Section 18, Article VI

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SECTION 18, ARTICLE VI

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989

REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner,vs.

REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY ASSECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionallyapportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political

parties represented in that chamber, including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido,the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the LiberalParty. 1

On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in apolitical realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Partyformally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and

correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members. 2

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the

Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving thisto the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representativesconsisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C.

Singson as the additional member from the LDP. 3

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from theCommission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting initially onhis petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporaryrestraining order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving inthe Commission on Appointments. 4

Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission onAppointments because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunananv. Tan. 5 His claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is notbased on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political partyand has not yet attained political stability.

For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in natureand so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been improperlyimpleaded, the real party respondent being the House of Representatives which changed its


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representation in the Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stressesthat nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled toproportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.

In addition to the pleadings filed by the parties, a Comment was submitted by the Solicitor General

as amicus curiae in compliance with an order from the Court.

At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate,as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives,elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties andparties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. TheChairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act onall appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from theirsubmission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.

Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent's assertion, theCourt has the competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not adiscretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it ispolitical in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamberin removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. That is not a political questionbecause, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v. Cuenco. 6

... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,namely, a question of policy. In other words, ... it refers "to those questions which, under theConstitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to whichfull discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the

Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of aparticular measure.

In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the petitioners therein to annul the election oftwo members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal of that chamber, on the ground that they had notbeen validly nominated. The Senate then consisted of 23 members from the Nacionalista Party andthe petitioner as the lone member of the Citizens Party. Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada nominated onlyhimself as the minority representative in the Tribunal, whereupon the majority elected SenatorsMariano J. Cuenco. and Francisco Delgado, from its own ranks, to complete the nine-mancomposition of the Tribunal as provided for in the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner came to thisCourt, contending that under Article VI, Section 11, of that Charter, the six legislative members of

the Tribunal were to be chosen by the Senate, "three upon nomination of the party having thelargest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein."As the majority party in the Senate, the Nacionalista Party could nominate only three members and

could not also fill the other two seats pertaining to the minority.

By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended inter alia that the subject ofthe petition was an internal matter that only the Senate could resolve. The Court rejected thisargument, holding that what was involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing therespondents but the legality of the choice in light of the requirement of the Constitution. The


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petitioners were questioning the manner of filling the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate indoing so. The Court held that this was a justiciable and not a political question, thus:

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are calledupon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate, as membersof the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-member and spokesman

of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-behalf of its Committee on Rules,contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shallbe chosen "upon nomination ... of the party having the second largest number of votes" in theSenate and hence, is null and void. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" inthe choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon issubject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearlywithin the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the

proceeding in connection therewith.

... whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary.Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a

given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformitywith such statute, and particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or

transgress on constitutional or statutory rights ...' (1 6 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied)

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also the duty, to consider anddetermine the principal issue raised by the parties herein."

Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was made in Cunanan v. Tan as itlikewise involved the manner or legality of the organization of the Commission on Appointments,not the wisdom or discretion of the House in the choice of its representatives.

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. Thereason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred uponus that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of theConstitution clearly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts asmay be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involvingrights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has

been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of anybranch or instrumentality of the Government.

The respondent's contention that he has been improperly impleaded is even less persuasive. Whilehe may be technically correct in arguing that it is not he who caused the petitioner's removal, wefeel that this objection is also not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this controversy. Wemay, for one thing, treat this proceeding as a petition for quo warranto as the petitioner is actuallyquestioning the respondent's right to sit as a member of the Commission on Appointments. Foranother, we have held as early as in the Emergency Powers Cases 7 that where serious constitutional


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questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands thatthey be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." Thesame policy has since then been consistently followed by the Court, as in Gonzales v. Commission

on Elections, 8where we held through Chief Justice Fernando:

In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection was raised by five members of

the Court. It is their view that respondent Commission on Elections not being sought to berestrained from performing any specific act, this suit cannot be characterized as other than amere request for an advisory opinion. Such a view, from the remedial law standpoint, has muchto recommend it. Nonetheless, a majority would affirm the original stand that under thecircumstances, it could still rightfully be treated as a petition for prohibition.

The language of justice Laurel fits the case: "All await the decision of this Court on theconstitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case hasassumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that [its]constitutionality ... be now resolved.' It may likewise be added that the exceptional character ofthe situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for

ruling, the national elections being barely six months away, reinforce our stand. It would appearundeniable, therefore, that before us is an appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to preventthe enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional statute. We are left with no choice then; we mustact on the matter.

Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that both the petitioner and therespondent are invoking the case of Cunanan v. Tan to support their respective positions. It is best,therefore, to make a quick review of that case for a proper disposition of this one.

In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the NacionalistaParty, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly, the representation of the

chamber in the Commission on Appointments was apportioned to 8 members from the NacionalistaParty and 4 from the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professingdiscontent over the House leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and formed whatwas called the Allied Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize the chamber. Included in thisreorganization was the House representation in the Commission on appointments where three ofthe Nacionalista congressmen originally chosen were displaced by three of their party colleagues

who had joined the Allied Majority.

Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim appointment as Deputy Administrator of the ReforestrationAdministration was rejected by the Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized andrespondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was thereafter designated in his place. Cunanan then came to this Court,

contending that the rejection of his appointment was null and void because the Commission itselfwas invalidly constituted.

The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as theNacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the newpolitical group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization ofthe Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportionalrepresentation of the political parties in the House of Representatives as required by the

Constitution. The Court held:


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... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if du to arrangements of a more or lesstemporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-called "Allied Majority,"does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership of the Commission for saidHouse. Otherwise the Commission on Appointments may have to be reorganized as often asvotes shift from one side to another in the House. The framers of our Constitution could not haveintended to thus place a constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the

mercy of each House of Congress.

The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated inthe Constitution because it has not been registered in accordance with Article IX-B, Section 2(5), inrelation to the other provisions of the Constitution. He stresses that the so-called party has not yetachieved stability and suggests it might be no different from several other political groups that havedied "a-bornin'," like the LINA, or have subsequently floundered, like the UNIDO.

The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different viewpoint. According to him, that caseexpressly allows reorganization at any time to reflect changes in the political alignments inCongress, provided only that such changes are permanent. The creation of the LDP constituting the

bulk of the former PDP-Laban and to which no less than 24 Liberal congressmen had transferredwas a permanent change. That change fully justified his designation to the Commission on

Appointments after the reduction of the LP representation therein. Thus, the Court held:

Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a Commissionon Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House ofRepresentatives elected by each House, respectively, on the basis of proportionalREPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes theauthority of each House of Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As aconsequence, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of theCommission, but also, subsequently thereto. If by reason of successful election protests against

members of a House, or of their expulsion from the political party to which they belongedand/or of their affiliation with another political party, the ratio in the representation of thepolitical parties in the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority todeclare vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held bymembers of said House belonging to the political party adversely affected by the change andthen fill said vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.

In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between the petitioner and the respondent (whowas supported by the Solicitor General) an important development has supervened to considerablysimplify the present controversy. The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument heavily on the non-registration of the LDP which, he claims has not provided the permanent political realignment to

justify the questioned reorganization. As he insists:

(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced majority is actually the LDP itself, then theproposed reorganization is likewise illegal and ineffectual, because the LDP, not being a dulyregistered political party, is not entitled to the "rights and privileges granted by law to politicalparties' (See. 160, BP No. 881), and therefore cannot legally claim the right to be considered indetermining the required proportional representation of political parties in the House ofRepresentatives. 9


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xxx xxx xxx

... the clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is to givethe right of representation in the Commission on Appointment only to political parties who areduly registered with the Comelec. 10

On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged against the petitioner. On that date,the Commission on Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its First Divisiondated August 28, 1989, granting the petition of the LDP for registration as a political party. 11 Thishas taken the wind out of the sails of the petitioner, so to speak, and he must now limp to shore asbest he can.

The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to proveits permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of theseats in the House of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to representation inthe Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged."The Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created in December 1945 by a

faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for thePresidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. 12 The Liberal Party won. At thattime it was only four months old. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in theCommission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority

party in both chambers of the Congress.

The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House ofRepresentatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of thePhilippines and its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from SpeakerRamon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there still are, some internal disagreementsamong its members, but these are to be expected in any political organization, especially if it is

democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist Party in a number of socialist stateshas undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be considered stilltemporary because of such discord.

If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House ofRepresentatives would have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments and,for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says isnow "history only," should also be written off. The independents also cannot be represented becausethey belong to no political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of itsseventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the House of Representatives in the Commissionon Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.

