SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT SPECIAL RESEARCH REPORT65BFCF9B... · 2019-01-05 · Security Council...

SPECIAL RESEARCH REPORT SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT

ANATOMY OF A SANCTIONS REGIME:A Case Study of Sixteen Years of Failed Efforts to

Effectively Implement Sanctions in Somalia

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This report and links to all of the relevant documents are available on our website at www.securitycouncilreport.org

Security Council Report OneDagHammarskjöldPlaza,885SecondAvenue,31stFloor,NewYork,NY10017T:12127599429F:12127594038www.securitycouncilreport.org

2008 No.4�6 September 2008

This report examines in depth thelongest running Security Councilsanctions measure still in existence(16years).WehavechosenthiscasebecausethecrisisinSomaliacontin-ues to be as serious as it has everbeen since 1992. It remains on theCouncil’s work programme and thehumanitarian situation has dramati-cally worsened in recent months.Somalia is quite possibly the leastsuccessful example of Council-imposed sanctions. Historically, allsanctions regimes have presentedchallenges when it comes to imple-mentation. But the arms embargoimposed on Somalia in 1992 hasfacedmoredifficultiesthanmost.Thisreport examines these difficulties. Itsuggests that some of the problemlay in the situation on the ground.There was no governmental entitywith control over Somali territory.There was no customs or bordercontrol.Buttherewerealsoproblemsthe Council could have addressed,including weaknesses in design,unreasonableexpectationsofrelianceonauthorities inneighbouringcoun-tries toenforce the regimeand lackofwill topursuediligentlymeasuresto enforce decisions or to adaptwhen the initial sanctions designprovedwhollyinadequate.

TABLE OF CONTENTS1.Summary.......................................12.PoliticalandRegionalContext..... 3 PoliticalContext............................ 3 RegionalContext.......................... 53.RoleoftheSecurityCouncil........ 6 BriefHistoryofEarlyCouncil Engagement............................. 6 TheSanctionsMandate............... 8 DesignandScope........................ 8 CouncilDynamics........................ 8 Changes,Renewalsand ExpansionofMandates............ 9 CouncilEngagement(2002-07)... 10 SecurityCouncil’sResponse in2008..................................... 134.RoleoftheSanctions Committee.............................. 14 Committee’sMandate................ 14 Committee’sModusOperandi Effectiveness:TheCommittee 1992-99................................... 15 TheCommittee:2000-present... 16 Committee’sResponseto SanctionsViolations................17 RelationshipwithNeighbouring andOtherStates..................... 19 RelationshiptoRegionaland InternationalOrganisations.... 20 RelationshipwithOtherCouncil SubsidiaryBodies(Relevant SanctionsCommittees).......... 205.RoleoftheMonitoring Mechanism............................. 20 MandateoftheMonitoring Mechanisms........................... 20

RelationshipoftheMonitoring MechanismtotheCommittee andtheCouncil........................21 ModusOperandi,Including StandardofProof.....................21 ProblemsIdentifiedwith EffectivenessofSanctions/ ArmsEmbargo........................ 22 ObservationsbytheMonitoring Mechanisms........................... 226.RoleoftheSecretariat............... 227.FinalObservationsRegarding ImplementationandEffec- tivenessoftheSanctions........ 238.OtherRelevantInformation........ 249.UNDocuments.......................... 2510.UsefulAdditionalSources........ 28

�. Summary

Somalia is awash in weapons. Formorethan17years, therehasbeenno viable central government. Theensuing clan-based and banditryfightinginflictedstaggeringhardshipson the civilian population, includingviolence,displacementandstarvation.By2008,UNrefugeeofficialsestimatedthat,outofapopulationofninemillion,there were about 457,000 SomalirefugeesoutsideSomaliawithanotherone million internally displaced.Because most refugees are inneighbouring states this has put anenormousburdenontheregion.

Security Council Report OneDagHammarskjöldPlaza,885SecondAvenue,31stFloor,NewYork,NY10017T:12127599429F:12127594038www.securitycouncilreport.org2


In1992,theSecurityCouncilimposedan arms embargo on Somalia, andthis sanctionsmeasure still remainsonthebookstoday.TheCouncilhasdone little to enforce the sanctions.To the contrary, the quantities andvariety of weapons entering thecountry have now reached theirhighest level since the early 1990s,UN-appointedmonitorssay.

Inasenseitseemsthatformanyyearsthearmsembargobecameasubsti-tute foranactivepolicyonSomaliafollowingthefailureofpeacekeepingmissionsintheearly1990s.ThemainCouncil dynamic for more than adecade,afterthewithdrawaloftheUSmilitaryfromSomaliain1994andtheendoftheUNpeacekeepingmissionin1995,wasoneofneglect.

TheSecurityCouncilthreatenedandcajoled, but until 2008 it did notseriously consider enforcementmeasures against violators such asfinancialorothertargetedsanctions.Itignoredmanyrecommendationsfromitsindependentexpertpanel.Instead,it has resorted simply to repeatingrequeststomemberstatestohonourtheembargo.Atpresstime,theCoun-cil was discussing a new sanctionsresolutionthatwouldimposetargetedmeasures against peace spoilersandviolatorsofthearmsembargo.Ifthis resolution is indeed adopted itwill remain to be seen whether thismeasurewillgobeyondprovidinganewframeworkandwhetheralistoftargetswillfollow.

ShortlyaftertheCounciladoptedthearms embargo in January 1992 itcreatedaCommitteetooverseethesanctions.Thisgroup,composedofdiplomatsfromall15Councilmembers,

didlittleduringthefirsteightyearsofits existence. It held only 15 formalmeetings during that period. TheCommittee said it was waiting forcooperation from states and organi-sations in a position to providepertinentinformationtoit.Therewasnosuchcooperation.

Geography also worked againstimplementing the weapons ban.SomaliasharesborderswithDjibouti,Ethiopia and Kenya. It has a long,unpatrolled3,200kilometrecoastlineand a 1,600 kilometre frontier withEthiopia, with limited border controlon either side. Both Somalia andEthiopiaalsohavedifficultyregulatingunsecured airstrips through whicharmscanbetransported.Thislackofenforcementcapacitystillexists.Andat times, neighbours and otherregional states have turned a blindeyetoarmstransferswhenitbenefit-tedtheirpoliticalalliesinSomalia.

Inthe1990s,theCouncil’sSanctionsCommitteetooknostepstoacquiredirectknowledgeofviolations,despiteoverwhelmingreportsfromthemediaandUNofficials thatweaponswereflowingintoSomaliaunabated.NorastheyearswentbydidtheCommitteeseektoemploytechniquesdevelopedinotherCouncilsanctionscommittees,suchasthosefortheformerYugosla-viaorevenIraq.Atbest,theCommitteereferredinformationitreceivedtogov-ernments allegedly involved insmuggling arms. But these nationsignoredit,orrejectedtheallegations.

In2000,theCommitteeshowedsomesignsoflifeanddecidedforthefirsttime to seek the assistance of theOrganization of African Unity (OAU)and the Intergovernmental Authority

on Development (IGAD), composedofNorthandEastAfricannations.TheCommitteealsonotedithadnoinde-pendentmonitoringbodyandbeganto lobby forone,which theCouncilapprovedin2002.(The2001terroristattacksagainsttheUnitedStatesandreportsfromAfghanistanofAl-QaidaactivitiesinSomaliamayhavestimu-latedsomeCouncilmemberstotaketheissuesmoreseriously.)

In2002,atwo-personTeamofExpertswas created to make recommenda-tions on a monitoring body afterwhich the Council established aPanelofExperts,basedinNairobi.Atfirst, thepanelwas limited inwhat itcouldinvestigate,butinJuly2002,theCouncilredefinedthearmsembargoto prohibit “the direct or indirectsupplytoSomaliaoftechnicaladvice,financial and other assistance, andtraining related to military activities.”By 2004, the Panel of Experts wasreplacedbyaMonitoringGroupwiththesamemandate.

In2002,theCommitteebegantoholdmorefrequentmeetings.Italsobegantoreviewanddiscussthereportsofthe monitoring mechanisms, whichwere submitted to the full SecurityCouncil. Its chairman at the time,AmbassadorStefanTafrovofBulgaria,pushedforvisitstotheregionandledadelegationinNovember2003.Butthe Committee—which operates byconsensus,ineffectgivingeachmem-beraveto—wasunabletoagreeonanyrecommendationstotheCouncil.

InaMarch2003report,thePanelofExpertswarnedCouncilmembersofthe prevailing “dismissive attitude,”andreportedthatSomaliscarriedout

“business as usual” because they

Security Council Report OneDagHammarskjöldPlaza,885SecondAvenue,31stFloor,NewYork,NY10017T:12127599429F:12127594038www.securitycouncilreport.org �

knewtheCouncildidnotenforceitsactions. Its November 2003 reportsaid thatarmsdestined forSomaliaoriginatedfromorwereroutedthroughDjibouti,Eritrea,Ethiopia,theUnitedArabEmiratesandYemen.Cargoofthe1,250flightsthatarrivedinSoma-lia each month between May 2003and October 2003 was rarely in-spectedateitherendof the journey.Theexpertswarnedthat“transnationalterrorists”hadbeenabletoobtaininSomaliaportableairdefencesystems,light anti-tank weapons and explo-sives,andusedSomaliaasabaseforsometerroristactsinKenyain2002.Mostofthenamedcountriesdeniedthe charge, and the Committee lettheissuesdrop.

Since 2003, the Panel and then theMonitoring Group have identifiedmanyviolators,includingnations,indi-viduals, entities and groups whoseassetscouldbe frozen.Theexpertsalso recommended that violatorsshouldbebannedfromreceivingUNcontracts. But no action was taken,andtheCommitteereleasednocom-prehensivelistofculpritstotheCouncil.

In a 2006 report (S/2006/229), themonitors said military materiel andfinancial support for weaponscontinued “to flow like a river.” Itrecommended a ban on two majorsourcesofarmsfinancing:charcoalexportsandfishingfeesbyownersofforeignvessels.

In their November 2006 report, theMonitoringGroupalleged thatSyria,Iran, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, SaudiArabia and especially Eritrea haddeliveredweaponsandothersuppliestoinsurgentIslamists,whileEthiopia,UgandaandYemenweresupporting

theTransitionalFederalGovernment,all inviolationof thearmsembargo.Mostof thecountriesnamedissueddenials.Thatsamemonth,theUnionofIslamicCourts(UIC)capturedMog-adishuandhelditforsixmonthsuntilitwasoustedbyEthiopianforces.

InDecember2006,inresolution1725,the Council threatened to considerurgently ways to strengthen theembargobutdidnotfollowup.AndinitslastreportinApril2008,theMoni-toringGroupsaid that ithad“foundthat the arms embargo has limitedimpact on the conflict.” It recom-mended that the Security Council

“considertheimpositionofadditionalindividualsanctionsontravelandtheassetsofkeyindividuals,thepostingof international technical assistanceadvisersinkeylocationsoutsideandinsideSomalia,andtheprovisionofadded means to States requestingsuchcapacity-buildingsupport.”

All thissuggests that the inactionofthe Somalia Sanctions Committeeduring its first eight years, coupledwith its inability tomakesubstantiverecommendations to the Council inthepasteightyears,tendstoconfirmthatthearmsembargowasonlyeverafigleaf,andsincethefailureofthe1990s peacekeeping missions, theSanctionsCommitteehasreallyonlybeenaproxyforstrategyinSomalia.

Thearmsembargomayhavehadtheunintendedconsequenceofenhancingthestatusofundergroundarmsdeal-erswhoprofitfromthecontinuationofhostilitiesandmilitarisationofsociety.InitsApril2008reporttheMonitoringGroupaddressedthisissueasitiden-tifiedmilitarycommanders,inadditiontotheexistingarmsdealers,whoare

profiting from the conflict and thecurrent“wareconomy.”“Anendtotheconflictisthereforenotintheirinterest,asthatwouldnegativelyimpacttheiropportunitytomakehugeprofits,”thereportsaid.

Atthetimeofwriting,debateisunder-way regarding a possible new UNpeacekeeping presence in Somalia.The ineffective role of the SecurityCouncil on the Somalia sanctionsissueoverthelast16yearssuggestsaneed for a frank assessment of thepaththathasbeenforgedtothispoint.Thenewsanctionsmeasures,underdiscussionasofthiswriting,maybeastepinthatdirectionbutonlyifthesemeasures are matched to an even-handedlistofactorsastargetsandiftheCouncilcanmusterapoliticalwilltoseethattheyareimplemented.

2. Political and Regional Context

Political Context The overthrow of Somali PresidentSiad Barre in January 1991 leftSomaliawithoutaviablegovernment.Fighting broke out, mainly betweentwomajorclans,withthesupportofa number of clan-based militias. Byearly1992,thecountry’shumanitariansituation was dire with more than300,000 people estimated to havedied of hunger and disease andanother1.5millionindangerofstarva-tion,accordingtoUNagencies.

Against thisbackground, inJanuary1992, the Security Council unani-mouslyadoptedresolution733underChapter VII, imposing an armsembargo. InApril 1992, theCouncilestablishedUnitedNationsOperation



in Somalia (UNOSOM) in resolution751,initiallyasasmallobservermis-sion but subsequently as a securityforcetosupportthedeliveryofhuman-itarian assistance. By mid-1992, themedia,especiallyUStelevision,wasreporting starvation in southernSomalia.Withfiftyunarmedobserversandlightlyarmedinfantry,UNOSOMproved unable to protect humanitar-ian aid. Shortly before he left office,US President George HW Bushinitiated a US-led military operation,Unified Task Force (UNITAF), autho-risedbytheCouncilinresolution794,toguardanddistributereliefsupplies.Theresultwasashorttermimprove-ment in security and a decline indeaths from starvation and malnutri-tion. However, the opportunity toconvert this into a sustainable longtermsolutionwasmissed.

Three months later in March 1993,under resolution 814, the operationwasturnedovertoUNpeacekeepers(UNOSOM II) without adequateresourcesorcapacityandwithoutapeacetokeep.ArmedconflictbetweenSomali factions intensifiedandresis-tance to the UN began to emerge.On 5 June, a key warlord, GeneralMohamed Farah Aidid, in retaliationforUNplanstoclosedownhisradiostation,senthismentoambushPaki-stanipeacekeepers.Twenty-fourwerekilled. The Council reacted with out-rage,andinresolution837mandatedUNOSOMtoarrestGeneralAidid.ThisledtovirtuallyopenwarfarebetweenAidid’sforcesandUNOSOM.Thesitu-ation furtherdeteriorated inOctoberwhenAmericanrangers—notpartofUNOSOMandwithouttheknowledgeorconsentoftheUN—raidedAidid’sareaof control.EighteenUS troops

andhundredsofSomalisdied;75UStroopswerewounded.Asaresultofthedisaster,manyintheUSgovern-ment blamed the UN. President BillClinton decided to pull out the USforce in lightof thedomesticoutcryoverAmericansoldiersbeingdraggedthrough the streets of Mogadishu.ManyotherWesternnationsfollowed,andtheUSurgedtheUNtoalsowith-drawitspeacekeepers.

