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Security Culture:a handbook f or activists

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This handbook is the third edition of what we has been an evolving and

growing document dealing with security issues and canadian activism.We would like to say a big thanks to the Collective Opposing PoliceBrutality in Montreal for editing some of the text of the original pamphlet

and adding so many great examples to the Informants and Infiltratorssection. We have replicated many o f their changes in this edition.Thanksalso goes out to Eric Drooker whose artwork we used throughout this

pamphlet.

For more information or to make contributions to this document - please

email [email protected]

Third edition - prepared November 2001.

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5. ANYTHING YOU SAY TO THE POLICE MAY BEUSED AGAINST YOU AND OTHER PEOPLE. Onceyou've been arrested, you can't talk you way out of it.Don't try to engage cops in a dialogue or respond toaccusations.

6. YOU DO NOT HAVE TO REVEAL YOUR HIV STA-TUS TO THE POLICE OR JAIL PERSONNEL. Ifyou've been arrested you should refuse to take a bloodtest until you've been brought before a judge andhave a lawyer of your choice.

7. YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO TELEPHONE A LAWYEROF YOUR CHOICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. Thismeans after you've been arrested, charged and bookedinto jail. This does not mean however, that you'll begiven the right to speak with you family and friends.This is left up to the discretion of the police involved inyour case.

8. LYING TO THE POLICE IS A CRIME.

9. IF YOU ARE NERVOUS ABOUT SIMPLY REFUS-ING TO TALK, YOU MAY FIND IT EASIER TO TELLTHEM TO CONTACT YOUR LAWYER. Once a lawyer

is involved, people will know more about your state i.e.charges, bail, court date, etc.

R ights



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Introduction:

Resistance has been on the rise for the past fewyears, with activists adopting more and more effective

tactics for fighting back. Our increased activity andeffectiveness has meant that the RCMP, FBI, and

local police have continued to escalate their activitiesagainst us. As well, the events of September 11th andensuing state hysteria are no small footnote to the

way that our radical and revolutionary movementshave and will be targeted by repressive state forces.

If we want our direct action movement to continue, itis imperative we start tightening our security and

taking ourselves more seriously. Now is the time toadopt a security culture. Good security is certainly the

strongest defense we have.

This is a handbook for the Canadian activist who is

interested in creating and maintaining securityawareness and culture in the radical movements. We

are always looking for contributions - so please feelfree to email [email protected] with any images ortext you think belong in a handbook such as this.

This is the third edition of this zine that we have putout in order to add and improve on the original text(thanks for the work of the Collective Opposing PoliceBrutality in Montreal for their help). There will be

future editions of this handbook so keep puttingforward suggestions to us.

We hope that you will put the material containedwithin to good use. Now more than ever is the time to

act!

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1. YOU DON'T HAVE TO TALK TO THE POLICE OR

INVESTIGATORS. You do not have to talk to them onthe street, if you've been arrested, or even if you're in jail. Do not talk about illegal actions with fellow “in-mates” in holding as they may be plants.

2. YOU DON'T HAVE TO LET CSIS OR THE POLICEINTO YOUR HOME OR OFFICE UNLESS THEYHAVE A SEARCH OR ARREST WARRANT. Demandto see the warrant. It must specificallydescribe theplace to be searched and things to be seized. It mustbe authorized by a judge and should bear a signature.

3. IF THE POLICE DO PRESENT A WARRANT, YOU

DO NOT HAVE TO TELL THEM ANYTHING OTHERTHAN YOU NAME, ADDRESS AND BIRTH DATE.Carefully observe the officers; you're in your ownhome you're not required to stay in one room. Youshould take written notes of what they do, theirnames, badge numbers, and what agency they'refrom. Have friends who are present act as witnesses.It's risky to let cops roam around alone in your place.

4. IF THE POLICE TRY TO QUESTION YOU OR TRYTO ENTER YOUR HOME WITHOUT A WARRANT,JUST SAY NO. The police are very skilled at getting

information from people, so attempting to outwit themis very risky. You can never tell how a seeminglyharmless bit of information can hurt you or someoneelse.

Your



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of the agent will accomplish aneffective neutralization. Bu t if theagent is no great threat to the

group's functioning, the agentstaying inside the group may be

useful for other purposes.

The group might decide thatthey prefer to keep the agent,

rather than risk not knowing whowould replace a known quantity.It the agent is not in a sensitive

position, can be monitored andisolated from important work, thegroup may want to keep such an

agent at a low organizationallevel. Or the agent might begiven tasks that seem to be

sensitive but are in reality notcrucial to the group. Under thecover of doing "sensitive" work,

false and semi-false informationabout the group can be relayedto the intelligence agencies that

the agent belongs to. Or per-haps certain information that isin fact true about the group can

be willfully discredited by crea-

tion of pseudo-events and/orfalse information. Remember

that when the intelligenceagencies have a great deal ofcontradictory information, it

decreases their ability to actdecisively against the group.

