Secure biometric match-on-card feasibility report · 2016. 4. 11. · Secure Biometric...

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NIST Interagency Report 7452 Secure Biometric Match-on- Card Feasibility Report David Cooper Hung Dang Philip Lee William MacGregor Ketan Mehta

Transcript of Secure biometric match-on-card feasibility report · 2016. 4. 11. · Secure Biometric...

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NIST Interagency Report 7452

Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

David Cooper Hung Dang Philip Lee William MacGregor Ketan Mehta

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report David Cooper

NIST Interagency Report 7452

Hung Dang Philip Lee William MacGregor Ketan Mehta

C O M P U T E R S E C U R I T Y

Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930 November 2007

U.S. Department of Commerce

Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary National Institute of Standards and Technology

Dr. James Turner, Acting Director

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REPORTS ON COMPUTER SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation’s measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of non-national security-related information in Federal information systems. This Interagency Report discusses ITL’s research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency Report, 112 pages

(November 2007)

Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such

identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, nor is it intended to imply that the entities,

materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

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Acknowledgements

The authors, William MacGregor and David Cooper of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Ketan Mehta of Mehta Inc., Hung Dang of Booz Allen Hamilton, and Philip Lee of Identity Technology Partners wish to thank their colleagues who reviewed drafts of this document and contributed to its development. The authors appreciate the many contributions from the product developers and integrators to the weekly teleconferences and the workshop. The authors also acknowledge the important and timely contributions of Gemalto, Oberthur Card Systems, Sagem Morpho Incorporated, and TecSec Incorporated to this study.

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Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................................1

2. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................................2

3. TEST PROCESS................................................................................................................................................3 3.1 TEST FIXTURE .............................................................................................................................................3 3.2 TEST EXECUTION ........................................................................................................................................4

4. RESULTS ...........................................................................................................................................................7

5. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................................................9

List of Appendices

APPENDIX A— AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME CHARTS.................................................................................10

APPENDIX B— RESPONSE TIME GRAPHS......................................................................................................53

APPENDIX C— SAMPLE TEST FIXTURE OUTPUT........................................................................................96

APPENDIX D— TEST APPROACH ....................................................................................................................101

APPENDIX E— ACRONYMS ..............................................................................................................................106

APPENDIX F— REFERENCES ...........................................................................................................................107

List of Tables

TABLE 1. TEST FIXTURE OUTPUT FILE FIELDS ..............................................................................................................3 TABLE 2. SMART CARD READER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS......................................................................................4 TABLE 3. DUT SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................................5

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1. Introduction

On August 27, 2004, the President signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12) [1], entitled “Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors.” HSPD-12 required the development and implementation of a government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms of identification for Federal employees and contractors. In response, NIST developed the Federal Information Processing Standard 201 (FIPS 201) [2], Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors, to establish a standard for identity credentials. NIST also issued several special publications in support of FIPS 201 to enable interoperable implementations.

FIPS 201 and its associated special publications define a method to perform biometric match-off-card authentication of a PIV cardholder when the PIV card is inserted into a contact smart card reader. Today, many smart cards, however, implement match-on-card technologies and are desiged to perform cardholder authentication using contactless interface. Contactless match-on-card operation requires additional security measures to ensure the transaction data is encrypted and can be securely transmitted, which can impact performance. NIST conducted the Secure Biometric Match-on-Card (SBMOC) feasibility study to understand the effects of security on performance. This report describes the tests that were conducted to obtain timing metrics for the SBMOC feasibility study and provides a summary of the test results.

This feasibility study also allows NIST to explore smart card technology advancements for possible extension of the FIPS 201 and / or other smart card standards.

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2. Background

In June 2007, NIST extended an open invitation to companies to participate in the SBMOC feasibility study. The purpose of the study was to determine if secure biometric match-on-card operations could be performed in less than 2.5 seconds per transaction.1 The feasibility study was conducted per guidelines set forth in the NIST Test Approach for SBMOC Feasibility Study (see Appendix D). The test approach describes a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based protocol for performing secure biometric match-on-card authentication of a cardholder using contactless operation. The protocol describes general message transactions so that variations in protocol implementation by participants are acceptable so long as the security, functional, and performance objectives defined in Sections 2 and 3 of Appendix D are met. An example use case scenario is as follows:

Host Smart Card Reader

contactlesssmart card

Establish secure session

Encrypted sample template

Signed match result

+ The cardholder presents their card to a contactless biometric reader.

+ The cardholder presents their finger to the biometric scanner.

+ The host establishes a secure session with the card.

+ The host prepares an encrypted template containing the fingerprint (image or minutia) and transmits it via contactless interface to the card.

+ The card decrypts the template and compares it with the reference template stored on the card.

+ The card returns signed result (i.e., Yes/No) to the host.

At the time this study began, NIST was unable to identify any commercial product meeting all of the requirements in Appendix D. Participants worked with NIST to understand the requirements and then developed submissions. Submissions received for the feasibility study that met the stated objectives were tested by NIST. The subsequent sections in this report discuss the test procedures and the results of successful tests obtained from the feasibility study. The results of unsuccessful tests are not reported.

1 The template generation time (which is live presentation of a fingerprint) is excluded from the time measurement.

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3. Test Process

In order to obtain performance timing metrics, a test fixture was developed that implements the secure message protocol for each Device Under Test (DUT) and records the measured transaction times. Test cases executed for the feasibility study were designed to study how matching/non-matching templates, varying minutia counts, and different encryption algorithms impact transaction times. The following subsections describe the test fixture and procedures used for the feasibility study.

3.1 Test Fixture

The test fixture uses the Win32 Smart Card Application Programming Interface (API) library to communicate with DUTs and smart card readers. The library was used to acquire the following time measurements:

+ Average2 time to establish a secure session

+ Average time to transmit the encrypted biometric data to the DUT and receive a match result

+ Average total time to perform a complete biometric match-on-card transaction

To perform time measurements, the test fixture sends Application Protocol Data Units (APDU) to a DUT using the SCardTransmit command. The time it takes to execute a SCardTransmit command, which is obtained by computing the time difference before and after a call to SCardTransmit, is then recorded to an output file. For APDUs that require multiple calls to SCardTransmit (e.g., GET RESPONSE), the total elapsed time is determined by adding the time to execute each SCardTransmit operation. An example message sequence between a DUT and the test fixture is as follows:

1. The test fixture selects the SBMOC application on the card.

2. The test fixture performs Get Data to read the PKI certificate from the DUT and validates the certificate.

3. The test fixture requests a challenge from the DUT. The DUT responds with a challenge.

4. The text fixture and DUT generate encryption and Message Authentication Code (MAC) session keys, and finish establishing a secure session.

5. The text fixture encrypts biometric data using session key and sends it to the DUT for verification. The DUT responds with the signed match / no-match result.

After running the test fixture, a Comma-Separated Values (CSV) output file is created that contains the measured times for the DUT used in the test. Table 1 lists the data recorded in the output file. A sample test fixture output appears in Appendix C.

Table 1. Test Fixture Output File Fields

Field Name Description

Date/Time Date/time that the test run was executed. Recorded as “mm-dd-yyyy HH:MM:SS”.

