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LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

OPERATION LOCK

SITUATION REPORT COVERING PERIOD 18 JAN - 31 MAY 1989.

THIS REPORT IS THE PROPERTY OF KAS ENTERPRISES LTD. NO UNAUTHORISED DISSEMINATION EITHER VERBALLY OR BY COPYING OF ANY

PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS ALLOWED WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE ORIGINATOR.

WARNING. COMPROMISE OF THE CONTENTS OR PART THEREOF OF THIS DOCUMENT COULD LEAD TO THE DEATH OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE

OPERATION.

June 1989 I W T Crooke. DSO. Managing Director. KAS Enterprises Ltd.

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Distribution:

Copy No 1 of 2. KAS Enterprises Ltd. London. Copy No 2 of 2 KAS Enterprises Ltd. RSA. Main File stored on computer. RSA.

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LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. COPY No of COPIES.

SITUATION REPORT ON OPERATION LOCK COVERING PERIOD 18 JAN - 31 MAY 1989.

GENERAL.

1. The KAS team arrived in RSA on the 18 January 1989 with a small advance party of 2 men in order to prepare the way for the rest of the team's arrival in the last week of January. Thus the team did not become operational until 1st February5 when accommodation» vehicles and other necessary administration details had been completed. Liaison with the SAP also needed to be established so that a firm foundation and 'Modus Operandi' for the joint operations could be agreed with the Stock Theft Unit of the SAP. This liaison has been an on—going business and now the SAP element attached to the KAS team has grown from 1 LO to a team of *t experienced police officers? who are working full time with KAS on all aspects of the illegal horn and ivory trade within RSA. This team includes a newly appointed E i/c of Warrant Officer rank to the Police Captain currently commanding the Stock Theft Unit.

2. The KAS team has also operated in the following countries:—

a. Namibia/SWA.

b. Botswana.

c. Swaziland.

d. Zimbabwe.

e. Zambia.

AIM.

3. The aim of this report is to outline what the KAS team has achieved to—date in relation to combatting the illegal horn and ivory trade and the way ahead for future operations. Also what steps that need to be taken to secure the future of the Black Rhino in Southern Africa.

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RSA.

h. The RSA has become the base for the KAS team from which to conduct its operations within Southern Africa. The reasons for this are because the RSA has become the prime location for the export of all illegal horn* ivory and other associated game trophies to international destinations in Europe, the Middle East and Far East. Communications and international travel are efficient within the RSA and smugglers can be more assured that their illegal products will reach international destinations more efficiently than if dispatched from any other country within Southern Africa. Thus it makes logical sense> that if the bulk of the illegal traffic in horn and ivory is ending up in RSA that an operation be mounted against the middlemen and dealers who are responsible for the export of their illegal products to foreign countries. Also to ascertain the routes and methods used by them to export their illegal trophies as well as collecting as much information as possible covertly on their overall network in the RSA and the key personalities involved.

5. This can only be achieved by the use of a surveillance team and also the ability of KAS to infiltrate the smuggling network. These S operations must be run concurrently. The surveillance team must act in support of the infiltration team? as well as produce vital photographic and video evidence of various smuggling activities taking place.

6. It is also vital that the laws concerning the illegal trade of horn and ivory are changed within the RSA from the paltry fines of about R500 as imposed currently. To this effect) pressure is now being exercised on the legal system at the very highest level in Government to change the penalties to R100>000 and or 10 years in jail. Plus also a fine of 3 times the total value of the consignment to be paid by the consignee when smuggled trophies are found in vehicles or containers hidden in secret compartments.

7. Finally it is also important that all the loopholes utilised by the smugglers at Jan Smuts Airport? at various docks/ports such as in Durban and Cape Town and the international . border crossing points are identified and these smuggling routes closed down so that it will become increasingly more difficult for the smugglers to use RSA as a conduit for international export. At the same time the SAP must develop close liaison and coordination with their countei—parts in both Hong Kong and Taiwan in particular, as well as various countries in both Europe and the Middle East, which participate in the international smuggling routes. ,

RESULTS ACHIEVED SO FAR.

8. During the *t month period that the KAS team has been on the ground in RSA, the following has been achieved:—

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Liaison & co-operation with SAP.

a. Liaison and trust has been developed with the SAP to such an extent that a really good working relationship has emerged. It is evident that the Stock Theft Unit rely completely on the KAS surveillance team to develop their information and the intelligence acquired by both KAS and the SAP. The Stock Theft Unit does not have a surveillance capability and General Conradie has made enquires as to whether KAS will train up a surveillance unit for them.

