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Seeking Peace in El Salvador

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Seeking Peace in El Salvador

The Struggle to Reconstruct a Nation at the End of the Cold War

Diana Villiers Negroponte

seeking peace in el salvadorCopyright © Diana Villiers Negroponte, 2012.

All rights reserved.

First published in 2011 byPALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States – a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Negroponte, Diana Villiers. Seeking peace in El Salvador : the struggle to reconstruct a nation at the end of the Cold War / Diana Villiers Negroponte. p. cm. 1. Peace-building—El Salvador—International cooperation. 2. Mediation, International. 3. United Nations—El Salvador. 4. United Nations. Observer Mission in El Salvador. 5. Peacekeeping forces—El Salvador. 6. El Salvador—History—1979–1992. 7. El Salvador—Politics and government—1979–1992. I. Title. JZ5584.S2N44 2011 972.84053—dc23 2011023642

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by MPS Limited, A Macmillan Company.

First edition: January 2012

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2012 978-0-230-12094-5

ISBN 978-1-349-29909-6 ISBN 978-1-137-01208-1 (eBook)DOI 10.1057/9781137012081

To John who has always stood beside me

Contents

Preface ix

Acknowledgments xiii

1 Theoretical Issues in El Salvador’s Peace Process 1

2 Ancient Conflicts, Modern Violence: The Causes and Context for Civil War in El Salvador 15

3 Internal Forces Struggle to Resolve the Civil War: The FMLN and FDR 29

4 Internal Pressures for Ending El Salvador’s Civil War: ARENA, the Jesuits, and FUSADES 47

5 The United States: Protagonist or Mediator? 61

6 External Influences on the Negotiations to End the War in El Salvador 79

7 Introducing the United Nations 97

8 Four Critical Moments in the Negotiations 115

9 Implementation of the Chapultepec Peace Accords: The Achievements 131

10 Challenges to the Peace Accords 145

Epilogue: El Salvador Today 163

Notes 173

Bibliography 225

Index 241

Preface

The history of El Salvador’s struggle to make peace after twelve bitter years of war has been told from different perspectives. This book integrates the domestic and international context of that struggle to demonstrate that the withdrawal of the super-powers allowed the domestic parties to seek a negotiated settlement. El Salvador’s efforts to negotiate the end to its protracted social conflict is examined in the light of the Soviet resolution to end Moscow’s support for wars of national liberation and Washington’s decision to test Soviet good will in Central America. General Secretary Gorbachev’s call for noninterference in the socio- political develop ments of each state before the UN General Assembly in December 1988 had profound consequences for the civil wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua. President George H. W. Bush’s decision to test that declaration in Central America and Washington’s evaluation of Gorbachev’s capacity to end Soviet support for the Salvadoran guerilla forces were critical to ending the war. If Gorbachev’s declaration was effective and Cuban support through Nicaragua ended, Washington could begin to wind down its commitment to both the government of El Salvador and the Contras in Nicaragua. The debate between National Security Advisor, retired General Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of State, James Baker reflected both U.S. uncertainty of Gorbachev’s commitment and Secretary Baker’s predominance in the administration’s willingness to deflate Cold War tensions in Central America.

This historical work examines the consequences for the Cold War’s proxy warriors in El Salvador. It analyzes internal efforts by private institutions and individuals to end the civil war. To the extent that the protagonists, the Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberación Nacional (FMLN) and the Frente Democrática Revolucionario (FDR) and President Alfredo Cristiani’s government depended upon outside supporters, Gorbachev’s pronouncements, and Washington’s response forced both sides to focus on their own capabilities and goals.

Furthermore, the FMLN comandantes faced the consequences of a failed “final military offensive” in November 1989 and the opposition’s victory in the Nicaraguan presidential elections of February 1990. The failure of the offensive brought home the reality that the FMLN had lost both the active support of the Salvadoran people, and their resupply chain in Managua. Also, in November 1989, the Salvadoran armed forces faced the consequences of their brutal assassinations of respected Jesuit priests, their innocent housekeeper and teenage daughter. From defenders against communism Defense Minister Rene Emilio Ponce and the High Command’s

elite brigade became conspirators and alleged assassins. As a result, they lost the support of the U.S. Congress, which determined to bring the murderers to justice. The reluctance of both Moscow and Washington to support, unconditionally, their respective Central American allies caused the Salvadoran conflict to become predominately local and contained. This provided an opportunity for Salvadoran citizens to begin a slow process of dialogue. Domestic factors propelled each of the protagonists to seriously consider a political outcome and to lower expectations of a military victory.

The tensions between political negotiation and continued military engagement are familiar to those who study the resolution of conflicts. Both negotiation and military clashes often continue as each protagonist seeks to maximize its position at the bargaining table. In El Salvador, those who slept with their boots on and guns by their side, retained considerable suspicion toward negotiators who exchanged documents and discussed words in airconditioned rooms. There is nothing unusual about the Salvadoran capacity to do both and the protagonists could have continued to fight and talk for several more months, if not years. However, the outside world, particularly Washington, was anxious to end this war and rid the U.S. domestic debate of the “Central American quagmire.” Therefore, Washington actively sought ways to negotiate a peaceful solution to El Salvador’s war. When the Latin American presidents gathered in the Contadora group failed to deliver a peaceful solution, the State Department accepted the Central American presidents’ effort within the Esquipulas process. However, neither intervention legitimated the guerilla forces and, therefore, could not provide an acceptable peace process to the FMLN. With few options left, Washington accepted the mediating role offered by the United Nations (UN).

Peacemaking in Latin America was new to the UN. During the Cold War, Washington had ensured that the UN did not intervene in hemispheric conflicts, even when “threats to peace and security” were evident. Amid cautious steps to end the Cold War, Secretary Baker no longer insisted that the UN stay out of hemi-spheric security affairs. However, the UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar was not sure that he should seek the role as mediator. Were it not for the activism of his Special Representative, Alvaro de Soto, it is unlikely that the UN would have assumed the key role in ending El Salvador’s civil war. Alvaro de Soto’s role in achiev-ing several peace accords is central to the peace process. He was supported by UN Security Council authority both to pursue an investigation into human rights abuses and to create a peacekeeping force. Later, UN economists would mediate the com-plex issues of land for ex- combatants and international reconstruction. However, while the UN called for nation building, the International Monetary Fund called for a more restricted government role and privatization within a financial paradigm known as the “Washington consensus.” The contradiction between the policies of the two multilateral organizations caused bitter dispute and harmed efforts to reconcile the protagonists in the postwar El Salvador.

This history reflects domestic efforts to reach an enduring peace after twelve years of bitter war, 75,000 dead, and half a million displaced persons. It also reflects external pressures, particularly from Washington, to reach an agreement rapidly. The deadline of the departing Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, and his replacement

x P r e f a c e

by an Egyptian Secretary General with less interest in hemispheric affairs drove the U.S. government and the UN to push for peace. With a time limit of December 31, 1991, neither side consulted adequately with its constituents. Instead, the elite of the FMLN, its partner the FDR, and the Cristiani government reached agreements far away from their respective supporters. The consequence of the decisions made by a selected small group was that few had a stake in the outcome, and implementing the peace accords proved to be more troublesome than negotiating the agreements themselves.

Students of conflict resolution can derive several lessons from the experience of El Salvador’s peace process:

maintain political negotiations despite the violence of ongoing military engagements;create consultative processes with constituent groups;recognize the value of private institutions and individuals as internal mediators;accept that external mediator(s) can never be completely neutral;insist on external financial support for the reconstruction in the postwar period; andseek an international sponsor to sustain interest in the nation building enter-prise for a reasonable period after the war.

El Salvador’s civil war ended in 1992, but ten years later random violence from gangs of youth began to plague the country. Growing up in the context of war and the absence of parental guidance, young men and women created new identities in youth gangs, known as the maras. These gangs fought viciously with each other for territory, resources, and allegiance. Contemporaneously, transnational crimi-nal organizations shipping illicit drugs through Central America, heightened the conflict with El Salvador’s law enforcement. The mara and the criminal organiza-tions fought principally in cities and harmed innocent citizens. The newly created police and the reformed courts have so far been unable to curb the violence. Many Salvadorans now ask whether the war ended, or whether there was merely a pause before another violent process obsessed the nation. This book provides a detailed review of the past, but it is written at a time of fear for the future of El Salvador.

