Security K- Table of Contents€¦ · Web viewThe aff attempts to limit arms to control and...

Security K and Answers ENDI 2019

Security K- Table of Contents 1nc – Security K...............................................................................................................................................3

Links.....................................................................................................................................................................6

Limiting Arms Sales Bad.................................................................................................................................7

Focus on Arms Sales........................................................................................................................................9

AT: Decreasing Sales Solves.........................................................................................................................10

AT: Plan challenges Militarism......................................................................................................................11

Arms Control Link.........................................................................................................................................12

Weapons Focus Link......................................................................................................................................13

Free Trade Links............................................................................................................................................14

Hegemony Links............................................................................................................................................17

China Links....................................................................................................................................................19

Terrorism Links..............................................................................................................................................22

Impact.................................................................................................................................................................25

Securitization Impact......................................................................................................................................26

Human Security Good....................................................................................................................................30

Governmentality IL........................................................................................................................................32

Structural Violence Outweighs......................................................................................................................33

Rhetorical Focus Good...................................................................................................................................35

AT: Aff Solves War.......................................................................................................................................36

AT: Aff Outweighs.........................................................................................................................................37

AT: We save lives..........................................................................................................................................38

AT: Aff solves Militarism..............................................................................................................................40

Neoliberalism Makes Aff Inevitable..............................................................................................................41

AT: Neoliberalism is Vacuous.......................................................................................................................43

Alternative..........................................................................................................................................................44

AT: Impossible...............................................................................................................................................45

Perm: AT: End arms sales..............................................................................................................................46

Perm: AT: Aff Challenges Militarism............................................................................................................47

Perm: AT: We are anti Weapons....................................................................................................................49

Aff Answers...........................................................................................................................................................50

Link Turn...........................................................................................................................................................51

2ac – Plan Fights Militarism..........................................................................................................................52

Ext - Arms Sales Fuel Militarism...................................................................................................................531

Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 Impact Answers..................................................................................................................................................54

AT: Securitization Causes Extinction............................................................................................................55

AT: Security Causes War...............................................................................................................................57

AT: Governmentality Bad..............................................................................................................................59

AT: Representations First...............................................................................................................................61

AT: Structural Violence O/W.........................................................................................................................62

Impact Turn - Security Good.............................................................................................................................63

2ac Security Good..........................................................................................................................................64

Ext – Security Good.......................................................................................................................................66

Alternative..........................................................................................................................................................68

2ac – Alt Fails.................................................................................................................................................69

Ext – Alt Fails.................................................................................................................................................71

Permutation........................................................................................................................................................72

2ac – Perm – First Step...................................................................................................................................73

Ext – First Step...............................................................................................................................................74

Not Mutually Exclusive..................................................................................................................................75

Landmine Ban Proves....................................................................................................................................77

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1nc – Security K

The aff attempts to limit arms to control and create security – that leaves the apparatus of the military - and the U.S. specifically – in control of the lives and decisions of others. That is the heart of securitized governmentality. Keith Krause 11. Professor at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. Leashing the Dogs of War: Arms Control from Sovereignty to Governmentality. Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.32, No.1 (April 2011), pp.20–39 ISSN 1352-3260 print

The nature, form, and objectives of contemporary arms control practices have not been subject to systematic conceptual analysis. Canvassing the academic and policy-relevant literature of the past 50 years, one can find scattered contributions to theoretically-informed

reflection about arms control, disarmament, and the overall regulation of weapons and related technologies.1 But there exists no real theory or paradigm of arms control practices.2 Within the broader panorama of contemporary security studies, the absence of sustained and systematic

reflection on what lies behind the ideas, principles and practices of arms control is somewhat puzzling, for at least two reasons. First, other fields of security studies have engaged considerable efforts to develop (and critique) theories of deterrence (conventional and nuclear), alliance theory, offence-defence balance theory, and other intellectual offshoots of the rationalist approach to war and peace. Second, and as Emanuel Adler pointed out in 1992, there is (or at least was) a large epistemic community of arms control professionals engaged in sporadic or ongoing development and negotiation of treaties or other arrangements.3 Given both of these elements, one would expect that arms control at least would warrant as much attention as other central aspects of great power

security practices. The implications of this for our understanding of post-Cold War arms control practices are somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, the narrow focus in scholarship and practice on weapons of mass destruction has meant that the specific arms control efforts associated with these weapons occupy today only a small place in the wider panoply of efforts to regulate the production, transfer, possession,

stockpiling, and use of arms, within and between states. On the other hand, the particular way in which arms control evolved throughout the Cold War and its

emphasis on the rational management of the means of violence meant that the underlying principles governing arms control efforts together generated a larger logic concerning the ‘governance of military technology’. This article argues that the

progressive development of measures to control weapons of mass destruction in the 1980s and 1990s essentially moved arms control beyond a sovereign

conception of how (and why) to control arms, as part of the management of security relations between competing powers, towards a larger logic of governmentality that reached deep into the domestic affairs of states and involved forms of regulation and control that went far beyond inter-state agreements to regulate their military competition. The notion of a shift from a sovereign to a governmental form of power draws upon Michel Foucault's analysis of the emergence, in the 16th and 17th centuries, of government and governing as the way in which state power over its population was exercised, as opposed to cruder, more direct, exercises of unlimited and/or arbitrary sovereign power.4 Sovereignty and governmentality are thus two distinct modes of exercising power that either focus on securing a given territory and system of rule over a people (sovereignty) or on managing a population through the wide-ranging regulation of economy and society (governmentality).5 *****footnote

5***** As Foucault puts it, governmentality is a form of power one central aspect of which is the ‘institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics … that has the population as its target , political economy as its major form of knowledge and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument’. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (note 4), p.108. *****footnote 5***** Applying these concepts, designed to help understand the changing exercise of state power, to the international arena is not without some challenges. In the international arena, sovereign rule is about negotiated and strategic (in the instrumentally-rational sense) relations between recognized equals, whereas governmental rule involves hierarchical relations, the effacing of the domestic-international divide, and a complex set of relationships between states, international organizations and transnational civil society.6 It is not my intention, however, to provide a full theoretical exploration of these concepts, but rather to use them as a window through which I can shine new light on the changing practices of arms control (and perhaps international security more broadly). In the first part of this

article, I focus on the underlying elements of the larger historical process of controlling arms, understood as a technology of social and political control, and as a set of institutional practices designed to manage and channel the use of violence

both within and between states. I will then look at the way in which the Cold War arms control paradigm represented both a shift in, and a continuity with this historical experience by highlighting the underlying principles that governed the Cold War arms control paradigm and its related practices and practical manifestations. Despite some elements of continuity with previous practices, by representing itself as a set of instrumentally-rational techniques for managing conflict, arms control throughout the Cold War normalized a particular set of practices as one (or the only) proper way of dealing with what was a subset of the larger issue of how to ‘control and regulate the possession and use of the means of violence’ in social and political relations.7 In the last section of the article, I will show

how many contemporary security building practices that are not often thought of as arms control share its same logic , but move towards a more governmental mode of exercising the control in arms control , focussing as much on institutions and

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 individual wielders of violence as on the instruments of violence themselves. Although they break with the narrow sovereign conception of arms control

inherited from the Cold War, they remain consistent with its logic, attempting to subject the use of violence to the same technical-bureaucratic and instrumental rationality that characterized Cold War arms control practices , albeit with different scope and targets, and in different geopolitical and conflict contexts. Through some illustrative examples, I will briefly demonstrate the way in which some

contemporary security building practices embody a similar underlying logic of social (and self-) control, in which the goal of arms control measures is to reinforce or reassert the state's legal monopoly of lethal violence , to maintain the geopolitical structure of contemporary world politics, and to spread certain humanitarian norms of civilized warfare.

A politics of securitized governmentality guarantees extinction. Michael Dillon 96. Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster. “Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought,” http://www.questia.com/read/103092657?title=Politics%20of%20Security:%20Towards%20a%20Political%20Philosophy%20of%20Continental%20Thought#.

The way of sharpening and focusing this thought into a precise question is first provided, however, by referring back to Foucault; for whom Heidegger was the philosopher. Of all recent thinkers, Foucault was amongst the most committed to the task of writing the history of the present in the light of the history of philosophy as metaphysics. 4 That is why, when first thinking about the prominence of security in modern politics, I first found Foucault’s mode of questioning so stimulating.

There was, it seemed to me, a parallel to be drawn between what he saw the technology of disciplinary power/knowledge

doing to the body and what the principle of security does to politics. What truths about the human condition, he therefore prompted me to

ask, are thought to be secreted in security? What work does securing security do for and upon us? What power-effects issue out of the regimes of truth of security? If the truth of security compels us to secure security, why, how and where is that grounding compulsion grounded? How was it that seeking security became such an insistent and relentless (inter)national preoccupation for humankind? What sort of project is the pursuit of security, and how does it relate to other modern human concerns and enterprises, such as seeking freedom and knowledge through representative-calculative thought, technology and subjectification? Above all, how are we to account—amongst all the manifest contradictions of our current (inter)national

systems of security: which incarcerate rather than liberate; radically endanger rather than make safe; and engender fear rather than create assurance—for that terminal paradox of our modern (inter)national politics of security which Foucault captured so well in the quotation

that heads this chapter. 5 A terminal paradox which not only subverts its own predicate of security, most spectacularly by rendering the future of terrestrial existence conditional on the strategies and calculations of its hybrid regime of sovereignty and governmentality, but which also seems to furnish a new predicate of global life, a new experience in the context of which the political

has to be recovered and to which it must then address itself: the globalisation of politics of security in the global extension of nihilism and technology, and the advent of the real prospect of human species extinction .

The alternative is bottom-up call for radical re-thinking of the security apparatus first. Allowing the hegemon to control the flow of weapons keeps the power asymmetrical – which makes conflicts and violence inevitable. The alternative is a necessary pre-requisite to change. Neil Cooper 06. Professor of International Relations and Security Studies and Head of Peace Studies & International Development, The University of Bradford. "Putting disarmament back in the frame." Review of International Studies 32.2 (2006): 353-376.

Conclusion: towards disarmament from below The preceding analysis has attempted to demonstrate how, contrary to the impression given in the mainstream literature on arms limitation, there has in fact been a great deal of disarmament - at least in the terms understood in the disarmament negotiations of the 1950s and 60s. Yet these very successes have been coopted by arms controllers in ways that function to delegitimise disarmament as Utopian and appear to confirm realist representations of a world system with limited potential for transformation. This article has also demonstrated the way in which global civil society has been able to set an apparently more radical, new arms limitation agenda for the new wars - one in particular which has emphasised human and economic security rather than state and military security. These factors then, represent a basis for optimism about the future prospects for further disarmament.

However, it is also the case that the contemporary disarmament and broader arms limitation system is a highly asymmetric one geared to preserving the military hegemony of the US and its allies. Moreover, even the new arms limitation agenda is characterised by its own asymmetries. In particular, civil society has manifestly failed to gain the same level of influence over core military security issues - for example, NBC or the trade in major conventional weapons that keeps Western defence industries viable. In some respects then, this analysis shares certain commo- nalities with offensive realist critiques that emphasise the

problematic nature of arms control theory (albeit from a different standpoint) and the supremacy of politics and power in determining the possibilities for the control of arms.86 One response, therefore, might be to adopt a similar attitude of resigned cynicism in the face of the overwhelming influence of power and interest in shaping

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http://www.questia.com/read/103092657?title=Politics%20of%20Security:%20Towards%20a%20Political%20Philosophy%20of%20Continental%20Thought

http://www.questia.com/read/103092657?title=Politics%20of%20Security:%20Towards%20a%20Political%20Philosophy%20of%20Continental%20Thought

Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 discourse and practice - and to conclude that a truly emancipatory, as opposed to asymmetric, disarmament agenda is unrealisable. However, there are both material

and ideational factors immanent in the contemporary international system that suggest a politics of radical emancipatory disarmament can be constituted . First , the success of existing disarmament initiatives - albeit under asymmetry -

highlights the real-world relevance of disarmament proposals still dismissed as failed and Utopian. This illustrates the potential for a more radical disarmament agenda to be realised by simultaneously deconstructing hegemonic framings of the arms limitation problem and developing alternative narratives that contain inherently transformatory meanings - a powerful political act in itself.

Second , the influential role of global civil society in new arms limitation suggests the possibility of a truly progressive practice of arms limitation - a kind of disarmament from below.87 In particular, campaigns such as those on landmines or conflict diamonds demonstrate the (as yet unfulfilled) potential for networked and adaptive rhizomatic movements to envision and realise radical alternative security futures. This is not to deny the significant power differentials that exist between states and civil society movements that may themselves have different goals. However, the flexibility of such movements contrasts

sharply with the rigid and sclerotic statist institutions most immediately geared to dealing with the diplomacy of arms limitation. Moreover, at their optimal, such swarming resistances to hegemony have the potential to exploit the uncontrollable spaces and flows of a networked information age88 to generate focused policy goals and shared understandings; to generate political and cultural power by exploiting global media tropes (Princess Diana as beatified saint opposed to

landmines) or creating their own (diamonds as blood diamonds);89 to challenge both the threat discourses that underpin the arms dynamic and the counsels of despair in the face of anarchy and a supposed military technological imperative that lie at the heart of arms control theory; and to thus effect change by eroding the legitimacy of institutions and actors upholding militarism.90 Moreover, such movements have the potential to resolve the perennial debate over what has to come first

before disarmament is realised - radical reduction of armaments or radical political change . The inevitable corollary of

the emergence of such rhizomatic social movements is that the very act of campaigning for a radical disarmament

agenda presages radical change in the nature of local-global politics - the one brings the other into being, and vice versa .

Third , it might also be argued that this is precisely the wrong time to articulate a new disarmament agenda, particularly given the imperatives of the 'war on terror'. However, to the extent that the threat of 'WMD' terrorism is rooted in material conditions, the safest response is to eliminate the very weaponry that might be utilised - to move, if you like, from a policy that aims to prevent loose nukes to a policy that aims simply to lose nukes. Furthermore, rather than

being an inopportune moment to pursue a radical disarmament agenda, it is clear that we are now facing a range of new and old arms limitation challenges that will require a radically different kind of arms regulation. These include challenges such as the growing pressure to weaponise space, the military potential of the new biology, the weapon- isation of nanotechnology and the challenge of controlling the military uses of cyberspace. A further challenge is that presented by the growing importance of dual-use technology for the military. This has been compounded by the simultaneous concentration and globalised integration of the defence industry in a largely Western-dominated hub and spoke model characterised by the erosion of defence industrial national identities and increased intra-firm movement of technology and knowledge.91 Finally, there is the problem presented by the extension and intensifi-cation of illicit global arms networks that exploit porous borders, corrupt officials, lax regulation and the mechanisms of

globalisation to move arms to conflict zones.92 The corollary of all this is that traditional, supply-side non-proliferation initiatives based around the ability

of hermetic nation-states to supervise the physical movement of military technology will inevitably be subject to

declining utility . Such developments then, are likely to require a qualitative step-shift in the application of end-use monitoring and the kind of intrusive verification of civil

industries dealing with dual-use technologies presaged in the CWC; the innovative adaptation of existing arms limitation methodologies adopted by recipients and the peripheries - such as the extension of nuclear weapons-free zones to incorporate bans on other military technologies, or the greater use of moratoria/bans on arms imports; and an enhanced role for local-global

civil society as presaged by the role of NGOs in monitoring implementation of the landmines treaty. In sum, if the challenge of controlling contemporary military technology is to be addressed effectively (and it may not be, of course), then the new arms limitation agenda of the current era is likely to represent

merely a half-way house towards a radically novel practice of arms limitation. This will entail a move away from control primarily based on physical management of objects (finished weapons, national militaries) and their accumulation and movement within or across borders. Instead, current trends will require a shift to a form of oversight and limitation characterised by swarming.93 Such an approach will focus far more on dual-use technologies and

thus intrude into the very warp and weft of socioeconomic life. It will be marked by a move from the asymmetry of hegemon/supplier-

dominated control and non- proliferation instruments and imply a far greater role for recipients and the peripheries . It

will require such a qualitative intensification and expansion of the network of arms limitation practices that this in itself will constitute a radically novel approach to arms limitation. And it will require the interactive, interpenetrated agency of multiple institutions and actors from states, multilateral institutions, NGOs, industry, media, epistemic communities and society generally.

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Links

6


Limiting Arms Sales Bad

Limiting arms props up asymmetric system – risks the conflicts it hopes to solve – only results in feelings of security.Neil Cooper 06. Professor of International Relations and Security Studies and Head of Peace Studies & International Development, The University of Bradford. "Putting disarmament back in the frame." Review of International Studies 32.2 (2006): 353-376.

This also has profound implications for the supposed distinction between arms control and disarmament around which arms control theory is based. Once we move from framing (successful) partial disarmament as merely one variant of arms control, and instead frame both GCD and partial disarmament as variants of disarmament practice; once we understand disarmament as an activity that is advocated by both Utopians and hyper-realists alike (albeit in different ways) then both

the empirical and philosophical distinctions between arms control and disarmament fall away. As will be noted below, this implies that we need to develop an alternative way of conceptualising the different strategies of arms limitation and the structure of the contemporary arms limitation system.

However, whilst it is important (if only to counter the pessimistic discourse surrounding this issue) to recognise the various disarmament outcomes that have been generated under the current arms limitation system, it is also important to recognise the context in which these have occurred. In particular, both disarmament and broader arms limitation initiatives are now taking place as part of an asymmetrical arms limitation system that has replaced the emphasis on balance between the superpowers that dominated

Cold War practice.34 It is sufficient at this juncture to note that what characterises this system of arms limitation is the way in which it is structured to consolidate and preserve the military superiority of the US in particular and the West in general. Moreover, rather than reinforcing security this profound military imbalance promotes insecurity - both by creating incentives for other actors to pursue asymmetric technologies (NBC) or strategies (terrorism) that offset the US's conventional superiority,35

and by diverting resources that could be expended on human security to militarism . At best, the contemporary arms limitation system aims to keep the lid on such contradictions by setting in place a variety of disciplinary mechanisms that attempt to constrain asymmetric military responses whilst simultaneously preserving the asymmetrical advantages of the West. At worst, in attempting to contain pressures that may ultimately be uncontainable, the contemporary arms limitation system

may promote an illusion of relative security whilst positively fostering a variety of insecurities . However, a few more

comments are in order before we proceed to consider this system of asymmetrical arms limitation in more

Yes, the plan is an example of arms control – it’s an extension of the Cold War logic of big treaties – it’s an example of state control over the means of violenceKeith Krause 11. Professor at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. Leashing the Dogs of War: Arms Control from Sovereignty to Governmentality. Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.32, No.1 (April 2011), pp.20–39 ISSN 1352-3260 print

Maintaining the Monopoly over the Use of Force As argued above, one element of the sovereign vision of arms control was the establishment of an effective monopoly of the legitimate use of violence for the state, designed to remove challenges and threats to the Weberian state's legal (and practical) monopoly on the use of force. This can most clearly be seen in the

early modern struggle to outlaw the use of force by what we would now call Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs), and to regulate the circulation and use of weapons within states to eliminate threats to effective state power. But the main thrust of the Cold War arms control paradigm was that the Weberian state's monopoly over the use of lethal force could not only be used to impose order domestically and to create social peace, but also projected outwards to create a form of international order that reduced the risk of violence between states. As such, negotiated agreements throughout the Cold

War to limit the quantities or disposition of weapons systems between competing states or blocs partook of the logic of sovereign rule. But – and as reflected in the NPT – arms control was also designed to maintain the global geopolitical hierarchy of states (and of patron-client relations). Similar efforts can be found in the Washington and London Naval treaties, which created (or codified) a short-lived global naval hierarchy anchored around a 5:5:3 ratio of British, American, and Japanese naval power.50 The sovereign logic of the states system limited, however, the extent to which powerful states

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 could impose these terms on emerging states, as reflected in the repeated incantations of the right of self-defence by Southern states (which implies in their eyes a

right to acquire weapons), and their general opposition to restrictions on the arms trade that might hinder their ability to arm themselves. But from a logic of governmentality, however, one important subtext of Cold War arms control was a concentration on technology transfers, and how military technology itself was conceived as a sphere for regulation and means to maintain a stable global hierarchy of haves and have-nots.51 Such governmentality concerns are evident in the shift in the late 1990s from non-proliferation to

what was called counter-proliferation, and to the advent of the doctrine of preemptive war as used against Iraq and justified in terms of proliferation risks.52 The inward gaze of the Weberian state is also part of this logic, and is reflected in efforts by the international community to right size national armed forces in post-conflict or post-transition settings, and the concern in some circles with exports of weapons and technologies that could be used for repression and in violation of human rights norms and laws. The principal concern of the Arms Trade Treaty preparatory work and negotiations, for example, was that weapons ‘shipments appear in countries with dismal human rights records or where they exacerbate conflict or facilitate repression’. Only one aspect of that could be considered within the conventional concern of arms control (exacerbate conflict), and even here conflict is usually understood more broadly than just inter-state or civil war.53 In its maximalist version, this involves oversight and regulation of the entire national security apparatus in the name of creating or maintaining domestic, regional, and international order. Recent and current examples include training and re-arming

programmes in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Iraq, and (more controversially) South Sudan.54 This logic of governmentality is seldom (if ever)

part of an emancipatory project that would involve bottom-up initiatives such as gun-free cities or the provision of citizen security, but is more often about simultaneously asserting state power over its citizens and establishing sufficient restraints on this to make its exercise acceptable and legitimate. Conclusions: Sovereignty, Governmentality and Weapons of War This article has tried to situate the evolution of

contemporary arms control practices against a broader historical backdrop, and to demonstrate how these practices have evolved from a sovereign

perspective (understood as maintaining a particular kind of global and domestic political order) towards a governmentality perspective, through which the political economy of violence within and between societies and populations is managed. Post-Cold War arms control practices demonstrate elements of both systems of rule, in the (sovereign) emphasis on maintaining a hierarchical ordering of global politics through efforts at non-proliferation, counter-

proliferation and restrictions on technology transfers; as well as a governmentalizing emphasis on regulating the place and scope of armed violence in contemporary political life through humanitarian disarmament and such practices as DDR and SSR. The narrow, sovereign,

vision of arms control (legally-binding treaties negotiated between states) that dominated throughout the Cold War was largely only about one form of violence: that perpetrated between states. It was also part of the logic of the national security state, and arms control and deterrence (or military strategy writ large) were twinned and inseparable. From this perspective, ‘arms control was a stepchild of the Cold War’, and the 21st century arms control agenda is

thus relatively limited in scope to the fulfilment of unfinished business, and the extension of particular agreements to other regions where possible.55 But this narrow perspective fails to understand that arms control practices can be potentially both/either a manifestation of sovereign rule, and/or a form of governmentality. Arms control is not just the regulation and control of particular technological artifacts

(weapons), but can also represent a form of rule, and a technology of control that can be used to reshape state-society

relations on the Weberian model, and that can reach deep into the state through various forms of surveillance and control over the political economy of violence. In the contemporary world, just as during the Cold War, it is thus part of a broader set of

techniques for managing the use of force. Understanding the contemporary discourse and practice of arms control itself as a technology of social control to maintain particular forms of rule at all levels of social life – from the inter-national to the local and

community level – does provide a way to integrate disparate initiatives and efforts into an ‘arms control paradigm for the 21st

century’. Such a paradigm can encompass the basic level at which inter-state arms control measures order and secure global political relationships, and the higher-order concern with where the regulation of the use of force and violence is located or lodged in social, political

and economic life. Although still fraught with the same intellectual and practical tensions as Cold War arms control practices , this

larger perspective allows us better to understand how arms control is part of the broader process of constructing strong, stable, and

legitimate states that provide security to their citizens through the regulation of violence within and between states.

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Focus on Arms Sales

focus on limiting arms locks in power politics and incentivizes asymmetric systems of warfare – only a politics that prioritizes ‘human security’ first can change the system.Neil Cooper 06. Professor of International Relations and Security Studies and Head of Peace Studies & International Development, The University of Bradford. "Putting disarmament back in the frame." Review of International Studies 32.2 (2006): 353-376.

This article aims to examine both arms control theory and practice from a critical security studies perspective. It is therefore concerned to

deconstruct the mainstream discourse on arms control in order to illuminate the interests that underpin received wisdom

on the issue; to outline the structures of power established by current practice; to highlight the emancipatory potential immanent in

contemporary approaches to arms limitation and to consider how these might be extended to build a system of 'disarmament from below .1 First, I will suggest that the supposed distinctions between arms control and disarmament that lie at the heart of arms control theory represent the

mirage- creation of a dominant disciplinary discourse. I will also argue that Stuart Croft's attempt to reinvent arms control for the post-Cold War era has

produced a teleological history that ignores the extent to which the development of arms limitation has been non-linear and which downplays the role of power in shaping discourse and practice. Second, I suggest that - in contrast to the impression created by an increasingly pessimistic

literature on the topic - the world is not only experiencing a lot of arms limitation, but that it is also experiencing a significant amount of

disarmament, particularly when judged against the goals elucidated in the disarmament negotiations of the 1950s and 60s. Furthermore, I will suggest that this point is largely ignored in the mainstream literature on arms control, which still persists in 'imagining' disarmament as a failure. Such a framing acts as a powerful tool of delegitimisation that means proposals for more far-reaching and emancipatory forms of disarmament arrive still-born into the Zeitgeist of IR academia and global society more generally. Whilst in some ways depressing, such an analysis nevertheless implies that disarmament utopias may well be realisable. However, I will also

suggest that the current disarmament and broader arms limitation system is , to a significant extent, an asymmetric one, designed to preserve the military hegemony of the US in particular and the West in general. On the one hand therefore, we can now be said to live in a

disarmament system of sorts, but its configuration is one primarily shaped in the interests of a disarmament empire - the USA .

Ironically therefore, the current disarmament system is one that nevertheless legitimises significant levels of global - and particularly US - military expenditure and which serves to further embed both the military supremacy of the USA and the stark disparities that exist

between spending on armaments compared with spending on human security . Moreover, the very asymmetry in military

power that the current arms limitation system is designed to shore up actually creates an incentive for weaker nations to pursue non-conventional military technologies or strategies (NBC weapons/ terrorism) as a way of offsetting their marked inferiority in conventional weaponry. Finally, I will suggest that whilst the influences maintaining this system are certainly very strong, practices immanent in the contemporary

arms limitation system and the challenges presented to it by emerging military technologies suggest that a more emancipatory system of

'disarmament from below' - one geared less to the preserva-tion of hegemony and more to the promotion of human security - may be realisable.