2 Throughout this report, “average” is the arithmetic mean of the measured values.

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Field Name Description

Run # Test run number

Reader Smart card reader description

Card DUT description

Symmetric Crypto Name of symmetric cryptographic algorithm used in the test (e.g., “2 Key TDES - CBC”, “AES-128 - CBC”)

Asymmetric Crypto Name of asymmetric cryptographic algorithm used in the test (e.g., “RSA 1024”, “RSA 2048”)

Fingerprint Filename Filename of sample fingerprint template used in the test run

Finger Name of finger associated with the sample fingerprint template. Set to “Unknown finger” if this information is not known.

Minutia Count Minutia count of the sample fingerprint template

Total Time Total time to perform the biometric match-on-card operation. This is measured as the time from when the SBMOC application is selected until the time when a result is returned from the DUT, and includes host-processing time to perform cryptographic and other necessary functions. In the above example, Total Time is approximately (1) + (2) + (3) + (4) + (5).

T0 Time to establish a secure session. This time does not include the time to select the SBMOC application. In the above example, T0 = (2) + (3) + (4).

T1 Time to authenticate the biometric data after a secure session has been established. In the above example, T1 = (5).

Cert Verified Indicates if the X.509 certificate loaded on the DUT has been validated. If the “Perform certificate validation” checkbox is not checked then this field will be set to “N/A”.

Finger Verified Indicates if the sample biometric data matched the reference biometric data stored on the DUT. Set to either “Yes” or “No”.

3.2 Test Execution

The smart card reader used in the tests was an SCM SDI010 dual interface reader. The reader’s technical specifications are given in Table 2.

Table 2. Smart Card Reader Technical Specifications

Category Description

Host Interface • Full speed USB 1.1 (12 Mbps) • High Bus powered device • CCID compliant

Firmware • Version 7.09

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Category Description

Contactless • Support of ISO 14443 A and B (13.56 MHz) smart cards • ISO 14443 Part 1 to 4 compliant • Operating distance: 1 cm • Communication speed: up to 848 Kbit/s

API • PC/SC driver version 5.09

For each test case, a DUT was loaded with a reference fingerprint template containing a minutia count of 41, 34, or 27 in either ANSI 378 or ISO/IEC 19794-2 compact format (depending on the DUT being tested). In addition, each DUT was loaded with an X.509 certificate that was generated using the NIST PIV Data Generator tool. The size of the generated certificates was kept consistent by changing only the public key modulus and exponent associated with each certificate to match the public/private key pair stored on a DUT. For tests using Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) 1024, the size of the certificate used was 1,345 bytes and for RSA 2048, the certificate size was 1,477 bytes.

Testing consisted of sending matching and non-matching sample fingerprint templates to a DUT for verification in alternating sequence. First, sample fingerprint templates containing a minutia count of 41 were sent to the DUT for verification and time values were recorded. The process was repeated for sample fingerprint templates containing a minutia count of 34 and 27. Live fingerprint scans were not used in the tests since it was desirable to maintain a controlled test environment where the minutia count of the sample fingerprint templates could be regulated. Instead, the sample fingerprint templates were read from files generated from fingerprint scans beforehand. For each test case, 200 trials were run so that 100 time values could be collected each for matching and non-matching templates.

The DUT was powered continuously during the automated sequence of 200 trials. As a consequence, transaction delays that could result from operations at DUT power-up, for example FIPS 140-2 power-up diagnostic tests, are not visible in the measurements.

Table 3 provides a summary of the DUTs used in the feasibility study. Multiple DUTs may correspond to the same physical card but have been given unique names to differentiate the test configurations. Note that the DUTs submitted are prototypes constructed to meet the requirements stated in Appendix D. In conformance with the “no endorsement” policy of NIST, the participants’ DUT names have been omitted.

Table 3. DUT Summary

DUT Name Crypto Mechanism Description

Card 1 (x) 2TDEA, RSA 1024 DUT loaded with ISO 19794-2 compact reference template containing a minutia count of ‘x’, where x = 41, 34, or 27.

Card 2 (x) AES-128, RSA 1024 DUT loaded with ISO 19794-2 compact reference template containing a minutia count of ‘x’, where x = 41, 34, or 27.

Card 3 (41) 2TDEA, RSA 1024 DUT loaded with ISO 19794-2 compact reference template containing a proprietary extension and a minutia count of 41.

Card 4 (41) AES-128, RSA 1024 DUT loaded with ISO 19794-2 compact reference template containing a proprietary extension and a minutia count of 41.

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DUT Name Crypto Mechanism Description

Card 5 (x) 2TDEA, RSA 1024 DUT loaded with ISO 19794-2 compact reference template containing a minutia count of ‘x’, where x = 41, 34, or 27.

Card 6 (x) 2TDEA, RSA 1024 DUT loaded with ISO 19794-2 compact reference template containing a minutia count of ‘x’, where x = 41, 34, or 27.

Card 7 (x) 2TDEA, RSA 1024 DUT loaded with ANSI 378 reference template containing a minutia count of ‘x’, where x = 41, 34, or 27.

Card 8 (x) 2TDEA, RSA 1024 DUT loaded with ISO 19794-2 compact reference template containing a minutia count of ‘x’, where x = 41, 34, or 27.

Card 9 (x) 3TDEA, RSA 1024 DUT loaded with ISO 19794-2 compact reference template containing a minutia count of ‘x’, where x = 41, 34, or 27.

Card 10 (x) AES-128, RSA 1024 DUT loaded with ISO 19794-2 compact reference template containing a minutia count of ‘x’, where x = 41, 34, or 27.

Card 11 (x) 2TDEA, RSA 2048 DUT loaded with ISO 19794-2 compact reference template containing a minutia count of ‘x’, where x = 41, 34, or 27.

Card 12 (x) AES-128, RSA 2048 DUT loaded with ISO 19794-2 compact reference template containing a minutia count of ‘x’, where x = 41, 34, or 27.

Card 13 (41) 2TDEA, RSA 2048 DUT loaded with ISO 19794-2 compact reference template containing a proprietary extension and a minutia count of 41.

Card 14 (41) AES-128, RSA 2048 DUT loaded with ISO 19794-2 compact reference template containing a proprietary extension and a minutia count of 41.

Card 15 (x) 2TDEA, RSA 2048 DUT loaded with ISO 19794-2 compact reference template containing a minutia count of ‘x’, where x = 41, 34, or 27.

Card 16 (x) 2TDEA, RSA 2048 DUT loaded with ISO 19794-2 compact reference template containing a minutia count of ‘x’, where x = 41, 34, or 27.

Card 17 (x) 2TDEA, RSA 2048 DUT loaded with ANSI 378 reference template containing a minutia count of ‘x’, where x = 41, 34, or 27.

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4. Results

Timing metrics obtained with the test fixture could not be validated with a protocol analyzer since one could not be acquired within the SBMOC test framework that supports the high-speed data rates used by the SCM SDI010 reader. However, the test fixure was built on a test framework for a previous NIST study in which timing metrics were obtained and validated with a protocol analyzer. Hence, there is a reasonable degree of confidence that the timing metrics reported in this document are accurate.

Appendix A contains the average response times for each DUT, separated by matching and non-matching results as well as minutia count. In the charts, “SMC” stands for “Sample Minutia Count” and refers to the minutia count of the sample fingerprint templates sent to the DUT. The average response time is an aggregate of three time values: T0, T1, and Host Processing.

+ T0—refers to the time it took to establish a secure session with the DUT.

