SECTION - II

BUDDHIST VIEW OF PURE SENSATION

16

SECTION - II

BUDDHIST VIEW OF PURE SENSATION

The Buddhist logicians introduce the theory of logic in

their scheme with a view to establishing their category. The

Buddhist logic which is generally known as epistemological logic

seeks to place its concept of category on a firm footing. The

Buddhist holds the opinion that the source of knowledge admits

only of two varieties, since the knowable objects are of two

types and siRce the difference in the type of knowable objects

25 alone a~counts for the variety of the means of proof.

While most of the branches of Indian Philosophy consider

nirvikarpaka and savikalpaka as two forms of perception, the

Buddhist philosophers, particularly the Yogacara school, main­

tains that nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka are two for;ms of

26 knowledge.

The Buddhist Philosophers headed by Dihnaga, take great

pains to make an essential distinction between svalaksana and • •

25. prameyadvaividhyat pramanam dvividhain jagut'l I nany~ prama!labhedasya h~etur vifayabhedat~ II - Nyayamanjari, Part-1, Page 27, lines 3-4, Chowkhamba

Sanskrit Series, Varanasi, 1971.

2 6 • d vi vidham s amy ag jnanam. Praty ak~ am anumanan ce ·• ti • •

- Nyayabindu 1.2-3, Pages 35-37, edited by Pandit

Dal~sukhbhai Malvania, K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1955.

17

samanyalaksana - one is perceptible and the other is imper-• •

ceptible, - one is exclusively particular and the other is

universal. As these two objects mutually exclude each other, 27

existence of the third type of object is not possible. While

svalak~a~as are the unique particulars, s-amanyalak~a~as being

the universals are conceptually constructed by the mind. The

former is an ultimate reality while the latter lacks it.26

Svalaksana is pure; it consists of bare point instant and exists • •

beyond space and time. Samanyalaksana is a figment of • •

imagination, but is a real object from empirical point of

view which has nothing to do with the ultimate reality. Dharma­

klrti spends substantial energy in making a distinction between

svalaksana and samanyalaksana. Svalaksana, as Dharmakirti • • • • • • - , 29

views, has a power to produce effects (arthakriya-sakti),

it is specific (asadr~a). 30 It is not denotable by a •

2 7. dve eva samyagjnanavyakti i ti.

- Nyayabindutika, page 36, line 1, ibid.

28. arthakriyasamartham yat tad atra paramarthasat I . - -anyat samvrtisat proktante svasamanyalaksane // • • • •

- Prama~avarttika 3.3t edited by Rahul Sankritayana,

K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1953.

29. arthakriyasamarthyalaksanatvad vastunah. • • • - Nyayabindu 1.15; Pratyaksavisayad arthakriya

• • prapyate na vikalpavi~ayat.

- Nyayabindutlka, page 79, line 34, edited by Pt. Dal sukhbhai Malvania, K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute,Patna, 1955.

- - . . . 30. svam asadharanam laksanam tattvam svalaksanam. • • • • • - Ibid., page. 70, line 78.

18

I - i word (sabdasyavi?aya}, and it is apprehensible without requir ng

the help of other agencies like verbal convention. On the

other hand, sam1anyalaksana has no power to produce effects; i£ . . 31 is common to many particulars. It is de notable by a word

and is not capable of being cognised without depending upon

verbal convention. 32 As each being the negation of the other

they exhaust the entire universe and exclude the third type of

object.

corresponding to this essential distinction between

these two types of prameyas, a radical distinction between

two sources of knowledge has been taken into consideration

33 . in the Buddhist system. ·The Buddhist logician advocates

the settled theory (pramanavyavastha) and with all emphasis •

at its command asserts that sources of knowledge have settled

31. samaropyamanam hi rupam sakalavanhisadh-aranam. . . tatah tat samanyalaksanam.

• • • - Nyayabindutika, Page 77, line 14, ibid.

32. vikalpavijnanam hi samket~aladrastatvena vastu . " . .

33.

- • • ""r grhanac chabdasamsargyogyam grhn1yat. • •

- Ibid, page 69, lines 3-4.

I ' manain dividham meyadvaividhyat saktyasaktitah

• arthakriyay-ain • • • II

Pramapavarttika 2.1, edited by Rahula sankritayana, K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1953.

and clear limits. One source of knowledge never acts in the

sphere of another. A source of knowledge is either direct

or indirect. It either means a source of cognizing ultimate

reality, or it is a source of cognizing condition reality.