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AT: Decreasing Sales Solves

Decreasing sales only increases market power – denying weapons will just drive up pricesJonathan D. Caverley 17. Research scientist in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology & Associate Professor of Strategy in the Strategic. Slowing the Proliferation of Major Conventional Weapons: The Virtues of an Uncompetitive Market. Carnegie Council for Ethics & International Affairs, 31, no 4 (2017), pp 401-418.

So far this essay has shown the pressures that most arms manufacturing countries feel to export abroad. It has described a growing market with increasing competition among potential suppliers. Finally, it has detailed how often most states export to corrupt governments that abuse human rights, as well as to those

seeking to develop their own export capacity, further fueling proliferation. The question now is: What can be done to slow the rise in arms transfers? The products produced by the “merchants of death” have traditionally been considered one of the great menaces of international life.29 Yet, from the Second Council of the Lateran prohibition on crossbow use against Christians to Tsar Nicholas II’s calling of the 1899 Hague Convention, efforts to control the spread and use of weapons have been sporadic and largely ineffective.30 In the aftermath of World War I the arms industry received a great deal of blame for fueling the global slaughter, and disarmament underpinned the establishment first of the League of Nations and then, after World War II, the United Nations. The results of such

institutional responses speak for themselves. Nonetheless, there exists an order in the global exchange of weapons. It rests not on

multilateral compacts among sovereign states but on the self-centered actions of one powerful market-maker. The unique economics of

weapons production—substantial and rising fixed costs and potential for “network effects”— creates an environment favorable to a monopoly, and the United States can fill that role, as Ethan Kapstein laid out in 1994. 33 The traditional practice of a monopolist is to restrict supply , causing prices to rise and profits to soar. These profits, known to economists as “rent,” are generally financial in the world of

commercial firms. Economists and regulators generally consider rent a social ill, as it comes at the expense of the consumer welfare arising from a more competitive

market. But in a world of states, where the product is advanced weaponry, a reduction in the supply, and thus a rise in prices, is a market distortion akin to a “sin tax.” Rent can have a benign effect. Moreover, instead of collecting this rent in the form of additional financial gains, the United States collects some of it in terms of political influence : restricting the supply of tech nology,

cutting off some (but certainly not all) of the most odious regimes, enforcing stringent anti-corruption rules, and even occasionally encouraging the

observance of human rights norms. The consequent reduction in the ills associated with a competitive arms trade does not result because the United States is a benign power; it is simply pursuing its own interests . But many of the interests it chooses to pursue remain

aspirational for other states. As much as, or even more than, the United States, countries such as Canada or Sweden desire both a healthy defense industry and a reputation for international do-gooding. Unfortunately, they cannot afford both.32 Historically, the United States has foregone exporting its highest-capability weapons to a region until a viable competing product emerges; for example, refusing to deliver Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) to Asian

states until China purchased the Russian equivalent R-77 (dubbed the “AMRAAM-ski”).33 The United States can also afford to cut off clients over policy differences, as it did when it crippled India’s Tejas light combat aircraft program with sanctions in 1998 following that country’s testing of nuclear

weapons. U.S. policy explicitly links its market dominance of high-end weapons to a practice of “unilateral restraint” in its sales.34

Not selling weapons to a regime is only one of the ways the United States exercises its market power to advance its political goals. U.S. weapons that are deemed exportable but sensitive—which includes major weapons but also “man-portable air defense missiles, cryptographic equipment, precise geo-locational positioning technologies, and airborne early warning and control systems” 35—are sold almost exclusively through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, rather than through the somewhat less regulated “direct commercial sales” (DCS) route.36 With very few exceptions, all weapons purchased through U.S. foreign aid are also processed through this mechanism.37 Indeed, FMS is an unheralded counterproliferation program that also makes corruption relatively hard, as clients pay the same price as the United States military (plus 3.5 percent administration costs), and most of the contracting is handled by the Department of Defense. For U.S. arms deliveries from 2011 to 2015, FMS handled 76 percent of the financial value.38

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AT: Plan challenges Militarism US export changes don’t change reality – markets mean they will be filled in Jonathan D. Caverley 17. Research scientist in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology & Associate Professor of Strategy in the Strategic. Slowing the Proliferation of Major Conventional Weapons: The Virtues of an Uncompetitive Market. Carnegie Council for Ethics & International Affairs, 31, no 4 (2017), pp 401-418.

The above evidence does not prove that the United States causes good behavior by its arms export policies . Countries that import weapons in appreciable amounts and meet high transparency and human rights standards tend to be (a) rich enough to buy the sophisticated weapons in which the

United States specializes and (b) allied with the United States. Rather, the data show that, relative to any other state, the United States does not need its exports to problematic regimes to underpin the health of its arms industry. Moreover, any effort by second-tier states to increase

their own exports will likely rely on regimes with high potential for corruption and human rights abuses. Egypt, under limited U.S. sanctions after its 2013 coup and

subsequent human rights abuses, starkly illustrates the behavior that a competitive arms market encourages in second-tier arms

producers. While the U.S. response was fairly tepid, the United States did place real restrictions on arms transfers to the al-Sisi regime, delaying F-16 and other major platform deliveries and postponing military exercises.21 The Obama administration announced that future Foreign Military Financing grants (of which Egypt is one of the largest recipients) may only be used to purchase new equipment specifically for counterterrorism, border and maritime security, and for

patrolling Sinai. Other states quickly attempted to fill this gap. In 2014, Russia signed a multibillion-dollar deal to supply attack helicopters and MiG-29 fighter aircraft to Egypt. France off-loaded Mistral helicopter carriers (originally intended for Russia but embargoed after the invasion of Crimea), sold four corvettes and a frigate, and propped up its Rafale fighter production line by making that plane’s first export sale to Egypt. Germany agreed to supply two submarines to the Egyptian Navy in 2011 and two more in 2014. Overall, the export agreements of major European sellers to Egypt have gone up forty-seven-fold over the previous period.22 A blistering Amnesty International report calls out nearly half of the European Union member states for “flouting” an

EU-wide suspension of arms transfers to Egypt.23 A competitive market not only encourages dealings with problematic buyers but also creates pressure for technology transfer. Indeed, the reluctance of the United States to export weapons production know-how means that technology transfer is a key competitive advantage, indeed a necessity, for even as sophisticated an exporter as France.24 Turkey has methodically played European, Chinese, and Russian long-range air and anti-missile defense systems against each other in a bid not just to lower the price tag but especially to acquire advanced technology. The U.S.-made Patriot system was eliminated from consideration because most of its technology would not be given to Turkey. In announcing the deal with Russia, Turkey’s presidential spokesman was frank: “Let’s say the price difference could have been manageable. But the issue of technology transfer was more important. On this issue, our allies, including the United States, caused a big disappointment.”25 Turkey explicitly seeks to enter the top echelon of arms exporters, and understands it needs foreign technology to do so.26 Should it fail, like so many aspiring exporters do, it will have consumed enormous amounts of the country’s resources to produce a product that could be bought easily from any number of existing producers. Should it succeed, it will join a very crowded field. Growing competition will lead to more proliferation, fewer scruples about corruption and human rights, and generous amounts of technology transfer to clients. The consequences of a desperate Russia’s freewheeling export policies in the 1990s and early 2000s clearly helped fuel China’s own increasingly successful international sales push.27 Finally, transferring technology and production to the client can hinder human rights and anti-corruption efforts in more direct ways. For example, shifting production of sensitive components to third-party countries has allowed German defense firms to skirt

their home country’s export regulations.28 And the entry of desperate second-tier suppliers shapes U.S. behavior in turn. The presence of alternate sources, also known as the “gray threat,” has an effect even on the United States, as shown by the recent U.S. decision to resume military aid and most sales to Egypt. Thailand presents a similar example. The United States, the Thai military’s traditional supplier, largely ceased both arms sales and military assistance after that country’s 2014 coup.

Thailand accordingly procured weapons from relatively new suppliers, such as China, Russia, and Ukraine, and has strengthened ties with suppliers from Israel, Sweden, and other countries in Europe. The United States is now resuming much of its sales to that country.

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Arms Control Link

Arms control maintains governmental controlKeith Krause 11. Professor at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. Leashing the Dogs of War: Arms Control from Sovereignty to Governmentality. Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.32, No.1 (April 2011), pp.20–39 ISSN 1352-3260 print

The neo-colonialist and political implications of pushing the problem of war to the periphery are of course clear , and one could argue that the arms control paradigm sketched above, especially the treaties that stabilized the nuclear confrontation between East and West (SALT I and II), made certain kinds of proxy wars more possible or acceptable by creating escalatory fire-breaks that facilitated the relatively risk-free provision of military assistance to client states and movements. These fire breaks were easier to create in the global South, where American and Russian troops managed to avoid confronting each other directly, but less easy to create in Europe. The history of attempts to achieve mutual and balanced force reductions (the 1975 name for what in the late 1980s became the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), and of debates over the necessity for intermediate range and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and the problem of extended deterrence (or the nuclear umbrella) all point towards a set of tensions or contradictions within the logic of arms control. It is not the place of this article to demonstrate in detail how these four understandings or elements of the arms control paradigm were instantiated in particular Cold War arms control

practices (treaties and negotiations). It is reasonably clear, however, that such things as the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), which enshrined the

nuclear supremacy of the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, or the logic of the nuclear strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), or the

NATO doctrine of first use of nuclear weapons, or the lack of any meaningful restraint on technological innovation for nuclear weapons and delivery systems,

rested upon a deep faith in the ability of the Weberian state to regulate and control the use of violence. Some scholars and analysts

went so far as to argue that the possession of nuclear weapons imposed – as a sort of structural constraint – a strong form of rationality on state behaviour.29 Arms control efforts were simply one part of this larger logic, and in any event were not designed to threaten or undermine it.

They were, in short, a clear expression of a Foucauldian form of sovereign rule that reinforced the system of rule of the contemporary state system.

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Weapons Focus Link Focus on weapons ignores structural violence – kills far more peopleMartin Broek 02. Researcher working at the Campagne tegen Wapenhandel in Amsterdam, editor of 'Indonesia: arms trade to a military regime'. Arms are not Tomatoes. Asia Europe Crosspoints. https://www.tni.org/en/article/arms-are-not-tomatoes.

Towards Human Security For quite some time now, the concept of human security has identified the necessity of a new development paradigm which puts people at the center of development. In 1994, the UNDP Human Development Report reflected this: "For too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for

conflict between states. For too long, security has been equated with the threats to national borders. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their security. However, the majority of people today experience insecurity more from worries about daily food and susbsistence that from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, environmental security, security from crime, these are emerging concerns of human security all over the world ."(38) Throughout the 90s new issues of 'insecurity" have emerged globally and a major impact of the Asian economic crisis of 1997 was the sense of insecurity caused by the runaway growth and

spread of global capital flows (39) and the consequent devastating effects on millions of people. Human security was again put forward in the debate after the September 11 attacks: "The cost of failing to advance human security and to eliminate the fertile ground upon which terrorism thrives is already escalating. Since September 11, we know that sophisticated weapons offer little protection against those who are out to seek vengeance, at any cost, for real and perceived wrongs. Unless our priorities change, the threat is certain to keep rising in the coming years. But first, we must all understand that in the end, weapons alone cannot buy us a lasting peace in a world of extreme inequality, injustice, and deprivation for billions of our fellow human beings."(40) However, the September 11

debates put almost exclusive emphasis on military and repressive solutions. The US led war against terrorism prevailed over a well thought-out plan to counter terrorism and further marginalised Human Security discourse and initiatives.

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https://www.tni.org/en/article/arms-are-not-tomatoes



Free Trade Links Free trade spreads militarism and violenceNafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed 07. Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex, , 2007, “STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE AS A FORM OF GENOCIDE THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER”, PDF

The Impact of Globalization IMF/World Bank stabilization and struc tural adjustment programmes have consist ently advocated and implemented essen tially the same package of promarket policies throughout the world, designed fun damentally to allow debtor nations to per petually service their everexpanding debt. Essentially, these programmes foster an in creased

“outward orientation”, involving for example “devaluation, trade liberalization and incentives for exporters” policies that “are widely believed to lead to social hard ships, increased inequality of income distri bution and increased poverty” (Singer, 1995). The focus of these policies, then, is not poverty alleviation,

but economic re structuring conducive to the expansion and concentration of capital (see Appendix A). Thus, the logic of market economics tends towards a

form of market imperialism, in which key agential entities like the World Bank are cognizant of – but simultaneously

indifferent to the devastating impact of their policies on victim populations (see Ap pendix B). As former US Federal Reserve Board economist

Martin Wolfson observes, when the IMF loans funds to alleviate a growing economic crisis – such as in Asia – the funds are intended to allow Asian bor rowers to repay capital investors. Mean while, further IMF austerity measures such as continued deregulation and slowgrowth policies are designed “restore the ‘confid ence’ of investors and to make it again prof itable for

them to return.” In other words, market economics is consistently focused “on restoring the investments of the wealthy, not on helping the people” (Wolf son, 1998). The people are simply irrelevant to the equation. Africa provides an illuminating casein point. Naiman and

Watkins (1999) heavily critique the impact of IMF interventions in Africa based largely on the IMF’s own data. They document that less developed coun tries (LDCs)

worldwide participating in the IMF’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Fa cility (ESAF) programmes have experienced lower economic growth, and even drastic declines in per capita income, compared to those outside these programmes . Although increasing numbers of millions of Africans are suffering due to lack of appropriate health, education and sanitary facilities, the IMF is forcing African countries to further decrease public spending on such services, including a long term decline in such spend ing between 1986 and 1996. External debt has also escalated exponentially. In sub Saharan Africa, for instance, debt rose as a share of GDP from 58% in 1988 to 70% in 1996. This has had tangibly devastating results for the African population. According to the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO, 1996), between 1985 and 1990,

under the policies of the global economic regime, the number of people living in poverty in sub Saharan Africa increased from 184 to 216 million. By 1990, 204 million people suffered from malnutrition – a situation that is drastically worse off than the previous 30 years. Indeed,

the proportion of Africa’s population living on less than a dollar a day increased from approximately 18% in 1980 to 24% in 1995. The numbers living on less than a $1000 a year increased from 55% to 70% (Serioux, 1999). Data from the World Health Organization shows that correspond ing to the massive increase in impoverish ment and indebtedness under the global economic regime, parts of subSaharan Africa now have adult mortality rates that are higher than 30 years ago. In Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, for in stance, life expectancy for men and women has reduced by 20 years. In Africa, 40 per cent of deaths occur within the age range of below five years. Of the 10 million children who die worldwide unnecessarily every year, half occur in Africa. Of the 20 coun tries with the highest child mortality rates, 19 are in Africa. Of the16 countries with higher mortality rates than in 1990, 14 are in Africa. Of the 9 countries whose child mortality rate is higher than those recorded over 20 years ago, 8 are in Africa. The vast majority of these deaths were not only fore seeable; they were entirely preventable, res ulting largely from malnutrition, diarrhoea, malaria and infections of the lower respirat ory tract. Simple investments in clean wa ter, improved sanitation and basic precau tionary health care such as insecticide treated nets and more effective malarial drugs made available to the population could easily prevent much of these deaths (WHO, 2004). Now over 1

million children die annually —3,000 every day— of mal aria, simply due to lack of access to appro priate medication (WHO/UNICEF, 2003). While these mortality rates have steadily increased over decades, the global economic regime has continued to conduct the same fundamental pattern of market oriented policies designed to cut spending on health care and sanitation ultimately in the interest of transnational capital. But the example of Africa is not isolated. On the contrary, it is representative of a decades long pattern of Southern death by deprivation generated systematically by the global economic re gime (Nef, 1997). Conclusions

Globalization as promoted by powerful bearers of capital, including Western gov ernments, banks and transnational corpora tions, is clearly of benefit to those who have already accumulated considerable amounts of capital, or who otherwise retain profes sional skills that can be sold or traded on the market. The poor, lacking both capital and the necessary professional skills, are in creasingly marginalized, disempowered and periphalized in both developed and less de veloped countries, not only between the North and South, but even within both Northern and Southern countries. The inter national economic order is thus systematic ally shifting resources and power in favour of predominantly Northern transnational capital, at the expense of the predominantly Southern multinational poor. Given the consistency with which these policies have produced the same pattern of mounting deathbydeprivation, and given the extent to which this pattern has been thoroughly publicly documented by numer ous official government and intergovern mental agencies (including the IMF and the World Bank themselves), it is impossible to credibly claim that the key actors in the global economic regime are not cognizant of the impact of their policies (Kim, 2000; Chossudovsky, 2003). Even if it may be quite unfounded, if not patently absurd, to assert that transnational deathbydepriva tion constitutes the outcome of a conscious plan to exterminate millions of people loc ated in African, Asian and other Southern nations

peripheral to the world capitalist economy, it is similarly absurd to suggest that the principal agential entities – North ern governments, institutions, and corpora tions – responsible 14

Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 for erecting and pre serving the fundamental architecture of the global economic regime, are completely ig norant of the structural violence produced by globalization. As with the global process of environmental degradation, intent with regards to the systematic rise of Southern death by deprivation by now can be said to have formed, on the part of these key Northern governmental, institutional and corporate actors. Indeed, the vast bulk of the policies of the global economic regime are under pinned by neo Malthusian principles de rived from the logic of neo liberalism (Nair and Kirbat, 2004). Former editor of Popula tion and Environment Virginia Abernethy (1991: 323, 326), for example, defends the “legitimacy of unevenly distributed wealth,” on the basis of conserving scarce resources and protecting the “legitimacy of owner ship.” Her emphasis on over population as the most prominent destructive force in LDCs is also representative of a general

ideological trend in much developmental discourse. Similarly, Nobel Prizewinning economist Arthur Lewis argued that since the key to growth is capital accumulation, inequality was good for development and growth, because the rich save more than the poor . Simon Kuznets, another Nobel Prize winner, saw inequality as an

inevitable byproduct of the initial stages of develop ment, but believed that later this trend would reverse (Kuznets cited in Stiglitz, 2002: 79). These highly influential perspect ives propose that the generation of inequal ity – structural violence – is an inevitable and legitimate dimension of a desirable and successful market oriented economic policy. Neo liberal ideology therefore sees violence and progress as two sides of the same coin. As to the target groups of these destruct ive economic policies, they clearly consist of a multiplicity of national groups that are peripheral to

the world economy, and as such are functionally subordinate to the in terests of transnational capital. Con sequently, the well being and even survival of these national groups is considered ulti mately irrelevant to the protection and pro mulgation of those interests. But more spe cifically, although these national groups are generally targeted, the specific victims of global structural violence are largely the most impoverished classes within these na tional groups, classes that

entirely lack the ability to access or connect to the market. Thus, the intrinsic logic of market econom ics categorizes the class of multi - national poor – largely members of Southern nation al groups – as irrelevant, indeed, as dispos able relative to the

more significant in terests of transnational capital, to which the former are subordinated. Heggenhougen (1996) describes this as “functional apartheid”, a process of structur al “discrimination against or the so called ‘setting apart’

of ‘disposable people.’” This sense of ‘disposability’ applies largely to the populations of LDCs, whose primary func tion is to serve as “open economic territories and ‘reserves’ of cheap labour and natural resources” for the North,

whose role and po sition in the global economy is defined by its “unequal structure of trade, production and credit”

(Chossudovsky, 1991: 2527). In deed, the term “unpeople” was originally coined by historian and development spe cialist Mark Curtis (cited in Pilger, 1998: 55) to describe “ those

whose lives have been deemed expendable, worthless, in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives”, includ ing the imperial imperatives underlying the market orientated economic order. Un people are therefore “human beings who

impede the pursuit of high policy and whose rights, often lives, therefore become irrelev ant” (Curtis, 2004). The concept of “un people” is thus intrinsic to the logic of glob alization which concentrates capital in few er and fewer

hands while marginalizing in creasing numbers of people in LDCs, in the pursuit of lofty market values (Opotow, 1995). This is, moreover, an arguably genocidal logic, rooted in an ultimately genocidal in tent . The key actors in pivotal positions of power within the

global economic regime are cognizant of the devastating impact of globalization on the world’s multinational poor. Hence, they can no longer be absolved of responsibility by reckless but

intentional indifference toward this global structural vi olence that generates mass deathsby deprivation of millions of people across the globe. Returning to the example of Africa, although millions of African children die an nually due to a variety of preventable dis eases —a fact that is well - documented and known to the key actors in the global eco nomic regime— rather than endorsing in creases in public spending on urgent health and sanitation requirements, the global eco nomic regime enforces the very opposite, thus deliberately depriving these children of the facilities and medication necessary to prevent and/or cure the savage conditions of life that lead to such swift and high mor tality rates . In doing so, the global economic regime is obviously

not only complicit in, but principally responsible for, these deaths, by perpetuating – indeed worsening – the artificial

structural constraints that exacer bate the incidence of mass deaths. Moreover, such policies of the global eco nomic regime are clearly targeted

princip ally against multiple peripheral national groups in the South, and specifically against the poorest classes of those groups. The key agents of the global economic regime are by now fully aware that an inevitable con sequence of their marketoriented policies is the periphalization and eventual death of such unpeople. Thus, these key actors in the global eco nomic regime have demonstrated implicit intent to destroy in part multiple national and lower class groups of the ‘Third World’ in the pursuit of capital accumulation, by deliberately creating and

perpetuating condi tions of life that will bring about their partial physical destruction. This is therefore a form of global structural violence with

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 distinctly genocidal features, bearing strong parallels with previous cases of genocidal structural violence such as colonization and collectiv ization. It therefore seems justifiable to see the impact of the international economic or der as not merely a case of structural viol ence, but more specifically a form of struc tural genocide. At the very least, it must be seen as possessing markedly genocidal or quasi genocidal characteristics.

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Hegemony Links

Hegemony is based on an ideological fantasy of US exceptionalism that necessitates permanent war making—you should look at the benefits of hegemony from the outside-looking-in. Their theoretically scary impacts obscure the real consequences of hegemony.Richard JACKSON, Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, 11 [July 2, 2011, “The World’s Most Warring Nation,” http://www.e-ir.info/2011/07/02/the-world%E2%80%99s-most-warring-nation/]

The history of US foreign policy is a violent and bloody one , although this is not necessarily the dominant perception of most

Americans. From the frontier wars of subjugation against Native Peoples to colonial wars against Mexico, Spain and the Philippines, the Cold War interventions in Korea, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, Libya and elsewhere, the post-Cold War interventions in Somalia, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, and the post-9/11 interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen and Libya today, the US has an unrivaled record of

war and foreign military intervention . There are in fact, few periods in its history when the US has not been engaged in war or military attacks on other countries. In

addition, the US is the world’s largest manufacturer and exporter of military weapons, and has a military budget several times greater than all its nearest rivals combined. It is in fact, the most warring nation in modern history . It is in this historical context that we have to try and understand its current military involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, the Horn of Africa and Libya. Although it is sometimes argued by apologists that these military actions are always

defensive in nature rather than proactive and expansionist, and are the result of real and serious threats to US security or the wider international system, the virtually impregnable security position of the US , notwithstanding the 9/11 attacks a decade ago, makes this argument unconvincing. The reality is that the size of the US landmass and population, the vast oceans to its eastern and western

borders and the friendly countries to its north and south, and the extent of its economic and military power, means that

there are no serious obstacles to the adoption of an isolationist foreign policy or even the adoption of a pacifist role in international affairs. In other words, there is nothing inevitable or predetermined about its long record of war and intervention . Explaining the

historical record of US foreign intervention requires a careful evaluation of both its strategic interests and its ideological system, as it is the almost unique combination of these factors and the way in which they underpin and interact with each other which helps to explain why the US continues to be the most violent state in the international system today. Strategically, the US

is today the world’s dominant power. In order to maintain this hegemonic position in the international system, which is the primary and preeminent goal of all US foreign policy (or at least, no major foreign policy initiative can seriously contradict this first principle goal), necessitates a number of key measures,

such as: maintaining military advantage over rivals, which in turn requires a permanent internal military-industrial complex; a system of allies and a military presence in bases stretched around the globe, especially in strategic regions like the Middle East and the Horn of Africa; influence over or

control of strategic resources such as oil; domination or at least influence over the global economic and trading system; significant influence in international institutions; and preventing the rise of serious challengers to its overall hegemony. At the same time, the US has evolved since the founding of the republic a core set of ideological beliefs which are now deeply embedded culturally and accepted by both the political elite and the

wider society. Some of these beliefs are necessitated by, and functional to, the military power of the US: maintaining a costly and

permanent m ilitary- i ndustrial c omplex capable of staying ahead of its rivals, for example, requires a supporting set of cultural values which valorize military prowess, patriotism and sacrifice in war. These values are now part of the military-industrial-media complex in which video games and

movies, among others, serve as recruitment tools for the military, narrative frames for interpreting foreign threats and as propaganda for generating support for foreign military intervention. Importantly, this military-industrial-media complex has come to generate its own

material and political interests, in part because it requires actual wars to reproduce and sustain itself . Other important

ideological values include the strongly-held belief that the US has been called by history (or God) to protect the so-called free world from major threats. Thus, it is believed that the US was

first called to defeat the threat posed by the Axis powers, then the communist threat, and today, the global threat of terrorism. This ideological belief rests on the notion that the US is uniquely placed – by virtue of its military and economic power, and its moral values – to ensure the safety of the civilized world; it is the ‘exceptional nation’ which must lead the world . Related to this, the US has come to believe that its core values of liberty and democracy are actually universal values which is it bound to protect at home and

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 spread abroad. As with its military values, these ideological beliefs are ubiquitous in popular and political culture. It is the combination of the US’s strategic interests and its ideological dispositions in the past two hundred years or more which explains the frequency and geographical distribution of its military interventions . In some cases, interventions have been launched primarily to protect perceived strategic interests, such as the case of the first Gulf War in which Iraq

took control of Kuwait oil reserves and appeared to seriously threaten Saudi oil reserves. In other cases, the US’s strategic interests coincided with strong ideological imperatives, such as the Libyan intervention today where the presence of significant oil reserves and the desire to create a pro-US regime in a strategic region has combined with the US ideological value of spreading democracy and overthrowing a long-term dictator and US opponent. The key point however, is that ideological values such as democracy promotion only rarely generate sufficient will by themselves for military intervention, although Somalia and Kosovo may be considered exceptions (although there were strategic interests involved in both cases). In many other cases, such as Rwanda in the 1990s and Syria today, such ideological imperatives are insufficient on their own to generate US-led military intervention. At the same time, no wars can be justified or defended to the American public, except by claiming that they fit US ideological values; US politicians cannot admit that they are ever at war solely to secure strategic advantage. Of course,

during some periods such as the cold war and to a lesser degree the war on terror, US strategic interests simply overrode ideological commitments to human rights or democracy promotion, as it supported a series of brutal dictatorships in places like Latin America, Asia and Africa. In some cases, the US even approved of mass murder, such as the Indonesian government’s suppression of Communists in 1965 which killed 500,000 people, its support for the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, and its support for Latin American death squad activities in places like Chile and El Salvador. In other special cases, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, US strategic interests override ideological commitment entirely and little real effort is made to promote values-based policies. The war on terror, particularly the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, demonstrates the interplay of these two factors, with both strategic interests – dealing with the threat of terrorism, the securing of Iraq’s oil and Afghanistan’s potential role as an access-point to Central Asian oil reserves, fashioning pro-US regimes, and the construction of military bases in strategic regions to put pressure on countries like Iran – and ideological imperatives – bringing liberty and democracy to countries wracked by human rights abuses – driving the interventions. Paradoxically, of course, the war on terror, like many previous US interventions, has resulted in massive human rights abuses around the world and the denial of liberty to millions, with torture, rendition, and the denial of civil rights commonplace, among others. At the same time, it has also endangered US strategic interests: the attack on Iraq strengthened

and emboldened Iran, destabilized Pakistan, and greatly damaged the reputation and standing of the US in the Middle East and large parts of the Muslim world. In the end, the culturally and politically embedded ideology of the US – its militarized patriotism – blinds its leaders and public to the interests and consequences of its military interventions, and sustains the likelihood of future interventions . Few Americans accept that its country’s wars have killed, injured and displaced literally millions of people in the last few decades, most often for little or no positive result in either strategic or ideological terms – that in fact the real-world

consequences of its interventions are virtually always the denial of its own stated values of liberty and democracy.

