Second-Degree Price Discrimination with declining AC

2
Second-Degree Price Discrimination with declining AC Quantit y $/ Q D MR MC AC P 0 Q 0 Without discrimination: P = P and Q = Q 0 . With second-degr discrimination there are thr prices P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 . (e.g. electric utilities), not P 1 Q 1 1st Block P 2 Q 2 P 3 Q 3 2nd Block 3rd Block Second-degree price discrimination is pricing according to quantity consumed--or in blocks. With blocks (P1, Q1), (P2,Q2), (P3,Q3), deadweight loss becomes zero P 4 P A B C D E Q 4 4 th Block F G H Note at P2,P3 blocks, prices charged are uniform; hence no question of falling MR; So, problem of MR<MC doesn’t arise. Consumer surplus is sum of triangles PAP1, ACF, CDG (not DHE)

description

Second-degree price discrimination is pricing according to quantity consumed--or in blocks. P 1. Without discrimination: P = P 0 and Q = Q 0 . With second-degree discrimination there are three prices P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 . (e.g. electric utilities), not P 4. P 0. P 2. AC. P 3. MC. D. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of Second-Degree Price Discrimination with declining AC

Page 1: Second-Degree Price Discrimination with declining AC

Second-Degree Price Discrimination with declining AC

Quantity

$/Q

D

MR

MC

AC

P0

Q0

Without discrimination: P = P0 and Q = Q0. With second-degree

discrimination there are threeprices P1, P2, and P3.

(e.g. electric utilities), not P4

P1

Q1

1st Block

P2

Q2

P3

Q3

2nd Block 3rd Block

Second-degree pricediscrimination is pricing

according to quantityconsumed--or in blocks.

With blocks (P1, Q1), (P2,Q2), (P3,Q3), deadweight loss becomes zero

P4

P

A

B

C

D

E

Q4

4th Block

F

G

H

Note at P2,P3 blocks, prices charged are uniform; hence no question of falling MR; So, problem of MR<MC doesn’t arise.

Consumer surplus is sum of triangles PAP1, ACF, CDG (not DHE)

Page 2: Second-Degree Price Discrimination with declining AC

Second-Degree Price Discrimination with U-shaped AC

$/Q

Q

AC

MC

ARMR

P1

P2

P3P4P5

P

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5

A1

A2A3

A4A5

B2

B3B4

B5

Profit-maximizing combination= (P2,Q2), if uniform price is charged

In case of second-degree pricediscrimination, price-block combinations (P1,Q1), (P2,Q2),(P3,Q3), (P4,Q4) are possible w/oDWL. But if combinations stop at (P3,Q3), then there will be some DWL. Combination (P5,Q5) not feasible as MC>P5.