Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force Toolkit

Welcome to the companion toolkit of the Modern Defense Force book. Let this accessible guide show the breadth and depth of the issues that affect security sector actors, particularly the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police. More than a summary, it is meant to engage and inspire readers to look beyond the general mindset and examine the intricacies of security sector reforms.

Using the Toolkit

Each booklet breaks apart and problematizes pertinent and relevant topics in transforming the armed forces to a modern defense force. Whether as a policy-maker or a practitioner, the Toolkit will prove to be invaluable in their pursuit for a just and lasting peace:

For Policy-Makers:• Easyreference• Digestiblepostulations• Balanceddiscussion• Historicalimperatives

For Practitioners:• Quick-look• Theoreticalgrounding• Conceptualframing• Agendasetting

Points of Discussion

Attimesbroadandsweeping,whileothersdelveintospecifics,thesetopicsrepresent the discourse of building a modern defense force under the nuances of a security sector reform agenda.

ABOUT THE TOOLKIT 1

Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force toolkit philippines

ABOUT THE TOOLKIT

ABOUT THE TOOLKIT2

philippinesSecurity Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force toolkit

• Dreaming of a Modern Defense Force

• Policy Environment for a Modern Defense Force

• Mapping Out the Legal Terrain of the Philippine Security Sector

• AFP Modernization

• AFP Force Structure

• AFP Doctrine and Training

• AFP Clear Operational Plans

• Philippine Intelligence Community: A Case for Transparency

• Civil Military Operation: Models of Institutional Engagement in the Philippines

• Gender Inclusiveness in the Military

• Ethnic Representation in the Armed Forces of the Philippines

• Self-Reliant Defense and People-Centered Security

• AFP Regional Security and Defense Cooperation

• The Evolving Role of the AFP: Skewing Towards Non-Traditional Roles

• Regional Cooperation on Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Response – Crisis or Opportunity

Written by : Reyna Mae L Tabbada

CopyEditor :MerenizaCGomez

Editor : Kathline Anne S Tolosa

GENDER INCLUSIVENESS IN THE MILITARYCARLA ISABEL M. RAVANES

Since the Women’s Movement of the ‘50s and ‘60s, integration of women in various working sectors has increased, including the security sector. Since the late ‘80s, there has been a considerable rise in the percentage of women in armed forces.

But much is left to be done to fully realize a gender-inclusive modern defense force. Globally, 15 percent of the organization must be comprised of women to be considered more than a token. Women are not only a minority population, they actually form an even smaller classification – the token population. For this, positive recruiting policies and strategies that are reflective of the best practices in major organizations must be adopted.

WOMAN AS SOLDIER

Though a small number of women perform direct combat roles, majority still serve in non-combat roles (e.g., military nurse) or combat service/support roles (e.g., clerk, radar operator). But Woman as a Soldier is not easily deemed as a natural social concept. A main hurdle for women integration into numerous military roles is the “warrior framework,” which reinforces the traditionally ideal military image of a physically strong, emotionally tough, masculine war-fighter.

But over the years, studies have painted a different picture of Woman as a Soldier, one that reinforces the capabilities of a gender-neutral armed forces:

• With the proper physical training methods and given an appropriate amount of time, women could effectively execute military duties traditionally carried out by men.

GENDER INCLUSIVENESS IN THE MILITARY1


• In mixed-gender groups, members have identified leadership and teamwork as more important factors than gender in determining variations in morale, lack of cohesion, and military performance.

• A survey of female cadets in West Point showed that only 30 percent would join a combat arms branch. So a possible key reason as to why women do not have the same population in combat units as men is because they are not drawn to it.

• Women often possess a variety of skills which make them better at defusing violent confrontations and carrying out tasks that men can have difficulty taking on, like the screening of female ex-combatants.

• Anecdotal evidence shows women as better able to gain the trust of the community, ensure the full involvement of local women, and exercise communication and crowd control skills.

GENDER INTEGRATION IN THE AFP

GENDER INCLUSIVENESS IN THE MILITARY 2


Female officers are at a relatively high proportion of 9.22 percent. But only BGEN RAMONA GO, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, is the first female line officer to become a general.

As of March 2012 there are 2,905 enlisted women serving in the AFP.

2.64%Enlisted Women

9.22%Female Officers



The Philippine Military Academy (PMA), the training ground for personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), opened its gates to female cadets in 1993. Since then the AFP has seen an increase in the number of women in the military. While this may be the case, the gender-inclusiveness of the academy is still found to be wanting. Its circumstance mirrors the state in other countries wherein women are almost inexistent in the more senior ranks.

Though the deactivation of the Women’s Auxiliary Corps was aimed to discontinue gender-based segregation and gave women greater chances to enter the service of their choice, the AFP failed to couple the deactivation with the necessary adjustments and preparation in terms of addressing the impact of the dissolution. A clear-cut policy and uniform procedure for the implementation of the integration process is needed. The same scenario also befell the US Army WAC and École Interarmées du Personnel Militaire Fémini (EIPMF) – the joint service women’s school of the French Army.

Various policy directives and legal frameworks seem to champion gender inclusiveness in the AFP, but each still leaves much room for improvement:

a. Republic Act (RA) 7192 or the Women in Nation Building Law

This law enabled Filipino women to study military science in the PMA, participate in combat operations, and mobilize military assets. But the AFP overlooked the crafting of implementing rules and regulations that will address the proper utilization of this new set of female cadets.

b. Gender and Development (GAD) as mandated by RA 9710 or the Magna Carta for Women

GAD policies and programs are vital instruments for any organization if it wants to promote and/or further develop gender-inclusiveness. But without an implementation strategy, GAD is not utilized as a strategic tool to boost the morale of the armed forces or to enhance the capability of the military organization.

This points to the fact that on the national policy level, gender and development concerns are not integrated into the defense plans and programs of the government, which is basically what the essence of gender mainstreaming



A Cadet by Any Other Name

When The Cadet Core AFP Regulations (CCAFPR) 2008, also known as the gray book, was subjected to a limited textual analysis to determine its gender-sensitivity, particularly, it showed that only 2/27 of its sections are found to be free of any sexist word. Since language articulates consciousness, reflects culture, and affects socialization, it would be safe to say that the gender-insensitive terms in the current CCAFPR are highly reflective of the academy’s framing of the cadets and officers. Language reform can be an approach to gender-sensitize the AFP.

Also, comparing the surveys on the perceived capacities and capabilities (physical, intellectual, and emotional) of male and female cadets answered by the PMA classes 2000, 2001, and 2002 with those from the classes 2010, 2011, and 2012 showed that there has been an increased favouring of the male cadets over the female cadets.

is all about. It is mandated by law that 5 percent of the budget allocation of a government organization must be for GAD, with an option to increase allocation by 10 percent -20 percent after five (5) years. However, most are not able to meet the 5 percent budget appropriations.

INSTITUTIONAL INTERVENTION

Since 2009, the Department of National Defense (DND) has been conducting Gender Sensitivity Training (GST) with military officers. It aims to:

• identify, assess, and analyze the gender issues and gaps that are present in society and in the participants’ personal and work situation• recognize the significance of attaining gender equality• develop in the participants the confidence to do their work as gender advocates

There are at least three GSTs held every year, with 30 participants for each training session. Initially, majority of the participants of the GSTs were women, but for 2012, the male participants constituted 55.56 percent of the total participant population. It could be said that over the years, the GSTs conducted have encouraged male officers to be more participative in the said program. Its Trainer’s Trainee Program was designed to create a larger and better skilled pool of GST trainers among military officers.

SIDE NOTE



PATHS TOWARD A GENDER-NEUTRAL AFP

There is growing recognition that increased female participation in the defense forces is practical, necessary and beneficial in operations. A more gender-inclusive defense force will ultimately lead to an increased access to additional human resources and will create a more diverse pool to select better qualified staff. But if no innovative and inspired interventions will be done, the movement towards forming a modern defense force will be incomplete.

Related to this, a three-pronged, integrated institutional strategy should push forth:

1) A Championing strategy to obtain support from the highest ranks of the military

2) A Social Marketing/Information Campaign Strategy aimed to change how military personnel think and behave regarding gender

3) An Organizational Development Strategy to make GAD relatively easier by eliminating organizational barriers like gender-bias regulations, and establishing mechanism that would complement the change process.

This strategy will complement these in-roads that would pave the way to a gender-sensitized and modern defense force:

• PMA should also conduct its own regular Gender Sensitivity Seminar among the cadets, officers, and civilian employees to further raise gender awareness. Moreover, a GAD Focal Person or committee in PMA should be institutionalized and strengthened.

• Developing of substantial and long-term GAD programs within the AFP will lead to substantial retention of female military personnel.

• Enhance the GAD primary unit/office to make it more responsive and effective.

• Encourage primary stakeholders to participate in the creation, implementation, and assessment of GAD programs.

• Make the leaders accountable to achieve gender mainstreaming, transforming them to “gender champions.”

• Improve the health and living condition of both male and female personnel.

• Build constructive but critical engagement of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to help in the AFP’s gender-mainstreaming.



AFP REGIONAL SECURITYAND DEFENSE COOPERATIONMELANIE RODULFO-VERIL

With the Philippines as a responsible member of the ASEAN, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) promotes regional and international peace and stability through continued presence and involvement in various international engagements. A strong yet collaborative stance is imperative since the country is located in a politically strategic but environmentally cataclysmic area.

AFP and International Engagements

The implementation of AFP’s international engagements is facilitated through the interaction of 3 different systems:

• J5-network that oversees the overall International Defense and Security Engagements (IDSE) implementation in accordance with the country’s security-defense agreements

• J2-network that utilizes the intelligence community through various Defense Armed Forces Attache (DAFA)

• J4-network that acts as the logistics system

However, as the AFP shifts from internal security to an external defense role, its strategy for regional security and cooperation can still be described as “Call-A-Friend.” Because of a lack in resources, the country depends on goodwill and non-materiel exchanges through key partnerships, which also includes agreements on Defense and Logistics Cooperation with Spain, Japan, India, and the UK.

AFP REGIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION1


AFP REGIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION 2


United States

For decades, the AFP operated on a structure that took after the US armed forces. Even after the closure of its military bases, this link remains the country’s single and most important bilateral relationship. In fact, the Mutual Defense Treaty with the US is the only defense treaty of the country. At present, both continue to conduct joint military activities on counterterrorism and maritime security. The US also extends humanitarian assistance, disaster response, civil-military operations, and peacekeeping operations. When then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with then Department of ForeignAffairs SecretaryAlbert del Rosario in 2011, she affirmed therelationship through the “Manila Declaration,” as US foreign policy “pivot” or “rebalance” towards Asia.

Australia

Australia is second only to the US in being the largest provider of training to AFP personnel under the Defense Cooperation Programme (DCP). It provided assistance on counter-terrorism and maritime needs analysis for the Coastal Watch System (CWS).

South Korea

Common security concerns bond the Philippines and South Korea. This was formalized under a Memorandum of Understanding on Logistics and Defense Industry Cooperation, with the latter giving USD 90 million worth of military assistance. In return, the AFP supports the Honor Guard Company by providing ceremonial security and support to the UN Command (Korea) in the 38th Parallel pursuant of the Treaty of Armstice.



Of ASEAN Security and Defense

Another important engagement for the Philippines is with fellow ASEAN members. As it nears integration, its security and defense as a region becomes crucial. Three factors are highlighted on this area:

• Defensecooperationandsynergyincludesfinancialandtechnicalsupport, transfer of materiel, training and services to allies, military-to-military contacts and security-cooperation arrangements and relationships. This is supported by the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), the highest ministerial defense and security consultative and cooperative mechanism in the region. The Network of ASEAN Defense Institutions (NADI) is a forum where scholars and researchers exchange insights on defense and security matters, forwarding recommendations to ADMM.

China-Taiwan armed conflict

Race for EnergyWith the Philippines classified as an oil-importing country, energy securityremains underappreciated. Oil and coal as energy sources account for 50% of its electricity, with the remainder sourced from renewable energy sources. Meanwhile, China is hoarding oil for its reserves since 2008, which explains its increasedmovementintheSpratlysinsearchofoilfieldsandtheconstructionof dams in Mekong region for hydroelectric power.

SIDE NOTE



• PartofMilitary-to-Militaryengagementaretop-levelmilitarymeetssuchas: ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM, since 2001), ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting – ACAMM (since 2000), ASEAN Navy Interaction – ANI (since 2001), ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference – AACC (since 2004), and ASEAN Military Intelligence Informal Meeting – AMIIM.

