The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 13 | Issue 18 | Number 3 | Article ID 4316 | May 04, 2015

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Sawaki Kōdō, Zen and Wartime Japan: Final Pieces of thePuzzle 沢木興道、禅宗、そして戦時下日本　パズルの最後のピース

Brian Victoria

An earlier article posted at The Asia-PacificJournal entit led “Zen Masters on theBattlefield” (available here) sparked a heatedonline debate extending over a series of articlesconcerning the wartime role of Sōtō ZenMaster Sawaki Kōdō (1880-1965).

Sawaki as a priest

Interested readers will find the relevantarticles, including both sides of the debate,here and here.

In light of this debate, I invite readers to join

me as I seek to “take readers behind thescenes” to recreate the wartime past of Zenmaster Sawaki Kōdō. Inasmuch as Sawaki’swar-related statements are already known, theprimary focus of this article is a recreation ofSawaki’s wartime activities as the final piecesof a puzzle leading to a comprehensiveunderstanding of this well-known master’swartime record.

Part I

Getting behind the scenes in Japan’s war yearsis not an easy task, for writings in the Zentradition about a particular Zen master, past orpresent, are nearly all works of hagiography,i.e., especially those written by someone in thatZen master’s Dharma lineage. This is becausedisciples invariably seek to present theirpredecessors in the best possible light,allowing them to bathe in their master’s“reflected glory” while establishing their owncredentials as bona fide Zen masters. Equallyimportant, such unconditional praise is inaccord with the Confucian moral dictum, longincorporated into Zen, that one’s master mustnever be publicly criticized.

Another major difficulty is similar to oneexperienced in Germany following the Nazi’sdefeat, i.e., few Germans were willing to admitthey had once staunchly supported Adolf Hitler.Many Postwar Germans went to great lengthsto hide their wartime complicity. Similarly, inpostwar Japan few have been willing to admitthey once supported Japanese aggressiondirected against the peoples of Asia. Eventoday, some Japanese political leaders dismissthe very idea of any Japanese wrongdoing. The

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current attempts by the Japanese governmentto disavow the role of the Japanese military inorganizing wartime sexual slavery (aka“comfort women”) are but the latest example.

Ironically, this unwillingness to admitculpability spills over, in the case of Zen, evento the Western Dharma descendants of wartimeZen masters. If their master (or master’smaster) was a fervent advocate of war and themass killing it entails, what does this say aboutthe master’s alleged “enlightenment” (or theirown)? Facing a situation, how does one goabout reconstructing a past that no one wishesto have reconstructed or be reminded of?

The first step is, of course, to look for thewartime writings of the master or masters inquestion. Fortunately, many of their commentsare still extant in the publications of theirrespective Zen institutions, whether Sōtō orRinzai. The second step is to look for thewritings of these masters that were publishedin newspapers, books or other wartimeBuddhist periodicals, including secularpublications.

Sawaki’s Statements

In attempting to reconstruct Sawaki’s wartimerecord, there is, as evidenced in previousarticles, ample proof of his efforts to employthe Buddha-dharma in support of the Japanesewar effort.1 For this article, two short exampleswill suffice:

Religion exists in the renunciationof all forms of desire. This is wherethe way is to be found. This isw h e r e e n l i g h t e n m e n t i sencountered. . . .

Expressed in terms of our Japanesemilitary, it denotes a realm inwhich wherever the flag of ourmilitary goes there is no ordeal toogreat to endure, nor enemy

numbers too numerous [ toovercome]. I call this invoking thepower of the mi l i tary f lag .Discarding one’s body beneath themilitary flag is true selflessness. 2

(Emphasis mine)

In a similar vein:

Zen master Dōgen said that weshould discard our self. He taughtthat we should quietly engage inpractice having forgotten our self.Dōgen expressed this in thechapter entitled “Life and Death”of the Shōbōgenzō [A Treasury ofthe Essence of the True Dharma]as follows: “Simply discard bodyand mind and cast yourself into therealm of the Buddha. The Buddhawill then serve as your guide, andif you follow the guidance given,you will free yourself from life anddeath, and become a Buddha,without any need to exert yourselfeither physically or mentally.”

Expressed in different words, thismeans that the orders of one’ssuperiors are to be obeyed,regardless of content. It is in doingthis that you immediately becomefaithful retainers of the emperorand perfect soldiers. If you die youwill be worshipped as a god in[Shintō] Yasukuni shrine. 3

(Emphasis mine)

Needless to say, “true selflessness” inBuddhism does not consist in “discarding one’sbody beneath the military flag” any more thanbecoming “perfect soldiers” is a teaching ofZen Master Dōgen. Something similar of course

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can be said concerning the support that all ofthe world’s major religions give to the warsfought by the nations they are a part of.

Sawaki’s Wartime Actions

While it may be possible to debate the meaningof some of Sawaki’s more obscure wartimestatements, the meaning of the two quotationsabove is clear. However, a more controversialquestion remains, i.e., did Sawaki’s wartimeactions match the Buddhist rhetoric he used toendorse Japan’s aggression? About this there ismore room for debate.

