Douglas Macgregor Colonel (ret) U.S. Army, PhDExecutive VP Burke-Macgregor Group LLC+1 703 975 6954Doug.Macgregor@Burke-Macgregor.com

Reshaping the Army for Joint Warfighting:

Maneuver inside the 21st Century Joint Force

“If you want something new, you have to stop doing something old… People in any organization are always attached to the obsolete.”

Peter Drucker, Management Challenges for the 21st Century, 1999

Outline for Discussion:

I. What you should take away from this presentation.

II. What is the new strategy?III. How should the Army organize for Joint

Operations?i. Operational Command and Controlii. Tactical Organization for Combatiii. Reduced Overheadiv. Joint Rotational Readiness System

IV. How would the new system work? i. Yesterday’s System in Retrospectii. Future Response to Conflict and Crisis

V. How does professional development change?VI. What if nothing is done?VII. Summary of Key Points and Recommendations

• Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (2003) is a book by Michael Lewis that tells the story of how Billy Beane, the general manager of the Oakland Athletics baseball team cast adopted a fundamentally new, analytical, evidence-based, sabermetric approach to assemble a winning baseball team.

• Beane’s new approach brought the A's to the playoffs in 2002 and 2003. Beane had to fight coaches, scouts and industry executives that rejected his “game changing concept.”

• Beane’s model changed baseball. Any team that fails to use his model today is a “dinosaur.” Pause now and watch this clip from the Movie, Moneyball:

“To change something, build a new model that makes the existing model obsolete.”

Richard Buckminster Fuller, 1970

• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jjf1O4jMqeM

What you should take away!

So, what are the game-changing implications?

• The approach outlined in this presentation is the game changer, the Army equivalent of Moneyball!

• Reorganizing the Army for Joint Warfighting (integrated, all arms/all effects warfare) is a leap ahead in warfare.

• It’s not about “new things.” It’s revolutionary change within an agile framework guided by human understanding.

• Build a 21st-century Ground Maneuver Force with a scalable, “lego-like” force design, a design that provides more ready, deployable combat power at lower cost with less overhead.

• 21st Century Warfare demands forces-in-being organized around maneuver (ground), strike, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and sustainment capabilities for employment under Joint Force Commands (JFCs).

• Regionally align C2 (JFCs), not Army forces.

• “Armies don't innovate; people innovate.” (Robert R. Leonhard, Fighting by Minutes, 1994)

• To get ahead in the Army officers must embrace the orthodoxy of how the Army fights.

• Army Officers learn early what questions are acceptable to ask, as well as, what answers are acceptable.

• Army Officers discover that acceptable technologies, tactics and organizations are those that do not contradict or threaten to disrupt the Army Status quo views on warfare.

• Without a top-down Redefinition of Warfare that is inherently joint, the Army’s organization for combat and modernization parameters will not change.

• Then, the nation pays heavily to re-equip the old, shrinking force (The French Army approach between 1920 and 1940).

Why not leave change in the hands of the generals?

US OperationalConcepts

US Military Strategy

US NationalSecurity Strategy

Strategic

First, there must be a new Strategy!

Acquisition

Tactical

Outcome: Reorganize the Army to expand the nation’s range of strategic options; Combat Groups – Forces in Being – capable of conducting operations on land under Joint C2 against a mix of potential opponents, conventional and unconventional.

Operational

Outcome: Build regionally focused, integrated, Joint Force Commands, (not ad hoc Joint Task Forces), designed to conduct “all arms/all effects” operations (new operational concept) in dispersed mobile warfare.

1. Maintain the military power to ensure no one power or coalition of powers can dominate the Eurasian landmass and restrict the U.S. freedom of maneuver in any area of importance to the U.S.

2. Defend the Western Hemisphere and ensure the security of U.S. borders and coastal waters;

3. As required, conduct punitive military operations to neutralize or destroy unambiguous threats to U.S. national security interests.

4. Defend and maintain the lines of communication and bases necessary for the execution of the above tasks.

(Conduct Integrated Operational Maneuver)

(Conduct Tactical Operations)

(Conduct Tactical Maneuver)

Combat Group isjoint capable!