The direct one is Pratyaksa or pure sensation, and the • indirect one is anuma~a or conception. The former grasps

- - 34 svalaksana and the latter samanyalaksana. Pratyaksa grasps • • • • •

the object and anumana-imagi~the same object. The former

is that aspect of reality which appears directly in the

19

first moment. The latter is the form of it which is construe-

ted in a distinct apperception. What is immediately cognized

in Pratyaksa is only one moment but what is distinctly • conceived is always a change of moment cognized in a cons­

truction on the basis of some sensations. 35

It may be profitable at this point of time to

discuss the point of view of the Buddhist on the problem

of pratyaksa. It is the Buddhist philosopher alone who • equates Pratyaksa with indeterminate perception. While the • champions of the other systems of Indian philosophy prefer

34. svalak~anavisyam pratyaksam. samanyalaksanavisyam • I e e e e e -anum an am • •

- Pra.n\anavarttikabhasya on Pramanavarttika 3 .1. . ' . 35. Pratyaksasya hi ksana eko gr-ahyah. adhyavaseyastu ' . . .

I -pratyak~avalotpannena niscayena santana eva.

- Nyayabindu 1.12, Nyayabindut1ka, page 71, lines 2-3, edited by Pt. Dalsukhabhai Malvania, K.P. Jayaswal

Research Institute, Patna 1955.

20

to refer indeterminate perception by the word alocana jnana

in their early treatises, the Buddhist logician uses the

word nirvikalpaka to denote indeterminate perception. The

word vikalpa or nirvikalpaka was first used in the philo­

sophical literature probably by Dinnaga who is known as the

father of logic. In his pramanasamuccaya, Dinanga defines •

pratyak~a as a knowledge free from conceptual construc­

tion (kalpanapo~ha) and having no connection with name,

genus and the like (namajatyadyas~yuta). In his Nyayamukha

. -Dinnaga provides an etymological explanation of the word

·-Pratyaksa. The word Pratyaksa, Dinanga holds, is so named • • inasmuch as, it occurs in close connection with (Prati)

each sense faculty {aksa). But some later Buddhist logicians, •

do not favour this etymology of Pratyaksa, simply because it • can lead to an undesirable conclus1on that knowledge having

sense organs (ak~a) for its object_is Pratyak~a.

The Buddhists are of opinion that the definition of a

known object is useless and that of a unknown object is still

more useless, because it is impossible. This does not mean

that the Buddhists do not resort to definition on every step

of their investigation, but it means that what a thing in

itself, what its essence is, one can never express, one

only knows its relation. Every word or every conception,

according to the Buddhist, is correlative with its counter-

part, and that is the only definition that can be given. So

an object may be defined negatively. The Buddhist classifies

21

knowledge under two heads - sak~at or direct and parok~a or

indirect. The direct experience is. not indirect and is other

than the direct. The Buddhist epistemology has been built

up on the foundation of this classification of knowledge.While . -explaining the definition of pratyak~a Dinnaqa follows this

principle. He proposes that perception is Kalpanapodha or • •

non-constructive which means that this source of direct

knowledge is virtually not indirect. By the requirement Kal­

panapodha Dinniga seeks to define perception negatively and ••

this is the only way to define it. While Kalpana or conceptual

construction is other than perception or sensibility, Kalpa­

nap~~a or nirvikalpaka signifies that perception is other

than the inferential cognition or understanding. It is

perhaps Vindhyavasin who endeavours to define Pratyak~a

negatively. It appears from Jayanta•s Nyayamanjar"l that

- I -Vindhayavasin defines Pratyaksa as Srotradivrttir avikal-• . pika. 36 Subsequently, Oirmaga provides a log.ical basis for

this definition by distinguishing svalaksana from samanya-• •

laksana. • •

I -36. Srotradivrttir aparair avikalpike' ti pratyaksa-• . laksanam aparair •••• I • • - Nyayamanjari Part I, p. 93, edited by Pandit Surya Narayan Sukla, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi,

1971; also vide P.B. Chakraborty's Origin and Develop­ment of the Samkhya System of Thought, P. 146,149,

Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, Delhi 1975.

