Schumann et al, v Collier Anesthesia et al. Document Compilation 12-2013

Case 2:12-cv-00347-JES-SPC Document 1 Filed 06/29/12 of 10 PageID 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

BILLY SCHUMANN, an individual, and DUSTIN ABRAHAM, an individual, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

Plaintiffs,

vs. CASE NO.:

2DI2JUN29 Pf-1 l=ZO

COLLECTIVE ACTION COLLIER ANESTHESIA, P.A., a Florida corporation, WOLFORD COLLEGE, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, THOMAS L. COOK, an individual, and LYNDA M. WATERHOUSE, an individual,

Defendants. _____________________________ ./ COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs, Billy Schumann ("Schumann"), and Dustin Abraham ("Abraham")

(collectively ''Plaintiffs"), on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, hereby sue

Defendants, Collier Anesthesia, P.A. ("Collier Anesthesia"), Wolford College, LLC

("'Wolford"), Thomas L. Cook ("Cook"), and Lynda M. Waterhouse ("Waterhouse")

(collectively "Defendants"), and allege as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. This is an action brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standard Act of 1938, as

amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. C'FLSA") to recover unpaid overtime compensation, unpaid

minimum wage compensation, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees and costs owed to

Plaintiffs and others similarly situated.

Page I of 10


2. Defendants had a policy and practice of not compensating employees for hours

worked at a rate at least commensurate with the federal minimum wage, and requiring or

permitting employees to work in excess of forty ( 40) hours in each workweek without paying

them time and one half overtime compensation as required by the FLSA.

3. Pursuant to the FLSA, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly

situated, seek overtime compensation, minimum wage compensation, liquidated damages,

interest, and attorneys' fees and costs from Defendants.

4. Subsequent to the filing of this action, Plaintiffs will request this Court to

authorize concurrent notice to all employees similarly situated to Plaintiffs who are or were

employed by Defendants, informing them of the pendency of this action and their right to opt

into this lawsuit pursuant to 29 U .S.C. § 216(b ).

JURISTDICTION AND VENUE

5. This Court has jurisdiction over this claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 216 and 28

u.s.c. § 1331.

6. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 133l(b), as the events or

omissions giving rise to the claims alleged herein occurred in the Middle District of Florida, Fort

Myers Division.

PARTIES

7. At all times pertinent, Plaintiffs worked for Defendants in the Middle District of

Florida, Fort Myers Division.

8. Defendant Collier Anesthesia was and is a Florida Profit Corporation conducting

business in the Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division, and subject to the requirements

ofthe FLSA.

Page 2 of 10


9. Defendant Wolford was and is a Florida Limited Liability Company conducting

business in the Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division and subject to the requirements of

the FLSA.

I 0. Defendant Collier Anesthesia and Defendant Wolford have interrelation of

operations; centralized control of labor relations; common management; and common ownership

or financial control. As such, for FLSA purposes, Defendant Collier Anesthesia and Defendant

Wolford represent a single, integrated enterprise.

I I. Defendant Cook was and is an individual who operated Defendant Collier

Anesthesia and Defendant Wolford, and who regularly exercised the authority to: (a) hire and

fire employees; (b) determine the work schedules for employees; and (c) control finances and

operations. By virtue of having regularly exercised that authority on behalf of Defendant Collier

Anesthesia/Defendant Wolford and over Plaintiffs, Defendant Cook is an employer as defined by

29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.

I 2. Defendant Waterhouse was and is an individual who operated Defendant Collier

Anesthesia and Defendant Wolford, and who regularly exercised the authority to: (a) hire and

fire employees; (b) determine the work schedules for employees; and (c) control finances and

operations. By virtue of having regularly exercised that authority on behalf of Defendant Collier

Anesthesia/Defendant Wolford and over Plaintiffs, Defendant Waterhouse is an employer as

defined by 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.

13. At all times material, Plaintiffs were employees of Defendants pursuant to 29

U.S.C. § 203(e)(l); Defendants were the employer of Plaintiffs within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.

§ 203(a) and (d); and Defendants employed Plaintiffs within the meaning of29 U.S.C. § 203(g).

Page 3 of 10


GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

14. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated worked for Defendants at Defendant

Collier Anesthesia. Defendant Collier Anesthesia employed Plaintiffs and others similarly

situated as interns. As interns, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated worked for Defendants at

Defendant Collier Anesthesia performing the work of nurse anesthetists.

15. Defendants provided no monetary compensation to Plaintiffs and others similarly

situated for the work performed.

16. At all times pertinent, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were/are registered

nurses.

17. Nurses service the medical profession.

18. At all times pertinent, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated did not and do not

have a valid license or certificate to practice medicine.

19. At all times pertinent, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated did not and do not

have the requisite academic degree for the general practice of medicine. Plaintiffs and others

similarly situated also did not and do not have the requisite degree to work as nurse anesthetists.

20. As interns working for Defendants, Plaintiffs were serving the medical profession.

21. Nurse anesthetists service the medical profession.

22. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were not licensed and practicing in the field

of medical science and healing, or any of the medical specialties practiced by physicians or

practitioners.

23. In the course of their work, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were directly

engaged in the operations of Defendant Collier Anesthesia, and were scheduled for work based

on the staffing needs of Defendant Collier Anesthesia.

Page 4 of 10


24. In the course of their work, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated performed

productive work for Defendant Collier Anesthesia.

25. In the course of their work, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated performed the

routine work of Defendant Collier Anesthesia on a regular and recurring basis.

26. Defendant Collier Anesthesia is dependent upon the work of interns, like

Plaintiffs and others similarly situated for its normal daily operations.

27. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated worked for Defendants for Defendants'

benefit.

28. Defendants employed interns like Plaintiffs and others similarly situated as

substitutes for regular workers, and/or to augment its existing workforce during specific time

periods.