It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was alloted two of the seats in theCommission on Appointments, it did not express any objection. 13Inconsistently, the petitioner isnow opposed to the withdrawal from it of one seat although its original number has been cut bymore than half.

As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive in ageneral congressional election, the LDP has doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. Itmay even be said that as it now commands the biggest following in the House of Representatives,


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the party has not only survived but in fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was never laid down inCunanan.

To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing considerations, that the issue presented to usis justiciable rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the wisdom of the actcomplained of, or the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the

Constitution. Even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers ofreview under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of theConstitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretionamounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality ofthe government. As for the alleged technical flaw in the designation of the party respondent,assuming the existence of such a defect, the same may be brushed aside, conformably to existingdoctrine, so that the important constitutional issue raised may be addressed. Lastly, we resolve thatissue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in theCommission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the politicalalignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do notinclude the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties

or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.

The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by the Houseof Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But as our

jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional stalemate had to beresolved, there was no alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course,we are not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, butmerely discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the Constitution. That is a dutywe do not evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989,

is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of theCommission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI,Section 18, of the Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 86649 July 12, 1990

ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG and KABABAIHAN PARA SA INANGBAYAN, petitioners,

vs.HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., as speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress ofthe Philippines; HON. FRANCISCO SUMULONG, as Majority Floor Leader of the House ofRepresentatives of the Congress of the Philippines; HON. JOVITO SALONGA, as Ex-Oficio

Chairman of the Commission on Appointments; HON. ROQUE R. ABLAN, JR., HON. LORNAL. VERANO-YAP, HON. MIGUEL ROMERO, HON. ANTONIO V. CUENCO, HON.ROGACIANO M. MERCADO, HON. ALAWADIN T. BANDON, JR., HON. JOSE L.

CABOCHAN, HON. CARLOS R. IMPERIAL, HON. MA. CLARA L. LOBREGAT, HON.NATALIO M. BELTRAN, JR., HON. CARMELO J. LOCSIN & HON. LUIS C. SINGSON, asMembers of the Commission on Appointments for the House of Representatives of the

CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO,J.:

The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election to the House of Representativesof the candidates of diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng Bansa (LB), LiberalParty (LP), NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para sa InangBayan (KAIBA), and some independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only

candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA.

On August 26, 1987, the House of Representatives, upon nomination by the Majority Floor Leader,Cong. Francisco Sumulong, elected from the Coalesced Majority, eleven (11) out of twelve (12)congressmen to represent the House in the Commission on Appointments. They were:

1. Hon. Miguel Romero LP (Liberal Party)2. Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco LB-Panaghiusa3. Hon. Rogaciano Mercado LB (Lakas ng Bayan)4. Hon. Raul Daza LP5. Hon. Alawadin T. Bandon Jr. PDP-Laban6.

Hon. Jose Cabochan PDP-Laban7. Hon. Lorna L. Verano-Yap LP

8. Hon. Carlos R. Imperial IND9. Hon. Ma. Clara L. Lobregat IND10.Hon Natalio M. Beltran, Jr. LB/Unido/NP11.Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin PDP-Laban/LB

(pp. 115-116, Rollo.)


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On September 22, 1987, upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader, the House electedHonorable Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, as the twelfth member of the Commission on Appointments,representing the Coalesced Minority in the House.

A year later, on September 16, 1988, the "Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino" (LDP, for brevity) wasorganized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives formally

affiliated with the LDP, the House committees, including the House representation in theCommission on Appointments, had to be reorganized.

On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that asrepresentative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments andHouse Electoral Tribunal (p. 15, Rollo). Her request was endorsed by nine (9) congressmen, namely,Hon. Lally Laurel-Trinidad, Bonifacio Gillego, Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Gerardo Cabochan, Jose D.Aspiras, Oscar Santos, Eduardo N. Joson, Antonio H. Cerilles and Isacio Pelaez.

On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, on motion of the Majority Floor Leader andover the objection of Cong. Raul A. Daza, LP, revised the House majority membership in the

Commission on Appointments to conform with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. RaulA. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, as follows:

1. Hon. Miguel L. Romero LDP2. Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco LDP3. Hon. Rogaciano M. Mercado LDP4. Hon. Alawadin T. Bandon, Jr. LDP5. Hon. Jose L. Cabochan LDP6. Hon. Carlos R. Imperial LDP7. Hon. Maria Clara L. Lobregat LDP8. Hon. Natalio M. Beltran, Jr. LDP9.

Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin LDP10.Hon. Luis C. Singson LDP

11.Hon. Lorna L. Verano-Yap LP(p. 122, Rollo.)

Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member representing the House minority.

On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman Coseteng and her party, the KAIBA, filed this Petition forExtraordinary Legal Writs (which may be considered as a petition for quo warranto and injunction)praying this Court to declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap,

Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, asmembers of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoinalso the other respondents from recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointmentson the theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate ofproportional representation because:

1) the New Majority (158 LDP members out of the 202 members of the House) is entitled to onlynine (9) seats out of the twelve to be filled by the House (p. 29, Rollo);


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2) the members representing the political parties, or coalitions thereof, must be nominated by theirrespective political parties or coalitions;

3) the nomination and election of respondent Verano-Yap by the respondents as representative ofthe minority was clearly invalid (p. 31, Rollo); and

4) that similarly invalid was the retention of respondent Ablan as Minority member in theCommission because he was neither nominated nor elected as such by the minority party or partiesin the House (p. 31, Rollo).

Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the Commission on Appointmentsas a representative of the Minority because she has the support of nine (9) other congressmen andcongresswomen of the Minority (p. 31, Rollo).

In their collective Comment, the respondents House of Representatives, the Speaker, the MajorityFloor Leader, the members of the Commission on Appointments including Congressman Roque R.Ablan, but excluding Congresswoman Lorna Verano-Yap (who filed a separate Comment), alleged:

(1) that the legality of the reorganization of the Commission on Appointments is a political question,hence, outside the jurisdiction of this Court to decide, and (2) that in any case, the reorganizationwas "strictly in consonance with Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution" i.e., on the basis ofproportional representation of the political parties, considering the majority coalition "as a form of apolitical party" (pp. 115, 118, Rollo). They further alleged that as of March 3, 1989, 160 members ofthe House (including 26 former Liberals) had expressly renounced in writing their respectivepolitical party affiliations and formally affiliated with the LDP leaving only 15 Liberals in the House(p. 119, Rollo).itc-asl After its petition for registration as a political party was granted on August28, 1989 by the First Division of the COMELEC) and affirmed on November 23, 1989 by theCOMELEC en banc, the LDP become the new Majority in the House. They finally argued that asKAIBA is part of the Coalesced Majority which supports the administration of President Corazon C.

Aquino, not of the minority, petitioner is bound by the choice of the Coalesced Majority of themembers who would sit in the Commission on Appointments.

Representative Lorna Verano-Yap, in her comment alleged that the petitioner has no better lightthan those already selected, to be chosen as a member of the Commission on Appointmentsbecause: (1) the Constitution was not violated in electing Yap and eleven (11) other House membersto the Commission on Appointments; (2) respondent Yap is a rightful incumbent; and (3)petitioner's claim to a seat on the Commission on Appointments is without legal and factual basis(pp. 217-218, Rollo).

The Commission on Appointments took a neutral stand on the petition as the issues involved may

touch on the validity of its organization and the legality of the entitlement of the LDP or the LP torepresentation, which are raised in the case of Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, then pendingbefore this Court (pp. 195-198, Rollo).

The issue here is whether the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments werechosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided inSection 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads:


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Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate,asex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representativeselected by each House on the basis ofproportional representation from the political parties andparties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairmanof the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on allappointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission.

The commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.)

After deliberating on the petition and the comments of the respondents, we hold that the petitionshould be dismissed, not because it raises a political question, which it does not, but because therevision of the House representation in the Commission on Appointments is based on proportionalrepresentation of the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987Constitution.

The "political question" issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989,where this Court ruled that "the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling theCommission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution" is justiciable, and, "even if the

question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under theexpanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, whichincludes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lackof jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government."

The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based onproportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDPin the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%).Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seatswere apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the

Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in theHouse. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission onAppointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein."

The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is presumablya member also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's choices. Even if KAIBA wereto be considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4%or less than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats inthe Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the Commissionon Appointments, a political party should represent at least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e., itshould have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or congresswomen.

The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the petitioner'selection to the Commission are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and theysigned identical indorsements in favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap.

There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the Commission onAppointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. Thepetition itself shows that they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. Theywere elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the


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Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments eleven (11) fromthe Coalesced Majority and one from the minority is unassailable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIANDEMOCRATS (LAKAS-NUCD),petitioners,

vs.NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAADA, respondents.

NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention.

R E S O L U T I O N

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

In motions separately filed by respondent Senator Wigberto E. Taada on October 27, 1992 andrespondents Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Senator Alberto Romulo on October 30, 1992,said respondents moved for a reconsideration of our decision dated October 20, 1992, on the

following grounds:

Senator Taada alleges that:

1) The decision was premised on an erroneous appreciation of relevant factual precedents;

2) The decision ignored the reality of the multi-party system recognized both by the letter and spiritof the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions;

3) It is mandatory to fill up twelve (12) seats in the Commission on Appointments;

4) The Senate did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it elected respondent Taada to the

Commission on Appointments.

In their Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification, Senators Gonzales and Romulo allege:

1) That the decision is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in the two cases of Coseteng vs.

Mitra, Jr.1

and Daza vs. Singson.2

2) It is mandatory to have twelve (12) members of the Commission of Appointments to enable it tofunction as a constitutional body.

3) The Tolentino Compromise Formula was adopted by the Senate and accepted by all politicalparties and must govern the selection of respondent Senators to the Commission on Appointments.


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4) The election of the respondents Senators is in compliance with the multi-party system whichcontemplates a realignment of political parties to remove fractional membership of any party in theCommission.

On December 16, 1992, the petitioner-in intervention Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) filed itsseparate Comments to the Motions of respondents Senators while the petitioners filed on January 7,

1993 their separate Comments on the Motion of the respondents.

Considering the grounds set forth in the Motions of the respondents and in the light of thereasons/arguments submitted in refutation thereof, We deny both Motions for Reconsideration onthe following grounds:

1) The decision is based on a simple interpretation and application of Article VI, Section 18 of the

1987 Constitution and We quote pertinent portions thereof.

It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the mathematical representation of eachof the political parties represented in the Senate is as follows:

LDP 7.5LP-PDP-LABAN .5NPC 2.5LAKAS-NUCD 1.5

It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractionalmembership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the politicalparties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no othermanner of application than as above. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 towhich each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half

membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able toelect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's fractional membership was correspondinglyreduced leaving the latter's representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than theirproportional representation in the Senate. This is a clearly a violation of Section 18 because it isno longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on theproportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave morerepresentation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either theLAKAS-NUCD or the NPC.

xxx xxx xxx

We find the respondent's claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments bynomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 ofArticle VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not incompliance with the requirement that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis ofproportional representation of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resultingfractional membership of the political parties in the Commission on Appointments by addingtogether two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representationbecause it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing the fractionalmembership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation.


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The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and doesnot leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule onproportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate orthe House of Representatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the haplessminority. By requiring a proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments,Section 18 in effect works as a check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the

balance of power. No party can claim more than what is entitled to under such rule. To allow itto elect more than its proportional share of members is to confer upon such a party a greatershare in the membership in the Commission on Appointments and more power to impose its willon the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its rightful membership in theCommission. 3

The membership of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada in the Commission on Appointments for theyear alluded to by respondents is not disputed. The questioned decision however refers to theformer Senator's Membership in the Commission during his first election as Senator in 1953-1954. 4 In the following years the composition of the Commission on Appointments showed varyingmembership from the Nacionalista Party and Liberal Party, not discounting the various coalitions of

the rival groups within their own ranks. During this period, his membership in the Commissionwas acquiesced to by the other members of the Senate, including the Nationalista Party which had afractional vote. His membership in the Commission was never contested nor disputed by any partynor member of the Senate so that the question of whether his sitting as member of the Commissionwas constitutionality valid or not never reached the Court. The older Taada's membership in theCommission on Appointments cannot thus be considered by respondent Senator Taada as aprecedent sufficient to overrule the clear mandate of Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution.