TheUNforcedepartedfromSomaliain1995andaperiodofinternationalabandonmentfolloweduntilMay2000whenSomalicivilgroups—includinglocal authorities, elders, women’sgroups and others—gathered in Dji-boutitoembarkonapeaceprocess.InAugust2000,aTransitionalNationalAssemblywasformedandelectedaninterimpresident.ThenewTransitionalNational Government (TNG) initiallyattractedsomeinternationalsupportbutonlyasatransitionalentity.

Over time it became clear that itslackofrepresentativecharacterwasincreasinglyaproblem,anditbegantomeetactiveresistancefromvariousclansandmilitias.

In October 2004, the TNG was suc-ceeded by the Transitional FederalGovernment(TFG)intalksmediatedbyIGAD,aregionalblocthatincludesEthiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Sudan,Djibouti,KenyaandSomalia.

InsupportoftheTFG,IGADdecidedto send a “peace support” missionknownasIGASOM,aninitiativesanc-tionedbytheAUinMay2005.Councilmembers,however,remaineddividedabout whether to support IGASOM,withsomeseeingitaspotentiallyriskyandineffectual.

In2006, anewpolitical andmilitaryforce began to rise in Somalia, theUnionofIslamicCourts.Littlenoticedinitially, the UIC began to attractattentionwhenitstartedacampaignto expand its controlled areas inSomalia.Thisledtostrongconcernsfromkeyplayers,inparticularEthiopiaandtheUS,especiallyabouttheUICconnections with terrorist networksand because of a perceived UICinterestinEthiopia’sethnicallySomalieasternregion.

Following important UIC victories,including the seizing of Mogadishu,Kismayo and Jowhar, there was anincreased fear that the UIC wouldeventuallyoverthrowtheTFG.Peacetalks in June failed to produce acompromise.

The Council came under intensifiedpressuretosupportIGASOM,whichitreluctantlydid inDecember2006 inresolution1725.BythentheTFGwasconfinedtoasoleoutpostinBaidoa.

InlateDecember,Ethiopiaintervenedwithout UN authorisation (and inapparentbreachofthearmsembargo)and by late January its forces hadcompletelyoverruntheUIC.

The Council authorised in February2007anAUoperation(AMISOM)asa means to allow the withdrawal ofEthiopian troops. However, troopgeneration proved difficult andcontributions—besidesUgandanandBurundiancontingentstotallingsome2,500 troops—failed to materialise(AMISOM’s authorised strength is8,000 troops).Fightingbetween theEthiopian-backed government andtheoppositionforces(inparticulartheShabaabmilitia,anextremistsplinter


groupofUIC)hascontinuedastheAUsteppedupeffortstohavetheCouncilauthoriseaUNpeacekeeping force.Memberscurrentlyremaindividedontheissue.

“Somaliaremainsaprisonerofthepast,neverforgivenfortheviolentactionscarried out against the internationalcommunityinthe1990s,”saidAhme-dou Ould-Abdallah, the UN SpecialRepresentative for Somalia, whenbriefingtheCouncilinMarch2008.

On9June,theTFGandawingoftheoppositionAlliance for theRe-libera-tionofSomalia(ARS)metforpeacetalks in Djibouti. An agreement (theDjibouti Agreement) was reached.Afterextensivedelaysitwassignedon18August.Theagreementenvisagedaninety-dayrenewablecessationofhostilities,thedeploymentwithin120daysofaSecurityCouncil-authorisedinternational stabilisation force,pledges to ensure unhinderedhumanitarianaccessandassistance,a statement by the ARS group con-demningviolenceanddisassociatingitselffromrecalcitrantgroupsandtheformationoftwoUN-chairedcommit-tees:theHighLevelCommittee(whichdeals with political cooperation, jus-ticeandreconciliation)andtheJointSecurityCommittee(whichistaskedwith implementing security arrange-ments).On4SeptembertheSecurityCouncil requested the Secretary-General provide a detailed andconsolidateddescriptionofafeasiblemultinationalforce.However,despitesome expectations that the Councilmightreverttothesanctionsissueaswell,atthetimeofwritingactiononthesanctionsregimeremaineduncertain.

Regional ContextStrategically located in the Horn ofAfrica, Somalia shares borders withDjibouti,EthiopiaandKenya.

Animportantpracticalpointtonoteisthat theseneighbouringstateshavelimited capacity for sanctions imple-mentationandenforcement.

Somalia’sgeographiclocationshouldthereforehavebeenanimportantfac-torinconsideringtheeffectivenessofany arms embargo imposed by theCouncil.Atthetimeoftheimposition,there was, and still remains, noeffective border control mechanism,customs administration or air trafficcontrol in Somalia to deal with itslargelyunmonitored1,600kilometrefrontierwithEthiopia, itsunpatrolled3,200kilometrecoastline,oritsnumer-ousuncontrolledremoteairstripsandports,whichwereandstillareidealforsmuggling. InEthiopia, for example,therewaslimitedbordercontrolandlimited capacity to oversee unregu-latedandunsecuredairstripsthroughwhich arms were or could be trans-ported into Somalia with ease. Thislackofenforcementcapacityistrueofothercountriesintheregion.

Asecondkeyaspect isthateachofthestatesintheHornofAfricahashadimportanthistoricalandpoliticalinter-ests in Somalia. As a result, somesought to influence the military andpolitical struggle that ensued follow-ing Siad Barre’s ouster. The flow ofrefugeesalsoposedproblemsforthereceivingstatesintheregion.

Atthetimeofindependencein1960,regional tensions emerged due toSomali claims over territories popu-latedbyethnicallySomalicommunitiesin Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia. At

leastthreeseparateinstancesofmajorfightingbetweenEthiopiaandSoma-liaoccurredupuntiltheearly1980s.PoliticalandmilitarydevelopmentsinSomalia are therefore a matter ofongoingconcerninAddisAbabaandotherregionalcapitals,asevidencedby Ethiopia’s swift and strongresponsetotheUIC,agroupwhichEthiopia sees as associated withrenewedSomaliexpansionism.

Regionaltensionsarealsocompound-ed by the ongoing border disputebetween Eritrea and Ethiopia, whofoughtamajorwarin1998,whichcul-minatedina2000peaceagreementmandating independent arbitrationto determine the common border.Ethiopiarefusedtoaccepttheresultsof the arbitration. Tensions haveremainedeversince.ObserversnotetheunresolvedsituationhasledbothtofightaproxywarinSomalia,withEritreasupportinganti-TFGelements.

As early as March 1992, thenSecretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali,reportedthatthemainSomalifactions had claimed that the otherside was receiving arms fromcountriesintheregion.

Inafollow-upreportinApril1992,theSecretary-General requested theCouncil consider putting in placeappropriatearrangementstomonitortheembargo.Another reportby theSecretary-GeneralinJuly1992againindicatedthat,“thesituationregardingtheflowofarmsandammunitionfromoutside…hasnotchangedsincemy[theSecretary-General’s]lastreport.”Butdespite thisadvice theprincipleburden for effective implementationandenforcementofthearmsembargowas left on the shoulders of the



neighbouringstates.Accordingly,fromtheoutset,theprospectofaneffectivearmsembargoregimewastenuous.

�. Role of the Security Council

Brief History of Early Council EngagementTheCouncilconveneditsfirstmeetingon Somalia on 23 January 1992.Formally it was in response to arequestfromtheChargéd’affairesofthe Somalia UN mission, Ms. FatunMohamedHassan.InherlettertothePresident of the Council, dated 20January 1992, she advised that theInterim Prime Minister of Somalia,Mr. Omer Arteh Ghalib, wanted “topresentthedeterioratingsituationofSomalia to the Security Council.”(AttachedwasacopyofaletterGhalibhadwrittentotheSecretary-Generaland the President of the SecurityCouncil.InithereferredtoalettersentbythePresidentoftheOrganisationofIslamicSummitConference(OIC)andasked that Somalia be put on theCouncil’s agenda.) Letters outliningthepositionsoftheOAUandtheOICwith regards to those organisations’positionsonthesituationinSomaliawerealsosenttotheCouncil.

In reality, the initiative to bring thesituationinSomaliatotheCouncilwasdriven, behind the scenes, by themedia, international aid groups andby Boutros-Ghali, who came intooffice in 1992 and sought to giveAfricanconflictsahigherprofile.Butthe Secretary-General was initiallycautious, believing that it would bedifficulttosecureresourcesforafullfledgedpeacekeepingforce.

On23January,theCounciladoptedresolution733,thefirstofmanyreso-lutions on Somalia. The resolutionimposedanarmsembargoovertheterritoryofSomalia.TheCouncilnotedintheresolutionthatithadheardthereportoftheSecretary-GeneralonthesituationinSomalia,includingthedirehumanitariansituationand theprob-lemstheconflictposedforthedeliveryofhumanitarianassistance.Eversince1992,resolution733hascontinuedinforce,althoughitsscopewasextendedin2002byresolution1425.

In addition to imposing the armsembargoinresolution733,theCouncilrequestedtheSecretary-Generaltakewhateveractionnecessarytoincreasehumanitarian assistance by the UNand its specialised agencies to theaffected population of Somalia, andfor theSecretary-General toengagethepartiestotheconflictinanattempttosecureacessationofhostilities.ItalsorequestedtheSecretary-GeneralreporttotheSecurityCouncilassoonaspossibleonthematter.

In his follow-up report on 11 March1992,theSecretary-Generaldetailedhis efforts to secure a cessation ofhostilities toallowfor thedeliveryofhumanitarianassistanceandtohelpachieve a political settlement of theconflict.Thereportindicatedthatfight-inghadpersistedinMogadishusinceNovember1991,whichhadresultedinwidespreaddeathanddestruction,forcedhundredsofcivilianstofleethecityandbroughtaboutagravethreatofwidespreadfamine.

TheSecretary-Generalalsostatedinhis report that both Somali factionshadclaimedthattheothersidewasreceiving arms from some of the

countries in the region. Theseallegations, if proven, would havebeen a clear violation of the armsembargo. The Council consideredthe report on 17 March 1992, butwithoutcommentontheimplicationsforthearmsembargo.

Inafurtherfollow-upreporton21April1992, the Secretary-General notedvariousreportsonarmsflowing intoSomalia.He recommended that theCouncilputinplacearrangementsforthemonitoringofthearmsembargo.In response, theCouncildecided inApril1992,inresolution751,toestab-lishtheSomaliaSanctionsCommittee.

TheCouncilalsodecidedinresolution751 to establish the United NationsOperationinSomalia(UNOSOM,laterknown as UNOSOM I) includinga “security force,” and fifty militaryobservers and other personnel tomonitorceasefireagreementssignedinMogadishuon3March1992.

UNOSOMwasmandatedtomonitorthe ceasefire in Mogadishu and toprovideprotectionandsecurityforUNpersonnel,equipmentandsuppliesatMogadishu’s seaports and airportsandtoescortdeliveriesofhumanitar-iansuppliesfromtheseentrypointstodistributioncentresinthecityanditsenvirons. The Council, in resolution775 in August 1992 expanded andstrengthenedUNOSOM’smandatetoprotect humanitarian convoys anddistribution centres throughoutSomalia. It authorised up to 3,500militarypersonnel,butthemaximumdeployed by February 1993 was 54military observers and 893 troopsandsupportpersonnel.

InJune1992,UNSpecialRepresenta-tive Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria


saidhistalkswithfactionleadersondeploying UN peacekeepers werebeginning tobear fruit.Cooperationfell apart, however,whenanaircraftwithapparentUNmarkingsdeliveredmilitaryhardwareandSomalicurrencytowarlordAliMahdiMohamedathisairfieldinMogadishu.TheUNstillhasno explanation for this event, but itplayedan importantrole in thedeci-sionbyMahdi’srival,GeneralAidid,torefuseUNpersonnelaccessintoareashecontrolled.

Asharpdeterioration in thesecuritysituation in Somalia followed withUNOSOMfinding increasingattacksandblockageofitseffortstofacilitatedeliveryofhumanitariansupplies.Bylate 1992 the situation had becomedire,leadingtothedecisionbytheUStoinitiateacoalitionofthewillingtointervene in Somalia. In December1992, the US put forward a draftChapterVIIresolutiontoauthorisetheestablishmentofamultinationalforcetouse“allnecessarymeanstoestab-lish as soon as possible a secureenvironment for humanitarian reliefoperationsinSomalia”.Resolution794initiatedanoperationwhichbecameknownastheUnifiedTaskForce(UNI-TAF).TheUSwasexpectedtobuildaforceofabout28,000tobejoinedby17,000 additional troops from othernations (though in practice the USdeployedsome24,000supplementedby13,000additional troops from23countries).TheresolutionauthorisedtheSecretary-Generalandparticipat-ingstatestomakearrangementsfor

“theunifiedcommandandcontrol”ofthe military forces that would beinvolved. UNITAF began its deploy-mentinMogadishuinDecember1992,and, within a short period of time,

securedmajorreliefcentrestoallowforresumptionofhumanitarianaid.

InMarch1993,theCouncilapproveda transition from UNITAF to a newpeacekeepingoperation,UNOSOMII,in resolution 814. The mission wasestablished with a mandate underChapterVIIauthorisingittouseforce—if necessary—in order to secure astableenvironmentforthedeliveryofhumanitarian assistance. While UNI-TAFhadpatrolledlessthanhalfofthecountry with 37,000 well-equippedtroops, UNOSOM II with the initiallyauthorised28,000troops,wasgiventhemandatetocoverallofSomalia.

The presence of UNOSOM II, whilefacilitating humanitarian assistance,had limited effect on the overallsecurity and stability of the country.Effortstodisarmthevariousfactionsprovedunsuccessful,andtheSomalifactionsbegantotesttheresolveoftheUNmission.

General Aidid’s Radio Mogadishubetween 1 May and 4 June 1993accusedUNOSOMIIand theUSofbeing aggressors trying to coloniseSomalia. Aidid was aware ofUNOSOM’sintentiontodealwiththeRadioMogadishuissueanditspossi-bleseizure.On5June,afteraPakistanicontingenthadcompletedinspectionofthestation,whichwasclassifiedasanauthorisedweaponsstoragesite(AWSS), Aidid’s faction attacked. Asecond Pakistani company wasambushedleavingaseparateAWSS.Despite reinforcements arriving, bythe end of the fighting 24 Pakistanisoldiers were dead, 57 injured, sixmissing(oneofwhomdiedincaptivity)and five were later released. As theReportoftheCommissionofInquiry

(S/1994/653) stated: “The death ofso many UNOSOM II forces in oneday brought to light the enormityof the challenge that the UnitedNationsfacedinitsmissiontoforciblydisarmSomalia.”