Diana Villiers NegroponteMay 2011

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P r e f a c e xi

Acknowledgments

Many people in El Salvador, at the United Nations, in Mexico City, former U.S. government officials, and scholars helped me research the facts and underlying perceptions necessary to write this book.

At the UN in New York, bureaucrats and observers helped me to understand the Byzantine institution and its political intrigue. There are no records of internal memorandum between the field and headquarters. Papers are zealously guarded and kept secret. Penetrating this monastery was a challenge. Alvaro de Soto provided his personal insights on his mediation efforts to end El Salvador’s civil war. Iqbal Riza, who worked closely with Secretary General Kofi Annan, shared the dilemmas of establishing a UN peacekeeping force in El Salvador. Observers from the Institute of Peace Academy gave me wise insights into comparative theories on peacemaking and reconstruction. Thanks to their hospitality, I spent a productive summer working in David Malone’s offices overlooking the UN headquarters and New York’s East River.

Brent Scowcroft, Bernie Aronson, William Walker, Peter Romero, Cresencio Arcos, and Alex Watson shared their memories of the struggle to make peace in El Salvador. I hope that I have respected their call for discretion, while placing their narrative within the broader context of an integrated history that looks at diplo-matic, political, and social events.

At Yale University, Jean Krasno opened the cabinets that housed her oral inter-views with the leading participants of El Salvador’s civil war and the peace process. She remained generous with her time and her observations on the key actors.

At Georgetown University, John Tutino, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, and David Painter guided my studies as I excavated documents on the end of the Cold War and El Salvador’s peace process. Chester Crocker stimulated me to find the contradic-tions and omissions in both his courses on Conflict Resolution theory. Despite his focus on Africa, he encouraged those of us with a passion to end the conflicts in the American hemisphere. Later, while working at the U.S. Institute of Peace, I came to understand the role of civilians in making peace; persons now given the accredita-tion, “Track II” mediators.

More recently, I spent time with Salvador Samayoa, Ruben Zamora, and Oscar Bonilla; men and women who had struggled to find a political solution in the midst of war. Also, I met with President Cristiani and Roberto Murray Mesa, leaders of the ARENA party. They impressed me by their dedication to heal the country, as well

as to confront the problems of public insecurity and economic development. Also, I thank the people of El Salvador for allowing me to probe their lives and history through articles, movies, and books.

Anu Prasad and Bradford Barker carefully read the manuscript, finding mistakes and making editorial comments. Sarah Nathan led me through the editorial pro-cedures at Palgrave Macmillan. The factual mistakes and interpretation are mine and may offend some with whom I have discussed ideas on making peace in El Salvador.

Finally, I thank my family who has watched me bounce from parenting to teaching to writing in spare moments when I hoped that no one needed me. I read through their childhood illnesses, travelled when a supportive husband could assume family responsibilities, and wrote while the family was asleep, hoping to be alert and inspired when they awoke.

xiv A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s

C h a p t e r 1

Theoretical Issues in El Salvador’s Peace Process

El Salvador’s civil war was a violent, destructive, and dynamic process that evolved over twelve years, with shifts in the framing of issues on both sides as the external context changed. It was a domestic war, captured by the broader Cold War between the superpowers. The internal protagonists, namely the Salvadoran government and its armed forces battled against the Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberación Nacional (FMLN) and their political allies in the Frente Democrática Revolucionaria (FDR). Salvadoran non- governmental communities lent their support to each of the respec-tive protagonists with the result that the whole of society was captured by the deadly and protracted social conflict. No one escaped unless they migrated northward.

Each of the protagonists had within their midst extremists, for whom moderate solutions were unacceptable. They were the “spoilers” who sought to prevent a poli-tical or negotiated resolution of the war. Balanced against the extremists were a few moderate men who sought to mediate, or act as a bridge, between the protagonists. There were three significant domestic mediators: first, the Archbishop of El Salvador and the Catholic Church, second, moderate conser vative businessmen gathered together in a newly created non- governmental organization, and third, the leader-ship of the Jesuit community. Furthermore, mayors, teachers, and community leaders sought to act as mediators in small towns to enable daily chores, such as passage through road blocs, transporting the sick to hospital, and holding local elections. They are the unsung mediators.

External forces played a critical role. They cannot be considered prota gonists, but they aided and abetted their respective allies with arms, commu nication equipment, intelligence, finance as well as space for rest and recuperation. The U.S. govern-ment supported the Salvadoran government and El Salvador’s armed forces (ESAF). Cuba and the Sandinista government in Nicaragua—with indirect support from the Soviet Union—helped the FMLN. Consequently, a civil war was exacerbated by the larger global conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both

2 S e e k i n g P e a c e i n E l S a l v a d o r

sides to the prolonged conflict saw an advantage to belonging to the U.S. or the Soviet bloc. They relied upon communications, equipment and in the case of ESAF, U.S. military training and funding. Consequently, both sides voluntarily accepted participation in the broader global conflict, known as the Cold War. When the Cold War began to ratchet down in early 1989, Washington and Moscow made Central America a test of a new, non- confrontational policy. The strategy of both superpowers evolved forcing the Salvadoran protagonists to consider shifts in their own priorities. So long as both the FMLN and ESAF were dependent upon outside support, they were unable to determine when they would end their war. To a signi-ficant degree, both had become pawns in the global chess game.

Furthermore, regional players with little direct interest in the outcome, beyond a determination to avoid spillover into their respective nations, intervened with the intent to resolve the conflict. They became regional mediators. The Contadora foreign ministers played an active role in the early years, but were replaced by the Central American presidents, gathered together at Esquipulas. Contadora—the Panamanian island—gave its name to the broader group of Latin American national leaders from Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico. Esquipulas—the colonial Guatemalan town—gave its name to the Central American neighbors. The latter group had a greater interest in pursuing peaceful resolution under the leadership of Costa Rican President, Oscar Arias Sanchez. For his mediation in resolving both El Salvador and Nicaragua’s civil wars, Arias received the 1987 Nobel Prize in Peace.

Finally, both the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS) played a role in Central America. The UN Secretary General’s choice of a Peruvian as his Special Representative respected the desire of hemispheric leaders to end U.S. and Soviet intervention. From a “hands-off ” policy toward Latin America, the UN played the principal role in mediating between the protagonists and balan-cing the interests of the external parties to the conflict.

This chapter examines the nature of the mediators, both domestic and external. What was the purpose of those who intervened in Salvador’s civil war? Who held the trust of the parties? Was it necessary to be seen as impartial to the conflict, or could a biased mediator with known relationships to one or the other of the protagonists be effective? Did the UN mediate effectively? What leverage did the respective mediators bring to the negotiation? As indirect participants in El Salvador’s war, how did the U.S. and Soviet governments contribute to a negotiated peace settlement? Finally, what role did non- governmental organizations (NGOs), community- based organizations (CBOs), and grassroots organizations (GROs) play in implementing the peace process?1

The Protagonists

The protagonists are defined as those who led the fight, the political leaders and warriors who made decisions that directly impacted the war and peace effort. They should be distinguished from “the parties” who participated in the war as allies or supporters but were not engaged in the decision- making process. On the govern-ment side, the principle protagonists were threefold: the Salvadoran president and his civilian cabinet; the High Command of ESAF; and the conservative political

T h e o r e t i c a l I s s u e s 3

party, the Alianza Republicana Nacional (ARENA) under its founder, retired Major Roberto d’Aubuisson. Furthermore, the traditional landed families and the private security forces retained to protect their interests remained constant factors to be consi-dered. The latter had the potential to be “spoilers” of any negotiated outcome.2

The Salvadoran government was arraigned against the FMLN, an alliance of five military comandantes, leading six distinct groups, each of which held geographic influence, tactical preferences, and ideological distinctions.3 By 1980, they united under the umbrella of the FMLN. This coalition was joined with the FDR; itself a coalition of political activists who rejected armed conflict in favor of negotiation and participation in the political process.4 Closely allied with the FMLN and FDR were popular organizations that acted in local communities to protect citizen’s interests. Notable among them were women’s groups, formed to search for family members who had disappeared during the conflict. The Comite de Madres (COMADRES) was not created to participate directly with the FMLN. However, the sympathy of its members lay more often with the guerilla forces because the majority of their rela-tives had disappeared at the hands of the Salvadoran government security forces.