(d) What are the responsibilitiesto other groups of the group'sknowledge of an informer? I f the

group makes a decision to sever

connection with the agent it is

certainly the group's responsibil-ity to quietly contact leadershipin other groups to warn them

about the agent. Often public

exposure is done through thegroup's newspaper/newsletter/

journal; in this case, the newsarticle should be sent to a widevariety of groups. The more

pressing problem is the instancewhere there are only suspicionsbut not decisive evidence.

Experience has shown thatsuspicions are taken seriously

only when then is a politicalbond that exists betweenpersons with long movement

experience. People who havebeen in the movement a longtime, and who are known to

each other and trusted asdedicated movement people,can convey agent suspicions

that will get a favorable hearingor be readily believed. This "oldhands trust network" is relatively

independent of political point ofview; veteran leaders of rivalradical organizations can f reely

and easily exchange informationon matters of security.



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A CTIV ISM AND STATEREPRESSION

This pamphlet has essential

information for anyone asso-ciated w ith groups advocating

or using economic disruptionor sabotage, theft, arson, self-

defence from police or m oremilitant tactics. The advice

that followsalso applies to

anyone associated w ithgroups practising civil dis-obedience, especially since

people often work in severalgroups at the same time and

gossip travels freely betweenthem.

Even if you've never

expressed your politics bydoing property damage,

pitching cobblestones, or

getting arrested for civildisobedience; even if youthink you have nothing tohide, these guidelines arepresented here to enhanceyour personal safety as wellas the overall effectiveness ofour movements.

The simple reality is thatgovernments in industrializedcountries target groups that

advocate economic sabotageand groups that don’t, move-

ments that are militant andmovements that are m arkedlypacifist. The government'ssecurity machinery serves theelitist political and economicobjectives of capitalism. Thereare over 250 political prison-ers in Canada and the US thatcan testify to this from first-hand experience. By ado ptinga security culture, we can limit

or neutralize counter-intell-igence operations meant todisrupt our political organ-izing, be it mainstream orunderground.

Peasant-rebels; communards;liberationists; abolitionists;labour organizers; revolut-ionaries; from large uprisingschallenging the entire politicalstructure, to isolated environ-

mental and social struggles,people have constantly workedto create a better world. Theresponse of government hasalways been repression topreserve the status quo..

Historically, governmentsurveillance and harassmenthas increased relative to theascendancy of direct acti onmovements. Minimizing the

destructiveness of politicalrepression requires that we

What it is, why we need it

and how to implement it...

Security

Culture

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Assuming that the securitypeople within the group have

suspicions about a groupmember being an informer/ provocateur, it is useful for

security/leadership to resolvecertain questions both beforeand after the investigation:

(a) How badly do you want toknow whether the person is in

agent or not? Clearly, if theperson under suspicion isrelatively important to the

group's functioning, then leader-ship must know one way or theother. The more important the

person under suspicion is to thegroup, the more intensive theinvestigation. We may suggest

methods of investigation whichare unorthodox and from acertain point of view morally

indefensible. But the question isalways how badly the groupneeds to know. No group need

use all or any of the methods wedescribe. But under the condi-tion that the correct in formation

is a life-and-death matter for thegroup, certain drastic measures

may be justified.

(b) What will be done if the

information is inconclusive?Often there is not enoughevidence to confirm that some-

one is a police agent, but thereIS enough evidence to confirmcertain suspicions. A great deal

will depend upon what is at

stake with the person undersuspicion. In general, the

choices come down to1) labelling the person a securityrisk and acting accordingly;

2) doing nothing outwardly butcontinuing the investigation;3) isolating the person from

sensitive work but keeping himor her in the group;4) moving to a higher stage of

investigation.

(c) What will be done If the

person does turn out to be anagent? While common sensedictates that the person be

exposed and severed from thegroup, other act ions might beinitiated. If the presence of the

agent is a real threat to thegroup, then the agent should beneutralized in an effective

manner. Usually wide exposure

MOVING AGAINST INFORMERS:

CONSIDERATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES

(Taken f rom PROTECTING OURSELVES FROM STATE REPRESSION:

A MANUAL FOR REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVISTS. Published in 1984 bythe Anti-Repression Resource Team - Jackson, Mississippi)



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implement and promote asecurity culture within ourmovements.

SO WHAT IS A SECURITY

CULTURE?

It’s a culture where the peopleknow their rights and, moreimportantly, assert them. Thosewho belong to a security culture

also know what behaviourcompromises security and they

are quick to educate thosepeople who, out of ignorance,

forgetfulness, or personalweakness, partake in insecurebehaviour. This security con-sciousness becomes a culturewhen the group as a whole

makes security violationssocially unacceptable in thegroup.

