Securiting the Bomb 2006-Matthew Bunn

7/31/2019 Securiting the Bomb 2006-Matthew Bunn

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114 SECURING THE BOMB 2006

lectively, from FY 2002 through FY 2006these programs have had over three timesmore funding than they would have if theFY 2001 budget had been kept the samein real terms. The Second Line of Defenseprogram at DOE went from a budget un-der $2 million in FY 2001 to a proposed budget for FY 2007 of nearly $124 million.

This growth trend is very likely tocontinue. DOE, DOD, and the StateDepartment each continue to operatesome type of border security assistanceprogram, and there is a long list of con-cerns about countries capacities to securetheir borders against nuclear smuggling.With the Megaports Initiative within the

the Historical Tables: 19402011, in U.S. O ce ofManagement and Budget, FY 2007 Presidents Bud-

get.

Second Line of Defense program, DOEcontinues to install radiation detectionsystems at major ports overseas. DOEhopes to install equipment at up to 35ports overseas, but anticipates that theFY 2007 proposal will only allow the totalnumber of ports completed to rise to 13. 10 With heightened a ention focused on portsecurity following the controversy overthe bid by a United Arab Emirates com-pany to operate ports in the United States,a program to increase the chances of de-tecting nuclear cargo before a ship evendeparts for U.S. shores will likely continueto receive robust funding.

Furthermore, as with security for materi-als, UNSCR 1540 created a legal obligation

10 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2007 Defense Nu-clear Nonproliferation Budget Request , p. 519.

Table 4-3Requested and Enacted U.S. Budgets or

Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling

(Current $, in millions;numbers may not add due to rounding)

Final EnactedAdministration Change rom

Request Previous Year% Change rom Previous Year

FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007

Tota , Inter i tin Nu ear smu in 1

Second Line o De ense (DOE)2

E port Control and Related Border Security Assistance(State)

International Counterproli eration (DOD)

WMD Proli eration Prevention (DOD)

1 This total only includes programs to provide assistance to oreign countries; it does not include domestic nuclear andradiological detection e orts.2 DOE lists unding or the Second Line o De ense program (which includes the Megaports Initiative) under the MaterialProtection, Control, & Accounting budget line item.

160 191

75 97

36 43

12 11

37 41

237 194 217

149 98 124

38 44 45

10 11 11

40 41 37

+39 +31 +26

+29 +22 +27

+1 +6 +2

+2 -1 +0

+7 +4 -3

+32% +19% +12%

+62% +29% +28%

+2% +6% +5%

+26% -11% +0%

+25% +11% -8%


129/178

UPDATING THE BUDGET PICTURE115

for all 191 member states of the UnitedNations to put in place appropriate ef-fective controls on the movement ofWMD and related materials across their borders. 11 Most of these states will re-quire assistance to put e ective controls in

place. A U.S.-led e ort to help countriesaround the world truly meet the UNSCR1540 mandate will likely require that theseU.S.-sponsored programs have additionalmoney and personnel with which to work.

Stabilizing Employment or Nuclear Personnel

The cumulative FY 2007 budget proposedfor the programs in this category would be a drop from the previous year. 12 Over-

11 United Nations, 1540 Commi ee.12 None of the programs focus solely on redirectingformer Soviet scientists and engineers with nuclearexpertise (except for NCI), but their entire bud-gets are included here because of the di culty of

breaking out how much of each is spent on nuclearscientists and engineers versus other scientists and

all, the budgets for these programs have been largely stable in nominal terms overthe last several years; because of in ation,real annual budgets in this area have beendeclining.

Nevertheless, these programs appearinterested in taking on more work: thescientist redirection e orts at both theState Department and DOE state in the budget justi cations that they intend toconduct operations in countries outsidethe former Soviet Union, such as Iraq andLibya. For FY 2007 the State DepartmentsNonproliferation of WMD Expertise ex -pects to go even further, seeking in FY

2007 to develop a new targeted strate-gic engagement program for scientists,engineers and technicians with WMD-ap -plicable expertise...in key regions whereterrorists and proliferating states may beable to access this [weapons of mass de-

engineers with nuclear, biologicall, or chemicalweapons knowledge.


Stabilizing Employment or Nuclear Personnel




FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007

Tota , stabi izin Emp oyment or Nu ear Per onne

Nonproli eration o WMD E pertise (State)

Global Initiatives or Proli eration Prevention (DOE)

Civilian Research and Development Foundation (State) 1

1 Amount can only be estimated until urther in ormation is made available by the State Department.

106 107

50 52

41 40

15 15

107 105 99

51 53 56

41 38 28

15 15 15

+5 +1 -7

-0 +2 +4

+1 -1 -11

+4 0 0

+5% +1% -7%

-0% +4% +7%

+2% -3% -29%

+36% 0% 0%


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struction (WMD)]-applicable expertise. 13 Congress and the administration will haveto carefully review proposals to broadenthe scope of these programs to ensurethat additional funding demands do notundermine support for on-going e orts tocope with un- or under-employed nuclearexpertise in the former Soviet states.

For instance, as noted above, for FY 2007DOE has requested a lower funding levelfor GIPP, which contains both IPP andNCI. If approved, the administrationsproposal would reduce these combinedprograms budgets to their lowest an-nual levels since FY 1996. This proposed

reduction comes despite the fact thatthe White House O ce of Managementand Budget (OMB), using its ProgramAssessment Rating Tool, assigned GIPPits highest rating of e ective. 14 Thereduction came in part because the U.S.-Russian agreement governing NCI hadexpired, making it di cult to start newNCI projects; with the resolution of theU.S.-Russian liability dispute, however,DOE now has authority to negotiate anew NCI agreement. 15 DOE appears to be be ing that the program will be able todo the same with less money, as it expectsannual performance in FY 2007 to matchthat of FY 2005, using the programs met-ric of Cumulative number of the GIPPtarget population of displaced Russianand former Soviet WMD experts who arecurrently employed in GIPP grants orlong-term private sector jobs. 16

13 U.S. Department of State, FY 2007 Congressional

Budget Justi cation for Foreign Operations , p. 140.DOEs intention are in U.S. Department of Energy,FY 2007 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Re-quest , p. 140.14 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2007 Defense Nu-clear Nonproliferation Budget Request , p. 495.15 Interview with DOE o cial, April 2006.16 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2007 Defense Nu-clear Nonproliferation Budget Request , p. 497.

Presumably in part because of the stag-nant or declining budget resources andthe broadened ambitions, both the DOEand State Department programs are try-ing to elicit greater contributions fromprivate partners in scienti c redirectionprojects, and are increasing trainingand support so that scientists and theirinstitutes can move away from U.S. sup-port. For FY 2005 DOE reports that thecumulative non-U.S. government (that is,private and foreign government) contribu-tions equaled 65% of the cumulative DOEfunding for GIPP; DOE hopes to reach75% by FY 2007.17 For FY 2005, the StateDepartments Nonproliferation of WMDExpertise program says that private sector

funding for collaborative projects equaledapproximately 9% as a percentage of theU.S. funding provided for such projects(this gure does not include the projectsfunded by other countries through theInternational Science and TechnologyCenter in Moscowwhere contributionsfrom the European Union and Canadaoutweigh direct contributions from theState Departmentand the Science andTechnology Center of Ukraine). 18

Monitorin sto kpi e anRe u tion

By far the least funded of these goals,programs focused on transparency andmonitors received largely stable budgetsover the last several years. But for FY2006 Congress went even farther thanthe Bush administration had proposed inreducing funding for the Warhead andFissile Material Transparency program;the FY 2006 budget is $10.2 million, as

17 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2007 Defense Nu-clear Nonproliferation Budget Request , p. 497.18 U.S. O ce of Management and Budget, Program

Assessment Rating Tool (Washington, D.C.: OMB,2006; available at h p://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/ as of 27 March 2006).


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opposed to $16.4 million in FY 2005. Ingeneral, though, funding is not the great-est constraint for these e orts. As wehave discussed in prior reports, the mostcritical issues blocking or delaying prog -ress are almost entirely policy issues. 19 Breakthroughs on these policy blockageswould likely require additional fundingto implement, however.