New Organization for Combat: Fewer Single Service C2 Echelons, Faster Decision Cycle, Cheaper to Modernize

The Fighters!

Brigade(Joint Plugs)

Division HQ

(Joint Capable)

Corps HQ

ARMY HQ

Task Force

Battalion

Company-Team

Company

Integrated All Arms

Command COMBAT GROUP

Joint Force Command

Operational ground forces are wedded to a hierarchical arrangement with its origins in Napoleonic warfare; a pyramid with a commander at each echelon requiring the next higher headquarters to integrate into the joint fight.

Army, Navy, AF, Marine capabilities for employment plug in under one star or below.

Deputy CDR for Maneuver

Deputy CDR for Strike

Deputy CDR for ISR

Deputy CDR for Sustainment

Joint Force Commander

• Modern warfare, conventional or unconventional, demands Joint C2 structures that accelerate decision cycles and integrate the functions of maneuver, strike, intelligence, information, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and sustainment across service lines. Flag officers are drawn from all services.

• Stand up initial 3 star Joint Force Headquarters at Joint Base Lewis-McChord. Develop template for JFCs across regional unified commands.

These are modular HQTRS. More C-2 modules can be

added as required.

The Joint Force Command Structure

One Star Force Packages Exist Now!

Flatter, Faster C2: How does it work?

Industrial AgePost-Industrial Age

There won’t be time for a “pick-up game” in a future crisis or conflict. By the time the U.S. gets its operational construct and “C2” act in order, China (or any other future

great power or coalition of powers) will defeat U.S. forces and achieve its own strategic aims.

Joint TFCDR

Combatant CDR

Corps/AF/Fleet/MEF CDR

DivisionCDR

Combatant CDR

Joint Force CDR

AirAir Force

Navy

Army

TBD Marines

Corps/AF/Fleet/MEF CDRCorps/AF/

Fleet/MEF CDR

DivisionCDRDivision

CDR

Integration within a relatively flat, joint command structure is a vital step in the direction of combining ground maneuver forces with Strike, ISR and sustainment capabilities from all the Services.

Flag Officer Totals:Four Stars: 4Three Stars: 15Two Stars: 35

Total: 54 Flag Officers

“Failure in war is most often the absence of one directing mind and commanding will.” Sir Winston Churchill

Single Service C2 inside the Regional Unified Commands: Example PACOM

Single Service Operational Commands in USPACOM

US Force Japan

US Force Korea

Alaskan Command

Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC)

Additional Unified Commands in USPACOM

More Efficient, Effective and Agile C2 at Lower Cost! Five regionally focused Joint Force Commands (JFCs); Services provide one-star commanded mission focused ISR, Strike, Maneuver or

Sustainment capability-based force packages to JFCs on rotational basis; Deputy CDRs for ISR, Strike, Maneuver and Sustainment assist JFC CDR to employ

mission focused capability force packages; Reduced multi-Star headquarters improves “tooth to tail” ratio.

More teeth, at the expense of Unneeded overhead and tail!

$ Savings will be substantial!

After Conversion: Four Star: 1Three Stars: 6Two Stars: 29

Flag Officer Total: 36Note 1: SOF JTF retained;Note 2: One Stars are excludedfrom this total

JFC

MNVR

IISR

STRIKE

SUST

Deputy Commander

5 x +MNVR IISRSTRIKE SUST

Deputy Commander

JFC Deputy Commanders

Notional Areas of JFC Responsibility inside PACOM:

JFC

JFC

JFC

JFC

JFC

Army Materiel Command

Cyril Northcote Parkinson’s (1909-1993) Law Applies: “Work expands to fill the time available for its completion, "and that a sufficiently large bureaucracy will generate enough internal work to keep itself 'busy' and so justify its continued existence without commensurate output.”

Building Joint Force Commands requires a reduction in Army overhead.