+ T1—refers to the time it took to send an encrypted template to the DUT for verification and receive a response.

+ Host Processing—refers to the time spent performing processing on the host-side (e.g., cryptographic functions).

Figure 1 below shows the average response times for all DUTs that support RSA 1024. Figure 2 shows the average response times for all DUTs that support RSA 2048.

Average Response Times for DUTs Using RSA 1024

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

Card1

Card2

Card3

Card4

Card5

Card6

Card7

Card8

Card9

Card10

DUT

Tim

e (m

s)

MatchingNon-Matching

Figure 1. Average Response Times of DUTs Using RSA 1024

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Average Response Times for DUTs Using RSA 2048

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

Card 11 Card 12 Card 13 Card 14 Card 15 Card 16 Card 17

DUT

Tim

e (m

s)

MatchingNon-Matching

Figure 2. Average Response Times of DUTs Using RSA 2048

Appendix B contains graphs of the response times for each DUT, separated by matching and non-matching results as well as minutia count. A 17 ms fluctuation is visible in the response time charts, e.g., in Figure C-1. This fluctuation can be attributed to the Windows NT clock resolution of the host PC, which is 1/60 second or 17 ms. Such fluctuations are recorded whenever a fixed duration phenomenon is measured repeatedly, starting at random points with respect to a clock tick. Assuming the DUT response time is fixed, the actual DUT response time is approximately the computed average response time, as reported in Appendix A. Whether the assumption holds or not, a 17 ms fluctuation is less than 3% of the measured values in all cases.

In some cases, one or more of the following anomalies were observed while obtaining timing metrics for a DUT:

+ The entire protocol sequence could not be executed (e.g., a secure session could not be established with the DUT). Hence, some graphs may have less than 100 time values for matching and/or non-matching results (an example appears in Figure C-29).

+ A matching template was sent to a DUT for verification and the DUT responded with a “No match” result. Consequently, there may be more non-matching than matching time values (an example appears in Figures C-35 and C-36).

+ Anomalous time values were observed that exceed the 17 ms host clock resolution (an example appears in Figure C-29).

These anomalies may have been caused by a number of different factors, such as Radio Frequency (RF) noise between the DUT and smart card reader, and the actual negotiated operating speed of the DUT.

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5. Conclusion

The timing metrics obtained from the SBMOC feasibility study showed that it is possible to securely perform biometric match-on-card operations over the contactless interface of a smart card within 2.5 seconds, while meeting the constraints in Appendix D except the accuracy constraint. The study also showed that the amount of time required to complete an SBMOC operation is dependent on a number of factors, such as the cryptographic mechanisms used, the minutia count of the reference and sample fingerprint templates, and the format of the fingerprint templates.

Accuracy testing of ISO/IEC 19794-2 devices is in progress at this time. Partial results indicate that some devices exhibit accuracy approaching that measured for Minutiae Interoperability Exchange Test (MINEX) 04 implementations, and are likely to exceed the PIV accuracy requirements in Special Publication (SP) 800-76-1. Results will be announced at http://fingerprint.nist.gov/minexII/.

The feasibility study participants informed us that some of the DUTs were constructed by adding firmware and data to PIV card stock that had passed NIST NPIVP and FIPS 140-2 testing. These remarks are further evidence that SBMOC is technically feasible through firmware extensions to existing smart cards.

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Appendix A—Average Response Time Charts

Card 1 (41) Average Response Times (Matching)

599 598 600

164 139 133

272827

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-1. Card 1 (41) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 1 (41) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

598 598 598

200 187 171

282827

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-2. Card 1 (41) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

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Card 1 (34) Average Response Times (Matching)

576 577 578

143 148 160

282724

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-3. Card 1 (34) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 1 (34) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

574 577 579

198 186 152

262627

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-4. Card 1 (34) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

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Card 1 (27) Average Response Times (Matching)

594 596 597

141 200 159

2828

27

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-5. Card 1 (27) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 1 (27) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

596 597 598

177 164 147

262826

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-6. Card 1 (27) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

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Card 2 (41) Average Response Times (Matching)

632 633 630

184 155 152

302828

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-7. Card 2 (41) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 2 (41) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

632 631 630

218 204 188

282727

0

100200

300400

500

600700

800900

1000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-8. Card 2 (41) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

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Card 2 (34) Average Response Times (Matching)

608 611 610

161 165 176

292731

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-9. Card 2 (34) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 2 (34) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

609 610 611

216 201 168

262927

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-10. Card 2 (34) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

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Card 2 (27) Average Response Times (Matching)

627 632 631

158 217 177

2827

31

0100

200300

400500

600700

800900

1000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-11. Card 2 (27) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 2 (27) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

630 631 631

195 182 164

282628

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-12. Card 2 (27) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

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Card 3 (41) Average Response Times (Matching)

597 597 597

161 140 136

282929

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-13. Card 3 (41) Average Response Times for Matching Templates3

Card 3 (41) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

596 597 597

201 192 161

282929

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-14. Card 3 (41) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

3 Card 3 was loaded with a reference fingerprint template containing a proprietary extension and a minutia count of 41. It was

not tested with reference fingerprint templates containing a minutia count of 34 or 27.

16

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 4 (41) Average Response Times (Matching)

631 630 631

181 156 151

293028

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-15. Card 4 (41) Average Response Times for Matching Templates4

Card 4 (41) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

630 630 631

220 209 176

272928

0

100200

300400

500

600700

800900

1000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-16. Card 4 (41) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

4 Card 4 was loaded with a reference fingerprint template containing a proprietary extension and a minutia count of 41. It was

not tested with reference fingerprint templates containing a minutia count of 34 or 27.

17

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 5 (41) Average Response Times (Matching)

1012 1018 1022

597 562 527

135138142

0200

400600

80010001200

14001600

18002000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-17. Card 5 (41) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 5 (41) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

1012 1018 1018

638 611 579

138 140 140

0200

400600

8001000

12001400

16001800

2000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-18. Card 5 (41) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

18

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 5 (34) Average Response Times (Matching)

1016 1020 1021

571 634 602

138138142

0200

400600

80010001200

14001600

18002000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-19. Card 5 (34) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 5 (34) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

1016 1020 1021

635 581 543

139140138

0200

400600

8001000

12001400

16001800

2000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-20. Card 5 (34) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

19

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 5 (27) Average Response Times (Matching)

1017 1025 1027

675 614 545

143138138

0200

400600

80010001200

14001600

18002000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-21. Card 5 (27) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 5 (27) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

1017 1024 1023

599 552 494

142140138

0200

400600

8001000

12001400

16001800

2000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-22. Card 5 (27) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

20

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 6 (41) Average Response Times (Matching)

1000 1000 1004

613 566 531

137137137

0200

400600

80010001200

14001600

18002000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-23. Card 6 (41) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 6 (41) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

999 1000 1003

651 610 583

137 137 139

0200

400600

8001000

12001400

16001800

2000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-24. Card 6 (41) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

21

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 6 (34) Average Response Times (Matching)

1006 1010 1005

571 627 592

137138137

0200

400600

80010001200

14001600

18002000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-25. Card 6 (34) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 6 (34) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

1006 1009 1006

634 576 535

138139137

0200

400600

8001000

12001400

16001800

2000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-26. Card 6 (34) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

22

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 6 (27) Average Response Times (Matching)

1008 1014 1015

672 608 537

137138137

0200

400600

80010001200

14001600

18002000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-27. Card 6 (27) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 6 (27) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

1008 1013 1011

596 546 487

139139136

0200

400600

8001000

12001400

16001800

2000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-28. Card 6 (27) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

23

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 7 (41) Average Response Times (Matching)

752 752 751

875712

530

15

1415

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-29. Card 7 (41) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 7 (41) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

752 750 753

999789 660

1615

16

0

200400

600800

1000

12001400

16001800

2000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-30. Card 7 (41) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

24

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 7 (34) Average Response Times (Matching)

769 746 747

837681

507

1716

16

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-31. Card 7 (34) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 7 (34) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

753 748 750

863666 616

1516

15

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-32. Card 7 (34) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

25

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 7 (27) Average Response Times (Matching)

738 738 737

689 604458

1616

15

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-33. Card 7 (27) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 7 (27) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

736 738 739

700 590 495

1417

16

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-34. Card 7 (27) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

26

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 8 (41) Average Response Times (Matching)

378 362

357326

1716

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 Note: No matching templatesresulted w hen SMC = 27.