22

Di~naga in his Prama~asamuccaya defines Kalpana as

the association of name (nama), genus (jati) and the like

with a thing perceived resulting verbal designation of the

thing. A thing which is essentially inexpressible comes to

be expressed by a word when it is associated with a name

(naman) and other factors. Kalpana or conceptual construction

signifies nothing other than this process of associating a

. -name etc. with a thing. Dinnaga classifies the factors to be

associated with a thing for the sake of verbal designation

into five categories - naman, jati, guna,kriya and dravy.a • •

These five types of construction respectively function in I - I I - I

producing yad~chasabda, jati-sabda, gu~a-sabda,kriya~sabda I - I

and dravya-sabda. But Santaraksita and Kamalasila hold the •

opinion that the word naman in Dinnaga's definition of Kalpana

must be distinguished from jatyadi. Since jatyadi are not

recognised by Dinnaga as real entities, jatyadiyojana is a

heretical theory. Both santaraksi ta and Kaaalasila are of • . -opinion that Dinnaga's own interpretation of Kalpana is

namayojana. The compound n-amayojana in the definition of

perception given by Dinnaga has been explained by Kalmala~ila

in his Panjika as ''that whereby the connection of the two

things are brought about." 37 The compound may also be

37. n-amadlnam yojana yato bhavati sa tathokta.

- Panji}(a on Tattvasamgraha, Verse No. 1221, edited by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi,

1968.

23

explained on the basis of the assumption that the cause is

spoken of as the effect. The purpose served by the indirect

expression is that it serves to bring out the efficiency of

the cause as bringing about an effect different from other

I - - - -causes. Kamalasila further proposes that namajatyadiyojana

may also be explained in another way as standing for kalpana

or conceptual construction itself. Here yojana means 'wherewith

one is connected' - and this yojana of name, class etc. would

be the same conceptual content as "idea associated with verbal

expression."

Santaraksita in his Tattvasamgraha asserts that by the •

phrase 'namayatyadiyojana Dinnaga makes it clear that things

qualified by the qualification and the like, are also

denoted by the word. When proper names are pronounced, what

is denoted is the 'object• ·qualified by the name. In a

similar manner, when a universal like 'cowness• is pronounced

what is denoted is the object •qualified by that name.•

Similarly in all other cases, what are denoted are the

objects qualified by or connected with a respective name.

So namayojana, as KamalaSila thinks, is the only conceptual

construction and all other constructions may be brought under

the shade. 38 In view of this consideration Santaraksita •

38. yadva svamat.asiddhaiva kevala kalpanadita 1 sarvatra namna yukto• rtha ueyata iti yojanat //

• - Tattvasamgraha, Vol. 1, Chapter on Pratyak~a

verse 1223, p. 452, ibid.

I and Karnalasila hold that the association of the word

namayojana is the distinctive feature of Dinnaga' defi­

nation of Kalpana.

Dharmaklrti is more cautious in defining Kalpana.

24

Kalpana or conceptual construction implies a distinct cogRi­

tion of a mental reflex which is capable of being associated

39 with verbal designation. By verbal designation is meant

a word or speech through which something is denoted. To

'associate' with a word means such a cognition when the

denoted aspect of the object and its verbal aspect are

mixed up in its apprehended aspect. When the denoted fact

and the word denoting it enter into one act of cognition

40 then the association of the object with the word happens.

This definition of kalpana as given by Dharmakirti includes

the conceptual construction of infant and dump persons who

have the potentiality of verbal expression although they

do not utter an actual word. Though the mental constructions

of a newly born infant are not accompanied by words, they

39. abhilapasamsargayogyapratibhasa pratiti~ kalpana.

- Nyayabindu 1.5.

40. yadai'kasmin. jnane' bhidheya' bhidhanayorakarau

sannvistau bhavatas tada samsrste abhidhanabhidheye • • •• bhavatah • • - Ibid, Nyayabindutika, p. 48, lines 1-2, edited by

Pandit Dalsukhbhai Malvania, K.P. Jayaswal Research

Institute, Patna 1955.