Thesituationdeterioratedfromoneinwhich the UN was essentially even-handedbetweentheSomalistooneof virtual war between UNOSOM IIforcesandtheAididclan.

TheCouncilreactedvigorously.On6June,inresolution837,itapprovedanextendedapplicationofthemandateunderwhichapprehensionandarrestofthepersonsresponsibleforattacks(widelyunderstoodasAididandhisforces)becameamajortask.Thisledto virtually open warfare betweenAidid’sforcesandUNOSOM.ByJuly,UNOSOMIIwashavingdifficultypro-vidingprotectiontothehumanitarianagenciesoperatinginSomalia.

Thesituationdeteriorateddramaticallyon3Octoberwhentroopsfromasep-arateUSforce,deployedinMogadishu(outsideUNOSOMandthusnotunderUNcommandandcontrol),launchedanoperationtocaptureGeneralAididwithouttheknowledgeorconsentofthe UN. Hundreds of Somalis died.TwoUSBlackHawkhelicopterswereshotdownand18Americansoldierswerekilled,somedraggedthoughthestreets;75UStroopswerewounded.

The operation had not been coordi-natedwiththeUN,andthisdelayedaUN rescue of the remaining USsoldiers.PublicreactionintheUSwasextremelyhostiletotheUNandledtopressureontheUStowithdrawfromSomalia.Pressurewasputonothercountries, particularly those fromWesternnations,tofollowtheUSlead.



By early 1994, US troops had with-drawnfromSomalia.UNtroopsbegana drawdown in early 1994 and byMarch1995,theremaining14,000UNpeacekeeperswerewithdrawn.

The Sanctions MandateInresolution733,theCouncil,actingunderChapterVIIof theUNCharter,imposed “a general and completeembargoonalldeliveriesofweaponsand military equipment to Somalia.”In the resolution the Council alsoexpressedalarmat thedeterioratingsituationandheavylossofhumanlifeandwidespreadmaterialdamage,aswellasanawarenessofthedestabilis-ingeffectontheregionposedbytheconflictinSomalia.

Design and ScopeThearmsembargoimposedonSoma-liainJanuary1992wasverybroadinscopeandnotspecificallytargetedatarmedgroups.Instead,theembargowason the territoryofSomaliaasawholeandcoveredthedeliveryofallarmstoSomalia.Curiously,itdidnotprohibitdeliveryofweaponstoSomali-based, non-state actors outside ofSomali territory. Nor were there anyrequirements for verifiable end-usercertificates.Accordingly,traderscouldlegitimately make sales outsideSomaliatoknownSomaliend-users.Mostimportantly,therewerenoprovi-sions in the resolution targeting thearmsembargoagainstdefinedarmedgroupsoperatingwithin the territory.NordidtheCouncilconsidertryingtostoptheflowofthearmstoSomaliaatthelevelofthesuppliers.

Theinitialresolutiondidnotestablisha sanctions committee to monitorimplementationoftheembargo.After

a three-month hiatus and on therecommendation of the Secretary-General, the Council revisited theissue and in resolution 751, estab-lishedaCommitteeconsistingofall15Councilmembers,butitimposedno obligations on states to reportto the Committee. Effectively, theCommitteecouldonly“seek”informa-tion,but ithadnoauthoritybackingsuchrequests.Andtheonlyactionitcould take was to make recommen-dations to the Council based oninformationthatcametoitsattention.

Thearmsembargolackedenforcementmeasures.Andtherewasnoprovisionforsecondarysanctionsonviolators—stateandnon-stateactorsalike.

Somecountriesintheregionfailedtoimplementtheembargo,inpartduetolackofcapacity,butalsoduetoalackof political will, and, in some cases,perhaps influenced by their ownpolitical and security interests. Thecountries accused of violating thearmsembargo routinelydeniedanyinvolvement. Individuals and statesviolated the embargo with impunity.TheForceCommanderforUNOSOMII,inhisbriefingoftheSecurityCouncilMissiontoSomaliain1994,saidthat,despitethearmsembargo,theflowofarms into Somalia was continuingunabated.Inthemeantime,thepolitical,securityandhumanitariansituationinthecountrycontinuedtodeteriorate.

TheCouncildidadoptvariousresolu-tions and presidential statementsduringthe1990scallingonstatestouse such measures as might benecessarytoensureimplementationof the arms embargo. However, nodecisionsweretakenbytheCouncilto strengthen the sanctions regime,

closeloopholesandutilisenewtools,especially targeting of sanctions,which it had been developing else-where.Exceptforgrantingexemptionsforprotectiveclothing,flakjacketsandmilitaryhelmetsrelatedtoUNpersonnelandothersin2001,theCounciltooknosignificantactionontheSomaliaarmsembargountilMay2002.

Council DynamicsTheprincipaldynamicintheCouncilwithrespecttoSomaliapriorto1994was the effort to respond to thehumanitarian crisis and the acutesecuritysituation.However,followingthe withdrawal of the United Statesmilitary presence in 1994 and thewithdrawal of UN peacekeepingoperationsin1995,themaindynamicwasoneofneglect.

ItwasevidenttoallthattherewasaconstantflowofarmsintoSomaliainviolationoftheembargo.Inpresiden-tialstatementsduringthisperiod,theCouncilrepeatedlyacknowledgedtheflowofarmsintoSomaliainviolationof the embargo. Yet, SanctionsCommittee reports indicate that noviolationswerereported.

This apparent inconsistency can beexplained in part because the Com-mittee had such a limited mandatewhichonlyallowedittoseekfromallstatesinformationonactiontheyhadundertaken to implement the armsembargo. The members of theCouncil are regularly briefed by theSecretary-General(orhisrepresenta-tive)onconflictsituations,andeachmember also relies on informationobtained outside of the Council toguidedeliberations.Duringthisperiod,the Council members would havebeenprivytoinformationandreports,


including reports of the Secretary-General, from which it could haveconcluded that there were ongoinggrossviolationsofthearmsembargo.Yet,despitetheobviousviolationsofthearmsembargo,theCouncilrepeat-edlyfailedtotakeanyremedialaction.Instead,theCouncil’sresponsesweretocallonallcountriestoobservethearmsembargo.

The Council’s lack of effectiveresponsetothetransparentviolationsofthearmsembargooverthefirsttenyearsiscontrastedwithmoredecisiveCouncil actions on sanctions else-where.Thisperiod, theaftermathoftheendoftheColdWar,sawasignifi-cantincreaseintheuseofsanctionsasappropriatenon-militarymeasuresunderarticle41ofChapterVIIoftheUNCharter.CasesincludedIraq,theformerYugoslavia,Libya,Liberia,Haiti,Angola,RwandaandSierraLeone.

Changes, Renewals and Expansion of MandatesIn2002,theCouncilundertookarela-tivelybriefeffort toconsideroptionsfor improving implementationof thearms embargo. In this period, theCounciltooksomenoteofthecontra-dictionsinthereportsbytheSanctionsCommittee.On theonehand, therewere no reported violations. On theotherhand,therewasoverwhelmingevidence to thecontrary. InJuly theCouncil in resolution 1425 decidedtoestablishamonitoringmechanismin the formofaPanelofExperts togenerateindependentinformationonviolations of the arms embargo. Indoingso,itwasbelatedlyapplyingtoSomalia the lessons of the utility ofsanctions monitoring mechanisms,whose use started with resolution

1013of7September1995,whichcre-atedaUNInternationalCommissionofInquirytomonitortheRwandasanctions.

Earlier, in a press statement on 28March 2002, the Council expressed

“its determination to put in placeconcretearrangementsand/ormech-anisms, by 30 April 2002, for thegeneration of independent informa-tionon violationsand for improvingtheenforcementoftheembargo.”

Prior to establishing a monitoringmechanism for the Somalia armsembargo, the Council in resolution1407of3May2002firstestablishedatwo-memberTeamofExpertstoexam-inethefeasibilityandprospectsforamonitoringmechanism.TheCouncilaskedtheSecretary-Generaltoappointtwoexpertswiththemandatetoexam-inethefeasibility,formandmandateofafuturemonitoringmechanism.

Specifically, the Council asked theTeam of Experts “to provide theCommitteewithanactionplandetail-ingtheresourcesandexpertisethatthe future Panel of Experts wouldrequire to be able to generate inde-pendent information on violationsandforimprovingtheenforcementofthe weapon and military equipmentembargo.”TheCouncilindicatedthattherequiredexpertiseandresourcesofthefuturePanelofExpertsshouldincludethecapacitytoinvestigateallforms of violations; to assess thecapacity of the states in the regiontoimplementthearmsembargo;andto provide recommendations tothe Council on ways to strengthenenforcementofthearmsembargo.

TheTeamofExpertsconcludedthattherewouldbevalueinestablishing

a monitoring mechanism, and itsuggestedguidanceonthemandateandresourcerequirements.

TheTeamofExperts’July2002reportalso highlighted a number of prob-lemswiththepastimplementationofthe arms embargo against Somaliaand suggested ways the sanctionsregimeanditsimplementationmightbeimproved.TheTeamnotedthatthepastfailuretoenforcethearmsembar-gothreatenedtoundermineattemptsatapoliticalsettlementinSomalia.

TheTeamofExpertsfurthermoremadeanumberofobservationswithregardtoviolationsofthearmsembargo:n the volume of arms flow, while

notconstant,hadcontinuedsincethe collapse of the Siad Barregovernment;

n somegovernmentssuppliedarmsand military equipment to armedgroupingsinsideSomaliatofurtherpoliticalandstrategicobjectives;

n armed groups in Somalia tookadvantageof illicitarmstraffickingnetworksfortheirsupplies;

n arms supplies were financed in anumberofways,includingthroughrevenues generated by businessactivities in Somalia and throughdonationsfromforeigngovernments;

n effectiveenforcementof thearmsembargocouldnotrestonactionsbyneighbouringstatesduetotheirlimitedtechnicalcapacitiesandtheprevailing political atmosphere;and

n regional actors, after ten years ofnon-enforcement of the armsembargo,believedthattheinterna-tionalcommunityhadthecapacitybut lacked the will to enforce theembargoeffectively.

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Council Engagement (2002-07)In resolution 1425of July 2002, theCouncildecidedtoexpandthearmsembargoandtoestablishamonitor-ingmechanism.

Compared to the original embargo,thisnewresolutionaddedprohibitionson financing and other forms ofassistanceincludingmilitarytraining,and it was an incremental develop-mentofthesanctionsregime.However,itwasaminorandlargelyineffectiveincrementsinceitstilldidnotincludeprovisionspermittingtargetingofthesanctions, provisions for an assetfreeze to prevent the financing ofarms purchases, and provisions fordesignatingindividualsforsanctions.Andmostsignificantly,noobligationwas imposed on states to report totheCommittee.

OnthebasisoftheTeamofExperts’report,theCouncilestablishedaPanelof Experts consisting of three mem-berstobebasedinNairobi,Kenya,toinvestigate embargo violations andassisttheSanctionsCommitteeinitsmonitoring functions. The Secretary-GeneralwasalsorequestedtoensurethatthePanelhadaccesstosufficientexpertise in the areas of armamentandfinancingthereof, transportationmodalities, regional affairs, andspe-cialised knowledge of Somalia. ThePanelwasaskedtofollowupontherecommendationsmadebytheTeamofExperts,includingissuesrelatedtostrengtheningofthearmsembargo.

Finally,theCouncilpromisedtofollowup reports from the Panel and anyrecommendationsonpossiblepracti-calstepsforstrengtheningthearmsembargo. As will be seen below,the Council follow-up consisted of

nothing more than repeating anintention to consider and act onrecommendationsbythemonitoringmechanism. In fact, this became aritual theme in subsequent resolu-tions;Councilactionsnevermatcheditsexpressedintention.

ThePanel’sfirstreportinMarch2003statedspecificallythattherewereclearpatterns of violation of the armsembargo with weapons, equipment,trainingofmilitiaandfinancialsupporttoSomali factionsbeinggiven regu-larly by neighbouring states andothers.ItalsosaidthatSomalifactionswere able to purchase arms on theinternationalarmsmarketinclearvio-lationoftheembargo.Mostimportantly,the Panel reported that faction lead-ers—havingnotseenanyenforcementofthearmsembargointhepreceding12years—feltthattheycouldcontinuetheirbusinessasusualwithimpunity.

Further, the Panel wrote that, “Thedismissive attitude to resolutions oftheSecurityCouncilwillcontinuetoprevailiftheinternationalcommunitydoesnotshowresolveinimplement-ingastrictembargoregimeorremainvigilantininvestigatingnewviolationsoftheembargo.”

The Council responded to this firstPanel report in resolution 1474 of 8April 2003. The Council clearlyacknowledgedthenegativeeffectofarmsembargoviolationsonthepeaceand security efforts in Somalia—theCouncil’softenstatedobjective.Butittook no action and simply renewedthe mandate of the Panel for anadditionalsix-monthperiod,askingitto investigate violations of the armsembargo,tomakerecommendationsfor effective implementation, to

identifyviolatorsandprepareadraftlistforpossiblefutureCouncilaction.

ThePanelofExperts’secondreport,dated 4 November 2003, providedfurtherdetailsconcerningviolationsofthe arms embargo. The report high-lightedthefollowing:n acontinuousinfluxofsmallquanti-

ties of weapons and ammunitionfed the local open arms marketsandfactionleaders’warehousesinSomaliaandtheconstantmicroflowofweaponsandammunitionrepre-sentshundredsof tonsofarmsinviolationoftheembargooverasix-monthperiod;

n weapons shipments destined forSomalia tended to originate in orwereroutedthroughDjibouti,Eritrea,Ethiopia,theUnitedArabEmiratesandYemen;

n approximately1,250flightsarrivedinSomaliaeachmonth,mainlyfromneighbouring countries and otherstatesintheregion,andtheircargowasrarelysubjecttoinspection;

n transnational terrorists had beenabletoobtainsmallarmsandman-portableairdefencesystems,lightanti-tankweaponsandexplosivesinSomalia,andthoseresponsiblefortheterroristactsinKenyain2002(thebombinginMombassaandtheattempttoshootdownaMombassatoTelAvivflight)broughtmissilesfromYemenviaSomaliatoKenya;

n many of the frontline states andregional actors persisted in viola-tions and few had taken activemeasurestocurbcommercialarmstransferstoSomalia;and

n many neighbouring states lackedthe tools to sufficiently monitorexports and/or transhipmentsthrough their ports, airports, land

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bordercrossings,territorialwatersandairspace.