Fewer still question why the US is willing to sacrifice thousands or even millions of lives to secure its strategic interests, or why the US population is so perennially vulnerable to ideological appeals by leaders which mask the deeper strategic reasons for violent intervention. While it is unlikely that its strategic interests will change any time soon or that the military-industrial complex can be significantly reduced

in size, there is always the hope that new leaders might arise and peace movements might emerge which are able to challenge, and perhaps even

change, the militarized patriotism and deeply-embedded culture of violence which makes the US the most violent state in the world.

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China Links The representation of China as the source of existential threat and economic opportunity produces cycles of disillusion and conflict.Chengxin PAN Deakin University, Humanities and Social Sciences Department ’12 Knowledge, desire and power in global politics western representations of China's rise p. 148-149

At the core of the Western self - imagination is the modern knowing subject . Implying the existence of a certain, objectively knowable world ‘ out there ’ , this self - fashioning affords the West both the confidence and duty to know and lead that world . W hen certain knowledge about a particular ‘object’ , as in the case of China, is stubbornly not forthcoming, the self - professed knowing subject then resorts to certain emotional substitutes such as fear and fantasy to make up for the absence of certainty . With fear , one may restore a sense of ( negative) certainty about an existential threat ‘ out there ’ , a threat which seems readily accounted for by the timeless wisdom of realism ( and to some extent liberalism ) . Alternatively , with the subliminal aid of fantasy , the West can envisage an immensely soothing scenario of opportunity, engagement and convergence that carries with it a teleological predictability about how History begins, evolves, and ends . Thanks to those emotional substitutes, the initial ‘inscrutability’ of China’s Otherness gives way to more comprehensible imageries: it is now either an affront

to , or an opportunity for , the Western self and its will to truth and power . Either way, it becomes a reassuring object of aversion and attraction that

allows for continued Western self - posturing as the modern knowing subject . Indeed, a s evidenced in the two dominant sets of China discourses , the Western self and its Chinese Other are mutually constitutive . More importantly, such mutual constructions

are from the out set linked to power and political practice. At one level, they are complicit in the political economies of fear and fantasy ‘ at home ’ . At another level, they are constitutive of foreign policy which in turn helps construct the Other in reality . Consequently , the China discourses turn out to be an integral and constitituive part of their ‘ object of study ’ . For example, a s illustrated in Chapters 4 - 5, America’s ‘ China threat’ discourse both contributes to , and is reproduced by, the US partisan politics of fear and military Keynesianism . At the same time, this threat imagery helps sustain a containment policy of sorts . By provoking similar responses from China , such a policy ends up participating in the creation of the very threat it seeks to contain . The ‘ China opportunity’ narrative , by contrast , tends to favour a policy of engagement . But as examined in Chapter 6, this paradigm and its associated engagement strategy are more often than not false promises . They are false in that their assumption of the West / US and China in terms of a temporal self/Other hierarchy allows their advocates to ignore or at least downplay China ’s inherent subjectivities and agency in this intersubjective relationship . To the extent that Sino - Western relations are intersubjective, socialisation does occur, but it takes place on a mutual basis , rather than as a on e - way traffic . In this context , the promises of the ‘ China opportunity ’ become less certain

and more problematic. Yet often oblivious to its own false premises , the paradigm instead blames China ( and to a lesser extent, Western engagers ) for its increasingly apparent ‘China fantasy ’ . What is significant about this ‘ China opportunity’ disillusionment is that it converges with the ‘ China threat ’ imagery and together justifies a tougher approach to a country which now not only appears unreceptive to our tutelage but also grows menacingly stronger by the day . Consequently, for all their apparent differences , the ‘threat’ and ‘opportunity’ paradigms are the two sides of the same coin of Western knowledge, desire, and power in China watching . In essence, both are specific manifestations of a modern quest for certainty in an uncertain

world . These seismic twin s are not only similar in terms of their discursive functions of constructing self / Other, but they are also joined together in practice . They make up a

powerful bifocal lens for China watching , a lens which can largely account for the emergence and popularity of the ‘hedging’ strategy towards China

The “responsible stakeholder” narrative of China projects US neoliberal-constructivist desires – it is the flip-side of China threat discourses.Chengxin PAN Deakin University, Humanities and Social Sciences Department ’12 Knowledge, desire and power in global politics western representations of China's rise p. 36-38

A Responsible Stakeholder: The Opportunity for Global Integration In addition to the wealth-democracy linkage, some observers believe that those opportunities in turn set the stage for

integrating China into the international system. As China becomes more open economically and politically, it holds the promise of becoming a ‘responsible stakeholder’ , a term coined by Zoellick . In his remarks to the National Committee on US-China Relations in September 2005,

Zoellick noted that as a responsible stakeholder, China would share with the US a common interest in sustaining an open

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 international economic system that had proven crucial to the prosperity of both countries and the world at large .99 While the Chinese initially struggled to find a Chinese equivalent to the English word ‘stakeholder’, this ‘responsible stakeholder’ rendition of the China opportunity instantly strikes a responsive

chord in Western foreign policy circles. For many observers, a more responsible China bodes well for the prospect of ‘locking China into an American-dominated international order’.100 Three interrelated factors seem to underpin this optimistic assessment: China’s deepening economic interdependence, its transition to democracy, and its cognitive learning of international norms and rules through a process of socialisation and norm diffusion . First, China’s economic development, as

well as generating commercial opportunities, helps bolster its integration with the global economy, thus providing a strong incentive for it to behave more responsibly on the world stage. Drawing implicitly on nineteenth-century liberals’ faith in the peaceful effect of commerce, many pundits are confident that Beijing’s focus on economic development and trade signals a convergence of Sino-American commercial and national interests. 101 For instance, as the Chinese become as dependent on the flow of Persian Gulf oil as Americans and Europeans have, it is argued that a common interest in open sea lanes may arise, thereby brightening the prospect for cooperation.102 In this context, Susan Shirk, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for US relations with China, predicts that Beijing cannot but behave ‘like a cautious, responsible power… intent on avoiding conflicts that would disrupt economic growth and social stability’.103 In his characteristically playful style, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman calls this whole phenomenon the ‘Dell theory of conflict prevention’. The gist of his theory is this: the economic interdependence between China and its East Asian neighbours through the global supply chain will help overcome the historical and geopolitical rivalry between China and Taiwan as well as that between China and Japan. As he approvingly quoted from a senior official at Dell, contrary to some received wisdom, this supply chain makes the amiable co-existence of a strong Japan and a strong China possible.104 Second, with Chinese democratisation, there appears to be a better chance for China’s emergence as a peaceful player in international relations. In the words of Diamond, ‘a China governed by the more comprehensive architecture of democracy… would be a more responsible regional neighbor and global actor’.105 For Gilley, a China pursuing a ‘democratic foreign policy’ would be ‘a

salutary new force for global justice, peace, and development’.106 Almost claiming that a democratic China would offer a panacea for regional stability, Gilley then goes on to list a whole range of thorny international problems which would easily go away, such as its testy relations with the US, the Taiwan impasse, territorial claims in the South China Sea , border disputes with India and Russia, and the ethnic tensions in Tibet and Xinjiang. Meanwhile, according to a particular cottage industry in the field of Chinese foreign policy, the country’s socialisation into multilateral international institutions , norms, and regimes further enhances its ‘ global commitments and responsibility’ . 107 In a popular attempt to gauge the level of Beijing’s ‘acceptance of the legitimacy of the

current international economic and political system’,108 scholars have surveyed almost every aspect of China’s engagement with international institutions, ranging from its relations with the United Nations to its participation in the regimes of international trade and investment, security and arms control, environmental protection, energy, telecommunications, as well as human rights.109 And typically most of their findings are encouraging. For example, Economy and Oksenberg maintain that overall ‘China has become less distinctive. Its foreign policy calculus increasingly resembles that of other major powers’. Hence their verdict that it ‘has rejoined the world’.110 As China

emerges as a responsible stakeholder on the world stage, it is believed that it will provide further economic and political opportunities. For example, Beijing’s legal and commercial reforms in accordance with World Trade Organization ( WTO ) requirements would make China an ideal place for America ns to ‘contemplate doing business or expand existing business’ , once claimed Robert A. Kapp, who served as president of the US-China Business Council during the period of China’s entry into the WTO.111 A number of US officials echoed Kapp’s optimism. Arguing for the case of granting China’s accession to this global multilateral trade regime, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright insisted that China’s WTO membership ‘would give the United States more access to China’s market, boost our exports, reduce our trade deficit, and create new, well-paying jobs’.112 Similarly, Clinton’s national security adviser Samuel Berger saw a positive feedback loop between China’s global integration and domestic political change. As he put it, ‘Just as NAFTA [the North American Free Trade Agreement] membership eroded the economic base of one-party rule in Mexico, WTO

membership… can help do the same in China’.113 This confidence in China’s transformation into a responsible stakeholder has been supported by two influential perspectives: neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism . Both approaches assume that growing interdependence and integration enables states to learn international norms and redefine their national interests and identities. For many, China represents an exemplar case of such cognitive learning. For example, by looking at its institutional integration process, Thomas Robinson provides an interesting analysis of the evolution of Chinese attitudes towards the notion of interdependence. He notes that throughout much of the 1990s, Chinese statements became increasingly favourable to this notion, thereby raising hope that, given time, China could be eventually converted to ‘full interdependence’ and ‘end up with the same domestic structure (market economy) and foreign policy (peace and internationalism) as other developed nations’.114 In the security realm, a systematic study of China’s socialisation by Alastair Iain Johnston notes a similar trend. Between 1980 and 2000, ‘Chinese leaders adopted more cooperative and potentially self-constraining commitments to security institutions’. This development, according to Johnston, testifies to both the constitutive influence of international institutions and the cognitive learning capacity of China’s foreign policy makers.115 Coupled with his study on the attitudes of a liberalising Chinese middle class towards world affairs, Johnston has provided a largely optimistic assessment on the prospect of China becoming a responsible stakeholder.116 WE ARE ALL PANDA HEDGERS’: THE AMBIVALENCE OF THE BIFOCAL LENS This chapter has briefly surveyed the main arguments and theoretical underpinnings of the ‘China threat’ and ‘China opportunity’ paradigms. By way of conclusion, I should stress three points. First, to reiterate the obvious, this is not a comprehensive survey of China studies in the West. At most, it is only a snapshot of some recent Western writings on China’s rise in the field of international relations. To equate the latter with Western understanding of China as a whole would be misleading, and certainly that is not this author’s intention. Second, by singling out these two paradigms, I do not seek to pigeonhole China observers into two pre-existing ideological or scholarly camps. Some analysts, motivated by the belief in either moral clarity or the supposedly timeless wisdom of power politics, do subscribe to some sharp images of the China threat. Likewise, some starry-eyed business leaders may often see China as little more than an economic opportunity. But

overall these paradigms do not correspond neatly with two clearly-defined, discrete groups of observers or two homogeneous bodies of quintessential literature. The ‘China threat’ discourse often transcends the political divides between the conservative right and progressive left, and resonates with defence industrialists and human rights activists alike. Similarly, the ‘China opportunity’ paradigm is not held exclusively by any particular category of people, but is shared by a diverse group of observers of various political persuasions. Third, to the extent that these fundamental images represent

two different cognitive frameworks within which to understand China’s rise, they may be treated as rival paradigms, which ‘see different things when they look from

the same point in the same direction’.117 But even so, they are not mutually exclusive , incompatible, or incommensurable. As Richard J. Bernstein argues, ‘There is always some overlap between rival paradigms—overlap of observations, concepts, standards, and problems. If there were no such overlap, rational debate and argumentation between

proponents of rival paradigms would not be possible’.118 In fact, a bifocal lens that encompasses both paradigms has been characteristic of

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 mainstream Western literature on China’s rise . Often dreading and marvelling at China’s economic rise at the same time,

the business world is clearly prone to this bifocal framework, as trade magazines and newsletters are saturated with endless analyses of the China ‘threat’ and ‘opportunity’. William Callahan has documented how the bifocal lens is deployed by business analysts and security experts to understand the phenomenon of ‘Greater China’ as both a danger of China’s imperial expansion and an opportunity of the newest version of capitalist utopia . 119 Sometimes even the same observer subscribes to both imageries. The CNN commentator and anchor Lou Dobbs is a case in point. A staunch defender of American jobs and author of bestseller Exporting America, Dobbs lashed out at those US companies who moved their production to China, a country which, in his view, was a source of threat to the American economy and job security. But on the other hand, as an investment adviser, Dobbs had no qualms about recommending his clients to buy shares of the very companies that have established a presence in China (and India). Consequently, Dobbs’s China was both an economic threat and opportunity.120 In the scholarly community, the bifocal lens is equally palpable. As mentioned above, on the one hand, Johnston perceives a China threat through an analysis of Chinese strategic culture, but on the other hand, he seems to believe in the malleability of Chinese interests and identity through socialisation. Drawing on a constructivist approach, he in fact sees no contradiction between these two arguments. Nor do William Kristol and Robert Kagan find it incompatible to believe at once in the China threat and in its opportunity for regime change. In a way, just as the missionaries’ enthusiasm for the salvation of the Chinese heathens was often prompted by he very belief in the Chinese as great sinners, Kristol and Kagan’s hope for China’s political transformation is made more imper ative not despite, but precisely because of their fear of China as a political and mil i tary threat. 121 Indeed, it is now difficult to find a work which does not treat China as both a cha l lenge and an opportunity, even though most would lean towards one or th e other end of the spectrum . 122 E ven policy - makers who normally favour clear - cut, unambiguous i m ages seem to have largely avoid ed an either/or assessment . For instance, distancing himself from the ‘strategic competitor’ rhetoric of his early days in office, George W. Bush later called relations with China ‘complex’, in the sense that China was not just a potential threat, but also presented opportunities for cooperation, such as in the ‘War on Terror’. Zoellick, best known for his preference for engaging Chin a, was similarly ambivalent, as his ‘responsible stak e holder’ speech can attest . Even as analysts and policy - makers continue to effor t lessly invoke such seemingly dichotomous terms as ‘engagement’ and ‘containment’ or binary questions of whether China will emerge as a partner or strategic rival, their concl u sion s are rarely one way or the other . 123 In this sense , the China - watching community seems to have come a long way since Harry Har d ing lamented more than two decades ago that ‘We appear unable to see Chin a as a complex society, in which some features are worthy of approval and others demand criticism ’. 124 Such apparent sophisticat ion in C hina watching may prompt one to wonder whether it is still plausible to speak of the two China paradigms in the first pla ce . Could they just be this author’s analytical straw men? They are not. T he various combinations of threat and opportunity in Western imaginings of China’s rise testify to the very power of these two par a digms as the outer limits of China representation . As just noted, together they form a bifocal lens and provide an enduring ambivalen t framework for China literacy . In a classic study of American attitudes towards China first published in 1958 , Harold Isaacs noted the simultaneous presence of two powerful scratches on Americans’ minds: a despicable China and an admirable China. As he put it astutely, ‘In the long history of our associ a tions with China, these two sets of images rise and fall, move in and out of the center of people’s minds over time, never w holly displacing each other, always coexis t ing... ’. 125 Today , one could easily substitute these scratches with the two China paradigms , and understand how, now as then, China is viewed with profound ambivalence . Speaking of this contemporary China ambivalence, what Ian Bremmer calls the ‘panda hed g ers’ comes to mind . 126 ‘Panda huggers’ and ‘dragon slayers’ continue to exist, of course. But more often than not, these two groups are not as mutually exclusive as their stark appellations seem to suggest. In any case, both paradigms have been integral to contemporary Western unde r standing of China’s rise . At a given time or in Threat and opportunity 41 a single piece of writing on China, a particular imagery may be more pronounced. But a s a whole, Western representation s of China’s rise ha ve be en characterised by this enduring ambiv a lence , a topic to which the next chapter will turn.

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Terrorism Links Apocalyptic terrorism scenarios are grounded in vested political interests and violent modes of national-identity formation in which political reforms like the plan are used to carve the world into liberal and illiberal spheres—the impact is a racist extermination of alterity and expansive structural violenceDesiree BRYAN, Research Assistant Intern at Middle East Institute. MScECON Candidate: Security Studies at Aberystwyth University, 12 [June 22, 2012, “The Popularity of the ‘New Terrorism’ Discourse,” http://www.e-ir.info/2012/06/22/the-popularity-of-the-new-terrorism-discourse/]

New Terrorism vs. Old Terrorism The opening sentence of a textbook on terrorism states, “Terrorism has been a dark feature of human behavior since the dawn of recorded history” (Martin, 2010, 3). If this is the case, what makes the ‘new terrorism’ different from the old? According to the mainstream

orthodoxy on terrorism, the old terrorism was generally characterized by: left wing ideology; the use of small scale, conventional weapons; clearly identifiable organizations or movements with equally clear political and social messages; specific selection of targets and “explicit grievances

championing specific classes or ethnonational groups” (Martin, 2010, 28). Also according to the orthodoxy, the shift to the new terrorism, on the other hand, is thought to have emerged in the early 1990s (Jackson, 2011) and took root in mass consciousness with the September 11, 2001

terrorist attacks on the U.S. (Martin, 2010, 3). The new terrorism is characterized by: “loose, cell-based networks with minimal lines of command and control,” “desired acquisition of high-intensity weapons and weapons of mass destruction” (Martin, 2010, 27), “motivated by religious fanaticism rather than political ideology and it is aimed at causing mass causality and maximum destruction” (Jackson, 2007, 179-180). However,

these dichotomous definitions of the old and new types of terrorism are not without problems. The first major problem is that terrorism has been characterized by the same fundamental qualities throughout history . Some of the superficial characteristics, the means of implementation (e.g. the

invention of the Internet or dynamite) or the discourse (communism vs. Islam) may have evolved, but the central components remain the same. The second major problem is that the characterization of new terrorism is, at best, rooted in a particular political ideology, biased and inaccurate. At worst, it is racist, promotes war mongering and has contributed to millions of deaths . As David Rapoport states: Many contemporary studies begin … by

stating that although terrorism has always been a feature of social existence, it became ‘significant’ … when it ‘increased in frequency’ and took on ‘novel dimensions’ as an international or transnational activity, creating in the process a new ‘mode of conflict’ (1984, 658). Isabelle Duyvesteyn points out that this would indicate evidence for the emergence of a new type of terrorism, if it were not for the fact that the article was written in 1984 and described a situation from the 1960s (Duyvesteyn, 2004, 439). It seems that there have been many new phases of terrorism over the years. So many so that the definition of ‘new’ has been stretched significantly and applied relatively across decades. Nevertheless, the idea that this terrorism, that which the War on Terror (WoT) is directed against, is the most significant and unique form of terrorism that has taken hold in the popular and political discourse. Therefore, it is useful to address each of the so-called new characteristics in turn. The first characteristic is the idea that new terrorism is based on loosely organized cell-based networks as opposed to the traditional terrorist groups, which were highly localized and hierarchical in nature. An oft-cited example of a traditional terrorist group is the Irish Republican Army (IRA), who operated under a military structure and in a relatively (in contrast to the perceived transnational operations of al-Qaeda) localized capacity. However, some of the first modern terrorists were not highly organized groups but small fragmented groups of anarchists. These groups were heeding the call of revolutionary anarchist Mikhail Bakunin and other contemporary anarchists to achieve anarchism, collectivism and atheism via violent means (Morgan, 2001, 33). Despite the initial, self-described “amorphous” nature of these groups, they were a key force in the Russian Revolution (Maximoff, G.). Furthermore, leading anarchist philosophers of the Russian Revolution argued that terrorists “should organize themselves into small groups, or cells” (Martin, 2010, 217). These small groups cropped up all around Russia and Europe in subsequent years and formed an early form of a “loosely organized cell-based network” not unlike modern day al Qaeda. Duyvesteyn further notes that both the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was founded in 1964, and Hezbollah, founded 1982, operate on a network structure with very little

central control over groups (2004, 444). The second problematic idea of new terrorism is that contemporary terrorist groups aim to acquire and use

weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This belief is simply not supported by empirical evidence . One of the key problems with this theory is that WMDs are significantly more difficult to obtain and utilize than most people understand. Even if a terrorist group were to obtain a biological WMD, “Biologist Matthew Meselson calculates that it would take a ton of nerve gas or five tons of mustard gas to produce heavy causalities among unprotected people in an open area of one square kilometer” (Mueller, 2005, 488). And that’s only an

example of the problem with the implementation of WMDs, assuming they are acquired, transported and desirable by a terrorist group in the first place. Additional problems, such as the fact that WMDs “are extremely difficult to deploy and control” (Mueller, 2005, 488)

and that making a bomb “is an extraordinarily difficult task” (Mueller, 2005, 489), further diminish the risk . It is interesting to note that,

while the potential dangers of WMDs are much lauded, the attacks of September 11th were low tech and had been technologically possible for more than 100 years. Mueller also states, “although nuclear weapons have been around for well over half a century, no state has ever given another state (much less a terrorist group) a nuclear weapon that the recipient could use independently” (2005, 490). All of this talk about the difficultly of acquiring and deploying WMDs (by non-state agents), is not to diminish the question

of what terrorists have to gain by utilizing these weapons. It is important to question whether it would even further the aims of terrorists to

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 use WMDs. The evidence suggests otherwise. In the “Politics of Fear” Jackson states, “ Mass casualties are most often

counterproductive to terrorist aims – they alienate their supporters and can provoke harsh reprisals from the authorities […]” in addition, “[…] they would undermine community support, distort the terrorist’s political message, and invite over-whelming retaliation” (2007, 196-197). Despite popular rhetoric to the contrary, terrorists are “rational political actors and are acutely

aware of these dangers” (Jackson, 2007, 197). Government appointed studies on this issue have supported these views. This leads us to the third

problem with new terrorism, which is the idea that we are facing a new era of terrorism motivated by religious fanaticism rather than political ideology. As stated previously, earlier, so-called traditional forms of terrorism are associated with left wing, political ideology, whereas contemporary terrorists are described as having “anti-modern goals of returning society to an idealized version of the past and are therefore necessarily anti-democratic, anti-progressive and, by implication, irrational” (Gunning and Jackson, 3). Rapoport argues the idea that religious terrorists are irrational, saying, “what seems to be distinctive about modern [religious] terrorists, their belief that terror can

be organized rationally, represents or distorts a major theme peculiar to our own culture […]” (1984, 660). Conveniently for the interests of the political

elites, as we shall see later, the idea of irrational fanaticism makes the notion of negotiation and listening to the demands of the other impossible. In light of this, it is interesting to note that the U.S. has, for decades, given billions of dollars in aid to the State of Israel, which could be argued to be a fundamentalist, religious organization that engages in the terrorization of a group of people. Further, it is difficult to speak of The Troubles in Northern Ireland without speaking of the religious conflict, yet it was never assumed that the IRA was “absolutist, inflexible, unrealistic, lacking in political pragmatism, and not amenable to negotiation” (Gunning and Jackson, 4). Rapaport further reinforces the idea that religious terrorism goes back centuries by saying, “Before the nineteenth century, religion provided the only acceptable justifications for terror…”

(1984, 659). As we have seen here, problems with the discourse of new terrorism include the fact that these elements of terrorism are neither new nor are the popular beliefs of the discourse supported by empirical evidence . The question remains, then, why is the idea of new terrorism so popular? This

question will be addressed next. Political Investment in New Terrorism There are two main categories that explain the popularity of new terrorism. The first

category is government and political investment in the propagation of the idea that a distinct, historically unknown type of terrorism exists. The mainstream discourse [1] reinforces, through statements by political elites, media, entertainment and every other way imaginable, the

culture of violence, militarism and feelings of fear . Through mass media, cultural norms and the integration of neoliberal ideology into society, people are becoming increasingly desensitized to human rights issues, war, social justice and social welfare, not to mention apathetic to the political process in general. The discourse of the WoT is merely the contemporary

incarnation of this culture of fear and violence . In the past, various threats have included American Indians, women, African Americans, communists, HIV/AIDS and drugs, to name but a few (Campbell, 1992). It can be argued that there are four main political functions of terrorism discourse. The first is as a distraction from other, more immediate and domestic social problems such as poverty, employment, racial inequality, health and the environment. The second , more sinister function is to control dissent. In

looking at both of these issues Jackson states: There are a number of clear political advantages to be gained from the creation of social anxiety and

moral panics. In the first place, fear is a disciplining agent and can be effectively deployed to de-legitimise dissent, mute criticism, and constrain

internal opponents. […] Either way, its primary function is to ease the pressures of accountability for political elites . As instrument of elite rule,

political fear is in effect a political project aimed at reifying existing structures of power . (Politics of Fear, 2007, 185). Giroux further reinforces

the idea that a culture of fear creates conformity and deflects attention from government accountability by saying, “the ongoing appeal to jingoistic forms of patriotism divert the public from

addressing a number of pressing domestic and foreign issues; it also contributes to the increasing suppression of dissent” (2003, 5). Having a problem that is “ubiquitous, catastrophic, and fairly opaque” (Jackson, Politics of Fear, 2007, 185) is useful to political elites, because it is nearly impossible to address the efficacy of combating the problem. At least, empirical evaluation can be, and is, easily discouraged in academic circles through research funding directives. Domestic problems such as the unemployment rate or health care reform, on the other hand, are directly measurable and heavily monitored by domestic sources. It is possible to account for the success or failure of policies designed to address these types of problems and the (re)election of politicians often depends heavily on success in these areas. However, the public is neither involved on a participative level nor, often, socially aware of what is happening in murkier and unreachable areas like foreign policy. The third political investment in

maintaining the terrorism discourse has to do with economics. “At a material level, there are a great many vested interests in maintaining the widespread condition of fear, not least for the military-industrial complex which benefits directly from increased spending on national security” (Jackson, Politics of Fear, 2007, 186). This is true with all forms of crime and insecurity as all of them factor into the greater security-industrial complex. Not only do these industries employ millions of people and support their families, they boost the economy. Barry Buzan talks of these the

importance of these issues to both the government and the public in terms of a ‘threat-deficit’ – meaning that U.S. policy and society is dependent on having an

external threat (Buzan, 2007, 1101). The fourth key political interest in terrorism discourse is constructing a national identity. This will be discussed more

thoroughly in the following section, however, it is important to acknowledge the role the WoT (and previous threats) has had on constructing and reinforcing a collective identity.