29. If Defendant Collier Anesthesia did not use interns like Plaintiff and others

similarly situated, Defendants would need to hire additional employees to perform the work of

the interns.

30. In working for Defendants, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated received the

same level of supervision as Defendant Collier Anesthesia's regular workforce.

31. Defendants derived an immediate advantage from the work of Plaintiffs and

others similarly situated for Collier Anesthesia.

32. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated performed duties as employees of

Defendants such that they did not satisfy the requirements for any of the exemptions set forth in

the FLSA.

Page 5 of 10


33. As Plaintiffs and others similarly situated did not receive compensation for their

hours worked, their manner of compensation did not, and does not, satisfy the salary basis test

necessary for any exemptions of the FLSA to apply.

34. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are not exempt from the FLSA's salary-

basis test.

35. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated regularly worked over forty (40) hours in a

workweek while employed by Defendants.

36. Despite working more than forty (40) hours in a workweek, Plaintiffs and others

similarly situated did not receive appropriate overtime compensation under the FLSA.

37. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated also did not receive compensation for hours

worked at a rate at least commensurate with the federal minimum wage. In fact, Plaintiffs and

others similarly situated received no payment whatsoever for hours worked.

38. Upon information and belief, there are numerous persons similarly situated to

Plaintiffs who are and were employed as interns by Defendant Collier Anesthesia who work in

excess of forty ( 40) hours in a workweek without receiving compensation for hours worked.

39. Upon information and belief, the records to the extent any exist, concerning the

number of hours worked and amounts to be paid to Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are in

the possession and custody of Defendants.

COUNT I (MINIMUM WAGE- PLAINTIFFS)

40. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves, hereby incorporate by reference the allegations

contained within paragraphs I through 39 above.

41. Plaintiff Schumann worked as an intern for Defendants from approximately

February 2011 through May 2012.

Page 6 of 10


42. Plaintiff Abraham worked as an intern for Defendants from approximately

October 20 II through January 2012.

43. Defendants' failure to compensate Plaintiffs at a rate at least commensurate with

the federal minimum wage constitutes a violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206.

44. Defendants' violations of the FLSA were knowing and willful.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully requests that this Court:

a. accept jurisdiction over this action;

b. award damages for the amount required to provide Plaintiffs minimum wage for

all hours worked and overtime compensation for all overtime hours worked;

c. award liquidated damages, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 215(b), in an amount equal to

the overtime compensation owed to Plaintiffs;

d. award post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 29

u.s.c. § 216(b);

e. authorize the issuance of notice at the earliest possible time to all employees

similarly situated to Plaintiffs who were employed by Defendants during the

Liability Period; and

f. award all other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COUNT II (OVERTIME- PLAINTIFFS)

45. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves, hereby incorporate by reference the allegations

contained within paragraphs I through 39 above.

46. Plaintiff Schumann worked as an intern for Defendants from approximately

February 20 II through May 2012.

Page 7 of 10


4 7. Plaintiff Abraham worked as an intern for Defendants from approximately

October 2011 through January 2012.

48. Defendants' failure to provide Plaintiffs overtime compensation at a rate not less

than one and one-half ( 1 and 1/2) times the regular rate for hours worked over forty ( 40) in a

workweek constitutes a violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207.


WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully requests that this Court:


b. award damages for the amount of unpaid overtime compensation owed to

Plaintiffs;

c. award liquidated damages, pursuant to 29 U .S.C. § 215(b ), in an amount equal to

the overtime compensation owed to Plaintiffs;

d. award post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 29

u.s.c. § 216(b);

e. authorize the issuance of notice at the earliest possible time to all employees

similarly situated to Plaintiffs who were employed by Defendants during the

Liability Period; and

f. award all other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COUNT III (MINIMUM WAGE- OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED TO PLAINTIFFS)

50. Plaintiffs, on behalf others similarly situated, hereby incorporate by reference all

allegations contained in paragraphs I through 39 above as if fully restated herein.

Page 8 of10


51. Defendants' failure to compensate employees similarly situated to Plaintiffs

commensurate with the federal minimum wage constitutes a violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §

206.


WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, respectfully request on behalf of others similarly situated to

Plaintiffs that this Court:


b. award damages for the amount required to provide them minimum wage

for all hours worked and overtime compensation for all overtime hours

worked;

c. award liquidated damages, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), in an amount

equal to the overtime compensation owed to them;

d. award post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b); and

e. award all other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COUNT IV (OVERTIME- OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED TO PLAINTIFFS)

53. Plaintiffs, on behalf others similarly situated, hereby incorporate by reference all

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 39 above as if fully restated herein.

54. Defendants' failure to provide to employees similarly situated to Plaintiffs

overtime compensation at a rate not less than one and one-half(l and 1/2) times their regular rate

for hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek constitutes a violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §

207.


Page 9 of 10

Case 2:12-cv-00347-JES-SPC Document 1 Filed 06/29/12 of 10 PageID 10..

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, respectfully request on behalf of others similarly situated to

Plaintiffs that this Court:


b. award damages for the amount of unpaid overtime compensation owed to

them;

c. award liquidated damages, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), in an amount

equal to the overtime compensation owed to them;

d. award post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b); and

e. award all other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs do hereby demand a Jury Trial on all issues and claims so triable.

