Professor Clive Schofield

Joint Development of the Continental Shelf where Delimitation is Pending:Cooperative Opportunity or Complication in Oceans Governance

Maritime Zones under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

The Area

200 M

Sea Level

12 M Contiguous zone

Territorialsea

12 M

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

Water Column, Sea-bed, Subsoil

Rise Deep Ocean

Inte

rnal

wat

ers

Terri

toria

l Sea

Bas

elin

e

(Extended Continental Shelf)

Continental ShelfSea-bed, Subsoil, Sedentary Species

High Sea

Shelf

LowerSlopeAnimation by Arsana & Schofield, 2012

UpperSlope Plateu

orTerrace

Source: TALOS Manual (5th edition, 2014)

Implications of Creeping Coastal State Jurisdiction

• Extended maritime claims200 nautical mile claims = 147km2 million (43M2 million)41% of the area of the oceansPLUS: c.30km2 million of extended continental shelf areas (and counting)

• Proliferation in overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction, “new” potential maritime boundaries and maritime boundary disputes

• c.54% of potential maritime boundaries agreed• BUT: many agreements partial or not in force

Continental Shelf and EEZ delimitation

LOSC Articles 74 and 83

3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation.

The legal rationale for joint development arrangements

Key Components of Joint Development

• A formal agreement• Definition of a special zone• Without prejudice clauses• Definition of the resources to which the

arrangement applies• Agreement on the laws and jurisdiction governing

exploration, operations and revenue sharing• Uncontested sovereignty over the area

designated as a joint development zone• Political will

Joint Zones as an addition to delimitation

• Bahrain-Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf (signed 1958)• Qatar-United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) in the Persian

Gulf (1969)• France-Spain in the Bay of Biscay (1974)• Colombia - Dominican Republic in the Caribbean (1978)• Australia-Papua New Guinea in the Torres Strait (1978)• Iceland-Norway in the North Atlantic (Jan Mayen Island)

(1981)• Faroes-UK in the North Atlantic (1999)• Boundaries defined so security/enforcement jurisdiction

clear cut

Source: International

Maritime Boundaries

Torres Strait

Source: Geoscience Australia

Faroes-UK

Source: International Maritime Boundaries

Joint Zones in lieu of delimitation

• Kuwait-Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf (1965)• Japan-South Korea in the Sea of Japan (1974)• Sudan-Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea (1974)• Australia-Indonesia in the Timor Sea (Timor Gap) (1989)• Malaysia-Thailand in the Gulf of Thailand (1990)• Malaysia-Vietnam in the Gulf of Thailand (1993)• São Tomé-Nigeria in the Gulf of Guinea (2001)• Australia-Timor Leste in the Timor Sea (2002)

The East China Sea

Advantages of Joint Development

• Unlocks intractable disputes• Sidesteps sovereignty issues• Allows development/management of resources/

environment to proceed without delay• Without prejudice clauses effectively address

concerns over compromising jurisdictional claims (at least in a formal legal sense)

Additional Advantages

• Avoids the need for a costly ‘once and for all’ boundary delimitation exercise

• Often perceived to be an ‘equitable’ solution• Cooperative – no ‘winner’ or ‘loser’• Flexible in area, administration, function and

durationCan apply to living or non-living resourcesCan be general or resource-specificCan be permanent or temporaryCan be applied to security issues

• Consistent with international law• Models exist

Challenges in the Application of Provisional Arrangements of a Practical Nature

• The Limits of zones of cooperation• Does using the limits of overlapping claims

areas legitimise and encourage excessive maritime claims?

• Third party rights – other claimants?• Complexity and Continuity

• Intricate arrangements and ongoing costs• Difficult to negotiate and sustain• Need to endure for the long haul• A challenge to State sovereignty• A source of friction in relations?

Challenges in the Application of Provisional Arrangements of a Practical Nature

• Downstream issues• As much of a prize as the marine resources

themselves?• Dealing with the impacts of “success”

• Gulf of Thailand examples - a concentration of State practice

• Gulf of Guinea• Timor Sea arrangements

Cambodia – Vietnam joint ‘historical waters’ area

Malaysia – Thailand joint development area

Malaysia – Vietnam joint development area

Cambodia – Thailand Memorandum of Understanding

The Gulf of Thailand

Source: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011

Source: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011

Sao Tomé EEZ

São Tomé and Príncipe – Nigeria JDZ

Cameroon Claim Line

120°

15°

10° 10°

125°

130°

130°

135°

135°E

TIMOR

FLORES

SUMBAWA

Lombok

SUMBASawu Roti

Alor

Sulawesi

WetarBabar Tanimbar

Islands

Aru Islands

KaiIslands

SCALE0 100 200 300 400km

ScottReefAEEZ

IEEZ

8° 8°

12°102°

102°

106°

106°

111°

111°

12°

5° 5°

JAVA

Christmas I

IEEZ

IEEZ

AEEZ

AEE

Z

0 160kmSCALE

Mercator ProjectionCentral Meridian 106°E

Latitude of true scale 10°S

Sumatra

I N D I A N O C E A N

Agreed seabed and water column boundarybetween Christmas Island and Java (Article 3)

I N D O N ESI A

A U STRA LI A

AshmoreIslands

Mercator ProjectionCentral Meridian 128°ELatitude of true scale 0°

Agreed exclusive economic zone (water column) boundary in the area between continental Australia and the Indonesian archipelago (Article 2)

Agreed extension of the seabedboundary in the area between continental Australia and the Indonesian archipelago (Article 1)

Indonesian exclusive economic zone boundary

Area of overlap between Australian seabedjurisdiction and Indonesian exclusive economiczone (water column) jurisdiction

Australian exclusive economic zone boundary

Zone of Co-operation (Timor Gap Treaty)

Previously agreed seabed boundaries (1971 and 1972)

Area subject to 1974 MOUregarding the operations of Indonesian traditional fishermenwithin the Australian fishing zone

A U STRA LI A

I N D O N ESI A

120° 125°

ButonSelayar

Map 5 - Consolidated depiction of all Australian-Indonesian maritime boundaries after entry into force of the Treaty

MAP 96/ 523.25

I N D I A N O C E A N

Timor Sea

Arafura Sea

IRIAN JAYA

Overlapping claims in the

Timor Sea

Source: Clive Schofield, ‘Minding the Gap: The

Australia – East Timor Treaty on Certain Maritime

Arrangements in the Timor Sea’, International Journal of

Marine and Coastal Law, Volume 22 (2007), No.2: 189-

234.

Opportunities and Challenges in the Application of Provisional Arrangements of a Practical Nature

• Great potential merit but…• Not to be entered into lightly, simply

because negotiations deadlocked

• Significant implementation challenges to overcome

• What area?• Third party rights• Institutional issues• Certainty and Continuity• Downstream issues• Political dimensions