Ending Further Production

Budget estimates for the program toeliminate three weapon-grade plutonium

production reactors in Russia have risen

19 Ma hew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John Hold -ren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: AReport Card and Action Plan (Cambridge, Mass., andWashington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom,Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative,2003; available at h p://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/report.asp as of 1 February 2006),pp. 147-150.

since our previous report. For FY 2006,Congress provided $174.4 million for theprogram, though the administration hadrequested $132 million. The change wasdriven by the House Energy & Water Ap -propriations Subcommi ee, which initiallyproposed FY 2006 funding of $197 million, based on skepticism that a DOE proposalto solicit additional funding from othergovernments would succeed. 20 DOEs FY2007 budget request is $206.7 million (inFebruary 2005, before the congressionalincrease, DOE had anticipated that the FY2007 budget would be $137.6 million). 21 Toround out the program, DOE now expects

20 FY 2006 Energy and Water Appropriations Act HouseReport.21 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Congres-sional Budget Request: National Nuclear Security

AdministrationDefense Nuclear Nonproliferation ,vol. 1, DOE/ME-0046 (Washington, D.C.: DOE,2005; available at h p://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/06budget/Content/Volumes/Vol_1_NNSA.pdf as of27 February 2006), p. 505.

Table 4-5Requested and Enacted U.S. Budgets or Monitoring Stockpiles and Reductions




FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007

Tota , Monitorin sto kpi e an Re u tion

HEU Transparency Implementation (DOE)

Warhead and Fissile Material Technology (DOE)

Trilateral Initiative (DOE) 1

1 Funding or this activity was once embedded in a larger budget item, allowing us only to estimate unding levels. Asthe activity is largely dormant, or FY 2006 and beyond, we have stopped making any assumptions about the undinglevel until urther in ormation becomes publicly available.

39 29

21 19

16 10

2 0

39 34 32

21 20 18

16 13 15

2 0 0

+4 -9 +3

+3 -1 -2

+1 -6 +5

0 -2 0

+10% -24% +10%

+16% -7% -9%

+4% -38% +45%

0% -100% N/A


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that it will request $182.0 million for thee ort in FY 2008, $139.4 million in FY 2009,and $24.9 million in FY 2010. 22

As noted in Chapter 3, this program has become very expensive, if judged on the basis of cost per ton of plutonium whoseproduction will be avoided. Neverthe-less, it has received support from both theadministration and Congress, and there

is li le point in trying to save money thisyear by spreading the funding over alonger period: that would only increasetotal costs and allow plutonium produc-tion to continue longer. But the rapidlyrising budgets for this e ort should not


be allowed to cut into funding for evenhigher-priority programs in the struggleto prevent nuclear terrorism, such asMPC&A and GTRI.

Reducing Excess Stockpiles

In FY 2005 the program to dispose ofRussias excess weapons plutoniumescaped a House e ort to halve new

funding, but as noted above, for FY 2006Congress sliced nearly $30 million fromthe $64 million request. For FY 2007, theadministration is planning to continueat the lower level voted by Congress inFY 2006, using funds appropriated inFY 1999. As of February 2006, DOE pro- jected continuing at roughly that level inFY 2008 and FY 2009, and then returning


Ending Further Production and Reducing Excess Stockpiles




FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007

Tota , En in further Pro u tion

Elimination o Weapons Grade Plutonium Production (DOE) 1

Tota , Re u in E e sto kpi e

Russian Plutonium Disposition (DOE) 2

HEU Reactor Fuel Purchase (DOE) 3

1 $4.189 million in FY 2002 unds trans erred to DOE rom DOD e pired, and were reappropriated to DOE in FY 2005 byNational De ense Authorization Act o FY 2004.2 FY 2007 Administration Request e cludes $34.695 million in planned e penditures rom carryover balances rom FY1999 Emergency Supplemental o $200 million.3 Updated to refect lack o allocation speci ed in FY 2007 Congressional Budget Justi cation.

67 174

67 174

63 34

63 34

0 0

50 132 207

50 132 207

74 64 0

64 64 0

10 0 0

-15 +107 +32

-15 +107 +32

+7 -29 -34

+8 -29 -34

-1 0 0

-18% +159% +18%

-18% +159% +18%

+13% -46% -100%

+15% -46% -100%

-100% N/A N/A


133/178


to the earlier budgets in the range of $63million per year in FY 2010 and FY 2011,presumably assuming that constructionof facilities would be underway in Russia by then. 23 DOE and the State Departmentare also working to secure nancing fromother governments rather than havingthe United States pay entirely for thise ort on its own (having secured $844million in commitments thus far, count-ing U.S. commitments, enough to fundfacility construction, but not operation).As noted earlier, the dispute over liabilityprotection for contractor work has beenresolved; but as discussed in Chapter 2,the Russian plutonium disposition pro-gram faces many other issues that could

still undermine the programs future andthe prospects for gaining additional for-eign contributions for it.

For HEU, as we discussed in earlier re-ports, su cient funds are in place tocarry out the current approaches to dis-position of U.S. HEU, and the purchaseof Russian HEU, which is nanced pri -marily through commercial means ratherthan government expenditure. If the

United States and Russia decided to pur-sue a large-scale acceleration of the HEU blend-down rate, signi cant additionalfunding would be required.

t otal t hrEat r Eduction f unding

With the FY 2006 allocation, total appro -priations since 1992 for all cooperativethreat reduction e orts, including chemi -

cal, biological, and other nonproliferation


cooperation, has eclipsed $13 billionin constant 2005 dollars (using a broadde nition of threat reduction funds thatincludes some funds spent outside theformer Soviet Union that the administra-tion does not count toward its G8 GlobalPartnership contribution). 24 Just underhalf of that sum has been appropriated toDOD, though DOE programs (predomi-nantly focused on nuclear technologies,rather than chemical, biological, or mis-sile technologies) have accounted formost of the recent growth. The overallthreat reduction budget is slated to fall inFY 2007, largely because less new fund-ing is required to pay for construction ofa chemical weapons destruction facility

at Shchuchye, Russia.

Beyond the accomplishments alreadydiscussed in this report, that $13 billioninvestment has produced clear results:over 6,500 former Soviet warheads have been deactivated, nearly 1,200 interconti-nental and submarine-launched ballisticmissiles have been destroyed, and almost30 ballistic missile-carrying strategicsubmarines have been demolished. 25 $13

billion is not a small amount of money, but spread out over een scal yearsit is dwarfed by other defense expendi-tures. Taken as a whole, this e ort hasdirectly reduced the nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile threat pointed atthe United States, at a remarkably lowcost.

24 Calculations on data contained in Wier, Interac -tive Budget Database.25

U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Coopera-tive Threat Reduction: Scorecard (Washington,D.C.: DTRA, 2006; available at h p://www.dtra.mil/toolbox/directorates/ctr/scorecard.cfm as of 27March 2006).


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5 REcOMMENdATIONsThe danger of nuclear the and terrorismis a global problem, requiring a globalresponse. The presidents of the UnitedStates and Russia, along with the heads ofstate of other leading nuclear weapon andnuclear energy states, should join togetherin taking three actions:

launching a global coalition to preventnuclear terrorism;

forging e ective global nuclear securitystandards; and

accelerating current e orts toward aglobal cleanout, in which weapons-us-able material would be removed fromthe worlds most vulnerable sites asrapidly as possible.

To make these three initiatives work willlikely require ve key changes in current

approaches:

new steps to build the sense of urgencyabout, and commitment to addressing,the threat of nuclear terrorism amongpolitical and nuclear leaders aroundthe world;

sustained leadership from the highestlevels (including the appointment, inthe United States and Russia, and pos-

sibly in other participating countries aswell, of senior o cials with direct ac -cess to the head of state when needed,with full-time responsibility for leadingthe myriad e orts directed toward pre -venting nuclear terrorism);

truly partnership-based approaches,incorporating ideas and resources from

all cooperating partners, moving awayfrom donor-recipient relationships;

more exible approaches to nuclearsecurity cooperation that can allowimportant improvements to be madewithout in all cases requiring that U.S.personnel be able to travel to the mostsensitive nuclear sites; and

expanded e orts to ensure that highlevels of nuclear security will be sus-tained for the long haul, and to buildstrong security cultures, in which allsta relevant to security give it the pri -ority it deserves.