Bradley P. Rothman, Esq. Florida Bar No. 0677345 WELDON & ROTHMAN, PL 7935 Airport-Pulling Road N., Suite 205 Naples, Florida 341 09 Tel: (239) 262-2141 Fax: (239) 262-2342 Email: [email protected] Counsel for Plaintiffs

Page 10 of 10

Case 2:12-cv-00347-JES-SPC Document 1-1 Filed 06/29/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID 11

CIVIL COVER SHEET The JS 44 civil CO\'Crsheet and the infornution contained herein neither replace nor supplemmtthe filing and service of pleadngs or other papers as required by Jaw, except as pDvided by local rules of coun. This form. approved by the Judicial Conference ofthe United States inSeptember 1974, is required for tne use of the Clerk of O:>un for the purpose of mitiating the CIVIl docket sheet !SEE I.V:.TRUL 7IO.VS ON NE.\T I'AC iE 01-" TillS FOR.\()

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS Billy Schumann and Dustin Abraham, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff tli.'iC 'f.PT IN/ IS. I'!JUWI/-"1-" c 'ASESJ

DEFENDANTS Collier Anesthesia, PA, Wolford College, LLC, Thomas L. Cook, and Lynda M. Waterhouse

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant Co""lwli..,e._r ____ _

NOTE: (IN /!.S. I'UIN71FF CAS/o:'i ONI.)J

IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES. USE TilE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

(c) AUPr~·s Wm11 Namr. Adc(rr~•· and l<·&p/l!Jn•· Numherl Bradley P. Kbthman, Esq., vveldon & Rothman, PL. 7935 Airport-Pulling

Attorneys (/f Kn""'"l

Road, Ste. 205, Naples, FL 34109, (239) 262-2141

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION !l'lacru" ".\'" mon,.HcuOnM Ill. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES(I'Ic=an "X" mo,..&afi,Piamtlffi

:J 1 liS Go,emm~nl l'laintiff

LJ 2 F.S. GO\cmmcnt Defendant

:J 110 Insurance u 120 Morine 0 130 Miller Act :J 140 Negotiable Instrument 0 1~0 Rc:co•ety ofO.ctpa)mmt

& Enforcement of 0 151 Medic:lt'e Acr a IS2 RctO\'el)' of Defaulted

Student Loans (E\cl \'eter.ltls•

IJ 153 Rc:co'el)' ofO•crpa)ment of Veteran's Benefits

:J 160 Stockholders' Suits :J 190 Other C ontnu:t :J 195 Contr.ICt Product l.iability 0 196 Franchise

0 220 Foreclosure 0 230 Rent lease & EJcttment 0 UO Tons to Land LJ 245 Tort Product Liobility 0 290 All Other Real Property

Cl( 3 Federal Question (l f.S. (im,•r:rnmc!nl Not a Par~\')

LJ 4 Di,cnity (lmltmte ( 'm:emhtp cif l'artte.• i11llem 11/J

PERSO!'iAL INJlJR\' 31 0 Airplane 31 S Airplane Praduct

Liability 320 Assault. Libel &

Slander CJ 330 Federal Employers'

Liability LJ 340 !l.lorinc CJ 345 Morine Prodtu:t

l.iabilit)' rJ 350 Motor Vehicle CJ 3SS !1.1otor Vehicle

Product l.iallility 360 Other l'ersonal

lnjlll)' 362 PersonallnjUI)'-

441 Voting 442 Employment 443 Housing!

Actonmtodatians 445 Amcr. wfOisabilitics •

Employment 446 Amer. wiDisabilities •

Other 448 Education

PERSOSAL INJlJR\' ("') 365 PersonallnjUI)' •

Praduct Liability 0 367 llealth Carel

Pharmateutital PersonallnJUI)' l'roducr liability

CJ 368 Asbestos Personal lnjUI)' Praduct l.iability

PERSONAL PROPF.RT\' CJ 370 Other Fraud LJ 371 Truth in !.ending LJ 380 Other Pcrwnal

l'ropcny DIUlUige ("') 38S l'ropcny Damage

Produ.:t Liability

Sentence JlabNS Corpus:

CJ 530 General a S3S Death Penalty CJ 540 Mandamus & Other CJ 550 Civil Rights CJ SSS Prison Condition 0 560 Ci•·il Dclaincc -

Conditions of Confinement

(Far DnW'!IIIJ' ('a ...... Only) and on .. lhu for lkfi·ndantl I'TF DEF PTF DEF

Citiun of This State CJ I CJ I Incorporated or Principal Place 0 4 CJ 4 of Bwincss In This Stale

Cittzcn of Another State

625Drutr Related Seizure ofPropcny 21 USC 881

690 Other

710 Fair Labor Standards Act

CJ 720 Labor/MI!Illl. Relations CJ 7 40 Railway Labor Acr CJ 7SI Family and Medical

Le.-·e Act CJ 790 Other l.abor l.itil!alion CJ 791 Empl. Ret. Inc.

Scturity Act

CJ 463 Habeas CoiJlus • Alien Detruncc t Prisoner Petition)

CJ 465 Other lnuniJ!mtion Actions

CJ 2 CJ 2 lncorponued o111i Principal Place CJ s CJ 5 of Business In Another State

