allowof scientific proof (Jung 1950, para. 405). But this postulate serves only toformulate and link together the processes that have already been empiricallyestablished. If the Self was available for an intellectual encounter Jung believesit could be understood without much difficulty for the world-wide pronounce-ments about the God within us and above us, about Christ and the corpus

mysticum, the personal and suprapersonal atman, etc., are all formulationsthat can easily be mastered by the philosophic intellect (Jung 1951, para. 60).The intellect promotes the illusion that one can be in possession of the Self andcan master and manipulate it accordingly,

but actually one has acquired nothing more than its name, despite the age-oldprejudice that the name magically represents the thing, and that it is sufficient topronounce the name in order to posit the things existence the intellectual graspof a psychological fact produces no more than a concept of it, and that concept is nomore than a name, a flatus vocis.

(ibid.)

In terms of an intellectual theory, the Self is simply the name given to thatwhich is unfathomable in the psyche, a metaphysical concept, but this is inap-propriate for Jung. According to Jung, the Self is a concept or postulate thatis grounded neither in metaphysical speculation nor faith, rather the Self is aconcept that is experienced.15

452 Lucy Huskinson

15 According to Martin Buber, however, there can be no experience of an autonomous Self/Godwithin Jungs psychological model. The subject cannot experience the essential I-Thou

relationship with the Self/God because, as a function of the unconscious, it is a content within thesubject. Buber is therefore critical of Jung for psychologizing God and for preventing the

possibility of having a genuine experience of the Other. For a lucid and detailed account of Jungs

polemic with Martin Buber on this matter, see: Barbara D. Stephens, The Martin BuberCarl

Jung disputations: protecting the sacred in the battle for the boundaries of analytical psychology,

Journal of Analytical Psychology, 46, 45591.


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The definitions of the Self that I outlined at the start of this paper derive theconcept from the Selfs role as a necessary postulate within Jungian theory,

each one therefore defines the Self as an entity that can be experienced. Thus,Humbert defines the experience of the Self as an ethical inner voice which tellsme frequently and precisely how I am to live (Humbert 1980, p. 38) andSamuels describes the experience of feeling whole (Samuels 1985, p. 91).Hubback defines the Self as a dynamic experience, with a feeling forenergetic action (Hubback 1998, p. 279) and Redfearn discusses the Selfsinspiring effect (Redfearn 1977, p. 140). The model of the Self that I havearrived at through using arguments that are not solely derived from Jungiantheory confirms each of these definitions. Thus, the Self as a violent infinite

Other ethically calls consciousness into question and forces the ego to answerto the Self by forcing it to acknowledge the Self as a higher authority. The egocertainly experiences the Self as dynamic and energetic in the wounding itexperiences from the Self, and the ego will come to acknowledge the Selfsinspiring effect in its acts of creation through destruction when the egoacknowledges its rebirth. The reborn ego will also experience the feeling ofwholeness of the Self for it is only through the violence of the Self and onlythrough extreme pain [that] you experience yourself; you believe then that youare a unit (Jung 19349, p. 978, italics mine). The Levinasian critique that

I have used therefore provides further confirmation and an external justifica-tion for some of the derivative definitions of the Self that have been made.This technique has also arrived at a secure part-definition (only a part-

definition because the whole cannot be determined) of the Self away from theimplications of its role as a necessary postulate in Jungs model of the psyche.Although this paper has extensively argued that it is impossible to arrive ata complete intellectual theory of the Self it has also argued that through itsvery need to evade comprehension the Self is essentially comprehended as anoverpowering and violent entity. Further knowledge of the Self, outside of itsrole within Jungian theory, cannot be determined, and as such the concept ofthe Self does not comprise a satisfactorily rigorous and thorough intellectualtheory. The Self, in intellectual terms, remains no more than a name, and Ihave merely given it the names of infinity and violence. However, as anentity to be experiencedthe Self is very much alive; the Self cannot be reducedto intellectual terms as it will always evade the egos grasp but it does relate tothe ego in a relation of non-relation (Levinas 1969, pp. 7980) and is therebyexperienced as a numinous quality.