Examples of this can be seen in the discourse and the subsequent reaction to anyone daring to step outside the parameters of the Bush Administration-established narrative in the days immediately following the September 11th attacks. A number of journalists, teachers and university

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 professors lost their jobs for daring to speak out in criticism of U.S. policy and actions following the attacks. In 2001, Lynne Cheney attacked the then deputy chancellor of the New York City Schools, Judith Rizzo, for saying “terrorist attacks demonstrated the importance of teaching about Muslim cultures” (Giroux, 2003, 22).

According to Giroux, this form of jingoistic patriotism “becomes a euphemism for shutting down dissent, eliminating critical dialogue, and condemning critical citizenship in the interest of conformity and a dangerous departure from what it means to uphold a viable democracy” (2003, 24). The message is, we are not the other (Muslims), patriotism equals agreement and compliance and our identity is based on the shared values of liberty and

justice. According to Carol Winkler, “Negative ideographs contribute to our collective identity by branding behavior that is unacceptable … American society defines itself as much by its opposition to tyranny and slavery as it does by a commitment to liberty” (Winkler, 2006, 12). Terrorism, and by association in this case, Islam, functions as a negative ideograph of American values. It thereby tells us what our values and our identity are by telling us who the enemy is and who we are not . According to Jackson, “[…] some have argued that Western identity is dependent on the appropriation of a backward, illiberal, violent Islamic ‘other’ against which the West can organize a collective liberal, civilized ‘self’ and consolidate its cultural and political norms” (Jackson, Constructing Enemies, 2007, 420). Through this analysis we can see there are four key ways in which the

hegemonic system is invested in propagating a culture of fear and violence and terrorism discourse. Not only is it key for political elites to support this system, it is also crucial that there be an ever renewing threat that is uniquely different from past threats. These new threats allow for the investment of significantly more resources, the continuation of the economy, the renewal of a strong sense of cultural identity and the indoctrination and obedience of new generations of society . This essay will now look at how individual and collective psychology supports the popularity of the new terrorism discourse.

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Impact

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Securitization Impact

Militarism is an unsustainable system which creates the conditions of its own destruction. The results are global war, terror, ecological destruction, and nuclear use. Only a fundamental rethinking of the way we related to systems of violence can solveDr. Joel KOVEL. Alger Hiss Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, 2 [November 21, 2002, “The United States Military Machine,” http://joelkovel.com/the-united-states-military-machine/]

I want to talk to you this evening about war – not the immediate threat of us war against Iraq, but about how this conflict is an instance of a larger tendency toward war-making endemic to our society . In other words, the phrase from the folksong, “I ain’t gonna study war no more,” should be rethought. I think we do have to study war. Not to make war but to understand more deeply how it is put together and about the awful choices that are

now being thrust upon us. These remarks have been stimulated by recent events, which have ancient roots, but have taken on a new shape

since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of the second Bush administration, and the inception of the so-called “War on Terror.” The shape is that of permanent

warfare - war-making that has no particular strategic goal except total us dominance over global society. Hence, a war without end and whose internal logic is to perpetuate itself. We are , in other words, well into World War III, which will go on whether or not any other state such as Iraq is involved. It is quite probable that this administration will go to war in Iraq, inasmuch as certain very powerful people crave it. But it is not necessarily the case, given the fact that the war against Iraq is such a lunatic proposal that many other people in high places are against it and too many people are marching

against it. And while war against Iraq is a very serious matter that needs to be checked by massive popular resistance, equally serious are the structures now in place in the U nited States dictating that whether or not the war in Iraq takes place, there will be another war to replace it, and others after that, unless some very basic changes take place . America Has Become a War-Making

Machine The United States has always been a bellicose and expansive country, built on violent conquest and expropriation of native peoples. Since the forming of the American republic, military interventions have occurred at the rate of about once a year. Consider the case of Nicaragua, a country utterly incapable of being any kind of a threat to its giant northern neighbor. Yet prior to the Sandinista revolution in 1979 (which was eventually crushed by us proxy forces a decade later), our country had invaded Nicaragua no fewer than 14 times in the pursuit of its imperial interests. A considerable number of contemporary states, such as Britain, South Africa, Russia, and Israel, have been formed in just such a way. But one of the special conditions of the formation of America, despite its aggressivity, was an inhibition against a military machine as such. If you remember, no less a figure than George Washington warned us against having a standing army, and indeed the great bulk of us interventions prior to World War II were done without very much in the way of fixed military institutions. However, after WWII a basic change set in. War-weary America longed for demobilization, yet after a brief

beginning in this direction, the process was halted and the permanent warfare state started to take shape. In part, this was because policy planners knew quite well that massive

wartime mobilization had been the one measure that finally lifted America out of the Great Depression of the 1930s. One of the lessons of that time was that propounded by the British economist John Maynard Keynes, to the effect that capitalist societies could ameliorate chronic [economic] crises by infusions of

government spending. The Great War had certified this wisdom, and permanent military expenditure readily became the received wisdom. This was greatly reinforced by the drastic realignment of capitalist power as a result of the war. America was essentially the only capitalist power in 1945 that did not lay in ruins and/or have its empire shattered. The world had been realigned and the United States had assumed a global imperial role. Policy planners like George Kennan lucidly realized that this meant safeguarding extreme inequalities in wealth , which implied a permanent garrison to preserve the order of things . The

notion was especially compelling given that one other state, the Soviet Union, had emerged a great power from the war and was the bellwether of those forces that sought to break down the prevailing distribution of wealth. The final foundation stone for the new military order was the emergence of frightful weapons of mass destruction, dominance over which became an

essential element for world hegemony. The Iron Triangle These factors crystallized into the Cold War, the nuclear arms race, and,

domestically, into those structures that gave institutional stability and permanence to the system: the military- industrial complex (mic). Previously the us had used militarism to secure economic advantage. Now, two developments greatly transformed our militarism: the exigencies of global hegemony and the fact that militarism became a direct source of economic advantage, through the triangular relations of the mic with the great armament industries comprising one leg, the military establishment another, and the state apparatus the third, profits, power, and personnel could flow through the system and from the system. Clearly, this arrangement had

the potential to greatly undermine American democracy. It was a “national security state” within the state but also extended beyond it into the economy and society at large, virtually insulated from popular input, and had the power to direct events and generate threats. Another conservative war hero-become-president, Dwight Eisenhower, warned the nation in a speech in 1961 against the emerging permanent war machine, but this time, the admonitions were not heeded.* The machine made a kind of war against the Soviet system for 35 years. Although actual guns were not fired between the two adversaries, as many as 10 million people died in its varied peripheral conflicts, from Korea

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 to Vietnam, Angola, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. The Cold War divided the world into bipolar imperial camps, directed by gigantic superpowers that lived off each otherís hostility. It was a terrible war whose immense suffering took place largely

outside the view of the American people, but it also brought about an uneasy kind of stability in the world order, in part through the standoff in nuclear weapons. During the Ford and Carter administrations, another great crisis seized the world capitalist economy. Having matured past the rebuilding that followed the world war, a period of stagnation set in, which still has the global economy in its grip despite episodic flashes of vigor. Predictably, a spate of militarism was central to the response. A “Second Cold War” took place under Reagan, featuring an accelerated nuclear arms race, which was deliberately waged so as to encourage Soviet countermeasures in the hope that this would cause breakdown in the much weaker, bloated, and corrupt Russian system. The plan worked splendidly: by 1989-91, the mighty Soviet empire collapsed, and the bipolar world order became unipolar, setting a stage for the current phase. The fall of the Soviet Union was widely expected to bring a ìpeace dividend.î This would have been the case according to the official us line, parroted throughout the media and academe, that our military apparatus was purely defensive (after all, we have no Department of War, only one of “Defense”) and reactive to Soviet expansionism and military/nuclear threat. As this was no longer a factor, so the reasoning wentóindeed, as the us now stood bestride the world militarily as had no power since the Roman Empireóconventional logic predicted a general diminution in American militarism after 1991, with corresponding benefits to society. The last decade has at least settled this question, for the effect on us aggression, interventionism, and the militarization of society has been precisely the opposite. In other words, instead of braking, the machine accelerated. Removal of Soviet power did not diminish Americaís imperial appetite: it removed inhibitions on its internally driven expansiveness. As a result, enhanced war-making has replaced the peace dividend. The object of this machine has passed from dealing with Soviet Communism to a more complex and dispersed set of oil wars (Iraq I and now II), police actions against international miscreants (Kosovo), and now the ubiquitous War Against Terror, aimed variously at Islamic fundamentalists, Islam as a whole, or anybody irritated enough with the ruling order to take up some kind of arms against it. The comparison with the Roman Empire is here very exact. As the eminent economist and sociologist Joseph Schumpeter described Rome in 1919: “There was no corner of the known world where some interest was not alleged to be in danger or under actual attack. If the interests were not Roman, they were those of Rome’s allies. And if Rome had no allies existed, the allies

would be invented. The fight was always invested with the order of legality. Rome was always being attacked by evil-minded neighbors.” The logic of constant threat meshes with that of ruthless expansion , which we see everywhere in this epoch of unipolar world dominion. Currently, the military budget of the us is 334 billion dollars. The budget for the next fiscal year is 379 billion dollars- an increase of more than 10

percent. By 2007, the projected military budget of the us is to be an astounding 451 billion dollars: almost half a trillion dollars, without the presence of anything resembling a conventional war. The present military budget is greater than the sum of all other military budgets. In fact, it is greater than the entire federal budget of Russia, once America’s immortal adversary, and comprises more than half – 52 percent of all discretionary spending by the us government. (By comparison, education accounts for 8 percent of the federal budget.) A considerable portion of this is given over to “military Keynesianism,” according to the well-established paths of the mic. Thus, although in the first years after the fall of the ussr certain firms like General Dynamics, which had played a large role in the nuclear arms race, suffered setbacks, that problem has been largely reversed for the entire class of firms fattening at the trough of militarism. It is fair to say, though, that the largesse is distributed over a wider scale, in accordance with the changing pattern of armaments. US Armies Taking Root

Everywhere From having scarcely any standing army in 1940, American armies now stand everywhere. One feature of us military policy since WWII is to make war and then stay where war was made, rooting itself in foreign territory . Currently, the us has military bases in 113 countries, with 11 new ones formed since the beginning of the War Against Terror. The us now has bases in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kurdistan, encircling China and creating new sources of military tension . On these bases, the us military has erected some 800,000 buildings. Imagine

that: 800,000 buildings in foreign countries that are now occupied by us military establishments. And America still maintains large forces in Germany, Japan, and Korea, with tens of thousands of troops permanently on duty (and making mischief, as two us servicemen recently ran over and killed two Korean

girls, provoking massive demonstrations). After the first Gulf War the us military became installed in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait , in which latter place it currently occupies one quarter of the country – 750 square miles devoted to military activity. This huge investment is no doubt determined by proximity to Iraq. Again, after going to

war in Kosovo, the us left behind an enormous base in a place called Bondsteel. These self-expanding sites of militarism are permanent goads to terrorist organizations . Recall that one of Osama bin Laden’s professed motivations for al-Qaeda’s attacks on American

facilities was the presence of us bases in his home country of Saudi Arabia. The bases are also permanent hazards to

the environment – indeed, the us, with some 800,000 buildings on these military sites, is the world’s largest polluter and the largest consumer of fossil fuels. With territorial expansion of the us military apparatus, there is a corresponding expansion of mission . For

instance, in Colombia, where billions of us dollars are spent in the “War on Drugs,” us troops are now being asked to take care of pipelines through which vital oil

reserves are passing. In addition, the War on Drugs is now subsumed into the War Against Terror. The signifier of Terror has virtually unlimited elasticity, for once an apparatus reaches the size of the us military machine, threats can be seen anywhere .

With the inauguration of the new hard-line president of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe, the us authorized the use of 1.7 billion dollars in military aid hitherto limited to anti-drug operations for direct attacks on deeply entrenched farc guerrillas. This redirection of aid came after Colombian officials and their American supporters in the Congress and Bush administration argued that

the change was needed as part of the global campaign against terrorism. Within this overall picture, American armed forces are undergoing a qualitative shift of enormous proportion. In words read by President Bush: “Our forces in the next century must be agile, lethal, readily deployable, and must require a minimum of logistical support. We must be able to project our power over long distances in days or weeks rather than months. On land our heavy forces must be lighter, our light forces must be more lethal. All

must be easier to deploy.” Crossing Weapons Boundaries – Both Nuclear and Conventional As a result, many boundaries and limits of the bipolar era have been breached. For example, the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons had always constituted a radical barrier. The standoff between the us and the ussr was epitomized by mind-numbing hydrogen bomb-missiles facing each other

in a scenario called “Mutual Assured Destruction.î”In short, a strategic condition of deterrence prevailed, which made nuclear weapons seem unthinkable. With the demise of the ussr, deterrence no longer inhibits us nuclear weaponry, and the weapons themselves have proliferated downward, becoming miniaturized and increasingly tactical rather than strategic . Meanwhile,

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 the genie of the weapons industries has developed ever more destructive “conventional” weapons. These include non-explosive devices of

awesome power, such as laser beams, microwaves, and large-scale climate manipulation, along with a new generation of super-powerful explosive devices. Thus the strongest non-nuclear weapons are now considerably more lethal than the least powerful nuclear weapons, making the latter thinkable and eliminating a major barrier against their employment . These so-called conventional bombs have already been used, for example, in Afghanistan, where the us employed a gigantic explosive weapon, called a ìBunker Busterî to root out al-Qaeda combatants in underground bunkers. They are based upon the “daisy cutter,” a giant bomb about the size of a Volkswagen Beetle and capable of destroying everything within a square kilometer. Significantly, the model used in Afghanistan, the B61-11, already employs nuclear technology, the infamous depleted uranium warhead, capable by virtue of its

extreme density, of great penetrating power. Depleted uranium (du) is a by-product of the nuclear power industry (chiefly being U-238 created in the

extraction of U-235 from naturally occurring uranium ore). Over 500,000 tons of deadly du have accumulated and 4-5,000 more tons are being produced every year. Like all products of the nuclear power industry, du poses immense challenges of disposal. It has this peculiar property of being almost twice as dense as lead and it is radioactive with a half-life of 4.5 billion years. Wherever depleted uranium is used, it has another peculiar property of exploding , vaporizing at 56 degrees centigrade, which is just like a little more than half

the way to boiling water. So it is very volatile, it explodes, it forms dust and powders that are inhaled, disburses widely, and produces lethal cancers, birth defects, and so forth for 4.5 billion years . In the case of depleted uranium, the challenge of disposal was met by incorporating the refuse from the ìpeacefulî branch of nuclear technology into the war-making branch. Already used in anti-tank projectiles in the first Iraq war (approximately 300 tons worth) and again in Yugoslavia (approximately 10-15 tons were used in each of the various Yugoslav wars), it is presumed, although the defense department coyly denies it, that this material was also used in the Afghanistan war. Depleted uranium has spread a plague of radioactivity and further rationalized the use of nuclear weapons as such . Consequently, the B61-11 is about to be

replaced with the BLU113, where the bunker buster will now be a small nuclear weapon, almost certainly spear-tipped with du. Pollutants to Earth and Space To the boundaries crossed between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, and between the peaceful and militaristic uses of atomic technology, we need to add those between earth and its lower atmosphere on the one

hand, and space on the other. The administration is poised to realize the crackpot and deadly schemes of the Reagan administration to militarize space and to draw the rest of the world into the scheme, as client and victim. In November 2002, Bush proposed that nato allies build missile defense systems, with components purchased, needless to add, from Boeing, Raytheon, etc, even as Congress was approving a fiscal 2003 defense budget containing $7.8 billion authorization for missile defense research and procurement, as part of the $238 billion set aside for Star Wars over the next 20 years. The administration now is poised to realize the crackpot and deadly schemes of the

Reagan administration to militarize space and to draw the rest of the world into the scheme, as client and victim. A new missile defense system bureaucracy has risen. It is currently developing such wild items as something called ìbrilliant pebblesî which involves the release of endless numbers of mini satellites into outer space. All of this was to protect the world against the threat of rogue states such as North Korea . As the Seattle Times reported, the us expects the final declaration to, “express the need to examine options to protect allied forces, territories, and population centers against the full range of missile threats.” As an official put it, “This will establish the framework within which nato allies could work cooperatively toward fielding the required capabilities. With the us withdrawal this year from the anti-ballistic treaty with Russia, it is no longer a question of whether missile defenses will be deployed. The relevant questions are now what, how, and when. The train is about to pull out of the station; we invite our

friends, allies, and the Russian Federation to climb on board.” The destination of this train is defensive only in the Orwellian sense, as the missiles will be used to defend us troops in the field. In other words, they will be used to defend armies engaged in offensive activities. What is being

“defended” by the Strategic Defense Initiative (sdi), therefore, is the initiative to make war everywhere. Space has now become the ultimate battlefield. And not

just with use of these missiles. The High Frequency Active Aural Research Program (haarp) is also part of sdi. This amounts to weather warfare: deliberately manipulating climate to harm and destroy adversaries. A very dubious enterprise, to say the least, in an age when global warming and climate instability are already looming as two of the greatest problems facing civilization. The chief feature is a network of powerful antennas capable of creating controlled local modifications of the ionosphere and hence producing weather disturbances and so forth. All of these technical interventions are accompanied by many kinds of institutional and political changes. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, nasa, for instance, is now a partner in the development of this strategic defense initiative. The very way in which the United Nations was drawn into the resolution in the war against Iraq is a breach and a violation of the original un Charter, which is to never make war, never to threaten to make war on any member state. The un was a peacemaking institution, but now the Super power has forced it into its orbit. The scrapping of the abm and other elements of the treaty

structure (non- proliferation, test-ban) that had organized the world of the Cold War is one part of a process of shedding whatever might inhibit the cancerous growth of militarism. It also creates an atmosphere of general lawlessness in the world. This is felt at all levels ófrom the rise of an ultra-militarist clique in the White House to the formal renunciation of no-first-use nuclear strategy, the flouting of numerous un regulations, the doctrine of pre-emptive war, and, as the logical outcome of all these developments, the condition of Permanent War and its accompaniment of general lawlessness, media slavishness, and a wave of repression for whose parallel we have to go back to the Alien and

Sedition acts of the 1790s, or Trumanís loyalty oaths of 1947. Militarism cannot be reduced to politics, economics, technology, culture, or psychology . All these are parts of the machine, make the machine go around, and are themselves produced by the actions of the machine. There is no doubt, in this regard, that the machine runs on natural resources (which have to be secured by economic,

political, and military action), and that it is deeply embedded in the ruling corporate order. There is no contradiction here, but a set

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 of meshing parts, driven by an insensate demand for fossil fuel energy . As a man from Amarillo, Texas put it when interviewed by npr as to the

correctness of Bush’s plan to go to war in Iraq: “I agree with the president, because how else are we going to get the oil to fly the F-16s?” We go to war , in other words, to get the oil needed to go to war . A Who’s Who List of mic Beneficiaries The fact that our government is front-loaded with oil magnates is another part of the machine. It is of

interest, therefore, that Unocal, for example, celebrated Condoleezza Riceís ascendancy to the post of National Security Advisor by naming an oil tanker after her. Or that Dick Cheney, originally a poor boy, became a rich man after the first Gulf War, when he switched from being Secretary of Defense, in charge of destroying the Kuwait oil fields, to ceo of a then-smallish company, Halliburton, in charge of rebuilding the same oil fields. Or that G.W. Bush himself, aside from his failed venture with Harken Oil, is scion of a family and a dynasty that controls the Carlyle Group, founded in 1987 by a former Carter administration official. Carlyle is now worth over $13 billion and its high officials include President Bush I, his Secretary of State (and fixer of the coup that put Bush II in power) James Baker, Reaganís Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, former British Prime Minister John Major, and former Phillipine President Fidel Ramos, among others. The Carlyle Group has its fingers everywhere, including ìdefenseî, where it controls firms making vertical missile launch systems currently in use on us Navy ships in the Arabian sea, as well as a range of other weapons delivery systems and combat vehicles. And as a final touch which the worldís people would be much better off for knowing, there are very definite connections between Carlyle and the family of Osama bin Laden – a Saudi power whose fortunes have been fused with those of the United States since the end of World War II. Thus the military-industrial complex lives, breathes, and takes on new dimensions. There is a deep structural reason for the present explosion of us militarism, most clearly traceable in the activities of Vice President Cheney, made clear in the energy report that he introduced with the generous assistance of Enron executives in May 2001. According to the report, American reliance on imported oil will rise by from about 52 percent of total consumption in 2001 to an estimated 66 percent in 2020. The reason for this is that world production, in general, and domestic production in particular are going to remain flat (and, although the report does not discuss this, begin dropping within the next 20 years). Meanwhile consumptionówhich is a direct function of the relentless drive of capitalism to expand commodity productionóis to grow by some two- thirds. Because the usage of oil must rise in the worldview of a Cheney, the us will actually have to import 60 percent more oil in 2020 to keep itself going than it does today. This means that imports will have to rise from their current rate of about 10.4 million barrels per day to about 16.7 million barrels per day. In the words of the report: “The only way to do this is persuade foreign suppliers to increase their production to sell more of their output to the us.” The meaning of these words depends of course on the interpretation of “persuade”, which in the us lexicon is to be read, I should think, as requiring a sufficient military machine to coerce foreign suppliers. At that point they might not even have to sell their output to the us, as it would already be possessed by the superpower. Here we locate the root material fact underlying recent us expansionism. This may seem an extravagant conclusion. However an explicit connection to militarismóand Iraqóhad been supplied the month before, in April 2001, in another report prepared by James Baker and submitted to the Bush cabinet. This document, called “Strategic Energy Policy Challenges for the 21st Century,” concludes with refreshing candor that ìthe us remains a prisoner of its energy dilemma, Iraq remains a destabilizing influence to the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East, Saddam Hussein has also demonstrated a willingness to threaten to use the oil weapon and to use his own export program to manipulate oil markets, therefore the us should conduct an immediate policy review toward Iraq, including military, energy, economic, and political diplomatic assessments. Note the absence of reference to “weapons of mass destruction,” or aid to terrorism, convenient

rationalizations can be filled in later. Clearly, however things turn out with Iraq, the fundamental structural dilemma driving the military machine pertains to the contradictions of an empire that drives toward the invasion of all social space and the total control

over nature . Since the former goal meets up with unending resistance and the latter crashes against the finitude of the

material world, there is no recourse except the ever-widening resort to force . But this, the military monster itself, ever

seeking threats to feed upon, becomes a fresh source of danger, whether of nuclear war, terror, or ecological

breakdown . The situation is plainly unsustainable , a series of disasters waiting to happen. It can only be checked and brought to rationality by a global uprising of people who demand an end to the regime of endless war. This is the only possible path by which we can pull ourselves away from the abyss into which the military machine is about to plunge, dragging us all down with it.