• Politicalinstrumentscompriseofconfidencebuildingmeasures,preventive diplomacy,andconflictresolution.ExamplesaretheDeclarationonZone ofPeace,Freedom,andNeutrality(ZOPFAN1971);TreatyofAmityand Cooperation(TACSEA1976);andSoutheastAsianNuclearWeapons- FreeZone(SEANWFZ1995).ForthePhilippines,arelevantandtimely measure is the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the West Philippine Sea (2002) – signed by claimant countries PH, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei.

As a region, improving its security and defense posture can be accomplished along the following points:

• Intensifysharedresponsibilityonregionalsecuritybyinstitutionalizing peacefulresolutionofconflictsandmakeitbindingthrutheASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint

• Laythegroundworkforinformationsharing,mutualsupport,andassistance

• AssessthedefensecapabilitiesofASEANmilitaries

• Continuethedialogueandexchangebestpracticesindefensesecurity and peace operations

• Createalegally-bindingCodeofConductintheWestPhilippineSea

• Organizeajointauthoritydedicatedtocommondevelopmentofresources within the Spratlys



Areas of Contention

Non-Traditional Security Issues Philippine security policies are still anchored on a realist perspective, centered on protecting territorial integrity and national sovereignty. This perspective downplays the effects of non-traditional security issues, like climate change and disaster management.

West Philippine SeaThis highly contentious marine territory presents a primary security challenge with claimant nations like China and other ASEAN members. Oil, navigation, and abundant marine resources result to an arms race, turning the area to a potentflashpoint.ThePhilippineshaselevated the issue to the InternationalTribunal on the Laws of the Sea, declaring that it’s prepared to use military force to protect its territory.

Korean PeninsulaThough it’s a flash point forNorth andSouthKorea, the Filipinos living andworking in the latter stands as an insecurity. Add to this the former’s missile tests and proliferation of biological, chemical, nuclear weapons development.

SIDE NOTE



Prospects for AFP Advantage

No matter how proactive, the Philippines lacks the power to fully leverage on its enagements. Sharing human resource, like peacekeeping missions, training and education exchange, i.e. Balikatan Exercises, Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT), can be maximized by the AFP for defense materiel and technology transfer with partners.

Anchored on the country’s Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States, the Philippines must pursue assistance programs that are responsive to the AFP’s shift from internal security to territorial defense. Also, the acquisition of defense equipment thru Foreign Military Sales (FMS) since government-to-government transaction should be explored as this could fast track the otherwise long-winding procurement process.

THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE AFP1


THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE AFP: SKEWING TOWARDSNON-TRADITIONAL ROLESMERENIZA C. GOMEZ

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as a security sector actor is evolving from a traditional defense and military force into an agent of political, social, and economic development in the country. However, it must not compromise the military’s core traditional missions. The military should always ensure that the sovereignty of the state is never threatened and its people protected from any danger.

According to the 2002 National Military Strategy (NMS), traditional roles of the AFP include:• maintainterritorialintegrityanddefendthenationalterritory–toppriority mission• protecttheexclusiveeconomiczone(EEZ)

While non-traditional roles include:• decisivelydefeatallarmedinternalsecuritythreats• contributetoregionalpeaceandstability• supporttonationaldevelopment

WHAT ARE THE CATALYSTS FOR THE AFP’S EVOLVING ROLE?

1. Professionalization and Politicization of the AFP

• Professionalism-fromwithinthearmedforces • Politicization-outsidethearmedforces

The concept of a “professional armed forces” was only introduced during theAmerican occupation. This led to theAFP being patterned after theUS military system during its inception, with foreign influence furtherstrengthenedbybilateraldefenseagreementssuchas theMilitaryBasesand Military Assistance Agreements (1947); Mutual Defense Treaty (1951); andtheestablishmentoftheJointUSMilitaryAssistanceGroup(JUSMAG).

Professionalism deteriorated post-World War as some elements joined the insurgencies against the government. Then Defense Sec. Ramon Magsaysay introduced reforms and expanded the AFP’s role with theEconomic Development Corps (EDCOR), which took charge in givingresettlementareastorebelreturneesintheprocessofreintegration.

During Martial Law, the AFP became a “close partner” for nationaldevelopment under the New Society movement. But it also served asthe martial rule’s self-preservation apparatus to suppress opposition, controlmedia,andcurtailfreedomofexpression.MartialLawexposedthemilitary’svulnerabilitytopatronagepoliticsandcorruption.Becauseoftheassassinationof opposition leaderBengino ‘Ninoy’Aquino, theREFORMthe Armed Forces Movement (RAM) called for changes within the uniformed services.

Whendemocracywasrestoredinthe1987Constitution,theAFPwasnamedas the “protector of the people and the State.” However, this mandate is alsobeingused to legitimize its involvement inpoliticalaffairs.Examplesarepost-Marcoscoupd’etats–between1987-1989-aswellasthe2001withdrawal of support from then President Estrada. The Arroyo regimeencounteredthe2003OakwoodMutinyandthewithdrawalofsupportfromtwoBrigadeCommandersin2006.

THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE AFP: SKEWING TOWARDS NON-TRADITIONAL ROLES 2


THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE AFP: SKEWING TOWARDS NON-TRADITIONAL ROLES3


When the Oakwood Mutiny was investigated, the Feliciano Commissionfound“realityandlegitimacy”totheissuesraisedbytheinvolvedsoldiers.This underscored the need for corruption control mechanisms and modernizationofthearmedforces.

2. The US Connection

Becauseofthe1947MilitaryBasesAgreement,theAFPbenefittedfromUSmilitaryassistancethrucapabilityupgradeandtraining.TheUSextendedasecurityumbrellaforthecountrywithterritorialdefenseguaranteedthruairandnavalsupport.Consequently,thearmedforcesalsogainedsavingsin defense expenditures, additional compensation and grants in return.SincetheclosureofAmericanmilitarybasesin1992,theAFP’scapabilitytodefend the state and national territory has deteriorated.

3. Modernization

In1995,theAFPModernizationActwaspassedwiththefollowingprovisions:To develop a self-reliant and credible strategic armed force capable of defending sovereignty, territorial integrity, and preserving national patrimony.

TheModernizationProgramwastobeimplementedoveraperiodof15yearswithaP50-Bbudgetceilingforthefirstfiveyears.TheAFPModernizationAct Trust Fund was created for this purpose.



Its implementation period ended in 2010.However, three years before itended,itscapabilityassessmentshowedthat:

• PhilippineArmedForcesdoesnothavecredibleairdefensecapabilitytoperform territorial defense.

• Philippine Navy is greatly challenged in maritime defense over territorial watersandEEZ.Ithasnomodernnavalwarfarecapability.

• PhilippineArmyhasnomodernfirecontrolsystems,airdefensesystem,and anti-craft weapons. It only possess small arms and machine guns.

Another detriment to modernizing its territorial defense capability is the“back-to-basics”directionandshifttointernalsecurityoperationsfromtheCapabilityUpgradeProgram(CUP).ItalsocompelledtheAFPtotakeonanactiveroleinsupportofnationaldevelopmentinitiatives.Suchexpansionofrolenecessitatesasubstantialincreaseinitsbudget.

WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR THE AFP?

AftertheColdWar,changesintheinternationalsecuritylandscapeincludetheemergenceofnon-traditionalsecurity threats likeclimatechangeandterrorism. This shifting role is not completely remote to the AFP, as it has sincebeenattheforefrontofthegovernment’scounter-insurgencyefforts.GiventhechangingdutiesoftheAFP,belowarethepossibleconditionsthatfaces the armed forces:

• Military remains a critical force for humanitarian assistance and disaster response(HA/DR),especiallyasfirst-timeresponders

• Military still at a superior stance over the police force in matters of internalsecurityoperations,thoughtheircentraltaskremainsinterritorialdefense

• Military faces a future centered on maintaining domestic order and national development

THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE AFP: SKEWING TOWARDS NON-TRADITIONAL ROLES5


• AFP to continue internal reforms to improve technological sophistication andquick-responsecapabilities

• GovernmenttoprovideaclearlegalconstructtoidentifyAFP’sevolvingresponsibilitiesfornon-traditionalsecuritypurposes.Promoteanddirectinteragency efforts and further civil-military interactions.

GARemittances51,257,165

0%

Figure 1: AFP Modernization Trust Fund

BCDAShares6,943,770,376

39%

Ayala Lease Proceeds 271,144,000

1%FY2002GAA5,000,000,000

28%

MNGPProceeds1,000,000,000

5%

FY2007GAA5,000,000,000

27%

Thelackofappropriationforthearmedforcesmodernizationprogramisoneofthereasonsforitsfailure.TaperingoftheannualAFPbudgetledtoitscontinuousdecline,evensmallerwhentheUSbaseswereinthecountry.Onealsoneedstolookathowitisbeingspent,with70%beingusedtoforpersonnelcompensationandtheresttosustainoperations.Capitaloutlayreceivesveryminimalfunding.



AFP CLEAROPERATION PLANSCOLONEL ISIDRO L. PURISIMA (GSC) PAAND IREN C. GUMPAL

The operational approaches and concepts employed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) reveal how the institution fulfills its role as the protector of the state and its people. Its evolution can be traced from a purely combative to an integrated and collaborative approach called IPSP-Bayanihan, which introduced the concept of security sector reform and its main thrusts of developing AFP capabilities, enhancing professionalism, and institutionalizing stakeholders involvement.

AFP Operational Approaches / Concepts

I. Lambat Bitag / Bantay Laya

• Win-Hold-Win = use combat power to WIN against the principal threat group + HOLD and contain less priority threats + WIN against the emergent threat

Sustained Operations: Rapid Conclusion = dismantle, in the shortest possible time, major guerilla fronts + defeat main enemy forces through a simultaneous and sustained campaigned + do battle in a situation determined by the military Gradual Constriction = organize enemy affected barangays* “in reverse” from the outskirts of the guerilla front and towards its central district + seek decisive engagements

AFP CLEAR OPERATION PLANS1


* basic unit of political governance in the Philippines

AFP CLEAR OPERATION PLANS 2


One-on-One = one task unit under one commander against one guerilla front + “focus rather than spread” Key Hole Approach = form a mobile battalion at the central district of the guerilla front + disrupt threat group activities in its center and threaten its rear

• Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop (Support) = carry out coordinated and integrated efforts of the entire government machinery + support of civil society

Four Stages (overlapping, supporting, and interrelated):

CLEAR - decisive defeat of armed groups, neutralization of politico-military structures - integrate combat, intelligence, and civil-military operations - dismantle mass base political structure in barangays - also known as Area Clearing HOLD - preserve initial gains by strengthening local defense systems to secure cleared areas - reinforced by the Community Security Mechanism / Integrated Territorial Defense System (ITDS) -- integrating AFP, PNP, CAA, local government, local sectors, local populace -- to secure and insulate the locality from threat group influence, incursion, or re-entry CONSOLIDATE - collaborative participation of the military, the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the civilian government agencies and instrumentalities - delivery of basic services

DEVELOP - implement socio-economic, psychosocial, and political reforms by the government



• Other Programs TRIAD = synergy of combat, intelligence, and civil-military operations

Inter-Agency Legal Assistance Group (IALAG) = stronger legal cooperation where the AFP, in close coordination with PNP and other law enforcement agencies, exercise legal offensive opeartions against armed threat groups

DND-AFP Balik-Baril Program** = encourages armed insurgents to lay down their firearms and be productive members of society, with benefits like firearms payment, emergency cash loan, livelihood assistance, and amnesty

Amnesty Program thru Proclamation No. 405, s.2000 = grants amnesty to all rebels who committed crimes in pursuit of their political beliefs

II. IPSP Bayanihan

In 2010, the AFP crafted a fresh approach to address insurgency and bring the government’s peace and security agenda at the local level. It is called the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan, with the AFP as its catalyst. Some of its key concepts are:

• People-Centered Approach - enhance human rights - promote human development - under the broader frame of Human Security and its seven components of economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security

• Whole-of-Nation Approach means security is shared not just among security forces and government but with civil society and communities

• “Winning the Peace” - shift from a predominantly militaristic solution to a people-centered security strategy

** Department of National Defense



- founded on broad-based consultations and engagements with key stakeholders

• Pursue collaborative efforts with other internal peace and security actors and participants to share responsibility to the peace and security agenda

• Conduct Focused Military Operations against all internal armed threat groups endangering the safety and well-being of the people, with adherence to Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law or Law on Armed Conflicts, and Rule of Law

• Deploy community peace and development teams that combine military and non-military activities to counter coercive activities and diminish influence of armed threat groups

• Integrate interagency assessment and stakeholder’s analysis

• Introduced the concept of Security Sector Reform, adhering to the principe of democratic control of armed forces with emphasis on transparency and accountability

Interventions to improve Plan and Operational Environment

a. The need for a national policy that shall necessitate other line agencies to take part in the internal security operations

• learn from the non-implementation of the National Internal Security Plan in 2001, which embodied the “Strategy of Holistic Approach” involving the entire instrument of power of the government

• complement the National Security Policy 2011-2016 with the National Security Strategy, which embodies the method to achieve national security objectives

• create a comprehensive national plan for internal security, which will also clarify the roles of government agencies, including AFP and PNP

• avoid delayed or lack of development phase for cleared barangays resulting in marginalized government impact



• overlook pre-emptive measures against insurgent offensives

b. The need to empower the POCs and LCEs/LGUs.