Jung believes that the concept of the Self belongs to the realm of experiencerather than the realm of the intellect; he thus believes that an adequate picture

of the Self can indeed be formed but only on the basis of a thorough experi-ence of it: Just as the concept arose out of an experience of reality, so it canbe elucidated only by further experience (Jung 1951, para. 63). But is Jungcorrect to say that the concept of the Self is turned into factsimply because itarose from experience and is elucidated by further experience? Plaut remains



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uncertain, for such understanding drives one to the very edge of sanity. IfJungs vision arose from that very place in his mind (as we have reason to believe),

small wonder that it makes us anxious too (Plaut 1985, p. 248). However,Plaut is resigned to acknowledge other scientifically approved theories thatmake use of such mad-driving paradoxes as quantum physics, where the factsdepend ultimately upon the act of observation. Nevertheless, Colman (2000)once again saves Jung from potential flaw and takes the argument of experi-ence a step further by concluding that: The self is not an experience and itcertainly is not a content of experience, but rather it is the taste of experience,its quality. The self is not subjectivity but the condition by which subjectivityis possible. It is not myself, nor the experience of myself but the very possibility

of my having self-experience (ibid., p. 15). The Self, in Levinasian terms, isthus not just the Other that questions the authority of the Same (the ego) butit is also the very encounter itself between the two elements of Other andSame, it is the third thing (Jung 1916/1957, para. 189), it is a thing of infinitythat unites the two. That is, the Self is that dangerous and violent relation ofnon-relation that enables the individual to have a more complete understand-ing of himself. Danger and violence provide the very possibility of my havingself-experience for if the ego is to develop according to the hidden teleologicalplan of the psyche, it must acknowledge and interact with the violent Self.

TRANSLATIONS OF ABSTRACT

Tento clnek sleduje otzku uspokojiv definice bytostnho J v pojet C. G. Junga ahled jej resen. Autorka nejprve ukazuje, jak se s tmto problmem vypordalijunginst badatel a ukazuje, ze jejich pojet se v zsade spolehla na omezen definicebytostnho J. V nich jiz bytostn J nen transcendetlnm postultem, ale spsejednoduchou odvozeninou vnitrn struktury junginsk teorie. Autorka pak hledpuvod tohoto problmu a vysvetluje, ze nemuze vzniknout pln definice bytostnho

J, kter zahrnuje nevedom obsahy, a nelze je tedy redukovat smerem k chpn j.Pouzitm metody fiilosofick analyzy (v Levinasove pojet) autorka ukazuje, ze prvekvu li potrebe bytostnho J vzprat se pochopen je bytostn J esencilne vnmnojako premhajc a divok entita. Autorka tvrd, ze pro definici bytostnho J je jehokvalita divok sly rozhodujc. Badatel nesm ve prospech pasivn funkcionalityprehlzet bytostn J jako numinosn zzitek. Dokazuje, ze prijetm Levinasovy kritikymuze bytostn J zskat definici a oprvnen i mimo vnitrn systm, ktery je kolem nejzbudovn a ze kterho se obvykle odvozuje.

Cet article considre la difficult quil y a arriver une dfinition solide de la notiondu soi chez Jung et cherche un moyen de rsoudre cette question. Lauteur montre toutdabord que ce problme sarticule sur le fait que les chercheurs qui ont tudi la thoriejungienne se sont bass fondamentalement sur des dfinitions limites du soi, danslesquelles celui-ci nest rien de plus quun postulat de transcendence drivant simple-ment de la position jungienne relative la structure interne. Elle pointe ensuite comme

454 Lucy Huskinson


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cause du problme, le fait quune dfinition complte du soi nest jamais possible, dansla mesure o le soi inclut ce qui est inconscient et est par consquent inapprhendable

par la comprhension du moi. En utilisant une mthode danalyse philosophique ( lamanire de Levinas) lauteur montre que du fait mme du besoin du soi dchapper la comprhension, ce dernier est essentiellement peru comme une entit violente etsurpuissante. Lauteur avance que cette perception du soi en tant que force de violenceest cruciale pour sa dfinition, et que les chercheurs qui tudient Jung ne doivent pasignorer la dimension numineuse de lexprience du soi, au profit de la description dunefonctionalit passive. Elle montre quen adoptant une critique du type de celle deLevinas, le soi peut tre dfini et son existence justifie en dehors du systme dauto-cohrence interne, partir duquel lide du soi est gnralement pense.