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Human Security Good

Human security as a framework outweighs their impacts and is necessary to confront different forms of violence—war, environmental destruction, genocide, etc. on its own terms. Patrick HAYDEN IR @ St. Andrews 04 “Constraining War: Human Security and the Human Right to Peace” Human Rights Review October-December p.38-40

The more expansive formulation of human security represents a radically different approach to security from that offered by the

traditional realist security paradigm . The fundamental difference in orientation between the two approaches is that for the traditional paradigm security means the protection and welfare of the state per se , whereas for the new formulation security means the protection and welfare of the individual human being. While the classical paradigm is clearly realist in that it is narrowly preoccupied with the state and national security interests, the human security paradigm is consistent with cosmopolitanism in that it adopts a more comprehensive approach concerned in the first instance with persons

and threats to their existence and dignity.10 It should be noted that the human security paradigm does not suggest that national security becomes irrelevant; rather it becomes embedded within a wider framework of interests that takes the quality of life of

the individual human being and the justice of fundamental social institutions as primary components of security viewed holistically . Along with the end of the cold war and its “great powers” rivalry, the past decade has seen increased recognition of a number of phenomena associated with globalization

that challenge many of the norms enshrined in the Westphalian system. The entrenchment of global capitalism, the internationalization of telecommunications and media, the explosive growth of supranational organizations and transnational corporations, the intensified flows of people, fashions, drugs, weapons and culture across borders, and the rise of global terrorism , all have undermined the traditional claims that the state alone is able to guarantee the physical security, order, and integrity of a given territory, and of the people who reside within it . It seems that not only is the state not as “self-reliant” as it is portrayed to be by realists, but recent changes in the inteInstitute of Social and Political Sciences, Lisbon Technical Universityrnational system and how world politics is conducted—which include processes and agents of

integration as well as fragmentation —demonstrate a plethora of challenges to the very existence of individuals and communities that are incapable of being addressed on the basis of the state-centric assumptions of the national security paradigm. Given the institutional and processual transformations occurring in conjunction with globalization, appealing to realist orthodoxy as a basis upon which to construct genuinely secure modes of human existence has become increasingly implausible. Former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, who became well known for his advancement of the

human security concept during his diplomatic career, captured the cosmopolitan character of human security when he observed that threats to human security are those that “strike directly home to the individual” and “largely ignore state boundaries.” Such threats are often violent and systemic in nature, and require “action and cooperation at different levels— global, regional, and local —if they are to be tackled effectively.”11 Human security concerns transcend the traditional statist confines of national security, and tend to focus on elimination or prevention of the causes of threats to human security. The types of threats identified with the human security concept include

armed conflict, ethnocultural violence, genocide, terrorism, violent crime, slavery, government repression, discrimination, environmental degradation, deprivation of basic needs, underdevelopment, and the spread of small arms, nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction. In sum, for the human security concept, the core threats are those that present a clear and consistent (and, sadly, preventable) danger to “human life and

dignity.”12 Another way of putting these last points is that human security “recognises that an individual’s personal protection and preservation comes not just from the safeguarding of the state as a political unit, but also from access to individual welfare and the quality of life . ”13 Consequently, the human security approach is concerned with both direct and indirect

violence, or organized and “structural” violence , none of the forms of which can be understood in exclusively national or territorial terms and many of which are

exacerbated by the statist biases of conventional international politics. In addition to the commonly recognized forms of direct violence (such as international and domestic war, genocide, and ethnic cleansing) other forms of direct violence (including slavery, physical abuse, crime, and terrorism) along with forms of structural violence (such as political repression, discrimination, and the lack of food, water, and basic health care) are all identified as critical threats to personal safety, well-being, and dignity. Because the new security paradigm places the individual’s well-being and dignity within the context of humanity rather than the sovereign state, the normative focus of realism gives way to that of cosmopolitanism. The security referent

is no longer the citizen of a particular sovereign state, but all persons understood as “members of a transcendent human community with common global concerns.”14 Security is not the domain of a privileged few, but the entitlement of al l human beings. Neither is the goal of security simply the preservation of the state

(or the society of states); rather it is the preservation of human well-being. The normative focus also shifts from that of power struggles and unilateral militarism as the means by which to obtain national security, towards recognition that genuine

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 security can only be ensured through multilateral efforts aimed at evading or curtailing war and other forms of direct and indirect violence, protecting human rights, and providing the social and environmental resources needed for a safe and dignified human life. In short, human security is inseparable from conditions of peace.

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Governmentality IL Arms limitations continue the same logic – certain groups controlling the means of violence.Keith Krause 11. Professor at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. Leashing the Dogs of War: Arms Control from Sovereignty to Governmentality. Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.32, No.1 (April 2011), pp.20–39 ISSN 1352-3260 print

21st Century Arms Control: Towards Obsolescence or Expansion? How, if at all, is this relevant to 21st century challenges of controlling the possession and use of the means of violence? Viewed narrowly as a policy-relevant and technocratic means of regulating military competition between states to minimize the risk of accidental violent conflict (or to reduce the overall risk of conflict), the arms control paradigm is intellectually, although not necessarily practically or politically, exhausted. There remains much practical negotiation and work to be done on such things as a fissile material cut off treaty, further reductions in the American and Russian nuclear arsenals (especially of tactical nuclear weapons), and efforts to maintain the somewhat shaky edifice of nuclear non-proliferation. Other initiatives, such as restrictions on the weaponization of space, or on ballistic missile defences, seem less relevant to 21st century geopolitical realities, in which the risk of inter-state war is relatively minor, while the risk of large-scale intra-state and non-state violence remains. What the complete paralysis of the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament and the non-events of the past two decades (since the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993) have highlighted is the way in which arms control as narrowly conceived was a product of particular geopolitical conditions and presuppositions that gave rise to certain kinds of multilateral measures, based on shared understandings of the significance of stability and balance, transparency, equality, hierarchy, and the technological potential of nuclear weapons. All of these understandings have been challenged in different ways by states such as India, Pakistan, China, Egypt, North Korea, or Iran, often for reasons of national or strategic interests, but also because they reject the way in which traditional arms control practices reinforced and legitimated particular sovereign understandings of who could (and could not) possess, use, or threaten to use, particular weapons.30 But I argue that arms control practices can also be viewed more broadly through the lens of governmentality .31 To begin, the regulation of and control over the use of lethal violence was not, since the early 20th century, just about inter-state military competition. It was also about a set of social and institutional practices that imposed certain understandings about the rules for the use of force in international society, that reinforced the state's monopoly of legitimate use of force both internally and externally, and that manifest themselves through particular forms of management of a given territory, population and resources. Thus, even though some of the new frontiers of contemporary arms control do not have the same practical manifestations or targets, nor even the same actors engaged in promoting arms control, they can be understood as sharing the same premises about state power and violence. On this broader account, one could redefine arms control as being about who can possess, use, develop and transfer the technologies of violence, under what circumstances, against whom, and for what ends ? And the (critical) scholarly

question is then: what are the consequences and effects of the legitimization of particular configurations and distributions of technologies of violence? In this light, a wide range of contemporary international practices, include such things as the bans on anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions, post-conflict weapons collection and destruction efforts, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes (DDR), and security sector reform (SSR) initiatives all can be considered as new manifestations of arms control as governmentality. Some have argued that these types of measures reflect a shift towards humanitarian disarmament, or ‘disarmament as humanitarian action’, and aim to reclaim the disarmament side of the arms-control and disarmament divide.32 I would argue, however, that despite some significant differences in focus and targets, there is a great deal of continuity with the logic of governmentality that emerged in the latter stages of Cold War arms control practices.

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Structural Violence Outweighs

Structural violence locks in social and environmental tension—culminates in extinction and makes war inevitable Tamás SZENTES is a Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest, and member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 8 [April 22, 2008, “Globalisation and prospects of the world society,” http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav..pdf, (Gender modified—Sigalos)]

(1) It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace . Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but • numerous local wars took place, • terrorism has spread all over

the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, • arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc,

but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, • many “invisible wars” 1 are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty , unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination , physical terror, organised injustice , disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular

infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that • the “war against Nature” , i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance , wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life . Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intra society inequities and distorted development patterns 2 , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions , thus

paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars . It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence , of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of

social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional

system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars . Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with over exhausted resources and polluted

environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner , directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore,

the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of [hu]mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an

exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development

studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war,

etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution .

Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra- society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated . Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, well- fed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global

interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the

one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by

the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.

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Rhetorical Focus Good

Debating the rhetorical frame for war is the only way to address the sources of warJeremy ENGELS Communications @ Penn St. AND William SAAS PhD Candidate Comm. @ Penn ST. ’13 “On Acquiescence and Ends-Less War: An Inquiry into the New War Rhetoric” Quarterly Journal of Speech 99 (2) p.230-231

The framing of public discussion facilitates acquiescence in contemporary wartime: thus, both the grounds on which war has been justified and the ends toward which war is adjusted are bracketed and hence made infandous. The rhetorics of acquiescence bury the grounds for war under nearly impermeable layers of political presentism and keep the ends of war in a state of perpetual flux so that they cannot be challenged . Specific details of the war effort are excised from the public realm through the rhetorical maneuver of ‘‘occultatio,’’ and the authors of such violence*the president, his administration, and the broader national security establishment*use a wide range of techniques to displace their own responsibility in the orchestration of war.28 Freed from the need to cultivate assent, acquiescent rhetorics take the form of a status update: hence, President Obama’s March 28, 2011 speech on Libya, framed as an ‘‘update’’ to Americans ten days after the bombs of ‘‘Operation Odyssey Dawn’’ had begun to fall. Such post facto discourse is a new norm: Americans are called to acquiesce to decisions already made and actions already taken. The Obama Administration has obscured the very definition of ‘‘war’’ with euphemisms like ‘‘limited kinetic action.’’ The original obfuscation, the ‘‘war on terror,’’ is a perpetually shifting, ends-less conflict that denies the very status of war. How do you dissent from something that seems so overwhelming, so inexorable? It’s hard to hit a perpetually shifting target. Moreover, as the government has become increasingly secretive about the details of war, crucial information is kept from citizens*or its revelation is branded ‘‘treason,’’ as in the WikiLeaks case*making it much more challenging to dissent. Furthermore, government surveillance of citizens cows citizens into quietism. So what’s the point of dissent? After all, this, too, will pass. Thus even the most critical citizens come to rest in peace with war. The confidence game of the new war rhetoric is one of perpetually shifting ends. In this ‘‘post-9/11’’ paradigm of war rhetoric, citizens are rarely asked to harness their civic energy to support the war effort, but instead are called to passively cede their wills to a greater Logos, the machinery of ends-less war. President Obama has embodied the dramatic role of wartime caretaker more adeptly than his predecessor, repeatedly exhorting citizens to ‘‘look forward’’ rather than to examine the historical grounds upon which the present state of ends-less war was founded and institutionalized.29 All the while, that forward horizon is constantly being reshaped*from retribution, to prevention, to disarmament, to democratization, to intervention, and so on, as needed. What Max Weber called ‘‘charisma of office’’*the phenomenon whereby

extraordinary political power is passed on between charismatically inflected leaders*is here cast in bold relief: until and unless the grounds of the new war rhetoric are meaningfully represented and unapologetically challenged, ends-less war can only continue unabated .30

War rhetoric is a mode of display that aims to dispose audiences to certain ways and states of being in the world . This, in turn, is the essence of the new war rhetoric: authorities tell us, don’t worry, we’ve got this, just go about your everyday business, go to the mall, and take a vacation. What we are calling acquiescent rhetorics aim to disempower citizens by cultivating passivity and numbness. Acquiescent rhetorics facilitate war by shutting down

inquiry and deliberation and, as such, are anathema to rhetoric’s nobler, democratic ends. Rhetorical scholars thus have an important job to do.We must bring the objective violence of war out into the open so that all affected by war can meaningfully question the grounds, means, and ends of battle.We can do this by describing, and demobilizing, the rhetorics used to promote acquiescence. In sum, we believe that

by making the seemingly uncontestable contestable, rhetorical critics can and should begin to invent a pedagogy that would reactivate an acquiescent public by creating space for talk where we have previously been content to remain silent.

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AT: Aff Solves War

Less weapons & Arm Sales doesn’t lessen instabilityJamie Levin 15. PhD in Political Science from the University of Toronto. Rethinking Disarmament: The Role of Weapons in the Resolution of Internal Armed Conflicts. Dissertation – University of Toronto, 2015. https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/71021/3/Levin_Jamie_201511_PhD_thesis.pdf.

This research aims to shed light on both the theory and practice of disarmament, in particular the many difficulties associated with its implementation. Despite the emergence of disarmament as a strong norm, or perhaps because of it, belligerents tend to stubbornly cling to their weapons (Knight, 2004, p. 503). The widespread failure to collect weapons, however, is often neglected or downplayed, and has not prompted a systematic reevaluation of the core assumptions underlying disarmament. In fact, practitioners and theorists alike are often single-mindedly focused on devising new strategies to disarm combatants instead of stopping to question the necessity of disarmament for the successful resolution of internal conflict (these efforts are dubbed the “second generation of disarmament”). For example, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations recently released a report based on lessons learned from recent on-the ground experience ("Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations," 2010). In it, the UN recommends, a new focus on disarming women, children, and gangs, not just military structures. While the UN and others have spent considerable time and energy trying to improve the

practice of disarmament, these efforts have done little to remediate one particularly crucial underlying problem: Disarmament often generates rather than resolves feelings of insecurity by leaving belligerents defenseless and vulnerable to attack should conflict

resume (as they so often do) . The fear of insecurity is often what triggers belligerents to resist or undermine disarmament efforts and withhold weapons. Instead of being a necessary condition for internal conflict resolution, as its

proponents hold, disarmament might actually act to constrain the prospects for peace. Rather than trying to improve the practice of

disarmament, therefore, this research aims to rethink it altogether. With the aid of elite interviews, historical and contemporary research, and the extensive use of counterfactuals, I will argue that disarmament is neither necessary nor sufficient for the

resolution of internal conflict . Conflict can and (to a lesser extent) does get resolved without disarmament. Indeed, weapons have sometimes played a productive and even legitimate role in bridging the difficult transition between war and peace and post-conflict state formation, something that can be seen more clearly when exploring cases that predate the practice of disarmament.

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AT: Aff Outweighs

Aff can’t outweigh – removing the weapons doesn’t remove the SOURCE of insecurity – they are the tools used to create a feeling – have to remove the root of human insecurity first – only a risk the aff worsens the problemJamie Levin 15. PhD in Political Science from the University of Toronto. Rethinking Disarmament: The Role of Weapons in the Resolution of Internal Armed Conflicts. Dissertation – University of Toronto, 2015. https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/71021/3/Levin_Jamie_201511_PhD_thesis.pdf.

This study proposes to look at weapons in a new light. Weapons are not always destabilizing, as disarmament scholars argue, but may,

instead, prove potentially stabilizing and mitigate the insecurity associated with anarchy (Cooper, 2006, p. 356). Where belligerents fear that robust security guarantees are not forthcoming, they may turn to weapons to ensure their survival

(Spear, 2002, p. 156; B. F. Walter, 1997, p. 337; Weingast, 1998). Weapons can help actors mitigate their insecurity both by providing deterrence, which should lessen the likelihood of defection, and by providing defensive capabilities should an agreement fail and violence reerupt. In this way, weapons can be thought of as an insurance policy against their potential annihilation or disenfranchisement

from the levers of power. (c.f., Cohen, 2001, p. 48 on insurance policies; Stedman, 1997). Unlike third party guarantees, that can easily be revoked, or the norms and institutions of democracy, which are slow to mature, weapons provide a highly credible last line of defense against a peace agreement that goes horribly wrong. With weapons, belligerents need not trust their survival on the word of

another party. Instead, they need rely only on themselves. In other words, weapons are tools of self-help , remarkably similar to those

that actors under conditions of international anarchy are said to seek in order to guarantee their survival (Glassmyer & Sambanis, 2008, p. 382; Waltz, 1979). The force of arms can be used to provide protection, repel attacks, hold territory, and extract the resources necessary for long term survival (see C. Tilly,

Evans, Rueschemeyer, & Skocpol, 1985; Weber, 1978 on coercion and taxation). Even small numbers of weapons used by highly motivated troops with sufficient knowledge of their surroundings have managed to repel and, in some cases, overcome much stronger adversaries (Arreguin-Toft, 2001; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Lyall & Wilson, 2009; Mack, 1975; Petraeus & Amos, 2009). And, where third parties, democratization, and power sharing require belligerents to place their trust in others, weapons are self-enforcing tools of risk management. By providing a last line of defense, weapons allow belligerents the ability to take the risks associated with peacemaking. Without robust guarantees, such as those provided by weapons, belligerents might simply be unwilling to enter into negotiations at all or will likely defect from the terms of the agreement. Hartzell and Hoddie note, “in the absence of assurances that the process of disarmament . . . will not leave them vulnerable to future aggression, parties to the conflict often prove reluctant to either reach or honor negotiated settlements.” (2006, p. 156 emphasis added)

Weapons can, therefore, be thought of as resolving the prisoner-dilemma like scenario outlined by Walter. If combatants retain their weapons post conflict, they can reduce the possibility of surprise attack and the permanent exclusion from power. While it is no doubt true that the tools of war can

be used by belligerents to gain strategic advantage, increase bargaining leverage, or generally derail a peace process, weapons also provide insurance against the failure to achieve peace and renewed conflict. Where they do so and peace obtains, they cannot reasonably be considered spoilers. In other words, actors

might hold onto their weapons and cease fighting. That weapons correlate with instability and the failure of peace does not mean that they

are the cause of instability and failure. In fact, the opposite is often true. Conflict also triggers belligerents to seek weapons. Groups that feel threatened often turn inwards and arm for their own defense (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2006; Kaufman, 1996a; C.

Kaufmann, 1996; C. D. Kaufmann, 1998; David A Lake & Rothchild, 1996; Posen, 1993; J. Snyder & Jervis, 1999; Wendt, 1992). Weapons are, paradoxically, both the tools used to wage war as well as the means to avoid it. Context very much matters.

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AT: We save lives

The humanitarian warrant is a necessary component of justifying governmentality – it’s how control is justifiedKeith Krause 11. Professor at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. Leashing the Dogs of War: Arms Control from Sovereignty to Governmentality. Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.32, No.1 (April 2011), pp.20–39 ISSN 1352-3260 print

Of course, the story of arms control does not begin in the 1950s or 1960s. Understood broadly as a means of managing the monopoly over – and channelling the risk of –violence, state managers from the earliest historical records have attempted to control arms. This took the form of either confiscating weapons, attempting to restrict the export of know-how and ‘embodied technologies’ and even, on rare occasions, of attempting to ban or restrict the use of certain military technologies.8 Most of these restrictions were imposed by victorious parties on the vanquished after wars, or as part of the progressive development of the laws of war – both exercises of sovereign power. What these efforts did not generally involve, at least until the late 19th century, was formal cooperation between states in peacetime to regulate their military competition. By the late 19th century, however, this aspect of arms control moved to the forefront, and the period between 1899 (the first Hague conference) and the early 1930s witnessed an explosion of efforts to regulate armaments and their use. These included the Washington Naval Treaty (1922) (which was extended throughout the 1920s and early 1930s in a series of bilateral and multilateral naval agreements), the series of negotiations in the 1920s on a Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition (1919), Convention on the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and Implements of War (1925), and subsequent Draft Convention on the Private Manufacture of

Arms and Ammunition (1929), and the Geneva Protocol (1925) restricting the use of poison gas. The Cold War arms control paradigm thus did not emerge in a vacuum, and it demonstrated both elements of continuity and break with the security and ordering practices of the interwar period. The first element of continuity was that efforts to control arms were meant to preserve, if not reinforce, the geopolitical hierarchy of global politics, and the relative military advantages of particular states . The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Missile Technology Control regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar arrangement (military and dual-use technologies), the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group (chemical weapons) all reflected this logic, which was most clear in the unusual discriminatory treatment that is built into the NPT between nuclear

haves and have-nots. Arms control also thus served to perpetuate certain kinds of patron-client relations in the global geopolitical system, and to create club goods such that so-called responsible states were identified as legitimate possessors of certain kinds of technologies (missile technology, chemical precursors), while others were not. For example, membership in the various clubs often included judgments about the legitimacy and illegitimacy of certain kinds of domestic political arrangements, regarding such things as civilian control of the armed forces or appropriate forms of domestic political oversight. One example was the rehabilitation of Argentina and Brazil after the dictatorships and their joining of the NPT. Another aspect included explicit acceptance of the logic of the deterrence/arms control paradigm itself, reflected most often by participation in the ‘epistemic community of arms control’ at the national and

international level, and its conventional understandings of what constituted acceptable nuclear policies.9 This notion that arms control was not just an exercise of sovereign rule between equals, but a reflection of deeper forms of self-restraint over the use of force (domestically and internationally) opened the door towards

the different (governmental) understanding of arms control that I sketch out below. The second element of continuity was that arms control measures

often had a sort of humanitarian subtext , that echoed earlier restrictions on the civilized use of weapons, such as the banning at the Second

Lateran council of the use of crossbows against Christians, or the general opprobrium that greeted the spread of firearms on the battlefield. From the 1899 and 1907 Hague conferences, on forward to the debate around dum-dum bullets and chemical weapons in the first half of the 20th century, to contemporary debates on land mines, cluster munitions and the treaty on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), particular tropes concerning inhumane and unacceptable ways of killing and

injuring people have been deployed.10 These include such things as the ban on chemical weapons, on blinding lasers, and on anti-personnel landmines. This humanitarian subtext to most of these measures was an important part of the civilizing discourse of warfare, but was therefore also

part of the broader devil's bargain of international humanitarian law. The principle of international humanitarian law, which protects

some groups of people from some forms of weapons or violence, may also have made certain forms of inter-state war-fighting more palatable or acceptable, rather than challenging in any fundamental way the relationship between states, citizens, and violence. It may also have channelled military innovation in certain directions, without necessarily having restricted overall the destructiveness of the weapons that were deployed.11 This second element is not entirely coherent with a purely sovereign system of rule, and its emergence in the mid19th century (with the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross and progressive codification of international humanitarian law) reflects more the slow emergence of a system of rule that goes beyond the assertion of sovereignty and the relatively simple regulation of competitive relations between states, towards a more diffuse form of governmentality that focusses on ‘more subtle methods of power exercised

through a network of institutions, practices, procedures and techniques which act to regulate social conduct’.12 Sovereign power was to be subjected to self-control and the regulation of behaviour – of individual soldiers on the battlefield and of statesmen directing military machines.

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39


AT: Aff solves Militarism

Can’t stop funding militaries – too many classified and non-subsidized programsI.C.I.J. 14. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING U.S. FOREIGN MILITARY AID. May 19, 2014. https://publicintegrity.org/national-security/a-citizens-guide-to-understanding-u-s-foreign-military-aid/.

There is no single, accepted definition of the terms “foreign aid” or even “foreign military aid” or “military assistance.” For a

government as large as that of the United States, it’s virtually impossible to track all of the various federal agencies’ programs across

countries and sectors to arrive at a single number that captures the true amount of U.S. taxpayer dollars going to foreign governments, or even

just their militaries. For the “Collateral Damage” investigative study, the Center for Public Integrity created a database that tracks a subset of those financial flows: taxpayer-funded programs or assistance that contribute to a nation’s offensive military capabilities. The database does not include certain large nuclear non-proliferation programs or expenditures such as Foreign Military Sales or Direct Commercial Sales, which are not supported directly with taxpayer dollars. The database is also limited to tracking funds appropriated to either the Defense Department or the State Department. For this report, these are the criteria for “foreign military assistance” or “foreign military aid.” Funds appropriated to the State Department and Defense Department represent the vast majority of unclassified military aid and assistance. This report does not attempt to track smaller overseas

programs where funding is appropriated to the Justice Department, Drug Enforcement Agency, or Department of Homeland Security. The public does not have any way of tracking classified programs administered by the U.S. intelligence community. These classified programs likely command large amounts of funding , especially after the 9/11 attacks, and oversight is limited to members of congressional intelligence

committees. Programs included in the Center’s database: Coalition Support Funds (CSF): created after 9/11 to reimburse key allied countries for

providing assistance to the U.S. in the global war on terror. Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP): created after 9/11 to give the Defense Department its own funding to train and educate foreign military officers in counterterrorism techniques. In practice, CTFP has evolved into a program very similar to

IMET (see definition below). Department of Defense Counterdrug Funding: assists foreign militaries and security forces to combat drug trafficking

around the world; also known as Section 1004 appropriations. Economic Support Fund (ESF): provides grants to foreign governments to support economic stability. ESF is often used for non-military purposes, but the grants are commonly viewed as a way to help offset military expenditures. They have historically been earmarked

for key security allies of the United States. Israel and Egypt are the two largest recipients of ESF. Foreign Military Financing (FMF): finances foreign governments’

acquisition of U.S. military articles, services and training. International Military Education and Training (IMET): educates foreign military personnel on issues ranging from democracy and human rights to technical military techniques and training on U.S. weapons systems. International Narcotics and Law Enforcement/Andean

Counterdrug Initiative (ACI): the primary State Department funding effort for countering drugs, including the large Colombian initiatives. Military Assistance Program

(MAP): provides military material and services to foreign countries; the U.S. government is not reimbursed. MAP includes “emergency drawdowns,” which are emergency transfers authorized by the president for weapons, ammunition, parts and military equipment to foreign governments. Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism,

De-mining and Related Activities (NADR): supports de-mining, anti-terrorism, and nonproliferation training and assistance. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO): supports programs that improve foreign militaries’ peacekeeping capabilities.

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https://publicintegrity.org/national-security/a-citizens-guide-to-understanding-u-s-foreign-military-aid/

https://publicintegrity.org/national-security/a-citizens-guide-to-understanding-u-s-foreign-military-aid/


Neoliberalism Makes Aff Inevitable

Neoliberalism makes the impact inevitable – we will export death to sustain the economy – ending one sale of arms won’t change the systemJoe Brunoli 18. Progressive Army Contributor. Dual Citizen of the US and Italy. @EuroYankeeBlog. This is Neoliberalism, Part IV: The Military Industrial Complex and the Big Lie Exposed. http://progressivearmy.com/2018/05/21/neoliberalism-part-iv-military-industrial-complex-big-lie-exposed/.