The early findings of the Panel ofExpertsconfirmedmuchofwhathadalreadybeenreportedelsewhereonviolationsofthearmsembargo.ThePanel identified countries involved,the links between violations of thearmsembargoandactsofterrorismcarried out elsewhere with armsacquiredinortransitingSomalia,andthe lackofcapacityofneighbouringstates to implement and enforcetheembargo.

TheCouncilagainside-steppedtheseissues and in resolution 1519 inDecember2003mandatedtheexperts(now called a Monitoring Group) tofollowupon thepreviousreportsofthe Panel of Experts; to investigateviolationsof thearmsembargoandmake recommendations; and toprepare a draft list of violators forpossible future measures by theCouncil. The request to the four-memberMonitoringGrouptopreparealistofviolatorsseemedtosometosignal an intention to take actionagainst theperpetrators.Butalmostfiveyears later, theCouncil hadstillfailedtofollowthroughonthisintention.

TheCouncildidhoweverstepupitsattempts to engage neighbouringstates by requesting in December2003 in resolution 1519 that theyreportquarterlytotheCommitteeontheir efforts to implement the armsembargo.This,however,didnotseemtohaveanyeffectontheimplementa-tion of the arms embargo and theflow of arms to Somalia, and therewasnodiscernable improvement inthereportingbyneighbouringstatestotheCommittee.

However,followingtheestablishmentof theTeamofExperts inMay2002and its report two months later, theCommitteedidbecomea littlemoreactiveinitsreviewofsanctionsviola-tionsandinreportingtotheCouncil.TheChairmanoftheCommitteeregu-larly briefed the Council followingbriefingsbytheexpertpanelandthediscussionswhichhadtakenplaceintheCommitteepursuanttothepanel’sreports.Thesebriefingsoccurred ininformal consultations of the whole,hencethereisnopublicrecord.

Since 2004, the Monitoring Group’smandateincludedconductinginvesti-gations with a view to exposing thefinancial networks and sources thatpermit the purchases of arms andotherformsandtypesofmilitarysup-portinviolationofthearmsembargo.

In response, the Monitoring GroupidentifiedthesourcesoffinancesformajoractorsinSomaliaanddraftedalistforapossibleimpositionofassetsfreezeondesignatedindividualsandgroups.Whilethislisthasbeendraftedand re-drafted, and the MonitoringGrouphasprovidedverifiabledetailson the violators and violations, theCommitteehasnever requested thelistfromtheMonitoringGroupandtheCouncilhas takennoactionagainsttheseviolators.

TheCouncilroutinelyissuedpresidentialstatements remindingstatesof theirobligationsundertherelevantresolu-tionsandcallingonthemtoimplementthe arms embargo against Somalia,butstillittooknostepstoimposeobli-gationsonstatestoprovideeffectivereportingorrespondtoviolationsbystates.TheCouncilalsocontinuedtorepeatcondemnationsoftheinflowof

weapons into Somalia. In a 2006presidential statement, the Councilreiterated its intention to urgentlyconsider ways to strengthen theeffectiveness of the arms embargo.Butnothingmaterialised.

InitsMay2006report,theMonitoringGroupstatedthatarms,militarymate-riel and financial support continued

“toflowlikeariver”inviolationofthearmsembargo.TheMonitoringGrouprecommended “an integrated armsembargo”whichwouldinvolve:n reaffirming and effectively sustain-

ingthearmsembargoonSomalia;n implementingatradeembargoon

theexportofcharcoaloriginatinginSomalia;and

n implementingabanonforeignves-selsfishinginSomaliwatersandanembargoontheexportoffishtakeninSomaliwaters.

The additional recommendationswereaimedataddressingtwomajorsources of financing of the armspurchases—charcoal exports andfeesfromforeignfishinglicenses—bythe various factions engaged in theconflict in Somalia. The idea of an

“integratedarmsembargo,”therefore,wastocutoffthesourcesoffundsforthepurchaseofthearmsinviolationoftheembargo.

Unlike most other sanctions caseswheretheCouncilhassupporteditsarmsembargoesby imposingothermeasuresontheactors,suchasassetsfreezesandtravelbans,theseoptionswereneverincludedinthesanctionsregime for Somalia. In the case ofSomalia,despitetheMonitoringGroupreportsandthebriefingstotheCouncilbytheCommitteeChair,theCouncil’sdecisionwastotakenoaction.



Instead, the Council continued thepatternof simply renewing theman-date of the Monitoring Group forsuccessive six-month periods. Eachtime,theCouncilmandatedthemoni-toringmechanismtoinvestigateandkeep investigating; to refine its find-ingsandkeeprefiningandupdating;to make recommendations and tokeepmakingrecommendations.

The Monitoring Group’s November2006reportbrought to the forenewissues for the Council. It identifiedcountries that itbelievedwereviolat-ing the arms embargo by shippingweapons, related supplies and uni-forms. It said Eritrea, Syria, Iran,Djibouti,Egypt,LibyaandSaudiAra-bia were supporting Islamists whileEthiopia, Uganda and Yemen weresupplying the TFG. The reportdescribedtheviolationsasaggressive.(Yemenhadalreadypubliclyacknowl-edgedtoprovidingarmstotheTFG,citingsecurityconcerns.)

Despite denials by most of thesestates, there was an abundance ofevidencethatthetwomainpartiesinSomalia—UIC and the TFG—hadconsiderably increased their weap-onry, military materiel and training.ThereportfurtherstatedthattheUIChad also received a considerableamount of outside financial support.These violations contributed to thebroadeningoftheconflictinSomalia.ThereportinferredthattheCouncil’sfailuretoactonearlierrecommenda-tionscontributedtothelevelofmilitarybuild-upandconsequentialdeteriora-tioninthesecuritysituationinSomaliaandtheregion.

Again, the Monitoring Group madea number of recommendations for

possible Council action. Theseincluded:n increasingthestrengthofthearms

embargo through an all-bordersurveillance and interdiction effortinvolvingacombinationofsea,airandlandmilitaryforcessupportedby relevant international organisa-tions,intendedtoseverelycurtailorcutoff arms,militarymateriel andotherformsofmilitarysupport;

n extensiveinternationalpoliticalanddiplomaticinitiativefullyincorporat-ingregionalactors;and

n applyingfinancialsanctionsonsig-nificantSomali-ownedbusinesses(intendedtoreducetheavailabilityof monies and other financialresourcesforpurchasingarmsandmilitarymateriel).

However,theGroupseemedclearthatwithoutaneffectivelyenforcedarmsembargo and a substantially broad-enedandeffectivesanctionsregime,including enforceable secondarysanctions,suchasassetsfreezeandtravelban,anyimpactonthesituationinSomaliacouldnotbeexpected.TheMonitoringGroupfurtherwarnedthatthearmsflowswerepartofadeliber-ate, ongoing and broader militarybuild-up takingplaceonbothsides.Thereportwarnedthatthiscouldbeaprecursortoanunnecessarywarthatcouldinvolveothersintheregion.

InDecember2006,withthesituationinSomaliaapproachingacrisispoint,the Council yet again set aside therecommendations of the MonitoringGroupandinresolution1725merelyrequested that all states—includingthoseoftheregion—fullycomplywiththearmsembargo.TheCouncilestab-lishedexemptionsforIGASOM,anditalsothreatenedtourgentlyconsider

ways to strengthen its effectivenessthroughtargetedmeasuresinsupportof the embargo. However, this lan-guage was basically the same thatwasusedinthepresidentialstatementsomesixmonthsearlier.Anddespitethe expression of urgency by theCouncilintheearlierstatement,againtherewasnofollow-up.

IntheperiodbetweenNovember2006andthefollowingMonitoringGroup’sreport in July 2007, the situation inSomalia deteriorated even further.Thisculminatedinamilitaryinterven-tionbyEthiopiainsupportoftheTFG.TheJulyreportnotedthatthecountry

“isliterallyawashwitharms”that“con-tinuedtoflowheavily”whosemajoritywas“deliveredorintroducedintotheSomalienvironmentinviolationofthearmsembargo.”Ironically,aftersome15yearsofanarmsembargoinplace,theMonitoringGroupthenconcludedthat thesheernumbersofarmscur-rently inSomaliaexceeded those inthecountrysincetheearly1990s.ItisclearthattheCouncil’sarmsembargohadcompletelyfailedtocurbtheflowofarmsandtherebylessenhostilitiesinSomalia.

In its latest report, inApril2008, theMonitoring Group observed contin-uedmilitarisation,anexpansionoftheconflictandarmsembargoviolationsonallsides.OppositiongroupshaveincreasedcontrolofterritoryandtheTFGsecurity forcesare increasinglyfragmented.Thegrouphasnotedthatstates (notablyEthiopia,EritreaandYemen)continuetobeinviolationofthe embargo. The Group receivedinformation that various TFG, Ugan-dan and Ethiopian personnel havesold weapons and ammunition thatoriginateinarmystocksorareseized


following battles with insurgents.Accordingtoarmstraders,EthiopianandTFGcommandersarethebiggestsuppliers of ammunition. Eighty per-centoftheammunitioninthemarketsoriginates from their stockpiles.Thereport again concluded that “theMonitoringGrouphasfoundthatthearmsembargohaslimitedimpactontheconflict,asthepartiesarestillabletoreceivearms.”

InitsApril2008report,theGrouprec-ommendedthattheTFGandAMISOMtake steps to gain control over thearmsproblemthroughputtinginplaceefficient systems for managing anddisposingammunitionandexplosivestockpilesinaccordancewithinterna-tionalpractices.Itwasrecommended,in addition to addressing letters tostatesfoundtohaveviolatedthearmsembargo,thattheTFG,EthiopiaandAMISOM conduct independentinvestigations into participation bytheir personnel in the Somali armsmarkets. The Group also recom-mended that the Council considerexpanding its mandate to includeinternalarmstransactions.

ThePermanentMissionofUgandainaletter(S/2008/370)tothepresidentof the Security Council respondedto the allegations that the Ugandancontingent of AMISOM was sellingweaponsintheSomaliarmsmarkets.The letterstatedthat,“Ugandafindstheallegation thatUgandaPeople’sDefence Forces (UPDF) personnelsoldarmstoinsurgentstotallyuntrueandoutrageous.”

The Monitoring Group’s report alsoreferredtoaletterfromtheChairper-son of the AU Commission to theSecretary-GeneraloftheUN,requesting

the Security Council to review thearmsembargoagainsttheTFGsoitcouldestablishitsowndefenceforces.(TheAUpeacekeepingforceAMISOMhas been exempted from theembargo.)BecausethelinebetweenTFGsecurityforcesandmilitiasofTFGis “almost impossible to distinguish”theMonitoringGroupdidnotrecom-mendanexemptionfortheTFG,butdidconcedethat“itmaybepossibleto authorise official deliveries on acase-by-casebasis.”

Additionally,theMonitoringGroup,asin previous reports, recommendedtargeted sanctions and enhancingthe capacity of states. But it alsoconsideredthatthemainelementforimprovement of the arms embargo

“lies with the increased political willofStates.”

Thepreviousandcurrentrecommen-dations by the Monitoring Group(suchastargetingsanctionsandtheintegratedarmsembargo,withprovi-sionstocutfundingofarmspurchasesandfinancingof themilitias) remainunimplemented.Over theyears, theMonitoringGrouphadadvancedwhatitreferredtoas“anumberofinterre-lated recommendations forSomalia”that would strengthen the armsembargowiththeintentionofcurtailingor cutting off the flow of arms intoSomalia. These would entail imple-menting a total border surveillanceandinterdictioneffortinvolvingacom-binationofsea,airand landmilitaryforcessupportedbyrelevantinterna-tional organisations. It was alsorecommended that these measuresbe linked to extensive internationalpoliticalanddiplomaticinitiativefullyincorporating regional actors. How-ever, the Group seemed clear that

withoutaneffectivelyenforcedarmsembargo and a substantially broad-enedandeffectivesanctionsregime,including enforceable secondarysanctions,suchasassetsfreezeandtravelban,thereishardlyanyimpactthatcanbeexpectedonthesituationinSomalia.

Security Council’s Response in 2008TheMonitoringGroup’s latestreportof24April2008,whichstatedthatthe

“armsembargohaslimitedimpactontheconflict”,offerednonewstrategytodealwiththearmsembargoviola-tions.Themessageremainsbasicallyas it has been for the past severalyears.Thereportnotedthatthemilita-risationandexpansionoftheconflicthasincreased,withoppositiongroups,particularly the Shabaab, enlargingtheir control over territory. As withprevious reports, states (notablyEthiopia,Eritrea,andYemen)continuetobeinviolationofthearmsembargo.TheMonitoringGroupsent38lettersto states indentified in connectionwithinformationconcerningpossibleviolations, but received only tensubstantivereplies.

The Group’s response to violationsremainsbasicallyas it hasbeen forthepastseveralyears,reiteratingtheneed for targeted sanctions andstrengtheningstatecapacity.Itrecom-mended that the Security Council

“considertheimpositionofadditionalindividualsanctionsontravelandtheassetsofkeyindividuals,thepostingof international technical assistanceadvisersinkeylocationsoutsideandinsideSomalia,andtheprovisionofadded means to States requestingsuchcapacity-buildingsupport.”



In resolution 1811 of 29 April 2008theCouncilonceagainstressedtheobligationsofallstatestocomplywiththearmsembargowithoutgivinganyspecificindicationofwhatactionmightbe contemplated in the absence ofcompliance. Much like three priorreportsoftheMonitoringGroup,theCouncil in reference to the findingsof the Group’s April 2008 reportexpressed its intention to considerspecificactiontoimproveimplemen-tationofandcompliancewiththearmsembargo and specifically raised thepossibility that such action couldinclude targeted measures. TheCouncil also re-established theMonitoring Group with basically thesame mandate to continue itsmonitoring functions and to makerecommendationstotheCommittee.

AtpresstimetheCouncilwasdiscuss-inganewsanctionsresolutionwhosegoal would be to impose targetedmeasuresagainstpeacespoilersandviolatorsof thearmsembargo.How-everitwillremaintobeseenwhetherthere is actually going to be agree-menton imposing realmeasuresorsimplyaframework,andwhetherthemeasureswillbeeven-handedoronlyappliedtoanti-TFGfactions.

4. Role of the Sanctions Committee

Asoutlinedabove,threemonthsafterestablishing the Somalia armsembargo, the Council in April 1992established the Somalia SanctionsCommittee.Itcomprisesall15mem-bersoftheCouncilandischairedbyanelected(non-permanent)member,asareallsanctionscommittees.