Security culture is about morethan just targetting specific

behaviours in individuals suchas bragging, gossipping or lying.

It is also about checkingmovement behaviours and

practices as a whole to ensurethat our own oppressive

practices don’t feed intointelligence operations being

carried out against ourcommunity.

For example, racism or sexism

in the movement can help tospread division, make some

people more open to inf iltrators(those who feel marginalized bygroup practices), and createopenings that can be used by

state operatives. Obviously, our

movements have a lot of work todo before we address the bigger

questions - wha t’s importanthere is to recognize how

oppressive behaviours play intobad security culture overall.

(IN)SECURE PRA CTICES

Activists like to talk, wegenerally can spend hours andhours discussing theory, tactics,

and strategy. Mostly this isuseful in building our analysis

and our work, but in other casesthis can be dangerous.

WHAT NOT TO SAY

To begin with, there are certainthings that are inappropriate to

discuss. These things include:

> your involvement or someoneelse’s involvement with an

undergound group

> someone else’s desire to getinvolved with such a group

> asking others if they are a

member of an undergroundgroup

> your participation or someone

else’s participating in any actionthat was illegal

> someone else’s advocacy for

such actions

> your plans or someone else’splans for a future action

Essentially, it is a bad idea to

speak about an individual's

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are activist-friendly lawyers who can help us demand retractions andcorrections. Speak to the journalists involved, call them on theirsloppy, dishonest work, expose their hypocrisy, and complain to the

journalists' ethics body. We can not rely on capitalist, private-mediafor any kind of fairness.

It is valuable for us to learn more about the covert actions of the

police. There exists a long and documented history. Factual informa-tion about police covert activities also comes out as evidence pre-

sented in court. An important, too often neglected part of our strengthis our knowledge of, and our protection from, police action againstus.



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involvement (past, present orfuture) with illegal activities.

These are unacceptable topicsof discussion regardless of

whether it is rumor, speculationor personal knowledge.

Please note: this is not to say

that it is incorrect to speak aboutdirect action in general terms. Itis perfectly legal, secure anddesirable that people speak out

in support of mokeywrenchingand all forms of resistance. The

danger lies in linking individualactivists to specific actions or

groups.

THREE EXCEPTIONS

There are only three times that itis acceptable to speak aboutspecific actions and activistinvolvement.

The first situation would be if

you were planning an actionwith other members of your

small group (your “cell” or“affinity group”). However, these

discussions should never takeplace over the Internet (email),

phone line, through the mail, orin an activist's home or car, as

these places and forms ofcommunication are frequently

monitored. The only people whoshould7dear this discussion

would include those who areactively participating iXäthe

action. Anyone who is notinvolved does not need to knowand, therefore, should not know.The second exception occures

after an act ivist has been

arrested and brought to trial. If

s/he is found guilty, this activistcan freely speak of the actions

for which s/he was convicted.However, s/he must never give

information that would help theauthorities determine who else

participated in illegal activities.The third exception is for anony-

mous letters and interviews withthe media. This must be done

very carefully and withoutcompromising security. Advice

on secure communicationtechniques can be found at

http://security.tao.ca.

These are the only situationswhen it is appropriate to speak

about your own or someoneelse's involvement or intent tocommit illegal direct action.

SECURITY MEASURES

Veteran activists only allow aselect few to know about theirinvolvement with direct actiongroups. Those few consist of thecell members who they do theactions with AND NO ONEELSE!

The reason for these securityprecautions is obvious: if peopledon't know anything, they can'ttalk about it. When activists whodo not share the same seriousconsequences know who did anillegal direct action, they are farmore likely to talk after beingharassed and intimidate d by theauthorities, because they arenot the ones who will go to jail.

Even those people who aretrustworthy can often be t ricked

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COVERT ACT ION OTHER

THAN INFILTRAT ION

Covert (or "Special") Action

from police and secret service isalso done outside of the group,with or without infiltration. These

efforts include: intimidation and

harassment, blackmail andmanipulation, propaganda,

informing employers andsecurity checks, as well asphysical sabotage like theft and

arson.

Intimidation and harassment

can include visits from secretservice agents, calling you oryour partner by their first name

on the street, thefts whereobvious clues are left. Policewill try to b lackmail people if

they want to recruit or neutralizethem.

Police uses propaganda in anattempt to poison the atmos-phere and manipulate media

and public opinion. In Decem-ber 1971, when the FLQ wasnear its end and heavily infil-

trated, the RCMP issued a fa lseFLQ communiqué in the nameof the "Minerve" cell. The

communiqué adopted a hard-line position, denouncing theabandonment of terrorist act ion

by a well-known activist, PierreVallières, and urging the con-tinuation of armed struggle.