Figure B-35. Card 8 (41) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 8 (41) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

361 363 361

388289 249

1723

15

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-36. Card 8 (41) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

27

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 8 (34) Average Response Times (Matching)

361 363 375

362261 240

1515

15

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-37. Card 8 (34) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 8 (34) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

360 374 364

339 269 244

1615

16

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-38. Card 8 (34) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

28

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 8 (27) Average Response Times (Matching)

360 363 364

269 234 212

151617

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-39. Card 8 (27) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 8 (27) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

361 362 364

300212 202

1416

15

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-40. Card 8 (27) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

29

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 9 (41) Average Response Times (Matching)

375 389

405 342

1513

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 Note: No matching templatesresulted w hen SMC = 27.

Figure B-41. Card 9 (41) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 9 (41) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

374 376 374

399286 256

1815

16

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-42. Card 9 (41) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

30

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 9 (34) Average Response Times (Matching)

372 373 374

368284 247

1616

17

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-43. Card 9 (34) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 9 (34) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

372 387 376

350 269 255

141416

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-44. Card 9 (34) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

31

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 9 (27) Average Response Times (Matching)

387 373 375

289229 242

151613

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-45. Card 9 (27) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 9 (27) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

373 375 375

308221 208

1413

16

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-46. Card 9 (27) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

32

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 10 (41) Average Response Times (Matching)

412 398

421 393

1613

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 Note: No matching templatesresulted w hen SMC = 27.

Figure B-47. Card 10 (41) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 10 (41) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

407 397 404

437340 302

1516

16

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-48. Card 10 (41) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

33

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 10 (34) Average Response Times (Matching)

395 399 396

421322 288

1915

14

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-49. Card 10 (34) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 10 (34) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

407 398 399

391317 297

161712

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-50. Card 10 (34) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

34

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 10 (27) Average Response Times (Matching)

394 398 396

331 276 260

161417

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-51. Card 10 (27) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 10 (27) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

396 398 408

351 284 251

171616

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-52. Card 10 (27) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

35

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 11 (41) Average Response Times (Matching)

1980 1981 1981

167 140 13629 29 30

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-53. Card 11 (41) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 11 (41) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

1978 1981 1982

201 189 173292929

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-54. Card 11 (41) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

36

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 11 (34) Average Response Times (Matching)

1973 1977 1980

151 168 15729 30 30

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-55. Card 11 (34) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 11 (34) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

1973 1978 1981

209 198 162292829

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-56. Card 11 (34) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

37

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 11 (27) Average Response Times (Matching)

1990 1996 1996

141 186 14331 29 27

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-57. Card 11 (27) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 11 (27) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

1992 1997 1995

178 167 148292728

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-58. Card 11 (27) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

38

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 12 (41) Average Response Times (Matching)

2014 2013 2015

187 157 152292929

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-59. Card 12 (41) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 12 (41) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

2013 2015 2015

222 208 191282831

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-60. Card 12 (41) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

39

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 12 (34) Average Response Times (Matching)

2014 2013 2014

171 186 174313130

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-61. Card 12 (34) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 12 (34) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

2012 2013 2014

228 215 179303030

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-62. Card 12 (34) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

40

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 12 (27) Average Response Times (Matching)

2031 2030 2031

159 203 157303030

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-63. Card 12 (27) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 12 (27) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

2030 2031 2030

198 184 164282730

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-64. Card 12 (27) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

41

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 13 (41) Average Response Times (Matching)

1982 1979 1980

165 142 137293028

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-65. Card 13 (41) Average Response Times for Matching Templates5

Card 13 (41) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

1978 1980 1980

206 195 164303030

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-66. Card 13 (41) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

5 Card 13 was loaded with a reference fingerprint template containing a proprietary extension and a minutia count of 41. It was

not tested with reference fingerprint templates containing a minutia count of 34 or 27.

42

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 14 (41) Average Response Times (Matching)

2013 2015 2014

185 158 153312932

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-67. Card 14 (41) Average Response Times for Matching Templates6

Card 14 (41) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

2015 2015 2015

224 214 180293028

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-68. Card 14 (41) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

6 Card 14 was loaded with a reference fingerprint template containing a proprietary extension and a minutia count of 41. It was

not tested with reference fingerprint templates containing a minutia count of 34 or 27.

43

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 15 (41) Average Response Times (Matching)

1621 1621 1628

602 561 529

148138138

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-69. Card 15 (41) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 15 (41) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

1624 1619 1633

643 611 585

137 140 137

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-70. Card 15 (41) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

44

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

Card 15 (34) Average Response Times (Matching)

1625 1635 1624

576 640 603

140140140

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-71. Card 15 (34) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 15 (34) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

1627 1633 1626

640 588 546

139140139

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-72. Card 15 (34) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

45

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Card 15 (27) Average Response Times (Matching)

1629 1624 1627

684 612 544

142139138

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-73. Card 15 (27) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 15 (27) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

1631 1624 1630

605 551 491

139139138

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-74. Card 15 (27) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

46

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Card 16 (41) Average Response Times (Matching)

1609 1601 1598

622 571 532

137138138

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-75. Card 16 (41) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 16 (41) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

1608 1602 1598

659 617 585

139 136 137

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-76. Card 16 (41) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

47

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Card 16 (34) Average Response Times (Matching)

1604 1607 1599

573 630 593

137137140

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-77. Card 16 (34) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 16 (34) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

1606 1608 1599

636 578 535

138138136

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-78. Card 16 (34) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

48

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Card 16 (27) Average Response Times (Matching)

1600 1610 1613

672 607 537

136137139

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-79. Card 16 (27) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 16 (27) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

1601 1611 1610

596 547 486

138139137

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-80. Card 16 (27) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

49

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Card 17 (41) Average Response Times (Matching)

1851 1851 1851

870 706 521

1716

16

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-81. Card 17 (41) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 17 (41) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

1851 1851 1853

1001 782 655

1416

17

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-82. Card 17 (41) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

50

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Card 17 (34) Average Response Times (Matching)

1874 1837 1833

817 687 501

1314

16

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-83. Card 17 (34) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 17 (34) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

1867 1833 1833

849670 616

171616

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-84. Card 17 (34) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

51

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Card 17 (27) Average Response Times (Matching)