Access to SAP intelligence.

b. The SAP team attached to KAS has increased from 1 to 4-men. This excludes all the other points of contact available to KAS such as in Customs 8c Excise, Airport Security, Ports and Docks Transport Police, National Parks and a host of other Government agencies. The SAP provide KAS with all the necessary research and information regarding routine requirements such as vehicle registration numbers, addresses, company details, export licences, travel visas, sponsorship of foreign nationals to RSA and many other routine research checks which the KAS team could not obtain without SAP support. Thus KAS have access to the SAP intelligence and collation system on all matters relating to the illegal horn and ivory trade. It has also become very apparent that the KAS team could not work effectively without the goodwill and co-operation of the SAP.

Surveillance Operations.

c. The Stock Theft Unit of the SAP do not have a surveillance capability. At the same time the SAP's designated surveillance unit has so many high priority taskings - generally in the area of national security, such as terrorism and subversion — that it is highly unlikely that this surveillance unit will ever be allocated to the Stock Theft Unit for an effective period of time. Thus KAS is providing the Stack Theft Unit with that essential surveillance capability required to combat the smuggling network within RSA. In return, now that the necessary confidences have been established and developed between KAS and the SAP, support has become very much a two — way affair and of immense mutual benefit to both parties. For instance SAP have supplied KAS with false passports (for infiltration of the smuggling network) as well as sensitive information which could effect KAS activities in foreign countries. They have provided KAS with the requisite top cover on a number of occasions, without which the operation could not have taken place. Two major surveillance operations have taken place to date. Firstly one was mounted to uncover an ivory smuggling network operating via Jan Smuts Airport from Zaire and Zambia. The key persons involved in Jo'burg and Pretoria have now been identified and they will be arrested

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collectively as soon as the timing is correct. This will give the SAP a major P.R. success and will also highlight the absolute necessity to increase the legal penalties as outlined previously. The second surveillance operation was mounted against the Pong family to discover as much information about the Pongs and their associates. This operation also included a surveillance phase against all Pong's vehicles coming to RSA via the Kazangula crossing point into Botswana. The aim of this on—going operation is to ascertain all relevant intelligence concerning cargo> transport companies, routes and crossing points into RSA as well as information relating to the onward dispatch of freight by container and cargo ship to foreign ports. A number of other surveillance operations have taken place of a routine nature and on lower priority targets in order to gain a wider working knowledge on the smuggling fraternity and to identify a wider circle of associates. There is little doubt that this information to—date could have only have been achieved by surveillance. Also that the KAS surveillance team plays a key role on behalf of the Stock Theft Unit and by its presence acts as ongoing pressure for the change in legal penalties regarding the smuggling of horn and ivory. It has also highlighted to the SAP that the Pong family are running a huge smuggling empire in the very heart of Pretoria and that their nefarious activities are giving the RSA very detrimental international P.R. in the western world. The RSA Government are becoming increasingly more aware now of the great international concern in relation to matters of conservation and in particular the preservation of the Black Rhino and Elephant in Southern Africa.

Infiltration Team.

d. KAS has at last developed a small team with the necessary credibility to infiltrate the smuggling network. It has taken a lot of time* patience and hard work to develop this credibility that is so essential to anyone operating within the smuggling fraternity. The horn has been acquired - a total of 178 of which 7B are immediately available to KAS and is being held in a secure place within RSA. Again it would have been impossible for KAS to acquire the horn necessary for infiltration purposes without the back—up of the relevant RSA authorities. The KAS infiltration team is now ready to commence smuggling operations in both Swaziland and Mozambique where the required contacts have now been set up and business deals agreed in principal. In RSA there is an on—going deal concerning 2 tons of ivory smuggled into the Northern Transvaal •> concerning various dealers in both Jo'burg and Pretoria) who wish to acquire either horn or ivory? and finally contact has been made with Mr Pong who has expressed interest so far in buying only ivory that is accompanied by a CITIES certificate. The SAP have agreed to assist the KAS

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infiltration team by ascertaining how confiscated ivory can be released to KAS by the Customs & Excise and also the issue of false CITIES certificates so that business can be initiated with the dealers, and in particular Mr Pong» to increase the credibility of the KAS infiltration team. This will also save KAS the expense of buying the ivory on the black market and then reselling it to the dealers in Jo'burg/Pretoria at a very much reduced rate of profit. It is essential that any deals conducted by the infiltration team is covered by the surveillance team in order to develop intelligence on the dealers and secondly to gain as much photographic evidence as possible. Indeed the SAP will only allow KAS to carry out illegal dealings in horn and ivory within the RSA providing the transactions are monitored by a surveillance team, which covers them legally in this type of covert operation. Thus the KAS surveillance team has become an essential requisite to act in support of any smuggling deals and the overall infiltration operation.