The Business of America … In Part One of this series, I laid out the Ten Tenets of Neoliberalism, which declare that the Market is the Mother of All things. However, the arms manufacturing industry and its main customers in the defense, intelligence and security industries seem to be the one area of the US economy for which these laws do not apply. Indeed, neoliberalism is defined

not just by its slavish devotion to the dictates of the Market, but also by areas, sector, and industries that it singles out for exemption from those Market forces. The most indestructible weapons system known to man is one that is manufactured in all 50 States. The Defense industry is one that is virtually devoid of competition. Defense contractors charge whatever they can get away with, and their pricing and profits are rarely if ever questioned. Yes, we have heard about the famous $600 hammer and the $1000 toilet seat, but those are merely anecdotal punchlines to a cruel joke. The fact is that Defense contractors have little to no oversight, and despite the scathing and damning reports issued by the various Inspectors General for the armed services receive no attention and are rarely acted upon. A US Army private who drives a truck makes a mere fraction of what a truck driver working for a Defense contractor makes. This article in the Washington Examiner describes the various ways in which Defense contractors make three times private sector wages: … defense contractors earn three times as much as their private sector counterparts, according to a 2012 report by the nonprofit Project on Government Oversight. Raytheon charges the government $90 per hour for “administrative support/clerical” work for individuals with a minimum of a high school diploma and two years of experience, and slightly more than $100 per hour for first-tier management consulting. Rates for labor are offered as a price to the government, with no information available as to how much is used for overhead, profit or actually distributed to workers in the form of pay. Moreover, the government does not collect data on the number of contractors it hires. Spending on federal contracts has increased 45 percent in the past decade, which may help explain why we are now spending 40%

more on Defense overall than we were in 2004–2005 -at the height of the Iran and Iraq Wars. So where are those Market forces? The short answer is that Market forces play no role under neoliberal regimes when it comes to military spending or spending on other areas that are of

personal or class-based importance to the ruling oligarchy. This is why, as I explained in Part Three of this series, military service has become the last resort for so many of American youth. In the absence of access to affordable education or decent-paying jobs in the private sector, our young people

are forced to risk their lives — and possibly take the lives of others — in order to get by. Uncle Sam is always hiring, and can always afford to hire. The Big Secret of Neoliberalism: Deficits don’t matter “Reagan proved that deficits don’t matter,” Vice President Dick Cheney said when the Bush administration sought a second round of tax cuts in 2003. Yes, the great neoliberal icon, Ronald Reagan, who claimed we could simply not afford social programs, who claimed the government was too big and spent too much, didn’t mind going into the red when it came to stoking up the arms race or handing big tax cuts to his wealthy donors and friends. And many of them were in the “arms industry”. In the 2018 US Budget, defense and military spending were increased by $80 Billion a year. No debate. No discussion. No filibustering. 60% of Democrats joined with Republicans to approve this massive increase in military spending, which, quantitatively speaking, was

much more than the cost of providing tuition-free college to every American student. But no one asked, “how are you going to pay for that?” Trade Agreements are Now Arms Agreements — and Vice Versa Many on the Left wondered why Obama and the Democrats were so fervently pushing the TPP. While some realized that Obama’s “pivot to Asia” was not just on defense, but also on trade, fewer still realized that defense and trade were now one and the same interest. The TPP will usher in a new era of massive arms sales to Pacific countries. In 2016, in preparation for what they believed would be a passing of the TPP, the Obama Administration lifted a long-standing ban on arms sales to Communist Vietnam. Why? Because we do not want them to be buying their

drones from China. Likewise, the enormous arms deals that we have signed with Saudi Arabia and Israel are not just for strategic purposes. Our support for the war in Yemen is not ideologically based — it is economically based . The US is one of the sole producers of such weapons as cluster munitions, white phosphorous and depleted uranium tipped shells — all of which are either banned or have been condemned by the international community. It is getting harder and harder to find buyers for these goods. The Saudis and Israelis are happy to provide a market for them. Recently, CNN’s Wolf Blitzer spilled the beans about what our relationship with these countries means. In a contentious interview with Senator Rand Paul, Blitzer challenged the Senator’s opposition to the US aiding Saudi Arabia in its war in Yemen, claiming that stopping the Saudi support for the Yemeni genocide would result in lost jobs here at home: “So for you this is a moral issue,” he told Paul during the Kentucky Republican’s appearance on CNN. “Because you know, there’s a lot of jobs at stake. Certainly if a lot of these defense contractors stop selling war planes, other sophisticated equipment to Saudi Arabia, there’s going to be a significant

loss of jobs, of revenue here in the United States. That’s secondary from your standpoint?” The Death Economy The above clip from CNN really says everything that needs to be said about the imperial manifestation of US neoliberal economic policies. We cannot stop making war because our economy runs on death . The tentacles of the Military Industrial Complex are sunk deep into every Congressional District, and the manufacture and sale of weapons have now become the dominant US industry in terms of

providing “good manufacturing jobs.” All other such jobs have been outsourced and off-shored under a succession of neoliberal trade

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 agreements. The US Military Industrial Complex has been given immunity from the neoliberal “Market forces” that have ravaged all other

sectors of the American manufacturing base. This was done on a bipartisan basis over decades. And now we must accept the fact that the US economy literally runs on spreading death and misery around the world. The solution? Reject neoliberalism.

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AT: Neoliberalism is Vacuous

Neoliberalism isn’t vacuous – it’s just describing a complicated system of letting the market drive decisionsJeremy Fox 16. Journalist and Consultant, Taught at the Centre for Teaching and Research Economics (CIDE) in Mexico City. “NEOLIBERALISM” IS IT? https://www.resilience.org/stories/2016-01-18/neoliberalism-is-it/.

Samuel Beckett once remarked that he switched to writing in French rather than English because he considered it impossible to express anything in English that was not ambiguous. Linguistic reform under the auspices of the Académie Française in 17th century France resulted in a literary language stripped of foreign borrowings and regional accretions, and about which a century later Rivarol famously claimed that “If it isn’t clear, it isn’t French”.[1] English, by contrast, has always been accumulative, happily borrowing from everywhere, unruffled by neologisms, grammatical innovations and ambivalence. It thus came as a surprise to read in William

Davies recent piece that the term neoliberalism has been savagely dismissed as ‘vacuous’ and that so ‘distinguished’ a pressure group as

Progress as well as various other soothsayers have described it as a mindless insult employed by intellectually lazy people who have no sense of what it might mean. In rejecting these complaints, Davies tells us that ‘neoliberalism’ is both complex and ambiguous because, like other watchwords of political discourse, it is an abstraction capable of multiple interpretations

and shades of meaning, just like capitalism, communism, democracy, and liberty. What concepts like these have in common is that they resist one-line interpretation; and the more we try to pin them down, the more complex and contentious they seem to become. Inability to elucidate a notion, however, is not the same as lacking a general grasp of its sense. Called upon to define our daily use of words of more than one syllable, many of us would probably flunk the test . However, that doesn’t make what we say unintelligible. Compared with some other candidates, ‘neoliberalism’ does not seem to be an especially elusive abstraction. I take it to mean marketisation of the public realm as a political project. Its current popularity among political leaders of a certain hue is that it has the appearance of offering value-free decision-making because it allows market competition rather than ideological bias to determine value. They are thereby absolved, at least in theory, from responsibility for the provision of important public services. In their place, the private sector runs the services on a competitive basis, or alternatively individuals and self-organised collectives take charge of their own needs. A recent example of the latter is the flood defence initiative in the

North Yorkshire town of Pickering. A core principle of neoliberalism is that citizens are to be defined first and foremost as consumers. Hence why ‘neoliberal’ governments insist on ‘consumer choice’ in sectors like health and education, a proposition that derives its force from a now widely discredited but still vital element of classical economic theory which posits that consumers act rationally in their own interests. “Rational” is another word capable of multiple interpretations, but for economists it means optimising the benefit or utility of a transaction; and it is supposed to be what we do, even though three hundred and fifty years ago Pascal had already worked out that we don’t – not always at any rate.[2] Here, therefore, we must wave goodbye to Freud, Jung and the subconscious.

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Alternative

44


AT: Impossible

The alt is possible – lots of success in the 50s and 60s – framing those success key to moving forwardNeil Cooper 06. Professor of International Relations and Security Studies and Head of Peace Studies & International Development, The University of Bradford. "Putting disarmament back in the frame." Review of International Studies 32.2 (2006): 353-376.

This categorisation of disarmament highlights part of the problem with the way in which arms control theory frames both arms control and disarmament. First, in framing disarmament as failed and Utopian it downplays the progress made in realising the disarmament agenda of the 1950s and 60s that structural disarmament combined with a series of partial disarmament treaties has brought, and thus the extent to which even Utopia might be realistic for future generations. Second, in enveloping a succession of really existing disarmament initiatives within the essentially realist/neorealist framework of the arms control perspective it undermines the claim of disarmament as a practice and set of goals with real-world relevance. In combination this amounts to a very powerful discursive strategy that works to maintain the intellectual hegemony of arms control theory in particular and realist

academia and policymaking more generally. To invert Ken Booth, what is at work here is what might be termed realist utopianism33 - the capture and suborning of Utopian achievements in ways that work to shore up the realist view of a world long on dangers and short on peaceful strategies to confront them. In contrast, when the various types of disarmament (some of which have a decidedly non-utopian

flavour to them) are reclaimed under the disarmament rubric, then it becomes clear that the world has, and is, experiencing a tremendous amount of disarmament - some of it relatively successful. This also has profound implications for the supposed distinction between arms control and disarmament around which arms control theory is based. Once we move from framing (successful) partial disarmament as merely one variant of arms control, and instead frame both GCD and partial disarmament as variants of disarmament practice; once we understand disarmament as an activity that is advocated by both Utopians and hyper-realists alike (albeit in different ways) then both the empirical and philosophical distinctions between arms control and

disarmament fall away. As will be noted below, this implies that we need to develop an alternative way of conceptualising the different strategies of arms limitation and the structure of the contemporary arms limitation system.

45


Perm: AT: End arms sales

Ending arms sales isn’t enough – doesn’t change the economicsMartin Broek 02. Researcher working at the Campagne tegen Wapenhandel in Amsterdam, editor of 'Indonesia: arms trade to a military regime'. Arms are not Tomatoes. Asia Europe Crosspoints. https://www.tni.org/en/article/arms-are-not-tomatoes.

III. Arms are not Tomatoes Arms production differs from the production of many other goods and it for this it is given "special treatment" status. During the G-8 meeting in 2000, arms exports were described as non-productive(27) - implying they have no function to improve the living conditions of people unlike food, mobile telephones or furniture. The G8 and World Bank and IMF(28) criticism on arms exports however is mainly focused on poor economies -

mainly in the South. Similar criticism is not applied where most needed - in the capitals of the North where all major decisions on new armament programmes are made. Neither is this criticism applied to governments introducing new weapon systems in other regions of the world for example when European submarines were are sold to Southeast Asia (29) or when the US sells its Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM).

(30) Weapons manufacturing and arms trade are not a direct cause of conflict, but the availability of large amounts of arms makes the outbreak of conflict more probable and severely narrows the possibilities of seeking peaceful solutions to conflict. Moreover, the proliferation of arms directly impact on human rights violations and absorb huge proportions of state budgets. But it is too simplistic to just call for a stop on all arms production or call arms economically useless. We need to underline the connection between economic domination and the need of military force to defend it. Thomas Friedman has been very explicit about this when he remarks that "the hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist ."(31) This inter-relationship between economic and military politics challenges peace, security and anti-arms trade groups to develop an alternative security paradigm focused on the wellbeing of people rather than on profits of the TNCs. This will also open up new possibilities of cooperation with other social movements, particularly the global movement for economic justice.

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Perm: AT: Aff Challenges Militarism

Controlling Arms Sales doesn’t change the security apparatus – it operates within the same systemKeith Krause 11. Professor at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. Leashing the Dogs of War: Arms Control from Sovereignty to Governmentality. Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.32, No.1 (April 2011), pp.20–39 ISSN 1352-3260 print

What were some of the conceptual parameters of the 20th century arms control paradigm, and how did they fit with or break from the previous historical

experience? The Cold War paradigm was, according to its earliest architects and thinkers, built around three main goals.17 The first, and

most obvious, was that arms control was a means of managing the superpower nuclear confrontation. Arms control's primary goal was to reduce the risk of war – in this case of accidental nuclear war – and perhaps incidentally to reduce the costs associated with vertical nuclear proliferation. Early formal agreements such as the Hot Line Agreement (20 June 1963), the Outer Space Treaty (10 October 1967), or the Seabed Treaty (18 May 1972) were explicitly designed to achieve either risk reduction or reduce the potential costs associated with extended arms racing to all realms. There were two other stated goals, however, on which the Cold War practice of arms control had little or no impact: reducing the destructiveness of war should it break out; and reducing the cost of preparations for the wars that weren't supposed to happen. The continued pace of technological improvements in nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction, certain offered no reassurance that the destructiveness of modern warfare had been systematically reduced, although it is certainly the case that one consistent thread has been the attempt to develop ever more accurate and targeted weapons systems in order to make the use of force more precise. Debates

over civilian casualties in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, point to the difficulties of constraining the destructiveness of modern war. And – as John

Mueller pointed out recently – the more than US$5.5 trillion spent on the American nuclear arsenal since 1940 (not to mention other nuclear states), and

the more than one trillion dollars in annual global military expenditures, suggests that arms control by itself did little to curtail military spending on weapons systems.18 What restraint that has been exercised has mostly been driven by economic and budgetary ,

rather than strategic, considerations related to arms control. So what remains is a set of formal arms control agreements,

mostly bilateral, but also a few that were multilateral, designed to manage the potentially most dangerous and destabilizing aspects of inter-state conflict

dynamics. They channeled the confrontation between the superpowers into a technical and problem-solving logic that would facilitate decision making about what kinds of weapons to produce and deploy, and under what circumstances to use them. In addition, after some of the conceptual confusions of early nuclear strategy (such as Massive Retaliation), arms control became part of the logic by which decisions over appropriate (rational) strategies could be designed. In the 1960s and 1970s, in context of the East-West conflict and nuclear proliferation,

maintaining the conditions of stable deterrence and reducing the risk of war was perhaps a politically and normatively laudable goal. But arms control was

thus also linked to deterrence theory and practice, and to the entire functioning of the so-called military-industrial complex, and not something distinct and in opposition to it. This vision would not necessarily be accepted by those – such as researchers at the Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and other think-tanks – who saw themselves as growing out of the peace and anti-nuclear weapons movements, but I

think the policy acceptability of SIPRI's work (for example) came precisely from its progressive acceptance of the underlying rules of the game.19 What were these rules of the game? There are four elements of the Cold War practice of arms control that warrant a deeper

exploration in order to illustrate the normalizing and sovereign logic of arms control. The first element was the attempt by proponents of arms control to

distinguish it from advocacy of disarmament in any form. Disarmament was associated with the failed attempts to negotiate reductions in armaments during the interwar period. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was associated with the peace and anti-nuclear movements, and was seen as the preserve of impractical idealist efforts – at best politically naïve; at worst politically suspect. As Jeffrey Larsen notes, ‘in the early 1960s international security specialists began using the term arms control in place of the term disarmament, which they believed lacked precision and smacked of utopianism. The seminal books on arms control

published in that era all referred to this semantic problem’.20 So arms control was presented by its practitioners as directed towards controlling or regulating the numbers, types, deployment or use of certain types or quantities of arms, and disarmament was defined as involving the reduction or the elimination of particular weapons and weapons systems, and/or foreswearing of acquisition of new weapons.21 Although occasionally agreements were signed that did eliminate weapons systems or particular classes of weapons, most notably the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty that eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, when seen as part of the broader spectrum of nuclear capabilities, such restrictions were tilted more

towards the control side of the equation.22 Overall, arms control reinforced, not undermined, sovereign state power. The second, related,

element was the technocratic or problem-solving orientation of arms control practices . Its political acceptability came

from its claim to operate within the same policy frame as other forms of military-strategic thinking , including of

47

Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 course deterrence theory and strategy, alliance-building, and the entire military-industrial logic that shaped Western (and arguably Eastern) security policy. More importantly, however, it provided legitimacy to a counter-intuitive set of policy prescriptions (such as leaving your own civilian population vulnerable to nuclear attack, or revealing the equivalent of state secrets as part of confidence-building measures). And finally, the technocratic approach also was, in its strongest version, opposed to the irrational and uncontrollable prescriptions of what, as early as President Eisenhower, was called the military-

industrial complex. High level proponents of arms control (Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, for example, as well perhaps as Secretary

of State Henry Kissinger), regarded the defence establishment as unable to set limits on its threat assessment and concomitant arms

acquisitions. They wished to subject security policy to rational managerial techniques, including such ideas as diminishing marginal returns to investments in new weapons, cost-benefit analysis for weapons systems, and trade offs between competing goals (the guns-versus-butter debate).23 As Henry Kissinger is once purported to have said, ‘What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?’ thus expressing his frustration with the inability of the nuclear defense establishment to provide a rationale for its weapons acquisition plans.24 Even more hawkish arms controllers subscribed to the rational calculus, with, for example, Paul Nitze arguing, with respect to ballistic

missile defense (Star Wars), that it had to be cost effective on the margin in order to make strategic sense.25 Arms control was thus more rational – and

promised to achieve the same national security goals (including war-fighting dominance) at lower cost. But the actual achievements of arms control negotiations, treaties and agreements are difficult to assess, even if we use some counter-factual analysis. As noted above, arms control failed to stem the

technological arms race, failed to reduce spending on weapons, and perhaps played only a marginal role in preventing a violent superpower confrontation. In all of its forms, arms control was not a transformative paradigm – but a techno-managerial project . The transformation of inter-

state relations via either nuclear disarmament or nuclear holocaust was to be avoided at all costs, and the management of the superpower arms race was a sort of via media between these two Manichean visions. Parenthetically, some prominent advocates, such as Robert McNamara, or President Barack Obama, who have argued prominently for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, claim implicitly or explicitly that there is a seamless conceptual thread that goes from arms control to nuclear disarmament, and that all that distinguishes one from the other is the relative time horizon or degree of pragmatism of the advocates.26 But this is both

conceptually and practically unlikely – if arms control is a set of techno-managerial practices fully integrated into the Cold War logic of national security strategy, then it is unable to make the leap to disarmament – which involves an entirely different idea about the place of violence in social and political life. Recent debates around the ratification of the New START treaty in late 2010 illustrated how it hardly represented a step towards deeper nuclear reductions.

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Perm: AT: We are anti Weapons

Fixing weapons fails – have to re-orient human securityMartin Broek 02. Researcher working at the Campagne tegen Wapenhandel in Amsterdam, editor of 'Indonesia: arms trade to a military regime'. Arms are not Tomatoes. Asia Europe Crosspoints. https://www.tni.org/en/article/arms-are-not-tomatoes.

As bigger portions of national budgets are being spent in arms production and procurement, ever-greater inequities between investment in arms and investment in people become more glaring. Two warships ordered by Malaysia from the UK "at a cost of US$ 661 million, could have provided water for nearly a quarter century to the five million people without safe water". Likewise, it is estimated that the overall costs of the Joint Strike Fighter, developed by several countries of the North, will be US$ 500 billion.(43) At the same time 17 million people die each year because of poor nutrition and an unsafe environment - particularly from polluted water. Military budgets can be allocated to better ends than arms acquisitions in the South but

even more so in the North. It is not enough to criticize the 'iron fist' military policies if this is not combined with a sharply identified agenda of people's oriented security . Global poverty is no accident, but the result of the current neo-liberal policy regime - which is enforced by military might when deemed necessary. It is this power politics which is at the core of the 'real threat' to our human security. To create genuine security the most protected should not be the arms industry, but the people. Despite the limitations in the concept, human security creates new opportunities to connect peace and security agendas to the agenda of the movement for a just and social globalisation. We need to reclaim security from the military and make people not arms the first security consideration . In its preparation for the World Summit on Sustainable Development,(44) the South African Cease Fire campaign urged people to participate actively in this debate and challenge insider military security experts' assessments of security and justification of military

budgets. Creating genuine security, means protecting the people and not the arms industry.

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Aff Answers

50


Link Turn

51


2ac – Plan Fights Militarism

Limiting arms transfers can combat militarism – EVEN IF done for selfish reasons – it can switch the market to challengeJonathan D. Caverley 17. Research scientist in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology & Associate Professor of Strategy in the Strategic. Slowing the Proliferation of Major Conventional Weapons: The Virtues of an Uncompetitive Market. Carnegie Council for Ethics & International Affairs, 31, no 4 (2017), pp 401-418.

As with gasoline, Coca-Cola, and heroin, global demand for major conventional weapons is both massive and hard to counteract. Moreover, one cannot understand any of these markets without acknowledging the crucial role played by the United States. This essay employs both of these insights to analyze the global production and sale of the principal tools of war, including fighter aircraft, armored vehicles, naval vessels, and the munitions they deliver.1 In doing so, it argues that a power such as the United States—indeed perhaps only the United States—can develop an effective, if self-serving, international order for moderating arms transfers in a world of ongoing international competition, weak norms, fuzzy laws, and shallow institutions. To paraphrase Harold Lasswell’s famous

definition of politics, international relations is largely a matter of who gets what weapons, when, and how . Exporting weapons remains the practice of many states and the ambition of many more. The pressures of international politics not only push states to defend themselves but also encourage economic nationalism and pride—the three primary justifications for a domestic arms industry and the exports to support it. On top of this, many countries believe, often incorrectly, that large economic and political gains result from

selling weapons abroad. For these states, a healthy arms export business serves as both a signal of international power and a means of exercising it. Proliferation of major conventional weapons (MCW) in larger numbers, at greater levels of sophistication, and to more actors is at best a waste of valuable resources and at worst fuel for more and bloodier conflicts .2 Imported weapons are used to repress local populations as well as to fight international wars.3 Beyond that, as much as 40 percent of the world’s corruption has been associated with the arms trade.4 Given this track record of violence, repression, and graft, norms against exporting weapons to active conflicts and human rights abusers, as well as norms in favor of transparency in weapons transfers, have grown more salient in recent years. The 2014 UN Conventional Arms Trade Treaty (CATT), for example, may appear to be a positive step in encouraging, if not enforcing, such behavior, but compliance with CATT and other, less formally expressed norms has been limited. As of mid-2017, ninety-two states have ratified or acceded to the CATT, but four of the most important market-makers in the global arms trade—Russia, China, India, and Saudi Arabia—have not signed the treaty. Indeed, observers actually complain of a recent decline in defense transparency through much of the world.5 The limited effect of multilateral cooperation in a world of increasing arms transfers prompts this essay to suggest a counterintuitive means of

limiting the spread of such conventional weapons. If one accepts that demand for weapons will remain high, that many countries aspire to provide them, and that reducing global arms sales is normatively desirable , then an uncompetitive market—where prices are higher, orders are lower, and less technology is transferred—will shape arms transfers in a positive way . Given the

inelastic nature of this demand, a monopoly or, better yet, a cartel provides the most feasible means of moderating supply. Only one country has the capacity to create such a market. The first two sections of the essay describe the United States’ distinctive position as a MCW supplier, both in terms of its market share and in terms of its unique portfolio of buyers. Sections three and four detail how the United States is already using its position to curb MCW exports to problematic regimes. The final two sections argue that although U.S. market dominance may be slightly eroding and its policy of “unilateral restraint” may be

fading, the United States can still leverage its market power to create and lead an informal cartel of MCW exporters. Although such an arrangement may be motivated by pure selfinterest , it will go a long way toward slowing MCW

proliferation.

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Ext - Arms Sales Fuel Militarism

Ending arms sales challenges militarism and neoliberalism – it’s a first step that can be included in broader challengesGwyn Kirk and Margo Okazawa-Rey 00. Assistant Adjunct Professor of Race, Gender and Sexuality Studies @ Mills College & Professor at Fielding Graduate University and one of the founding membersof the International Network of Women. Neoliberalism, Militarism, and Armed Conflict. Social Justice Vol. 27, No. 4 (2000).

The analyses in this special issue show the need for understanding connections between neoliberalism and militarism and for

addressing this linkage through activist efforts. This means opposing Plan Columbia, for example, as a neoliberal strategy as well as a military

intervention into the FARC's struggle for self determination. It means exposing the fraud of the War on Drugs in the United States, Latin America, and elsewhere,

and articulating genuine solutions to the problem of poverty and lack of economic opportunity for small drug producers and users. Opposing neoliberalism also means seeking effective strategies toward de? militarization, dismantling the permanent war economy,

and working for eco? nomic justice in a world of limited resources. It means opening up public discourse on the economic reasons for war, the profitability of arms sales, and the costs of militarism in human, environmental, and economic terms. Steps toward demilitarization include: -

Decommissioning weapons of mass destruction and opposing the militarization of space. - Reducing weapons production and sales , and promoting initiatives for conversion of military-based industries to provide for civilian needs. -Developing nonmilitary forms of strength to counter military threats, and expanding and disseminating current knowledge and experience of peaceful resolution to conflicts. - Developing renewable sources of energy. - Stopping the glorification of war and warriors, supporting initiatives like the Hague Appeal for Peace and UNESCO's culture of peace, and defining adventure and heroism in nonmilitary terms. - Broadening notions of conventional masculinity and femininity and delinking masculinity and militarism. -Developing genuinely democratic processes and structures for political and economic decision-making at community, national, and transnational levels. -Redirecting public spending to meet human

and environmental needs and opposing assaults on locally controlled government purchasing and legislation by the WTO. The increasing integration of the world economy requires and has given rise to new political movements across national and regional boundaries. It is clear to many

people around the world that neither capitalism nor militarism can guarantee genuine security for the majority of the world's population or

for the planet itself. The thousands of labor activists, environmentalists, human rights activists, indigenous peoples, feminists, and students who came together in November 1999 in Seattle, and in Washington, D.C., Windsor (Ontario), Melbourne, and Prague during 2000 show a growing ability to

integrate issues that have been kept separate in the past (Brecher, Costello, and Smith, 2000). Progressive people must articulate our visions of genuine security based on sustainable environmental and economic principles, accountable political systems, and sturdy connections among people that acknowledge and transcend identities and territories. Our focus must be on global security.