As stipulated in the Local Government Code of the Philippines, Peace and Order Council (POCs) with the Local Government Units (LGUs) are the focal point and central authority responsible to deal with human security issues at their level.

Local Chief Executives (LCEs), in coordination with the POCs, must prioritize a Public Safety Plan to resolve insurgency and serious threats to national security.

c. The need to repeal Section 3 of RA 8551 or the PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998

One of the main issues in defense reform is identifying the role of the PNP for internal security operations. This is apparent in the need to repeal Section 3 of the RA 8551 which relieves the PNP of primary responsibility on the suppression of insurgency and other serious internal security threats. According to the Defense Planning Guidance 2013-2018, the AFP is projected to focus on territorial integrity, while rendering support for internal security.

d. The need to continue the Modernization Program to prepare for transition to territorial defense (RA 10349)

The extension of the AFP Modernization Act is crucial to ensure enhancement of defense capability as it shifts focus to territorial defense.

e. The need for parallel understanding of the AFP and stakeholders of the plan.

The need for comprehensive advocacy and education of all actors involved in the implementation of IPSP is essential.



Implications if No Interventions are Done

• With the lack of a national policy that will compel other line agencies to take part in the internal security operations, the plan shall remain an entirely AFP plan – no different to previous plans crafted by the AFP.

• Non-functioning POCs/LCEs will again put greater weight on the AFP to pursue the peace and security agenda of the government in the local level.

• As RA 8551 is still in force, the AFP will not be able to focus its energy and resources to territorial defense.

• PNP must be prepared and equipped to take the lead role so as not to compromise the gains the country so far has achieved against armed threats. The Joint Peace and Security Coordinating Center (JPSCC), and AFP and PNP partnership, must be enhanced as one of its mechanisms.

• Without the support of a modernization program, the AFP cannot be fully mission-capable in territorial defense.

• Disjointed appreciation of AFP plans breeds indifference to its commanders and field operators.

Supporting Civil Government AgenciesPeace and Order Council (POC) is a coordinative mechanism in the conduct of overall counterinsurgency efforts

National Reconciliation and Development Program under Social Welfare and Development, National Defense, Interior and Local Government, Trade and Industry, and Public Works and Highway

Join Legal Action Committee under Justice, Interior and Local Government, National Defense

SIDE NOTE

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATION: MODELS OF INSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT INTHE PHILIPPINESMARIBEL A. DAÑO-LUNA

In the broader frame of security sector reform, a modern defense force is not only a function of upgraded capability but also a result of transparent, effective, and institutionalized civil-military operations or CMO. This is anchored on the local context of a civilian authority that is supreme over the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) with the vibrant involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs).

Fundamental Concepts of CMO

In the Philippines, CMO is developed and intertwined with the history and culture of the AFP. It is defined as “planned activities undertaken independently or in coordination with civilian entities in support to the accomplishment of the AFP mission to gain popular support and weaken the will of the enemy to fight.”* Its objectives include:

• Reduce the will of armed threat groups to fight and gain popular support for the AFP

• Support the government’s development activities such as environmental protection and disaster preparedness

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATION: MODELS OF INSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES1


* AFP CMO Doctrine as cited in the AFP CMO Handbook: CMO Assessment Tools. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 2013.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATION: MODELS OF INSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES 2


These objectives stand on three pillars:

• Public Affairs involves gathering support from the public in order to accomplish military missions through Public Information (PI) and Community Relations (COMREL) activities.

• Civil Affairs directly affects communities because it encompasses socioeconomic activities undertaken by the AFP together with civilian government and other non-government entities. It facilitates delivery of basic services through civil relations (CIVREL) and civic action (CIVAC) activities.

• Information Support Affaris or ISA, formerly known as Psychological Operations or PSYOPS, is geared to influence beliefs, attitudes, and opinions of a given target. It is also responsible for processing reintegration of former rebels.

DEED

S

CIVA

C

WORDS

PUBLIC INFO

COUNTER PROP

CIVIL AFFAIRS

CIVRELPUBLIC AFFAIRS

COMREL

INFORMATIONSUPPORT AFFAIRS

CIVILMILITARY

OPERATION

AFP CMO Pillars and components, Adapted from the AFP CMO Handbook (2013)



Paradigm Shift: Models of Institutionalized Engagement

After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, there had been sustained efforts for CMO to veer away from treating stakeholders as “subjects-to-be-won-over” to being “partners-to-be-engaged”. The importance of this paradigm shift is emphasized in the AFP’s Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan, recognizing that purely militaristic solution to insurgency alone is not enough. Thus, CMO emerges as the best tool available for this people-centered security strategy.

Signing Memorandum of Agreement with National Government AgenciesThe President, who is also the Commander in Chief, exercises the supremacy of civilian authority over the military, together with government agencies and local chief executives. For the AFP, it means being cooperative without encroaching on the responsibilities of concerned entities.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Military Operations (OJ7) created lines of convergence with the civilian government by entering into various Memoranda of Agreement with national government agencies. This addresses two concerns: a.) it breaks the notion of military as the only face of government in far-flung areas; and b.) clarifies the tasks of other stakeholders in peace and security.

Bantay Bayanihan as Civil Society OversightThe role of CSOs as enablers makes them an important partner in peace and security matters. IPSP Bayanihan opened the door for the partnership of military and CSOs, with the former inviting the latter to provide inputs as an oversight body and contribute in policy-making. This led to an institutionalized engagement between the AFP and CSOs.

Formally launched in 2011, the Bantay Bayanihan (BB) performs its mandate as the network of CSOs performing an oversight role on the implementation of AFP’s IPSP Bayanihan. Through its Assessment Matrix, they conduct dialogue between local CSO members and AFP officers with focus on adherence to Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, and Rule of Law. This engagement, first of its kind in the Philippines and conceivably in Southeast Asia, is a relevant institutional mechanism for civil society to engage defense reform issues.



Confronting Dilemmas of AFP-CMO

The deployment of Peace and Development Teams (PDTs) in far-flung communities molds the military into a role meant for civilian government. However, their prolonged stay in communities are seen to breed “soft soldiers” and promotes dependency on the military in ensuring peace and security in the area.

For the AFP, the function of CMO as support to counterinsurgency strategies becomes problematic where simple profiling of progressive CSOs leads to harassment and human rights accusations. This feeds the historical antagonism brought about by military-perpetrated abuses, especially during Martial Law. Civilians and military vary on how they think and operate — a nuancing that has to be considered in an environment where CMO is implemented.

CMO towards Security Sector Reform

Strong, transparent and institutionalized civilian engagement is an imperative toward SSR. With developments in the peace process, CMO must be recalibrated to balance the AFP Triad, which includes combat and intelligence gathering.

Balancing CMO in AFP TriadIn a post-agreement security arrangement, CMO in support of counterinsurgency may not be the best utility for civil-military engagement. Instead, activities related to humanitarian and nation building are seen as the likely focus of support operations performed by the envisioned modern defense force. The AFP’s mandate to perform internal security operations (ISO) functions not only prevents it from improving on its other mission areas but also causes serious implications in the community. It is thus crucial for civilian units, like the police and local government units, to take the lead role in ISO.



Institutionalized engagementStakeholder engagement must not just be aligned with the national security policy but institutionalized as well. A national security strategy outlining the roles and functions of different stakeholders results to transparency and accountability in their respective mandates.

Balance implementation of activities The deployment and employment of CMO must be reviewed, exploring ways to widen its reach so shared responsibility in peace and security can be sustained. Also, CMO’s shift towards the other AFP mission areas (e.g. disaster risk management and regional border security etc.) and how it can contribute to a modern defense force should be examined. The existing AFP CMO Handbook 2013 can stand as a strong monitoring mechanism to ensure balance in the implementation of CMO pillars and components.

Evolution of AFP-CMO Practices in the Philippines1950sCMO elements were employed together with armed combat to address the rise of insurgency, particularly against the Hukbalahap.

1965Marcos took over the presidency, touting economic development as the permanent solution to internal security threats. He deployed the AFP to the countryside to embark on a “socioeconomic program” of unprecedented scale under the banner of “civic action”

Late 1960sAlbeit the reinforced military presence, the recovery of insurgency gave birth to two groups: the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Such was the impetus for Marcos to place the country under Martial Law in 1972, giving rise to military corruption and human rights violations “negating any impact civic action had on the community.”**

SIDE NOTE

* AFP CMO Doctrine as cited in the AFP CMO Handbook: CMO Assessment Tools. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 2013.



1986Democratization under the late President Corazon Aquino restored civilian authority over the military. AFP replaced OPLAN Katatagan with OPLAN Mamamayan with focus on the protection of the people rather than the state, coupled with encouraging insurgents to turn in their arms and return to the fold of law in exchange of loans so they can start their new life.

OPLAN Mamamayan was replaced by OPLAN Lambat Bitag. In this plan, CMO was first introduced in Special Operations Teams (SOTs). The SOT, a composite of combat, intelligence gathering, and CMO, gave brith to the AFP Triad concept of operations.

1994 When the AFP engaged in CMO activities under OPLAN Unlad Bayan, modest gains were seen as evident in the turnover of 236 firearms from the Moros.

1996-2000More AFP and PNP coordination were seen under the Ramos and Estrada administrations, under OPLAN Pagkalinga, Kaisaganaan, and Balanga. Cleared areas were turned over to DILG-PNP while establishing development programs as the closure of US bases made the AFP think about Modernization. Thus, CMO was not made a priority.

2000sOplan Bantay Laya was implemented, using a new methodology called ‘clear, hold, and support.’ The military is not equipped in handling development, so the last phase should be done by the civilian government. But there was no clear doctrine on CMO until 2006, when the AFP Doctrine for Civil Military Operations was born.

2011Under the IPSP Bayanihan, SOTs were replaced by Peace and Development Teams (PDTs) or Bayanihan Teams giving equal importance to combat and non-combat operations on the ground. It is under this plan that the role of civil-military operations in the achievement of military goal is most pronounced.

SELF-RELIANT DEFENSE AND PEOPLE-CENTERED SECURITYJOSEPH RAYMOND S. FRANCO

Under the overarching theme of security sector reform (SSR) and “people-centered security”, a self-reliant defense posture has two strategic benefits:

a. enhanced civilian oversight over the military, making the AFP a depoliticized institution and more resilient in pursuing modernization; and

b. opened up opportunities for synergy among industries, commercialenterprises, and the nascent defense industry.

WHY PURSUE A SELF-RELIANT DEFENSE POSTURE (SRDP)?

SRDP points to a potential rebirth of an indigenous defense system in the Philippines. It fully aligns with three broad strategies of the 2011-2016 Philippine Development Plan:

• high and sustained economic growth• opportunities across geographic areas and socioeconomic spectrum• implementation of effective and responsive social safety nets

SRDP can also be aligned with the “public-private partnerships” or PPP thrust of the Aquino administration.

HOW DID THE SRDP EVOLVE?

On March 19, 1974, Presidential Decree (PD) no. 415, “Authorizing the Secretary of National Defense to enter into defense contracts to implement projects under the self-reliant defense programs and for other purposes”, was initiated. The escalation of Muslim secessionism and the ascendance

SELF-RELIANT DEFENSE AND PEOPLE-CENTERED SECURITY1


of import-substitution industrial policies are imperatives to establish stategic industries necessary for national defense and security.

Under the purview of the Secretary of National Defense, funding appropriated for SRDP was pegged at PhP 100 million annually. At that time, the AFP was entirely dependent on the American security umbrella with almost all ordnance and ammunition coming from US stockpile. SRDP was a response for the need to provide the AFP “necessary materiel to accomplish its mandate of upholding the sovereignty of the state and protecting the national territory.”

At the policy level, SRDP is a tacit continuation of the prevailing “Filipino First” policy that started with Republic Act (RA) 5183. It grants bidding privileges to Filipino citizens and corporations locally-owned by at least 60 percent.

However, by 2002, the estimated PhP 4 billion spent on SRDP failed to achieve its main objective: the small number of industries established were most often not sustained.

WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES FACED BY SRDP?

Though anchored on SSR, the pursuit for a sustainable defense program also reflects the overall state of the economy and society. Discussed below are four factors that affect SRDP:

1. PoliticalSRDP initiatives suffer from changes in the priority of the national leadership. Since the gestation period for defense projects are both time and resource intensive, co-terminus and codependent political backing bodes ill for research and development.

2. Organizational / BureaucraticArbitrariness in SRDP also manifests within the defense and military establishment itself. The build-up of institutional knowledge has been hampered by the cyclical activation-reactivation of units/entities which are indispensable to SRDP. Illustrated below is the journey of the SRDP since

SELF-RELIANT DEFENSE AND PEOPLE-CENTERED SECURITY 2




its inception in the 70s:Under the AFPMPMO, SRDP projects were implicitly sidelined since the

office has a more secretariat function to support various project teams assigned to acquire defense materiel from foreign sources.

The lack of attention to SRDP in recent years has also seemed to have been manifested with the omission of the provision of Research & Development funding. Without the provision on R&D, SRDP projects are deprived a specific legislative clause that would empower stakeholders in the defense industry to obtain and leverage government support.

Another complicating factor is the Government Procurement Act or Republic

PD 415

OJ8 (Materiel Development Planning and Programming Office)

OJ8 Deactivated

Relegated to OJ9(Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel Development)

OJ9 Deactivated in 1999

Relegated to OJ4 (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics)

Functions subsumed to AFPMPMO(AFP Modernization Program Management Office) in 2004

Reverted AFPMPMO function back to OJ4



Act 9184 (RA 9184), which can hamper the acquisition of either time-sensitive or classified military materiel.

3. Economic / CommercialPublic funding cannot and should not be expected to fully support manufacturers of defense materiel. After domestic security sector contracts are fulfilled, the local defense industry should endeavor to tap outside markets. Without an expanded market base, it is just a matter of time before sunk costs and operating costs would diminish industry revenues and lead to bankruptcy. Not to mention that R&D is inherently capital-intensive, with the necessary financial resources not easily accessible from domestic sources. Best example is the success story of Arms Corporation of the Philippines or ARMSCOR. (see Side Notes)

The key challenge here is to maintain the potential of private defense industries to support national policy objectives while not prejudicing their profitability—and ultimately, their sustainability. Thus, an explicit and specified SRDP policy, which defines priority areas for development, is needed.

4. TechnicalThe struggle for SRDP also points to the diminished state of industries in the Philippines. SRDP can only meet its full potential with deliberate and protracted “foreign procurement coupled with technology transfer.” The most critical technical hurdle is the lack of a manufacturing base for defense industries in the Philippines. Even with unlimited funding, efforts to jumpstart SRDP will be hampered by the lack of upstream industries.

WHAT ARE THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS FOR SRDP?

Small arms and watercraft manufacturingIn 2010, the Government Arsenal (GA) embarked on a program to undertake in-house production of a line of rifles based on the M-16. The end-state is for the Philippine Government to be self-sufficient in meeting its small arms needs. An annual production rate of 20,000 units is envisioned to meet AFP and PNP requirements.



In November 2011, the Philippine Navy (PN) commissioned with the Fleet its first 51.43-meter landing craft utility (LCU), the Tagbanua (AT-296). The Tagbanua was jointly constructed by Propmech Corporation (engine and propulsion system) and the Philippine Iron Construction and Marine Works Inc. of Misamis Oriental (hull). Manned by a crew of 15 members, it has a freight capacity of transporting 200 soldiers with a cargo space area of about 250 square meters, or a maximum of 110 tons. The Tagbanua is the largest locally-manufactured Philippine Navy ship to date.

A joint venture of Propmech Corporation and Safehull Marine Technologies worth PhP 268.9 million is the construction of three Multi-Purpose Attack Craft (MPAC). The high-speed MPACs can accommodate 16 soldiers each, optimized for the insertion and extraction of special operations forces in hostile operational areas. It can also be used for search and rescue mission in areas which could not be accessed by ordinary watercraft.

Pinoy-Style Defense Materiel

Since the 1970s, the armed forces have been making strides towards a Self-Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP), albeit delays and setbacks along the way But there was a very productive period for SRDP, which resulted to the following creations that are proudly Filipino-made:

AFP Bolo-BayonetThe Bolo-Bayonet was an indigenously designed bayonet incorporating features of the ubiquitous jungle bolo. It was issued in limited numbers to deployed infantry units.

Combat boots by Marikina-based Ang Tibay brand (now defunct)

URC-187 and URC-601 radios for frontline infantry units by Vetronix Corporation in 1974

1/4-ton “Mini Cruiser” jeep, which became the most proliferated land mobility asset of the AFP, by Delta Motors in 1974

M-16 rifle production by Elisco Tool Manufacturing Company from 1983 to 1987

SIDE NOTE

Policy Interventions

At the level of national policy, the symbiotic relationship between SRDP and the wider national development agenda should be fully emphasized. Some recommendations include:

• Craft a new SRDP plan complementing and supporting the 2011-2016 National Development Plan.• Conceptualize specific, time-bound project goals through consultation with the widest stakeholder base. • Initiate an industry-wide knowledge base, a sustained research and monitoring process should be considered to periodically determine policy gaps.• Periodically review legislation pertaining to acquisitions, like RA 9184, to ensure that it does not stifle innovation.• Local industries are weaned off direct support (i.e. government funding) or indirect assistance (i.e. tariffs and non-tariff barriers to competing products) once local defense corporations achieve a viable level of sustainability. Fixation over cornering the relatively small Philippine market would only lead to a repeat of the short-lived life cycles of local corporations. • Meet the critical requirement for a publicly-known, transparent SRDP Roadmap that would highlight which specific areas corporations can pitch in, in support of the overarching national goal of attaining a self-reliant defense force.



Success Stories

Arms Corporation of the Philippines (ARMSCOR) produced 5.66mm ammunition for AFP’s standard-issue weapon. It pursued the commercial market and did not rely solely on government contracts.

Licensed-based production of defined materiel, such as the Aguinaldo-class patrol gunboats and thein-country assembly of the Simba Fighting Vehicle

SIDE NOTE

REGIONAL COOPERATION ON CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION IN DISASTER RESPONSE - CRISIS OR OPPORTUNITYSAYA KIBA, PH.D.AND ROSALIE ARCALA HALL, PH.D.

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR) is a crucial issue of civil-military cooperation. It gives soldiers a chance to encounter civilians and offers great possibility to stimulate professionalism and improve the capabilities of the state security forces. But it can also undermine civilian control and initiatives, in an area where the military is presumed to have no core capability.

SETTING THE PARAMETERS

Disaster management is a matter of governance of global and diverse actors and stakeholders. But it is only in recent years that large scale international humanitarian response has become more prevalent. The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) with other international humanitarian agencies try to institutionalize coordination through documents such as:• Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Response (Oslo Guidelines) for natural disasters in peace time • 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines) assumes the presence of armed conflict

Though these Guidelines are non-binding, its principles are “nationalized” by negotiating with individual governments to come up with country level counterparts.

REGIONAL COOPERATION ON CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION IN DISASTER RESPONSE - CRISIS OR OPPORTUNITY?1


HA/DR also attained international import with militaries being deployed to affected areas in foreign countries to provide assistance. Foreign militaries bring in much needed mobility assets and logistics expertise, their presence can’t be separated from geopolitical stategic considerations at play. Arenas to discuss HA/DR and strengthen coordination include:

• ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM Plus, which recently conducted joint HA/DR exercises in Brunei• ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) started practical cooperation among 26 member countries and European Union (EU)• Pacific Partnership, led by the US since 2007, is another framework for conducting multi-nation medical exercise and cultural exchange

An HA/DR Tale of Two Armies: Thailand and the Philippines

In societies where the military traditionally played an important domestic political role, the globalization of disaster response norms may have an effect on civil-military relations. Thailand and the Philippines are examples, and will be viewed closely in this toolkit on three dimensions: legal frameworks for democratic governance, peacetime mechanisms, and awareness of both civilian and military officers.

Royal Thai Armed Forces

A. Legal framework for democratic governanceThere is widespread consensus that disaster management is a principal military role. Even the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense admit that relief operations have been actually led by the military.

Efforts to put a civilian lead for HA/DR manifested through the Disaster Management Act 2007, where the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DPMM) under the Ministry of Interior plays a priority role in disaster management. Though policies are decided by the Disaster Relief Division (Office of Civil Affairs of Ministry of Defense), exercises and training are managed by the Joint and Combined Exercise Planning Office (Royal Thai

REGIONAL COOPERATION ON CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION IN DISASTER RESPONSE - CRISIS OR OPPORTUNITY? 2




Armed Forces Headquarters). Disaster Relief Center has regional offices corresponding to four Region’s Army command offices, which coordinate with DPMM regional offices in each province.

Another legal mechanism is the Ministry of Defense’s Guidelines of Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Response, expected to be finalized by 2015.

B. Peacetime communication mechanismIn the provinces, Thai Army’s Disaster Relief Center held joint exercise coordinating with DDPM regional offices while facilitating emergency contact sharing and evacuation plans. Village chiefs do their own evacuation drills. The army also encourages NGOs to participate in military exercises such as the Cobra Gold, the largest in Asia-Pacific. Other events were the 3rd ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF-DiREx) hosted by Thailand and South Korea in May 2013, and the ASEAN Disaster Exercise (AHEx) with Malaysia slated in April and May 2014.

C. Awareness of Defense Ministries and militaryIt is necessary that guidelines defining roles and norms are crafted in order to recognize and accept actual practice and action. Surprisingly, some soldiers find a “new identity” of the military in disaster relief. Special education on civil affairs are offered at the Army’s Staff College, preparing them to work closely with NGOs.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines

A. Legal framework for democratic governanceDisaster response was formalized as one of the AFP’s seven mission areas, institutionalizing a role it has played since the 70s. Presidential Order 1566 (1978) made the military one of the agencies tasked for disaster response, coordinated by a civilian National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) with the Office of Civil Defense as administrative hub. This tiered disaster response system puts primary responsibility of coordination to local government units (LGUs) and civilian local government executives.

In 1988, a Calamities and Disaster Preparedness Plan formed reaction teams in each military unit. This shift to cluster-based system placed the military under the tasks of search and rescue, transportation and communication.



They are also tasked to assist the police, help in reconstruction, and provide force protection in case disaster strikes a conflict zone.More than two decades later, Republic Act 10121 or the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 shifts focus from disaster response to risk reduction and management. It assigned responsibility to LGUs with help from other agencies like the military, while compelling the government to invest in capital outlay and a more robust organization. Some of its salient provisions are:

• invest on community-based early warning system, geo-hazard and vulnerability mapping, risk assessment and contingency planning, as well as education and awareness raising• maintain a database of disaster volunteers• require participation of civil society, private sector, volunteers• follow international norms and standards• make this parallel with the other points the President to declare need for international assistance• coordinate government agency efforts to civilian authorities i.e. local chief executives for municipalities and provinces and to the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council chaired by the Office of Civil Defense Chief• create an Incident Command Post within affected area for information sharing and coordination• include military and police as members of local and national DRRM councils

The Philippine military also has a standing HA/DR mechanism for integration of deployed US forces in a disaster area. It serves as focal point of coordination between US forces and civilian agencies. It also provides for a Combined Coordination Center.

B. Peacetime communication mechanismAn Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) dubbed “Bayanihan” is awhole-of-government effort where military provide support to civilian efforts. Here, the military defers to local government executives and DSWD personnel for operations within its area.



C. Awareness of Defense Ministries and militaryAs a veteran of armed conflict and disaster response, the Philippine armed forces has been working with international humanitarian actors such as aid agencies and foreign militaries. This is separate from internal security operations.

Royal Thai Army

Prevailing norms and practices in regional and international

HA/DR operations do not necessarily influence them

HA/DR remains conceptual or at dialogue level, a conversation

initiated by the military

There remains a serious gap between Thai military rhetoric

of respecting civilian control and on-the-ground reality

Armed Forces of the Philippines

Given the confluence of disasters and conflict, they are not all too kinetic

security conscious when it comes to relief operations,

nor are NGOs necessarily relianton military assets

Continuously learn and develop denser network with

civil society groups

What is more critical is to addressthe military’s asset-poor condition

for disaster response, making the country dependent on

external logistical assistance for large scale disasters, which is why linkages with international

humanitarian agencies and foreign militaries are crucial

SYNTHESIS

An HA/DR Tale of Two Cities: A Case Study

Last December 2012, Typhoon Pablo (international name Bhopa) struck Davao Oriental and Compostela Valley in Mindanao. It is the first large scale disaster where the Bayanihan framework was applied, in an active communist conflict zone with two army battalions in place. Also, international humanitarian actors already have prior structures with which to coordinate their actions on the ground.