25

certainly are suitable for such a connection. 41 A newly

born infant does not stop crying and does not press his lips

upon his mother's breast, so long as it does not produce a

synthesis of the breast it sees before him with the breast

it has experienced in the foregoing existence, by thinking

'there it is.' A cognition that unifies former experience

with later experiences does not have its object present to

it, inasmuch as, the former experience ceases to exist at

the time of present experience. So a synthetic image is

capable of ~eing associated with a word. But Pratyaksa or •

sense-perception strictly depends on its object. It is receP­

tive only in regard to what is exactly present before it. 42

Since Svalaksana or real object is a cause of confining per-• . ception to itself, rather to something unique particular,

perception is not therefore, capable of being associated with

a word. 43 Kalpana, thus, corresponds to a judgement in

which something indefinite to be made definite by the pre­

dicate. And it is a judgement of the form • this is that' and

the like. This can be called epistemological form of judgement.

41. tatra 'abhilapasamsrstavabhasa kalpana' ityuktav ••• . . - . avyutpannasamketasya kalpana na samgfhyeta~ . Yogyagraha~e

tu sa'pi samgrhyeta; Yadyapi abhilapasamsrstavabhasa • • ••

na bhavati tadaharjatasya balakasya kalpana, abhilapasam-sargayogyapratibhasa tu bhavaty eva.- Ibid., lines 6-9.

42. indriyavijnanain tu sainnihi tarthamatragr~i tvad arthasapeksam - Ibid, page 52, line 1 • •

43. svalak~a~asya. pi vacyavacakabhavam abhyupagamyai. tad avikalpakatvam ucyate. - Ibid, line 3.

26

Thus. it appears that all the Buddhist logicians headed

by Dinnaga and Dharmaklrti endeavour to make a distinction

between perception and conception by inserting the wovd

namayojanarahitam or kalpanapodham in the definition of .. perception.

Though Dharmakirti generally follows the footprints

left by his great teacher Dihnaga, he does not follow his

master in toto in defining perception. Dharmaklrti defines

• - - 44 perception as tatrapratyaksam kalpanapodham abhrantam. . . .. i.e.. perception is the cognition quite different from

productive imagination and sense-illusion. Absence of cons­

truction and absence of illusion as Dharmak1rti views. cons-

titute the definition of perception taken together.and not

separately. Knowledge which is free from construction and

does not produce an illusion. is Sense Perception. Thus.

both these characteristics combined with one another deter-

mine the essence of perception. While perception is generated

by the particular innocent or Syalaksal}Ci object, a construction . -of productive imagination is not produced by the object.

inasmuch as. it does not exclusively depend upon what is

present. Perception is an independent cognition as the

assembled factors which correspond to the synthetic images

are absent here • Sense perception does strictly depend

.... 44. Nyayabindu. 1.4.

•

upon its object, since it is receptive only in regard to

what is really present before it. Dharmakrrti further

announces that like the unique particulars (svalaksena) • •

27

every particular sound of the speech is free from construe-

tion, and naturally the unique sound is apprehended by

perception. Though every particular sound constitutes the

content of non-constructive knowledge the cognition of an

object associated with verbal expression is a synthetic

cons true tion.

A' question may be raised against this view that an

auditive sensation apprehends unique particular sound. This

particular sound has a double character. While it is a sound

it can have a meaning also. So it may be argued that sensation

of a strictly particular sound that corresponds to a mentally

constructive knowledge, is capable of being associated with

a word. To meet this objection Dharmakirti and his commenta-

tors proclaim that the unique particular sound may have this

double character of a sound and a meaning, and that meaning

involves synthesis. In spite of this it is really apprehended

in this double aspect, not as a present fact but as something

which has experience at the time of formation of language.

An entity that has been experienced at the past ceases to

exist at present. As the past experience does not continue

at present the present object is not capable of being cog-

nized by that experience. In the same manner an auditive

28

sensation fails to grasp the sound and meaning simultaneously,

simply because it cannot apprehend at present what has been

45 experienced long ago.

Dharmak!rti inserts the word • abhranta • in the defini-

tion of Perception as an essential requirement of sensation.

He proposes that sense perception does not contain an

illusion of the senses. But there is a storm of controversy

among the Buddhist logicians over the insertion of the word

'abhranta• in the definition of perception. 0

Asanga intra-

duces the second feature of non-illusiveness in the definition

of perception but Dinnaga does not feel it necessary to

admit it as an essential feature of sensation, and naturally

he drops the word. Subsequently ,Dharmakirti reintroduces

the word in the definition, but his followers do not always

join their hands on this point. While a large section refuses

to accept the word 'abhranta• in the definition of Pratyaksa, • Dharmottara a later Buddhist logician with all emphasis at

his command establishes the necessity for addition of the

word in the definition.