1877 1874 1871

708 622 470

171815

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-85. Card 17 (27) Average Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 17 (27) Average Response Times (Non-Matching)

1883 1871 1875

722 604 505

151715

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

SMC

Tim

e (m

s)

Host ProcessingT1T0

41 34 27

Figure B-86. Card 17 (27) Average Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

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Appendix B—Response Time Graphs

Card 1 (41) Response Times (Matching)

740

760

780

800

820

840

860

880

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-1. Card 1 (41) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 1 (41) Response Times (Non-Matching)

770

780

790

800

810

820

830

840

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-2. Card 1 (41) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

53

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Card 1 (34) Response Times (Matching)

720

740

760

780

800

820

840

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-3. Card 1 (34) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 1 (34) Response Times (Non-Matching)

740750

760770

780790

800810

820

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-4. Card 1 (34) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

54

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Card 1 (27) Response Times (Matching)

740760

780800

820840

860880

900

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-5. Card 1 (27) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 1 (27) Response Times (Non-Matching)

760

770

780

790

800

810

820

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-6. Card 1 (27) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

55

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Card 2 (41) Response Times (Matching)

780

800

820

840

860

880

900

920

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-7. Card 2 (41) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 2 (41) Response Times (Non-Matching)

820830

840850

860870

880890

900

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-8. Card 2 (41) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

56

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Card 2 (34) Response Times (Matching)

760

780

800

820

840

860

880

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-9. Card 2 (34) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 2 (34) Response Times (Non-Matching)

790800

810820

830840

850860

870

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-10. Card 2 (34) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

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Card 2 (27) Response Times (Matching)

780800820840860880900920940960

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-11. Card 2 (27) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 2 (27) Response Times (Non-Matching)

800

810

820

830

840

850

860

870

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-12. Card 2 (27) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

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Card 3 (41) Response Times (Matching)

740

760

780

800

820

840

860

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-13. Card 3 (41) Response Times for Matching Templates7

Card 3 (41) Response Times (Non-Matching)

770780

790800

810820

830840

850

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-14. Card 3 (41) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

7 Card 3 was loaded with a reference fingerprint template containing a proprietary extension and a minutia count of 41. It was

not tested with reference fingerprint templates containing a minutia count of 34 or 27.

59

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Card 4 (41) Response Times (Matching)

780

800

820

840

860

880

900

920

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-15. Card 4 (41) Response Times for Matching Templates8

Card 4 (41) Response Times (Non-Matching)

820830

840850

860870

880890

900

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-16. Card 4 (41) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

8 Card 4 was loaded with a reference fingerprint template containing a proprietary extension and a minutia count of 41. It was

not tested with reference fingerprint templates containing a minutia count of 34 or 27.

60

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Card 5 (41) Response Times (Matching)

1650

1750

1850

1950

2050

2150

2250

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-17. Card 5 (41) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 5 (41) Response Times (Non-Matching)

17301740

17501760

17701780

17901800

1810

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-18. Card 5 (41) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

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Card 5 (34) Response Times (Matching)

16501700175018001850190019502000205021002150

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-19. Card 5 (34) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 5 (34) Response Times (Non-Matching)

1680

1700

1720

1740

1760

1780

1800

1820

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-20. Card 5 (34) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

62

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Card 5 (27) Response Times (Matching)

16501700175018001850190019502000205021002150

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-21. Card 5 (27) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 5 (27) Response Times (Non-Matching)

16201640

16601680

17001720

17401760

1780

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-22. Card 5 (27) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

63

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Card 6 (41) Response Times (Matching)

1640

1660

1680

1700

1720

1740

1760

1780

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-23. Card 6 (41) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 6 (41) Response Times (Non-Matching)

1700

1720

1740

1760

1780

1800

1820

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-24. Card 6 (41) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

64

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Card 6 (34) Response Times (Matching)

1660

1680

1700

1720

1740

1760

1780

1800

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-25. Card 6 (34) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 6 (34) Response Times (Non-Matching)

16601680

17001720

17401760

17801800

1820

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-26. Card 6 (34) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

65

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Card 6 (27) Response Times (Matching)

16601680170017201740176017801800182018401860

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-27. Card 6 (27) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 6 (27) Response Times (Non-Matching)

1620

1640

1660

1680

1700

1720

1740

1760

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-28. Card 6 (27) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

66

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Card 7 (41) Response Times (Matching)

1200

1300

1400

1500

1600

1700

1800

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-29. Card 7 (41) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 7 (41) Response Times (Non-Matching)

900

1100

1300

1500

1700

1900

2100

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-30. Card 7 (41) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

67

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Card 7 (34) Response Times (Matching)

12001300

14001500

16001700

18001900

2000

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-31. Card 7 (34) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 7 (34) Response Times (Non-Matching)

1100120013001400150016001700180019002000

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-32. Card 7 (34) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

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Card 7 (27) Response Times (Matching)

11501200

12501300

13501400

14501500

1550

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-33. Card 7 (27) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 7 (27) Response Times (Non-Matching)

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1500

1600

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-34. Card 7 (27) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

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Card 8 (41) Response Times (Matching)

600800

10001200

14001600

18002000

2200

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s)

SMC = 41SMC = 34

Note: No matching templatesresulted w hen SMC = 27.

Figure C-35. Card 8 (41) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 8 (41) Response Times (Non-Matching)

300500

700900

11001300

15001700

1900

1 12 23 34 45 56 67 78 89 100 111 122

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Note: Only the f irst 100 trial runsfor SMC = 27 are plotted.

Figure C-36. Card 8 (41) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

70

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Card 8 (34) Response Times (Matching)

500

700

900

1100

1300

1500

1700

1900

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-37. Card 8 (34) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 8 (34) Response Times (Non-Matching)

500

700

900

1100

1300

1500

1700

1900

1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-38. Card 8 (34) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

71

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Card 8 (27) Response Times (Matching)

500

700

900

1100

1300

1500

1700

1900

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-39. Card 8 (27) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 8 (27) Response Times (Non-Matching)

200400

600800

10001200

14001600

1800

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-40. Card 8 (27) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

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Card 9 (41) Response Times (Matching)

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s)

SMC = 41SMC = 34

Note: No matching templatesresulted w hen SMC = 27.

Figure C-41. Card 9 (41) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 9 (41) Response Times (Non-Matching)

200400600800

100012001400160018002000

1 13 25 37 49 61 73 85 97 109 121 133

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Note: Only the f irst 100 trial runsfor SMC = 27 are plotted.

Figure C-42. Card 9 (41) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

73

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Card 9 (34) Response Times (Matching)

500

700

900

1100

1300

1500

1700

1900

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-43. Card 9 (34) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 9 (34) Response Times (Non-Matching)

500700900

1100130015001700190021002300

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-44. Card 9 (34) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

74

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Card 9 (27) Response Times (Matching)

500700

9001100

13001500

17001900

2100

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-45. Card 9 (27) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 9 (27) Response Times (Non-Matching)

300500

700900

11001300

15001700

1900

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-46. Card 9 (27) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

75

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Card 10 (41) Response Times (Matching)

700

900

1100

1300

1500

1700

1900

2100

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s)

SMC = 41SMC = 34

Note: No matching templatesresulted w hen SMC = 27.

Figure C-47. Card 10 (41) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 10 (41) Response Times (Non-Matching)

400600800

10001200140016001800200022002400

1 12 23 34 45 56 67 78 89 100 111

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Note: Only the f irst 100 trial runsfor SMC = 27 are plotted.