In Genoa, Italy, police played anactive covert role in trying to

discredit black bloc anarchists

during the July 2001 meeting of

the G8. Several reports revealthat Italian police masked asblack bloc members attacked

demonstrators and small shops.With a lack of public information,the police help manipulate

public discourse along the lines

of "how do legitimate demon-strators isolate activist thugs?"

Slanderous propaganda cantake the form of anonymous

letters, or rumours aimed at theactivist milieu. There are alsoexamples where police will

make uncorroborated, casualaccusations to journalists that,to use two examples, a person

is a drug dealer, or that at a

demonstration, a person aimeda handgun at an officer. It is

often for slanderous reasonsthat police charge activists with"weapons possession" for

having a penknife, or charges ofviolence like "assault."

The growth of the anti-globaliza-tion movement has been ac-companied by renewed anar-

chist-scare propaganda on thepart of authorities. Politiciansand police attempt to massage

public opinion, preparingpeople for a crack down, inorder to legitimate the use of

heavier methods of socialcontrol, exclusion andrepression.

Manipulative disinformationspread through the media needs

to be denounced as lies. There



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by the authorities into revealingdamaging and incriminating

information. It is safest for allcell members to keep their

involvement in the groupamongst themselves. The fewer

people who know, the lessevidence there is in the long

run.

SECURITY VIOLATING

BEHAV IOURS

In an attempt to impress others,activists may behave in ways

that compromise security. Somepeople do this frequently - theyare habitually gossiping andbragging. Some activists sayinappropriate things only when

they consume alcohol. Manyactivists make occasionalbreeches of security becausethere was a momentary

temptation to say something orhint at something that shouldn’t

have been said or implied. Inmost every situation, the desire

to be accepted is the rootcause.

Those people who tend to be

the greatest security risks arethose activists who have low

self-esteem and strongly desirethe approval of their peers.

Certainly it is natural to seekfriendship and recognition for

our efforts, but it is imperat ivethat we keep these desires in-

check so we do not jeopardizethe safety of other activists orourselves. People who placetheir desire for friendship over

the importance of the cause can

do serious damage to oursecurity.

The following are examples of

security-violating behaviours:

Lying: To impress others, liarsclaim to have done illega l

actions. Such lies not onlycompromise the person'ssecurity -- as cops will not takewhat is said as a lie-- but also

hinders solidarity and trust.

Gossiping: Some people thinkthey can win f riends because

they are privy to specialinformation. These gossips willtell others about who did whataction or, if they don't know whodid it, guess at who they think

did what actions or just spreadrumors about who did it.

This sort of talk is very dama-

ging. People need to rememberthat rumors are a ll that are

needed to instigate aninvestigation or even lay

charges.

Bragging: Some people whopartake in illegal direct action

might be tempted to brag aboutit to their friends. This not only

jeopardizes the bragger'ssecurity, but also that of the

other people involved with theaction (as they may be

suspected by association). Aswell the people who s/he told

can be charged as accessoriesafter the fact. An activist whobrags also sets a bad example.Indirect-Bragging: Indirect-

braggers are people who make

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It is your responsibility toinstruct these people on theimportance of security culture.

The other type of activist-informer is the person who

cracks under pressure andstarts talking to save his or

her own skin. Many activists getdrawn into situations they arenot able to handle, and someare so caught up in the "excite-

ment" that they either don'trealize what the consequencescan be, or they just don't think

they'll ever have to face them.

Keep in mind that the catego-

ries of "planted informer" and"activist-turned-informer" can,

and have been blurred. In 1970,during the height of the FLQ'sactivities, Carole de Vault - ayoung Parti Quebecois (PQ)

activist was drawn to the FLQ,but then became a paid policeagent. Her "activism" was with

the PQ; she disagreed with theheavier FLQ actions since itthreatened the "legitimate" work

of the PQ. Her involvementwith the FLQ was as a plantedpolice informer.

KNOW YOUR OWN L IM ITS

We have to know the possibleconsequences of every action

we take and be prepared todeal with them. There is noshame in not being able to do

an action because of responsi-bilities or circumstances that

make it impossible for you to do

jail time at this point in your life.

As long as capitalism and all ofits evils exist, there will beresistance. In other words, there

will be p lenty of great actions foryou to participate in when yourlife circumstances are more

favourable.

If others are dependent on you

for support, you aren't willing tolose your job, or drop out ofschool or ruin your future career,

DON'T DO THE ACTION. If youare addicted to an illicit drugand/or have a lengthy

criminal record, the cops willuse this to pressure you forinformation. If you don’t feel

capable of detoxing under

interrogation and brutality, ordoing a hell of a lot more time

than your comrades, DON’T DOTHE ACTION.

Make certain that you talk withothers in your affinity groupabout situations that make you

uncertain whether you shouldbe involved in particular actions,especially those that are at a

high risk of being criminalized.