45. tatah purvakaladrstatvam apasyae chrotrajnanam • • •• na vacyavacakabhavagr~i.

- NyayabindutTka, p. 11, lines 18-19, edited

by Peter Paterson, Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1929.

29

Dinnaga holds the opinion that perception or sensibility

is a knowledge distinguished from consistent thought-

construction. Illusion, he thinks, contains an illusive

perceptual judgement and every judgement is a construction

of the intellect. He considers all empirical knowledges

or concepts as transcendental illusions. Even memory and

desire also are produced by understandinQ, since they are

called for by former experience. So perception, according to

Dinnaga, is pure sensation free from all mnemi~ elements.

As Dinnaga equates conception of an illusion with empirical

illusion he does not recognize the necessity for addinq

the word 'abhranta• in the definition of perception which

would be mere repetition of the word Kalpanapodha. . . But Dharmakirti adds the word • abhranta • in the definition

with a view to distinguishing it from all types of empirical

illusion - illusion produced by colour blindness, rapid

motion, travelling on a boat, physical disorder and the

like. 46 Blindness is an eye disease. This is a cause of

illusion located in the sense organ. Rapid movement sometimes

causes an illusion. When one rapidly swings a firebrand one

46. --- . _, - .

taya rahitam timirasubhramananauyanasamkso-• . - -- . ~-bhadyanahitavibhramam jnanam pratyaksam •

Nyayabindu 1.6.

30

have the illusion of a firy circle. Travelling on a boat

also cause illusion. When a boat moves, a person standing

on the boat has the illusion of moving tree on the shore.

Here illusion depends on the place where one is situated.

Similarly, disease also sometimes, disturbs one of the

three humours of the body the gaseous, the bilious

and the phlegmy whose equipiose is equivalent to health

and whose disturbed equipiose is equivalent to sickness.

All physical diseases are attributed to an abnormal con-

dition of the gaseous principles. Each of these causes

invariably affects the sense-organs, inasmuch as, when

the organs of senses are normal there can be no illusive

sensation. To exclude all th~se sense illusions Dharmakirti

feels it necessary for insertion of the word 'abhranta'

in the definition. Dharmottara, the great commentator of

Nyayabindu, also is of opinion that the addition of the

word 'abhranta• to the definition of Pratyaksa is neceessary •

to exclude illusion of the moving tree on the shore and the

like. An opponent may argue that illusion of moving tree

is a right knowledge, inasmuch as, it leads to a success-

ful activity. The illusion may again be considered as

perception, since it is free from mental construction. To

exclude sense-illusion, Dharmaklrti, as Dharmottara

interprets, has done quite right by adding the word 'al:ilranta'

in the definition of perception. 47

I • Kamalasila in his commentary on Tattvasangraha

supports the view of Dharmaklrti and asserts that the word

'abhranta' or non-erroneous has been added to the defi-I

nition for the purpose of excluding such illusion, inasmuch

as all these illusions are not regarded as valid cognition

48 on the ground of being erroneous. He further points out

that the question what is the use of mentioning the word

'kalpanapodha •, does not stand to reason, as in that case ••

the inferrential cognition also would have to be regarded

49 as sense perception also.

•1. tatra• satyabharantagrahane gacchadvrksada-• . .

48.

rsanadipratyaksam kalpanapodhatvat syat. • • • tato hi pravrttena vrksamatram avapyate iti

• • . - - """- -samvadakatvat samyagjnanam, kalpanapodhatvac •• - - ~ . -ca pratyaksam iti syad asanka. tannivrtyartham • •

abhrantagrahanam • •

Ibid, Nyayabindutlka, p. 45, lines 1-3. I - • V'- • •

kesondrakad~vijnanamvrtyartham idam krtam I • • • • - . . - . -abhrantamgrahapam taddhi bhrantatvam ne~yate prama // • - Tattvasamgraha, Part I, Chapter on Pratyaksa verse

• 1311, Part-!, edited by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri,

Bauddha Bharati, varanasi 1960.

49. Yady evam abhrantagrahanam eva' stu, kim kalpana-•

podhagrahanene• iti ? na;anumanavikalpasya'pi • • • . -pratyaksatvaprasangat • ...... - . Panjika on Tattvasamgraha, Verse 1311, P. 480, lines 8-10, ibid.

