SBSM BOF Session-Based Security Model for SNMPv3

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ISMS BOF: SBSM August 6, 2004 Hardaker/Perkins SBSM BOF Session-Based Security Model for SNMPv3 Wes Hardaker David T. Perkins November, 2004 (draft-hardaker-snmp-sbsm-03.txt)

description

SBSM BOF Session-Based Security Model for SNMPv3. Wes Hardaker David T. Perkins November, 2004 (draft-hardaker-snmp-sbsm-03.txt). SBSM Protocol Proposal. Current draft: draft-hardaker-snmp-sbsm-03.txt Creates a “session” between two points 3 phases to the session: - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of SBSM BOF Session-Based Security Model for SNMPv3

Page 1: SBSM BOF Session-Based Security Model for SNMPv3

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August 6, 2004Hardaker/Perkins

SBSM BOF

Session-Based Security Model for SNMPv3

Wes Hardaker David T. PerkinsNovember, 2004

(draft-hardaker-snmp-sbsm-03.txt)

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SBSM Protocol Proposal

• Current draft:– draft-hardaker-snmp-sbsm-03.txt

• Creates a “session” between two points• 3 phases to the session:

– Initialization (Security setup, authentication)

– Running– Closing

• Initialization PDUs sent are GET/REPORT PDUs, but the application never sees them.– Similar to EngineID discovery today

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Clo

sing

Run

ning

Initi

aliz

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nSession Message Flow

SNMP App SBSM Initiator SNMP AppSBSM Responder

Note: Other SNMPv3 components (MP, etc) not shown but exist where expected

Init 1

SNMP PDU

Init 1

Init 2

Running

SNMP PDUSNMP PDU

Close

Close

...

Traffic protected by SBSM

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SBSM Disadvantages

• Based on SNMPv3 security model parameters

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SBSM Advantages

• Reuses existing transports– (UDP, TCP, IPX, AAL5, … +future)

• SNMPv3 architecture compliant• SNMPv3 application compliant• Reuses Existing Authentication Systems

– Local accounts, SSH, X.509, …– No “must have” system to make it work

• Extensible Authentication Definitions– New authentication types = 1-2 pages

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SBSM Advantages

• Supports compression• Supports identity disclosure protection• Supports true replay protection• Reuses SNMPv3 where possible

– Same message integrity (MD5, SHA-1)– Same encryption (DES, AES)

• Flexible enough to negotiate needs• Rigid enough not to make negotiation

a complex burden

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SBSM Advantages

• Based on a mathematically proven cryptographic exchange protocol– SIGMA (also used in other

protocols)

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SBSM Implementation Report

• Implementation completed for:– Local account authentication– Key negotiation– Authentication Algorithm Negotiation– Encryption Algorithm Negotiation

• Total time to implement in Net-SNMP:

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SBSM Implementation Report

• Implementation completed for:– Local account authentication– Key negotiation– Authentication Algorithm Negotiation– Encryption Algorithm Negotiation

• Total time to implement in Net-SNMP:– 19.5 Hours

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Questions?

Wes Hardaker David T. PerkinsNovember, 2004

(draft-hardaker-snmp-sbsm-03.txt)