CJ 3 CJ 3 Fon:ign N01ion

CJ 422 Appeal28 USC ISS 0 423 Withdmwal

28 usc 157

0606

CJ 375 False Claims Act LJ 400 State RcapponioMtent LJ 410 Antitrust

~~~~~~~immC=J o 43o o.ru.s and oant..ins CJ 450 Cornrncn:e CJ 460 Dcpon01ion

0 861111A(I39Sfl) CJ 862 Black Lung (923 • CJ 863 DIWCfOIWW (40S(g!l CJ 864 SSID Tide XVI CJ 86S RSI (40S(gll

(U.S. or Defendant)

CJ 871 IRS-Third Pllrty 26 usc 7609

CJ 470 Racketeer Influenced and Conupt Organimtions

LJ 480 Consumer Credit CJ 490 Cable/Sat TV CJ 8SO Sc:cmitiesiCommaditics/

Exchange CJ 890 Other Statutory Acrions CJ 891 Agricultural Acts CJ 893 Enviroruncntall\.latters CJ 89S Fn:edom of Information

Act CJ 896 Arbiuution CJ 899 Administrali•·e Procedure

ActiRe\·iew or Appeal of Agency Dcci sion

CJ 9SO Constitutionality of State Statutes

. ...,,. ·-·.;

V. ORIGIN ~I Onginal

Proceeding

11'10('(' 011 ".\'" "'Ondlcu OnM . Transferred from CJ 2 Removed from CJ 3 Remanded from CJ 4 Retnstated or CJ 5 another district CJ 6 Multi~~(~

Litigatioa, ·--. State Coun Appellate Court Reopened ·• .,., . Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (f)anotdtejurisdkdonalniiiMiesunlnsJhwsii)•J o~ ;· · ~2~9~u~·~s~·~c~.~~2~0~1~------------------------------------------------------------~~~;·~l-:~----.. ----------~~----VI. CAUSE OF ACTION Brief description of cause: ;p.g:_·,

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY

DATE

FOR OFFICE USE O!'lil.\'

Overtime and minimum wa e violations QIJ CJIECK IF TillS IS A Cl.ASS 1\CTION DEMANDS CIIECK YES on~f deman in complaint

UNDER F.RCP 23 JURY DEMAND: IX Yes CJ No

(St•t• IIUirucltmt~}: JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER

SIGN,\TUREOF AlTllC {)) RECEIPTU AMOUNT APPLYING IFI' JUDGE MAG. JUDGE

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

_______________________________

BILLY SCHUMANN, an individual and

DUSTIN ABRAHAM, an individual, ON

BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND

OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

Plaintiffs,

v. CASE NO.: 2:12-cv-347-FtM-29SPC

COLLIER ANESTHESIA, P.A., a Florida

corporation, WOLFORD COLLEGE,

LLC, a Florida limited liability company,

THOMAS L. COOK, an individual and

LYNDA M. WATERHOUSE, an

individual,

Defendants.

_________________________________/

ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

OF COLLIER ANESTHESIA, P.A.

Defendant, COLLIER ANESTHESIA, P.A. (“Collier Anesthesia”), by and through its

undersigned counsel and pursuant to Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., files its Answer and Affirmative

Defenses as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. Admitted for jurisdictional purposes only.

2. Denied.

3. Admitted for jurisdictional purposes only, and denied that Plaintiffs have any

valid claim under FLSA.

4. Collier Anesthesia denies that there are any employees whatsoever who are

Plaintiffs or could be a Plaintiff; Collier Anesthesia denies that Plaintiffs have standing to assert

Case 2:12-cv-00347-JES-SPC Document 16 Filed 08/01/12 Page 1 of 8 PageID 52

2

such a claim or that a violation occurred, and denies that Plaintiffs or the alleged similarly

situated individuals were employed by Collier Anesthesia. Collier Anesthesia lacks knowledge

or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of what these Plaintiffs plan to do, and,

therefore, denies same and denies and any all remaining allegations.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5. Admitted for jurisdictional purposes only.

6. Admitted for venue purposes only.

PARTIES

7. Denied.

8. Admitted.

9. Collier Anesthesia lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to

the truth of this allegation, and, therefore, denies same.

10. Denied.





13. Denied.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

14. Denied.

15. Denied.

16. Admitted that Plaintiffs were registered nurses during their tenure as students of

Wolford College. The remainder is denied.


3



18. Admitted that Plaintiffs did not have a license or certificate to practice medicine

during their tenure as students of Wolford College. The remainder is denied.

19. Admitted that, during their tenure as students of Wolford College, Plaintiffs did

not have the requisite degree for the general practice of medicine or nurse anesthetists, but were,

in fact, attending Wolford College for the very purpose of obtaining a nurse anesthetist degree.

The remainder is denied.

20. Denied.





23. Denied.

24. Denied.

25. Denied.

26. Denied.

27. Denied.

28. Denied.

29. Denied.

30. Denied.

31. Denied.

32. Denied.


4

33. Denied.

34. Denied.

35. Denied.

36. Denied.

37. Denied.

38. Denied.

39. Denied.

COUNT I – MINIMUM WAGE – PLAINTIFFS

40. Collier Anesthesia incorporates by reference its responses to paragraph 1 through

39 above as though set forth verbatim.

41. Denied.

42. Denied.

43. Denied.

44. Denied.

COUNT II – OVERTIME – PLAINTIFFS



46. Denied.

47. Denied.

48. Denied.

49. Denied.


5

COUNT III – MINIMUM WAGE – OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED TO PLAINTIFFS



51. Denied.

52. Denied.

COUNT IV – OVERTIME – OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED TO PLAINTIFFS



54. Denied.

55. Denied.

Defendant, COLLIER ANESTHESIA, P.A., denies any and all remaining allegations in

the Complaint not specifically admitted and requests that this Court dismiss Plaintiffs lawsuit,

enter judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiffs and that Defendant recover costs,

including reasonable attorneys’ fees and such further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

1. The Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted because it fails to show that Plaintiffs were employees of Collier Anesthesia

under the FLSA and also because Plaintiffs alleged that they performed the work of a nurse

anesthetist without the requisite degree, which is prohibited by law.

2. Plaintiffs claim that they performed the work of nurse anesthetists despite the fact

that Plaintiffs admit not having the requisite degree to work as nurse anesthetists, and; therefore,

Plaintiffs’ claim is legally barred and estopped.


6

3. No employment relation has ever existed between Plaintiffs and Collier

Anesthesia such that Plaintiffs lack standing to sue Collier Anesthesia and are barred from

asserting any claim based upon an employment relation. Plaintiffs were students, receiving

clinical training for their own educational benefit as part of the curriculum for obtaining a

Master’s Degree in Nurse Anesthesia from Wolford College. Plaintiffs’ receipt of clinical

training as students of Wolford College is not subject to the FLSA and, in any event, meets the

criteria developed by the Supreme Court in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152

(1947), which the Wage and Hour Division has sought to summarize with the following six