Remember - there is no excuse

for turning in comrades to thepolice - and those activists thatdo effectively excommunicate

themselves from our move-ments. We must offer no legalor jail support to those activists

who turn in others for theirimpact on our movement is fa r-reaching and can have devas-

tating effects.



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a big p roduction on how theywant to remain anonymous,

avoid protests, and stay"underground." They might not

come out and say that they doillegal direct action, but they

make sure everyone within ear-shot knows they are up to

something.

They are no better thanbraggers, but they try to be

more sophisticated about it bypretending to maintain security.

However, if they were seriousabout security, they would just

make up a good excuse as towhy they are not as active, orwhy they can't make it to theprotest . Concealing sensitiveinformation from even trusted

comrades is far better than jeopardising underground work.

EDUCATE TO LIBERATE

The unfortunate truth is thereare some security-ignorant

people in the movement andothers who have possibly been

raised in a "scene" that thriveson bragging and gossiping. It

doesn't mean these people arebad, but it does mean they need

to inform themselves and learnabout personal and group

security. Even seasonedactivists make mistakes when

there is a general lack ofsecurity consciousness in our

groups.

And that's where those of youwho are reading this can help.

We must ALWAYS act to in form

persons whose behaviour

breaches security. If someoneyou know is bragging about

doing an action or spreadingsecurity-compromising gossip, it

is your responsibility to explainto her or him why that sort of

talk violates security and isinappropriate.

You should strive to share this

knowledge in a manner thatencourages the person' s

understanding and changes her/ his behaviour. It should be done

without damaging the person’spride. Show your sincere

interest in helping him/her tobecome a more effective

activist. Keep your humility andavoid presenting an attitude ofsuperiority. An insensitiveapproach can raise anindividual’s defences andprevent them from listening toand using the advice o ffered.The goal of addressing theseissues with others is to reduceinsecure behaviour, rather thanshowing how much moresecurity-conscious you are.

Share your concerns and

knowledge in private, so that theperson does not feel as if theyare being publicly humiliated .Addressing the person as soonas possible after the securityviolation increases effective-ness.

If each of us remains res-ponsible for discussing securityinformation with people who slipup, we can dramatically improve

security in our groups and

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fessed ideals and how they live?One of our strengths as activistsis our ideas and values, our

counterculture, our attitudestowards the dominant society.Our sincerity in discussing these

things is also a way of learningabout each other.

When planning for new actions,care must be taken concerningwho is approached. As little as

possible should be said aboutthe actual action plan until aperson’s political philosophy,

ideas about strategy, and levelsof risk they are willing to engagein have been discussed on an

abstract basis. If there is astrong basis for believing this

person might be interested inthe action, then the general ideaof an action can be run bythem. Only when they have

agreed to participate, do theycome to the group to discussaction details.

During the trials of activists,police often reveal the kinds of

information that they havegathered concerning our groupsand activities. Note what revela-

tions come out of these trials.What are the possible and likelysources of the information?

Speak to persons that havebeen arrested and interrogatedto see what they may have said

to the police, or discussed intheir jail cell.

Placing infiltrators in social

justice and revolutionary move-ments is an established prac-

tice. It was done to the BlackPanthers, AIM, the Front deLibération du Québec (FLQ),

and the peace/ anti-war/andanti-nuclear movements on alarge scale. Small groups, such

as affinity groups, or workinggroups of larger more open

organizations, need to beespecially careful with newmembers. Direct action organiz-ing is ideally done with

longstanding, t rusted membersof the activist community.

This doesn't mean that no oneelse should ever be a llowed intothese groups. On the contrary, if

our movement is to continue togrow, new people should be

welcome and recruited; we justneed to keep security in mindand exercise caution at alltimes.

TheUnwitting Informer

Possibly an even greater threatto our movements than the

covert operative is the activist-turned-informer, either unwit-

tingly or through coercion.

The unwitting informer is theactivist who can't keep his/her

mouth shut. If someone brags toyou about what they’ve done,make sure this person never

has any knowledge that canincriminate you, because sooneror later, the wrong person will

hear of it. These activists don'tmean to do harm, bu t their

bragging can be very damaging.



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activities. When peoplerecognise that lying, gossiping,

bragging, and inappropriatedebriefing damages both

themselves and others, thesebehaviours will soon end.

By developing a culture where

breaches of security are pointedout and discouraged, all sincereactivists will quickly understand.

DEALING WITH CHRONIC

SECURITY PROBLEMS

So what do we do with activists who repeatedly violate security precautions even after being informed several times?

Unfortunately for them, the bestthing to do is to cut them loose.Discuss the issue openly andask them to leave your meet-

ings, basecamps and organ-izations. With law enforcement

budgets on the increase, newanti-terrorist laws that call for

stiffer sentences for political

actions, and with courtshanding down long sentences

for political "crimes", the stakesare too high to allow chronic

security offenders to workamong us.