Figure C-48. Card 10 (41) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

76

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Card 10 (34) Response Times (Matching)

600

650

700

750

800

850

900

950

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-49. Card 10 (34) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 10 (34) Response Times (Non-Matching)

400600

8001000

12001400

16001800

2000

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-50. Card 10 (34) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

77

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Card 10 (27) Response Times (Matching)

620640660680700720740760780800

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-51. Card 10 (27) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 10 (27) Response Times (Non-Matching)

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-52. Card 10 (27) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

78

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Card 11 (41) Response Times (Matching)

2120

2140

2160

2180

2200

2220

2240

2260

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-53. Card 11 (41) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 11 (41) Response Times (Non-Matching)

2160

2170

2180

2190

2200

2210

2220

2230

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-54. Card 11 (41) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

79

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Card 11 (34) Response Times (Matching)

2120

2140

2160

2180

2200

2220

2240

2260

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-55. Card 11 (34) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 11 (34) Response Times (Non-Matching)

21502160

21702180

21902200

22102220

2230

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-56. Card 11 (34) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

80

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Card 11 (27) Response Times (Matching)

2120214021602180220022202240226022802300

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-57. Card 11 (27) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 11 (27) Response Times (Non-Matching)

2150

2160

2170

2180

2190

2200

2210

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-58. Card 11 (27) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

81

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Card 12 (41) Response Times (Matching)

2180

2200

2220

2240

2260

2280

2300

2320

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-59. Card 12 (41) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 12 (41) Response Times (Non-Matching)

22102220

22302240

22502260

22702280

2290

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-60. Card 12 (41) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

82

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Card 12 (34) Response Times (Matching)

2180

2200

2220

2240

2260

2280

2300

2320

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-61. Card 12 (34) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 12 (34) Response Times (Non-Matching)

22102220

22302240

22502260

22702280

2290

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-62. Card 12 (34) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

83

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Card 12 (27) Response Times (Matching)

21802200

22202240

22602280

23002320

2340

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-63. Card 12 (27) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 12 (27) Response Times (Non-Matching)

2210

2220

2230

2240

2250

2260

2270

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-64. Card 12 (27) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

84

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Card 13 (41) Response Times (Matching)

2120

2140

2160

2180

2200

2220

2240

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-65. Card 13 (41) Response Times for Matching Templates9

Card 13 (41) Response Times (Non-Matching)

21502160

21702180

21902200

22102220

2230

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-66. Card 13 (41) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

9 Card 13 was loaded with a reference fingerprint template containing a proprietary extension and a minutia count of 41. It was

not tested with reference fingerprint templates containing a minutia count of 34 or 27.

85

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Card 14 (41) Response Times (Matching)

2180

2200

2220

2240

2260

2280

2300

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-67. Card 14 (41) Response Times for Matching Templates10

Card 14 (41) Response Times (Non-Matching)

22102220

22302240

22502260

22702280

2290

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-68. Card 14 (41) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

10 Card 14 was loaded with a reference fingerprint template containing a proprietary extension and a minutia count of 41. It was

not tested with reference fingerprint templates containing a minutia count of 34 or 27.

86

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Card 15 (41) Response Times (Matching)

2200

2300

2400

2500

2600

2700

2800

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-69. Card 15 (41) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 15 (41) Response Times (Non-Matching)

23202330234023502360237023802390240024102420

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-70. Card 15 (41) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

87

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Card 15 (34) Response Times (Matching)

2300

2320

2340

2360

2380

2400

2420

2440

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-71. Card 15 (34) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 15 (34) Response Times (Non-Matching)

22802300

23202340

23602380

24002420

2440

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-72. Card 15 (34) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

88

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Card 15 (27) Response Times (Matching)

2260

2300

2340

2380

2420

2460

2500

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-73. Card 15 (27) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 15 (27) Response Times (Non-Matching)

2220224022602280230023202340236023802400

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-74. Card 15 (27) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

89

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Card 16 (41) Response Times (Matching)

22402260

22802300

23202340

23602380

2400

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-75. Card 16 (41) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 16 (41) Response Times (Non-Matching)

2300

2320

2340

2360

2380

2400

2420

2440

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-76. Card 16 (41) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

90

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Card 16 (34) Response Times (Matching)

2280

2300

2320

2340

2360

2380

2400

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-77. Card 16 (34) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 16 (34) Response Times (Non-Matching)

2260

2280

2300

2320

2340

2360

2380

2400

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-78. Card 16 (34) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

91

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Card 16 (27) Response Times (Matching)

2260228023002320234023602380240024202440

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-79. Card 16 (27) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 16 (27) Response Times (Non-Matching)

22002220

22402260

22802300

23202340

2360

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-80. Card 16 (27) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

92

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Card 17 (41) Response Times (Matching)

2300

2400

2500

2600

2700

2800

2900

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-81. Card 17 (41) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 17 (41) Response Times (Non-Matching)

2400

2500

2600

2700

2800

2900

3000

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-82. Card 17 (41) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

93

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Card 17 (34) Response Times (Matching)

2300

2400

2500

2600

2700

2800

2900

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-83. Card 17 (34) Response Times for Matching Templates

Card 17 (34) Response Times (Non-Matching)

2400

2500

2600

2700

2800

2900

3000

1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s) SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-84. Card 17 (34) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

94

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95

Card 17 (27) Response Times (Matching)

2300

2400

2500

2600

2700

2800

2900

3000

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 7

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s)

3 82 91 100

SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Card 17 (27) Response Times (Non-Matching)

2200

2400

2600

2800

3000

3200

3400

3600

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Trial #

Tim

e (m

s)

Figure C-85. Card 17 (27) Response Times for Matching Templates

SMC = 41SMC = 34SMC = 27

Figure C-86. Card 17 (27) Response Times for Non-Matching Templates

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Appendix C—Sample Test Fixture Output

Date/Time,Run #,Reader,Card,Symmetric Crypto,Asymmetric Crypto,Fingerprint Filename,Finger,Minutia Count,Total Time,T0,T1,Cert Verified,Finger Verified 09/13/07 15:12:28,1,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,859,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:29,2,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,610,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:29,3,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:30,4,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:31,5,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:32,6,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:33,7,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:33,8,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:34,9,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:35,10,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:36,11,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:37,12,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,610,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:37,13,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:38,14,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:39,15,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:40,16,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,579,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:41,17,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:41,18,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:42,19,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:43,20,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:44,21,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,610,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:45,22,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,595,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:45,23,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:46,24,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:47,25,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:48,26,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,610,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:49,27,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:50,28,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,595,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:50,29,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:51,30,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:52,31,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:53,32,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,610,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:54,33,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:54,34,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:55,35,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:56,36,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,579,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:57,37,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:58,38,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:12:58,39,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:12:59,40,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:00,41,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,594,156,Yes,Yes

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Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report