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Impact Answers

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AT: Securitization Causes Extinction

No extinction from securitization --- the public will checkRosati & Scott 14—Jerel A. Rosati a Professor of international studies and political science at the University of South Carolina; James M. Scott a Professor of political science at Texas Christian University [The Politics of United States Foreign Policy, 6th ed., p. 347-348]

A second consequence, usually ignored by those who hold to the traditional wisdom, is that for some issues, especially those that are most salient, public opinion may act as an immediate and direct constraint on political officials in the policymaking process. No matter how inattentive, uninformed , and erratic public opinion is , the public vote political leaders in and out of office, so elected officials are particularly sensitive to public opinion . Within the White House, it is not uncommon to hear people say that “compared with analysts, presidents and potential presidents themselves see a close link between stands in foreign policy and the outcomes of presidential elections” (Halperin 1974:67). Even a casual review of the past two decades reveals extensive efforts by each administration to shape and cultivate public opinion and support (see Heilemann and

Halperin 2010 on the 2008 presidential election). Furthermore, if public feeling becomes intense concerning an issue, it severely constrains the choices available within the policymaking process. As Henry Kissinger (1957:328) once observed, “The acid test of a policy…is its ability to obtain domestic support.” Once the public was educated and let on the issue of anticommunism, American leaders began to feel constrained by public opinion, as cold war lessons—for instance that the United States should take a hardline approach and never appease aggressors—were internalized by Americans. The last

remnant of this anticommunist legacy in the present era can still be seen in U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea and Cuba. In addition, public support for a policy may turn rapidly into public disapproval . Although the public tends to rally around the flag and the president during a

crisis such as war, public support for presidential policies tends to dwindle over time . Studies, such as John Mueller’s (1973) classic, War,

Presidents, and Public Opinion, demonstrate that the longer a war lasts (and the greater the casualties), the more public support will erode . Quick and successful operations, as in Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf, and Kosovo maximize support; lengthy and unsuccessful conflicts, as in Korea,

Vietnam, Lebanon, and Iraq bring public disapproval (see Gelpi, Feaver, and Reiffler 2005/06). George W. Bush learned how quickly public approval can pivot as support changed to opposition as time, cost and casualties mounted in Iraq after 2003, and Barack Obama watched public support evaporate for his initial economic policies as well as military action in Afghanistan. Bruce Jentleson (1992:72) found that public opinion “varies according to the ‘principal policy objective’ for which force is used.” The tendency is for greater public support for the use of force in order to “contain” and “restrain” an aggressor state—such as in the Persian Gulf War—as opposed to using force to “initiate” and “impose” internal political change within another state—such as within Nicaragua, Somalia, or Haiti. Obviously, many cases are likely to be, or be perceived as, somewhat mixed. Nevertheless, Jentleson (1992:72) concludes: The American public is

less gun shy that during the Vietnam trauma period or the 1970s, but more cautious than during the Cold War consensus of the 1950s and 1960s…Presidents who contemplate getting militarily involved in internal [END OF PAGE 347] political conflicts—of which there may well be even more in the

post-Cold War world than when bipolarity had its constraining effects—had better get in and out quickly and successfully. Otherwise, the public is strongly disposed to oppose the policy . Thus the public tends to discriminate over the use of force more than is

commonly thought and is “pretty prudent.” As can be seen in the war in Iraq , from overwhelming support in early 2003 at the beginning of the invasion, public support dwindled steadily—with temporary interruptions for such events as the capture of Saddam Hussein or the Iraqi

elections in 2005—to the point where over half the public regarded the actions as a mistake by early 2005 . Similarly, the public’s

preference for withdrawal has also increased steadily as casualties have mounted (Mueller 2005). In late 2005, for example, polls showed that , even

while democracy promotion was embraced by most Americans as a foreign policy goal, a majority of Americans opposed the use of military force (either directly or via threats) to promote democracy, and believed that the goal of establishing democracy in Iraq did not warrant going to war. Finally, the collapse of the cold war consensus has made public opinion somewhat less responsive to the president. During the 1950s, most American leaders and members of the elite public shared a similar cold war view of the world that the

mass public tended to follow. Since the Vietnam War, however, differing views of the world and U.S. foreign policy have arisen , leading to

greater diversity and volatility in public opinion. This has made it more difficult for the president to rally and maintain public support for particular polices in an environment where opinion leaders with different foreign policy views now compete with each other for public support.

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AT: Security Causes War

The negative’s wholesale rejection of securitization fails – adopting a framework of issue-specific consequentialist evaluation of securitization can solve the neg’s impacts while still solving the caseFloyd 07 (Rita Floyd, University of Warwick, Review of International Studies, Vol 33 p 327-250)

Towards a consequentialist evaluation of security Considering the two brief overviews of the different schools provided in the first section, it could be argued that Wæver has an overly negative conception of security, whereas Booth and Wyn Jones have an overly positive conception of security. This article will aim to show that

what form security takes is entirely issue-dependent, leaving both camps having something important and valid to contribute to the study of security as both camps can potentially be right. Issue-dependent hereby does not mean that, for

example, all securitisations in one particular sector are always positive (negative) – indeed this article will show how differently securitisations in

the environmental sector can turn out – it rather means that every incidence of securitisation is unique. Since this is the case, however, security in general is neither as good nor as bad as the two camps argue, but rather it is a mixed bag . In the approach proposed here,

principles that determine whether a securitisation is positive or negative can only be derived by considering what would have been the alternative solution. Given that for the Copenhagen School, securitisation is nothing but ‘an extreme version of politicisation’,45 the question to consider in evaluating the nature of securitisation must be: did the securitisation in question achieve more, and/or better results than a mere politicisation of the issue would have done? It is important to note here,

that ‘more and better’, is not equivalent to the success of the speech act (successful securitisation can still be negative), but rather it refers to whether the consequences of, and the gains from, the securitisation are preferable relative to the consequences and gains from a politicisation. The idea that the moral rightness (or wrongness) of a securitisation depends on its consequences corresponds to what in moral philosophy is known as a consequentialist ethics. Consequentialism46 referring to a set of moral philosophies, which hold ‘that the rightness of an action is to be judged solely by consequences, states of affairs brought about by the action’.47 Or, put slightly

differently ‘a consequentialist theory [. . .] is an account of what justifies an option over alternatives – the fact that it promotes values.’48 These premises capture well what is meant by positive and negative securitisation in this article, for the adjectives positive and negative do

not refer to the relative success of the speech act that is securitisation, but rather to how well any given security policy addresses the insecurity in question. The approach introduced in this article will henceforth be referred to as a consequentialist evaluation of security. In moral philosophy

the idea that the moral rightness (or wrongness) of an action is attributable to its consequences alone is of course contentious (see also fn. 46). The question that arises is thus, why, in the evaluation of security/ securitisation, focus on consequences as opposed to, for example, rights as deontologists would have it, or indeed virtues, as virtue theorists suggest? Much of the answer to this question already lies in the argument of this article. Thus it is not only this author’s opinion that the key to security evaluation lies with its consequences, rather

scholars from both the schools discussed above, with their respective positive and negative views of security, themselves already focus on what they take to be the consequences of security. That is to say these scholars themselves are consequentialists. However, and as this article aims to show, the consequentialism proposed by them is neither very balanced nor, in the long run, particularly helpful, as in both cases, consequentialism is constricted by the nature of their respective theoretical frameworks. Frameworks, whereby one promotes security as emancipation, therefore generating a necessarily positive view of security, whilst the other school’s framework for analysis is void of emancipation altogether, therefore partial to a negative view of security. That security is neither always positive nor negative but rather issue dependent is the key hypothesis of this article. If this hypothesis holds true we are – as a discipline – much in need of a more balanced and indeed critical evaluation of security than proposed by either school, a provision of which is the purpose of this article. Given what has been

said so far it should have become clear that the herewith proposed consequentialist evaluation of security is also the key to rendering the above-mentioned ‘normative dilemma of speaking and writing security’ less important, as it enables the analyst to critically evaluate his/her speaking and writing security, rather than his/her simply speaking and writing security. This approach thus enables the previously solely analytical securitisation analyst to step into the security equation and on behalf of the actors encourage some securitisations and renounce others, depending on the moral rightness of the respective securitisation’s consequences. It is precisely at this point where the emancipatory nature of the

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 Welsh School’s security studies becomes crucially relevant for a consequentialist evaluation of security, for – under this approach – it is the task of the analyst to fight ignorance (or, put differently, false consciousness) on the part of existing and/or potential securitising actors and inform (or better enlighten) them of the best possible actions . But how does the analyst know what the best possible

actions are? Or, put differently, with what standards in mind are the consequences to be evaluated? Is it enough to problematise securitisation by elites for elites, and make majority consensus the measuring unit behind the principles for positive/negative securitisation? One should think not. Although it is useful to assume, that the narrower the interest group behind the securitisation, the more likely it is to be negative, this cannot

be ascertained as the only general principle. After all, majority consensus does not prevent the effective securitisation of something that is morally/ethically wrong. But how to determine what is morally/ethically right? In security studies, one way of doing so, is by entering the evaluation of positive/negative through the discourses of security prevalent in the different sectors of security. Here, by working out the specific security relations in the competing discourses that make up the individual sector

– who or what is the referent object of security, who is the securitising actor and what is the nature of the threat – it should be possible to determine the most and the least advantageous strategies in addressing insecurity; thereby determining which approach to security (in the

individual sector) is the best (most positive) all-round – morally, ethically, effective – strategy. A consequentialist evaluation of security thus postulates the maximisation of genuine security as its overarching value. The invocation of values itself is perfectly legitimate, particularly considering that ‘every moral theory invokes values such that it can make sense to recommend in consequentialist fashion that they be promoted or in non-consequentialist fashion that they be honoured,

Their impact assessment is a rigged game – they pre-determine the outcome of securitization ignoring counter-evidence.

Floyd 8 (Rita Floyd, ESRC Postdoctoral fellow, Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS), University of Warwick, "Consequentialist evaluation of security for cooperative International Society: A framework for analysis" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008 Online <PDF>. 2008-06-25 http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p251976_index.html)

Since the end of the Cold War security studies has changed greatly and by now nontraditional security issues such as the environment have become established alongside more traditional military security issues.2 The debate characteristic for the 1990s between the so-called ‘wideners’ and the ‘traditionalists’ of security has been ‘won’ by the former, with security both widened and at the same time deepened to include alongside the state other referent objects of security, for example,

the individual.3 Non-traditional or alternative approaches to the study of security -at least in Europe have become firmly established alongside more traditional security studies, with the latter now more commonly referred to by the label strategic studies.4 No longer primarily concerned with the debate of ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’, analysts working with such approaches have had time to develop their research agendas and with the so-called Copenhagen-, Welsh- and Paris schools5, as well as with the human security approach four distinct, if at times overlapping approaches, have emerged.

Proponents of each of these four different approaches to security are concerned with the consequences of securitisation and desecuritisation

in so far as in each case their anticipation of these consequences forms the basis for their normative position, with the latter informing their policy-making recommendations. The constructivist security analyst is necessarily concerned with the consequences of securitisation and desecuritisation, because any such analyst realises that she contributes to the coconstitution of social and political reality simply by virtue of writing about security. Despite this realisation , however, and as the remainder of

this section shows, each of the four alternative approaches’ view of the consequences of desecuritisation and securitisation is one-sided, as in each case these anticipated consequences are already enshrined into the individual theoretical framework of the respective approach, disallowing conceptual room for alternative consequences of either . As a result all current normative security theory is fundamentally limited. The here proposed consequentialist evaluation of security takes this shortcoming of all exiting alternative security theories as its point of departure.

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http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p251976_index.html


AT: Governmentality Bad

Governmental control isn’t evilStan Luger 17. **Professor and Chair of political science, University of Northern Colorado. **Brian Waddell, Associate Professor of political science, University of Connecticut. What American Government Does. John Hopkins University Press. 362-71.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT has become very controversial in the United States. Many Americans misunderstand what government does generally and underappreciate the specific role that government plays in guaranteeing America's success as a nation.

The US government has improved the lives of Americans in numerous ways . It provides income, food, education, housing, and health care supports for many, not just those in poverty. It ensures cleaner air, water, and food . It supplies the vast infrastructure (roads, bridges, sewage systems, etc.) on which economic growth depends. The government has stabilized the economic system through these activities and others, including the government's bailout of the largest banks and other institutions responsible for the 2008

economic meltdown. Without government action, that economic crisis would have led the world economy into a total collapse. The government also engages in activities that trouble many Americans, including domestic surveillance and repression and the monitoring and control of behavior considered to be immoral. The government's national security policies have also spun out of democratic control on many occasions, leading the nation into

unwanted and costly wars and interventions. What the government does, then, is a complex mix of activities that includes many things that Americans support wholeheartedly, and others that elicit concern and criticism. This has been one of our main points in this book. It is distracting and confusing to paint with a broad brush when speaking of "the government." The Anti-Government Movement

Still, many conservative commentators and politicians promote simplistic, anti-government attitudes , seeking to pit

American citizens against their government-over which they still have many types of democratic checks - while remaining silent about growing private, corporate power. There has been a long-standing anti-government strain to American culture that has been easily manipulated into blaming government for many of the ills affecting the nation today.

Americans actually embrace collectivist responses to the many problems they have faced over the course of the twentieth century and be"' [END PAGE 362] yond, accepting the often generous government contributions to their own success, while at the same time

believing in a libertarian individualism that assumes people are solely responsible for their fates, good or bad. Americans are thus vulnerable to simplistic arguments about their government, and easily distracted from the larger issues of power this book has raised. Americans

should be vigilant about possible abuses in the exercise of power. Differentiating among the government's many functions allows a

clearer focus for such concerns, since not all government powers potentially directly threaten citizens . In addition, we have noted that

concerns about the exercise of power should include both government and the business system, that is, both public and private power. The exercise of power is necessary and unavoidable in complex societies . Power is exercised in the public sector by government officials, and in the

private sector by corporate executives . It is simply not true that only government exercises power . Nor is it true that the "free"

market constitutes an arena free of power. One difference between the two forms of power is that public power is more visible, acknowledged, and easily criticized, as we can see in the strong criticisms of governmental power prevalent today. This difference is understandable, to an extent, since government can more directly interfere with one's freedom. Still, for many, a person's life opportunities, and the greater part of an individual's working life, are controlled by

business enterprises that are not directly accountable to the larger public. The irony in this hyperawareness of governmental power and lesser concern for private corporate power is that a key attribute of public power is its potential responsiveness and

accountability to democratic majorities . The exercise of public, governmental power is more scrutinized , and it is acceptable

and expected that we criticize government, therefore making it more accountable . Governmental power is also just as necessary to our nation's success as is the economic system. It is not simply some contingent institutional force that can be done away with, in a spasm of anti-government rage. Both the government and the economic system are inexorably connected in such a way that each is dependent on the other, in necessary and unavoidable ways, for the other's achievements. There is no free market system without the use of government power. The so-called free market is simply not a freestanding entity, as many would have it. This book, by detailing what the government actually does, has been geared to laying the groundwork for a healthier debate about the role of

government in our lives. Everyone likes some parts of what government does while disliking other parts. But many politicians today have been selling a fantasy that government represents the main problem that stands in the way of greater happiness for most

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 Americans, and that therefore we must reduce the role of [END PAGE 363] government to some bare minimum, or even eradicate it altogether. As Grover Norquist says: "I don't want to abolish government. I simply want to reduce it to the size where I can drag it into the bathroom and drown it in the bathtub." 1 Such a flippant statement may simply seem to be hyperbole, but we must remember the amount of influence Norquist has in the Republican Party today. Jeb Bush was the only 2016 Republican presidential candidate not to have signed Norquist's Taxpayer Protection Pledge, which obligates the signer to resist and vote against any and all tax

increases. Nearly 1,400 elected officials have signed the pledge, including essentially the entire Republican congressional delegation.2 The antitax message is one of the most powerful trends in our current politics. It blames government for all our troubles and, as such, seeks to "starve the beast" so government cannot fulfill its functions capably any longer. Tax cuts are most often directed at the very wealthy, who thereby gain both more wealth and more political clout. First, this allows them to invest their savings in the rising amount of government debt (needed to replace the revenues lost to tax cuts), transforming these individuals' tax liabilities (income on which they otherwise would have to pay taxes) into an investment in government bonds, securities, and the like that pay them dividends. As Wolfgang Streeck discerns, "Not only is state poverty the investors' wealth; it offers them a golden outlet to invest their wealth profitably." Second, as major funders of the fiscal instruments that underwrite the government's debt, they become an important constituency of the modern state. In the eyes of government officials, the wealthy minority competes with and even shoulders aside popular majorities. As the government's debt accumulates, the creditors' claims on government officials often trump those of common citizens, magnifying what scholars see as the growing tensions between capitalism and democracy. As Streeck concludes: "The state as debt state serves to perpetuate [and deepen] patterns of social stratification and the social inequality built into them. At the same time, it subjects itself and its activity to the control of creditors in the shape of 'markets.' " 3 Reductions in taxes deepen the amount of government debt and increase the leverage of the wealthy over any nation's politics. Such tax cuts also straightjacket government, reducing its ability to deliver the expected goods to

popular majorities. Moreover, hikes in taxes and fees paid by the working classes are used to make up for tax reductions on the wealthy. Therefore, the more many Americans pay, the less they seem to get in return, fueling their increasing distrust and

disgruntlement about the role of government in their lives. As a result of this process, anti-government voices have become the loudest and most prevalent ones in our politics, so much so that it has become difficult for many Americans to have a rational and coherent understanding of how necessary and significant the government is to our nation's success. This book [END PAGE 364] has been about providing some of the tools, understanding, and historical knowledge for interested citizens to gain a clearer sense of what their government actually does, in order to combat the simplistic thinking that has come to dominate political debates. The need for such knowledge is manifest, especially at this point in our nation's history, when recent polls have demonstrated that the public's trust in

government is at historic lows. These polls, however, show something very different from a knee-jerk dislike of government. When asked about specifics, large majorities of Americans have positive views about much of what the government does, including ensuring that foods and medicines are safe, dealing with natural disasters, setting rules for workplace safety, preventing terrorist attacks, protecting the environment, ensuring access to health care and education, maintaining infrastructure, and strengthening the economy. Of the thirteen major government functions listed in the polls, Americans gave high marks to ten of them. And even the low marks involved Americans believing that more should be done with regard to ensuring a basic income for the elderly and helping people get out of poverty. Concerns about

managing the immigration system received the lowest marks.4 Any government is multifaceted , engaging in many diverse and even

contradictory functions. As a result, it is difficult to generalize when we speak of what the government does . It does many things,

and, in this book, we have attempted to come to grips with the most significant functions of the US government. It is essentially meaningless to

pronounce blanket statements about "the government," or "what the government does." We can only know our own government, or any government, through an understanding of its specific functions. The polls cited above demonstrate that Americans appreciate many of government's distinct functions, approving much of what the US government does, while retaining a generalized distrust of "the government" writ large. 5

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AT: Representations First

Focusing on Representations FailsEmanuel ADLER IR @ Hebrew Univ (Jerusalem) AND Peter HAAS Poli Sci @ UMass ’92 “ Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program” International Organization 46 (1) p. 370-371

Our critique of the approaches mentioned above should not be interpreted as reflecting a preference for poststructuralist, postpositivist, and radical interpretive analyses, although we do hope to build a bridge between structural and interpretive approaches. Rejecting the view of international relations as the mere reflections of discourses and habits-wherein the word is power and the only power is the word-we nevertheless have incorporated into our reflective approach the notion that the manner in which people and institutions interpret and represent phenomena and structures makes a difference for the outcomes we can expect in international relations." Thus, we adopt an ontology that embraces historical, interpretive factors, as well as structural forces, explaining change in a dynamic way. This ontology reflects an epistemology that is based on a strong element of intersubjectivity. So long as even a tenuous link is maintained between objects and their representation, we can reject an exclusive focus on words and discourse . By defending an epistemological and ontological link between words and the objects with which they are commonly associated, we believe that learning may occur through reflection on empirical events rather than through their representation . Finally, epistemic communities should not be mistaken for a new hegemonic actor that is the source of political and moral direction in society." Epistemic communities are not in the business of controlling societies; what they control is international problems. Their approach is instrumental, and their life is limited to the time and space defined by the problem and its solutions. Epistemic communities are neither philosophers, nor kings, nor philosopher- kings.

Reps don’t cause warDan REITER, Political Science at Emory, 95 [“Exploring the Powder Keg Myth,” International Security, v20 No2 Autumn 1995 pp 5-34 JSTOR]

A criticism of assessing the frequency of preemptive wars by looking only at wars themselves is that this misses the non-events, that is, instances in which preemption would be predicted but did not occur. However, excluding non-events should bias the results in favor of finding that preemptive war is an important path to war, as

the inclusion of non-events could only make it seem that the event was less frequent. Therefore, if preemptive wars seem infrequent within the set of wars alone, then this would have to be considered strong evidence in favor of the third, most skeptical view of

preemptive war , because even when the sample is rigged to make preemptive wars seem frequent (by including only wars), they are still rare events. Below, a few cases in which preemption did not occur are discussed to illustrate factors that constrain preemption.

The rarity of preemptive wars offers preliminary support for the third, most skeptical view, that the preemption scenario does not tell us much about how war breaks out. Closer examination of the three cases of preemption, set forth below, casts doubt on the validity of the two preemption hypotheses discussed earlier: that hostile images of the enemy increase the chances of preemption , and that belief in the dominance of the offense increases the chances of preemption. In each case there are motives for war aside from fear of an imminent attack,

indicating that such fears may not be sufficient to cause war. In addition, in these cases of war the two conditions hypothesized to stimulate preemption—hostile images of the adversary and belief in the military advantages of striking first—are present to a very high degree. This implies that these are insubstantial causal forces, as they are associated with theoutbreak of war only when they are present to a very

high degree. This reduces even further the significance of these forces as causes of war. To illustrate this point, consider an analogy: say there is a hypothesis that saccharin causes cancer. Discovering that rats who were fed a lot of saccharin and also received high levels of X-ray exposure, which we

know causes cancer, had a higher risk for cancer does not, however, set off alarm bells about the risks of saccharin. Though there might be a relationship

between saccharin consumption and cancer, this is not demonstrated by the results of such a test.

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AT: Structural Violence O/W We should treat war differently than structural violence. The tradeoff only goes in the other direction – we lose what is distinctive about organized violence.Tarak BARKAWI, Associate Professor of Politics at the New School for Social Research, 12 [“Of Camps and Critiques: A Reply to ‘Security, War, Violence’” Millennium 41 (1) p. 129-130]

A final totalising move in ‘Security, War, Violence’ is the idea that the study of war should be subsumed under the category of ‘violence’. The reasons offered for this are: violence does not entail a hierarchy in which war is privileged; a focus on violence encourages us to see war in relational terms and makes visible other kinds of violence besides that of war; and that the analysis of

violence somehow enables the disentangling of politics from war and a proper critique of liberal violence.22 I have no particular objection to the study of violence, and I certainly think there should be more of it in the social sciences. However, why and how this obviates or subsumes the study of war is obscure to me. Is war not historically significant enough to justify inquiry into it? War is a more specific category relative to violence in general, referring to reciprocal organised violence between political entities . I make no claims that the study of war should be privileged over that of other forms of violence. Both the violence of war, and that of, say, patriarchy, demand scholarly attention, but they are also distinct if related topics requiring different forms of

theorisation and inquiry . As for relationality, the category of war is already inherently relational ; one does not need the concept of violence in general to see this. What precisely distinguishes war from many other kinds of violence, such as genocide or massacre, is that war is a relational form of violence in which the other side shoots back . This is ultimately the source of war’s generative social powers, for it is amidst the clash of arms that the truths which define social and political orders are brought into question. A broader focus on violence in general risks losing this central, distinctive

character of the violence of war. Is it really more theoretically or politically adequate to start referring to the Second World War as an instance of ‘violence’? Equally, while I am all for the analysis of liberal violence, another broad category which would

include issues of ‘structural violence’ , I also think we have far from exhausted the subject of liberalism and war, an important area of

inquiry now dominated by the mostly self-serving nostrums of the liberal peace debates.

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Impact Turn - Security Good

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2ac Security Good

Strategic planning to prevent crisis escalation avoids future spirals of insecurity – makes great power escalation unlikely PH Liotta, Pell Center for IR & Public Policy, ‘5 [Security Dialogue 36.1, “Through the Looking Glass: Creeping Vulnerabilities and the Reordering of Security,” p. 65-6]

Although it seems attractive to focus on exclusionary concepts that insist on desecuritization, privileged referent objects, and the ‘belief’ that threats and vulnerabilities are little more than social constructions (Grayson, 2003), all these concepts work in theory but fail in practice . While it may be true that national security paradigms can, and likely will, continue to dominate issues that involve human security vulnerabilities – and even in some instances mistakenly confuse ‘vulnerabilities’ as ‘threats’ – there are distinct linkages between these security concepts and

applications. With regard to environmental security, for example, Myers (1986: 251) recognized these linkages nearly two decades ago: National security is not just about fighting forces and weaponry. It relates to water-sheds, croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate and other factors that rarely figure in the minds of military experts

and political leaders, but increasingly deserve, in their collectivity, to rank alongside military approaches as crucial in a nation’s security. Ultimately, we are far from what O’Hanlon & Singer (2004) term a global intervention capability on behalf of ‘humanitarian transformation’. Granted, we now have the threat of mass casualty terrorism anytime, anywhere – and states and regions are responding differently to this challenge. Yet, the global community today also faces many of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering states, humanitarian crises. We are nowhere closer to addressing how best to solve these challenges, even as they affect issues of environmental, human, national (and even

‘embedded’) security. Recently, there have been a number of voices that have spoken out on what the International Commission on Intervention and State

Sovereignty has termed the ‘responsibility to protect’:10 the responsibility of some agency or state (whether it be a superpower such as the U nited States or an institution

such as the United Nations) to enforce the principle of security that sovereign states owe to their citizens. Yet, the creation of a sense of urgency to act – even on some issues that may not have some impact for years or even decades to come– i s perhaps the only appropriate first response. The real cost of not investing in the right way and early enough in the places where trends and effects are accelerating in the wrong direction is likely to be decades and decades of economic and political frustration – and , potentially, military engagement . Rather than justifying intervention (especially military), we ought to be justifying investment . Simply addressing the immensities of these challenges is not enough. Radical improvements in public infrastructure and support for better governance, particularly in states and municipalities (especially along the Lagos–Cairo–Karachi–Jakarta arc), will both improve security and create the conditions for shrinking the gap between expectations and

opportunity. A real debate ought to be taking place today. Rather than dismissing ‘alternative’ security foci outright, a larger examination of what forms of security are relevant and right among communities, states, and regions, and which even might apply to a global rule-set – as well as what types of security

are not relevant – seems appropriate and necessary. If this occurs, a truly remarkable tectonic shift might take place in the conduct of international relations and human affairs. Perhaps, in the failure of states and the international community to respond to such approaches, what is needed is the equivalent of the 1972 Stockholm conference that launched the global environmental movement and established the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), designed to be the environmental conscience of the United Nations. Similarly, the UN Habitat II Conference in Istanbul in 1996 focused on the themes of finding adequate shelter for all and sustaining human development in an increasingly urbanized world. Whether or not these programs have the ability to influence the future’s direction (or receive wide international support) is a matter of some debate. Yet, given that the most powerful states in the world are not currently focusing on these issues to a degree sufficient to produce viable implementation plans or development strategies, there may well need to be a ‘groundswell’ of bottom-up pressure, perhaps in the form of a global citizenry petition to push the elusive world community toward collective action. Recent history suggests that military intervention as the first line of response to human security conditions underscores a seriously flawed approach. Moreover, those who advocate that a state’s disconnectedness from globalization is inversely proportional to the likelihood of military (read: US) intervention fail to recognize unfolding realities (Barnett, 2003, 2004). Both middle-power and major-power states, as well as the international community, must increasingly focus on long-term creeping vulnerabilities in order to avoid crisis responses to conditions of extreme vulnerability. Admittedly, some human security proponents have recently soured on the viability of the concept in the face of recent ‘either with us or against us’ power politics (Suhrke, 2004). At the same time, and in a bit more positive light, some have clearly recognized the sheer impossibility of international power politics continuing to feign indifference in the face of moral categories. As Burgess (2004: 278) notes, ‘for all its evils, one of the promises of globalization is the unmasking of the intertwined nature of ethics and politics in the complex landscape of social, economic, political and environmental security’. While it is still not feasible to establish a threshold definition for human security that neatly fits all concerns and arguments (as suggested by Owen, 2004: 383), it would be a tragic mistake to assume that national, human, and environmental security are mutually harmonious constructs rather than more often locked in conflictual and contested opposition with each other. Moreover, aspects of security resident in each concept are indeed themselves embedded

with extraordinary contradictions. Human security, in particular, is not now, nor should likely ever be, the mirror image of national security. Yet, these

contradictions are not the crucial recognition here. On the contrary, rather than focusing on the security issues themselves, we should be focusing on the best multi-dimensional approaches to confronting and solving them. One approach, which might avoid the massive tidal impact of creeping vulnerabilities , is to sharply make a rudder shift from constant crisis intervention toward strategic planning, strategic investment, and strategic attention. Clearly, the time is now to reorder our entire approach to how we address –

or fail to address – security.