ThefirstCouncilsanctionscommitteewasestablishedbyresolution253in1968tomonitortheimplementationofthe sanctions measures adoptedagainst Southern Rhodesia in 1966andconsistingofallof itsmembers.The second such committee wasformed in resolution 421 in 1977 tomonitorthearmsembargoimposedagainst apartheid South Africa byresolution418.

Intheresolutionsimposingthesanc-tions measures on both SouthernRhodesia and South Africa, theCouncilrequested,fromtheveryoutset,that the Secretary-General report totheCouncilonimplementationofthemeasures.Bycontrast,withrespecttoSomalia,whenit imposedsanctionsinJanuary1992inresolution733,theCouncildidnotrequestthattheSecre-tary-GeneralreporttotheCouncilonimplementationofthearmsembargo.

Curiously,theCouncilwasnotwithoutrecentandverydetailedprecedentswhen it considered the sanctionsregime forSomalia inearly1992. In1990,underresolution661,ithadsetin place a comprehensive—and formanyyearsveryeffective—sanctionsregimeagainst Iraq,supportedbyaveryactivesanctionscommittee.

Committee’s MandateTheCommittee’smandate,setoutinresolution751,includedthefollowing:n toseekinformationfromallstates

onactionstakenbythemtoimple-menttheembargo;

n to consider information reportedbystatesofviolationsandtomakerecommendationstotheCouncilonwaystoincreasetheeffectivenessoftheembargo;and

n torecommendappropriatemeasuresinresponsetoreportedviolations.

More recently, the Committee hasalso been tasked with consideringrequestsforexemptionstothearmsembargo,asmandatedinresolutions1356and1744.

Committee’s Modus OperandiOneof thefirstactsofall sanctionscommitteesistoestablishguidelinesthatdirect futurework.Theseguide-lines establish the decision-makingprocess. Over the years, certaincommon basic standards for eachsanctionscommitteehavedeveloped,and inDecember2006, theCounciladopted resolutions 1730 and 1732whichestablishedadditionalstandardsforallsanctionscommittees.Thetextofthemostrecentlyrevisedguidelinesofeachsanctionscommitteeispostedoneachcommittee’swebsite.

Priorto2000,that is,duringthefirsteightyearsofitsexistence,theCom-mitteeonSomaliawaslargelyinactiveandheldamere15formalmeetings.Mostofthesemeetingswereheldtodeal with procedural matters ratherthan to discuss and act upon sub-stantive issuessuchasviolationsofthearmsembargo.TheCommittee’spracticewastouseinformalmeetingsto hold preliminary discussions onsubstantive issues with a view toarrivingatconsensusbeforeaformalmeetingwasconvened.TheCommit-tee seldom held formal meetingsunless there were decisions to betaken on which agreement hadbeenreachedpriortoconveningthemeeting. The Committee communi-cated its decisions to UN memberstatesthroughtheuseofletters,noteverbalesandpressreleases.


TheguidelinesfortheSomaliaSanc-tions Committee, as is the casegenerally with all Security Councilsanctionscommittees,specifiesthattheCommitteewilltakeitsdecisionsbyconsensus,whichmaybearrivedat through utilising a “no-objectionprocedure.”Whenthelatterdecision-makingprocessisused,themembersof the Committee are given a timeperiod(usuallyfivedaysunlessinanemergency situation) to respond tothe proposed decision, which isprepared after consultations andcirculated by the Chairman of theCommittee to all members. Unlessthere isanobjection inwriting fromanymemberwithinthesettimeframe,theChairmanisauthorisedtoactonthebasisoftheconsensus.

IntheearlystageswhentheCommit-teewasessentially inactive, thecon-sensusvotingprocedurehadlittle,ifany,bearingontheCommittee’sdeci-sion-making process. However, inrecentyears, reachingconsensus inthisCommittee (aswithmanyothersanctionscommittees),asituationinwhichallfifteendelegateshaveaveto,hasbecomemoredifficult.Increasingly,itseemstheconsensusruletendstostymie thedecision-makingprocessandtheCommittee’sabilitytoactoninformationconcerningarmsembargoviolationsbroughttoitsattention.

Effectiveness: The Committee 1992-99AnnualreportswereformallyinstitutedbytheCouncilforallsanctionscom-mitteesbythepresidentinanoteon29March1995. Itstatedspecificallythateachsanctionscommitteeshouldprepareanannualreportprovidingaconciseindicationofeachcommittee’s

activities.(ThelackofanannualreportbytheSomaliaSanctionsCommitteepriorto1995wasthereforenotunusualintheCouncil’spracticeatthetime.)

TheSomaliaSanctionsCommittee’sfirstreport,on15January1996,wasprepared and submitted to theCouncilinresponsetothisnote.Thereportpresented“afactualsummaryof the Committee’s activities sinceits establishment in 1992 until 31December1995.”

In that report, the Committee notedthat since its establishment it hadexperienced difficulties in obtaininginformation on violations, actual orsuspected, of the arms embargo.Mostpointedly,thereportstatedthat

“theeffectivenessoftheCommitteeinmonitoringthearmsembargowouldcontinue todependon thecoopera-tion of all States and organizationsin a position to provide pertinentinformation to it.” But there was nocooperation by states, in particulartheneighbouringones.

TheCommitteenotedthatfrom1992to1995,ithadheldtenformalmeet-ings.Atonlyafewofthesemeetingsweredecisionstakenonactionstobepursued by the Committee. Theseactions were, for the most part, tomake broad appeals as well as tar-geted appeals to states andorganisationsforinformationonarmsembargoviolations.

n The fourth formal meeting of theCommittee on 4 December 1992authorisedthechairmantoissueapress release dated 10 February1993 in which the Committeeexpressedconcernabout the lackof receipt of information fromstateswithregardtoarmsembargo

violations and appealed to allnational and international govern-mental and NGOs for informationonviolationsorsuspectedviolationsofthearmsembargo.TheCommit-teealsosentletterstoallstatesinFebruary 1993. Only two statesrespondedandnonereportedanyarmsembargoviolations.

n At the Committee’s sixth formalmeeting on 24 February 1993, adecisionwastakenforthechairmanto send individual letters to thosestatesgeographicallyneighbouringSomalia and other countries intheregion(Djibouti,Ethiopia,Egypt,theIslamicRepublicofIran,Kenya,SaudiArabia,theSudanandYemen)asking that they increase theirvigilancethroughmonitoringofairand sea traffic in the area withregardtothemovementofgoodsacross common borders withSomalia,andtomonitorandidentifythe origin of the carriers destinedfortheportsofSomalia.

n Responding to the Council’s con-cernsabout thecontinuedflowofarmstoSomaliaanditsrequesttotheCommitteetoseekthecoopera-tionoftheneighbouringstates,theCommitteedecidedin itsninthfor-malmeetingof16November1994toissueanappealthroughapressreleasesimilartotheonementionedabove,towritetoallstatesandtowrite individual letters addressedtothegeographicallyneighbouringstates and other countries in theregion, again seeking their assis-tance in monitoring the armsembargoandidentifyingviolators.

None of the neighbouring statesrespondedtotheCommittee.Aswascommon throughout theperiod, the



Committee received negligibleresponsestoitslettersfromthewiderUNmembershipandeven less sup-port in itsmonitoring functions.TheCommitteerepeatedlyreportedtotheCouncilthatithadreceivednoreportsfromstatesofanyarmsembargovio-lations.Allthiswashappeningagainsta backdrop of significant violationsevidencedby thepersistent fightinginSomalia, theseeminglyunendingsuppliesofarms,andclaimsbybothsidesthattheothersidewasreceivingarmsfromneighbouringstates.

Despite the overwhelming evidencefrom media reports that arms wereflowingintoSomalia,intheabsenceofanyformalreportsofviolationseitherfrom the Secretary-General or mem-berstates,theCommitteehadnothingto consider. A proactive committeecould have sought information onarms embargo violations fromUNOSOMortheSpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-General.Membersofthe Council with information couldhavemadeitavailabletotheCommit-tee.Butitseemsthattherewaslittleinclinationtoactivelypursuealternatesourcesofinformation.

TheCommitteenotedinitsreportcov-eringtheperiodfromitsinceptionin1992to31December1995thatithadtakenactionontwoallegedviolationsof the arms embargo. According tothereport,theCommitteetookappro-priate action with regard to theseviolations. But the report did notspecifythesourcesofitsinformationortheactiontaken.

In a similar vein, the Committeereported that in 1996 it had consid-eredand takenactionona caseofsuspected violation of the embargo

that concerned the shipment of aconsignmentofmilitaryhardwareandammunition to one of the factionsinvolvedintheconflict.Thegovernmentsallegedly involved were asked toinvestigateandreporttheirfindingstotheCommittee.Butthegovernmentsidentifiedsimplydeniedtheallegations.

This trend in the Committee’s workcontinued. In 1997 and 1998, theCommitteeheldone formalmeetingeachyearmerelytoelect itsbureau,whilereportingnoactiontakenduringtheperiodwithregardtoanyaspectofits mandate. In its 1998 report, theCommitteenotedthatitintended“toconsider appropriate steps with aview to improving the monitoring ofthearmsembargo…andtothatendwillestablishchannelsofcommunica-tion with relevant regional andsubregionalorganizationsandbodies.”Buttherewasnoindicationastohowit arrived at this decision or how itwouldbecarriedout,andtherewasnofurtherreferencetothisproposalinthesucceedingreports.

Thelackofinstitutionalmemoryinthestaff of permanent missions in NewYork makes it difficult to determinetoday what unreported action mayhavebeentakenbytheCommitteeintheaftermathof thisandotherdeci-sions.However, it issafe toassumethatiftheCommitteehadactedonitsdecision,itwouldhavebeencitedinitsreports.

Also,inits1999report,theCommitteenoted the concerns raised by theCouncilintwopresidentialstatements(27May1999and12November1999)onreportsofillicitdeliveryofweaponsand military equipment to Somalia.AndtheCommitteestatedthat in its

fifteenth formal meeting there wasan“exchange[of]ideasoneffectiveimplementationofthearmsembargo…andonstrengtheningtheworkoftheCommittee.” The report stated thatthe Committee considered severalproposals(nodetailsgiven)ofwhichthe succeeding chairman wouldbebriefed.

The Committee: 2000-presentIn2000,theCommitteebegantoshowsignsof increasedactivity invariousaspectsofitsmonitoringofthearmsembargo.Incontrasttothefirsteightyears,intheperiodfrom2000through2006 the Committee held 14 formaland35informalmeetings.Initsreportto the Council covering its activitiesfromJanuary to20December2000theCommitteeadmittedthatithadnoeffectivemonitoringmechanismandhad to rely solely on reports frommemberstates.

In 2000, the Committee decided toseekthecooperationandassistanceoftheOAUandIGADintheenforce-ment of the arms embargo. Thechairman of the Committee wroteletterson20March2000totheSecre-tary-General of the OAU and theExecutiveSecretaryof IGADappeal-ing tobothorganisations toprovidethe Committee, on a regular basis,any information theymayhaverelat-ing to any violations or suspectedviolationsoftheembargo.

This marked the first time that theCommitteehadspecificallyaddressedthese regional organisations on theissueof theSomaliaarmsembargo.ThiscommunicationcameeightyearsaftertheCommitteewasestablished.


TheCommitteeconvenedameetingin2001toconsideramendmentstoitsguidelines (originally adopted on 8May1992)fortheconductofitsworkin light of humanitarian exemptionsthat were now allowed pursuant toresolution 1356, and to considerhumanitarian exemptions requestsmadebyproviderstates.

Inaddition, theCommittee issuedapressstatementon20August2003remindingstatesoftheirobligationstoensure strict implementation of thearmsembargoandtoseekthecoop-eration of the AU and IGAD. It alsoendorsedthechairman’sproposaltoundertake a fact-finding mission toneighbouringcountriestoassessthedifficulties in implementing thearmsembargoandtoencouragememberstatesintheregiontocooperatewiththeCommittee.Adelegationvisitedtheregionfrom11-21November2003.

Havingoperatedforitsfirsttenyearswithouttheassistanceofamonitoringmechanism, the Committee repeat-edlyadvisedtheCouncilinitsannualreports, that itwashandicappedbysuchlackofsupport.TheCommitteestated specifically that it “does nothaveanyspecificmonitoringmecha-nism to ensure the effectiveimplementationofthearmsembargoand…thatitreliessolelyonthecoop-erationofStatesandorganizationsinaposition toprovide informationonviolationsofthearmsembargo.”Butas noted above, such cooperationfrom most states, in general, andneighbouringstates,inparticular,wasnotforthcoming.

Following the establishment of theTeamofExpertsinMay2002anditssubsequent report twomonths later,

theCommitteecontinuedtobemoreactive.Thechairmanof theCommit-tee regularly briefed the Councilfollowing briefings by the expertpanelandthediscussionswhichhadtakenplace in theCommitteepursu-ant to the panel’s reports. Thesebriefingsoccurredininformalconsul-tationsofthewhole,hencenopublicrecord of the contents of thesebriefingsareavailable.

Committee’s Response to Sanctions ViolationsPrior to 2002, without the aid of amonitoringmechanismandadearthofreportsonviolationsfrommembernations,theCommittee’sresponsetounverifiedreportsofviolationswasthesame—onlystatingthattherewerenosanctions violations reported. How-ever, the Committee noted that themonitoringofthearmsembargowashandicappedbythelackofitscapac-ityforactivemonitoringandtheneedtorelysolelyonreportsbythestates,some of which by definition had tobe involved, directly or indirectly, insanctionsviolations.TheCommitteereceivednoreportsofviolationsandtherefore offered no recommenda-tionsas itwas requiredpursuant toitsmandate.

Atitsnineteenthformalmeetingof28May2002,theCommitteeconsideredaletterithadreceivedfromthenascentSomaliaTransitionalNationalGovern-ment containing allegations thatEthiopiahadviolatedandcontinuedto violate the arms embargo. TheCommittee’sresponsewastoautho-risethechairmantosenda letter toEthiopia to query about the allegedviolation. This was followed by anote verbale to all states and

especially to neighbouring statesappealing for their support. LetterswerealsosenttotheOAUandIGADseekingtheircooperation.

InJuly2002,theCommitteereceivedand considered the report of thetwo-personTeamofExpertswiththeresultsofthefeasibilitystudyfortheproposed monitoring mechanism.Thisreportalsonotedgrossviolationsof the arms embargo. The Team ofExpertsfurthermoremadeanumberof observations with regard to viola-tionsofthearmsembargothatwerelater confirmed and documentedbythePanelofExpertsandlatertheMonitoringGroup.Theseincluded:n thevolumeofarmsflow,whilenot

constant,hadcontinuedsincethecollapseoftheSiadBarregovernment;

n somegovernmentssuppliedarmsand military equipment to armedgroupingsinsideSomaliatofurtherpoliticalandstrategicobjectives;

n armed groups in Somalia tookadvantageof illicitarmstraffickingnetworksfortheirsupplies;

n arms supplies were financed in anumberofways,includingthroughrevenues generated by businessactivities in Somalia and throughdonationsfromforeigngovernments;

n effectiveenforcementof thearmsembargocouldnotrestonactionsbyneighbouringstatesduetotheirlimitedtechnicalcapacitiesandtheprevailingpoliticalatmosphere;

n regional actors, after ten years ofnon-enforcement of the armsembargo,believedthattheinterna-tionalcommunityhadthecapacitybut lacked the will to enforce theembargoeffectively;and

n failure to enforce the embargoprobablyhaddelayedthecreationofapoliticalframework.