31

A fresh question may be raised here that illusion

iS purely mental, it can never be a sense perception. So

the addition of the word 'abhranta• in the definition of

32

perception for the purpose of excluding illusion is meaning­

' less. In reply to this objection Kamalasila reminds that

the definition of perception under reference does not refer

to a definition of only sense perception which is brought

about by the sense organ, but also of that sense perception

which appears in the mystique which is purely mental.

Dream-cognition also is non-conceptual as it appears quite I

distinctly and yet it is not non-illusive. So Kamalasila .

proposes that for the exclusion of drearn-cogni tion the

inclusion of the word • abhr"~mta • in the definition is

so necessary.

A section of the Buddhist logician may argue that

the word • abhranta • in the definition of Pratyaksa is not • necessary at all, inasmuch as, even the illusion of "yellow

conch-shell• is sense perception. Since it is not brought

about by an inferential indicative, it cannot influence the

idea of conch-shell is valid, is clear from the fact that

it is not incongruent with reality. It is perhaps for this . -reason the great logician Dinnaga does not introduce the

word • abhranta • in the definition of sense perception.

so. see Panjika on Tattvasamgraha,

verses 1312-13.

33

I But Karnalasila does not favour this argument and

holds the opinion that the validity of a cognition is of

two types when there is compatibility with the

appearance and when there is compatibility with the appre-

hension. But in the case of the idea of yellow conch-

shell compatibility is not in accordance with the appea-

ranee because what appears is the yellow conch-shell and

yet what is perceived on touching is not the yellow

thing. 51 Karnalasila further declares that compatibility

is not pos'sible here in accordance with the apprehension,

simply because it is the yellow thing in itself that is .

apprehended as capable of a successful activity, and 52 no successful activity in that form is actually found.

I With these arguments Kamalasila endeavours to establish

that the insertion of the word 'abhranta • in the definition

of Pratyaksa as given by Dharmaklrti is meaningful • •

51. tatre• ha na yathapratibhasam avisamvadah; • p~tasya pratibhasanat tasya tathBbhutasya prapteh •

•

52.

~ - . Panjika on Tattasarngraha, verse 1324,

P. 483, lines 15-16, ibid. - - - . -na pi yathadhyavasayam avisamvadah;

• - ~ - - - -pitasyai va visi~~arthakriyakaritvena•

dhyavasayat, na ca tadruparthakriyapraptir asti - Ibid, lines 16-18.

34

Dharmak1rti and his followers argue that hallucination,

appearance of flower on the sky and vivid dream fall under

the definition of perception, inasmuch as, they are not

constructions on the basis of a real cognition. So in all

these cases the visions are present with all that vividness

which is a special feature of perception. Hallucinations

and vivid dreams lack that vagueness and generality which

is the characteristic feature of conceptual thought. To

avoid this problem the addition of .the qualification

'abhranta•, as Dharmaklrti thinks, is necessary.

Thus, it appears that Dharmak1rti draws a line of

demarcation between a sense illusion and an illusion of

the understanding. He includes the word 'kalpanapoqQa'

in the definition of Pratyak~a to distinguish it from

an illusion of the understanding or 'kalpana•, while he

includes the word 'abhranta• with a view to distinguishing

pratyaksa from a sense-illusion. The causes of illusion • may lie either in the external objects or in the com­

prehender. They may be called forth by a disease of sense

organs, and sometimes they may also be entirely physical.

It is a fact that the senses contain no judgement neither

the right one, nor the wrong. But the senses in an abnormal

condition may influence the faculty of understanding regu-

lating thereby an erroneous cognition.

35

Mention may be made in this connection that Dinnaga

considers sensation as the only variety of direct cognition.

But Dharmaklrti maintains that sensation is not the only -

variety of direct perception. The word pratyak~a is much

wider in extension than sensation. It signifies direct

knowledge different from indirect knowledge or concept. He

classifies pratyak~ajnana under four heads - indriyajnana,

manovijnana, yogijnana and atmasaffivedana. Indriyajnana

or sensuous perception is direct experience of unique

particulars which is brought about by the contact of the

senses with the object. This type of perception has been

taken into consideration in great detail. Though the

Buddhist Philosophers distinguish between a percept and a

concept still they endeavour to reunite them. The first

moment of perception is followed by a second moment of

perception. This is an intermediate state of pure sensation

and the work of understanding. This kind of perception is

entirely mental, not at all sensuous. 53 This manasapratyak~a

or intelligible intuition can be assimilated to sense

perception because of the vividness with which the con-

templated pictures present itself to the imagination. A

section of the Buddhist recognizes intelligible intuition

53. svavisayanantaravisayasahakarinendriyajnanena • • • samanantarapratyayena janitam tan manovijnanam

Nyayabindu 1. 9.

as the mystic intuition of the Buddhist saints by which

they seek to completely change all ordinary habits or

thoughts.