A UN Humanitarian Action Team was created composed of 15 major UN and international agencies, with direct link to NDRRMC in Manila. All understood and respected the norms surrounding relief assistance, putting the DSWD as lead.

On military side, a unified command (army, navy, air force) was created at the Fourth Infantry Division level. A Joint Peace and Security Coordinative Council was set up by the Philippine National Police. They sent an advance party of infantry battalions from unaffected areas, which immediately went on search, rescue, and retrieval operations.



Meanwhile, a one-stop shop center was created at Davao International Airport for customs, immigration, quarantine matters. Two hubs were set up as centers for relief operations: a. Hub 1 (Panacan) near the 4th Infantry Division Headquarters organized by the military’s Civil Relation Service using the neighboring Department of Public Works and Highway warehouses for relief stockpiling, sorting and deployment, limited period; and b. Hub 2 in the Department of Social Welfare and Development Regional Office.

Though DSWD personnel were also deployed in Hub 1, they were generally seen by NGOs as less reliable and efficient than their military counterparts. More third party assistance and volunteers were recorded going to Hub 1 than Hub 2 during its period of operation.

Self-initiated projects include two post-Pablo responses that illustrate Bayanihan in practice - fund-raising concert featuring local and national musicians and the military carried out its own Task Force Tambayayaw where 40-50 teams of engineering units were deployed for shelter construction from a million-peso donation.

The nature of civil-military engagements in the context of Typhoon Pablo disaster response affirms observations that the military are de facto primary responders, and civilian agents and communities are accepting of its key role in the crucial emergency phase.

But to understand the dynamics and confluence of events during the Typhoon Pablo relief operations, the stories of New Bataan in Compostela Valley and Baginga in Davao Oriental offer a more detailed view. Both served as Incident Command Posts and show how the various frameworks are applied on the ground. Both distinguish between NGOs “outside of the community” and community-based ones, being selective when it comes to NGOs who want to partner or come into their area because of ‘leftist’ connections.

New Bataan, Compostela Valley66th IB

66th IB commmander served asIncident Commander because mayor is

also a survivor, but quickly turned over the post after a few days

spearheaded search andretrieval operations

partnered with parishes by usingmilitary vehicles for relief transport

NGOs coordinate to ensuresafe passage sans military operations

Baginga, Davao Oriental67th IB

Governor appointed 67th IB commander as Incident Commander

because of political squabbles

engaged NGOs to coordinate reliefdeliveries, directed civilians liketeachers and health personnel

direct NGOs coming for the first time to deliver goods in upland areas with the military, when they return they go

on their own

NGOs that came in their area aretypically: (1) have narrow, confined

goals not corresponding actual needs; (2) have no prior on-the-ground needs

assessment, limited timelines for engagements; (3) come in with pre-selected target sites and

project templates

engage Lumad communities

AFP DOCTRINEAND TRAININGCOLONEL AMADOR T. TABUGA, JR. (GSC) PA

The Philippines has been fighting insurgency throughout history, from the Huk rebellion to the communist and Muslim insurgencies. Its longest running insurgency, the communist insurgency lasting for more than 40 years, has affected and killed thousands. It has been said that Philippine insurgency is multi-dimensional -- covering political, cultural, sociological and economic dimensions and requires a unique and localized approach.

In February 1998, Republic Act No. 8551 or ‘An Act Providing for the Reform and Reorganization of the Philippine National Police’ formally transferred the task of handling insurgency from the Philippine National Police (PNP) to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

But despite numerous attempts, the AFP continuously failed in putting an end to insurgency. This resulted in a growing debate on whether the Armed Forces is capable of handling insurgency or it is beyond their capacity, looking traditionally at the Armed Forces who were basically trained to defend territorial boundaries and not the internal conflicts.

However, a military document called the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan was crafted in 2010 that would redefine the whole military operation, with the end goal of leaving its primary role on domestic threats and refocusing on territorial defense. The IPSP provides the AFP’s strategic direction in the fulfillment of its mandate of protecting the state and the people.

AFP DOCTRINE AND TRAINING1


ISSUES

In its fight against insurgencies, government successes are usuallyshort-lived and pocket-based. Looking back at past counter-insurgency efforts, several areas of concerns can be explored:

a. Is it doctrine? An Internal Security Operation (ISO) doctrine can provide the guiding principles in AFP operations against insurgency.

b. Is it the existing AFP doctrine that was patterned from foreign principles, specifically the United States?

c. Is it the absence of a national security strategy on insurgency? Such a strategy will clearly define the approach among stakeholders or courses of action towards insurgency.

d. Is it the heavy reliance on best practices and lessons learned rather than on one ISO doctrine?

e. Is it doctrinal development? This pertains to the technical capacity, available documents, systematic approach, and motivational attributes towards doctrine development.

SOURCES OF THE PROBLEM

Two aspects of national defense, namely its doctrine and military training, can be areas of development when it comes to improving the capability of the AFP in fighting insurgencies. Absence, lack of emphasis, and foreign influence are challenges that intersect with the aforementioned components.

AFP DOCTRINE AND TRAINING 2




ON DOCTRINE

The absence of an ISO doctrine has been largely considered as one of the major setbacks why the military was unable to suppress insurgency despite substantial investment and resources provided in every operation.

Lacking its guiding principles, interpretation will likely be based on individual belief and interpretations vis-à-vis best practices and lessons learned. And even though there are other existing military doctrines, these were patterned from sources in the United States. The overarching principles are foreign in nature.

Also, little attention has been given to doctrine development though it is one of the priority areas in the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program and also one of the major pillars of the earlier AFP Modernization Program.

ON MILITARY TRAINING

Fundamental to military training is the presence of a doctrine that will guide its courses of action. In the absence of guiding principles, training would be weak or inadequate to some extent because:

(1) context and direction setting, if not difficult, will be mostly trial-based (2) discourse might be all over the place and interpretation is widely open (3) cohesiveness or consensus building will be quite hard to achieve (4) targets or mission might suffer

While both military training and doctrine remain wanting, the nature of insurgency in the country continuously evolve, becoming more and more complex. Adding to the challenges is the AFP’s change of focus to external defense in 2016. With this paradigm shift, will it create opportunity for doctrinal support or would it lead to support insufficiency?



Of Doctrine and the Armed Forces

AFP Doctrine Development Center. The AFPDDC was established on February 10, 2007 as an AFP-Wide Support and Separate Unit (AFPWSSU). Historically, it is the Doctrine Development Office (DDO), a Special Staff of the Chief of Staff, AFP (1977). In 1984, its functions and personnel were transferred to the AFP Command and General Staff College (AFPCGSC) and became the Research and Doctrines Development Group of the college. The center underwent several renaming and eventually became the AFPDDC today. Aside from developing doctrines, its primary roles include managing GHQ and AFPWSSUs’ doctrine research and development activities and reinforcing doctrine proponents in support to the AFP mission. Since1977, AFPDDC has published 80 doctrine manuals, 23 are current while 57 are for review and revision.

Philippine Army. Doctrine development for the Philippine Army (PA) is undertaken by the Doctrine Center established in 1995 under the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) of the PA. The primary mission of DC, TRADOC is to develop, test, evaluate and validate doctrines; publish manuals and pamphlets for doctrinal/historical information and instructional purposes. To date, TRADOC has developed 34 doctrine manuals and 145 reference materials.

Philippine Air Force. Doctrine development for the Philippine Air Force (PAF) is handled by the Air Power Institute (API) which was organized on January 16, 2002. API is mandated “to develop doctrines and advance airpower for the Philippine Air Force”. To date, API has already developed 39 manuals (34 organizational, 4 functional and 1 operational manual).

Philippine Navy.The task of developing naval doctrine has been given to Naval Doctrine Office (NDO) of the Philippine Navy (PN). The office was established on December 2, 2009 and was later organized as a separate office from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Education and Training, N8, PN on July 26, 2010. The PN Basic Doctrine is still on test and evaluation at its Headquarters and would soon set for promulgation by the Chief of Staff, AFP.

SIDE NOTE



During the AFP Education and Training Summit 2012, participants observed and identified the following major gaps and challenges on training and education:

a. Some unified commanders are apprehensive to conduct joint training due to the absence of clear policy.

b. The present AFP peace education is insufficient. It should encompass building trust, communications, human relations, social marketing, and stakeholders’ management.

c. No local doctrinal basis for training, as it is usually anchored on US and allied doctrines and not on domestic best practices and lessons learned.

d. No institutionalized and functional development program in training institutions or units primarily due to: (1) funding challenges, (2) lack of permanent faculty, (3) absence of standards for instructor’s qualification, (4) lack of training facilities and amenities, and (5) ambivalent attitude of officers and personnel towards training.

RECOMMENDATIONS

ON DOCTRINE

a. To hasten the process of formulating a National Security Strategy (NSS) to provide overarching principles and guidance in training and actual operations. Subjective interpretations in the conduct of operations will be avoided, if not minimized.

b. To transform the present US-patterned doctrines to suit domestic requirements and incorporate regional, cultural, and territorial differences.



c. To highlight the importance of doctrine development by: (1) including doctrine development in all AFP training courses, (2) encouraging officers, enlisted personnel and civilian employees assignment in doctrine centers and offices, (3) allocating additional resources on doctrine facility improvements and other amenities, and (4) interfacing with learning institutions, civilian agencies, and Civil Society Organizations, local and foreign, in support of doctrine formulation.

d. To appoint a matured, seasoned, and experienced flag officer to lead and steer the AFP-Wide Support and Separate Unit (AFPWSSU)

ON TRAINING

a. To formulate policies that would amplify support for training, enhancing capacity and generating more quality and skilled personnel.

b. To create a more comprehensive AFP education and training system. The design of which will include policies and procedures in conducting individual, unit, joint and combined training exercises with emphasis on pre-entry training, professional military education program, and instructor development program. It should also include interfacing between the AFP and civilian learning institutions, both local and foreign, within the objective of enhancing the capacity of AFP training institutions. In addition, it should also include modules on peacebuilding, conflict transformation, human relations, communications, social marketing and stakeholder’s management.

c. To establish policy on motivational attributes of training, such as: (1) credit on promotion among instructors both for local and foreign trainings, (2) improvement on training facilities and amenities, and (3) allocation of additional fund support and resources to training institutions.

d. To support the proposed Senate Bill No. 675, the “National Defense and Security Act” that would strengthen military training and education.

ETHNIC REPRESENTATIONIN THE ARMED FORCES OFTHE PHILIPPINESCARLA ISABEL M. RAVANES

A culturally diverse armed forces enriches its activities and operations. With 140 indigenous groups in the Philippines, ethnic representation as a security sector reform agenda can facilitate relationship-building and communal spirit, especially when conflict happens in their own abode. It presents the opportunity to bridge its security operations and the indigenous communities.

IPs of the Philippines

Majority of the Philippine population are descendants of the ethno-linguistic group called Austronesians. But because of Western colonial rule, combined with visits from foreign merchants and traders, it is often difficult to accurately distinguish the lines between the numerous ethnicities present in the country.

The 140 indigenous groups collectively represent nearly 20 percent of the country’s population. The estimated 14 to 17 million indigenous peoples or IPs are mostly concentrated in the regions of Northern Luzon and Mindanao, with a few groups situated in the Visayas region.

ETHNIC REPRESENTATION IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES 1


The IPs of the Northern Luzon are found in the Cordillera Mountain Range, grouped according to major ethnolinguistic groups, namely: Kankaney, Ibaloy, Bontok, Kalinga, Isneg, Itneg, Ifugao, Iwak, and Gadang. In Mindanao, the IPs are referred to as “lumads,” a Visayan term meaning ‘native.’ The name was adopted by a group of 15 Mindanao ethnic groups to distinguish themselves from other Mindanaoans, namely the Moros and the Christians.

IPs in the AFP

In 2003, the late Secretary of National Defense Angelo T. Reyes committed to giving five (5) percent of the AFP’s recruitment quota to indigenous peoples. Accordingly, the AFP lowered its height and education requirements to accommodate high school graduates standing below five feet and four inches. In the same year, the AFP was geared to draft lumads as regular soldiers and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).

However, civil society and other sectoral groups claim that the motive of the military is to put the lumads at the frontline in its fight against the Communist armed group New People’s Army and, in the process, transform their communities into permanent battlegrounds. They also cite that civilian recruitment of IPs is contradictory to the provisions stated in the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act or IPRA, prohibiting recruitment of indigenous peoples “…for use against other Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) / Indigenous Peoples (IPs).”