Mediators—Partial or Neutral?

Seeking to communicate between the protagonists, if not to act as bridge buil ders between them, were the mediators. These third parties helped both the govern-ment and the FMLN–FDR find solutions that they could not find by themselves. Mediators may be partial (sympathetic) to one side or another, or neutral. Such a determination is not made objectively, but is the result of the protagonist’s percep-tion. This subjective assessment may change over time. The mediator should also be perceived as credible to one side or the other. Internal mediators are better known to the parties at war because they live within the community and have a history of participation in society. Consequently, they are more likely to be trusted. For example, after the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero in March 1980, the Catholic Church was viewed as favoring the FMLN. Also, ESAF viewed the efforts of the Rector of the Jesuit University to engage in a dialogue with President Cristiani in 1989 not as a neutral intervention, but as a partial and effective influence that favored the FMLN. On the other hand, NGOs associated with the Salvadoran busi-ness community were perceived as supportive of the Salvadoran state.

In theory, external mediators may be considered more objective. For this reason, as well as the international resources at their disposal, multilateral institutions, such as the UN and the OAS, are invited to mediate between the protagonists. However, the history in El Salvador suggests that the external mediator soon assumed prefer-ences, policies, and tactics that were perceived, by one or other of the protagonists, as more favorable to one side than the other. The UN can acquire the reputation of favoring one protagonist over the other. In this instance, both the Salvadoran and U.S. governments perceived the UN Secretary General’s Personal Representative, Alvaro de Soto as partial to the FMLN. The brief appearance of the OAS Secretary General was perceived as favorable to the Salvadoran government. Due to the wide-spread belief that the OAS was a U.S.-dominated body, its Secretary General, Baena Soares soon abandoned a mediating role.5


Analytical Framework for Mediation

Fen Osler Hampson developed a paradigm of third party mediation to understand the resolution of civil wars in Cambodia and Angola.6 This paradigm can be adapted to El Salvador’s peace process. Hampson suggests that mediation cannot be analyzed in isolation from the underlying causes of war. Rather, a close relation-ship exists between the efforts to mediate and the mediator’s understanding of the structural causes of the violence. The mediator’s assumptions on why civil war occurred give rise to distinct proposals on how to solve the war. Adapting Hampson’s categories to the context of El Salvador’s civil war, we can identify three relevant categories of mediators: those who seek a politically based solution; those who want a governance approach to strengthen democratic institutions; and those who favor a social, psychological solution.7

I. Politically Based Solutions

Mediators who subscribe to politically based solutions are state- centered and focused on power at the national level. They understand the balance of power, relative influence, and know that one protagonist is stronger than the other and is more likely to suppress the weaker party. These mediators understand the cause of war to be economically and socially constructed. Therefore, in addressing these underlying causes, politically based mediators seek to pers uade, extract promises, manipulate, offer side payments, or withhold resources from protagonists. They prepare the groundwork for democratic practices, and build security provisions for the losers of a democratically held election. Power sharing may be a solution, but it is more likely that constitutional guarantees must be agreed upon to protect the rights of the losing party. These mediators ask the protagonists to be flexible and adapt-able in addressing solutions. They employ appropriate inducements to deter and to prevent spoilers. Finally, these mediators need incentives to hold the protagonists to their negotiated political commitments.

In January 1983, Contadora, an external group of mediators, sought a politi-cally based solution. Contadora consisted of the foreign ministers of Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia, and Panama who analyzed the causes for Salvador’s civil war principally in economic and social terms.8 They recognized that the presence of the U.S., as well as the Cubans as proxies of the Soviet Union in the Central American isthmus had exacerbated historical and fundamental socio- economic inequities.9 Cold War protagonists had used these deep and historical divisions to further their own security and political interests. Therefore, the political problem had to be solved first. Contadora ministers applied leverage on the protagonists to the conflicts in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. “[They] also strove to apply this same leverage towards powers outside the region that sought to influence the outcome in favor of one side or the other.”10 In other words, Contadora mediators believed that their collaboration could decrease active intervention by the U.S. in Central America and force the protagonists to each of these disputes to dialogue, if not negotiate.

Contadora’s preferred method of work was through dialogue among Foreign Ministry officials. It acknowledged no role for parliamentarians or citizen interlocutors


or observers. In so doing, they denied political status and legitimacy to opposition forces in all three countries, namely the Contra forces in Nicaragua,11 the URNG in Guatemala,12 and the FMLN–FDR in El Salvador. This exclusion resulted in cynicism, if not outright opposition, from the FMLN–FDR, who only two years earlier had won recognition as legitimate political actors, known as “insurgents,” from the governments of France and Mexico.13 Under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, insurgencies are recognized and legal status is granted to “insurgents.”14 The Conventions grant no such legitimacy to guerilla forces, rebels, or irregular forces. In carrying out their work, the Contadora ministers drafted legal documents that applied to all Central American governments, but excluded any participation by guerilla forces, which were considered to be illegal and therefore without standing. In so doing, they protected their own governments against potential claims from opposition armed groups within their respective countries. The ministers also sought to exclude the U.S. and Cuba from any military role in Central America in order to reduce the level of military violence. Their intent was to allow the national leaders to pursue their own settlement without outside interference. In the words of the Venezuelan ambassador to the UN, Diego Arria, “For Latin Americans, Contadora was considered a tremendous moral force for political integrity.”15

Contadora’s success, however, depended upon the acquiescence of the guerilla forces and the cooperation of the U.S. government. It achieved neither. The FMLN remained opposed, and individuals within the U.S. State Department set out to stall the process.16 This occurred despite skeptical support for the negotiations from Secretary of State, George Shultz.17 In El Salvador, President Jose Napoleon Duarte declared his support for democratic national elections, but was unable to give the FMLN the security guarantees needed to ensure their participation in government.18 Duarte shared Contadora’s desire to see the withdrawal of Nicaraguan and Soviet bloc interference in El Salvador. However, neither he nor his military high com-mand had sufficient strength to survive the withdrawal of U.S. military support. Therefore, he publicly endorsed the effort of the Contadora mediators, but privately rejected their proposals.19

When it became evident that the Contadora mediators could not reach an agree-ment, presidents Vinicio Cerezo of Guatemala and Oscar Arias of Costa Rica each drafted their own plans to resolve the Central American conflicts. Cerezo focused on excluding external forces.20 Arias focused on democratization.21 Both accepted that only Central Americans could logically understand and emotionally feel the dependency of relatively weak states on the U.S. govern ment, as well as the need to balance external economic support with skilful tactics to withstand overwhel ming external political pressures.22 They therefore developed a three- part negotiating strategy that focused on democratization, national reconciliation, and international verification. These goals were acceptable to all parties, but neither President Cerezo nor President Arias included the “insurgents” as legitimate interlocutors of any peace process. In order to avoid legitimizing opposition groups that had taken up arms within their respective countries, they avoided direct communication with the FMLN- FDR as well as the Contras in Nicaragua. Instead, they preferred to use external interlocutors, such as the Mexican Secretary of Interior to communicate with the FMLN and its partner, the FDR.23


President Oscar Arias’ plan, later known as the Declaration of Esquipulas II, differed from the Contadora proposal in several respects, most notably in addres sing the political causes of violence. Arias noted and lamented the exclusion of critical sectors of Central American people from effective participation in the state. The issue of political participation was to be addressed by focusing on the need for effec-tive democracy and the incorporation of the insurgents into the political process through internationally supervised democratic elections. This was critical to Arias, whose focus was Nicaragua and the spillover effect of the Sandinista revolution into Costa Rica.24 Salvadoran President Duarte held strong reservations about the Arias plan, but publicly endorsed the proposal for democratization.25 FMLN Comandante, Schafik Handal’s response was that the Arias proposal was not directed toward El Salvador, but rather at Nicaragua. The FMLN had not been consulted in the development of the peace plan and he recommended to his leadership that the plan be rejected.26 Despite the fact that the Soviet Union signed on to the Esquipulas II agreement through the support of a UN Security Council Resolution, the FMLN- FDR refused to accept the legitimacy of a plan that had not been negotiated with them.27 Excluded from the process, they rejected a mediated outcome. The reality was that in 1987, the FMLN believed that they could succeed militarily. Therefore, they did not need external mediators.