36

Vinitadeva in his commentary on Nyayabindu defines

manasapratyaksa as the knowledge brought about by sense 0

cognition - as being the immediate and homogeneous cause

(samanantara pratyak~a) - which has for its accessory the

object that follows the same object of the first moment.

Since manovijnana or mental perception is preceded by a

sense perception and since the deaf and dumb persons can

never have respective previous sense cognition, such

persons can never be assumed to have the mental perception

of colour, sound and the like. Since the object of

""'-manovijnana reveals an exact reproduction that appears

immediately in the second moment, the object of mental

perception is not identical with that of preceding sense

cognition. Dharmottara, the great commentator of Nyayabindu,

observes that in the case of mental perception the sense

after cognizing at first moment ceases to function in

respect of the same object. But if the same sense continues

to function in respect of the same object in the following

moments, the subsequent cognition would be nothing other

37

th · i 54 s b th pe e t · nd mental an sense cogn~t on. o o sense rc p ~on a

perception belong to the same stream (santana) of

consciousness.55 Atrnasamvedana or svasamvitti, the third

variety of pratyak~a has already taken into consideration

in great detail. Yogajajnana, as Dharmakirti holds, is a

kind of perception (pratyak~a) which is entirely mental but

not sensuous.56 It can be assimilated to perception because

of the vividness with whi.ch the contemplated pictures presents

itself to the imagination.57 Yogic perception or mystic

intuition is a faculty of the Buddhist Yogin who acquires

the habits of realising the relativity (sunyata) and unreality

54.

55.

56.

tatas ca 1 ntare pratisiddhe samanajatiyo dvitiyaksana-• • • bhavyupadeyaksana indriyavijnanavisayasya grhyate. • • • •

Nyayabindu. 1.9, Nyayabindutlka, p. 58, lines

2-3, edited by Pater Paterson, ASiatic Society of

Bengal, 1929.

tadanenaikasantanantarbhutayor eve• ndriyajnana-'""- - """- . manovijnanayor janyajanakabhave manovijnanam

pratyak~am ity uktam bhavati - Ibid, p. 69, lines

1-2.

- - - . """- . bhutarthabhavanaprakarsyaparyantajam yosijnanam

ci 1ti-

Nyayabindu 1.11.

57. karatalamalakavat bhaveyamanasyarthasya yad, I •

darsanam tad yoginah pratyaksam. • • taddhi sphutavam

• - Ibid, Nyayabindutlka, p. 69, lines 1-2.

38

of the phenomena. It is an intuition of a condition which

is not capable of being cognised. A Yogin apprehends

something that does not or may not really exist. Actually

Yoga pratyak~a does not apprehend its object something

present before the comprehender. It refers to the

transcendental unique particulars (svalaksanas). A Yogin • •

may have also the direct knowledge of the sense-cognition

of even another person through the supernormal po'tlll'er.

In the case of the intuition of a Yogin the sense cog­

nition would be considered as alambana pratyak~a. Further­

more, the cognitlon of a yogin and that of another person

belongs to two different streams of consciousness. It

is perhaps for this reason Dharmakirti makes a dis­

tinction between manasa pratyak~a and yogaja pratyak~a.

Thus, it reveals that the nirvikalpaka pratyak~a,

according to the Buddhist logicians, is a simle, homo-

geneous unitary cognition in which the subject and the

object, perception and perceptual matter are not distin-

guished by giving in a lump, as it were. But such

knowledge is entirely useless and has no pragmatic value.

It is only when perceptual knowledge is interpreted.by

a subsequent act of relation which analyses it into a

subjective and objective elements and imposes a relation

39

upon them, that can be made useful in our practical life.

It is however, the primary homogeneous experience

(nirvikalpaka) that can be accepted as reliable testimony

of the external reality and the reflective result of it

are purely subjective thought. The Vikalpa which is

imagination, pure and simple is absolutely without touch

with a reality.