A er describing each of these recom -mended initiatives and changes inapproach, this chapter also outlines pos-sible options for the U.S. Congress.

There is still much to be done in Russia,to complete the cooperative upgradesnow under way, to ensure that secu-rity measures are put in place that aresu cient to meet the threats that existin todays Russia, to forge a strong se-curity culture, and to ensure that highlevels of security for nuclear stockpileswill be sustained a er international as -sistance phases out. But increasingly,the work with Russia should become atrue partnership of near-equals, framedas one part of a global approachandthe United States should redouble its ef-forts to expand its programs to preventnuclear terrorism across the globe. 1 The

1 For an especially useful discussion of speci c ap -proaches to strengthening U.S.-Russian nuclearsecurity cooperation through partnership-basedapproaches, wri en jointly by U.S. and Russianexperts, see U.S Commi ee on Strengthening U.S.


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122

recommendations below, therefore, whileapplicable to the work in Russia, areglobal in nature.

initiativE 1: a g loBal c oalition to P rEvEnt n uclEar t ErroriSm

President Bush should immediately beginworking with Russia and other leadingnuclear-weapon and nuclear-energy statesto gain their agreement to participate ina global coalition to prevent nuclear ter-rorism. The participants in this coalitionwould agree to:

Ensure that all stockpiles of nuclearweapons and weapons-usable ma-terials under their control would beprotected at least to a common securitystandard su cient to defeat the threatsterrorists and criminals have demon-strated they can pose. (Participantswould be free to protect their stockpilesto higher standards if they perceiveda higher threat in their country.) Forexample, the commitment could beto provide protection at least againsttwo small groups of well-armed andwell-trained outsiders, and one to twowell-placed insiders, or both outsidersand insiders working together.

and Russian Cooperative Nuclear Nonproliferation,National Research Council, and Russian Commit-tee on Strengthening U.S. and Russian CooperativeNuclear Nonproliferation, Russian Academy ofSciences, Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on

Nuclear Nonproliferation (Washington, D.C.: NationalAcademy Press, 2005; available at h p://fermat.nap.edu/catalog/11302.html as of 4 April 2006). See alsoMa hew Bunn, Building a Genuine U.S.-RussianPartnership for Nuclear Security, in Proceedings of the 46th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear

Materials Management, Phoenix, Ariz., 10-14 July 2005 (Phoenix, Ariz.: INMM, 2005; available at h p:// bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content_stage/docu -ments/inmmpartnership205.pdf as of 16 February2006).

Work with other states to convincethem to join the commitment to thiscommon standard, and provide assis-tance where necessary to help countriesput this level of security in place.

Develop and put in place transpar-ency measures that will help buildinternational con dence that theagreed security measures have in fact been taken, without providing publicinformation that would be helpful toterrorists.

Sustain security levels meeting theagreed standard inde nitely, usingtheir own resources, a er any interna -tional assistance they may be receivingcomes to an end.

Reduce the number of locations wherenuclear weapons and weapons-usablenuclear materials are located, achievinghigher security at lower cost.

Put in place border and transshipmentcontrols that would be as e ectiveas practicable in interdicting nuclearsmuggling, as required by United Na-tions Security Council Resolution 1540,and help other states around the worldto do likewise.

Drastically expand intelligence andlaw enforcement sharing related to in-dicators of nuclear the risks, nuclearsmuggling and criminal networks thatmight contribute to those risks, groupswith ambitions to commit catastrophic

terrorism, and other subjects related topreventing nuclear terrorism.

Pass laws making actual or a emptedthe of a nuclear weapon or weapons-usable nuclear material, unauthorizedtransfers of such items, or actual ora empted nuclear terrorism crimescomparable to treason or murder.

SECURING THE BOMB 2006


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RECOMMENDATIONS 123

Cooperate to strengthen nuclear emer-gency response capabilitiesincludingnuclear materials search capabilitiesthat could be deployed rapidly any-where in the world in response to anunfolding crisis.

Exchange best practices in security andaccounting for nuclear warheads andmaterialsto the extent practicableasis already done in the case of nuclearsafety.

Strengthen the ability of the Interna-tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)to contribute to preventing nuclear ter-rorism.

Take such other actions as the partiesagree are needed to reduce the risk ofnuclear terrorism.

As discussed in Chapter 2, deliberate deci-sions by hostile states to provide nuclear bomb materials to terrorists are a smallerpart of the danger of nuclear terrorismthan nuclear the , because regimes fo -cused on their own survival know thatany such act would risk overwhelmingretaliation. Nevertheless, gaining interna-tional agreement on packages of carrotsand sticks large and credible enough toconvince Iran and North Korea that it isin their interests to veri ably abandontheir nuclear weapons e orts would be akey contribution to reducing the dangerof nuclear terrorism, and should also be afocus of the global coalition.

Such a coalition does not yet exist. To

date, the Global Partnership Against theSpread of Weapons and Materials of MassDestruction announced at the summit ofthe Group of Eight (G8) industrializeddemocracies in Kananaskis, Canada, in2002 has nothing global about it exceptits name, and only a dribble of non-U.S.funds in the Global Partnership have sofar been focused on improving nuclear

security measures. Instead, the GlobalPartnership is almost entirely focusedwithin Russia (now with Ukraine as anadded recipient), and the non-U.S. fundshave primarily been devoted to chemi-cal weapons destruction and submarinedismantlement (the two areas Russiasrequests have focused on most intensely).The G8 summit in St. Petersburg in July2006 will represent another opportunity tolaunch such a global coalition against nu-clear terrorism; that opportunity shouldnot be missed.

The coalition against nuclear terrorismthat is urgently needed could be builtaround a fundamentally reenergized andrefocused Global Partnership, or, if thatproves impossible, it could be a new ini-tiativea complementary but separatee ort, building on the experience of theGlobal Partnership. The United Statesshould work with like-minded coun -tries to return the Global Partnership toits original ambitions, which included acommitment to take the steps necessaryto prevent terrorists, or those that har- bor them, from acquiring the materials

needed for weapons of mass destruction,speci cally called on all countries,not just Russia, to join in providing ef-fective security and accounting for theirstockpiles of nuclear weapons and weap -ons-usable nuclear materials, and o eredassistance to any country needing help toprovide such e ective security. 2

Whatever approach is taken to building it,this global coalition should include the G8members, along with China, India, Paki -stan, and ideally Israel (which is believedto have a signi cant stockpile of nuclearweapons) and South Africa (which once

2 The G8 Global Partnership against the Spreadof Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction(Kananaskis, Canada: Government of Canada, 2002;available at h p://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2002kananaskis/arms.html as of 27 June 2006).


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had nuclear weapons, and still has one ofthe largest stockpiles of highly enricheduranium (HEU) among the developingnon-nuclear-weapon states). 3

O ering these states roles as co-leaders,with the worlds leading nuclear states, ofa global e ort to improve all participantssecurity will be much more politicallyappealing than framing cooperation as ama er of assistance necessitated becausethey were unable to properly secure theirown stockpiles. Between them, thesecountries have all of the worlds nuclearweapons (except for the handful that mayexist in North Korea) and more than 95%of the worlds weapons-usable nuclearmaterial. If they were all participating,it is likely that other states with smalleramounts of HEU or separated plutoniumwould sign up as well.