Diese Arbeit bezeichnet das Problem eine solide Definition von C. G. Jungs Selbst-begriff erhalten zu knnen und versucht eine Lsung dieses Problems. Die Autorin zeigtzunchst, wie dieses Problem von verschiedenen Autoren ber Jungianische Theoriezum Ausdruck gebracht wird, indem sie zeigt, wie diese letztlich sich auf begrenzteDefinitionen des Selbst abhngig gemacht haben, wo das Selbst nicht mehr als eintranszendentales Postulat, eine einfache Ableitung aus der inneren Struktur JungianischerLehre darstellt. Sie beschreibt dann den Grund des Problems, indem sie argumentiert,da es niemals eine vollstndige Definition des Selbst geben kann, da es dasjenige umfat,was unbewut ist, und daher nicht auf Ich-Verstndlichkeit reduzierbar ist. Indem

sie eine Methode der philosophischen Analyse verwendet (im Gefolge von Levinas)zeigt die Autorin, da gerade aufgrund des speziellen Bedrfnisses des Selbst, sich demVerstndnis zu entziehen, das Selbst wesentlich als berwltigende und gewaltttigeEinheit verstanden wird. Die Autorin argumentiert, da das Selbst als gewaltttigeMacht wesentlich zu seiner Definition gehrt, und da Autoren das Selbst als numinoseErfahrung nicht zugunsten von passiver Funktionalitt ignorieren drfen. Sie argu-mentiert daher, da durch die Levinassche Kritik das Selbst auerhalb des internenselbstgengsamen Systems definiert und gerechtfertigt werden kann, in welchem es inder Regel abgeleitet wird.

Questo lavoro pone il problema di giungere a una solida definizione della nozione diC. G. Jung del S, e ne ricerca una soluzione. Lautrice dapprima dimostra come questoproblema venga articolato dagli studiosi della teoria junghiana, mostrando come essiin ultima analisi dipendano da nozioni limitate del S, laddove il S non che unpostulato trascendentale, un semplice derivato dalla struttura interna del discorsojunghiano. Specifica poi le ragioni per porre il problema, sostenendo che non pu maiesserci una completa definizione del S, poich esso abbraccia ci che inconscio ed quindi irriducibile ad una comprensione egoica. Usando poi un metodo di analisifilosofica (alla stregua di Levinas), lautrice mostrer che proprio per la intrinseca

necessit del S di evadere la comprensione, il S viene considerato essenzialmente comeunentit violenta e strapotente. Lautrice sosterr che considerare il S come forzaviolenta cruciale alla sua definizione e gli studiosi non devono ignorare il S comeesperienza numinosa a favore di una funzionalit passiva. Sosterr poi che adottandouna critica Levinasiana, si pu definire e giustificare il S al di fuori del sistema internoin s consistente dal quale viene convenzionalmente derivato.



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Este papel identifica el problema para logara una slida definicin de la nocin deC. G. Jung del Self, y busca su solucin. La autora demuestra en primer lugar comoarticulan este problema los estudiosos de la teora Junguiana por medio de mostrarque ellos dependen de limitadas definiciones del Self, donde el Self no es mas que un

postulado trascendental, un simple derivado de la estructura interna del argumentoJunguiano. Ella entonces determina la razn del problema argumentando que nuncapodr haber una definicin completa del Self debidoi a que este acompaa a aquelloque es inconsciente y por tanto irreductible a la comprensin del Ego. Usando el mtodode anlisis filosfico (en la forma de Levinas) la autora demostrar como a travs de lanecesidad del Self de evadir su comprensin el Self es comprendido como una entidadesencialmente poderosa y violenta. La autora argumentar que el Self como una fuerzade violencia es crucial para su definicin, y los estudiosos no deben ignorar que el Selfcomo una experiencia numinosa para favorecer una funcionalidad pasiva. Ella portanto argumentar como a travs la crtica Levinasiana, el Self puede ser definido y

justificado fuera del sistema interno de Self-consistencia de donde se deriva conven-cionalmente.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr Roderick Main for drawing my attention to theparticular characteristics of Ottos notion of the numinous and for his generalmeticulous comments.

[MS first received June 2001; final version February 2002]

458 Lucy Huskinson

Self as a Violent Other

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