II. Governance- based Model that Seeks to Strengthen Democratic Institutions

Under this model, third party mediators examine the context of civil war to deter-mine the existence or denial of due legal process and civic intolerance. Interveners examine domestic institutions and seek to reform political institutions and parti-cipatory governance structures at all levels of society so as to restore civil society. Mediators focus on the legal and judiciary system and the interaction between public services and the private sector. They give priority to democracy and human rights as preconditions to a lasting peace. These mediators seek enduring political change, including measures to insure accountability and justice over the long term. To achieve this, they seek to promote new norms, greater accountability, new codes of conduct, and transparency. They seek to reform state institutions that are per-ceived as instruments of state coercion, such as the police and the military.

In the case of El Salvador, the UN Secretary General identified the lack of poli-tical space for addressing critical socio- economic problems as the principal cause of the fundamental discord.28 When invited to act as a go- between in January 1990, the Secretary General’s personal representative, Alvaro de Soto insisted upon reform of the Salvadoran constitution, the judiciary, and the police as well as reform of ESAF. This proposal met with fierce opposition from President Alfredo Cristiani due to the adamant opposition of the military High Command. De Soto insisted and persisted. It would require more than a year of ongoing pressure to persuade Cristiani that constraints on the power of ESAF and the creation of a new police force were necessary components of any peace agreement with the FMLN. In a prolonged three- week meeting held in Mexico City in April 1991, de Soto and the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Bernie Aronson succeeded in persuading the


protagonists of the need to amend the Salvadoran constitution and thus reform military and security institutions, the judiciary, and the electoral tribunal.

Although irritated by the presence in Mexico City of multiple Salvadoran politi-cians from the opposition parties, as well as FMLN field commanders, Alvaro de Soto came to recognize that the presence of key domestic players assisted both protagonists in making significant concessions. Those members of the National Assembly, who would later vote on the constitutional amendments, urged solutions that strengthened a democratic Salvadoran state. The Mexico City agreement engaged directly the need to promote new norms and legal standards, as well as create new state institutions. However, the leader’s commitment to reform the judiciary and the police left unanswered the sense of social injustice and revenge. The psychological aspects of a decade- long civil war remained unanswered.

III. Social- psychological Approach

Scholars and practitioners of conflict- resolution, who stress the role played by nonofficial mediators, grassroots organizations, and citizens, find compatibility with the third paradigm, known as the “social-psychological” approach.29 For these mediators, the causes of conflict are a matter of “perception, a subjective phenom-enological social process.”30 A strong sense of victimization with personal experience of intense violence leads to a spiral of violence. Breaking this perception of violence can only be addressed by seeking solutions that change the attitudes of the protago-nists. To achieve this change, protagonists must be willing to modify their roles and procedures. In seeking solutions, combatants must be willing to drop a “we/them” approach and search for commonalities. This is not an easy task and both Harold Saunders, the U.S. diplomat and former Middle East negotiator and Hampson, the observer of the Angola and Cambodia peace talks believe that this cannot be done without the intervention of third parties.31 Third party mediators should seek to balance the subjective sense of victimization with public recognition by the perpe-trator of his responsibility for the harmful acts. In their opinion, the perpetrator should come to recognize the injustice and ask for forgiveness.32 One method for accomplishing this task is the establishment of international tribunals. For example, UN- sponsored Truth Commissions bring an element of impartiality, allows multiple voices to be heard, and can restore grains of faith in the judicial process.

In the case of El Salvador, the first director of the UN’s Observer Mission to El Salvador (ONUSAL), Iqbal Riza addressed directly the FMLN’s sense of victim-ization.33 In January 1991, the Pakistani diplomat and long- time UN bureaucrat, Ambassador Riza received Security Council authority to create a Human Rights’ Division to investigate abuses and protect citizens. This division was placed within ONUSAL offices, but reported directly to the UN Under Secretary for Political Affairs in New York. In July 1991, 100 UN observers investigated the sites where massacres had occurred, visited jails where poli tical prisoners were interned, and listened to complaints from victims and their families. Philippe Texier, the first Director of the UN’s Human Rights division, invited members of the public to come forward with their complaints against abuse by either side and also sent UN officials to investigate the validity of those complaints.34


Later, at their meeting in Mexico City in April 1991, the protagonists agreed to the formation of a UN Commission on the Truth in El Salvador. Led by 3 international jurists, the commission investigated complaints and corroborated the evidence before drafting the formal UN report on the Truth in El Salvador.35 80 percent of the complaints were directed against the Salvadoran state and its secu-rity apparatus. Due to the complaints against the government security forces, the Commission’s work was highly controversial, but the intent of the UN mediators was to address the subjective sense of victimization and the phenomenology of viol-ence throughout El Salvador.36

Furthermore, the UN mediators sought to legitimize the FMLN, a status that no previous official mediator had succeeded in extracting from the Salvadoran government. President Cristiani refused to accept the legitimacy of the FMLN and he criticized the manner in which the UN treated both the government and the FMLN as equals. Nevertheless, the UN insisted that the FMLN had acquired legitimacy through Security Council Resolution 637 that recognized the guerillas as “insurgents,” a term of international law that accorded them legitimacy under the 1949 Geneva Conventions on Armed Conflict.37 Furthermore, Security Council Resolution 637 bound the U.S. government, which, in turn, pressed Cristiani into recognizing that any dialogue with the FMLN required its legal recognition, as well as the recognition of their supporters gathered together in community- based and non- governmental organizations.

In conclusion, all the three methods of mediation— political- based solutions, governance- based, and the social- psychological approaches—were used at one time or another to help achieve a settlement to El Salvador’s civil war. The politically based solution was tried but failed, because it did not include the FMLN as a legiti-mate partner to any resolution of the conflict. The social- psychological approach contributed to the process by providing a legitimate, public, and highly respected method for denouncing charges of abuse. Although the Salvadoran government believed that the UN Truth Commission was intrusive and favored the FMLN, Cristiani recognized that the Presidency lacked sufficient power and independence to investigate on its own military and security forces.38 Therefore, Cristiani accepted the UN’s presence, despite fierce opposition from members of the extreme right wing and its allies within ESAF.39 The UN Truth Commission’s investigative work throughout El Salvador proved to be dangerous with numerous personal threats to its staff members.40

The most effective approach to resolve Salvador’s conflict was the governance- based model that sought to strengthen democratic institutions. This was agreed upon at the Mexico City negotiating session that proposed amendments to the Salvadoran constitution. It was put to the test during the implementation of the peace accords. The UN’s insistence on changes to the institutions of government was critical to the overhaul of the security structures. Thanks to U.S. and European funding, these institutional reforms were made possible. However, external media-tion was not sufficient. The political will of the Salvadoran prota gonists to change the judicial system, the electoral system, the new civilian police, as well as to create an effective Ombudsman for Human Rights office was essential to implement the mediated texts.41 It was not easy and because critical constituent groups had not


formed part of the negotiating process, there existed considerable opposition to the reforms from both the Supreme Court judges and ESAF’s officer corps. The mem-bers of the legislature may have been present during the Mexico City negotiations, but they failed to communicate with the justices of the Supreme Court and the military High Command. Therefore, when it came time to implement the reforms, the legislature was unable to carry forward the changes. Only significant external pressure forced the members of a new National Assembly to agree to these consti-tutional amendments; pressure that had to be impressed also upon the president of the Supreme Court and the High Command.

Mediators

Who were the mediators in El Salvador and what role did each carry out? Five cate-gories may be identified:

Official mediators representing multilateral institutions, that is, the UN and the OAS;Foreign Ministers of the Contadora group and the Presidents of the neighbo-ring Central American states gathered at Esquipulas;U.S. government after 1991 when the State Department moved from its traditional position as the protector of the Salvadoran state to a catalyst for resolving contentious issues between the state and the FMLN;42

Catholic Church and Jesuit priests at the University of Central America (UCA); and Community- based and grassroots organizations.

The role of the UN will be discussed at length in Chapter 7. The role of Contadora and Esquipulas officials has been reviewed earlier in this chapter. The role of the U.S. government is more complex.