The AFP has negated these claims, stating that the recruitment of self-volunteering IPs is part of the regular civilian recruitment for the CAFGU. This does not violate any IP laws and, as a matter of fact, constitutes their right to self-protection, which is stated in the IPRA. This promotes diversity in the armed forces, albeit it is still not completely representative of the IPs in Philippine society.

Following its campaign to win the peace through its Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan, the AFP should have “training programs which give importance to indoctrination on... ethnic sensitivity, and indigenous peoples.” But it does not further mention conducting affirmative action plans and programs, nor has the AFP proclaimed any intent to increase ethnic diversity among its military personnel or aid in promoting equal opportunities for both IPs and non-IPs.

Interventions for Ethnic Diversity

Creating greater ethnic diversity in the armed forces must be jointly conducted between two policy-making agencies, namely the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) and the General Head Quarters or GHQ of the AFP. Concrete steps to be taken may include:

• Craft an IPs employment strategy that focuses on their recruitment and retention in the forces. It should also involve the creation of an inclusive environment and meaningful communication lines for the IPs

In 2001, then-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo enacted Administrative Order (AO) no. 18 (2001) which integrated qualified members of the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA), an armed group of indigenous people in the Cordillera Region, into the AFP. Through AO 18, fifteen members of the CPLA were integrated as officers while 249 were integrated as enlisted personnel. Members of the CPLA who were not accommodated in the 264 quota allocation for integration were given an option to join the CAFGU Active Auxiliary Companies that were organized and deployed in each of the provinces in the Cordillera Administrative Region.



• Foster an environment, especially on the ground, that is culture-sensitive to IPs. This can be achieved through cultural awareness trainings for military personnel involved with recruited and integrated IPs and their communities

• Follow an overall general framework to ensure a consistent approach for recruitment and retention, but use a specific and nuanced approach during implementation to account for the differences among the indigenous groups

SIDE NOTE

On the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA)

To safeguard the rights of the indigenous cultural communities (ICCs) and indigenous peoples (IPs), Republic Act 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997 was enacted. It states that:

The State recognizes the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of Philippine society as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace. The rights of indigenous cultural communities / indigenous peoples are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. It is, therefore, the policy of the state to recognize and promote all individual and collective rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of national unity and development in accordance with the Constitution and applicable norms and principles.

The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) is mandated to protect and promote the rights of the ICCs/IPs, with the power to formulate policies and regulations for the proper implementation of IPRA. The commission was designed to function as an independent agency with its members being representative of IPs themselves.



Implications in the Absence of Interventions

It may take a considerable amount of time for affirmative action programs for IPs, which will provide equal opportunities and treatment in the armed forces, to produce an increase in representation of minorities in the senior ranks of military officials. Worse, initiating half-hearted or misguided plans that will not effectively improve the plight of minority groups would only fuel the fire of accusations that the AFP is using the IPs for token roles.

SIDE NOTE

DREAMING OF A MODERNDEFENSE FORCEJENNIFER SANTIAGO ORETA, PHD

Security governance is among the most controversial and contested terrain in transitional societies such as the Philippines. Society always has ambivalent feelings towards security forces - in this case, the police and the military - because they are used by states to protect their survival even at the expense of the protection of the people’s rights and wellbeing. But during periods of democratization, security forces naturally experience a transition, from serving exclusive power circles to where inclusivity and people engagement become the new normal.

The paradox of a transitional society is that while it attempts to strengthen and deepen the institutionalization of basic governance infrastructures, it also requires a significant democratic space for people to engage in democratic governance.

Context for Internal Security Operations (ISO)

In a democratic and fully functioning state, the monopoly of use of legitimate force is lodged only with the state through its military and police. Below outlines the evolution of internal security priorities as steered by presidential imperatives:

Marcos Presidency The Philippine Constabulary (PC), the nucleus of the Philippine Army during the Martial Law years, served as the primary unit that managed and handled internal security, with the rest of the military acting as support units. It was the PC that directly dealt with internal armed threat groups.

DREAMING OF A MODERN DEFENSE FORCE1


DREAMING OF A MODERN DEFENSE FORCE 2


Aquino Presidency (1986-1992)Fresh with a new Constitution and a restored democracy, Aquino adopted peace negotiation with armed threat groups as a major pillar of its security policy. The PC was collapsed with the Integrated National Police (INP) to form the PC-INP, which will be further transformed to the present Philippine National Police (PNP), placed under the Department of the Interior and Local Government.

However, armed threat groups continued to function as guerilla units with military-like chain of command and high-powered weapons – an obvious mismatch to a civilian-trained and bureaucratized police force.

Ramos PresidencyOnce again, the military was called on to take the lead in internal security concerns. By bringing in the entire military institution, not a hybrid like the Constabulary – it suffered great repercussions in terms of rewards, sanction, and promotion mechanism, force structure, code of conduct, and external defense capacity.

Aquino Presidency (2010-2016)Given its renewed thrust to peace talks and political settlements with armed groups, there is similarly a renewed discussion as regards the role of the AFP in ISO, especially since peace processes are steadily moving forward. With less force committed to ISO, more attention and resources of the AFP can now be devoted to improving its basic and fundamental function in a democratic state – to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country.

Still, lessons can be learned from similar initiatives in the past, especially when it has been proven that sudden shifts of ISO from AFP to PNP was not a good move. Such is the context by which a modern defense force is framed.



Modern Defense Forces

The concept of defensive forces relative to internal security requires the broadening of the imagination to include both the military and the police. It is a concept put forward as the long-term agenda of security reform initiatives. In the Philippines, it revolves around the security reform agenda necessary for its armed forces to move closer to becoming a modern defense force.

A modern defense force has the capacity and capability for effective and efficient provision of security that satisfies the demands of a democratic state, contributes to regional stability, and operates within a framework of democratic governance, rule of law, respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.

The relevant question, hence, is how to create this professional and modern defense force? This concern, to a large extent, reflects the dilemma of security governance in transitional societies. The push and pull of the need for order and control on the one hand, and the need for inclusivity and accountability on the other permeates the whole discussion on security.

Ten-Point Agenda for Reform

Defense reform is not just about changes in management or organizational structure. Its main agenda is changing mindsets, perspectives, and most importantly, security policies. Pursuing the ten-point agenda of a modern defense force would allow the AFP to move closer to its dream of becoming a world class army worthy of the pride and confidence of the Filipino people.

1. The Armed Forces are trained and equipped to suit their strategic domestic and regional environment:

• Capacitate the Armed Forces with modern equipment necessary to support its mission • Develop a self-reliant defense program • Improve training and education of military personnel, consistent with the demands of the strategic environment



2. The Armed Forces maintain an appropriately-sized force:

• Delineate the roles and responsibilities of the military and the police in so far as internal security is concerned • Make consistent the force structure of the Armed Forces with its internal-external security tasks • Use clear policy that defines situations needing military action and situations needing law-enforcement / police action

3. The Armed Forces has sound organizational set-up that maximizes the strengths of the institution and ably complements its weaknesses:

• Introduce integrated approaches to policy development, military expenditure, human resource planning, and management of military assets • Improve the career development of military personnel • Promote a transition and resettlement plan for those leaving the armed forces • Establish clear feedback channels between force employers (users) and providers (deployment unit)

4. The Armed Forces have sufficient budget to support its operations:

• Clear national policy regarding the share of “security mission areas” in the national budget and budget-sharing of local government units in disaster response and humanitarian mission • Balance expectation between the demand of transparency in government procurement process and the need to satisfy the military specs in equipment and materiel purchase

5. The Armed Forces can contribute to national and international goals of peace and security by strengthening regional arrangements for military cooperation, confidence building, arms control, and disarmament.



The military can serve as the ‘swing vote’ that could change political fortune, as proven by these decisive moments in local history:

• The military and police forces were heavily utilized by the Marcos’ government during the infamous martial law era (1972-1983), and even way after the official lifting of martial law until its fall in 1986.• People Power I: Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and AFP Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos staged a failed coup d’etat. It was only with the intercession of the late Jaime Cardinal Sin that swayed the favor of the people to their cause.• Democratic transition under then President Corazon Aquino was peppered with attempts to power grab by the military.• People Power II: The military withdrew support from then President Joseph Estrada, leading to his stepping down.

SIDE NOTE

6. The Armed Forces is under civilian authority:

• Create clear constitutional and legal framework regarding the role of the military in state building and national security • Clarify and strengthen the accountability lines in the chain of command

7. The Armed Forces have clear mechanism for feedback from civilians:

• Encourage civil society debate, improving citizens’ awareness and engagement with defense reform issues • Put clear mechanisms for civilian oversight on security forces



8. The Armed Forces abide by the principles of accountability and good governance:

• Comply with the requirements imposed by the Central government as regards transparency and accountability • Stipulate metrics on grievance, reward, and punishment regarding AFP personnel

9. The Armed Forces abide by the principles of human rights and international humanitarian law:

• Establish clear Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) regarding complaints on HR/ IHL violations • Communicate to public the HR-IHL SOPs of the AFP

10. The Armed Forces have representative composition in terms of gender and ethnicity:

• Promote clear policy on equal opportunity in the defense sector • Improve the gender sensitivity of the institution • Increase the number of ethnic representation in the AFP

POLICY ENVIRONMENT FOR A MODERN DEFENSE FORCEKATHLINE ANNE S. TOLOSA

Developing a modern defense force entails more than the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). It also calls for progressive policies and a reformed security sector. All of these efforts must be done in unison, under a coherent framework of a clear national security sector reform agenda. Hence, a conducive policy environment that is firmly grounded on national laws and policies can usher in an armed forces that is fullymulti-mission capable and is guided by people-centered security on its way to “winning the peace.”

OF POLICY AND THE MILITARY

The military is an instrument of policy, which is especially true in a country where the military is assumed to be under the firm democratic control of civilian authorities. The AFP implements national security and defense policies crafted by civilian government agencies, particularly the Congress, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Department of National Defense (DND). Based on these, the armed forces crafts its policies such as the National Military Strategy, the Unilateral Defense Plan, and the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan.

Aside from policy directives, military performance is also subject to the oversight and control of public institutions, particularly the DND, NSC, the House of Representatives and the Senate, the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman, as well as constitutional commissions, specifically the Commission on Human Rights and the Commission on Audit.

Ultimately, it is through policies that the civilian government defines the roles or ‘mission areas’ of the military. It is also through such policies that plans for the modernization of military assets and capabilities are laid down.

POLICY ENVIRONMENT FOR A MODERN DEFENSE FORCE1


Toward a Fully Mission Capable Defense Force

After the departure of U.S. military bases in 1991, there have been several efforts to fill the gaps in Philippine territorial defense. Such initiatives came after decades of reliance to the U.S. for external defense, even after the country gained full independence. Its effect can still be felt today as the capability of the Navy and the Air Force were maintained at a dismal level and largely defined within the ambit of internal security.

AFP Modernization Act

The AFP Modernization Act stipulated to “modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to a level where it can effectively and fully perform its constitutional mandate to uphold the sovereignty and preserve the patrimony of the Republic of the Philippines.” It covered a period of 15 years with a total budget of PhP 332 billion. It was meant to not merely focus the military to territorial defense but also to ensure its performance of non-war fighting tasks.

But its execution tells a different story. There was a dire need to bring back the basic capabilities of the AFP to acceptable levels of readiness, opting instead to undertake the Capability Upgrade and Philippine Defense Reform Programs. Skewed towards materiel and equipment upgrades, little attention was paid to skills transfer and personnel development. Add to this the dismal release of funds for the Modernization Program, with only PhP 33.9 billion released by the end of the implementation period.

Philippine Defense Transformation (PDT)

This program intends to ensure that the DND is able to meet the strategic objectives laid down in the National Security Policy of 2011-2016. It attempts to balance the modernization of materiel and equipment against the transformation of mindsets, knowledge, and skills – addressing the very shortcomings of the earlier AFP Modernization Act.

POLICY ENVIRONMENT FOR A MODERN DEFENSE FORCE 2




PDT got a big push with the passage of RA 10349, establishing the Revised AFP Modernization Program. It grants another 15-year period for modernization with a Php 75 billion budget for the first five years. Unlike its predecessor, this new plan seeks to, among others: a.) enhance military capability to conduct ISO, particularly in suppressing insurgency and national security threats; and b.) develop and transform the AFP into a multi-mission oriented force capable of addressing internal and external security threats.

As the journey toward a modern defense force continues, these lessons are worth noting to prevent past shortcomings:

• The very nature of the military institution requires that it is able to act as one. This can be done by clearly linking each individual’s tasks to the overall mission, vision and goals. This is done through the respective Governance Roadmaps.

