Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable,...

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Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex C. Snoeren, Geoffrey M. Voelker and Stefan Savage University of California, San Diego Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Operating System Principles (SOSP), Brighton, UK, October 2005 Presented By: Dan DeBlasio for CAP 6133, Spring 2008

Transcript of Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable,...

Page 1: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin

Virtual HoneyfarmAuthors:

Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex C. Snoeren, Geoffrey M. Voelker and Stefan Savage

University of California, San Diego

Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Operating System Principles (SOSP), Brighton, UK, October

2005

Presented By: Dan DeBlasio for CAP 6133, Spring 2008

Page 2: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Outline

•Architectural Overview

•Implementation

•Results

•Commentary/Conclusion

Page 3: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Overview•when a packet comes in, routed

it to an existing VM, else makes a new one with that address

•makes a copy of a template system to cary out interaction

•only keeps track of differences from template

•contains infection data to keep it from infecting others

Page 4: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Honeyfarm Architecture

Packet Packet Comes Comes

InIn

IP IP AlreadAlready A VMy A VM

OutbounOutbound Packet d Packet

SafeSafe

To To InternIntern

etet

YesVMVM

CreatCreate VMe VM

No

ForwarForward d

PacketPacket

Yes

No

Page 5: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Honeyfarm Architecture

Page 6: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Containment

•until now only seen low interaction honeyfarms

•how to keep honeyfarm from becoming worm incubator

• relies on gateway router to “scrub” the outgoing traffic

•emulates destination addresses if needed on internal network

Page 7: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Gateway Router• incoming packets to inactive IP are

sent to a non-overloaded physical server so it can be emulated

• choice is random, or calculated

•packets directed to an active IP pass to the machine where a VM has been created

•filters out “known” attacks so they don’t over-emulate the same worm

Page 8: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Gateway Router•must prevent a worm or outbreak from

starving honeyfarm of resources due to reflection

•decides when a VM should be reclaimed due to inactivity and not being successfully compromised

•also decides when a compromised machine should be reclaimed to reallocate resources

Page 9: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Virtual Machine Monitor

•at startup the system boots guest OS, and lets it warm up and start server services

•takes snapshot if system (like hibernate)

•use this snapshot to create new VMs on the fly

•leaves it running so it will update memory

Page 10: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

passed to clone manager’s queue “ clone VM”

cloned VM’s response

forward to cloned VM

packets flushed from queue “ okay”

“ change to IP A”

“ okay”

VMM - Flash Cloning

tim

e

Domain Network Stack Xen Management Daemon

Cloned VM

Clone Manager

New packet for address A

queues packets until clone is ready

Page 11: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Delta Virtualization

•At copy, each VM maps all it memory to the reference VM

•on write a private copy is stored in its own memory

•memory sharing to further reduce the amount of memory needed

Page 12: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Delta Virtualization

Page 13: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Delta Virtualization

Page 14: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Delta Virtualization

Page 15: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Results

/16 == Class B~65,536

addresses

~216

Page 16: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Results

Page 17: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Results

Page 18: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Contributions

•Show that you can make a large scale high interaction honeyfarm

•gives proof (in simulation) that it can improve efficiency of a honeyfarm

Page 19: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Weaknesses

•only tested in simulation

•only used linux based server VMs

•only tried at a /16 level

Page 20: Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm Authors: Michael Vrable, Justin Ma, Jay chen, David Moore, Erik Vandekieft, Alex.

Improvements

•use windows PC as well as Linux Servers

•use honeyd type first response so that you don’t have to clone for scanning packets