Given its overwhelming historical support for the Salvadoran government, it is hard to assume that the U.S. could be perceived as a neutral mediator. Bernard “Bernie” Aronson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs was knowledgeable of the underlying multiple causes of violence and he was non- ideological. Upon assuming his official responsibilities in June 1989, Aronson was prepared to use the leverage of U.S. financial, military, and humanitarian aid to pressure the Salvadoran government and ESAF into accep ting a negotiated end to the civil war. Furthermore, confronted with the assassination of the Jesuit fathers in November 1989, Aronson persuaded Secretary of State James Baker to cut off future military aid to ESAF without prior action from the U.S. Congress. With these actions, Aronson presented a radical change from the previous officials responsible for Latin America. This unilateral cutoff reflected a significant shift in U.S. policy toward El Salvador. Secretary of State James Baker’s purpose was to withdraw from the bitter political controversy or “quagmire” of Central America and to give the UN the principal role in seeking a solution. In pursuit of a negoti-ated settlement, one might consider the U.S. government from 1990 onward as an “insider partial mediator.”43 No one could claim that the U.S. was disinterested or

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did not hold historical prejudice in favor of the anti- communist Salvadoran state. The U.S. government was never neutral, but Aronson’s unpublished papers indicate that Baker was prepared to accept the FMLN as a legitimate political actor as part of a U.S. commitment to seek a negotiated, political settlement to end El Salvador’s civil war.44

Beyond the official level of mediators, there were unofficial but influential per-sons and institutions with access to the leadership of each contending protagonist. In El Salvador, the Catholic Church and the Jesuit Community played significant roles as facilitators and sometime mediators between the protagonists.45 As facili-tator, the Catholic Church could act as a go- between and arrange the procedural aspects of two meetings between the parties. The church had credibility and a follo-wing based on its role as the predominant religion. Within the Catholic Church one man sought to act as mediator. The Spanish Jesuit priest, Ignacio Ellacuria S. J. engaged in dialogue with both the FMLN and the leadership of the conservative political party, ARENA. During Salvador’s civil war, Ellacuria went into exile, but returned in early 1989 to continue his work as the Rector of the University of Central America—Jose Simeon Canas, hereafter known as UCA.46

On his return, Ellacuria established a personal relationship with the newly elected president, Alfredo Cristiani. The two men met on several occasions and established an understanding of how to move forward to a peace settlement. Based on these meetings, as well as conversations with the guerilla leader, Joaquin Villalobos and other members of the FMLN, Ellacuria put forward proposals that might be acceptable to both sides.47 In his mind, the parties could have reached an agreement between them-selves.48 Only U.S. government interference prevented the parties from resolving their own conflict.49 It has been argued that ESAF’s High Command was determined to eliminate Ellacuria precisely because he had access to Cristiani and sought to mediate between the president and the FMLN.50 However, the Salvadoran military never saw the Catholic Church, Father Ellacuria, or lay workers as impartial. Instead, since 1980 they sought out priests and religious leaders from protestant denominations for assassination.51 Despite that, church communities and the Catholic hierarchy continued to seek dialogue and negotiated with both sides. This level of internal and unofficial mediation was key to enabling a broader peace process.52 These sub- elite citizens were not accountable for decisions at the state level. However, they were influential in Salvadoran society through their intellectual capa city, status, use of the pulpit, and access to the international news media. Tragically, the Jesuit dialogue ended with Ellacuria’s assassination on November 16, 1989.

Another informal level of mediation was composed of community- based (CBO) and grassroots (GRO) organizations, which were active from 1985 onward.53 They may be distinguished by the formal and legal structure given to the former, versus the informality of local groups that suffered daily indignities and injuries. The narra-tives of these indignities and injuries justified the search for political and financial support from international NGOs. The funds were distributed to the CBOs, which in turn shared them with the GROs.

The principal focus of CBOs was the organization of local communities into cooperatives to provide sustenance and food, as well as to create collective defense against ESAF.54 In doing so, they took advantage of new government regulations


that permitted legalization and receipt of international funding.55 CBO leaders communicated with local military commanders to negotiate transport to hospitals for wounded civilians, access to water, information on detained prisoners, improved access to local markets, and other issues of critical importance in the daily life of the urban and rural population of El Salvador. These groups were not impartial: their sympathies lay with the FMLN. However, they had to survive and found ways to relate and negotiate with municipal and military authorities in order to support daily life.

At this level of negotiation, a strong sense of victimization affected those parti-cipating in the peace process, but these local mediators held various identities that helped compensate for the strong emotions of hatred and vengeance.56 For instance, a FMLN sympathizer was also a school teacher with responsibilities toward educa-tion authorities, and a member of the conservative ARENA party was also a share-cropper with long- held grievances against the tenant farmer or landowner.57 Natan Sharansky calls these people “double thinkers” in their public affiliation with the authorities and their private sympathy for the dissidents. Sharansky does not decry this double life, but recognizes the necessity for individuals to accommodate in order to survive in authoritarian regimes.58

In the late 1980s, campesinos (men and women from the countryside or campo) returned from the refugee camps in Honduras to resettle in their own communities or create new ones. They brought with them the organizing skills learned or fur-ther developed in the UN High Commission for Refugee camps at Colomoncagua and Mesa Grande.59 Upon return, the refugees applied those skills to reconstruct the productive capacity of their communities, creating workshops and coopera-tives.60 Although sympathetic to the FMLN and suspicious of the government, it was hoped that the former refugees would assert a political autonomy that could advance the interests of their community rather than the politics of the FMLN.61 The community leaders had shown great pragmatism as they sought to create collec-tive communities and negotiate with the UN authorities in the refugee camps. Now, it was hoped that the same commi tment to autonomous communities—both political and economic—would translate into a capacity to act as bridges between the FMLN and the local govern ment. It did not happen, principally because the level of insecurity during the two years of peace negotiations forced the inhabitants to demonstrate coopera tion with the government forces, while at the same time work-ing quietly with the FMLN.

When peace arrived in 1992 and the level of violence decreased, there was great hope that the former refugees and now community organizers would focus on eco-nomically productive activities and become more politically independent. However, after twelve years of war, the campesinos of northern Morazan were not interested in participating in national efforts at reconciliation. Instead, they withdrew to pick up the previous threads of their private lives. Their opinions had not been sought during the peace negotiations and they had no stake in the national experiment of making peace. Consequently, they withdrew to recreate their lives and those of their families. Even during the peace talks, the inhabitants of Morazan had to defend themselves against the government and the military, which seized materials, inhibited their com-merce, and publicly accused organized civilians of being FMLN “fronts.”62


The Mennonite scholar, John Paul Lederach, called for the empowerment of indigenous communities as the necessary ingredient of any sustainable peace.63 This empowerment could be achieved through the inclusion of GROs and CBOs within the peace process (either as observers or participants). The purpose is twofold: first, to enable the local communities to engage with the process and understand its relationship to their own lives and that of their communities; and second, to transmit “cultural modalities” to the elite negotiators so that peace agreements encompassed the real needs of those most affected by the war. Neither of these purposes was carried out on a sustained basis in the peacemaking for El Salvador. Instead, the elite among both protagonists focused on the reform of the Constitution, the armed forces, the judiciary, a cease- fire, and demobilization. Not until September 1991, some four months before the end of negotiations, did the issue of reintegrating FMLN combatants through access to land, credit, and training arise. No one was present at the negotiating table to convey the needs of campesinos and city folk who had fought on one side or the other. Only in the course of implementing the peace accords, did the Salvadoran government and the FMLN–FDR discuss in detail how to implement the demobilization and reintegration of soldiers into civilian life. Issues so vital to the men and women who had supported the FMLN and fought within ESAF, were not addressed until the end of the peace process.

Spoilers

Those who wish to prevent resolution or have an interest in perpetuating the conflict are known as “spoilers.” They exist on both sides of disputes and hold distin ctive reasons for destroying the peace process. In the case of El Salvador, those FMLN comandantes, who rarely participated in the talks with the government, were convinced that the FMLN leadership had become seduced by the good life of nego-tiations in luxurious Mexican and Costa Rican hotels. Until the end, they remained skeptical that their goals and those of their men in arms were represented. However, they were not prepared to ruin the chances of a peace that would permit them to participate in the political life of their country. What had failed to be achieved through the gun might still be achieved through the ballot box.