• Equal attention must be paid to the non-tangible aspects of modernization, such as internal controls and systems, training and education, morale and welfare, ethics and values.

• Developing capabilities for a modern defense force takes time, as reflected in the long term horizons of the Philippine Navy Sail Plan 2020 and the Army Transformation Roadmap 2028. Thus, efforts must be coherent, holistic, consistent, and sustained. The General Headquarters, AFP is currently in the process of coming up with an AFP-wide transformation and governance strategy.

Poised for Modernization

As the AFP transforms to a modern defense force, it proves to be multi-mission capable. However, it also shows a military with continually expanding roles, playing catch up in terms of capability development and modernization policies. With the need to set up an environment that is favourable to AFP modernization, these action steps can be taken:

• Clear parameters have to be set to define the roles of the military, demarcating the limits of its involvement in ISO, support to law enforcement, and national development



Evolving Role of the AFPThe military’s force structure, capability, and technology must be based on the functions that they are expected to perform. Throughout history, the role of the armed forces has been swayed and influenced by the unique context of a particular period.

Commonwealth Period• Prime duty of the government was the protection of the state• All citizens may be required to render military or civil service• Philippine Constabulary transferred under the control of the Chief of Staff, with the primary task of ensuring internal security and the performance of police duties in peacetime and wartime, but may also be called upon in case of invasion or national defense• Military was organized as a ground force, a territorial organization adapted as closely as possible to the territorial and administrative organization of the Philippines

• Roles assigned to the military must be anchored on a clearly articulated national security frame based on national security interests.

• Deployment of the military for “civilian tasks” must be borne out of national interests and not to fill in gaps in service delivery

• As policies commit men and women in uniform to a certain task, then there must be firm national resolve to commit full support to reach the objective.

• Legislation guiding national laws on security must undergo a process of review and/or be crafted to ensure coherence of policy

• Civil society can help frame a coherent strategy for reforms in the security sector while strengthening the modernization process by performing oversight and monitoring roles.

SIDE NOTES



Post Martial Law• Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) anointed as the “protector of the people and the State” and given the goals of securing the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory• Clearly defined the role of the military as an instrument of policy, thus decreeing that no member should be involved in partisan politics, except in the exercise of their right to suffrage• Expanded role of the AFP to guard the State against external and internal threats while providing support for social and economic development• Moved away from the transitional force structure under the Commonwealth regime to an Armed Forces of the Philippines comprised of the following major services: Philippine Army, Philippine Air Force, Philippine Navy, Philippine Coast Guard, and the Philippine Constabulary• Military’s attempt to develop its own capabilities for external defense while performing police and coast guard functions as well• Military’s police functions and internal security role were removed by virtue of Republic Act 6975 or the “Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990” with the creation of the Philippine National Police and the transfer of the primary role of preserving internal security, with some considerations, to the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)• However, the PNP, being a young organization, is not yet fully capable of addressing insurgency. So the said transfer of function was not absolute as the military can be called upon for support

1998By virtue of Republic Act 8551, the primary responsibility of suppressing insurgency was given back to the AFP

2004Within the ambit of the overall Philippine Defense Reform Program of the DND, its Secretary issued the first ever Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), intended to institutionalize a defense planning system that is based on strategy and is responsive to capability needs. It identified seven mission areas that must be focused on: (1) internal security; (2) territorial defense; (3) disaster response; (4) support to national development; (5) international defense and security engagements; (6) international humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations; and (7) force-level central command and control, support and training.



2010To guide the performance of its internal security role, the AFP came up with the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan, divided into four (4) strategic tasks: contribute to the permanent and peaceful closure of all armed conflict; conduct of focused military operations against armed threat groups; support community-based peace and development efforts; and, carry out security sector reform initiatives in the AFP. These tasks are consistent with the thrusts and objectives of the Philippine Development Plan 2011 – 2016 and the National Security Policy 2011-2016.

2011The National Security Policy was crafted prescribing a comprehensive definition of national security.

2012The Philippine Defense Transformation was issued to ensure that the DND is able to meet the strategic objectives laid down in the National Security Policy of 2011-2016.

AFP MODERNIZATIONMELANIE RODULFO-VERIL

HISTORICAL IMPERATIVES

As the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) prepares to hand over internal peace and security to civilian authorities and focus on external defense, developing its capabilities stands as a vital precondition in the fulfillment of its duties. Also, a modern AFP gives the nation a credible deterrent posture.

As the Philippines rose from the rubble of the Second World War, it created an armed forces whose structure and organization was patterned after that of the United States.

1947 • establishment of the AFP with three service units (Army, Navy, and Air

Force)• entered into security agreements with the United States (US) for support

against external threats, namely: Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1947, Military Assistance Program (MAP) of 1947, and the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951

• Clark Air Base became the biggest airbase outside US territory

1950s to early 1970s• Golden Era of the AFP• inventory includes jet-fighter interceptors F-5A/B and F-8 Crusaders, 140

Huey helicopters, 35 attack helicopters, 30 trainer jets, 12 C-130 Hercules planes, warships, and gunboats

• major role was being an occasional participant in the SEATO military exercises

• start of “professionalization” and capability building

AFP MODERNIZATION1


1970s• during the escalation of Muslim separatism in Mindanao, the Marcos

dictatorship aimed for an independent armed forces that will be capable of an autonomous defense posture

• Government allocated USD 25 million for research and development of Philippine Army capabilities

1980s• Continuous autonomous defense capability• Amid brewing tensions in the West Philippine Sea, the Department of

National Defense (DND) proposed the modernization of the Philippine Navy and maritime security

• Laid the groundwork for the AFP Modernization Plan, with the Philippine Congress and Senate directing the organization to formulate a 15-year plan for arms and acquisition

THE AFP MODERNIZATION PLANThe AFP Modernization Plan (AFPMP) was created and approved on February 23, 1995 as a legal and policy framework. Covering 15 years, it was mandated by Republic Act (RA) 7898, and was implemented through Department of National Defense Circular (DC) No. 1 dated March 6, 2000.

WHAT WAS THE GOAL OF THE AFPMP?This program aims to “modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines to a level where it can fully and effectively platform its constitutional mandate of upholding the sovereignty and preserving the patrimony of the Republic.”

WHAT PROMPTED THE AFPMP?• intent to lessen dependency with the US• end of the Cold War• withdrawal of US forces in the Philippines • reduced US military and economic aid• territorial disputes, specifically with China over the West Philippine Sea

AFP MODERNIZATION 2


AFP MODERNIZATION3


WHAT WERE THE SALIENT POINTS OF AFPMP?• Composed of five components:

(1) Capability, Materiel and Technology Development; (2) Bases and Support System Development; (3) Human Resource Development; (4) Doctrines Development; and(5) Force Restructuring and Organizational Development

• Funding of PhP 331.62 billion broken down into two sub-programs: Sub-program 1 with PhP 164.55 billion and Sub-program 2 with PhP 167 billion• Funding to be distributed in tranches: PhP 50 billion for the first five years;

PhP 74.2 billion for the second year; PhP 37.6 billion for the third year; and PhP 2.8 billion for the remaining five years

• Proposed acquisitions for the Philippine Air Force: two squadrons of multi-role fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missile, and gun systems

• Proposed acquisitions for the Philippine Navy: three frigates, six corvettes, 12 offshore patrol vessels, 12 missile boats, nine helicopters, six fixed-wing aircraft

WHERE WILL THE AFPMP FUNDING COME FROM?Parameters were set to limit the effect of hefty military spending so that AFPMP allocation will not hamper basic economic and social services. Since Congressional funding will only be available if there is surplus in the appropriations, an AFP Modernization Act Trust Fund was created. It will be sourced from:

(1) Appropriations for the AFPMP (2) Proceeds from the sale, lease, or joint development of military reservation, as may be authorized by Congress, including such immovable and other facilities as may be found therein, not covered by the Bases Conversion Development Authority, as provided for in RA 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 (3) Share of the AFP from proceeds of the sale of military camps provided for under RA 7227 (4) Proceeds from the disposal of excess and/or uneconomically repairable equipment and other movable assets of the AFP and the Government Arsenal (5) Funds from budgetary surplus, subject to the provisions of RA 7227; and (6) All interest income of the Trust Fund

EXECUTION OF THE AFPMP

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE AFPMP

The implementation of the AFPMP expired on December 2011 without significant progress. Though grand in paper, its execution severely suffered from lack of funding, misplaced bureaucracy, and conflicting guidelines.

• Of the PhP 331 billion funding, only PhP 35 billion was used

• According to a July 2011 report by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5, only 317 projects (59.36%) were completed. There are still 209 ongoing projects and eight suspended for review.

• With its complex acquisition structure, the AFP was slow to move. Primarily designed to speed up procurement for ISO and realign modernization with AFP missions, the Reprioritized Capability Upgrade Program (RCUP) directs the AFP to consider foreign military sales or government-to-government transactions, contributing to the already complex procurement process.

AFP MODERNIZATION 4


WHAT HAPPENED AT THE FRINGES OF THE AFPMP?At the heels of 9/11 and the US-led global war on terrorism, the Philippines and the US prompted the Joint Defense Agreement (JDA), which led to the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) and the AFP Capability Upgrade Plan (CUP)• The JDA identified 65 key and 207 ancillary areas of concern, distilled into

ten key recommendations, to be implemented by the PDR• As one of the ten key recommendations, the AFP CUP was aligned with

the AFPMP

WHAT WERE THE DETERRENTS IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION?• Asian financial crisis led to a depreciating peso and reduced foreign

investments• AFP shifted priorities from external defense to Internal Security Operations

(ISO), due to increased Muslim separatist activity in Mindanao

SIDE NOTE

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AFPMP: AN AFTERMATHA total of 138 projects spread over a period of five years are in the pipeline, with the bulk of the budget going to the Air Force and Navy and an initial budget of PhP 70 billion. Other notable developments are:

• Crafting of the AFP Long Term Capability Development Program to protect maritime borders and territorial claims in Spratlys

• Implementing the Defense System of Management (DSOM) as a support to the planning, resource, financial management, and decision-making responsibilities of senior leaders from the DND and AFP. It also develops the vital fiscally-constrained plans, programs, and budget proposals.

On the legislative front, a bill amending the AFPMP was passed by the Philippine Senate. It mandates that:

• a new system for the procurement process will be cut down from 29 stages to two assessment levels in addition to the actual procurement and contracting stages

• Filipino contractors who are willing to invest on the defense industry faced difficulties because of stipulations such as: “That no major equipment and weapons system shall be purchased if the same are not being used by the armed forces in the country of origin or used by the armed forces of at least two countries.” This contradicts the intent of RA 7898 to “give preference to Filipino contractors and suppliers” as they must sell first to other nation before they can be considered by their own.

• Lack and delayed release of funds were the main reasons for the poor implementation of the program.

• the AFP Trust Fund be amended to cover all necessary expenses during the procurement of equipment

• Congress approval will no longer be required in the lease or joint development of military reservations

• additional funds will be sourced out of earnings from Malampaya gas wells in the Sulu Sea

With the changing security environment, the AFP faces vastly different security challenges. If no interventions are done in the future, the AFP will be left behind and will not be able to perform its mandate of upholding the sovereignty and preserving the patrimony of the Republic. Aside from increased funding, a more focused modernization program and policy guidance is needed, while its projects must be approved immediately and properly implemented to see fruitful results.

AFP MODERNIZATION 6


MAPPING OUT THE LEGAL TERRAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE SECURITY SECTORATTY. NOEL DEL PRADO

The Marcosian history of the armed forces, where the police and the military acted as both judge and executioner, served as a focal point in shaping the country’s security sector agenda. With the power of state security agents prone to exploitation and political influence, legal frameworks and procedures serve as deterrents with capacity for oversight.

Civilian Oversight

The Philippine security sector rests on the principle that “Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.” This credo is manifested through the three branches of government, namely, the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary.

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE SECURITY SECTOR?

As the Chief Executive, the President is bestowed with three key capacities to exercise oversight over certain security sector actors:

a. Power of appointment - appoint leaders in the Department of National Defense and Department of the Interior and Local Government

MAPPING OUT THE LEGAL TERRAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE SECURITY SECTOR1


b. Power of control and supervision - control over the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police

c. Administrative power - create oversight offices such as the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process - supervise law enforcement to maintain general peace and public order - apply policies and enforce orders related to security sector

Thus, significant reforms in the security sector will necessarily entail an overhaul of the manner by which the President exercises his role as both the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief Executive of core security forces.

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE CONGRESS AND THE SENATE IN THE SECURITY SECTOR?