To be e ective in accelerating andstrengthening global e orts to reducethe risk of nuclear terrorism, the coali -tion would need a strong mechanism forensuring that the initial commitmentswere followed through. The participantsshould each designate senior o cials to beresponsible for all aspects of implement-ing the global coalition commitments,and these senior o cials should meetregularly to develop agreed plans withmeasurable milestones, to oversee prog-ress in implementation, and to developmeans to overcome obstacles. In particu-

3 This is similar in some ways to the proposal tocreate a Contact Group to Prevent Nuclear Terror-

ism, including many of the G8 states along withChina, India, Pakistan, Israel, and other states withweapons-usable nuclear material that wish to join,designed to pursue securing the worlds nuclearstockpiles at very high levels of each government.See George Perkovich et al., Universal Compliance:

A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington, D.C.:Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,March 2005; available at h p://www.carnegieen -dowment.org/ les/UC2.FINAL3.pdf as of 21 March2006), pp. 87-88.

lar, the coalition partners should agreeon a target of pu ing in place securitymeasures su cient to meet the agreedminimum standard for all stockpiles ofnuclear weapons and weapons-usable ma-terials worldwide within six years or less.Since this would be an operational initia-tive going well beyond the G8, this groupshould be a standing organization. Itshould report to the leaders of the partici-pating states on a regular basis, perhapsonce every six months. Such a mechanismwould help to avoid the fate of past sum-mit initiatives, which have sometimes been announced with great fanfare andthen went nowhere when the summit

spotlight was gone.

Bilateral cooperation with Russia andwith other countries should continue, butframed as part of this global coalition. AsPresident Bush and President Putin ac -knowledged in their Bratislava statement,as the countries with by far the worldslargest nuclear stockpiles, the UnitedStates and Russia bear a special respon-sibility for action. They should seek totake such e ective action in securing theirown stockpiles that they set a strong ex -ample for the rest of the global coalitionparticipants. In addition, they shouldapply their experience to work togetherto help other countries around the worldto secure their stockpiles. In particular,it is very important to get a presidential-level Russian commitment to provide theresources needed to sustain high levels

of nuclear security in Russia a er inter -national assistance phases outand toensure that mechanisms are in place tofollow up on implementation of that com-mitment. It is also important to work toforge strong security cultures, where allpersonnel take security seriously, and cut -ting corners on security is not widespread(see discussion below).


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RECOMMENDATIONS 125

Adapting the threat-reduction approachesdeveloped in cooperation with Russiaand other former Soviet states to the spe-ci c circumstances of each other countrywhere cooperation must go forward islikely to be an enormous challenge. At -tempts to simply copy the approach now being used in Russia are almost certainto fail. 4 Cooperation with states withsmall nuclear weapons arsenals, suchas Pakistan, India, China, and Israel, islikely to be especially di cult. For all ofthese states, nuclear activities take placeunder a blanket of almost total secrecy,and direct access to many nuclear sites by U.S. personnel is likely to be impos -sible in the near term (an issue discussedin more detail below). In general, work -ing out arrangements to improve nuclearsecurityand to build con dence thate ective nuclear security really is inplacewill require considerable creativ-ity and persistence. (Providing securityequipment and training in such cases inno way contravenes the United States ob-ligation under the Nonproliferation Treaty

4 For discussion, see Challenges of Adapting

Threat Reduction to New Contexts, in Ma hewBunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb: An

Agenda for Action (Cambridge, Mass., and Washing -ton, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, HarvardUniversity, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2004;available at h p://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/2004report.asp as of 1 February 2006),pp. 104-105. See also James E. Goodby et al., Coop-erative Threat Reduction for a New Era (Washington,D.C.: Center for Technology and National SecurityPolicy, National Defense University, September2004; available at h p://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/CTR%20for%20a%20New%20Era.pdf as of 21March 2006); Lee Feinstein et al., A New Equation:

U.S. Policy toward India and Pakistan a er September11 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, May 2002; available at h p://www.ceip.org/ les/pdf/wp27.pdf as of 21 March2006); Rose Go emoeller and Rebecca Longsworth,Enhancing Nuclear Security in the Counter-TerrorismStruggle: India and Pakistan as a New Region for Co-operation (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowmentfor International Peace, August 2002; available ath p://www.ceip.org/ les/pdf/wp29.pdf as of 21March 2006).

(NPT) not to assist non-nuclear-weaponstates in acquiring nuclear weapons, andcan be done in a way that is consistentwith all U.S. export control laws as well.)In general, working out arrangements toimprove nuclear securityand to buildcon dence that e ective nuclear securityreally is in placewill require consider-able creativity and persistence.

This coalition would be focused on tak -ing concrete actions to reduce the risk ofnuclear terrorismand in particular, onensuring that every nuclear weapon andevery kilogram of nuclear material world -wide is secure and accounted for. Thegoal would be to accomplish that objectiveas quickly and e ectively as possible. Inmany cases, this would mean countriestaking action to improve security for theirown stockpiles, perhaps with a modestamount of international advice and ex-change of best practices. In others, U.S. orother international funding or expertisemight be critical for ge ing the job donee ectively and quickly.

Those participating states in a positionto help fund the e orts of others shouldcollectively make substantial pledges offunds for implementing the needed ac-tions around the world. These pledgesshould be additional to, not substitutesfor, the pledges already made to theGlobal Partnership. As discussed inChapter 3, the number and magnitude ofthe upgrades needed around the worldare not publicly known, and dependon how high the bar is set (that is, the

security standard it is agreed upgradedsecurity systems should reach). As a re-sult, providing a reliable estimate of thetotal global cost is di cult. It seems verylikely, however, that total additional fund-ing substantially less than the $20 billionpledged to the Global Partnership would be su cient to drastically reduce the dan -ger of nuclear terrorism. The participants


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should commit to providing the resourcesnecessary to ensure that lack of fundingdoes not constrain the pace at which nu-clear stockpiles around the world can besecured and consolidated. As the seniorcontact group developed more detailedplans, they should be tasked with esti -mating the costs of implementation, andcoalition members should make pledgessu cient to implement them at the fastestpracticable pace.

The coalition partners should act to givestates and facilities strong incentivesto provide e ective security for theirnuclear stockpiles. 5 The United States

should work with all states with nuclearstockpiles to ensure that e ective andwell-enforced nuclear security rules areput in place, giving all facilities withnuclear stockpiles strong incentives toensure they are e ectively securedin -cluding the possibility of being ned ortemporarily shut down if a facility doesnot follow the rules. It would also be de-sirable to work to convince these statesto structure nancial and other rewards

for strong nuclear security performance(comparable, for example, to the bonuspayments contractors managing U.S. De-partment of Energy (DOE) facilities canearn for high performance). The UnitedStates should also establish a preferencein all U.S. contracts (not just those sup-porting DOE nonproliferation programs)for facilities that have positively dem-onstrated e ective security performancein realistic tests, and should seek to con -vince other leading nuclear states to dothe same. Ultimately, e ective nuclearsecurity should become a fundamentalprice of admission for doing businessin the international nuclear market.

5 Ma hew Bunn, Incentives for Nuclear Security,in Proceedings of the 46th Annual Meeting of the Insti-tute for Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix, Ariz.,10-14 July 2005 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2005).

initiativE 2: E ffEctivE g loBal n uclEar S Ecurity S tandardS

Facing terrorists with global reach, nuclearsecurity is only as good as its weakest link:as former Senator Sam Nunn has said,insecure nuclear material anywhere is athreat to everyone, everywhere. Yet today,there are no binding global standards forhow well nuclear weapons and materialsshould be secured, and the actual securityin place ranges from excellent to appall-ing. E orts to negotiate an e ective globalstandard in a treaty have not succeeded inthe past, and are not likely to succeed inthe near-term future, as such negotiationsinevitably become bogged down by coun-try representatives who see li le urgencyfor action and considerable potential foradded costs and unwanted intrusion forthe organizations they represent. Themost plausible means to overcome suchobstacles is for high-level leaders who seethe need for a minimum global nuclearsecurity standard, in the interests of all, toquickly put in place a broad political com -mitment to such a standardsuch as theone included in the proposed global coali-

tion against nuclear terrorism, describedabove.