It is a matter of record that in the political ventures of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada, he had hisCitizens Party coalesce with the Nationalista Party and got himself elected as Senator under thebanner of the latter party. His election to the Commission was principally due to the alliance of his

Citizens Party with the Nationalista Party and not because he was elected thereto on the strength ofhis being the lone representative of the Citizens' Party. 5Senator Taada was included in theNationalista Party ticket in 1953 until he parted ways temporarily with the same before the end of1955. In 1959 he ran as a guest candidate of the Nationalista Party for a term of 6 years and again gotre-elected in 1965 for another 6-year term under the Nationalista Party. The Nationalista-CitizensParty coalition of 12 Senators in the Senate from1965-1967 gave the coalition 6 members in the Commission on Appointments, including the lateSenator Lorenzo Taada. As early as those years, the Senate recognized the rule on proportionalrepresentation in the Commission by resorting to a coalition of political parties in order to resolveand avoid fractional membership in the Commission. This practice was repeated in1968-1970 where the lone elected Senator of the Citizens Party was nominated and elected to the

Commission on Appointments as the Senator to complete a whole number in the proportionalrepresentation to the Commission, with the late Senator Taada becoming the 16th Senator of theCoalition, enabling it to put 8 members in the Commission. Likewise, in 1970, the late SenatorTaada filled up the 18th membership of the Coalition to become the 9th member representing theCoalition in the Commission.

The election of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada to the Commission on Appointments does notreflect any practice or tradition in the Senate which can be considered as a precedent in theinterpretation of the constitutional provision on proportional representation in the Commission on


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Appointments. No practice or tradition, established by a mere tolerance, can, without judicialacquiescence, ripen into a doctrine of practical construction of the fundamental law. In the absenceof judicial confirmation of the constitutionality of the challenged legislative practice the repeatederroneous legislative interpretation of a constitutional provision, does not vest power on thelegislature. 6

2) We take note of an erroneous reference in our decision to the listing of the party affiliation of theSenators based on the result of the election on May 11, 1992, giving the LDP only 15 members andincluding Senator Teofisto Guingona as a member of the Lakas-NUCDP. Respondents, however,accepted the fact that for purposes of determining the proportional representatives of each politicalparty to the Commission on Appointments, the basis thereof is the actual number of members ofeach political party at the time of election of the members of the Commission on Appointments inthe Senate. 7 In fact, respondents affirmed that the affiliation of Senator Guingona with the Lakas-NUCDP upheld the doctrine enunciated in Daza vs. Singson, 8 recognizing changes in alignments ofmembership in the Commission based on changing political alignments at the time of theorganization of the Commission on Appointments. The issue therefore has no significance as an

argument to set aside our decision.

3) Senator Taada was actually nominated by the LP because the house rules require that the partymust make the nomination. In fact he nominated himself as representative of the LP-LDP-LABAN.It was the Majority Leader, an LDP Senator, (Senator Romulo) who presented the motion to electrespondent Senator Taada (along with the Senators belonging to the other Minority parties NPCand LAKAS-NUCD) as part of his function or duty to present for election and votation thosepreviously nominated by the various political parties. In nominating the twelve (12) Senators to the

membership in the Commission on Appointments, Senator Romulo moved:

Mr. President, pursuant to the Motion just approved, I have the honor to submit for election tothe Commission on Appointments the 12 Senators to compose its membership : Senators Angara,

Herrera, Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and Romulo for the LDP; Senators Tolentino andOsmea for NPC; Senator Rasul, for Lakas-NUCD; and Senator Taada for LP-PDP, Mr.President. 9

4) This Court has ruled that, under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution providing for a multi-party system, entitlement to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointmentsrequires a minimum membership in each house. 10 The statement of this Court in Daza vs.Singson11 to the effect that "under the Constitutional provision on membership of the Commissionon Appointments, the members thereof are NOT limited to the majority and minority partiestherein but extends to all the political parties represented in each house of Congress", does not andshould not be construed to mean that all political parties, irrespective of numerical representation in

the Senate, are entitled by Constitutional fiat to at least one representation in the Commission. TheSupreme Court in the subsequent case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr. 12 made this clear where it ruled thatproportional representation in the Commission on Appointments requires a minimum membershipof a party in each house. The mere presence of one Senator belonging to a political party doesnot ipso facto entitle such a party to membership in the Commission on Appointments.

5) We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 Senatorsbe elected to the membership in the Commission on Appointments before it can discharge itsfunctions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission. The overriding


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directive of Article VI, Section 18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the politicalparties in the membership of the Commission on Appointments and that the specification of 12members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the maximum complementallowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard themandate of proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional membership inunusual situations like the case at bar.

Section 18 provides, in part, as follows:

There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate as ex-officioChairman, twelve Senators, and . . . , elected by each house on the basis of proportionalrepresentation . . . .