Training and Doctrine Command

Forces Command

Readiness & Training

Modernization & Doctrine

AMC

TRADOC

FORSCOM

Combat Groups offer more capability with less overhead at lower cost;

Combat Groups expand the nation’s range of strategic options;

Combat Groups are self-contained, survivable, mobile combat formations of 5-6,000 troops under Brigadier Generals.

Combat Groups punch above their weight, mobilizing fighting power disproportionate to its size (“High lethality, Low density”);

Combat Groups enable the Army to shed unneeded equipment, rationalize modernization and offer the modular continuum of response the nation needs

Combat Groups are faster to deploy and cheaper to modernize than divisions.

The Combat Group: Key Feature of the Lego-like Force Design

Mission focused force packages organized around maneuver (ground), Strike, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and sustainment capabilities for employment under Joint C2.

Example: Current BCT Compared with Combat Group

• (CSA plans to restore the third maneuver battalion to Armored and Infantry BCTs increasing their strength to roughly 4,500 men.)

VS.

Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (BCT)

3,739 Troops

RECON

Fires Battalion

Support Battalion

•58 M1 Tanks

•82 M2/3 BFVs

•36 LRAS HMMWVs

•10 120mm Mortars

•16 155mm SP Guns

•Target Acquistion

Battery

•UAVs and UCAVs

MANEUVER

MANEUVER

Combat Maneuver Groups (CMG)

5,500 Troops

•114 M1 Tanks

•131 M2/3 BFVs

•12-16 Armed

Helicopters +2

UH60s LRAS

•27 120mm Mortars

•24 155mm SP Guns

•6-8 MLRS (Rocket)

•Target Acquistion

Battery + Radars

and UCAVs

•Joint C4ISR/MI

•C2/MPs/SHORAD

MANEUVER

ARMORED RECON SQDN

Strike Battalion

C4I Battalion

Support Battalion

MANEUVER

MANEUVER

The Light Reconnaissance Strike Group has a joint mission focus: Provides a credible land component with the mobility, firepower, protection and organic

sustainment to operate autonomously under Joint C2 in dispersed/distributed mobile warfare;

Magnifies the striking power of aerospace and naval forces;

Signals escalation dominance to the enemy;

Bypasses or punches through enemy resistance for operational maneuver to encircle and destroy nation-state forces or sub-national groups ;

Shifts rapidly as needed between close combat and peace enforcement;

Integrates all arms/all effects.

New equipment must be tied to a new force design with a Joint purpose!

Brigadier General commands 5,150 troops

CMD (C4ISR) & CONTROL

ARMED RECON

STRIKE SUSTAINMENT

The Light Reconnaissance-Strike Group (LRSG)

The LRSG is the place for new

Puma variants!

Estimated cost of fielding four LRSG “all arms” battle groups equipped with 1,010 Puma variants in 5 to 7 years = $7.2 billion;

Versus 1,748 Bradley Replacements (GCVs) for $28.8 billion in 8 years.

PUMA variants are non-developmental, speeding delivery. (Pumas can be built in U.S.).

ARMED RECON

923 Troops

HHC 293 Troops

104 Troops

COMBAT ENGINEER CO

E

129 TroopsRECON TRP

129 TroopsRECON TRP

129 TroopsRECON TRP

43 TroopsAGS

ARMORED GUN CO

96 TroopsMTR BTRY

Notional Reorganized Army Expeditionary Forces: (250,100 inside 420,000 man AC)

Maneuver Echelon:(4) LRSG: Light Reconnaissance Strike Group – 5,150(12) CMG: Combat Maneuver Group – (Armor) 5,500(6) ICG: Infantry Combat Group – (Motorized) 5,000(4) AAG: Airborne-Air Assault Group – (Light) 5,000

Strike Echelon: (Aviation/UCAV/MLRS), TMD (4) ACG: Aviation Combat Groups – 3500(2) STG: Strike Groups (UCAV/MLRS) – 3,000(4) TMD: Theater Missile Defense Groups – 4,000

ISR Echelon: (C4I plus SR/manned/unmanned)(4) C4I Groups – 5,000

Sustainment Echelon: (See engineer consolidation)(8) CSG: Combat Support Groups – 6,000(2) ENG: Engineer Groups (construction) – 4,000(1) CBG: Chem-Bio Warfare Group – 3,000

Manpower Total20,000

Manpower Total 36,000

Manpower Total136,600

Manpower Total 57,500

At the height of the Korean conflict, 8th Army (in Korea) contained 201,000 U.S. Soldiers.