factors: (1) the internship is similar to training that would be given in a vocational school or

academic educational environment; (2) the internship training is for the benefit of the intern; (3)

interns do not displace Collier Anesthesia’s regular employees, but work under close observation

of existing staff; (4) Collier Anesthesia derives no immediate advantage from the activities of the

interns, and, on occasion, Collier Anesthesia’s operations may actually be impeded; (5) the

interns are not necessarily entitled to a job with Collier Anesthesia at the conclusion of the

internship; and (6) Collier Anesthesia and the interns understand that the interns are not entitled

to wages for the time spent in the internship.

4. Given that Plaintiffs received clinical training from Collier Anesthesia during

their tenure as students of Wolford College which training was required for certification and/or

licensure to work as a nurse anesthetist, Plaintiffs received the primary benefit from their

relationship with Collier Anesthesia, and; therefore, Plaintiffs were not employees of Collier

Anesthesia. See Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & School, Inc., 642 F. 3d 518 (6th Cir. 2011).

5. Collier Anesthesia at all times acted in good faith and reasonably believed that no

employment relationship ever existed between Collier Anesthesia and Plaintiffs; Collier


7

Anesthesia acted in good faith as a reasonably prudent entity would have acted under the

circumstances and with a belief of reasonable compliance with FLSA and is not subject to any

liability for alleged failure to pay wages. Collier Anesthesia did not intentionally or willfully

violate any law or regulation and, as such, any claims beyond the two-year statute of limitations

in 29 U.S.C. § 255 or for liquidated or statutory damages should be dismissed.

6. Any claim not filed within the applicable period of limitations is barred.

7. Plaintiffs have filed this action against Collier Anesthesia in bad faith, with

malicious intent, and for an improper purpose.

8. Plaintiffs lack standing to raise the claims which they seek to bring as a collective

action and types of claims on which Plaintiffs seek to bring as a collective action are matters on

which individual issues predominate and are not appropriate for collective treatment. Further,

Plaintiffs’ claims are not similar, common, or typical, and there is no basis in law or fact for a

collective action.

9. Plaintiffs’ Complaint should be dismissed, in whole or part, because any alleged

noncompliance by Collier Anesthesia was excusable and justified and not willful or intentional;

in addition, de minimis matters are subject to dismissal.

Respectfully submitted,

GRANT, FRIDKIN, PEARSON, ATHAN

& CROWN, P.A.

BY: /s/ JEFFREY D. FRIDKIN

Jeffrey D. Fridkin

Florida Bar No. 0490245

[email protected]

Rachael S. Loukonen

Florida Bar No. 0668435

[email protected]

5551 Ridgewood Drive, Suite 501


mailto:[email protected]


8

Naples, Florida 34108

(239) 514-1000

(239) 514-0377 (fax)

Attorneys for Defendant Collier Anesthesia, P.A.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY certify that on August 1, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing with the

Court by using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following:

Bradley P. Rothman, Esq.

[email protected]

WEDON & ROTHMAN, PL

7935 Airport Pulling Road N., Ste. 205

Naples, FL 34109

Telephone: (239) 262-21541

Facsimile: (239) 262-2342

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Tammie L. Rattray, Esq.

[email protected]

FORD & HARRISON, LLP

101 E. Kennedy Blvd., Ste. 900

Tampa, FL 33602

Telephone: (813) 261-7828

Facsimile: (813) 261-7899

Attorneys for Defendants, Wolford, Cook and

Waterhouse

By: /s/ JEFFREY D. FRIDKIN





SIXTH DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' claims are estopped and barred by their agreement and representation

to not work as a nurse anesthetist by title or function during their educational program.

SEVENTH DEFENSE

Plaintiffs were expressly prohibited from working as nurse anesthetists by title

and function during their educational program.

EIGHTH DEFENSE

Defendants acted in full compliance and conformity with and in reliance on the

FLSA, and applicable laws, regulations, orders, approvals and interpretations and with

the enforcement policies and acted in good faith as a reasonably prudent entity/person

would have acted under the circumstances and with a belief of reasonable compliance

and of no violative actions and is not subject to any liability for alleged failure to pay

wages required by the FLSA.

NINTH DEFENSE

Defendants acted in good faith and had reasonable grounds for believing that its

acts were not violative of the law and did not intentionally or willfully violate any law or

regulation and any claims beyond the 2 year statute of limitations in 29 U.S.C. § 255 or

for liquidated or statutory damages should be dismissed.

TENTH DEFENSE

The Complaint should be dismissed, in whole or in part, because any alleged non-

compliance by Defendants was excusable and justified and not willful or intentional; in

addition, de minimis matters are subject to dismissal.

ELEVENTH DEFENSE

Any claim not filed within the applicable period of limitations is barred.

12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTMIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

BILLY SCHUMANN, DUSTIN ABRAHAM, onbehalf of themselves and otherssimilarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs. Case No. 2:12-cv-347-FtM-29SPC

COLLIER ANESTHESIA, P.A., a Floridacorporation, WOLFORD COLLEGE, LLC, aFlorida limited liability company,THOMAS L. COOK, an individual, LYNDAM. WATERHOUSE, an individual,

Defendants.___________________________________

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiffs’ Motion to

Conditionally Certify Collective Action, and to Facilitate Notice,

and for Limited Expedited Discovery (Doc. #28) filed on August 20,

2012. Defendants filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #45) on

October 5, 2012. On October 22, 2012, plaintiffs filed a Reply

(Doc. #69). Subsequently, defendants filed a Sur-Reply (Doc. #70)

on October 29, 2012. Also before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion

to Toll the Statute of Limitations for All Current and Former

Employees (Doc. #34), to which defendants filed a Response (Doc.

#38).

I.

On June 29, 2012, plaintiffs Billy Schumann (Schumann) and

Dustin Abraham (Abraham) filed a Complaint (Doc. #1) against


defendants Collier Anesthesia, P.A. (Collier), Wolford College, LLC

(Wolford), Thomas L. Cook (Cook), and Lynda M. Waterhouse

(Waterhouse), on their own behalf and on behalf of other similarly

situated individuals for minimum wage and overtime compensation

relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In the

Complaint, plaintiffs allege that they were employed by Collier