By creating a security culture,

we have an effective defenceagainst informers and agents

who try to infiltrate groups.Imagine an informer who, every

time they ask another activistabout their activities, receives

information about security. Itwould frustrate the informer's

work. When other activistsdiscovered that she/he

continued to violate securityprecautions after beingrepeatedly informed, therewould be grounds for isolatingthe person from our groups. Andthat would be one less informerfor us to deal with!

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posals. Infiltrators often need tobuild credibility; they may d o thisby claiming to have participated

in past actions.

Also, infiltrators will try to exploit

activist sensibilities regardingoppression and diversity. Intelli-

gence organizations will send insomeone who will pose as aperson experiencing the com-mon oppression of the particular

activist group. For example, inthe 1960's, the Weather Under-ground ("Weathermen" - a white

anti-imperialist armed strugglein the US) was infiltrated by an"ordinary Joe" informant with a

working class image. Black warveterans infiltrated the Black

Panther Party.

A fresh example of policeinfiltration and manipulation

tactics is that of Germinal, agroup targeted for arrest twodays prior to the April 2001 anti-

FTAA demonstrations in QuebecCity. Five months prior, thepolice set up a false transport

company and specificallypostered opportunities foremployment in the vicinity of a

Germinal member seekingemployment.

The trap worked. Tipped off byan initial informant, two under-cover cops worked for four

months in the group. Thisoperation resulted in the media-hyped "dismantlement" of

the group on the eve of the

summit. Seven Germinal mem-bers were arrested, 5 of whom

spent 41 days in preventivecustody, only to be released

under draconian bail conditions.

The police's covert action was in

part about dismantling thegroup, but it was also aboutcreating a media/propaganda

campaign to justify the police-state security for the summit.

BACKGROUND CHECKS -

AN ESSENT IAL TOOL

What are some ways of lookinginto the possibility that someoneis an informer? Firstly, unless

you have concrete reasons orevidence that someone is aninfiltrator, spreading rumours will

damage the movement. Ru-mours that you do hear ofshould be questioned and

traced back.

A person's background can be

looked into, especially activismthey claimed to have partici-pated in, in other places. Do

your contacts in those places

know of the person, their in-volvement? Did problems ever

come up? One importantadvantage of having links withfar away places is that it makes

it more difficult for informers tofabricate claims about theiractivities.

What are a person's means ofliving? Who are her or his

friends? What sorts of contradic-

tions exist between their pro-



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a brief primer on the

canadian statesecurity apparatus

Recent incidents of repressionagainst activists in BritishColumbia illuminate the need for

grassroots people to understandand practice movement security.Police monitoring, infiltration and

agent provocateurs are routinelyused by the state to collectinformation about our groups, or

specific individuals in them, andto subvert our activities.

For example, during the APEChearings, it was revealed thatover seventy groups and

individuals were monitoredbefore and during the APECmeetings in 1997. A paid

industry informant/disruptor wasidentified at a wilderness actioncamp in 1999. Provocateurs

also targeted some Vancouveractivists, trying to convince themto disclose information and as

well, to break the law.

The Canadian security

apparatus identifies a number ofour groups and activities as athreat to "national security".

People and organizations arewidely targeted; even avowedpacifists have been included in

surveillance and repressive

measures. According to theCanadian Security and

Intelligence Service's (CSIS)annual reports, activities

targeted in the late 1990sincluded: native resistance,environmental & animal rights

movements, anti-poverty, anti-globalization, anti policebrutality, anti-racist, anarchist

and communist groups.

With the rise in militant First

Nations' struggles; covert directaction against corporations; therenewed militancy and strength

of popular struggles; and themass-media's increasing focuson anarchists and anti-

globalization protests, there isalso a growing level of policesurveillance and repression.

The need for security in ourmovements is obvious -

however, it is incrediblyimportant that we don't fall intothe trap of using our awareness

of security issues to shut otherpeople out of our growingmovements.

One of the key aims of the FBI'sCounter-Intelligence Program

("COINTELPRO") operationsagainst the Black Panthers and

American Indian Movement(AIM) was to spread distrust and

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**The "novice" type: presents asomewhat more active role, butconfines themselves to less

prominent work. They don't takeinitiatives, but the work they dois valued. This helps them build

trust and credibility.

**The "super activist" type: theycome out of nowhere and all ofa sudden, they are everywhere.Whether it's a meeting, protest,

or an action, th is person will beright in the thick of it. Keep inmind however that this can

also be the mark of a newactivist, whose enthusiasm andcommitment is so strong that

she/he wants to fight the powerevery minute of the day.

It should be said that withseveral of these modus oper-andi, the behaviour is hard to

distinguish from a sincere newperson’s involvement. How dowe tell them apart? Well, a

planted infiltrator will ask a lot ofquestions about the direct actiongroups, individuals and illegal

activities. She/he may suggesttargets and volunteer to doreconnaissance as well as take

part in the action. Infiltratorsalso try to build profiles onindividuals, their beliefs, habits,

friends, and weaknesses. At thesame time, infiltrators will shieldtheir true selves from other

activists.