Afterconsidering the reportand rec-ommendations of the two-memberTeamofExperts,theCouncildecidedtoestablishaPanelofExpertswiththeappropriate mandate to assist theCommitteeinitsmonitoringfunctions.By2004,thepanelwasreplacedbyaMonitoringGroup.

Intheperiodfrom2002tothepresent,the Committee has undertaken thereviewoftenreportssubmittedbythemonitoring mechanisms and hasreceived a numberof “mid-term”orinterimoralbriefingsbythem.Duringthesebriefingsandpresentationsofreports,membersof theCommitteehavehadtheopportunitytoengagethe experts on all aspects of theirobservations,conclusionsandrecom-mendations.Butitseemsthatforthemostpart,mostCommitteemembershave not taken advantage of theopportunities to address the issuesraisedwithregardtoviolationsofthearmsembargo.OnlyafewCommitteemembershaveparticipatedactivelyintheworkandthushadanyappreciableeffectontheCommittee’soutcomes.

The reports of the monitoring mech-anisms have repeatedly identifiedsanctionsviolatorsandmadeavastnumberof recommendationsaimedto improve the effectiveness oftheembargo.

AllofthesereportsarediscussedbytheCommitteeandthensubmittedtothe Council and published as docu-mentsoftheCouncil.Ultimately,itisonlytheCouncilthathastheauthorityandpowertotakemeaningfulactiontoenforcetheembargoinresponsetothe findings and recommendations.TheCommitteecanmakerecommen-dationstotheCouncil,butforthisto

happenall15membersmustagree,astheCommitteeoperatesbyconsensus.

Anillustrationofthepracticalimplica-tionsofthisprocedurecanbefoundintheCommittee’s2003annualreport,whichsimplystatedthatthechairmanprovided “a factual report to theCounciloftheCommittee’sdiscussionsonthePanel’sreporttotheSecurityCouncilon3December2003”.Thislanguagesuggests that theCommit-teewasunabletoarriveatanydecision,andconsequentlytheCommitteewasnotofferinganyrecommendationstothe Council regarding the violationsidentifiedand the recommendationsmadeinthemonitoringmechanism’sreport. In this report, the Panel ofExperts had identified a number oftransitcountriesintheregionthroughwhicharmsdestinedforSomaliahadpassed.(Themonitoringmechanismhad recommended that a list ofindividuals and groups engaged inviolatingthearmsembargoshouldbepreparedwithaviewtopossiblefutureSecurityCouncilactionsagainstthem.TheexpertshadalsorecommendedthatviolatorsshouldbebannedfromreceivingUNcontracts.)

Atvariouspoints theCommitteedidseektobemoreproactive.InNovem-ber 2003, a mission led by thechairman of the Committee visitedcountriesintheregion(Djibouti,Egypt,Eritrea,Ethiopia,KenyaandYemen)aswellasformercolonialpower,Italy.During this mission, the Committeemet with government and militaryofficials, representatives of SomalipoliticalpartiesandcivilsocietyandwithheadsoftheAfricanUnion,IGADandtheLeagueofArabStates.

Theaddedimportanceofthemeetingwith IGAD was the fact that it wassponsoringtheSomalinationalrecon-ciliation process led by Kenya. TheCommitteecould learnfirsthand theexpectationsofthefacilitatorsregard-ing the implementation of the armsembargointheregionandinturntheinterlocutors in the region could bemade aware of the Committee andthe Council’s expectations andapproaches.TheAfricanUnion,alsoinvolvedwiththereconciliationprocess,hadmadeacommitmenttodeployamilitaryobservermissiontoSomaliaonce a comprehensive agreementhadbeenreached.

ThePanelofExpertsinitsMarch2003reporthadmadeanumberofrecom-mendations aimed at improving theimplementationofthearmsembargo,including: measures to improveissuance,scrutinyandverificationofend-user certificates for arms salesandtransfers;preparationofalistforfinancial sanctions; targeted travelban;anddiplomaticsanctions.

These matters were beyond theCommittee’s competence and theCommitteesoughttheadviceofrele-vant internationalorganisations.Thechairman,onbehalfoftheCommittee,sent letters on 5 May 2003 to theAfricanUnion,LeagueofArabStates,theInternationalCivilAviationOrgani-sation (ICAO), the InternationalMaritimeOrganisation(IMO),andtheUN Department of DisarmamentAffairs (DDA)seeking theirviewsonthePanel’srecommendations.

Inordertofurtherimprovecommuni-cation between neighbouring statesand the Committee, the Chairmaninvitedneighbouringstates(Djibouti,


Eritrea,Ethiopia,KenyaandYemen)tomeetdirectlywith theCommittee.Whilenotunprecedentedforaffectedstatestomeetwithsanctionscommit-tees,thisalsomarkedanotherturningpoint in the Committee’s assertive-ness. Again, however, this did notseemtohaveanyappreciableeffecton the implementation of the armsembargobythesestates.

Even though the Committee hadbecome more active in engagingstates on the implementation of thearms embargo, it failed to act on aseries of recommendations offeredby the monitoring mechanisms andfailedtofollowupontheprovisionsofresolution 1519 imposing reportingrequirements. A key example is thefailuretoactonthedraftlistofthoseindividuals and entities that wereviolatingthearmsembargo,andtheiractive supporters. The Council, inresolution 1587 of March 2005 thatre-establishedtheMonitoringGroup,mandatedittocontinuerefiningandupdatinginformationonthedraftlistforpossible futuremeasuresby theCouncil.Thedraft listhadbeenpre-paredearlierbuthadseennoactionbytheCommitteeandtherewerenorecommendations to the Council inthatregard.

Also in resolution1587, theCouncilrequested that the Committee con-siderandrecommendtotheCouncilwaystoimprovetheimplementationof and compliance with the armsembargo,includingwaystodevelopthecapacityofstatesintheregiontoimplement the arms embargo. Yetwhile timeandagainthemonitoringmechanismshavedrawnattentiontothelackofcapacityandpoliticalwillinneighbouring states to implement

the arms embargo, no recommen-dations have been made by theCommitteeinresponse.

While the Committee continued toconsiderthereportsandrecommen-dationsoftheMonitoringGroup,therewasnoindicationthatitendorsedanyoftheMonitoringGroup’srecommen-dationsormadeanyofitsown(orifithasthesewerenevermadepublic).

DiscussionsintheSomaliaSanctionsCommittee have continuously beenmarked by a high degree of scepti-cism on the subject of targetedmeasures,inparticularthefreezingoffinancial assets and travel bans. Aperennial argument has been that,giventhelackoftechnicalresourcesand capacity in Somalia and theregion, or even widespread regularbankingservices,themeasureswouldbe largely ineffective. Another (verycontested) argument has been thatthemajorityoffightersinSomaliadonothavebankaccountsanddonottravelinternationally.

Political sympathy for the TFG alsoseemstohaveplayedakeyroleinthepositionsofsomemembers.

Armsproducingstateshavegenerallyargued that they cannot be heldresponsibleifthearmstheyproduceare illegally diverted to Somalia—either directly or through blackmarkets—bythosetowhomthearmsare first sold. And those states inwhichblackarmsmarketsexisthavegenerallyargued lackofcapacityorcognisanceofsuchmarkets.

ThesamelackofresponsehasbeenseenwithrepeatedrequestsfromtheCouncil—mostrecently inresolution1814ofMay2008—totheCommittee

forrecommendationsonstrengtheningthesanctionsregime.Theseseemtobelargelypro-formaexercises,sincemembersareveryawareof thedivi-sionsandscepticismprevailingintheCommittee—whichafterallcomprisesthesame15countriesasontheCouncil.

Relationship with Neighbouring and Other StatesTheCommitteeonatleasttwoocca-sions (2 March 1993 and on 12-13November1993)addressedletterstothose states geographically neigh-bouringSomaliaandothercountriesintheregion(Djibouti,Ethiopia,Egypt,the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya,SaudiArabia,theSudanandYemen)appealingtothemtomonitorairandseatrafficintheareatoincreasetheirvigilancewithregardtothemovementof goods across common borderswithSomalia,andtoidentifytheoriginofthecarriersofthegoodsdestinedfortheportsofSomalia.Thereisnoindication that neighbouring stateseverrespondedtothese1993letters.

Thetwomissionstotheregionledbythechairmanof theCommitteeanddescribed above, were meant toencourage neighbouring states tobecome more responsive and toactivelyseekinformationonthelevelof implementation of the armsembargoandtoseekimprovedcoop-erationbetweenthesestatesandtheCommittee.Thereisnoindicationthatthesevisitshaveinanywayresultedinimprovedimplementationofthearmsembargointheregion.ThereportsoftheMonitoringGrouphavesuggestedthat these countries have not beenimplementing the arms embargoand that some of them have beenimplicatedinarmsembargoviolations.



Therewereapparentlynorequestsforexemptionstothearmsembargoasstipulated in resolutions 1356 and1744.There isnonethelessclearevi-dence of international assistance toTFG forces and the delivery of sup-pliesofnon-lethalmilitaryequipmentintended solely for humanitarian orprotective use. This clearly signalswidespreaddisregardfortheembargoeveninthosesituationsauthorisedbytheCouncil.

Relationship to Regional and International OrganisationsInitsreporttotheCouncilfortheyear1998,theCommitteeindicatedthatitwouldconsiderappropriatestepstoimprove the monitoring of the armsembargo and would establish chan-nelsofcommunicationwith relevantregional and subregional organisa-tions and bodies. However, thatchannelwasnotformallyestablisheduntilMarch2000,when,asdiscussedabove,thechairmanoftheCommitteewrotetotheOAUandIGADseekingthe cooperation of those organisa-tions in the implementation of thearmsembargo.Thiswasnotsurpris-ingastheCommitteehardlyfunctionedin thepre-2000period.Furthermore,while these two organisations regu-larly sent representatives toCouncilmeetingsandoftensentletterstotheCouncil on declarations and resolu-tionsadoptedbythemwithregardtoSomalia,itwasclearthattheseorgan-isationshadnegligibleinfluenceovertheirmembers’lackofimplementationofthearmsembargo.

Also, as noted above, in 2003, theCommittee sought the views ofregional and international organisa-tions(ICAO,IMO,DDA,AfricanUnion

and the League of Arab States) onrecommendations of the MonitoringGroupto imposetargetedsanctionsonarmsembargoviolators.ItshouldalsobenotedthattheCommitteehelddiscussionswith theregionalorgani-sations during its missions to theregionin2003and2005.Thepurposeofthesediscussionswastourgetheregional organisations to use theirinfluencetohelpwiththeimplementa-tionofthearmsembargoandtohelpin the peace facilitation process inSomalia. And, while the regionalorganisationshavehelpedtofacilitatethepeaceprocessesefforts,theyhavenotbeenable to influence theeffec-tivenessoftheimplementationofthearmsembargobytheirmembers.

Relationship with Other Council Subsidiary Bodies (Relevant Sanctions Committees)Thesourcesofarmssuppliesandthesuppliersareoftenthesameactorsfordifferentconflictsituations.Armsmoveinandoutofacountryandinmanycaseshavebeenknowntomovefromoneconflictsituationtoanother.How-ever, there isnoevidence, includingany mention of it in reports of theSomalia Sanctions Committee thatwould indicate that there has beenany cooperation or coordination ofactivitieswithothersanctionscommit-tees or subsidiary bodies of theSecurityCouncil.

�. Role of the Monitoring Mechanism

TheuseofmonitoringmechanismstoassistsanctionscommitteesandtheCounciltoimproveoneffectiveimple-mentation of arms embargoes and

othertargetedsanctionshasbeenanimportantadditiontotheworkofsanc-tionscommittees.ThedetailsoftheirrecommendationsandtheCouncil’sresponsehavebeencoveredabove.

The expertise and the work of themonitoringmechanism(firstthePanelofExpertsandcurrently theMonitor-ing Group) has added a significantamountofcapacityfortheCommitteeto investigate violations and toformulate possible remedial actions.As noted in sections above, theCommittee had for many yearscomplainedthatithadtorelysolelyonstates to report embargo violations,andthatnostatehaddoneso.

Mandate of the Monitoring MechanismsTheoriginalmandateofthefirstSomaliasanctionsmonitoringmechanismwasdevelopedbytakingintoaccounttherecommendations of the Team ofExpertsestablishedin2002.Theycar-riedoutafeasibilitystudyandmaderecommendationswithregardtocon-stituting the monitoring mechanism.As a result, the Council establishedthePanelofExpertswiththeappropri-ateexpertiseandresourcestoassistthe Committee with the followingmandate: to investigate all forms ofviolations, toassess thecapacityofthestatesintheregiontoimplementthe arms embargo, and to providerecommendations to theCouncilonways to strengthen enforcement ofthearmsembargo.

ThemandateofthePanelofExpertswas then expanded by resolution1474of8April2003toinvestigatespe-cificallyviolationsofthearmsembargocoveringaccess toSomaliaby land,airandsea,andinparticulartopursue

Security Council Report OneDagHammarskjöldPlaza,885SecondAvenue,31stFloor,NewYork,NY10017T:12127599429F:12127594038www.securitycouncilreport.org 2�

anysourcesthatmightrevealinforma-tionrelatedtoviolations,andtodetailinformationandmakespecificrecom-mendations to give effect to andstrengthentheembargoinitsvariousaspects. The Panel was also man-datedtoconductfield-basedresearchinSomalia,neighbouringstatesandother states where appropriate andpossible,andtoassessthecapacityofstatesintheregion,includingtheircustoms and border control capaci-ties, to fully implement the armsembargo.Inaddition,thepanelwasasked to identify arms embargoviolatorsandprovidetheCommitteewithadraft listof them forpossiblefutureactionsbytheCouncil.

TheCouncil inresolution1519of16December2003replacedthePanelofExpertswitha four-memberMonitor-ingGroupwithasimilarmandatetothatofitspredecessor.Allmonitoringmechanisms are established underChapterVIIoftheCharter.Thisstronglysuggests that statesare required tocooperate with the investigationscarriedoutbythemandtogivethemaccessasrequiredintheconductoftheirwork.