within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) as interns who were

provided no monetary compensation; that they were registered nurses

that did not have a valid license or certificate to practice

medicine and did not have the requisite degree to work as nurse

anesthetists; that they were scheduled to work based on the

staffing needs of Collier and performed the routine work of Collier

on a regular and recurring basis; that Collier is dependant on the

work of interns for its normal daily operations and that Collier

derived immediate advantage from their work; that defendants

employed interns as substitutes for regular workers, and/or to

augment its existing workforce during specific time periods; that

if Collier did not use interns it would need to hire additional

employees; that they received the same level of supervision as

Collier’s regular workforce; that they did not satisfy any of the

exemptions set forth in the FLSA; and that they worked more than

forty hours in a given week but were not paid time and one-half for

the hours in excess of forty. (Doc. #1.) The Complaint describes

the additional persons who may become plaintiffs as other current

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and former interns who were employed by Collier and worked in

excess of 40 hours in a given workweek without receiving

compensation for hours worked. (Id.) Plaintiffs now seek

conditional certification of a collective action, to facilitate

notice to potential plaintiffs, to require expedited responses to

discovery, and tolling the statute of limitations.

II.

An action to recover unpaid minimum wage compensation and

unpaid overtime compensation under the FLSA may be maintained

“against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or

State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees

for and on behalf of himself or themselves and other employees

similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). “Thus, to maintain a

collective action under the FLSA, plaintiffs must demonstrate that

they are similarly situated.” Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores,

Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008)(citing Anderson v.

Cagle's, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 952 (11th Cir. 2007)). “The key to

starting the motors of a collective action is a showing that there

is a similarly situated group of employees.” Morgan, 551 F.3d at

1259. Being “similarly situated” does not require an identical

situation, but at least similar circumstances with respect to their

job requirements and pay provisions. Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1259-60;

Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1217 (11th Cir.

2001). The Eleventh Circuit has adopted a two-tiered approach to

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certification, as described in Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d

1207, 1213–14 (5th Cir. 1995):

The first determination is made at theso-called “notice stage.” At the noticestage, the district court makes adecision-usually based only on the pleadingsand any affidavits which have beensubmitted-whether notice of the action shouldbe given to potential class members.

Because the court has minimal evidence, thisdetermination is made using a fairly lenientstandard, and typically results in“conditional certification” of arepresentative class. If the district court“conditionally certifies” the class, putativeclass members are given notice and theopportunity to “opt-in.” The action proceedsas a representative action throughoutdiscovery.

The second determination is typicallyprecipitated by a motion for “decertification”by the defendant usually filed after discoveryis largely complete and the matter is readyfor trial. . . .

Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1218. Plaintiff must show that there are other

employees who desire to “opt-in” and who are “similarly situated”

before giving notice. Dybach v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 942 F.2d

1562, 1567 (11th Cir. 1991). As noted, at the first stage, the

Court applies a “fairly lenient standard,” Anderson, 488 F.3d at

953, although there must be more than counsel’s unsupported

assertions, Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1261.

III.

In support of their motion, plaintiffs rely on the

declarations of Billy Schumann (Doc. #28-10), Dustin Abraham (Doc.

-4-


#28-11), Lahoma Nachtrab (Doc. #28-12), Celine Vidaurri (Doc. #28-

13), and Denise Arminio (Doc. #28-14). In opposition, defendants

argue: (1) the declarations are “cookie cutter” and are

insufficient to provide a reasonable basis for a collective action;

(2) plaintiffs’ claims would require individualized inquiry; (3)

plaintiffs’ showing of potential opt-in plaintiffs is insufficient;

and (4) the proposed notice and consent form is objectionable.

(Docs. ## 45, 70.) Defendants also make a number of arguments

attacking the merits of the claim. (Id.) The Court will not

consider these arguments at this time. See, e.g., Fantauzzi v.

Agora Mktg. Solutions, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-513-T-26TGW, 2010 WL

2220246, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 2, 2010)(“district courts generally

do not consider the merits on a motion for conditional

certification”).

The Court concludes that plaintiffs have shown a “reasonable

basis” for their claim that there are other similarly situated

employees who wish to opt-in. The Court finds that the

declarations are sufficiently detailed to meet the “fairly lenient”

standard set by the Eleventh Circuit. The Court also finds that1

plaintiffs have demonstrated that there are other similarly

In support of their argument, defendants cite to Tussing v.1

Quality Resources, Inc., No. 8:09-cv-1833-T-26AEP, 2009 WL 4350253(M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2009). Tussing is inapposite. There, theplaintiffs filed six nearly identical affidavits from individualsemployed in five different positions in order to include all ofdefendant’s employees in one collective action.

-5-


situated interns for purposes of issuing notice. Additionally,2

the Court is also satisfied that there are other interns or Student

Registered Nurse Anesthetists who wish to opt-in, since, to date,

14 individuals filed Consents to join as opt-in plaintiffs. (Docs.

## 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 19, 20, 23, 27, 36, 43.) Therefore,

the Court finds that certification is appropriate for notice

purposes.

Defendants also raise the following objections to plaintiffs’

proposed Notice of Right to Join and Consent to Join forms: (1) the

Notice advises putative opt-ins multiple times of the contact

information for plaintiffs’ counsel and not defendants’ counsel;