One promising approach to followingthrough on such a high-level politicalcommitment is by eshing out the specif -ics of what is required by United NationsSecurity Council Resolution 1540. UNSCR1540, passed unanimously in April 2004,created a new binding legal obligationon every state to provide appropri-

ate e ective security and accountingfor whatever nuclear stockpiles it mayhave. This provides a crucial opportu-nity for the United States to work withother countries and the IAEA to: detailthe essential elements of an appropri-ate e ective system for nuclear security;assess what improvements countriesaround the world need to make to put


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RECOMMENDATIONS 127

these essential elements in place; and as-sist countries around the world in takingthe needed actions. If broad agreementcould be reached on what key elements anuclear security and accounting systemmust include to meet the appropriatee ective requirement, that would, ine ect become a legally binding globalstandard for nuclear security. Indeed, theentire global e ort to put in place strin -gent nuclear security measures for all theworlds stockpiles of nuclear weapons andweapons-usable nuclear materials can beconsidered simply as the implementationof the unanimously approved obligationsof UNSCR 1540.

If the words appropriate e ective meananything, they should mean that nuclearsecurity systems could e ectively defeatthreats that terrorists and criminals haveshown they can pose. Thus one pos-sible de nition would be that to meet itsUNSCR 1540 physical protection obliga-tion, every state with nuclear weapons orweapons-usable nuclear materials shouldhave a well-enforced national rule requir-ing that every facility with a nuclear bombor a signi cant quantity of nuclear mate -rial must have security in place capableof defeating a speci ed set of insider andoutsider threats comparable to those ter-rorists and criminals have demonstratedin that country (or nearby). This approachhas the following advantages: the logicis simple, easy to explain, and di cultto argue against; the standard is generaland exible enough to allow countries topursue their own speci c approaches, aslong as they are e ective enough to meet

the threats; and at the same time, it is spe-ci c enough to be e ective, and to providethe basis for questioning, assessment, andreview. 6

6 Questions to explore a countrys compliance withthis standard could include such items as: is therea rule in place specifying that all facilities withnuclear weapons or signi cant quantities of

The United States should immediately begin discussions with other leading gov-ernments, as part of the e ort to forge aglobal coalition to prevent nuclear terror-ism, on a common minimum standardfor nuclear security, strong enough to be

weapons-usable nuclear material must havesecurity in place capable of defending againstspeci ed insider and outsider threats? Are thosespeci ed threats big enough to realistically re ectdemonstrated terrorist and criminal capabilities inthat country or region? How is this requirementenforced? Is there a program of regular, realistictests, to demonstrate whether facilities securityapproaches are in fact able to defeat the speci edthreats? Are armed guards used on-site at nuclearfacilities, and if not, how is the system able to holdo outside a ack or insider thieves long enough forarmed response forces to arrive from elsewhere?Others have proposed other standards to meet simi-lar objectives: Graham T. Allison, for example, hasproposed a gold standard, arguing that given thedevastating potential consequences of nuclear the ,all nuclear stockpiles should be secured to levelssimilar to those used for large stores of gold such asFort Knox. See Graham T. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism:The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe , 1st ed. (NewYork: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2004). In 1994, acommi ee of the National Academy of Sciencesargued that because ge ing the essential ingredi -ents of nuclear weapons was the hardest part ofmaking a nuclear bomb, plutonium should, to the

extent practicable, be secured and accounted forto the same standards applied to nuclear weaponsthemselvesand argued further that this storedweapon standard should be applied to all sepa-rated plutonium and HEU worldwide (an approachthat presupposes that nuclear weapons themselveshave e ective protection, which may not always bethe case); U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Com-mi ee on International Security and Arms Control,

Management and Disposition of Excess WeaponsPlutonium (Washington, D.C.: National AcademyPress, 1994; available at h p://books.nap.edu/html/plutonium/0309050421.pdf as of 20 March 2006),pp. 31, 102. Other sources could also be drawn on

for insight in de ning what should be includedin an appropriate e ective physical protectionsystem, including the principles and objectivesin the proposed amendment to the physical protec-tion convention (though these are very general andinclude few speci cs), and the IAEAs recommenda -tions on physical protection (INFIRC/225 Rev. 4).Unfortunately, while both of these provide valuableconsiderations for physical protection, it is possibleto comply fully with both of them and still not havea secure system.


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e ective but general enough to allow eachstate to follow the approaches it has found best achieve the security objective in itsown context. The United States shouldalso seek agreement that such a standardrepresents the minimum required for anappropriate e ective system as required by UNSCR 1540. The United States andother nations agreeing to such a stan-dard should then launch an intensivee ort to persuade other states to bringtheir nuclear security arrangements up tothat standard, and help them to do so asneeded.

The United States should also make clearto all countries where nuclear stockpilesexist that with the passage of UNSCR1540, providing e ective security for thesestockpiles is now a legal obligation, anda positive relationship with the UnitedStates depends on ful lling that obliga -tion. As it already does with respect tocooperation on drug interdiction and pre-vention of human tra cking, the UnitedStates should put in place mechanisms toregularly report on how cooperative dif-ferent countries are being in the struggle

to prevent nuclear terrorism. The UnitedStates should toughen the standards ofsecurity it demands from countries thatreceive U.S. nuclear exports (while avoid-ing abrupt shi s in this respect that wouldonly lead countries to get their nuclearmaterial and technology elsewhere), andshould work with the other members ofthe Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) totoughen the NSG guidelines on physicalprotection.

Building Confdencein Nuclear Security

A particularly di cult problem is howto build con dence that nuclear securitycommitments have been implementedonce they have been made. Such con -dence is critical, as every country has a

direct national security interest in mak -ing sure that all countries with nuclearweapons and weapons-usable materialsprovide e ective security for them. But innearly every country with such stockpiles,the details of nuclear security arrange-ments are highly classi ed, making itdi cult to reveal enough information toprove that the security measures in placeare fully e ective. 7

For those countries willing to accept in-ternational peer reviews of their securityarrangements, IAEA-led peer reviews can be e ective in building con dence. Suchpeer reviews should increasingly becomea normal part of the nuclear business fordeveloped and developing states alike, just as international safety reviews are.But the reality is that some nuclear stock -pilesfrom those at U.S. and Russiannuclear warhead assembly plants to thosein Pakistan and Israelare extremelyunlikely to be welcoming IAEA visitorsanytime in the next decade. Graham Al-lison has proposed that nuclear weaponstates invite experts from another nuclearweapon state to review their nuclear secu-

rity arrangements and certify that they aree ective. China, for example, which haslong had close nuclear relations with Paki -stan, might review and certify Pakistansnuclear security system. 8

Another approach might focus on provid-ing, at least in general terms, the resultsof tests of security system e ectiveness.In the case of U.S.-Russian cooperation,

7 Even at sites in Russia where the United Stateshas invested heavily in improving security, Russiadoes not inform the United States about operationaldetails of day-to-day security measures importantto the e ectiveness of the overall system; and theUnited States has given Russia very li le informa -tion about the day-to-day e ectiveness of U.S.nuclear security systems.8 Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate PreventableCatastrophe , pp. 150-153.


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RECOMMENDATIONS 129

for example, to build understanding ofwhat was being tested and how, U.S. andRussian adversary teams used to test thee ectiveness of nuclear security systemsagainst outsider and insider threats mighttrain together, and perhaps conduct testswith joint U.S.-Russian teams at one ortwo non-sensitive sites in each country.Then the remaining sites could be tested by purely national teams, using similarapproaches and standards, and broaddescriptions of the results could be pro-vided to the other country. In the case oftests that revealed vulnerabilities requir-ing immediate corrective action, U.S. andRussian o cials would probably not wantto reveal the speci cs of those vulner -

abilities to the other side until they had been corrected (the existence of such vul-nerabilities is considered a secret in eachcountry). In cases where de ciencies werefound, they could simply be silent aboutthe results of the test, leaving the otherside to draw its own conclusions, until af-ter corrective action had been completed.Such an approach could provide substan-tially increased con dence to each sidethat the other s nuclear stockpiles were se -cure, and were being tested e ectively. Inparticular, an approach like this one might be used to con rm that Russia had takenaction to provide security at sites that had been judged too sensitive to allow U.S.access that was comparable to the securitymeasures at sites where U.S.-Russian co-operation had taken place, particularly thetwo remaining nuclear warhead assemblyand disassembly facilities.

Approaches such as these are sensiblegoals to aim for, though they will beextremely di cult to achieve. In the im -mediate term, states should do more toprovide general descriptions of their nu-clear security approaches, photographs ofinstalled equipment, and related data thatcould be made public without helping ter-rorists and criminals plan their a acks.