On the right, Roberto d’Aubuisson the founder of the ARENA party and author of Archbishop Romero’s murder might have succeeded in spoiling the negotiations. His popularity with the petit bourgeoisie could have provided the base for military or political action that would have damaged significantly the delicate peace talks. However, d’Aubuisson was diagnosed with cancer in 1988 and moderated his behavior to support a peaceful resolution to the decade- long civil war. Counter- intuitively, members of the Atlacatl Battalion who murdered the six Jesuits, their housekeeper and her daughter caused domestic and international outrage that resulted in greater support for UN mediation. We must conclude that in the case of El Salvador, potential “spoilers” came to recognize greater interest in a peace process than in continued war.


Zartman’s “Hurting Stalemate”

Mediators, of whatever persuasion, are ineffective unless the protagonists have reached a critical juncture in their war. A “hurting stalemate” must be reached, in which the parties recognize that no further advantage can be gained by fighting and that only negotiation can advance their cause.64 Such a moment was reached in late November 1989 when the FMLN uprising of that month failed to mobilize the popular sectors in the rural areas, as well as the capital city of San Salvador. At the same time, ESAF recognized that for a period of approximately one month, 47,000 troops had failed to maintain control over the capital city by night. It became clear to both protagonists that neither side could win; both sides were losing physical and moral support. In the circumstances of a military and political stalemate, the time was ripe for UN intervention. In December 1989, the FMLN approached Alvaro de Soto and agreed to meet in a neutral setting, the International Airline Association offices in Montreal. In January 1990, Secretary Baker strongly urged President Cristiani to seek the good offices of UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar. Tentatively, Cristiani began the dialogue with the UN.

C h a p t e r 2

Ancient Conflicts, Modern Violence: The Causes and Context for Civil War in El Salvador

El Salvador’s war lasted approximately twelve years, took approximately 70,000 lives, displaced one quarter of a million people, and destroyed $2 billion worth of pro-perty. It began on March 9, 1980, the day after the Civilian- Military Junta initiated a program of agrarian reform.1 The coffee elite, whose land was threatened, turned to their allies in the military in an effort to reverse the legislation and to obstruct the changes proposed by Salvador’s Christian Democrat party and their allies in Washington. They would also crush the upsurge from leftist sympathizers with a wave of violence. On March 24, Major Roberto d’Aubuisson ordered the murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero y Galdamez, and fellow officers persecuted those who gathered for his funeral mass by shooting and killing them as they gathered on the steps of San Salvador’s cathedral.

The response and the extraordinary security measures taken by the armed forces resulted in the disintegration of El Salvador’s governing Junta. Civilians holding centrists and leftist leanings resigned leaving only military officers to run the govern-ment.2 With their departure, El Salvador dissolved into a civil war that pitted the state against a coalition of disaffected middle- class revolutionaries. A weakened government relied for its existence on El Salvador’s armed forces (ESAF) and its use of force. In turn, the armed forces sought and obtained increasing U.S. govern-ment support. Washington financed the training and equipment of ESAF in order to prevent another Central American state from turning to Marxism/Leninism like Nicaragua.3 The Salvadoran military and security forces became autonomous from the elected government and more powerful than the President. On January 11, 1981, the Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberación Nacional (FMLN) launched a coordinated, nationwide offensive with the intent of provoking a people’s


insurrection similar to that which the Sandinistas had undertaken in Nicaragua. The offensive lasted one week, but the ESAF counteroffensive was fierce, and killings on both sides reached 1,000 people a month in the period 1980–1981, two- thirds of which were attributed to the military and security forces.4 What reasons lay behind the violence?

This pattern of large- scale violence and assassinations perpetrated in the early 1980s was not new to El Salvador, a nation with a land mass of 8,236 square miles,5 a population of 4.625 million, and a per capita income of $1,032 in 1982.6 The nation, whose name translates into “Savior of the World” possessed several fea-tures that distinguished it from the other Central American states: densely settled populations competing for inadequate agricultural land; historically rich fertile soil appropriate for intensive cultivation; a technically advanced coffee produc tion system; and, as with Guatemala, a laboring class that had suffered violent repression throughout the country’s history as an independent state.

President Alfredo Cristiani’s chief negotiator in the peace talks, David Escobar, spoke of the historic nature of El Salvador’s internal violence,

An internal conflict, such as Salvador’s always has causes that are very remote and ancient; in this case, there are causes that date back to the time of independence, to the time when we were still a colony of Spain. And causes of the kind that are economic, that relate to our social structure, and our juridical structure in society.

Escobar’s analysis is significant because he was a close personal friend of President Cristiani and led the government delegation in the peace dialogue. He recognized the underlying socio- economic issues and the lack of an independent and transpa-rent judicial system. However, he chose not to raise these critical issues during that dialogue. The government would not instigate any substantive themes for discus-sion. It would respond, but not initiate. Escobar left it to the coalition of five gue-rilla groups, unified under the umbrella organization of the FMLN, to raise issues of importance to them and to seek redress for these underlying causes.

The FMLN preferred to achieve political power through participation in the govern-ment, and subsequently to address the underlying socio- economic grievances, as well as the independence of the judiciary. Only in September 1991, three- quarters of the way into the peace talks did the former guerilla leaders raise the issue of land reform and the reincorporation of their forces into productive peaceful occupations. Why did they wait so long to raise fundamental socio- economic issues? Did the FMLN perceive socio- economic causes as secondary to the loss of political space within which they could exercise influence? Why did the FMLN give priority to achieving poli tical power? Escobar’s recognition of socio- economic causes and the FMLN’s focus on political grievances produced disparate goals in their search for peace.

Finally, the presence of the United States and its government’s support for the Salvadoran state provoked the enmity of the FMLN and the resentment of the Salvadoran military. The principal reason was that the direct presence of the U.S. in support of ESAF and the indirect presence of the U.S. in both the export economy and its aid programs were perceived to have resulted in a loss of Salvadoran sover-eignty. This chapter will examine each of the structural causes for the war.7

A n c i e n t C o n f l i c t s , M o d e r n V i o l e n c e 17

Underlying Socio- Economic Causes

Salvador’s intellectuals on the left, as well as observers of El Salvador’s tortured history have examined the underlying socio- economic nature of the nation’s past. Their claim is that the causes are threefold and found in the nature of the liberal reforms of the late nineteenth century, land patterns of an agro- export economy, and the domination by an agrarian elite allied with the military to ensure social stability and agricultural productivity. The result was a polarized society with minimum space for political action, an electoral system that could not produce real change, a judiciary that was beholden to an alliance of military and landowning elite. Furthermore, large sectors of a restless middle class found no political party within which to express their political opinions. They became exasperated by their inability to bring about peaceful change and concluded that revolution was the only means to carry out significant reform.

El Salvador’s violence can be traced back to the middle of the nineteenth century and the end of the export boom in the natural dyes, cochineal and indigo. Protection offered to small and medium- size planters by the Indigo Growers Society in the late colonial period ended as synthetic dyes made cochineal and indigo uncompetitive in world markets.8 In their place, coffee was chosen as the preferred export crop based on climate, Salvador’s fertile soils, and the capacity to dry and store the beans from one season to another. The transition to coffee required larger tracts of land and the financing of coffee bushes, fertilizers, and de- husking mills. Small peasant farmers, protected by the paternalistic leadership of conservative and authoritarian leaders, were now forced to sell their land to more prosperous coffee estates. In turn, they become day laborers. In El Salvador, as in many other parts of Latin America, for more than a century after independence, “coffee production was associated with a profound transformation of landscape and society.”9

General Gerardo Barrios, the Salvadoran liberal who assumed power in 1858 encouraged the transfer of land cultivation from cochineal to coffee and accelerated a process of modernization and economic reforms. When the conversion proved slow, General Barrios decided to “abolish any aspect of man’s ownership, use or settlement of the land that hindered the rapid establishment of coffee plantations.”10 The general and his liberal followers believed that expanded productivity and exports would lead to an industrial revolution that would lead Salvadoran society to a multilayered economy similar to that enjoyed by the United States and Western Europe.11 Based on the greater income generated by an export economy, general standards of living were expected to rise and secondary industries would emerge to satisfy the population.