Liaison.

e. Liaison has been established so far with the relevant authorities in both the USA and Hong Kong. Now that the Hong Kong Customs & Excise Department have established a special 10 man team to work on illegal ivory shipments, it is essential that the SAP establish direct links with them

C!^^ and pool their resources towards the mounting of joint Y>s _ operations. The fact that the HK Customs & Excise

KV^. Department have raised a special team is partly due to the \ ^ Rhino horn smuggling operation carried out by a US citizen

\called Dave Rogers (see press cuttings attached) which was orchestrated by the SAP using a mole, as well as with assistance provided by KAS, and partly by pressure from the international news media expressing grave concern at the flood of illegal ivory being exported into Hong Kong. Another a spin—off from this operation has been a visit by a member of the US Department of the Interior (US Fish and Wildlife Services) concerning the extradition of Mr Dave Rogers to the USA and intelligence relating to a smuggling network of horn, ivory and other illegal trophies from the RSA into the USA. KAS has participated in this liaison and assisted the credibility of the SAP in the development of this most important aspect.

UAY AHEAD.

9. The following recommendations are made as to the way ahead for KAS in the RSA.

a. First and foremost maintain and develop KAS liaison and co-operation with SAP.

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-•;*%£*'

b. Implement the infiltration operation into the smuggling network ASAP. In particular start dealing with Mr Pong to gain top notch credibility.

c. Ensure that the surveillance team is well poised to cover the dealings and infiltration operations - in or outside RSA — to develop the intelligence and gain the essential photographic evidence.

d. Develop the technical capability of the surveillance team in conjunction with the SAP. It has become clear now that it is necessary to have tailor—made transmitters built to insert into the horn and ivory — which cannot be acquired off the shelf — in order to provide a more effective surveillance capability to operate in conjunction with the infiltration team. It has been ascertained that the required technical expertise are available within the RSA* but needs to be adapted to the required operational specifications for this specialised task. The SAP are keen to acquire these transmitter unitsj thus making it a more cost—effeetive proposition? providing it can be linked into the KAS receiver unit.. The US Department of the Interior (US Fish and Wildlife Service) are keen to assist in this technical aspect and have the capability to do so. However sanctions prevent the passage of technical assistance to the RSA. It is possible that there is a way round this problem by sending the technical equipment to KAS in London.

e. Continue with the on—going surveillance operation on Pong and his shipments via Kazangula to RSA.

f. Assist with the arrest of the ivory smuggling network connected with the Jan Smuts airport surveillance operation) when the timing is ripe to implement this action.

g. Assist the SAP in their international liaison in particular with the USA, Hong Kong and Taiwan. General Conradie is visiting Taiwan shortly and he will be making contact with Mr Feng-Shu CHANG the Minister of state for the Office of the President in relation to the illegal traffic in horn and ivory providing a meeting between them can be arranged to fit in with their busy schedules. Also to assist them in liaison to countries in both Europe and the Middle East, dependent upon intelligence gained on the international smuggling routes. However> currently Hong Kong and Taiwan should hold top priority for liaison purposesr as intelligence indicates that the bulk of the smuggling activity within RSA is orientated to the Far East,

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horn and ivory in this particular market as horn will not suffice on its own as a viable smuggling operation.

i Continue to pressurise the RSA Government to change the laws relating to the illegal horn and ivory trade through the SAP» the Minister of Law and Order and other high ranking Government officials.

j Continue to alert the RSA Government of the adverse propaganda being generated against them by the international news media that the illegal horn and ivory trade is being orchestrated by the RSA as part of an overall policy to destabilise the front line Black African States.

k. Investigate new intelligence relating to smuggling routes via Durban and Cape Town. Also assist SAP in closing down smuggling routes already identified.

1. Continue with the collation of intelligence and build up the computer data base accordingly. Also assist the SAP to develop their own computer intelligence data base relating to the illegal horn and ivory trade.

CONCLUSION.

10. It is essential that firstly the RSA changes the legal penalties relating to the illegal trade in horn and ivory. Then really effective action can be taken against the major dealers. In particular an example must be made of Mr Pongj who is running

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