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65


Ext – Security Good

Security key to avoid fascism—We should manage violence instead of trying to create a metapolitics of difference and peace.

Ole WAEVER Senior Research Fellow @ Copenhagen Peace Research Inst. ‘2K in International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration eds. Kelstrup and Williams p. 284-285

The other main possibility is to stress responsibility. Particularly in a field like security one has to make choices and deal with the challenges

and risks that one confronts - and not shy away into long-range or principled transformations. The meta-political line risks (despite the theoretical commitment to the concrete other) implying that politics can be contained within large 'systemic' questions . In line with the classical revolutionary tradition, after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical transformation), there will he no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the 'small questions' of politics, only with the large one cf. Rorty 1996). However, the ethical demand in post- structuralism (e.g. Derrida's 'justice') is of a kind that can never be

instantiated in any concrete political order - it is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and re-inserts politics. Therefore, politics can never be reduced to meta-questions; there is no way to erase the small, particular, banal conflicts and controversies. In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the 'opening' oriented version of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and 'produce events' (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place 'in the singular event of engagement' (Derrida 1996: R3). In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the 'opening' oriented version of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and 'produce events' (Derrida $994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place 'in the singular event of engagement' (Derrida 1996: 3), Derrida's politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsibility contained in words like justice, Europe and emancipation. Should we treat security in this manner? No, security is not that kind of call.

'Security' is not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon . Security is a much more situational concept oriented to the

handling of specifics. It belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges - and avoid 'the worst' (Derrida 1991). Here enters again the possible pessimism which for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics

(Morgenthau 1946, Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some 'good deed', '1 have assumed my responsibilities' (Derrida 1996: 86). If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of another nation, of one family to the detriment of another family, of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise there would he no ethical problems or decisions. (ibid.) and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau

1946; Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts and risks - and the question of how to handle them. Should developments be securitized (and if so, in what terms)? Often, our reply will he to aim for de-securitization and then politics meet meta-politics, but occasionally the underlying pessimism regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations will point to scenarios sufficiently worrisome that responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst. As a security / securitization analyst, this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try to assist in shaping the continent in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence - even if this occasionally means invoking/producing 'structures' or even using the dubious instrument of securitization. In the case of the current European configuration, the above analysis suggests

the use of securitization at the level of European scenarios w ith the aim of pre- empting and avoiding numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to security dilemmas and escalations , violence and mutual vilification.

Evaluating consequences and planning security goodMichael C. WILLIAMS International Politics @ Wales (Aberystwyth) ‘5 The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations p.165-167

Moreover, the links between sceptical realism and prevalent post-modern themes go more deeply than this, particularly as they apply to attempts by post-structural

thinking to reopen questions of responsibility and ethics. In part, the goals of post-structural approaches can be usefully characterised, to borrow Stephen

White's illuminating contrast, as expressions of 'responsibility to otherness' which question and challenge modernist equations of responsibility with

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 a 'responsibility to act'. A responsibility to otherness seeks to reveal and open the constitutive processes and claims of subjects and subjectivities that a foundational modernism has effaced in its narrow identification of responsibility with a 'responsibility to act?' Deconstruction can from this perspective be seen as a principled stance unwilling to succumb to modernist essentialism which in the name of responsibility assumes and reifies, subjects and structures, obscures forms of power and

violence which are constitutive of them, and at the same time forecloses a consideration of alternative possibilities and practices. Yet it is my claim that the wilful Realist tradition does not lack an understanding of the contingency of practice or a vision of responsibility to otherness . On the contrary. its strategy of objectification is precisely an attempt to bring together a responsibility to otherness and a responsibility to act within a wilfully liberal vision. The construction of a realm of objectivity and calculation is not just a consequence of a need to act - the framing of an epistemic context for successful calculation. It is a form of responsibility to otherness , an attempt to allow for diversity and irreconcilability precisely by - at least initially - reducing the self and the other to a structure of material calculation in order to allow a structure of mutual intelligibility, mediation, and stability . It is, in short,

a strategy of limitation: a wilful attempt to construct a subject and a social world limited - both epistemically and politically - in the name of a politics of toleration: a liberal strategy that John Gray has recently characterised as one of modus vivendi. If this is the case, then the deconstructive move that gains some of its weight by contrasting itself to a non- or apolitical objectivism must engage with the more complex contrast to a sceptical Realist tradition that is itself a constructed, ethical practice. This issue becomes even more acute if one considers Iver Neumann's incisive questions concerning

postmodem constructions of identity, action, and responsibility. 83 Neumann points out, the insight that identities are inescapably contingent and relationally constructed, and even the claim that identities Inescapably indebted to othemess, do not in themselves provide a foundation for practice , particularly in situations where identities are 'sedimented' and conflictually defined . In these cases,

deconstruction alone will not suffice unless it can demonstrate a capacity to counter in practice (and not just in philosophic

practice) the essentialist dynamics it confronts)44 Here, a responsibility to act must go beyond deconstruction to consider viable alternatives and counter-practices . To take this critique seriously is not necessarily to be subject yet again to the straightforward 'blackmail of the Enlightenment' and a narrow 'modernist' vision of responsibility." While an unwillingness to move beyond a deconstructive ethic of responsibility to otherness for fear that an essentialist stance is the only (or most likely) alternative expresses a

legitimate concern, it should not license a retreat from such questions or their practical demands. Rather, such situations demand also an evaluation of the structures (of identity and institutions ) that might viably be mobilised in order to offset the worst implications of violently exclusionary identities It requires. as Neumann nicely puts it, the generation of compelling 'as if' stories around which counter-subjectivities and political practices can coalesce. Wilful Realism, 1 submit, arises out of an appreciation of

these issues, and comprises an attempt to craft precisely such 'stories' within a broader intellectual and sociological analysis of their conditions of production, possibilities of success, and likely consequences. The question is, to what extent are these limits capable of success-and to what extent might they be limits upon their own aspirations to responsibility? These are crucial questions, but they will not be addressed by retreating yet again into further reversals of the same old dichotomies.

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Alternative

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2ac – Alt Fails

The alt fails—the system’s too sticky to simply wish awayGeorg SORENSEN, British International Studies Association, 98 [IR Theory after the cold war, p. 87-88]

What, then, are the more general problems with the extreme versions of the postpositivist position? The first problem is that they tend to overlook, or downplay, the actual insights produced by non-post-positivists, such as, for example, neorealism. It is entirely true that anarchy is no given, ahistorical, natural condition to which the only possible reaction is adaptation. But the fact that anarchy is a historically specific, socially constructed product of human practice does not make it less real . In a world of sovereign states, anarchy is in fact out there in the real world in some form. In other words, it is not the acceptance of the real existence of social phenomena which produces objectivist reification. Reification is produced by the transformation of historically specific social phenomena into given, ahistorical, natural conditions.21 Despite their shortcomings, neorealism and other

positivist theories have produced valuable insights about anarchy, including the factors in play in balance-of-power dynamics and in patterns of cooperation and conflict. Such insights are downplayed and even sometimes dismissed in adopting the notion of 'regimes of truth'. It is, of course, possible to appreciate the shortcomings of neorealism while also recognizing that it has merits. One way of doing so is set forth by Robert

Cox. He considers neorealism to be a 'problem-solving theory' which 'takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power

relationships . . . as the given framework for action . . . The strength of the problem-solving approach lies in its ability to fix limits or parameters to a problem area and to reduce the statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination'.22 At the same time, this 'assumption of fixity' is 'also an ideological bias . . .

Problem-solving theories (serve) . . . particular national, sectional or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order'.23 In sum, objectivist theory

such as neorealism contains a bias, but that does not mean that it is without merit in analysing particular aspects of international relations

from a particular point of view. The second problem with post-positivism is the danger of extreme relativism which it contains. If there are no neutral grounds for deciding about truth claims so that each theory will define what counts as the facts, then the door is, at least in

principle, open to anything goes. Steve Smith has confronted this problem in an exchange with Øyvind Østerud. Smith notes that he has never 'met a postmodernist who would accept that "the earth is flat if you say so". Nor has any postmodernist I have read argued or implied that "any narrative is as good as any

other"'.24 But the problem remains that if we cannot find a minimum of common standards for deciding about truth claims a post-modernist position appears unable to come up with a metatheoretically substantiated critique of the claim that the earth is flat. In the absence of at least some common standards it appears difficult to reject that any narrative is as good as any other.25 The final problem

with extreme post-positivism I wish to address here concerns change. We noted the post-modern critique of neorealism's difficulties with embracing change; their emphasis is on 'continuity and repetition'. But extreme post-positivists have their own problem with change, which follows from their metatheoretical position.

In short, how can post-positivist ideas and projects of change be distinguished from pure utopianism and wishful thinking?

Post-positivist radical subjectivism leaves no common ground for choosing between different change projects . A brief comparison with a classical Marxist idea of change will demonstrate the point I am trying to make. In Marxism, social change ( e.g. revolution) is, of course, possible. But that

possibility is tied in with the historically specific social structures (material and non-material) of the world. Revolution is possible under certain social conditions but not under any conditions. Humans can change the world, but they are enabled and constrained by the social structures in which they live. There is a dialectic between social structure and human behaviour.26 The understanding of 'change' in the Marxist tradition is thus closely related to an appreciation of the historically specific social conditions under which people live; any change project is

not possible at any time. Robert Cox makes a similar point in writing about critical theory: 'Critical theory allows for a normative choice in favor of a social and political order different from the prevailing order, but it limits the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world . . . Critical theory thus contains an element of utopianism in the sense that it can represent a coherent picture of an alternative order, but its utopianism is constrained by its comprehension of historical processes. It must reject improbable alternatives just as it rejects the permanency of the existing order'.27 That constraint appears to be absent in post-positivist thinking about change, because radical post-positivism is epistemologically and ontologically cut off from evaluating the relative merit of different change projects . Anything goes, or so

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 it seems. That view is hard to distinguish from utopianism and wishful thinking. If neorealism denies change in its overemphasis on continuity and repetition, then radical post-positivism is

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Ext – Alt Fails

Alternative can’t erase those already in powerOlav. F. Knudsen, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, ‘1 [Security Dialogue 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” p. 366]

A final danger in focusing on the state is that of building the illusion that states have impenetrable walls, that they have an inside and an outside, and that nothing ever passes through. Wolfers’s billiard balls have contributed to this misconception. But the state concepts we should use are in no need of such an illusion. Whoever criticizes the field for such sins in the past needs to go back to the literature . Of course, we must continue to be open to a frank and unbiased assessment of the transnational politics which significantly influence almost every issue on the domestic political agenda. The first decade of my own research was spent studying these phenomena – and I disavow none of my conclusions about the state’s limitations. Yet I am not ashamed to talk of a domestic political agenda. Anyone with a little knowledge of Euro- pean politics knows that Danish politics is not Swedish politics is not German politics is not British politics. Nor would I hesitate for a moment to talk of the role of the state in transnational politics, where it is an important actor, though only one among many other competing ones. In the world of transnational relations, the exploitation of states by interest groups – by their assumption of roles as representatives of states or by convincing state representatives to argue their case and defend their narrow interests – is a significant class of phenomena, today as much as yesterday. Towards a Renewal of the Empirical Foundation for Security Studies Fundamentally, the sum of the foregoing list of sins blamed on the Copen- hagen school amounts to a lack of attention paid to just that ‘reality’ of security which Ole Wæver consciously chose to leave aside a decade ago in order to pursue the politics of securitization instead. I cannot claim that he is void of interest in the empirical aspects of security because much of the 1997 book is devoted to empirical concerns. However, the attention to agenda-setting – confirmed in his most recent work – draws attention away from the important issues we need to work on more closely if we want to contribute to a better understanding of European security as it is currently developing . That inevitably requires a more consistent interest in security policy in the making – not just in the development of alternative security policies. The danger here is that, as alternative policies are likely to fail grandly on the political arena, crucial decisions may be made in the ‘ traditional’ sector of security policymaking, unheeded by any but the most uncritical minds.

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Permutation

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2ac – Perm – First Step

Perm – do bothThe plan is a good first step – have to believe in the impossible to not embrace the plan as a first step.Jonathan D. Caverley 17. Research scientist in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology & Associate Professor of Strategy in the Strategic. Slowing the Proliferation of Major Conventional Weapons: The Virtues of an Uncompetitive Market. Carnegie Council for Ethics & International Affairs, 31, no 4 (2017), pp 401-418.

“Two Cheers?” When judging the effects of U.S. dominance on major conventional weapons proliferation, I have been careful to use qualifiers such as “relative.” The United States, pursuing what it considers to be its interests, may impede grander forms of international cooperation and perpetuate a certain type of warfare that suits its ends.51 It was certainly no friend to the UN Conventional Arms Trade Treaty in its early stages of development.52 As signed, the CATT is a pretty transparent effort to legitimate and spread existing U.S. practices.53 But international politics as currently practiced does not allow for a more effective means of moderating the spread of weapons . Activists and U.S. foreign policymakers should also have realistic expectations that many of these steps will only delay proliferation and make it more expensive; they will not eliminate it altogether. While a cartel of like-minded allies would cement U.S. influence over major conventional weapons proliferation, this essay has shown that the economic and political power of the U.S. market remains sufficiently high that it can unilaterally enforce higher ethical standards for vast swathes of the global arms market. Krause, in discussing the difference between first- and second-tier arms exporters, argues that market power is a prerequisite for a state to use arms sales to advance political, rather than economic, goals.54 But what if a first-tier state is interested solely in the latter? Largely in the name of supporting U.S. manufacturing jobs, but also due to a lack of interest in promoting liberal norms abroad, the Trump administration has already overturned several of the previous administration’s decisions to hold up arms sales over human rights concerns for countries such as Bahrain, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand. But even if a monopolist collects its rent in cash instead of political gains, the supply of arms will be reduced. It remains easier to change the foreign policy position of one large state than shift an entire market . Finally, such an administration is unlikely to be interested in the Arms Trade Treaty either. There is something ironic, perhaps even perverse, in labeling the world’s largest arms dealer as the best hope for counter-proliferation. Such a market will be rife with hypocrisy as large sales continue to go to countries such as Saudi Arabia, and will give the United States tremendous leverage in influencing smaller states’ foreign (and domestic) policies. But it will also result in a less competitive global arms market, which will go a long way in slowing the proliferation of dangerous technology, reducing the resources spent in the developing world on weapons, stymieing the deadweight losses of corruption in the arms industry, and lowering the rewards for human rights abusers. While far from an ideal arrangement, one cannot let perfect be the enemy of the good .

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Ext – First Step Arms sales fuel militarism and neoliberalism – ending them is a first stepGwyn Kirk and Margo Okazawa-Rey 00. Assistant Adjunct Professor of Race, Gender and Sexuality Studies @ Mills College & Professor at Fielding Graduate University and one of the founding membersof the International Network of Women. Neoliberalism, Militarism, and Armed Conflict. Social Justice Vol. 27, No. 4 (2000).

The articles in Part I focus on connections among nation-states, militaries, and corporations. Staples uses the term "corporate-military complex," rather than President Eisenhower's "military-industrial complex," as more accurate for contemporary times. In an early draft of his speech on leaving office in 1961,

Eisenhower used the phrase "military-industrial-congressional" complex , but dropped the reference to Congress in the public version (Nelson, 2000: 6). Lockheed Martin, the largest weapons maker in the world, provides a current example of these connections. The company received over $18 billion in U.S. government contracts in 1999, $12.6 billion from the Pentagon and over $2 billion from the Department of Energy for nuclear-weapons activities (Fischer, Sredanovic, and Massen, 2000). When Lockheed merged with Martin Marietta in 1995, U.S. taxpayers paid $1.2 billion for merger-related costs such as employee relocations and plant closures. Lockheed Martin has given over $1.6 million in Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions since 1997, plus another $500,000in soft money to Democratic and Republican Party committees; it also spent $10.2 million on lobbying in 1997 and 1998. Key Lockheed Martin company associates are involved at top levels of the Republican and Democratic presidential campaigns and in foreign-policy decision making. Many commen? tators have noted the

weakening of the nation-state as a corollary of increased corporate power. Despite some significant changes, we argue that nation-states continue to fulfill their major function: maintaining conditions for capital accumulation. Financing the military and, where necessary, generating

strong ideological support for it, whether by invoking patriotism, ethnocentrism, or national security, is a crucial state role. The military is both a state agency and a highly profitable sector within industrialized economies due to weapons manufacturing and the international trade in arms.

Governments of countries with arms industries pay for weapons production twice over. Public funds underwrite the often decades-long development process for complex weapons systems, and governments are the sole customers for them. Steven Staples argues that the large U.S. military budget "is for all practical purposes a corporate subsidy" siphoning public money into private hands, and protected under Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade (GATT), which allows "governments free reign for actions taken for national security interests." Staples argues that with global economic integration the "weakened state no longer has the ability to reign in weapons corporations, and is trapped increasingly by corporate interests: greater military spending, state subsidies, and a liberalization of the arms trade .” Tamar Gabelnick and Anna Rich take up the issue of the arms trade in the fifth article. They emphasize potential contradictions between security policy and international

arms sales, noting that "U.S. arms export policy was established to protect national security, but has become increasingly focused on commercial interests" such that "proposed export reforms will lead to further loss of control over conventional arms proliferation." An outcome of international sales is that militaries can find themselves up against an enemy armed with weapons provided by their own governments if political and military alliances shift. This happened to Britain in the Falklands/Malvinas war and to the United States in the Persian Gulf War. In an attempt to reduce arms sales, U.S. Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney has proposed a Code of Conduct that would restrict the sale of arms to countries that are "nondemocratic, aggressors, human rights abusers, or not open about their military spending." This is a step in the right

direction , but as Gabelnick and Rich suggest, it will need to be applied consistently to have much impact. The definitions of nondemocratic, aggression, or human rights abuse are open to interpretation. Russia's assurance, for example, "that it will not sell offensive weapons to Iran despite [its] decision.. .to resume arms sales to

Teheran" (Reuters, December 7, 2000: A16) suggests a clear-cut distinction between offensive and defensive weapons that may be meaningless in practice. Many countries are involved in arms trading. Most people are killed by small arms that are cheap and easily available worldwide, rather than by

highly sophisticated weaponry. A good deal of the cross-border trade in small arms is illegal, but highly profitable for manufacturers, dealers, brokers,

shippers, and financiers (Lumpe, 2000). This trade is an important way for poorer countries to earn hard currency to repay foreign debt. Staples notes that "foreign embassies and trade missions abroad are used to aid arms sales," a point reiterated by Karen Talbot, who argues that "bombing and missile strikes, are, more than ever, giant bazaars for selling the wares of the armaments manufacturers." The Persian Gulf War and the bombing of Kosovo allowed stocks to be displayed, tested, and reduced somewhat. William Greider (1998) argues that there is no technical reason to update U.S. weapons ? the most sophisticated in the world ? except for the need for continued profits. He notes that the biggest enemy of future U.S. weapons production is the copious supply of weapons already in existence; hence, the need to use them so as to justify continued production.

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Not Mutually Exclusive

Reducing violence and combatting structures of militarism aren’t exclusive- controlling the means of violence (CMV) does both Cooper and Mutimer, PhDs, 12(Neil, IR@Bradford, David, PoliSci@York, Arms control for the 21st Century: Controlling the Means of Violence in Reconceptualising Arms Control: Controlling the Means of Violence, ed. Cooper & Mutimer)

It should be noted that even this more expansive control agenda did not go far enough for some of our conference participants who argued that the limitation of armed violence also necessitated a focus on changing mindsets and cultures of violence . We would not disagree with the idea that cultures of militarism and violence need to be rejected if meaningful peace is to be secured (although we do have reservations regarding the way in which contemporary CMV practice has tended to become more about problematizing the cultures of violence possessed by others, rather than

critiquing our own militarism). However, we would also argue that for CMV as a field to have coherence it also needs to maintain a concern with the means by which armed violence is perpetrated , including both the instruments (for example, armed forces, suicide

bombers) and technologies (such as fighter planes, bio-weapons, communications systems, improvised explosive devices [IEDs]) of armed violence against individuals,

communities, and even states. This includes, for example, limits on small arms to prevent inter-communal violence; even restrictions on

knives to prevent knife crime against individuals; while also including sustained attention to the most potent means of the most extreme violence,

controlling the military capacity of states , whether this be via multilateral disarmament initiatives such as the CWC; arms limitation agreements such as the New START agreement between the United States and Russia; confidence-building measures designed to reassure actors that particular force structures are not threatening; or the harnessing of nano or biotechnology in as yet undreamed of ways to serve the goals of arms control (verification, for example) rather than to

undermine them. We would therefore make a distinction between the immediate and direct aims of CMV initiatives on the one hand and the longer term, indirect effects of the strategies of control employed. With regards to the former, we would argue for the following reformulation of the classic aims of arms control as outlined by Schelling and Halperin in 1961:24 To reduce the likelihood that the instruments of armed violence are used against individuals, communities, or states; 2. To reduce the effects of armed violence should it be employed; and 3. To reduce the resources employed in the development,

acquisition and deployment of the instruments of armed violence (a deliberately more ambitious formula than that of classical arms control). In all efforts to advance a ‘controlling the means of violence’ agenda, and particularly those directed to the third goal, the longer term, indirect effect should be to reduce militarism and to promote cultures of peace. In other words, whilst control initiatives should only be directed at the instruments and technologies of violence, the strategies of control employed should , at the very least, avoid further embedding cultures of militarism and, ideally, have the indirect effect of promoting global and local cultures of

peace in the longer term . Such a standard would mark a significant shift from the traditional practices of arms control, which

were expressly designed to seek security in and through an armed, militarized world. Thus, whilst our formulation of CMV is quite expansive in one sense,

this constraint regarding the indirect effects of its practices delimits the range of strategies that might be deployed to promote such control. Most obviously perhaps, it would rule out strategies of forcible disarmament employed in contravention of international law , and those now common practices of proliferation

control which have the effect of enshrining extravagant military dominance. Conversely, it would place a premium on the adoption of strategies that are underpinned by processes of dialogue and mutual understanding , processes that are based on, and develop, what Booth and Wheeler have termed a

‘security dilemma sensibility’ – an appreciation of the fears that can be aroused in others by one’s own search for security.25 This is not to suggest that we necessarily envisage controlling the means of violence as a vehicle to completely eliminate the security risks associated with weapons and the military potentials societies invent for supposedly civil technologies – at least not in the short-term. Wherever such risks are deemed to exist, CMV will, like Cold War arms control, be geared to managing and reducing risk rather than eliminating it, as we indicate in the first two of our revised CMV goals. In contrast to Hedley Bull however, we would suggest that this more hard-headed approach to the weapons-security nexus is, ironically, more the preserve of radicals and idealists than contemporary policy makers who, operating in their own maze of unrealism, endlessly pursue the chimera of absolute security via militarism and

authoritarianism and the unilateral disarmament of others. At the same time, given that identities and sensibilities are not fixed we can envisage a politics of controlling the

means of violence that contributes to the development of more peaceful global cultures, in which armed violence, both among and within political communities, becomes ever-less acceptable. This is not simply because we think the reduction or even

elimination of arms and other technologies of violence will eradicate military security dilemmas surrounding technological potentials – on its own it will not.

Rather, it is because the forms and methods of CMV can contribute to a politics that is transformatory . In other words, rather than CMV only being possible when it is least needed, as critics have suggested of arms control, we would argue that what makes CMV most

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Security K and Answers ENDI 2019 relevant will not be the substance of agreements per se, but the extent to which its practices contribute to a

transformatory politics that produces demilitarized communities where such control is no longer needed. 26(9-10)

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Landmine Ban Proves

landmine ban proves representational pluralism works best Cooper,PhD, 12(Neil, IR@Bradford, Humanitarian Arms Control and Processes of Securitization: Moving Weapons Along the Security Continuum in Reconceptualising Arms Control: Controlling the Means of Violence, ed. Cooper & Mutimer)

Second, the analysis highlights the relational elements that can be involved in processes of securitization and desecuritization. In the case of the landmines ban this manifested itself in the way campaigners engaged in simultaneous processes of securitization of APMs (with respect to the human as referent object) and (relative) desecuritization (with respect to the state as referent

object) that worked to mutually reinforce the case for a ban . In the case of pariah weapons generally, whilst there are a number of factors that explain their stigmatization, one factor can be the way their particular qualities are depicted as the antithesis of those possessed by legitimized and particularly heroic weapons. Conversely, the stigmatization of pariah weapons works to delineate other weapons as normal and legitimate. There is therefore a process of mutual constitution that is at work in the way different sets of weapons technology are framed and understood.

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