(2) the Notice portrays the case “as a free chance at gaining

money”; (3) the Notice does not advise putative opt-ins that

certain conduct could be considered a misdemeanor or third degree

felony under Florida law; and (4) the Consent Form states that the

fees retained by plaintiffs’ attorneys will be the greater of the

Lodestar amount or 40% of the gross recovery. (Docs. ## 45, 45-

16.) The Court will revise the Consent to reflect that the FLSA

requires the Court to review the reasonableness of counsel’s legal

fees and the parties cannot contract in derogation of FLSA’s

provisions. Silva v. Miller, 307 F. App’x 349 (11th Cir. 2009).

Defendants’ argument that individualized inquiry is required2

is better suited at the decertification stage when additionalinformation is available regarding the characteristics of the opt-in plaintiffs. See, e.g., Vondriska v. Premier Mortg. Funding,Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (M.D. Fla. 2007).

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The Court has also considered the remaining objections and

concludes that no other changes are necessary. 3

IV.

Plaintiffs also seek to toll the statute of limitations “up to

the date of the Court’s ruling of Plaintiff’s Opt-In Motion and, if

the Opt-In Motion is granted, until Defendants provide the

information necessary for Plaintiffs to send out the notice.”

(Doc. #34, ¶ 12.) After plaintiffs filed their motion, the Court

issued a scheduling order (Doc. #35), which tolled the limitations

period for any person receiving notice “from the date of [the

Scheduling] Order until the parties file a Case Management Order

lifting the stay on these proceedings.” Under Title 29, United

States Code, Section 255, any cause of action for unpaid minimum

wage or overtime compensation under the FLSA,

(a) . . . may be commenced within two yearsafter the cause of action accrued, and everysuch action shall be forever barred unlesscommenced within two years after the cause ofaction accrued, except that a cause of actionarising out of a willful violation may becommenced within three years after the causeof action accrued. . . .

29 U.S.C. § 255. Under Title 29, United States Code, Section 256,

an action brought under the FLSA is:

In order to reflect the tolling of the statute of3

limitations, the Court has also changed “during the past three (3)years” to “on or after August 2009" in the “Who May Join theLawsuit” section.

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commenced on the date when the complaint isfiled; except that in the case of a collectiveor class action . . . it shall be consideredto be commenced in the case of any individualclaimant--

(a) on the date when the complaintis filed, if he is specificallynamed as a party plaintiff in thecomplaint and his written consent tobecome a party plaintiff is filed onsuch date in the court in which theaction is brought; or

(b) if such written consent was notso filed or if his name did not soappear--on the subsequent date onwhich such written consent is filedin the court in which the action wascommenced.

29 U.S.C. § 256. “Congress expressed the concern that an opt-in

plaintiff should not be able to escape the statute of limitations

bearing on his cause of action by claiming that the limitations

period was tolled by the filing of the original complaint.”

Grayson v. K-Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1106 (11th Cir. 1996)(citing

93 Cong. Rec. 2,182 (1947)). Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate

that extraordinary circumstances warrant an additional tolling of

the statute of limitations. Therefore, to the extent plaintiffs

request an additional tolling of the statute of limitations, the

request will be denied.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Conditionally Certify Collective

Action, and to Facilitate Notice, and for Limited Expedited

-8-


Discovery (Doc. #28) is GRANTED and a collective action is

conditionally certified as follows:

All current and former Student RegisteredNurse Anesthetists (SRNAs), who are, or were,enrolled at Wolford College, LLC, and whowork, or worked, for Collier Anesthesia, P.A.,without compensation on or after August 2009.

2. On or before March 19, 2013, defendants shall deliver to

plaintiffs’ counsel a list in the form of an Excel spreadsheet on

CD-ROM (or comparable media) containing the full names, and

addresses of the putative opt-in plaintiffs. Upon delivery of this

list, defendants shall promptly file a notice of compliance with

this part of the Court’s Opinion and Order.

3. After plaintiffs’ counsel receives such information from

defendants, plaintiffs’ counsel is authorized to give notice to the

individuals in the conditionally certified collective action and

shall do so within a reasonable time, but no later than April 19,

2013. The form of “Notice of Right to Join” and the associated

form of “Consent to Join” for putative opt-in plaintiffs shall be

substantially in the forms attached as Exhibit “A” and Exhibit “B”,

respectively, to this Opinion and Order, shall be mailed via first

class U.S. Mail at the sole cost and expense of plaintiffs to all

individuals disclosed by defendants; shall be dated with the date

of mailing; and shall allow each individual up to ninety (90) days

(the “Opt-In Period”) from the date of mailing in which to return

a “Consent to Join” form to plaintiffs’ counsel. Upon mailing the

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“Notice of Right to Join,” plaintiffs’ counsel shall promptly file

a notice of compliance with this part of the Court’s Opinion and

Order.

4. During the allowed period for response to this initial

mailing, should the initial “Notice of Right to Join” mailed to any

individual be returned as un-deliverable, the parties shall

promptly cooperate and exchange such additional information in

their custody or control, or in the custody or control of their

agents, as may reasonably be available to identify a better address

for each such individual, to assist in the search for better

addresses. To the extent that it is feasible, but in no event

later than the end of the allowed period for response to the

initial mailing, plaintiffs’ counsel shall, at the sole cost and

expense of plaintiffs, re-mail one time the “Notice of Right to

Join” to each such individual. For each re-mailed “Notice of Right

to Join,” it shall be in the form set forth above; shall be

re-dated with the date of re-mailing, and shall give the individual

up to the same deadline allowed for response to the initial mailing

to return a “Consent to Join” and no additional time.

5. Each “Consent to Join” returned to plaintiffs’ counsel

shall be deemed timely if post-marked, or delivered to a commercial

carrier who provides a receipt, within the allowed period.

6. Individuals who timely opt into this collective action

pursuant to this Court’s supervised notice procedure shall be