The legislative power of inquiry is exercised through the Blue Ribbon Committee, National Defense Committee, Committee on Public Order and Safety, and such other ad hoc bodies. They monitor bureaucratic compliance and policy administration, while providing a balance to executive authority. Congress also wields the “power of the purse” since they decided on the appropriation for security sector actors like the police and military.

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE SECURITY SECTOR?

The Supreme Court of the Philippines, together with all lower courts, exercises the power of judicial review to determine if government policies and directives are in accordance with the 1987 Constitution.

MAPPING OUT THE LEGAL TERRAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE SECURITY SECTOR 2




Constitutional OversightInstitutionalization of the security sector subjects its players to closer scrutiny in terms of anti-graft monitoring and integrity promotion. This duty is fulfilled by the following public agencies:

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC)As the central personnel agency and human resource organization of the national government, it has jurisdiction over all personnel matters. Even though the military and the police have Judge Ad-vocate General Office (JAGO) and Internal Affairs Service (IAS), the CSC sets the minimum standards for qualifications. Together with the Office of the Ombudsman, they also conduct lifestyle checks and keep the Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth or SALN of state security agents.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA)It examines, audits, and settles all accounts pertaining to the expenditure and use of public funds and property by the armed forces.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMANThis office has the MOLEO or the Deputy Ombudsman for MIlitary and Other Law Enforcement Officers who surveil the AFP, PNP, Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP), Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), Bureau of Corrections, Philippine Coast Guard, and all civilian employees of these agencies.

NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM)Its authority over the police force is shared with local chief executives. NAPOLCOM covers pay, training, crime laboratories, and investigation of administrative and disciplinary cases. But when Republic Act No. 6975 or An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Recognized

Department of the Interior and Local Government, and for Other Purposes was enacted, control of the national police was transferred to the executive branch.

PEOPLE’S LAW ENFORCEMENT BOARDS (PLEB)Located in every city or municipality, PLEB conducts hearings and adjudicates on citizen complaints against Philippine National Police members for offenses committed in their area of jurisdiction.

Bumps and barriers in the security sector landscape, circa Martial Law until the present:

1. Political misuse of security units 2. Unaccountable bureaucracies 3. Arbitrary policy-making 4. Lack of transparency 5. Risk- avoiding 6. Amateurism 7. Corruption 8. Nepotism

They do not only prevent modernization, but point to a fundamental irony, that despite the institutionalization of multi-layered oversight mechanisms, the Philippine security sector continues to reflect the highly-politicized environment that has developed into its natural habitats.

The inter-governmental oversight structures have not only ironically institutionalized political intervention into the security sector, but have also informally installed the security sector as the “gatekeeper of power” and the “court of last resort.”



Another layer of oversight was added by granting governors and mayors the power to appoint, though local chief executives as NAPOLCOM deputies can countermand their decision

HOW TO STRENGTHEN THE EXISTING LEGAL STRUCTURES

The present structures and legal instruments covering security policies and stakeholders are unrelated, dis-integrated, and self-contained. In order to “bridge” the gaps, the following steps must be taken:

1. Integrate the local Peace and Order Councils (POC) into formal security sector structure and processes a. Authorize the PNP to develop barangay peace and order b. Integrate barangay neighborhood watch systems to peace and order initiatives of the armed forces c. PNP and DILG to prescribe minimum set of objectives to POCs

2. Correct the mis-integration of cross-over institutions a. De-limit the role of the local chief executives over the police and military b. Review the directive of the Philippine Coast Guard being an adjunct of the DOTC. c. Return the administration of the Philippine National Police Academy to the PNP

3. Develop Military Bases based on a Comprehensive Security Plan a. Prioritize it alongside social and economic development of communities b. Give merit on their strategic value c. Procure and acquire materiel according to security needs



4. Foster a culture of “Security Consciousness” a. Integrate security education in the school system b. Articulate the role of an “Informed Public” c. Identify the “pillars of the security sector” and their specific roles

5. Define the role of an “informed Media establishment” to clearly delineate between “watchdog” (outsider) and stakeholder (insider) functions

6. Insulate the security sector from politics, without removing the checks- and-balance functions of oversight agencies

In the same way that the 1987 Constitution envisions an integrated national and local government, the same principle must also apply to the security sector. Much like the concepts of health and public safety, the public must also internalize and claim ownership to national security.



AFP FORCESTRUCTURECAPT. ROY VINCENT T. TRINIDAD (GSC) PN

As part of security sector reform, transforming the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) requires looking into the suitability of its organizational structure. At present, the AFP is formulated as land-based or army-heavy because it is used by the government as a primary tool to suppress insurgency, even though more air and naval capabilities are needed by an archipelago like the Philippines.

As the AFP assumes more roles in territorial defense and non-traditional tasks like disaster response and humanitarian assistance, the need to review its organizational structure to befit the local setting becomes more pressing. This emergence of a more participatory role of the AFP in civilian functions requires the modification of its structure.

Challenges in AFP Structural Organization

The Post Martial Law Culture

During Martial Law, the military became the immediate option for conflicts and emergency situations. Under the guise of ‘civic action’, they were given unconventional duties in infrastructure and economic development to bridge gaps on logistics and resources. Such practice continued even after Martial Law, with military officials being granted government posts traditionally accorded to civilians.

AFP FORCE STRUCTURE1


AFP FORCE STRUCTURE 2


Counter Insurgency Operations

With Republic Act No. 8551 or the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998, internal security operations (ISO) is transferred from the police force to the AFP. But there is still difficulty in defining the scope and parameter of its role, especially vis-à-vis the roles of the local government units or LGUs.

Since the roots of insurgency cannot be solved solely by militaristic approach, LGUs need to take a proactive stance. If they become complacent, the AFP is forced to perform tasks beyond its mandate and competency. In turn, some LGUs feel disrespected and encroached when the AFP assumes their responsibility. Territorial defense and war fighting capabilities of the AFP, which should be its core competencies, have been neglected to suit its ISO mission.

Organizational Expansion / Modification

The AFP modified its organizational structure in its attempt to address ISO. It even extended efforts by training and building up capabilities to satisfy needs which are available outside the organization. This led to an abuse in the creation of positions that exceeded the number authorized by the law.



Utilization of Reservists

Ready Reservists are personnel that are always on constant alert and on a call whenever the mobilization order has been given, while Standby Reservists are the personnel that support and augment the Ready Reserve Force only when needed. At present, the AFP organization lacks proper accounting of the reservists as well as a clear concept or strategy on how to integrate reservist into the regular force.

Strategic Direction

The absence of a comprehensive policy framework, such as National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and National Military Strategy (NMS), make it more difficult for the AFP to chart its strategic direction. Policy baselines and national frameworks are very important in setting military objectives and coming up with the appropriate framework to support said plans.

Interventions Needed to Improve AFP Force Structure

The publication of a national policy framework is very vital in coming up with the AFP’s strategic direction and changes in its force structure. It includes clear policies on the handover of areas and declaration of insurgent-free communities. Government policy should also be crafted rendering the military as the last option in addressing emergency or internal conflict.



• Formulate a Transition Plan for the shift of military operations focus from ISO to Territorial Defense - create exit plan of AFP from internal security operation - define roles of AFP units in territorial defense - provide a clear concept and strategy on the utilization/ employment of reservists - make Contingency Plans and Rules of Engagement consistent with the Transition Plan - review the Unilateral Defense Plan and its implementation plans - revisit mobilization plans to ensure relevance and consistency with the transition plan

• Conduct in-depth review of the AFP force structure based on the laid down strategy of the agency

• Rationalize reservists’ organization and incorporate in the structure of the AFP

• Observe the force employer/force provider concept

• Follow a simpler command and control mechanism to avoid confusion in assuming responsibilities and chain of authority

• Address different war time scenarios, may it be internal or international conflicts, to be able to easily adapt to various situations.



• Design a force structure that complies with current laws and national policies and centered on its the core competencies

• Consider a sole headquarters for all the Major Services of the armed forces - aids in better coordination, supervision as well as command and control among the services - avoids the advent of creating a separate domain per Major Service - provides a united atmosphere among the highest leaders of the AFP, translating to a strengthened armed forces

• Reprioritize programs to support AFP modernization so it would be able to address maritime security and other non-traditional tasks

Consequences

If there would be no changes in the AFP structure, deterioration of the AFP capability may follow. The core competency of AFP in war fighting may be compromised.

Addressing the concerns and issues on force structure of the AFP entails a deep political will among its leaders and members. This also calls for support from policy makers and other stakeholders.



Rationalization of the AFP structure into a more fitting organization will affect other government instrumentalities, since it had been doing a big role not just in the provision of security but also in the internal dynamics of the state. In this light, the support of various government sectors to the gradual changes in the uniformed service in terms of strategy and roles in society is one key factor towards developing a reformed AFP and a modern defense force.

PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCYFRANCIS DOMINGO

The emergence of transnational security threats has proven that intelligence is an essential tool for states in the 21st century. Cloaked in secrecy and resistance, the Philippine intelligence community remains a ‘silent’ player of the security sector, even though transparency is an instituted norm in democratic states. This existing state of affairs may be hindering other national security stakeholders, specifically the general public, from developing awareness and becoming a pro-active ally of the intelligence community. At present, Philippine civilian and military intelligence strategies and policies are mostly based on the practices of the United States Intelligence Community.

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?

Three dominant notions of intelligence are generally accepted by its scholars and practitioners, though the quest for an “official” and viable definition is still ongoing.

• Information - intelligence as “information relevant to a government’s formulation and implementation of policy to further its national security interests and to deal with threats from actual or potential adversaries” (A. Shulsky and G. Schmitt, Silent Warfare), which is then processed and analyzed to generate an “intelligence product.”

PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY1


• Process - intelligence as a “process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policy makers.” (M. Lowenthal, Intelligence from Secrets to Policy 4th Edition)

• Organization - intelligence as “based on the particular set of organizations with that name: the intelligence services or (sometimes) the intelligence communities.” (M. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War)

WHY IS SECRECY IMPORTANT TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY?

• prevent damage to the prestige and national security of a state • protect the sources of intelligence and the methods utilized to obtain it

PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY 2


For public consumption: literature on intelligence

While the literature on intelligence is well-developed, it is strictly dominated by Western academics and practitioners, while some developing countries exercise transparency through an online presence.

SIDE NOTES



Key Players in thePhilippine Intelligence CommunityRECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE TRANSPARENCY

PRESIDENT

NATIONALSECURITY ADVISOR

(NSA)

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY

(NICA)

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCECOMMITTEE

(NIC)

NATIONALINTELLIGENCE

BOARD(NIB)

SPECIALMONITORINGCOMMITTEE

(SMC)

REGIONALINTELLIGENCE BOARD

(RIC)



PRESIDENT - highest authority on national security matters

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR (NSA) - chief advisor of the President on national security matters

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) - the President’s principal forum for deliberating national security and foreign policy matters, composed of members of key government departments including foreign affairs, national defense, military, interior and local government, justice, labor and employment, science and technology

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA) - implements policies from NSC; under it are two functional bodies, namely: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (NIC) - principal arm providing direction and control of operations REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD (RIC) - same structure as NIC but with a narrower, more ‘localized’ approach

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD (NIB) - highest forum for intelligence exchange among senior officials and select government units; provides independent advice to the NICA on the effectiveness of the country’s intelligence operations as well as coordination and integration with local and global players

SPECIAL MONITORING COMMITTEE (SMC) - conducts counterintelligence operations, particularly to monitor domestic threats such as terrorism and destabilization plots



The central issue in advocating for intelligence transparency is the challenge of how to provide democratic control of its agencies and operations while it operates on secrecy. The following recommendations are based on practices of other democratic states:

• Give basic information about their work thru an official website and published documents

• Collaborate with academics and researchers

• Be accountable thru executive oversight and congressional oversight - Executive oversight is more practical given the sensitive and urgent nature of the tasks

- However, congressional or legislative oversight is a dominant mechanism adopted by different governments because it can investigate the use of powers and expenditures

Official websites• Indonesia’s Badan Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence Agency)• Mexico’s El Centro de Investigacion y Seguridad Nacional (Center for Research and National Security)• India’s Central Intelligence Bureau



SCHOLARLY WORKS

Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War

Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence Jennifer Sims, Buton Gerber, Vaults and Mirrors and Masks Rediscovering US Counterintelligence

William Johnson, Thwarting Enemies at Home and Aboard

Stephen Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap Between

Scholarship and Practice and Thomas Fingar, Reducing Uncertainly, Intelligence Analysis and National Security

Gregory Treverton, Covert Action The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World

William Daugherty, Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency

Government publications• US National Intelligence: A Consumer’s Guide to Intelligence (2009)• UK National Intelligence Machinery (2010)

Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force Toolkit

Documents

Transcript of Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force Toolkit