'. Photos counesy of Nationnl Archives, Office of Wnr Infonnntion. Scatted quotations fmm TheP a m Papm 1940-1945 by MarcinBlumcnson, 0 1974

by Martin Blumcnson, reprinted by permission of the publisher, Houghton Mifffin Company.

Quotations from The Papm of Dwight David Eirmhmurr: The War Yean, edited by A l f d D.Chnndler, Jr., 0 1970 by the Johns Hopkins Pms, reprinted by permission of Johns Hopkins University Press.

Copyright 0 1981 by Russell F. Wcigley ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

No put of this bookmny bereproduced or utilized in my form or by my m a s , electmnic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by my information s t o m nnd &evd systcm,without permission in wriring from the publisher. The Association of American University Prcasa' Resolution on Permissions constitutes the only exception to

this prohibition. Manufactured in the United States of America

Library of Congress cataloging in Publication Data Wcigley, Russell Frank.

Eisenhower's lieutcnnnts.

Includes bibliogrnphical references and index. 1. World War, 1 9 3 % 1 9 4 ~ p P i g n e F r n n c e (1944-1945) 2. World War, 1939-

194S-CPmpnigns-Germpny. 3. World War, 193%194bUnittd States. 4. Frnncc-History-German occupation, 1940-1945. 5. Germany-History-193Ll945. 6. United States. Army-Biography. 7. Generals-United States--Biography. I. Title.

D761.W4 940.54'21 80-8175 ISBN 0-253-13333-5 2 3 4 5 85 84 83 82 81

5: The Beach

N AMPHIBIOUS assault is a frontal attack, with all the perils thereby implied. The A assaulting troops have no room for maneuver. They cannot fall back. They have only a limited ability to oudlank strong points. They can do nothing subtle. They must simply generate enough striking power to penetrate whatever crust of fortifications they find, yet not so overburden themselves with heavy weapons that they risk losing the mobility necessary to exploit a penetration and advance inland.

Against the hard crust of Hitler's Atlantic Wall as reinforced by Romrnel, General Bradley's First Army planners calculated that their assault divisions at best would not move inland very far with any speed. Consequently the First Army stripped these divisions of many of the vehicles and support troops that ordinarily gave them their overland mobility, but the army enhanced commensurately their firepower. Each assault regiment was to have a tank battalion attached, some of the tanks to be DDs to be launched offshore and to swim in ahead of the infantry, some of the tanks to be loaded on LCTs to touch down with the initial wave of infantry. The first tanks would be used simply as close-support artillery. This role is not ideal for tanks, especially for Shermans which were designed for movement more than for hard punching; but only guns protected by armor were likely to survive on the beaches. The main job of the tanks was to neutralize the enemy pillboxes by firing into their embrasures, thus helping the infantry approach the pillboxes with flame throwers and explosives to destroy them.

The leading infantry would come ashore immediately after the first tanks. For the occasion, one platoon of every rifle company was to have an 81mm. mortar and a heavy machine gun, and the other two platoons would each have a 60mm. mortar. Every rifle platoon would also have a wire-cutting team, a bazooka team, a flamethrowing team, and a demolition team. Each platoon would be divided into two sections of twenty-nine men and one officer, a force that could be accommodated in an LCVP. Once ashore, the infantry were to clear the beaches and cover the landing of engineer demolition teams, naval demolition units, and tankdozers that would clear and mark lanes through the underwater obstacles before the rising tide covered them.

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I EISENHOWER'S LIEUTENANTS

Subsequent assault waves would be mostly infantry, with someadditional engineers to help complete the clearing of the beaches and to go to work on mine fields farther inland. Artillery was to begin going ashore about an hour and a half after the first landings. Vehicles of all kinds would begin to debark after about three hours. By then, the infantry were expected to have opened exits from the beaches and to have pressed inland.

The problems of grasping a foothold were the tactical problems of a soldiers' battle. Once the landings began, the high command must leave the fate of NEPTUNE to the bravery and skill of the soldiers and of their company- and field-grade officers-to skill as well as to bravery, because though all units had rehearsed carefully, and every soldier was to have seen a model of his unit's landing beach and objectives and to know his unit's part in the plan, Allied intelligence could not have pinpointed every enemy stronghold, nor predicted the effects of the preliminary bombardment. The final problems were not for the NEPTUNE plans but for the men under fire.

OMAHA

Off UTAH Beach, General Collins of the VII Corps sailed with Admiral Moon on the attack transport BayfieId. Off OMAHA, General Gerow of the V Corps shared space with Admiral Hall on the amphibious command ship Ancon. General Bradley and Admiral Kirk plugged their ears with cotton at 5:30 on D-Day morning and the 8-inch guns of the Augusta began rocking the ship as they blasted away at OMAHABeach. The smoke of the naval and aerial bombardments soon thickened a morning mist over the shoreline; but while the generals offshore could see little, they soon had cause for worry.

In the lee of the Cotentin, UTAH was partially shielded from wind and weather. There, though restless Channel waters swelled ominously, all but four of thirty-two DD tanks with the first wave reached shore. The casualties came when an LCT carrying the rest struck a mine.

At OMAHA, in contrast, the sea was so choppy that Admiral Kirk was sure the DDs would be swamped ifthe LCTs did not carry them all the way to the beaches. On his instructions, one battalion of the amphibious tanks accordingly rode to the beaches in their LCTs, whence they emerged a minute before H-Hour with their guns blazing. But elsewhere in "0" Force, the plan and the lower-echelon officers had already taken over from the generals and admirals, and another battalion of DDs, attached to the 16th Infantry Regiment, was launched 5,500 meters offshore despite the rough surf. These tanks promptly fulfilled the Admiralty's original fears, foundering right and left, and only five of thirty-two made it to the beach. Three of the five survivors were from LCT-600, whose commander, Ensign H.P. Sullivan, had the presence of mind to pull up his ramp as soon as he saw the first DD go down, and beached the others he was carrying.

Worse followed. H-Hour on the American beaches was 6:30. By 8:30, the troops were supposed to be breaking through the beach exits toward higher ground along Route N13. But at that hour, the corps and army commanders had no confirmation that the V Corps had so much as effected a landing. Like the DDs, the OMAHA assault in fact was coming close to total foundering. The attacking infantry had been transferred from ships to LCVPs sixteen to twenty kilometers offshore, and at least ten of the LCVPs sank. So did the craft carrying almost all the 105mm. howitzers that were supposed to be the first artillery ashore after the tanks. The V Corps was assaulting with two regiments of the 1st

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