09/13/07 15:13:01,42,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:02,43,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:02,44,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:03,45,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:04,46,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:05,47,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:06,48,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:06,49,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:07,50,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,610,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:08,51,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:09,52,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:10,53,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:10,54,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:11,55,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:12,56,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,595,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:13,57,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:14,58,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:15,59,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:15,60,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,610,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:16,61,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:17,62,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:18,63,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:19,64,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:19,65,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:20,66,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:21,67,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:22,68,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:23,69,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:23,70,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,610,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:24,71,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:25,72,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:26,73,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:27,74,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:27,75,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,579,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:28,76,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,610,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:29,77,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:30,78,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:31,79,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:32,80,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,610,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:32,81,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:33,82,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:34,83,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:35,84,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:36,85,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:36,86,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:37,87,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:38,88,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:39,89,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:40,90,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,610,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:40,91,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:41,92,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No

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09/13/07 15:13:42,93,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:43,94,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:44,95,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:44,96,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,610,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:45,97,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:46,98,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:47,99,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:48,100,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:48,101,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,579,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:49,102,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,610,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:50,103,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:51,104,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:52,105,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,610,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:53,106,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:53,107,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:54,108,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:55,109,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,610,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:56,110,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:57,111,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:57,112,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:13:58,113,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:13:59,114,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:00,115,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:01,116,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:01,117,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:02,118,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:03,119,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,579,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:04,120,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,610,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:05,121,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:05,122,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:06,123,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,579,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:07,124,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,595,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:08,125,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:09,126,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,610,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:10,127,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:10,128,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,610,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:11,129,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:12,130,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:13,131,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:14,132,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:14,133,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:15,134,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:16,135,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:17,136,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:18,137,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,579,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:18,138,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:19,139,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:20,140,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:21,141,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,579,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:22,142,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,595,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:22,143,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,610,156,Yes,Yes

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09/13/07 15:14:23,144,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:24,145,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:25,146,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,610,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:26,147,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:26,148,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,610,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:27,149,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,579,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:28,150,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:29,151,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:30,152,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:31,153,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:31,154,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,595,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:32,155,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:33,156,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:34,157,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:35,158,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,610,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:35,159,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:36,160,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:37,161,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:38,162,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,610,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:39,163,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:39,164,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:40,165,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:41,166,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:42,167,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:43,168,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:43,169,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:44,170,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:45,171,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:46,172,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:47,173,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:47,174,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:48,175,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:49,176,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:50,177,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,579,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:51,178,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,595,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:52,179,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:52,180,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:53,181,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:54,182,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:55,183,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:56,184,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:56,185,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:57,186,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:14:58,187,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:14:59,188,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:15:00,189,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:15:00,190,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:15:01,191,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:15:02,192,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,610,188,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:15:03,193,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:15:04,194,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No

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09/13/07 15:15:04,195,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:15:05,196,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,610,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:15:06,197,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,781,610,156,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:15:07,198,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,813,595,203,Yes,No 09/13/07 15:15:08,199,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserL2_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Left index,41,797,595,172,Yes,Yes 09/13/07 15:15:09,200,Reader A,Card 1 (41),2 Key TDES - ECB,RSA 1024,UserR3_41_sample.iso-fmc-cs,Right middle,41,828,595,203,Yes,No

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Appendix D—Test Approach

D.1 Purpose

FIPS 201-1 and associated NIST Special Publications define a method to perform biometric authentication of a PIV cardholder when the PIV Card is inserted into a contact smart card reader. In some use cases, however, contactless operation is required. Security concerns have hindered communication of biometric data transfer over the contactless interface. The transaction data can be protected by secure messaging and data encryption, but these methods can impact performance. To understand the effects of security on performance, NIST will conduct a technical feasibility study of secure data transfer over the contactless interface to perform Secure Biometric Match-On-Card (SBMOC) operations. Eventually, NIST may propose an extension of the FIPS 201 standard that achieves secure biometric authentication in the contactless mode of operation, but such a proposal is not an immediate goal of this study.

The study will use PKI to create an authenticated, secure session (like an SSL/TLS session) that protects the integrity and confidentiality of messages sent from the terminal to a smart card, and the integrity and authenticity of messages sent from the smart card to the terminal. The protocol never releases biometric data from the smart card, called the Device Under Test (DUT) in this document. Instead, the DUT receives an encrypted sample template from a biometric reader, performs a match against a reference template stored on the DUT, and returns a logically signed Yes/No result to the reader.

Preliminary tests of BMOC operation have shown that a BMOC operation for physical access could be performed within 500 milliseconds without secure messaging. Tests of PKI transaction times suggest that the approach could meet a success criterion of less than 2.5 seconds per transaction.

D.2 Security Objectives

FIPS 201-1 permits biometric data to be released only across the contact interface of a PIV Card, and only after activation of the PIV Card through presentation of the cardholder’s Personal Identification Number (PIN). These restrictions achieve two security objectives: communication of biometric data occurs only over a trusted communication channel that is not easily subject to eavesdropping attacks (namely, the wired contacts inside the smart card reader); and the PIV cardholder implicitly attests to the legitimacy of the smart card reader, as they indicate by entering the PIN on the smart card reader keypad. FIPS 201-1 enables biometric authentication to occur without imposing a technical requirement for automatic authentication of smart card readers to PIV Cards. Such a requirement, it was believed, would add unacceptable key management costs. (The PIV fingerprint object is digitally signed, and the signature can be used to verify authenticity and integrity of the data.) This feasibility study will evaluate the impact of a secure protocol on transaction performance, when the protocol meets these security objectives:

+ SO1: communication of biometric data shall occur only over a trusted channel that is not susceptible to eavesdropping attacks in the reader-to-card direction, nor spoofing or replay attacks in the card-to-reader direction; and

+ SO2: communication of biometric data between the smart card and smart card reader shall occur only after the cardholder has indicated the reader is legitimate; and

+ SO3: communication of biometric data from the smart card to the reader shall occur only after the cardholder has entered their PIN; and

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+ SO4: the approach should achieve the preceding security objectives without reader-to-smart-card authentication or associated key management infrastructure.

These security objectives are aligned with the high-level security objectives of FIPS 201-1. They protect both the integrity of the biometric authentication transaction and the privacy of the cardholder’s biometric data, while avoiding the potential cost of reader authentication key management.

D.3 Functional and Performance Objectives

The Device Under Test (DUT) shall be a smart card having ISO/IEC 7810 physical and mechanical characteristics.

The Device Under test shall be capable of contact (via ISO/IEC 7816-3 methods, consistent with NIST SP800-73-1) and contactless (via ISO/IEC 14443 methods, consistent with NIST SP800-73-1).

Preferably, the DUT is listed on the General Services Administration (GSA) HSPD-12 Approved Product List, and modified only by the addition of BMOC firmware. The DUT may also be a type of smart card not on the GSA Approved Product List (APL). In this case, NIST will determine if the DUT could host a PIV card-application at reasonable development cost, and if so, the DUT will be tested.

The DUT may not have an NPIVP or a Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) certificate. In this case, NIST will determine if the DUT could pass NPIVP and CMVP testing at reasonable development cost, and if so, the DUT will be tested.

The DUT should perform a Biometric Match-On-Card authentication transaction and meet the security objectives described in Section D.2.

The biometric matching algorithm on the DUT should demonstrate accuracy meeting the criteria of SP800-76-1 Section 8.10 by testing in either the NIST MINEX II or Ongoing MINEX activity. (Note: accuracy testing may run concurrently with performance and security testing.)

The fingerprint sample template sent from the reader to the DUT should be represented following either ISO 19794-2 finger minutiae card or ANSI 378 format. Any extensions or options must be fully documented in the submitted protocol documentation.