Strengthening the Nuclear Security Role o the IAEA

The IAEA O ce of Nuclear Security, es -tablished in its current form in the wake

of the 9/11 a acks, can play a crucial rolein helping to set standards and dissemi-nate best practices for nuclear security,in providing training, in assessing coun-tries needs, and in coordinating nuclearsecurity assistance to countries aroundthe world. In many countries, assess-ment teams and assistance organized bythe IAEA would be far more welcomethan U.S. assessment and assistance.With UNSCR 1540, there are now scoresof countries that may require assistanceto meet the binding legal obligations toprovide e ective nuclear security thatthey now face. Yet the O ce of NuclearSecurity has so far labored with an ex-traordinarily small sta and a tiny budget(a total of $35 million has been pledgedto the IAEAs Nuclear Security Fund inthe three and a half years since the 9/11a acks, while the cost of substantially up -grading security at one site o en exceeds$10 million).

The United States should work withother leading governments to expand themission, personnel, and resources of theO ce of Nuclear Security, allowing theIAEA to substantially increase its contribution to preventing nuclear terrorism.Speci cally, this o ce should be given theresources both to perform larger numbersof more in-depth nuclear vulnerability as-sessments and other evaluations of needs

for prevention of nuclear terrorism andto nance itself some of the security up -grades identi ed in reviews, rather thanrelying entirely on donor states to provideneeded upgrades. It should also be giventhe mission and resources to take a lead -ing role in assessing states needs andhelping them to comply with the nuclearprovisions of UNSCR 1540. This o ce


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can also play a key role in identifyingand promoting best practices in nuclearsecurity, and organizing international best-practice discussions; it should begiven the resources and mandate to doso. The budget of the O ce of NuclearSecurity should be increased to at leastthe range of $30-$50 million, and most ofthe o ces budget should become part ofthe IAEAs regular assessed budget, ratherthan relying entirely on voluntary contributions.

An Industry Nuclear Security Initiative

In addition to governments, the nuclearindustry itself has a major role to play inforging e ective global nuclear securitystandards and exchanging best practicesfor achieving high levels of security. Anew Chernobyl caused by a terrorist sabo-tage, or worse yet a city being destroyed by a terrorist nuclear bomb, would notonly cause catastrophic damage and hu-man su ering, it would also be a politicaldisaster of epic proportions for the nuclear

industry, spelling the end of any realis-tic prospect that nuclear energy could be expanded to deal with the challengeof climate change. Hence, just as in thecase of safety, industry has a strong self-interest in ensuring that those facilitieswith the worst security performance arehelped to reach the standards of the topperformers. The nuclear industry shouldtake the lead, launching a World Instituteof Nuclear Security (WINS)modeled insome respects on the World Association

of Nuclear Operators (WANO), which hasplayed a key role in improving nuclearsafety around the worldwhich woulddevelop standards, exchange and circu-late best practices, perform industry peerreviews and other advisory services on re-quest, and more. Just as has been the casewith WANOs role in nuclear safety, suchan industry-led e ort could e ectively

complement (rather than undermine)related ongoing work being done by theIAEA and by national governments. TheNuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has chal-lenged the Institute for Nuclear MaterialsManagement (INMM) to play a centralrole in launching such an initiative. 9 Inresponse, a team of INMM experts de-veloped a more detailed concept of howsuch an organization might function, andseveral stakeholders are now working todevelop the concept in more detail.

To ensure that such an initiative has thenecessary clout, it will be important to de-velop it in a way that maximizes industry buy-in, particularly from those controllingthe purse-strings. What made WANO andits U.S.-based predecessor, the Instituteof Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), soe ective was that the industry perceivedthem as its own ideas, operating to servethe industrys own interest. These organi-zations also had direct access to the utilityCEOs, who could bring powerful peerpressure to bear on any CEO whose utilitywas lagging behind. 10

initiativE 3: a n a ccElEratEd g loBal c lEanout

The only foolproof way to ensure thatnuclear material will not be stolen froma particular site is to remove it. Whatis needed now is a fast-paced e ort toremove the weapons-usable nuclear

9 Charles Curtis, Promoting Global Best Practices,in Proceedings of the 46th Annual Meeting of the In-stitute for Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix,

Ariz., 10-14 July 2005 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2005;available at h p://www.nti.org/c_press/speech_cur -tisINMM_071105.pdf as of 8 June 2006).10 For a fascinating discussion of INPO, its recordof e ectiveness, and the factors that caused thatoutcome, see Joseph V. Rees, Hostages of Each Other:The Transformation of Nuclear Safety since Three MileIsland (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1996).


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RECOMMENDATIONS 131

material entirely from the worlds mostvulnerable sites, particularly HEU-fueledresearch reactors, while upgrading secu-rity for those now-vulnerable sites whereweapons-usable nuclear material willremain. The Global Threat Reduction Ini-tiative (GTRI), launched in the spring of2004, was established to accomplish thatgoalbut there is still much to be doneto accelerate and strengthen that e ort. 11 The goal should be to remove the nuclearmaterial entirely from the worlds mostvulnerable sites within four yearssub-stantially upgrading security whereverthat cannot be accomplishedand toeliminate all HEU from civilian sitesworldwide within roughly a decade. 12

The United States should make every ef -fort to build international consensus thatthe civilian use of HEU is no longer ac-ceptable, that all HEU should be removedfrom all civilian sites, and that all civiliancommerce in HEU should brought to anend as quickly as possible. 13

11 GTRI also addresses radiological materials thatcould be used in a so-called dirty bomb, bothwithin the United States and internationally. Thatimportant topic is not the subject of this report,

however.12 In saying that all the HEU should be removedfrom the worlds most vulnerable sites within fouryearsa recommendation we have been making forseveral yearswe are not suggesting that it is pos-sible to convert every HEU-fueled research reactorwithin four years. Rather, the argument is that allHEU should be removed from those sites identi edas having both (a) enough HEU for a nuclear bomb,and (b) inadequate security to meet the threatsthey face, within that time. In some cases, thismay mean encouraging reactors that are no longerneeded to shut down rather than converting; whereneither conversion nor shut-down is realisticallypossible in a short time span, substantial securityupgrades need to be put in place rapidly, su cientto remove the site from the list of the worlds mostvulnerable facilities.13 For a similar recommendation, see Charles Fer-guson, Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations,2006; available at h p://www.cfr.org/content/pub -lications/a achments/NucTerrCSR.pdf as of 8 June2006).

The global coalition should seek: to closeand decommission HEU-fueled researchreactors and other sites with HEU orseparated plutonium that are no longerneeded; to accelerate conversion of HEUor plutonium-fueled research reactorsthat will continue to operate, and forwhich replacement low-enriched ura-nium (LEU) fuel is available; to assurethat fuels are developed as soon as pos-sible to convert all or nearly all of theremaining still-needed research reactors;and to ensure that e ective security isin place (meeting global standards suchas those described above), and that boththe on-site inventories of HEU and theenrichment of HEU are minimized, forthose sites where all the HEU cannot beremoved immediately. 14

The goals just outlined are challenging,and achieving them would require a sub-stantial e ort, but the scale and urgencyof the threat demands no less. Successin achieving them will require focusingcomprehensively on all the facilities thathave vulnerable potential nuclear bomb

material, not just those that happen to be operating civilian research reactors,or whose nuclear material happens to beRussian-supplied or U.S. supplied. Suc-cess will require exible and creativetactics, with approachesincludingincentives to give up the nuclear mate-rialtargeted to the needs of each facilityand host country. It will also require theUnited States to convert and adequatelysecure its own HEU-fueled research reac-tors, not only to remove such threats frominside U.S. borders but also enable U.S.leadership in convincing others to do thesame.

14 A similar listing was rst proposed in Inter -national Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile

Material 2006: Report of the International Panel onFissile Materials (Princeton, N.J.: Program on Scienceand Global Security, Princeton University, 2006).