The respondent's contention that the use of the word "shall" in Section 18 indicating the compositionof the Commission on Appointments makes the election of the Senators mandatory, omitting thatpart of Section 18 which provides that (they shall be) elected by each house on the basis ofproportional representation. This interpretation finds support in the case of Taada vs.

Cuenco,13

where this Court held that the constitutional provision makes mandatory the election ofthe specified number of Senators to the Commission on Appointments but also ruled that theyshould be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties. In case ofconflict in interpretation, the latter mandate requiring proportional representation must prevail.Such interpretation is the only correct and rational interpretation which the court can adopt inconsonance with its solemn duty to uphold the Constitution and give effect the meaning intendedby its framers to every clause and word thereof.

The Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve Senators and twelveRepresentatives in order that the Commission may function. Article VI, Section 18 which deals withthe Commission on Appointments, provides that "the Commission shall rule by majority vote of all

the members", and in Section 19 of the same Article, it is provided that the Commission "shall meetonly while Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, todischarge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it". In implementing theseprovisions, the Rules of the Commission on Appointments provide that the presence of at leastthirteen (13) members is necessary to constitute a quorum, "Provided however, that at least four (4)of the members constituting the quorum should come from either house". 14 Even if the compositionof the Commission is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fullyconstituted, so long as it has the required quorum, which is less than the full complement fixed bythe Constitution. And the Commission can validly perform its functions and transact its businesseven if only ten (10) Senators are elected thereto. Even if respondent Senator Taada is excludedfrom the Commission on Appointments for violation of the rule on proportional representation, the

party he represents still has representation in the Commission in the presence of house membersfrom the LP-LDP-LABAN such as Congressman Juan Ponce Enrile.

Respondents ask for a clarification of our statement which suggested a practical solution to breakthe impasse in the membership of the Senate in the Commission on Appointments, which we quote:

. . . On the other hand, there is nothing to stop any of the political parties from forming acoalition with another political party in order to fill up the two vacancies resulting from this

decision. 15


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The statement is merely a suggestion but not an exclusive solution. It is not part of the disposition ofthe case. It does not contemplate a realignment of political parties, as otherwise this Court wouldhave explicitly said so. What we intimated is merely this: That those entitled to fractionalmemberships may join their half-memberships to form a full membership and together nominateone from their coalition to the Commission on Appointments. For example, the NPC and theLAKAS-NUCD may join their half-memberships and jointly nominate one of their own Senators to

the Commission. In the same way the LDP and the LP-PDP-LABAN may nominate SenatorWigberto Taada to fill up the other slot to complete the membership to twelve. But the latter, as acoalition, may not insist in electing both Senator Taada and Senator Romulo to fill up two slots

because this is certainly a violation of the rule on proportional representation.

Who decides the question of proportionality? The power to choose who among them will sit asmembers of the Commission on Appointments belongs to the Senate. The number of senators isfixed by the Constitution to twelve, but the numbers of senators to be chosen must comply with therule on proportional representation. The question of who interprets what is meant by proportionalrepresentation has been a settled rule that it belongs to this Court.

The acceptance by the Senate of Senator Tolentino's formula to settle temporarily the impasseconcerning the membership in the Commission on Appointments by leaving the final decision tothe Supreme Court is a Senate recognition that the determination of proportional representationunder Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution is a function of this Court.

Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raisedbefore this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by Constitutional mandate todecide. The framers of our Constitution, in borrowing from constitutions of other states, thought itwise to vest in the Supreme Court the role in final arbiter in cases of conflicts in the interpretation ofthe fundamental law. In this role, the Court serves as a check on the unbridled use of power by thelegislative majority to silence the minority. Democracy may breed but it will not sanction tyranny

by force of numbers.

The election of respondents Senators Taada and Romulo is a clear disregard of the constitutionalprovision and when done over the objections of their colleagues in the Senate, constitutes a grave

abuse of discretion. We quote from our decision:

. . . The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Taada as members of the Commission onAppointments by the LDP Majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 Article VIof the 1987 Constitution. Their nomination and election by the LDP Majority by sheer force ofsuperiority in numbers during the Senate organization meeting of August 27, 1992 was done ingrave abuse of discretion. Where power is exercised in a manner inconsistent with the command

of the Constitution, and by reason of numerical strength, knowingly and not merelyinadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of authority granted by law and grave abuse ofdiscretion is properly found to exist. 16

For lack of merit, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

Section 18, Article VI

Documents

Transcript of Section 18, Article VI