Both RSA 1024 and RSA 2048 should be available as asymmetric algorithm alternatives unless one of these is not available on the DUT.

AES (preferred), 3TDEA, or 2TDEA (deprecated) should be implemented at the symmetric encryption algorithm.

The target transaction time for the SBMOC Technical Feasibility Study is 2.5 seconds or less and is measured from steps 2 through 10 in Section D.5. Performance will be measured and reported separately for matching and non-matching cases.

D.4 Test Plan

This test plan identifies the tasks necessary to design, develop and install the BMOC Performance Test Platform at the NIST test facility located in Gaithersburg, MD.

The submission package to NIST will include:

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+ An executed copy of the Materials Transfer Agreement;

+ Documentation of the ISO/IEC 7816 command sequence implementing the SBMOC protocol, and at least one complete protocol sequence as an example;

+ Three DUTs (smart cards) capable of performing the SBMOC protocol;

+ Documentation of the loading process for biometric templates onto the smart card, both initially and as a replacement after the initial load.

Additional software tools or examples maybe supplied with the submission package.

Once a complete submission package has been received, NIST will begin a security analysis of the SBMOC protocol to determine if it meets the security-related objectives of Sections D.2 and D.3. NIST will construct the client-side protocol implementation in the test framework. NIST will develop a new client-side protocol implementation for each submitted DUT (this will insure that NIST is able to construct working client-side software from the protocol documentation).

The test fixture will record the duration of each command-response transaction between the host and the card. A test record will therefore contain a complete log of all APDUs exchanged, and timing on each request-response pair individually. A trial will run tests and reference templates, and with non-matching sample and reference templates, to highlight any differences in transaction time arising form the match result. If the reference template object contains multiple templates, trials will be designed to disclose the effects of multiple templates (e.g., separate trials matching first template vs. second on variance, break down communication and processing time per request-response cycle, document the amount of data transmitted (in both directions) during the protocol scenario, and estimate the command-response time per sub-activity (e.g., “read certificate, “general authenticate”, “verify”).

D.5 Protocol Implementation

The performance tests will measure the duration of phases during the SBMOC transaction. The rationale for the approach relies on two observations. First, the PIV System trust model is founded on PKI, and by design, any PIV Card can authenticate itself to another system element at a medium high assurance level using a private key and certificate stored on the card. Second, if a biometric match operation is performed on the PIV Card using SBMOC technology, there is no need to release biometric data from the PIV Card to any other system element (thus satisfying SO3 in Section D.2).

Variations in protocol implementation are acceptable provided that the objectives in Sections D.2 and D.3 are achieved.

In outline, the use scenario is as follows. The cardholder presents their card to a contactless biometric reader, and presents their finger to the biometric scanner. The scanner obtains a fingerprint image which is transformed into the sample template, encrypted, and transmitted via contactless into the PIV Card. The PIV Card decrypts the template, matches the sample template against the reference template stored on the PIV Card, and returns a signed “Yes” or “No” result to the smart card reader.

An example of a more detailed protocol is included next.

1. The cardholder presents their PIV Card to the contactless smart card reader. 2. The host system selects the SBMOC application on the card.

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e.g., using the SELECT APDU

3. The smart card reader performs Get Data to read the PKI certificate from the PIV Card, and validates the PKI certificate.

e.g., using the GET DATA APDU followed by GET RESPONSE APDU(s)

4. The host system gets the nonce (a random card data) from the card. The card responds with 8-bytes Rc(1) and 16 bytes Rc(2). Rc(1) is used to authenticate the host and Rc(2) is used to derive the session keys.

e.g., using the GET CHALLENGE APDU

5. The card and host system generate encryption and MAC session keys.

GENERAL AUTHENTICATE – Used to communicate the session keys in an ciphered data block encrypted by the card public key. The encryption uses the following input data:

• Random number for encryption session key (PSKenc)– 16 bytes • Random number for MAC session key (PSKmac) – 16 bytes • Rc(1) – 8 bytes padding received from GET CHALLENGE APDU • PKCS #1 padding GENERAL AUTHENTICATE returns the encryption and MAC session keys.

e.g., using the GENERAL AUTHENTICATE APDU

6. A secure session is established between the card and the host system. Both the card and the host system use the Rc(2) as a key to compute encryption session key and MAC session key. The algorithm is: SKmac = 3DES(PSKmac, Rc(2)) and SKenc = 3DES(PSKenc, Rc(2)).

7. The cardholder presents their finger to the fingerprint scanner. 8. The fingerprint scanner scans the finger, and generates the sample template from the

image. Alternatively, the finger print template is retrieved from a file. 9. The smart card reader encrypts the sample template using the session encryption key. 10. The host system sends the template to the card for authentication

• VERIFY – Used to send encrypted biometric template for authentication. The input data should be of the following format: 0x7F 0x2E || length || 0x81 || length || encrypted biometric template (pad the template with zero at the end to make it multiple of 8 bytes. The response of 90 00 means the biometric template matched. The message also responds with 9 bytes of MAC for further verification by the host system.

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e.g., using the VERIFY APDU

The time to complete each of the request-response transactions, and the total time to complete steps 2-10 will be recorded. Repeated measurements will be made to estimate variance. Trials will be conducted with templates that match, and with templates that do not match. The public key algorithm used will be RSA, and trials will be conducted at 1024 and 2048 bit key lengths. D.6 Publication of Results

A submission is successful if it achieves the objectives in Sections D.2 and D.3 when tested. At the completion of testing, NIST will publish a summary report indicating the number of successful submissions, and for each successful submission, and for both RSA 1024 and 2048, and for matching and non-matching tests:

1. the average total time for the transaction; 2. average time to establish a secure session; 3. average time to transmit the reference template to the smart card; 4. average time to compute the match; 5. average time to transmit the result from the smart card; 6. whether or not the smart card has passed NPIVP testing; 7. whether or not the smart card has passed CMVP testing.

The average total time (1) will be approximately (2) + (3) + (4) + (5).

NIST may also publish summary observations and recommendations resulting from the protocol security analyses, without reference to specific submissions.

In conformance with the “no endorsement” policy of NIST, the names of participants will not be published.

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Appendix E—Acronyms

The following acronyms and abbreviations are used throughout this document:

2TDEA 2-Key Triple Data Encryption Algorithm 3TDEA 3-Key Triple Data Encryption Algorithm AES Advanced Encryption Standard ANSI American National Standards Institute APDU Application Protocol Data Unit API Application Programming Interface APL Approved Product List CBC Circular Binary Coding CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CSV Comma-Separated Values DES Data Encryption Standard DUT Device Under Test FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards GSA General Services Administration HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive IEC International Electrotechnical Commission ISO International Organization for Standardization ITL Information Technology Laboratory MAC Message Authentication Code MINEX Minutiae Interoperability Exchange Test NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NISTIR National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency Report NPIVP NIST’s Personal Identity Verification Program PC/SC Personal Computer/Smart Card PIN Personal Identification Number PIV Personal Identity Verification PKI Public Key Infrastructure RF Radio Frequency RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman SBMOC Secure Biometric Match-on-Card SMC Sample Minutia Count SP Special Publication

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Appendix F—References

[1] HSPD 12, Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, August 27, 2004.

[2] Federal Information Processing Standard 201-1, Change Notice 1, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors, March 2006. (See http://csrc.nist.gov)

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