The doubling of coffee exports in the early 1880s created new wealth and a demand for arable land. Furthermore, the determination of General Barrios to transfer land from cochineal to coffee resulted in the liberal reforms of 1881–1882 that legislated the abolition of common and communal landholdings. As a result of this legislation, it is estimated that more than 22 percent of agricultural land in El Salvador became available for sale.12 The effect of both the coffee boom and the privatization of communal lands was that small coffee farmers were persuaded to sell their family plots to larger coffee fincas with the promise of ready cash. When that


cash ran out, the farmer and his families were forced to become day laborers. Over two generations, land was concentrated among fewer and more powerful coffee pro-ducers and a rural proletariat was created. Subsidies, tax exemptions, and the promise of large profits brought new land into cultivation.13 Alongside the large agricultural estates lay nume rous small holdings of family farmers whose production provided subsistence living, but no substantial contribution to national production.

In criticizing Salvador’s landowning patterns, the slogan of dominance by El Salvador’s “fourteen families” is bandied about widely. It reflects the concentra-tion of ownership in both land and processing that arose gradually between 1920 and 1982. In 1920, the U.S. Consul reported 337 important coffee growers.14 Eight years later, a U.S. survey found 350 coffee growers with farms larger than seventy- five manzanas.15 [1 manzana � 1.34 acres] The noted increase was slight. However, in the first official coffee census of 1938, 455 producers, representing 4 percent of the total landowners, owned almost 63,000 manzanas (53 percent of total land area) on farms of more than 50 manzanas. In addition, there were some 207 beneficios ( de- husking facilities) and a similar number of exporters.16 A leap in the concentration of land and productive resources had occurred between 1928 and 1938, coinciding with the authoritarian rule of General Maximiliano Hernandez.17 Forty- five years later, two Salvadoran researchers at the Central American University (UCA) found that 10 percent of all coffee producers controlled 80 percent of all Salvadoran produc-tion, and most millers of coffee individually controlled the production of hundreds of small growers.18 In the same period, the U.S. author, Tommie Sue Montgomery found 114 family groups, comprising 1,309 individuals, dominated coffee produc-tion, processing, and export.19 Both the UCA study and Montgomery’s work con-clude that land ownership had become increasingly concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. Although the slogan of fourteen families is inaccurate, the reality of social inequality and unequal concentration of land and wealth existed. Throughout the twentieth century, this contributed to the sense of economic injustice.20

The coffee elite exercised influence through their ownership of commercial pro-cessing plants as well as extensive arable land. Furthermore, the elite had significant, if not controlling interests in the commercial houses, brokerage firms, and financial institutions. By means of family and marriage ties, they controlled political and professional positions in Salvadoran society. They placed position seekers within the government bureaucracy, thereby creating favors and developing an extensive patronage system.21 Linked to the economic elite were former military officers who had retired at the top of the ranks and played a key role in pacifying the country during one or more periods of upheaval.22 These former military officers provided security to large economic enterprises and, based on their experience in the mili-tary, retired to managerial functions in the private sector. The integrated economic elite, its political connections, and its entanglement with the military produced an alliance, known as the oligarchy. The term is used pejoratively and reflects both concentration and abuse of power by the Salvadoran elite.

One of several distinctions within the oligarchy will be critical for the later examination of the peace process. The contemporary historian of Central American coffee, Jeffrey Paige identifies an inherent dualism, or two- class “fractions” within the Salvadoran coffee elite.23 The first “fraction” consisted of landowners in coffee,


and later in cattle, cotton, and sugar. They were closely tied to the banking system. For the most part, they were conservative and traditional defenders of the status quo. The second “fraction” consisted of processors of those same products, who had capital assets in agro- industrial plants and in the service industry. They employed wage labor and financed the processors. Although one family might participate in both “fractions,” different families specialized in one or other fraction. Paige identifies a parallel division between Spanish noble and immigrant families. Their respective backgrounds often reflected, but not always, the split between land ownership and the processors.24 Spanish colonial families such as the Regalados were more likely to be the owners of vast tracts of land and coffee trees, while immigrant families such as the de Solas tended to be coffee processors.25 This may be a dis-tinction of degree, because the Regalados exported coffee and the de Solas families owned extensive land. Nevertheless, observers of the coffee elite in the 1980s believe that this distinction influenced the political ideology, as well as the economic behav-ior of particular families.26

These distinctions became important in the development of a new conservative party, the Alianza Republicana Nacional (ARENA) in 1980. ARENA comprised both the landowning “fraction” and the commercial entrepreneurs. The former fraction was composed of old- line conservatives allied to the landowners. They remained staunch anti- communists and remained committed to defeating the guerilla insurgency, whom they referred to as “terrorists.”27

Historically, landowning families in El Salvador have reinforced authoritarian politics. In contrast, the agro- industrialists have been more open to democratic initiatives. They held their wealth in machinery, industrial plant, and investment portfolios not land. The agro- industrialists were more open to the search for a negotiated settlement in which the FMLN would participate in the democratic elections. During the early 1980s, both “fractions” held together in the face of both the FMLN insurgency and the government’s nationalization of the export trade in coffee.28 This unity broke down after the 1982 presidential election of the Christian Democrat, Jose Napoleon Duarte and his introduction of socio- economic reforms. The first “fraction” of coffee growers and landowning families assumed a die- hard defensive posture in alliance with the conservative officers in the armed forces. In contrast, the agro- industrialists and other progressive business leaders found alter-native options for protecting both their investment assets and their families—they invested in the United States and sent their families out of El Salvador. A group consisting of some notable figures among the moderate conservatives remained in El Salvador, determined to defend their economic interests and seek a solution to the spiraling violence. This group of businessmen would defeat the FMLN and, at the same time, seek to curb ESAF’s power. These moderate conservatives supported one of their own, Alfredo Cristiani Burkard, for the presidency in 1989.29

The alliance of the coffee elite and military officers was pitted against a restless middle class that became active politically in the 1960s. These were the children of men and women who had moved off the land and into the capital and provincial towns where they educated their sons and daughters. They became the decisive political force in El Salvador. The origin of this class is found in the significant economic growth of the post–World War II period when new agro- industries in


food processing, tanning, and textiles were produced as a result of the quadrupling of revenues from coffee, as well as the diversification into cattle and cotton. Increased production resulted in greater demands upon arable land. Foreign investment trickled in.30 As the agro- industrial coffee families extended their control into sugar and the development of cattle ranches and cotton farms, small holders sold their land at below market prices, or were forced off their land.31 The post–World War II economic expansion created a massive semiproletariat and informal sector with part- time migratory laborers. Lacking sufficient land to support themselves, subsistence farmers and their families drifted into towns where the agro- industrial expansion absorbed some, but not all.

Absence of Political Space

The emerging agro- industry in processing and manufacturing stimulated the for-mation of a middle class in San Salvador and small provincial towns. It consisted of a professional class of doctors, notaries, and lawyers, as well as government technocrats and tradesmen. The emerging middle class found only the official military party, the Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN) and three other and smaller conser vative parties for political action. There was no space for civic action within labor unions or centrist and leftist political parties. Active participation in those areas was immediately suppressed by the military and its security agencies with the result that critical opinions of a more liberal nature found little outlet for expression.32 Radio and newspapers were owned by members of the oligarchy who expected editorials and opinion pieces to reflect the views of the publisher. No space for moderate, centrist political expression existed.

Two groups arose within the growing urban, middle class to demand social change; the mildly reformist Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC) and the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), which supported a social democratic program. In 1960, reformers with centrist opinions began investigating the possibility of crea-ting a political party that encouraged the participation of all political persuasions and ensured that power went to the real electoral winner. Groups wrote to Christian Democratic parties in Chile and Venezuela asking for information and ideas from Eduardo Frei and Rafael Caldera. They drafted the party’s charter that was signed on November 25, 1960.33 Among its founding members was Jose Napoleon Duarte, a civil engineer and then president of El Salvador’s Boy Scouts.