Anyone who asks a lot of

questions about direct actions

isn’t necessarily an infiltrator,but they ARE someone you

should be careful with. At thevery least, they need to beinformed about security issues.

New activists should understandthat direct action tactics can berisky (though some risks are

worth taking!) and that asking alot of questions endangers

people. If the person persists inasking questions, there is aproblem and appropriate meas-ures must be taken. Activists

who can't understand the needfor security should be shunnedand kept away from the move-

ment.

Some types o f infiltrators stay in

the background and offermaterial support, other inform-

ants may have nothing to dowith the group or action, butinitially heard certain plans andtipped off the police. Among the

more active types of in filtratorscan be a gregarious person thatquickly wins group trust. Some

infiltrators will attempt to gainkey forms of control, such as ofcommunications/ secretarial, or

finances. Other informants canuse charm and sex to getintimate with activists, to better

spy or potentially destabilizegroup dynamics.

Active infiltrators can also beprovocateurs specializing indisruptive tactics such as

sowing disorder and demoraliz-ing meetings or demos, height-ening conflicts whether they are

interpersonal or about action or

theory, o r pushing things furtherwith bravado and violent pro-



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paranoia so that these activistswould be reluctant to integratenew people into their struggles.

A security culture can exist in alarge movement; indeed, it is

one indication of a movement'sstrength. Arming ourselves with

knowledge about how thesystem works and works againstactivists is essential in buildingsecurity culture. The aim o f this

section is to give a brief rundown of the working of domesticintelligence in Canada. In this

way, we can better understandhow to avoid its traps.

AN OVERV IEW OFDOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

ORGANIZATIONS

The Canadian Security andIntelligence Service (CSIS) isprobably the best known of the

"security" agencies that dealwith activist "threats". Itspredecessor was the Security

Service division of the RoyalCanadian Mounted Police,(RCMP-SS). In 1984, following

the MacDonald Commission on

the illegal activities of theRCMP, the civilian spy agency

CSIS took over RCMP spywork. That said, the RCMP didnot abandon its intelligence

gathering, it’s just that CSISspecifically gathers politicalintelligence.

The split f rom the RCMPallowed the new spy agency to

do legally what the Mountieshad been doing illegally. At the

operations level, the newagency was granted more lee-way in terms of public account-

ability than the Mounties hadever had.

CSIS carries out a wide range ofsurveillance activities. Since

they are not a law-enforcementagency and since their evidenceis not used in court, nothingstops them from contravening

the few regulations that doexist regarding privacy rights.For example, CSIS is not

required to inform people, as isRCMP, ninety days after awiretap (or bugging) is over.

Agents working for CSIS are

allowed, with "authorization", toenter people's homes to plantbugs, wiretap phones, open mailand look into health,

employment and governmentrecords without ever having totell a targeted individual what

they are doing. The informationthat they gather is used to buildprofiles and dossiers (files) on

individuals, organizations,networks, etc. This informationis also passed on to other wings

of the federal security systemwho are responsible for "law-enforcement", and will then

obtain whatever warrants arenecessary for legal surveillance(to be brought into court as

evidence).

The National Security Invest-

igation Service (NSIS) is the

primary law-enforcement wing inCanada. The NSIS is a section

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everything you ever wanted to knowabout inf ormers and

inf iltrators

Infiltrators seek information on most radical groups. The return of

mass mobilizations and radical actions in anti-globalization, anti-poverty, anti-racism and anti-police brutality demonstrations, as wellas declarations to continue struggling in the streets and underground

has drawn attention from the state's secret police. More infiltrators willbe sent into our ranks to try to bribe, entice or manipulate individuals.The extent to which

they are able to infiltrate our groups depends on our seriousness andresponsibility in learning about, promoting, and working within asecurity culture.

Radical movements can learn to better identify covert enemies in our

projects. Once identified, appropriate action is needed to undo,contain, or remove the danger.

This section is intended to arm you with information on how to spot

and deal with informers, infiltrators, and provocateurs in our ranks.

WHO IS AN INFORMER?

There are actually two kinds ofinformers. The deliberate

informer is an undercover agenton the payroll of government orindustry. The second type is theactivist-turned-informer. Both

kinds try to infiltrate our ranksand are equally dangerous toour movements.

Let's d iscuss the deliberateinformers first. They are often

difficult to identify. Informers can

be of any age and any profile,but they do have a few discern-

ible methods or operation, or

“modus operandi”. These are:

**The "hang around" type: they

are persons who regularly showat meetings and actions butgenerally don't get involved.

They collect documents, listento conversations and note who'swho. This observation role is

relatively inactive.