The process of renewal of the man-datesofeachmonitoringmechanismhas followed a pattern in which theCouncil generally reassigned thesametaskstoeachsucceedingpanel.Fromtimetotime,theCouncilwouldaddsomenewtasks,asitdidinreso-lution1630ofOctober2005whereitasked the Monitoring Group to con-tinuethetaskssetinresolution1587.It also broadened the mandate toallowthemonitorstoconductinvesti-gations incoordinationwithrelevantinternational agencies, including inthe financial, maritime and other

sectorsthatgeneraterevenuesusedtocommitarmsembargoviolations.

Relationship of the Monitoring Mechanism to the Committee and the CouncilThe monitoring mechanism is anindependentbodyof expertswithaspecific mandate from the CouncilandguidancefromtheCommittee.Itconducts its work independently oftheCommitteebutisrequiredtoreporttotheCouncilthroughtheCommitteeandtoprovidetheCommitteeperiodi-cally with briefings on its work. It isessentially a support mechanism toimprove the effectiveness of theCommitteeand itsexpertise isavail-abletotheCommitteeatalltimes.

AsamatterofpolicyandpracticetheMonitoringGroup(allofitsmemberstogether)isavailableforconsultationsbyindividualCommitteemembers.Butinanefforttoavoidundueinfluenceofanyparticularmemberstateover itswork,itavoidsmeetingsbetweenindi-vidualGroupmembersandindividualCommitteeorCouncilmembers.

During briefings of the Committeeandpresentationsofwritten reports,membersoftheMonitoringGroupareavailable to address specific issuesandrecommendationsincludedinthereports.InthiswaytheexpertiseofthemembersoftheGroupismadeavail-able to members of the Committee,includingthosememberswithlimitedaccess to expertise in all areascovered in the reports. But as hasbeennotedabove,mostmembersoftheCommitteerarelytakeadvantageofthisresource.

Thereis,however,nodirectinteractionbetween the Monitoring Group and

theCouncil. The lineof reporting isthroughtheCommittee,andthentheCouncil isbriefedon theMonitoringGroup’sreportsandrecommendationsbytheChairmanoftheCommittee.

This buffer between the monitoringmechanismandtheCouncilinsulatesthe Council from specific findings,conclusionsandrecommendationsofthe Monitoring Group. The Councilhas theoption toonlydealwith therecommendations coming from theCommitteewithregardtotheMonitor-ing Group’s work. But this tends toobscurethefactthattheCommitteeisinrealitythealteregooftheCouncil,andthe insulation isessentiallyonlyprocedural. However, members doseemtoseethestructureasshieldingthe Council from the realities oftheMonitoringGroup’sfindingsandrecommendations and perhapsabsolving the Council from anyrequirementformeaningfulresponse.The Council often refers to the find-ings in the reports without makingreferencetotherecommendationsoractingonthem.

Modus Operandi, Including Standard of ProofAs laid out in the reports of themonitoringmechanisms,reasonablestandards of proof (as opposed tojudicialstandards)areusedtodeter-minesanctionsviolations.Asamatterofpolicyandpractice,no individual,entity, group or state is identified inanyof its reports asarmsembargoviolatorswithoutatleasttwosourcesof verifiable information, preferablydocumentaryinformation.

The members of the monitoringmechanism,whoarebasedinNairobi,Kenya, visit countries in the region



regularly,andconductinterviewswithgovernmentofficials,representativesofregionalorganisations,NGOsandothers on an ongoing basis. Themonitoring mechanism also seeksdocuments from many sources toconfirmthepurchasesandshipmentsof arms in violation of the embargo,and carries out verification of thesedocuments as appropriate. But thereliabilityoftheGroup’sfindingshasbeen routinely questioned by someCouncilmembers.

Problems Identified with Effectiveness of Sanctions/ Arms EmbargoAmongtheproblemsmostfrequentlyidentifiedbymonitorsoftheembargoisthelackofcapacityofneighbouringstatestoimplementthearmsembargo.Insomecasespoliticalwillisalsoanissue.Forsomecountriesintheregiontheir own geopolitical interests areservedbyfacilitatingorturningablindeyetoembargoviolations.

As to the lackofcapacity, thereareadministrative and operational prob-lemswithcustomsandbordercontrol.This is particularly true for Somaliaitselfwhichiswithoutacentralgovern-ment exercising control over itsterritory,includingaccessbyland,airandsea.Similarly,thecountriesintheregionarealsooftenunabletoexercisecontrol over access to Somaliathrough their territories, evenwheretheyhavesomesemblanceofcustomsand border control mechanismsinplace.

Observations by the Monitoring Mechanisms The Monitoring Group, in order toimproveontheimplementationofthe

armsembargo,hasmadeaseriesofrecommendations based on theirfindings and observations. One ofthese observations is that lack offollow-up action by the Council hasledtheviolatorstoconcludethattheCouncilhasnointentionofenforcingtheembargo.Armsembargoviolatorsthereforebelievetheycancontinuetoviolatetheembargowithimpunity.

In its March 2004 report, it warned,“thedismissiveattitudetoresolutionsoftheSecurityCouncilwillcontinuetoprevailiftheinternationalcommunitydoesnotshowresolveinimplement-ingastrictembargoregimeorremainvigilantininvestigatingnewviolationsoftheembargo.”

It should be noted that the reportsof the monitoring mechanisms arepublisheddocuments.Violatorshaveaccesstothem,theyareawareoftheobservations and recommendationsof the monitoring mechanisms, and,most importantly, they are aware ofthe dynamics of the Council whichlead to a lack of meaningful actionagainstthem.

TheMonitoringGroup’s21November2006reportlaidsomeoftheblameforthedeteriorationinthesecuritysitua-tion inSomaliaon theCouncil. TheMonitoring Group stated, “pastrecommendations…werepredicatedbothontheanalysisoftheinformationavailable and a sense of what mea-suresmightbestservetocurbarmsembargo violations … however, nopast recommendations have beenimplemented.Consequently—arguably

—thesecuritysituationinSomaliahascontinuedtodeterioratedramatically,resultinginanexplosionofarmsflows,wider militarization of society and,

eventually, the ongoing and broadmilitary build-up of the two majorcontendersforcontrolofSomalia,allinviolationofthearmsembargo.”Thisstatement,apparentlyoverlookedbymost observers, was essentially aclear warning about the need foraction to enforce the effectiveimplementationofthearmsembargoonSomalia.

Since 2002, the monitoring mecha-nisms have largely fulfilled theirmandatesassetoutbytheCouncil,by conducting reasonably thoroughinvestigations of arms embargoviolations, identifying specific viola-tions and violators and preparinga draft list of those violators. Themonitors have made a series ofrecommendations to improve theeffectiveness of the arms embargo,including recommendations forthe Council to impose targetedsanctions—travel bans and assetsfreezes—onindividualviolators;andothermeasuresdesignedtoimprovethescopeofthearmsembargoitself.

6. Role of the Secretariat

The work of the Somalia SanctionsCommittee and the monitoringmechanism is supported by theUN Secretariat. In the case of theCommittee,theSecretariatthroughitsSanctionsBranchprovideslogisticalandclericalsupport,includingarrang-ing meeting venues and notifyingmembers of scheduled meetings,assistance in drafting of letters andreports, and related secretarialservices.Thisservice isofparticularimportancetosmalldelegationswhichwould not be able to cope with the


extra demands such as chairing asanctionscommittee.

The Somalia Sanctions Committeehas generally experienced profes-sional and competent support fromtheSecretariatstaff.Adviceandguid-ancetomembersoftheCommittee,inparticular to the chairingdelegation,on the conduct of Committee busi-nesshasgenerallybeengood.Thisalso includesorientingnewCommit-tee members on the nature of thesanctions and the historical back-groundoftheCommittee’sworkwithregard to the particular sanctionsregime.TheSecretariat isoftencon-sultedbymembersof thesanctionscommittees, many of whom lackexperienceindealingwithsanctions.The Secretariat also facilitates meet-ingsbetweentheCommitteeandthemembersoftheMonitoringGroupaswellasbetweenindividualmembersof the Committee and members ofthemonitoringmechanism.

The Secretary-General appoints themembers of the Monitoring GroupandtheSecretariatprovideslogisticalsupport, includingtravelandaccom-modations.

Theadministrativeprocess followingthe authorisation by the relevantresolution to appoint a monitoringmechanismaftertheexpiryofitsman-date(usuallyeverysixmonths)doesnotallowforimmediateappointmentsof theexperts.There is, therefore,aperiod of some four to six weeksfollowingthepassageoftheresolutionwhen the monitoring mechanism isnot on the ground. The MonitoringGroup has indicated that there isusually an increase of arms flow inviolationofthearmsembargoduring

thishiatus.From thisobservation, itwould appear that the Council pro-cess leading to renewing mandatesmaysignificantlyaffecttheefficiencyofthesanctionsregime.

TheworkloadoftheSecretariatinsup-portofthesanctionscommitteesandother Security Council subsidiarybodieshasbeengrowingsteadilyinthepastseveralyearswiththeincreaseinnumbersofsanctionscommitteesandmonitoringmechanisms.However,theSecretariat’scapacitytodealwiththisincreasehasnotgrowncommen-surately with this demand. Whilecreating new sanctions regimes,sanctionscommitteesandmonitoringmechanisms, the Council has notprovided support for an increase inthecapacityof theSecretariat.Lackof such support for the SecretariatcouldcontributetodeficienciesintheCommittee’sandmonitoringmecha-nism’swork.

�. Final ObservationsRegarding Implementationand Effectiveness of the Sanctions

This study draws attention to theCouncil’sdifficultyinmakingappropri-ateandtimelydecisionsandespeciallyitsinabilitytochangecoursewhenitbecomesobviousthattheinitialmea-suresarenothavingthedesiredeffect.

TheCouncilhasimposedvariationsofarmsembargoesinmanyconflictsitu-ations.Historically,allarmsembargoeshaveproveddifficulttoimplement.

But the arms embargo imposed onSomalia in 1992 at the outset con-fronted more difficulties than most.Therewasnogovernmentalentitywith

control over Somali territory. Therewas no customs or border control.FromtheverybeginningtheSecretary-Generalhadmadeclearthedifficultyof implementing an unsophisticatedsanctionsregime,especiallyifitreliedheavilyonauthoritiesinneighbouringcountries toenforce it.Notonlydidthe neighbouring countries lack theadministrativeandoperationalcapaci-ties required incustomsandbordercontrol,butsomealsohadcompetinginterests which ran counter to theircompliancewithandenforcementoftheembargo.

Violations by some neighbouringcountrieshavepersistedoveralongperiodoftimeandarewellknowntoCouncilmembers.Yet,despitethesewarnings and its experience withmuch more sophisticated sanctionstoolkitsinothersituations,theCoun-cilchosenottoaddresstheseissuesandput inplacethe limpest formofembargoimaginable.

Thisstudyclearlyshowsthat lackofpolitical will, national interests andlackofcapacity,onthepartofCouncilmembers and neighbouring states,made effective implementation oftheSomaliaarmsembargounlikely,ifnotimpossible.TheCouncilwasfullyaware of these problems. While itaskedforassessmentsofthecapacityof the neighbouring states to imple-mentthearmsembargoonSomalia,it did not react to findings of themonitors and has not facilitatedassistancetothosestatesthatlackedthenecessarycapacity.

The Council instead resorted toexpressingconcernabout theeffectthearmsflowtoSomaliawashavingontheconflictsituation.Itseemsthat



in imposing the arms embargo, theCouncilwantedtogivetheimpressionthat it intended to stem the flow ofarmstoSomaliaandtherebycreateanenvironmentconducivetoacessa-tionofhostilitiesthatwouldleadtoapoliticalsettlement.

Buteveninthefaceofobviousfailureoftheembargo,theCounciltooknoactionforthefirsttenyearstodefinemore clearly the scope of the armsembargoortoenforceit.Inmostothercaseswherearmsembargoesareinplace, the Council has employedadditional sanctions targeted at thefinancialassetsof,andimposedtravelbansagainstviolatorsoftheembargo.SixteenyearsaftertheadoptionofthearmsembargoforSomalia,andwiththesituationbecomingentangled inawiderregionalconflicttheCouncilisstilltodeviseatool-kitbasedonestab-lishedbestpractices.

No effort was made to impose sec-ondarysanctionsoncountriesintheregionthatwereidentifiedasviolators.Insteadofactingupontheevidencethathasbeenprovidedbythemoni-toringmechanismstoinvestigateandidentifynon-stateactorsresponsiblefor arms embargo violations, theCouncilmerelyaskedthemonitorstocontinueinvestigatingandrefiningthedraftlistofviolators.Thisprocesshasbeengoingonforthepastfouryears.AsthePanelofExpertsaptlypointedoutinoneofitsreports,Somalifactionleaders identified as violating thearmsembargo,havingnotseenanyenforcement action taken by theCouncil,haveassumedthattheycancontinuewithbusinessasusual.

AnotherconclusiontobedrawnfromtheSomaliaarmsembargoexperience

is that an arms embargo in and ofitselfisnotsufficienttohaveadesiredeffect on a conflict situation. It isimportant that specific targets forenforcement action are identifiedand appropriate measures imposedagainstthem.ItisnotsufficientfortheCouncil to threaten repeatedly toimposetargetedsanctionsonspecificindividuals or groups and not carryout its threats.At thesametimetheabsence of any carrots to counter-balance the sanctions, especially intheformofaseriouscommitmenttoapolitical reconciliation process, canbeseenasamajorweakness.

As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moonsaidinaspeechtoasymposiumonEnhancing the Implementation ofSecurityCouncilSanctionson30April2007, “while not a solution in them-selves,sanctionscanplayaneffectiveroleamongthepanoplyofmeasuresto prevent and resolve conflict.” Hestressed their use in support of aholistic conflict resolution approach.However,theSecurityCouncil’sexpe-rience with the Somalia sanctionsstandsincontrastwiththisapproach.

In the case of the Somalia armsembargo,theinactionoftheSomaliaSanctionsCommitteeduringthefirsteightyearsand its inability tomakeactionable recommendations to theCouncilinthepasteightyearstendsto confirm that the arms embargowasonlyeverafigleaf.Afterthefailureof UNOSOM II in 1993 and 1994,sanctionsbecameaproxyforstrategyinSomalia.

Among the lessons that should belearnedfromthefailureoftheSomaliaarms embargo is the risk of takingactionwhichtheCouncildoesnotintend

to enforce or which is understoodfromtheoutsettobeunenforceable.