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A Comprehensive Approach

GTRI was explicitly intended to take acomprehensive approach to the prob-lem of insecure nuclear material aroundthe world. GTRI has established anemerging threats sub-program whichis intended to cover what GTRI refersto as gap materialsthose materialsthat fell through the cracks in pre-exist -ing programs. To its credit, the DOE hasprepared and revised a list of the facilitiesaround the world where weapons-usablenuclear materials exist, to provide the ba-sis for a comprehensive approach, thoughDOE o cials report that as further visitsto particular sites are conducted, new

facilities using HEU are still being identi-ed. 15

Chapter 3 described in detail some of thegaps that still need to be lled: tons ofU.S.-origin HEU abroad not covered bythe current U.S. take-back o er (represent -ing some two-thirds of the U.S.-originHEU that was still abroad when the take- back o er was renewed in 1996); manyHEU-fueled reactors (in fact, nearly half

of the reactors still using HEU fuel aroundthe world) not yet slated for conversionor shut-down, particularly critical assem- blies and pulse reactors, which o en havehuge quantities of weapons-usable mate-rial on-site; reactors for medical isotopeproduction; HEU-fueled reactor types notyet covered by GTRI at all, such as ice- breaker and submarine reactors; and HEUthat does not come from either the UnitedStates or Russia, and hence is not covered by either the U.S. or Russian fuel take- back e orts. 16

15 Interviews with DOE o cials, February, April,and December 2005.16 See also Ma hew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Se-curing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Projecton Managing the Atom, Harvard University, andNuclear Threat Initiative, 2005; available at h p://

Civil plutonium and the Global NuclearEnergy Partnership. In addition tothese categories of HEU, the prolifera-tion risks of separated plutonium must be addressed as well. Small quantities ofseparated plutonium associated with re-search activities around the world should be addressed by GTRI, removing materialfrom vulnerable sites wherever possible,and ensuring that materials that remainare e ectively secured. But plutoniumis in civil use on a far larger scale thanHEU; it is not just a ma er of kilogramsor tens of kilograms at research facilities, but tens of tons being separated, stored,processed, and used around the world asfuel for large power reactors. This mate-

rial is weapons-usable, and it is essentialthat security and accounting commensu-rate with post9/11 threats be maintainedthroughout all stages of that process. 17

www.nti.org/e_research/report_cnwmupdate2005.pdf as of 6 May 2006); Alexander Glaser and FrankN. von Hippel, Global Cleanout: Reducing theThreat of HEU-Fueled Nuclear Terrorism, ArmsControl Today (January/February 2006; available ath p://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_01-02/JAN -FEB-heuFeature.asp as of 8 June 2006); Frank vonHippel, A Comprehensive Approach to Elimina-tion of Highly-Enriched Uranium from All NuclearReactor-Reactor Fuel Cycles, Science and GlobalSecurity 12, no. 3 (November 2004).17 Any state or group that could make a bomb fromweapon-grade plutonium could also make a bombfrom reactor-grade plutonium. For an o cial dis -cussion, see U.S. Department of Energy, O ce ofArms Control and Nonproliferation, Nonprolifera-tion and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-UsableFissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposi-tion Alternatives , DOE/NN-0007 (Washington, D.C.:DOE, 1997; available at h p://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/425259-CXr7Qn/webviewable/425259.

pdf as of 12 February 2006), pp. 35-39. For a briefdiscussion of the civilian plutonium problem, seeMa hew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John Holdren,Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Re-

port Card and Action Plan (Cambridge, Mass., andWashington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom,Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative,2003; available at h p://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/report.asp as of 1 February 2006),p. 128. For a disturbing recent analysis of securityfor transport of separated plutonium in France


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RECOMMENDATIONS 133

The large investments in plutonium sepa-ration facilities that have already beenmade make it unlikely that proposals foran immediate moratorium on plutoniumreprocessing will be adopted. 18 But theBush administration should renew thee ort to negotiate a U.S.-Russian mora -torium on separating weapons-usableplutonium (a 20-year moratorium wasnearly agreed at the end of the Clinton ad-ministration, which would have ended theaccumulation of over a ton of weapons-usable separated plutonium each year atMayak). Over the long term, civilian useof separated plutonium should be phasedout, in favor of fuel cycles that do not useweapons-usable separated plutonium.

In announcing its proposed Global Nu-clear Energy Partnership (GNEP), whichit hopes will ease nuclear waste manage-ment and thus contribute to the growth ofnuclear energy, the Bush administrationagreed that traditional reprocessing ap-proaches that fully separate plutoniumpose substantial proliferation risks. 19 Un-

(authored by an engineer with long experience in

physical protection at DOE, though commissioned by Greenpeace), see Ronald E. Timm, Security As-sessment Report for Plutonium Transport in France (Paris: Greenpeace International, 2005; available ath p://greenpeace.datapps.com/stop-plutonium/en/TimmReportV5.pdf as of 6 February 2006).18 Perkovich et al., Universal Compliance: A Strategy

for Nuclear Security.19 Speci cally, U.S. Secretary of Energy SamuelBodman stated, we all would agree that the storesof plutonium that have built up as a consequenceof conventional reprocessing technologies pose agrowing proliferation risk that requires vigilant

a ention. See Samuel Bodman, Carnegie Endow-ment for International Peace Moscow Center: Remarksas Prepared for Secretary Bodman (Moscow: U.S. De-partment of Energy, 2006; available at h p://energy.gov/news/3348.htm as of 17 March 2006). Criticsargue that the waste management approachesproposed in GNEP will undermine rather thanpromoting the future of nuclear energy, assertingthat the future of nuclear energy will be brightestif it is made as cheap, simple, safe, proliferation-resistant, and terrorism-resistant as possible, and

fortunately, while the Bush administrationargues that its proposed new approach,known as UREX+, would be proliferation-resistant, since plutonium would not beseparated in pure form, but would remainmixed with some of the higher actinidesand perhaps the lanthanide ssion prod -ucts as well, studies have suggested thatthis would o er only a very modest prolif -eration-resistance bene t. 20 And it seemsvery likely that a decision by the UnitedStates, with the largest number of nuclearpower plants in the world, to move to-ward reprocessing will make it moredi cult to convince states such as SouthKorea and Taiwan not to do likewise.(The administration argues that by build-

ing a commercial consortium that wouldo er guaranteed fresh fuel and spent fuelmanagement to countries willing to foregoenrichment and reprocessing facilities oftheir own, they will reduce, not increase,the incentives for countries to build theirown reprocessing plants. This is a prom-ising approach, but it does not requirereprocessing in the United States, whichseems much more likely to convince otherstates to consider reprocessing than toconvince them not to do so.)

A Creative and Flexible Set o Tacticsor Addressing the Problem

Rapidly convincing facilities and coun-tries all over the world to stop using

that reprocessing using past technologies or thoseproposed in GNEP points in the wrong direction onevery count. See, for example, testimony of Mat-thew Bunn in Commi ee on Science, Subcommi eeon Energy, Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing , U.S. Houseof Representatives, 109th Congress, 1st Session (16

June 2005; available at h p://www.house.gov/sci -ence/hearings/energy05/june15/index.htm as of 5

July 2006).20 Jungmin Kang and Frank Von Hippel, LimitedProliferation-Resistance Bene ts from RecyclingUnseparated Transuranics and Lanthanides fromLight-Water Reactor Spent Fuel, Science and GlobalSecurity 13, no. 3 (2005).


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potential nuclear bomb material and allowthe material they have to be removed will be an immense challenge. The task willrequire considerable tactical creativity,

exibility, and perseverance. Several ad -ditions to the set of policy tools currently being applied to the problem seem likelyto be essential.

