Security threats and the Ukrainian far rightopendemocracy.net /opensecurity/anton-shekhovtsov/security-threats-and-ukrainian-far-right

Anton Shekhovtsov

The rise to political power of the Ukrainian far right party, Svoboda, was recently halted by a newelectoral law. But there are further security issues connected to the far right's increasing support thathave not been stopped in their tracks.

Contemporary far-right organisations and movements in Ukraine can be largely divided into twogroups: political parties and social movements. Notable far-right parties in Ukraine are the All-UkrainianUnion Freedom (Svoboda), the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Ukrainian National Assembly Ukrainian Self-Defence, and the Motherland Party. All of them have representatives in local councilsbut no MPs in the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament. The largest far-right social movements inUkraine include the Patriot of Ukraine and its sister organisation Social-National Assembly,Autonomous Resistance and the pro-Russian Cossacks. The first three are closely linked to Svoboda,one of the leaders of Autonomous Resistance serving as a Svoboda deputy in the Lviv regionalcouncil. Pro-Russian Cossacks is a heterogeneous movement consisting of many small local groups.

According to the hate crime statistics of the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress, over the last six years, 295people became victims of racist attacks in Ukraine, while at least 13 people we killed over the sameperiod. Racist violence reached its peak in 2007-2008. It should be noted that the majority of racistvictims were attacked by street yobs rather than far-right organisations.

Of all the far-right organisations in the country, the strongest one is Svoboda, led by Oleh Tyahnybok. Itwas formed in 1991 as the Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU) but was renamed in 2004 in amove towards respectability. Svoboda is currently not represented in the Verkhovna Rada, but morethan 2,200 members of the party serve as deputies in regional and city councils in western and centralparts of the country. Members of Svoboda are currently heads of Ternopil, Lviv and Ivano-Frankivskregional councils. Svobodas weakest support is in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine. In the2006 parliamentary elections, held under a proportional system with a 3% threshold, the party gained0.36% of the vote and ranked 18th out of 45 parties. Svoboda enjoyed the privileged position of beingthe only far-right party to participate in the 2007 early parliamentary elections: it won 0.76% of thepopular vote and was ranked 8th out of 20 parties.

Although Svoboda, unlike the SNPU, does not have an worked out doctrine, it is possible to distinguishseveral different ideological strands most commonly articulated by the party leaders, includinganticommunism, anti-liberalism, racism, anti-Russian sentiments, glorification of Ukrainian historicalright-wing extremism and fascism, and heterosexism. According to the leaders of the party, itsmembership is around 15,000 people.

Svoboda is a member of the radical right-wing Alliance of European National Movements, a Euro-partywhich has recently been promised 289,266 (242,000) of EU taxpayers money by the EuropeanParliament. Moreover, Svoboda cooperates closely with the French National Front (FN). In thebeginning of 2004, it was FN spin doctors who suggested the rebranding of the overtly extreme-rightSNPU into a more populist right-wing Svoboda.

Svoboda aspires to Ukraines membership in NATO, but is critical of the EU, although, paradoxically,supporters of the party are more in favour of European integration than those of other Ukrainianparties. Officially, however, Svoboda does not promote European integration but rather argues infavour of the GUAM, the regional Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development unitingGeorgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. It also regularly calls for building closer political and

economic links with the countries of the Baltic-Black Sea geopolitical axis.

Today, popular support for Svoboda is growing. Several factors contribute to its rise, first and foremostis its capacity to design efficient strategies aimed at aggregating societal demands concerning social,economic and educational policies. Its growing legitimacy has also benefited from its ideologicalmodernisation, its massive presence in the national media, and its capacity to depict itself as thecontender of a cultural struggle a war of position. The breakup of the national-democratic(mainstream right) political camp and the absence of relevant rival far-right political parties have alsocontributed to Svoboda's success. However, one should not underestimate the role played by thegrowing capacity of the party in organising itself, enabled by an increase in its funding after the 2009and 2010 regional elections and the recruitment of young activists from extreme-right socialmovements.

On 17 November 2011, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a law creating a mixed electoral system that ledto members of parliament securing election with a 5% threshold. Although Svoboda is unlikely toovercome this new threshold, it is expected to have several members elected in single memberconstituencies in western and central regions.

A far right future in Ukraine?Today, there are no reasons to think that Svoboda will ever be able to seize power in Ukraine, but itnonetheless poses problems, including serious domestic and international security issues. Firstly, itmay contribute to the destabilisation of the political system, as the rise in popular support for Svobodatakes place at the expense of national-democrats and may threaten the fragile balance of powerbetween Ukrainian parties. The far right erodes the Ukrainian democratic camp and makes it difficultfor it to oppose the accumulation of power by Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and the currentlydominant Party of Regions (PR). Svobodas negative stance towards European integration, and inparticular its loathing of policies such as the readmission of illegal immigrants aimed at furthering thecountrys rapprochement with the EU may also hinder this process to the disadvantage of EU-Ukrainecooperation, which is already affected by the regression of democracy and selective justice policiestargeting opposition leaders in Ukraine under Yanukovych.

There may also be key security consequences to Svoboda's capacity to sour the Russian question.The far right contributes significantly to the political polarisation of Ukrainian society. Its further growthmay spark negative feelings from parts of the Russian minority and result in prompting pro-Russianultranationalist movements to be more active, especially those that can garner support from Russia andadvance separatist activities in regions like the Crimea where Russian speakers are in the majority. AsSvoboda is highly critical of the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, which are largely supportiveof Svobodas major political antagonist, the PR, and where Russian is more widely spoken thanUkrainian, the far right party may trigger a process of separation led by western Ukraine, pre-eminentlythe regions in Galicia and partly Volhynia, from the rest of the country. Lastly, Svoboda's virulently anti-Russian position may increase tensions between both countries, and given the countrys dependenceon Russia for energy supplies, the EUs energy security and Ukraines economic development mightbe put at risk.

This notwithstanding, Svoboda is by no means an object of cordon sanitaire in Ukrainian politics. Thedominant PR evidently encourages Svoboda's growth by increasing its presence in the national TVmedia largely controlled either by the authorities or by individuals associated with the PR. Svobodacannot properly compete with the PR due to deep differences in electoral bases between both parties,but it does successfully challenge the PRs major political opponents, namely the national-democrats.At the same time, the mainstream right, most importantly Yuliya Tymoshenkos Fatherland party andArseniy Yatsenyuks Front for Changes, openly cooperate with Svoboda in the national-democratsstruggle against the PR and President Yanukovych. In April 2012, more than 40 Ukrainian scholars andintellectuals signed an open letter to the leaders of Ukraines national-democratic opposition calling it tore-consider the inclusion of Svoboda into the Committee against Dictatorship (i.e. against the PR and

Yanukovych) and to avoid collaboration with a far right party that harms Ukraines fundamental nationalinterests. These recommendations were however completely ignored by the Ukrainian mainstreamright.

Security threats and the Ukrainian far rightA far right future in Ukraine?