**The "sleeper" type: is similar

to the "hang around" modusoperandi, except that theirabsorption of information is

used to activate their role at alater date.



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of the Royal Canadian MountedPolice (RCMP). Most majorcities across the country have

an NSIS office including Van-couver, Edmonton, Montreal,Ottawa, and Toronto. The NSIS

maintains a computer databaseon activists, immigrants and so

called "terrorists" which ishoused in Ottawa.

It is believed that the Vancouver

NSIS employs between 12 and18 members. Within NSIS thereare several sub-groups called

Team 1, Team 2, Team 3 - etc.that h ave different investigativetargets.

They employ informants,

infiltrators, personal physicalsurveillance, electronicsurveillance including phoneand room "bugs" and other

means of investigation andresearch.

The RCMP/NSIS also haveother resources at their disposalduring counter-insurgency

operations. "Special O" is ateam of surveillance specialiststhat may be called upon.

"Special I" is a penetration teamwhose specialty is to break intohomes, vehicles and other

properties for investigativepurposes. They are the team,which among other things,

installs listening devices,photographs building interiors,etc.

In a long-running case based inVancouver, all of these methods

of surveillance were usedagainst several Vancouveractivists. During the Vancouver

investigation, house and vehiclebugs were located by sometargeted individuals. The bugs

had large battery packsattached to facilitate less

frequent battery changes. TheNSIS also visited severalactivists across Canada in anattempt to question them

regarding the individuals underinvestigation.

THE GO LD EN RU L E OF

SI L ENCE

It needs to be stressed throughout our movements that

no one is under any legal obligation to provide to the police anymore information than one's own name, address and

birth date, and this only if one is under arrest. That is it! Saying

anything more jeopardizes security. Even answering seem-

ingly insignificant questions can assist the police in developing

personality profiles on a range of activists. It may not be

"evidence" but it is used to give police "leads" on other suspects

and construct intent during legal proceedings. The only principled response to police questioning when under arrest is to say nothing more than your name,birth date and address. If questioned further you can simply say "I have nothing to say (except in the presence of my

lawyer".

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14

The Communications SecurityEstablishment (CSE) is anagency of the National Defence

/ War department, which hasbeen long clouded in secrecy.

They collect and processtelephone, fax and computer

communications of foreignstates, corporations andindividuals. The federalgovernment uses the

intelligence gleaned from thedata to support troops abroad,catch "terrorists" and "further

Canada's economic goals"(what that means is up to them).

Although the CSE is nottechnically allowed to collect the

communications of Canadiancitizens, it is known to be apartner in the Echelon project -a multinational monitoring

operation which sees CSE andcounterpart agencies in theUnited States, Britain, Australia

and New Zealand shareintercepted communications ofinterest with one another,

effectively creating a globalsurveillance web.

The Terrorist Extremist Section(TES Unit) is British Columbia'santi-terrorist u nit. A joint

Vancouver/Victoria PoliceDepartment/RCMP unit calledthe Organized Crime Agency

(formerly the Coordinated LawEnforcement Unit - CLEU), it isbelieved that the this unit

employs two or three members

only.

Most activists will be initimatelyfamiliar with their local policeforces. Be aware that cops do

not only show up in blueuniforms - but rou tinely practicecrowd infiltration and carry out

surveillance and investigativeactivities either alone or jointly

with the RCMP depending onthe type of case. Watch for themon demonstrations - as they liketo come along and take photo-

graphs and video for the record -and they often appear in crowdsas “fellow demonstrators”.

THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY MODEL

Most Western nation-statesfollow a model of counter-insurgency developed by a

British intelligence expert named

Kitson who wrote, Low Intensity Operations , after much fieldwork in the colonies. He broke

down movement developmentinto three stages:

The Preparatory Phase: iswhen the movement is small,tends to focus on education,

publishing and groundwork.

The Non-Violent Phase: is

when the movement takes onmore of a mass character. Largedemonstrations are the norm.

In the Insurgency Phase: themovement has taken on a

popular character. Perhaps a

more assertive, guerrillacomponent has emerged.

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Kitson advises that the primary work of the intelligence agency shouldoccur during the preparatory phase. At this time the movements are

most vu lnerable. They have not experienced a h igh degree ofrepression. They consider talk of security as mere paranoia. As theyare not breaking laws they believe that it is safe to organize completely

openly. The intelligence agency is therefore able to exploit theseconditions and develop detailed dossiers on a wide range of people.

The information will be extremely valuable to them later on.

Important historical revolutionary activities and groups began as small,serious-minded projects that grew in spite of surveillance and

repression. It is therefore important to practice security at all po ints inthe movement's development. State agents gather more than just"hard evidence;" they are interested in knowing about radicals' beliefs

as well.

Police try to control with fear; don't be intimidated. Remember - If an

agent comes knockin', do no talkin'.

Security Culture.pdf

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