Closely related to the PDC was the MNR, led by Guillermo Manuel Ungo. The MNR received support from banned political organizations on the left, but failed to become a significant political force in Salvador.34 The MNR had received support from members of the Partido Comunista de El Salvador (PCS), but it split between those who sought to pursue popular mobilization and the development of an effec-tive rear guard and those who believed that the time was ripe for armed struggle. The PCS Secretary General, Salvador Cayetano Carpio left the party in 1970 over the issue of armed insurrection and helped to form the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación (FPL), the first of five political- military organizations that emerged to support guerilla warfare. With Cayetano’s departure, Schafik Handal became the leader of the PCS and revamped the party’s ideology. In this he found willing allies among


University students and middle- class intellectuals. Handal was to play a leading role both in the peace negotiations and the implementation of the peace accords.

From within the growing middle class, there emerged in the 1970s a new gene ration of activists, educated for the most part at the Universidad Nacional de El Salvador. Disenchanted by the traditional posture of the PCS that mass mobilization must precede armed rebellion, young student leaders proposed a union between the popular revolutionary movement and armed insurrection. At the same time, a segment from the youth groups broke away from the moderate PDC to create new political parties. These new groups were determined to abandon the “reformist” stage of the revolution and to undertake mass organization and armed struggle.35 Born in the late 1940s and early 1950s, these students came from relatively prosperous homes. They were young, well- educated, and impatient with the protracted process that an earlier generation of revolutiona ries considered essential.36 This educated leadership had the energy that propelled a generation of restless and marginalized activists.

Role of Salvador’s Armed Forces

Marshaled against the reformist middle- class youth, their parents, and aggrieved peasant farmers was the alliance between the oligarchy and ESAF with its security forces. This alliance joined in the determination to preserve the productive agricultural base of the Salvadoran state, as well as their socio- economic dominance. To ensure this, they reinforced a culture of fear by imprisoning, beating, and even murdering peasant workers, teachers, student organizers, or church workers who might lead, or support subversive behavior.37 Government violence became institu-tionalized. The military controlled the state in alliance with the economic policies of the oligarchy, which in turn oversaw the modernization of the agricultural sector. Together, they exercised “strict control over any public action.”38 Strikes were out-lawed and opposition leaders were jailed or deported. Supreme Court Justices and Departmental Justices were appointed by the President, often on the advice of the Chief of the armed forces, and were accountable only to them. The judiciary had no independence, but acted as an arm of the executive’s authoritarian rule. Regular elections were carried out, but the President in office chose his successor from within the official party and electoral fraud was commonplace. A pattern of military coups reflected divergent political interests within the military, but never posed a threat to the military’s dominance of Salvadoran society.39

El Salvador’s armed forces were created as a professional body in the first decade following independence.40 By 1864, El Salvador’s Constitution permitted the President of the nation to be an active- duty military officer, a marriage that existed from 1887 to 1903.41 A National Police was created in 1882 to maintain order in the cities, and the National Guard was created in 1912 to ensure control in rural sectors. Furthermore, a paramilitary organization, the Organización Democrática Nacionalista (ORDEN) insured that revolts in the countryside rarely went beyond the planning stage.42 In 1933, the Treasury Police was created to control the contra-band that eluded Treasury revenues. However, its most active role was the protection of landed estates and processing plants owned by the oligarchy.


ORDEN was the most hated of all the security forces. Salvadoran scholars explain its creation as a response to growing restlessness in rural areas.43 William Stanley, the U.S. scholar, has claimed that the U.S. Military Group, attached to the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador, created ORDEN to counter communist subver-sion.44 Further examination reveals that ORDEN was created earlier than 1960, but used by U.S. military trainers as a mechanism for counter- revolutionary work. Its leaders were answerable only to the High Command of the armed forces and to the president. The members of ORDEN were military men, working off- duty, wearing no uniform, armed by the National Guard, and paid indirectly by the oligarchy. Their brutality in carrying out their quasi- state functions was noto rious. President Cristiani had little difficulty in abolishing ORDEN in his effort to reform the armed forces because it had no supportive constituency, even among military officers.

Together, these police and security institutions ensured public security on behalf of the oligarchy. However, the landowners were unable to control these forces. ESAF and its security forces were accountable to no civilian institution or person. The military budget was partly secret and overseen by no legislative commi-ttee of the National Assembly. Together, the four security institutions associated with the armed forces protected crops and property of planters from sabotage and theft. They served as bodyguards against potential kidnappers or assassins. They collected intelligence and provided security for the state. To justify such activities, military leaders developed an ideology that imposed a constitutional duty upon the armed forces to correct corruption, ineptitude, and violations of the Constitution. The existence of a “permanent army” became enshrined in the Constitution.45 The military perceived themselves as the only institution capable of governing the country and directing its development. They assumed a praetorian form of government, guarding the constitution from threats by the majority of the population who were considered incapable of governing for the general good.46 The permanency and unchangeable nature of the Salvadoran constitution became a deeply held principle among conservative civilian and military leaders.47 It would create the single most intractable problem in the negotiations to achieve peace.

An official party was formed to support the military in their control of the state. Its name changed in the early twentieth century, but the institution conti-nued to act as a satellite to the military and liked to pose as modernizers.48 The PCN became the official state party in 1962. Its membership was drawn from the bureaucrats of the state ministries and trades unions. Membership was advisable for advancement within the state, though not essential. The party gave a civilian veneer to military rule, but no Salvadoran considered it to be indepen-dent of the armed forces. The PCN presidential candidate was assured of electoral victory until 1972 when a coalition of centrist and middle- class opponents led by the PDC emerged to challenge the dominance of the military class and its alliance with the oligarchy. Despite popular support for the PDC leader, Jose Napoleon Duarte, the PCN declared victory, physically assaulted and then banished Duarte into exile. In his place, the military imposed its PCN candidate, Colonel Arturo Molina.


The Oligarchy Versus the Armed Forces and its Reformist Colonels

Traditionally, the landowning elite had governed the country, but the preponderance of power shifted to the military after General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez’s brutal suppression of rural dissent, known as la matanza, in January 1932. With the horrific massacre of approximately 30,000 peasant farmers and their families, the oligarchy withdrew from governing to cultivate their economic interests, and a military man retained the presidency until 1979. The Salvadoran sociologist, Mario Lungo bemoans the retreat of the oligarchy from the management of the state because of their restraining influence on the military.49

However, Lungo’s thesis ignores the economic power and the control over financial and trade policy that the oligarchy historically had exercised. Those land-owning families, together with the processors and financiers of export and import merchandise, continued to exercise political influence. They demanded limits on the degree of social reform that young military officers could carry out. From the 1940s and with ongoing regularity, young army colonels attempted to enact social and economic reforms with the intent of introducing greater equality and limiting the dominance of the landed coffee growers. In 1964 and again in 1972, 1979, and early 1980, attempts at socio- economic reform came from young colonels who grew up in the emerging middle, urban class. With no future in politics, these young men entered ESAF and sought political influence and change through that institution. When those reforms threatened the inte rests of the economic elite, the oligarchy persuaded more conservative and senior military men to expel the young officers and stamp out reform. A military coup by conservative officers ensued; accompanied by increased state repression and brutality. This cycle of reform and brutal repression contributed significantly to the outbreak and continuation of social conflict in El Salvador.

Typical of the military officers’ attempt at social reform was the young officer coup of October 15, 1979. That month, a group of reformist colonels with socialist goals overthrew President General Humberto Romero and installed a military/ civilian Junta to institute major social reforms. The coup was accep table to the U.S. Embassy so long as it had a civilian face and was committed to significant socio- economic change.50 There were high hopes for a reformist government and space for politicians from the PDC and MNR parties. In the following months, the Junta proposed the investigation into the “desaparecidos,” the disbandment of ORDEN, a minimum wage for day laborers, the nationalization of the banks, as well as the savings and loan institutions. Finally, the Junta proposed the creation of a govern-ment institution that would control the price and quantity of coffee exports.51 The oligarchy viewed the proposals as communist and revolutionary, threatening their economic livelihood. They vowed to oppose both the Junta and the reforms. On the extreme left, the Junta was perceived as a tool of “Yankee imperialism and the bourgeoisie.”52 A coalition of peasants, workers, and students, estimated at 30,000, demonstrated against the Junta, confronting rightist groups, some of whom were off- duty policemen.53 Confrontation was inevitable and violence ensued. There appeared to be no place for moderate, centrist voices.


In December 1979, Duarte returned to El Salvador and agreed to work with the military, b

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