Packages of incentives targeted to theneeds of each country or facility. Sub-stantial incentives will be needed toconvince the operators of research reac-tors to convert their facilities to LEU(or shut them down), and give up theirHEU. 21 The United States and its interna-tional partners should o er packages ofincentives that make it unambiguously inthe interest of the facility or the countrythat operates it to get rid of the HEU atvulnerable sites. Such packages couldinclude help with converting to LEU; helpwith improvements that would make thereactor function even be er a er conver -sion than before; help with shu ing anddecommissioning a reactor; contracts forother research by the scientists at a site af-ter agreement is reached to shut the sites

reactor, including shared use of reactors atother sites; help with managing the wastesfrom a research reactor; and other steps,many of which will not even be thought ofuntil a particular case arises. 22 It appearsthat additional incentives are also likely to be needed to convince facilities to returneven that portion of the U.S.-supplied

21 For a discussion of some of the incentives pack -ages that worked in past cases of HEU removals,see Philipp C. Bleek, Global Cleanout: An Emerging

Approach to the Civil Nuclear Material Threat (Cam- bridge, Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom,Harvard University, 2004; available at h p://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/bleek -globalcleanout.pdf as of 13 April 2006).22 Where necessary, this should include help pay -ing for the cost of new LEU fuel (especially in caseswhere a reactor otherwise would not buy new LEUfuel because it already has HEU that will last formany years, or for the lifetime of the reactor).

HEU abroad that is covered by the currentU.S. take-back o er. 23

Pu ing together such packages of incen -tives will require some broadening of

current thinking, and an expansion ofcurrent budgets (which do not includeany funding for incentives going beyondpaying the costs of conversion to LEU).Currently, for example, GTRI is willingto help research reactors convert to LEU,so that conversion does not represent asubstantial new cost to the reactor op-eratorbut it is generally not willing tomake research reactors be er o than theywere before conversion, even if doing sowould carry modest cost while being cru-cial to gaining agreement to convert. Thispolicy should be reversed. GTRI programmanagers do not want to drive up theprice that reactor operators demand fortheir cooperation, and that is a legitimateissue. But within reason, price should not be allowed to stand in the way of success.U.S. taxpayers would be be er served byan $800 million cleanout e ort that suc -ceeded in convincing all of the worldsmost vulnerable sites to give up their

weapons-usable material than they would by a $400 million e ort that le dozens ofvulnerable sites with HEU still in place.

Providing incentives for shu ingHEU-fueled reactors, in addition toconversion. Most of the worlds researchreactors are aging and unneeded. The best answer for many of them is to pro-vide incentives to shut them down.Unlike conversion, shut-down need not

wait for the development of new fuels; itcan be pursued immediately. For most of

23 U.S. Congress, Government Accountability Of-ce, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Consider

Options to Accelerate the Return of Weapons-UsableUranium from Other Countries to the United States andRussia , GAO-05-57 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2004;available at h p://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0557.pdf as of 2 February 2006).


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the more than 130 HEU-fueled researchreactors not currently on the target list forconversion, the shut-down option would be quicker, less costly, and more likely tosucceed than conversion. There is goodevidence that such an approach can work,as even in the absence of any e ort toprovide shut-down incentives, far moreHEU-fueled reactors have shut downsince 1978, when the e ort to convert reac -tors to LEU began, than have successfullyconverted. 24 Indeed, IAEA experts haveestimated that of the more than 270 re-search reactors still operating in the world(both HEU-fueled and otherwise), only30-40 are likely to be needed in the longterm. 25

No research reactor operator wants toshut his or her facility. Convincing sitesto shut down their reactors is likely torequire substantial packages of incen -tives. In some cases, the best route will be through national governments, whichmay be growing tired of the drain on the budget imposed by subsidizing thesereactors, and may be more willing to ne-gotiate over these reactors fate than the

operators themselves.

Helping reactors see the virtues in shut-ting down will take considerable care,as no approach perceived by the worldsreactor operators as anti-science or anti-nuclear is likely to succeed. Indeed, it isquite possible that such an e ort should be undertaken separately from the con -version e ort, so that those pursuingconversion will not be tainted in the

24 Iain Ritchie, IAEA Presentation on Threat Re-duction Activities, paper presented at The GlobalThreat Reduction Initiative International PartnersConference, Vienna, Austria, 18-19 September 2004.25 International Atomic Energy Agency, New Lifefor Research Reactors? Bright Future but Far FewerProjected (Vienna: IAEA, 2004; available at h p://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/ResearchReac -tors/reactors20040308.html as of 22 March 2006).

minds of research reactor operators aspeople seeking to shut them down. Aspart of such an e ort, the internationalcommunity should help establish asmaller number of more broadly sharedresearch reactorsthe same direction thathigh-energy particle accelerators wentlong ago. Scientists at sites whose reactorsare shu ing down should be given fund -ing and access to conduct experimentsat other reactors (as is already routinelydone in many countries). The best ap-proach might be for the United States andother interested countries to work withthe IAEA to launch an IAEA-led SoundNuclear Science Initiative, the goal ofwhich would be to get the best science at

the lowest cost by ge ing the research,testing, training, and isotope productionthe world needs from the minimum number of research reactors.

Security upgrades, in advance of mate-rial removals. Removing nuclear materialfrom the worlds most vulnerable sitesshould be done as quickly as possible, butit cannot happen overnight. Thereforee orts to remove nuclear material should

go in parallel with programs to upgradesecurity at the sites where the materialnow resides. The international commu-nity should not be shy about investing toprovide e ective security at a site wherethe material will be removed in a fewyears; such an investment avoids leavinga weak link in nuclear security during thecritical time before removal takes place.Through GTRI or whatever other rubricis most appropriate, the United Statesshould assist countries around the world

in strengthening security at small, vulner-able sites with weapons-usable nuclearmaterial, and should work with states toput in place nuclear security rules requir-ing that every facility with signi cantquantities of weapons-usable material onhand have security measures su cientto defeat plausible terrorist and criminalthreats. (The cost of complying with such


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should require that all domestic civilianuse of separated plutonium, including inthe form of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, havesecurity measures in place with a demon-strated ability to defend against the fulldesign basis threat for nuclear the (con -trary to recent NRC rulings that held thatsites with MOX fuel need have no moresecurity than other power reactor sites). 28 If the United States is unwilling to phaseout its own civilian use of HEU, and pro-vide stringent security for all uses of HEUand separated plutonium, there is li lelikelihood that it will be able to convinceothers to do so.

a PProach 1: S trEngthEning thE S EnSE of u rgEncy and c ommitmEnt

The three initiatives described above, ifthey succeeded, could drastically reducethe risk of nuclear terrorism. If they are tosucceed, ve underlying approaches will be essential.

The single most essential ingredient ofsuccess in ensuring security for nuclearstockpiles around the world is convincingpolitical leaders and nuclear manag-ers around the world that the threat ofnuclear terrorism is real, and that im-provements in nuclear security are criticalto their own national security and deserv-ing of their own resources. If the leadersof all the key states and nuclear facilitiesaround the world were convinced of thosetwo points, they would be likely to take

Bariloche, Argentina, 5 November 2002 (Argonne, Ill.:Argonne National Laboratory, 2002; available ath p://www.rertr.anl.gov/Web2002/index.html as of16 May 2006).28 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, In the

Ma er of Duke Energy Corporation (Catawba NuclearStation, Units 1 and 2) , CLI-04-29 (Washington,D.C.: NRC, 2004; available at h p://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/or -ders/2004/2004-29cli.pdf as of 29 March 2006).

the actions needed to keep these stock -piles out of terrorist hands. But if theyare not convincedas many of them arenot todaythere is li le chance that theywill assign su cient resources, imposestringent security rules, take political risksto allow sensitive nuclear cooperationwith foreigners, or take the other actionsneeded to achieve and sustain securitylevels su cient to defend nuclear stock -piles against demonstrated terrorist andcriminal threats. In maintaining a strongsafety system, it is sometimes said thatthe most important element is never for-ge ing to be afraid. 29 The same is evenmore true for nuclear security.

But today, many of the key players are notafraid. They believe, with Pakistani Presi -dent Musharraf, that the United States isoverly concerned about the possibilityof nuclear terrorism. Several key stepsshould be taken to try to build the sense ofurgency and commitment among politi-cal leaders, nuclear managers, and all keypersonnel involved in nuclear security.

Joint Threat Briefngs

A series of brie ngs for political leadersof particular countries participating inthe global coalition (and their U.S. coun-terparts, for political symmetry), given jointly by nuclear experts from the UnitedStates and each of the countries wherethe brie ngs took place, cou

Securiting the Bomb 2006-Matthew Bunn

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