8. Other Relevant Information

Committee Chairs

AmbassadorYoshioHatanoofJapan(1992-93)AmbassadorSalimAl-KhussaibyofOman(1994-95)AmbassadorParkSooGiloftheRepublicofKorea(1996-97)AmbassadorJassimMohammedBuallayofBahrain(1998-99)AmbassadorSaidBenMustaphaofTunisia(2000-01)AmbassadorNoureddineMejdoubofTunisia(2001)AmbassadorStefanTafrovofBulgaria(2002-03)AmbassadorLauroL.BajaofthePhilippines(2004-05)AmbassadorNassirAbdulazizAl-NasserofQatar(2006)AmbassadorDumisaniShadrackKumaloofSouthAfrica(2007-08)

Team of Experts

23May2002:IanAnthony(armsexpert,StockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute)andHarjitSinghSandhu(expertwithInterpolinvestigativeexperience)

Panel of Experts

• 22August2002:ErnstJanHogendoorn(Netherlands),MohamedAbdoulayeM’Backe(Senegal),BrynjulfMugaas(Norway)

• 30April2003:EdwardHowardJohns(USA),MohamedAbdoulayeM’Backe(Senegal),JohanPeleman(Belgium)andPavanjeetSinghSandhu(India)


Monitoring Group

• 22Januaryand23August2004:MelvinE.Holt,Jr.(USA),LiChangsheng(China),JohnE.Tambi(SierraLeone)andJoelSalek(Colombia)

• 6Apriland2November2005and22Mayand15December2006:MelvinE.Holt,Jr.(USA),HarjitSinghKelley(Kenya),JoelSalek(Colombia)andBrunoSchiemsky(Belgium)

• 28September2007:BrunoSchiemsky(Belgium),GilbertCharlesBarthe(Switzerland),JulianaRuhfus(Germany)andEdwinaThompson(Australia)

• 13November2007:CharlesM.Lengalenga(Zambia)replacedEdwinaThompsonwhodidnotassumeherfunctions

• 10June2008:GilbertCharlesBarthe(Switzerland),MattBryden(Canada),CharlesM.Lenalenga(Zambia)andIgnatiusYawKwantwi-Mensah(Ghana)

�. UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

• S/RES/1816(2June2008)authorisedforeignshipstoenterSomaliwatersanduse

“allnecessarymeans”todeteractsofpiracy.

• S/RES/1814(15May2008)requestedrecommendationsfromtheSanctionsCommitteeonmeasurestostrengthentheembargo.

• S/RES/1811(29April2008)re-establishedtheMonitoringGroupforaperiodofsixmonths

tocontinuewithitspriormandate.• S/RES/1801(20February2008)

renewedAMISOMforsixmonthsandemphasisedthecontributionofthearmsembargo,demandedmemberstates’complianceandreiterateditsintentiontoconsiderwaystostrengthenitseffectiveness.

• S/RES/1766(23July2007)re-establishedtheMonitoringGroupforaperiodofsixmonthstocontinuewithitspriormandate.

• S/RES/1744(20February2007)establishedAMISOMforaperiodofsixmonthsandauthorisedexemptionstothearmsembargo.

• S/RES/1732(21December2006)wastheresolutionadoptingthereportoftheInformalWorkingGrouponGeneralIssuesofSanctions(S/2006/997).

• S/RES/1730(19December2006)wastheresolutionestablishingnewde-listingguidelinesforallsanctionscommittees.

• S/RES/1725(6December2006)authorisedthedeploymentofIGASOM,allowedexemptionstothearmsembargoandsignalledanintentiontoconsidertargetedmeasurestostrengthentheembargo.

• S/RES/1724(29November2006)re-establishedtheMonitoringGroupwithamandatesimilartothatofresolutions1587,1630and1676.

• S/RES/1676(10May2006)re-establishedtheMonitoringGroupwithamandatesimilartothatinresolutions1587and1630.

• S/RES/1630(14October2005)re-establishedtheMonitoringGroupwithamandatesimilar

tothatinresolution1587.• S/RES/1587(15March2005)

re-establishedtheMonitoringGrouptocontinueinvestigatingandmakingrecommendationsandaskedthatitrefinedthedraftlistandassisttheCommitteetoidentifyareaswherethecapacitiesofstatesintheregioncanbestrengthened.

• S/RES/1558(17August2004)re-establishedtheMonitoringGrouptocontinueinvestigatingviolationsandmakerecommen-dationsforadditionalmeasures.

• S/RES/1519(16December2003)establishedtheMonitoringGrouptobebasedinNairobi,KenyatoinvestigateviolationsofthearmsembargoandmakerecommendationsandprepareadraftlistofviolatorssubjecttopossiblefuturemeasuresbytheCouncil.

• S/RES/1474(8April2003)re-establishedthePanelofExpertstoinvestigateviolations,makerecommendations,prepareadraftlistofviolatorsandassesscapacitiesofstatesintheregiontoimplementtheembargo.

• S/RES/1425(22July2002)elaboratedonthescopeofthearmsembargo;establishedaPanelofExpertsconsistingofthreemembersbasedinNairobi,Kenyaandmandatedtoinvesti-gateviolations,assessstatescapacity,andproviderecom-mendationstostrengthentheembargo.

• S/RES/1407(3May2002)establishedaTeamofExpertscomprisedoftwomembersto



explorefeasibilityofamonitoringmechanism.

• S/RES/1356(19June2001)providedhumanitarianandotherexemptionstothearmsembargo.

• S/RES/954(4November1994)extendedthemandateofUNOSOMIIforafinalperiodending31March1995.

• S/RES/885(16November1993)establishedtheCommissionofInquirytoinvestigatethearmedattacksonUNOSOMIIpersonnel5June1993.

• S/RES/837(6June1993)theCouncilapprovedanextendedapplicationofthemandateunderwhichpersonsresponsibleforattacksonUNforcesandpersonnelareheldresponsible.

• S/RES/814(26March1993)establishedUNOSOMIIwithaChapterVIImandate.

• S/RES/794(3December1992)initiatedanoperationinSomaliawhichbecameknownastheUnifiedTaskForce(UNITAF).

• S/RES/775(28August1992)expandedandstrengthenedUNOSOM’smandatetoprotecthumanitarianconvoysanddistributioncentres.

• S/RES/751(24April1992)establishedUNOSOMandtheSanctionsCommittee.

• S/RES/746(17March1992)supportedtheSecretary-General’sproposaltosendatechnicalteamtoSomalia.

• S/RES/733(23January1992)imposedageneralarmsembargoonSomalia.

• S/RES/421(9December1977)establishedasanctionscommit-teetomonitorthearmsembargo

againstSouthAfrica.• S/RES/418(4November1977)

imposedanarmsembargoagainstapartheidSouthAfrica.

• S/RES/253(29May1968)establishedthefirstCouncilsanctionscommitteetomonitortheimplementationofthesanctionsmeasuresinSouthernRhodesia.

Selected Presidential Statements

• S/PRST/2006/31(13July2006)reiteratedtheCouncil’sintentionexpressedinpriorpresidentialstatementsandresolutionstoconsiderurgentlywaystostrengthentheeffectivenessofthearmsembargo.

• S/PRST/2002/8(28March2002)urgedalongthepeaceprocessandunderlinedtheurgencytodevelopmonitoringmechanismsthatallowedlegitimatefinancialtransactionswhilepreventingtheflowoffundstoterroristgroups.

• S/PRST/1999/31(12November1999)raisedconcernsaboutthegrossviolationsofthearmsembargo.

• S/PRST/1999/16(27May1999)raisedconcernsaboutthegrossviolationsofthearmsembargo.

Reports of the Monitoring Mechanisms

• S/2008/274(24April2008)notedanincreaseinarmedactionsbetweentheTFGandoppositiongroupsandfoundthatthearmsembargowashavingalimitedimpactontheconflict.

• S/2007/436(17July2007)notedthegrossviolationsofthearmsembargo,includingtheinvasionofSomaliabyEthiopia.

• S/2006/913(21November2006)identifiedtencountriesviolatingthearmsembargo.

• S/2006/229(4May2006)repeatedtherecommendationfor“anintegratedarmsembargo”.

• S/2005/625(5October2005)firstrecommendedthe“integratedarmsembargo.”

• S/2005/153(8March2005)firstspecifiedadraftlistofpossibletargetsforsecondarysanctionstotheCommittee.

• S/2004/604(11August2004)includedrecommendationsonstrengtheningthecapacityofthearmsembargo,

• S/2003/1035(4November2003)wasthesecondreportofthePanelofExperts

• S/2003/223(25March2003)wasthefirstreportofthePanelofExpertswhichspecificallyidentifiedclearpatternsofarmsembargoviolations.

• S/2002/722(3July2002)wasthereportoftheTeamofExperts.

Annual Reports of the Somalia Sanctions Committee

• S/2007/761(26December2007)• S/2007/154(15March2007)• S/2005/813(19December2005)• S/2004/1017(30December2004)• S/2003/1216(31December2003)• S/2002/1430(30December2002)• S/2001/1259(21December2001)• S/2000/1226(14December2000)• S/1999/1283(28December1999)• S/1998/1226(28December1998)• S/1997/16(6January1997)• S/1996/17(15January1996)

wasthefirstreportoftheCommitteeanditcoveredthe


periodfromitsinceptionthrough31December1995.

Selected Reports of the Secretary-General

• S/2008/466(16July2008)wasthelatestreportoftheSecretary-GeneralreiteratingcontingencyplanningforapossibleUNpeacekeepingforce.

• S/2008/178(14March2008)addressedcontingencyplanningforapossibledeploymentofaUNpeacekeepingforceinSomalia.

• S/1994/839(18July1994)wasthereportoftheSecretary-GeneralonthesituationinSomaliahighlightingarmsflowtothecountry.

• S/24343(22July1992)wasonthesituationinSomaliaandhigh-lightedarmsflowtothecountry.

• S/23829(21April1992)wasonthesituationinSomaliaandhighlightedprogressmadeinimplementingthearmsembargo.

• S/23693andCorr.1(11March1992)waspreparedinresponsetoSecurityCouncilrequestinresolution733.

Selected Letters

• S/2008/378(10June2008)wasaletterfromtheSecretary-GeneralappointingGilbertCharlesBarthe,MattBryden,CharlesM.Lengalenga,IgnatiusYawKwantwi-MensahastheexpertsfortheMonitoringGroup.

• S/2008/370(6June2008)wasaletterfromthePermanentRepresentativeofUgandatothepresidentoftheSecurityCouncildismissingallegationsfromtheMonitoringGroup’s24AprilReportthatUgandanpersonnel

soldarmstoinsurgents.• S/2007/667(13November2007)

wasaletterfromtheSecretary-GeneralappointingCharlesM.LengalengatoreplaceEdwinaThompsonwhodidnotassumeherfunctionsasanexpertfortheMonitoringGroup.

• S/2007/575(28September2007)wasaletterfromtheSecretary-GeneralappointingBrunoSchiemsky,GilbertCharlesBarthe,JulianaRuhfus,EdwinaThompsonastheexpertsfortheMonitoringGroup.

• S/2006/986(15December2006),S/2006/313(22May2006),S/2005/695(2November2005)andS/2005/229(6April2005)werelettersfromtheSecretary-GeneralappointingMelvinE.Holt,Jr.,HarjitSinghKelley,JoelSalekandBrunoSchiemskyastheexpertsfortheMonitoringGroup.

• S/2004/676(23August2004)andS/2004/73(22January2004)werelettersfromtheSecretary-GeneralappointingMelvinE.Holt,Jr.,LiChangsheng,JohnE.TambiandJoelSalekastheexpertsfortheMonitoringGroup.

• S/2003/515(30April2003)wasaletterfromtheSecretary-GeneralappointingEdwardHowardJohns,MohamedAbdoulayeM’Backe,JohanPelemanandPavanjeetSinghSandhuasthePanelofExperts.

• S/2002/951(22August2002)wasaletterfromtheSecretary-GeneralappointingErnstJanHogendoorn,MohamedAbdoulayeM’BackeandBrynjulfMugaasasthePanelofExperts.

• S/2002/575(23May2002)wasaletterfromtheSecretary-GeneralappointingIanAnthonyandHarjitSinghSandhuastheTeamofExperts.

• S/23445(20January1992)wastheletterfromtheCharged’affairesofSomalia,FatunMohamedHassan,requestingameetingoftheSecurityCouncilonthesituationinSomalia.

Other Relevant Documents

• SG/SM/10968SC/9010(30April2007)BanKi-moon’sspeechtotheSymposiumonEnhancingtheImplementationofSecurityCouncilSanctions.

• SC/7849(20August2003)wasapressreleaseremindingstatesoftheirobligationsregardingthearmsembargoandseekingcooperationoftheOAUandIGAD.

• SCA/1/02(09)(7June2002)wasthenoteverbaletoallstatesremindingthemoftheirobliga-tionstoimplementthearmsembargo,andseekingtheassis-tanceofneighbouringstates.

• SC/7417(29May2002)wastheCommittee’spressreleaseonthenoteverbalesenttostatesandletterssenttotheOAUandIGAD.

• SC/6823(13March2000)wasthepressreleaseoftheCommitteeinwhichitindicateditsintentiontosendletterstoallmemberstatestoremindthemoftheirobligationstoensurestrictimplementationoftheembargo;alsoonitsdecisiontosendletterstotheOAUandIGADseekingtheircooperation;andendorsementofproposalto



undertakeafact-findingmissionbytheChairmantoneighbouringstates.

• S/1995/234(29March1995)wasthenotebythepresidentoftheCouncilformallyestablishingannualreportsby,andimprovingthetransparencyof,allsanctionscommittees.

• SC/5960SOM/62(5December1994)wasthepressreleasebywhichtheCommitteeissuedanappealtoindividuals,nationalandinternationalorganisationsforinformationonembargoviolations.

• S/1994/1245(3November1994)wasthereportoftheSecurityCouncilMissiontoSomaliaon26and27October1994.

• S/1994/1194(21October1994)wastheNotebythePresidentoftheCouncilnamingthemembersofthemissiontoSomaliaon26and27October1994.

• S/1994/653(1June1994)wasthereportoftheCommissionofInquiryestablishedtoinvestigatearmedattacksonUMOSOMIIpersonnelon5June1993.

• SC/5554SOM/10(10February1993)wasthepressreleaseexpressingtheCommittee’sconcernwiththelackofreceiptofinformationfromstates.

• S/PV.3039(23January1992)wastheverbatimrecordofthemeetingoftheSecurityCouncilatwhichresolution733wasadopted.

�0. Useful Additional Sources

Irrelevant or malevolent? UN arms embargoes in civil warsbyDominicTierneyReviewof InternationalStud-ies(2005),31645-664

Monitoring UN Sanctions in Africa: the role of panels of expertsbyAlexVinesVerificationYearbook(2003)247-263

Background on UNOSOM I http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosomi.htm

Background on UNOSOM II http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom2.htm

Website of the Somalia SanctionsCommittee http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/index.shtml

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