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deemed joined as opt-in plaintiffs for all purposes under the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and under the orders of this Court

through trial and appeal, if any, subject to any motion for

decertification or representative discovery, and may be represented

at any settlement, mediation or trial by the named plaintiffs at

the time, pending further orders of the Court.

7. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Toll the Statute of Limitations for

All Current and Former Employees (Doc. #34) is DENIED.

8. In light of the deadlines above, the parties shall submit

an Amended Case Management Report within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of this

Opinion and Order suggesting new deadlines.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 21st day of

February, 2013.

Copies: Counsel of record

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Case 2:12-cv-00347-JES-UAM Document 69-1 Filed 10/22/12 Page 1 of 13 PageID 685

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

BILLY SCHUMANN, and DUSTIN ABRAHAM, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

COLLIER ANESTHESIA, P.A., a Florida corporation, WOLFORD COLLEGE, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, THOMAS L. COOK, an individual, and LYNDA M. WATERHOUSE, an individual,

Defendants.

------------------------~/

CASE NO.: 2:12-cv-347-FtM-29SPC COLLECTIVE ACTION

AFFIDAVIT OF LESLIE HUSSEY, PhD. RN

Before me the undersigned authority, personally appeared Leslie Hussey, PhD, RN who

being duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

I. My name is Leslie Hussey, and I am over the age of 18 years and otherwise

competent to testify as to the matters herein.

2. The facts in this Affidavit are based upon my personal knowledge.

3. I was employed by Wolford College, LLC ("Wolford") from June 30, 2003

through August 31, 2012 during which time my job title was Director of Academic Education,

Director of Program Development, and Associate Director of Doctoral Education, respectively.

My CV is attached as Exhibit "1," and incorporated herein.

4. As faculty at Wolford, I assisted in the design of Wolford's curriculum for nurse

anesthesia students and I have knowledge of how the curriculum is supposed to be implemented.

Page I of3

Exhibit A


5. With respect to the clinical portion of Wolford's curriculum, the intent of the

program is to have students obtain their clinical experience during their last four semesters in the

program.

6. During the first three (3) semesters of clinical experience, the intent is for students

to have forty (40) hours of clinical experience based on five (5) graduate credits per semester at a

ratio of eight (8) clinical hours to one (I) hour of graduate credit. In other words, during the first

three (3) semesters of clinical experience, the students are supposed to receive five (5) credits per

semester for forty (40) hours of clinical work for each week of the semester.

7. During the last clinical course/semester, the intent is for students to have thirty-

two (32) hours of clinical experience based on four (4) graduate credits per semester at a ratio of

eight (8) clinical hours to one (I) hour of graduate credit. In other words, during the last clinical

course/semester the students are supposed to receive four (4) credits per semester for thirty-two

(32) hours of clinical work for each week of the semester. This is because during this semester

there is an additional didactic (non-clinical) three (3) credit hour course which students are

required to take.

8. Despite Wolford's curriculum, during the students' final semester of clinical

experience, Wolford did not honor the above ratio in the clinical assignments.

9. On multiple occasions, I discussed with Dr. John Nolan, the Dean of Wolford and

a Collier Anesthesia physician, the design of Wolford's curriculum and that students were only

supposed to have thirty-two (32) hours of clinical experience per week during their final

semester. His response to me was always that the students needed to be at ''work" because they

were seniors and because the students were needed in the clinical area.

I 0. Further, I participated in the exit interviews with all graduating classes from

Wolford from 2007 through the class of 2011B (which graduated in February 2012). Each year

Page2 of3


multiple students would come to me to state that they were verbally abused by certain physicians

at Collier Anesthesia, and at times experienced inappropriate physical contact from the certain

physicians at Collier Anesthesia. I would report what I heard to Wolford's program director,

Dr. Lauren Corder. I do not know what she did with the information. I do know that verbal

abuse and inappropriate physical contact in any setting is not part of any acceptable academic

curriculum that I am aware of.

AFFIANT FURTHER SA YETII NAUGHT.

STATE OF FLORIDA

COUNTY OF COLLIER

) ) SS: )

The foregoing instrument was sworn to and subscribed before me this 19th da y of

October 2012, by Leslie Hussey who is personally known to me and who did take an oath.

NOTARY SEAL:

Page 3 of3


From:•• Date: Mon, Oct 11, 2010 at 7:49PM To: [email protected], [email protected]

I have: been on my heart rotation for several weeks now. I stayed late today because I was the call persou. I have been putting in long hours, plus call shifts for the heart rotation,

at the main. I was call for so at 3

I was not able to complete my heart case.

Schumann 775

Exhibit C


Meeting with May 3, 2.012@ Wolford College: Conference Room with John Nolan~ MD & Brian Mears, MS~

CRNA,ARNP

Issues:

e Ms. was assigned a library day for 0700~1500 hrs. She signed out at 1430, but wrote 1500 in the sign-out block.

Discussion:

• Dr. Nolan; when you write something down make sure it is accurate. Think

as though you are always being watched. I am trying to give you friendly advice. Signing out early shows a lack of professionalism and honesty. You must communicate with your future employer. In the real world you need

to accurately communicate. Your word is your bond. Also, you are getting ready to graduate and I understand you said call in a

shifts to travel out of town. J recomme and do not call in. Cc:~lling in on the last shi

allowing week.

• Ms. :I didn't re!alize leaving early was a big deal. Regarding calling in, I wanted off for anc,ther interview. The scheduler said that

probably will not happen since I have been off twice for two interviews.

• Dr. Nolan: Always tell the truth.

Recommendations: • Tell the truth all the time. • Do not call in the last shift

Outcome:

• Ms acknowledged and agreed with the recommendations

Exhibit

Schumann et al, v Collier Anesthesia et al. Document Compilation 12-2013

Documents

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