1. Army can provide 35,000 to 50,000 ready, deployable troops at all times; The National Command Authorities (NCA) always know what forces/capabilities can deploy;

2. Funding for O&M is managed more efficiently. Preserves depth in the Army Force;3. Army Force Packages are precisely aligned with strategic air and sea lift;4. No more last minute, hasty assembly of units and equipment for crisis or conflict; 5. Deployments become predictable improving the quality of life for soldiers and families;

Pre-deployment Phase (6-9 months)

Deployment Phase (6-9 months)

Reconstitution Phase (6-9 months)

Modernization TNG/ED Phase (6-9 months)

Army Joint Rotational Readiness

Deployment Phase (6-9 months)

Emergency Crisis or Conflict Imminent:

• Crisis or Conflict requires the deployment of forces to Joint Force Commands inside regional unified command.

• Combat Groups within the

Deployment Phase are notified by Army readiness and training command for immediate deployment in 96 hours or less.

Forces selected from the deployment phase for immediate deployment.

AAG

TMD

CMGCMG

CMG

ICG

C4I STG

ACGCSGCSG

Affordable readiness can best be achieved by adopting some form of rotational deployment scheme for the entire U.S. Army both at home and overseas.

MG (ret) Robert H. Scales Jr., USA, Yellow Smoke: The Future of Land Warfare for America’s Military, 2003

CMGCMG

CMG

STG

CMGCMG

CMG

AAG

C4I

STGTMD

ACG

CSGCSG

C4I

CMGCMG

CMG

ICGICG

ACG

CSGCSG

ENG

ICGICG

Follow on deployment

Readiness & Training

Army Readiness & Training Command begins notifying follow-on forces in training phase for potential deployment as air and sea lift become available.

CSGCSG

AAG

C4I

TMD

ACG

CMGCMG

CMG

ICGICG

CSGCSG

AAG

C4I

TMD

ENG

ACG

“Victory required a single commander with absolute authority to harness the power of ground, air and naval forces in a way that brought the strengths of each to maximum effectiveness. No duplication of effort, no untapped resources, no inter-Service rivalry.”

General of the Army Dwight David Eisenhower, 1947

JFC

JFCs receive command and control of arriving Army tactical forces.

JFC

CMGCMG

CMG

STG

C4I

STGTMD

ACG

CSGCSG

C4I

CMGCMG

CMGCMG

CMGCMG

ACG

CSGCSG

ENG

ICGICG

“The more elastic a man’s mind is… the more it is able to receive and digest new impressions and experiences… Youth, in every way, is not only more elastic, but less cautious and far more energetic.”

J.F.C. Fuller, Major General, British Army 1936

Change demands a New Professional Development Paradigm!

Eliminating unneeded echelons offers the opportunity to promote younger officers faster to flag rank. (Scraps Colonel level of command)

New Human Capital Strategy values talent more than longevity! (C2I = Character, Competence, Intelligence).

This is the path to “more agile and effective organizations and more empowered junior leaders.”

PLATOON LEADER/STAFF

COMPANY CMD/STAFF

STAFF OFFICER

BATTALION CMD/STAFF

GROUP CHIEF OF STAFF

GROUP CMD

Fewer Required Command Gates Create Flexibility in Professional and Intellectual Development.

Combat Group Command Desirable, But Not Required for Promotion

Battalion Command Gate Required for Future Command

Company Command Gate Required for Future Command

Platoon Command Gate Required for Future Command

Without reform and reorganization, the nation ends up with a smaller, less capable, “Hollow” Army than the one we have today.

• Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Army’s generals fought for the Army’s historic budget share and end-strength. New ideas and new organizations were treated as disruptive. Officers with ideas vanished.

• General Marshall spent 6 years (1939-1945) replacing the Army’s club of generals and recovering Army Forces from 20 years of neglect.

• After 1945, Army Four Stars testified “no war for decades” and created the hollow constabulary army on wheels that failed in 1950 Korea.

• After 1991, the Army generals set out to preserve the Army status quo with a failed technological “make-over” (Force XXI, Future Combat System…). Result: Lots of Generals, fewer soldiers, less capability.

“The primary purpose of an army - to be ready to fight effectively at all times - seemed to have been forgotten…. The leadership I found in many instances was sadly lacking…” General Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, page 88.

What if nothing is done?

Bold, new initiatives can succeed. Incremental changes court failure in defense reform and produce few, if any, $ savings.

Organize for a different future, the unexpected, “Strategic Surprise;” a “Korean-like Emergency” in 1950 or a “Sarajevo-like” event in 1914, not counterinsurgency and nation building;

Modernize, but don’t build a better carburetor. Go for fuel injection with a new, inherently joint force design!

With a new force design (Combat Group), $ Savings emerge; unneeded programs and equipment are identified and shed;

Reduce and eliminate command overhead the Army no longer needs: Reduce redundant overhead, adopt joint rotational readiness;

Build Joint Force Commands! Single Service Warfare is obsolete.

“You cannot win this war by sitting still!” Sir Winston Churchill, 1915

Recommendation 1:

From March 1942 to April 1945 when there were 11 million men in the Army and Army Air Corps the US had only 4 four star generals to command them. How many four stars do we have to direct today's Active Army and Air Force?

Answer: 21 Four Stars for 879,000 soldiers and airmen.

From 7 December to 31 December 1946 when there were 4,183,466 million men in the Navy and 480,000 in the Marines the US had 4 four star admirals to command them: How many four stars do we have to direct today’s Active Navy and Marine Corps?

Answer: 10 Four Star Admirals and 5 Four Star Marine Generals for a combined force of 490,000.

What is to be done?1. Freeze all flag rank promotions pending DoD wide Flag Officer review, identify Flag rank Billets

for downgrade 1 or more stars and those billets for elimination;2. Direct Unified Command Plan to consolidate COCOMs into five RCCs – Pacific, Atlantic

(formerly EUCOM and AFRICOM), Central, Northern, Southern and Central Commands;3. Establish initial 3 star Joint Force Headquarters at Joint Base Lewis-McChord. Develop

template for JFCs across regional unified commands.

End the state of war/national emergency. Urge the President to reverse President Bush’s Executive Order 13223 that suspended Flag and General Officer End Strength Limits after 9/11.

Review and Reevaluate 12 Four Star and 51 Three Star Billets.

Recommendation 2:

Current USA USAF USN USMC Total4 Star 10 11 10 5 363 Star 51 44 38 17 150

Title 10 USC End Strength Limits4 Star 7 9 6 2 243 Star 38 34 26 13 111

http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/10C32.txt

Bureaucratic Bloat Increases Costs and Obstructs Effective and Efficient Operational and Administrative Command

http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/rg1302.pdf

SECDEF should exercise his “authority, direction, and control,”* to increase value while reducing cost.

Change is a marathon, not a sprint. Direct the following actions:

1. Document current baseline capability inside Army;2. Model the forces described in this briefing in simulation. NOTE: Israeli Defense Force and U.S. Army modeled BTP/TUF forces in simulation. Results dramatically favored the new force design. (Points of Contact Available on Request)

3. Identify existing gaps/overlaps/seams. Overlaps help identify current and future systems and/or investments that are not needed inside the Joint Force.

4. Develop an Army Reorganization Roadmap for execution to include milestones and requirements.

5. Direct the CSA to stand up, exercise and validate the formations outlined in the reorganization proposal and report to the Secretary of Defense on the execution of the roadmap. Reorganize the Force!

Recommendation 3:

* 10 USC § 113 (b)