The major reason this question is moredebatable is because the evidence is less clear.For example, to the best of my knowledge,Sawaki, unlike D.T. Suzuki, left no diariesbehind detailing his wartime actions ormotivations. We must therefore rely on reportsby those who were close to Sawaki, i.e., hisdisciples, the authors of his hagiographies.Needless to say, they are highly unlikely towrite anything that is unambiguously negativeabout him. Thus, when references are made toSawaki’s wartime teachings or actions, theydeserve close attention, not just regarding thecontent of the references but, equallyimportant, the way these references fit into thelarger context of a country in the midst of whatJapanese leaders accurately described as “all-out war” (zenmen sensō).

Further, in seeking to understand Sawaki’sthought it is critically important to compareand contrast it with that of his peers. Sawaki’swartime statements must be compared withthose of other Zen masters of his time toascertain what they held in common and what,if anything, separated them. Doing this enablesus to determine if Sawaki was alone in his pro-war statements, and especially to determine ifSawaki was in any sense unique in usingBuddhist teachings as the basis for his supportof Japan’s war policies.

We find that Sawaki was but one in a long list

of both Rinzai and Sōtō Zen leaders who spokesimilarly. Sawaki’s uniqueness among his peerswas that, as a young Zen priest, he haddemonstrated his willingness, as a soldier, tokill (and be killed) on behalf of Japanesecolonial expansion in the Russo-Japanese Warof 1904-5. He subsequent ly act ivelyencouraged others to do likewise. It wasprecisely this willingness that enabled Sawakito have such a powerful wartime impact duringthe Asia-Pacific War of 1937-45.

Sawaki as a soldier

Especially in wartime, the political orientationof one’s friends, even acquaintances, providesadditional information about the nature of theperson under discussion. If Sawaki hadassociated with those few antiwar Buddhists of

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his day, we would come away with a muchdifferent impression of him than if, as we shallsee, he consistently associated with some ofJapan’s most prominent rightwing civilian andmilitary leaders.

In short, establishing context is a keyingredient of the academic enterprise. Themore contextual evidence presented, coupledwith hard facts, the greater level of confidencewe can have in conclusions reached. InSawaki’s case we have already noted themanner in which he broke his priestly vow notto kill during the Russo-Japanese War. Thus,there is no need to repeat that evidence here.Instead, let us first closely examine a secondtrip Sawaki made to China years later,beginning in March 1934 and extendingthrough August.

Before doing this, however, it is important toexamine what appears at first glance to be areasonable suspicion regarding informationconcerning Sawaki. In the first instance, thissuspicion has to do with the difference betweenbooks written about Sawaki by his disciplesversus those writings that bear Sawaki’s nameas their author. In Sawaki’s case, however, thisdifference is minimal, for none of the writings,attributed directly to Sawaki or simply quotinghim, was actually written by him. In otherwords, all of his writings, whether carrying hisname or not, were written by his disciples, nothimself. As Sawaki’s longtime disciple, SakaiTokugen, notes, “There is not a single one ofSawaki’s writings that he wrote himself. All ofthem were written stenographically.”4

There may be at least two reasons for this.First, as an impoverished youth, Sawakireceived only a primary school education. Thus,it is possible he found it tedious to writeemploying the complicated Chinese characterscomprising the Buddhist lexicon. Sawaki was,however, recognized for his wide knowledge ofthe Zen canon. Thus, a more likely explanationis the long tradition in Zen, first practiced in

China, in which the disciples of Chan (J. Zen)masters wrote down their master’s words andpublished them as if their master had writtenthem. This is not to suggest that Sawaki didnot, or could not, have carefully checked hisdisciples’ work exactly as his disciples claimedhe did.

Sawaki’s Second Trip to China

Bearing this in mind, Sakai Tokugen began hisdescription of Sawaki’s four- month China visit(March through August 1934) by quotingSawaki as follows:

Inasmuch as I had previously beenclose to Lt. General YanagawaHeisuke, he made the followingproposition to me, “Why don’t youcome to China to worship at thevarious temples there?” [I replied]“I wouldn’t be able to serve as amilitary spy, you know.” “Aha, ha,ha! It’s not something like that atall. It would be fine if you wouldjust come to worship.”5

On the surface this doesn’t seem to be aparticularly revealing conversation, let alone asinister one. Yet things begin to look differentwhen one examines the contents more closely.For starters, it is interesting to note thatSawaki, a former enlisted soldier, identifieshimself as a close friend of an Imperial Armygeneral. What was the origin of theirfriendship? And who was General Yanagawa?

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General Yanagawa Heisuke

Lt. General Yanagawa Heisuke [1879–1945]was one of the senior members of the “ImperialWay faction” in the Imperial Army. Thedomestic aim of these ultra-rightwingnationalists was the complete eradication of theremaining elements of Japanese democracy; theadoption of national socialist economic policiessimilar to the Nazis; and the restoration of fullpolitical power to Emperor Hirohito. As forforeign policy, they fully supported theexpansion of the Japanese colonial empire, yetbelieved the Soviet Union was Japan’s principalenemy due to its promotion of communism.6

In order to achieve their goals, encapsulated inthe call for a “Shōwa Restoration,” youngerfaction members committed numerous

domestic assassinations of opposing political,business and military leaders in the early1930s. These assassinations succeeded inbringing a halt to Japanese cabinets based onpolitical parties following the assassination ofPrime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi in May 1932.Because of the emphasis this faction placed on“spiritual training” ( seishin kyōiku ), both Sōtōand Rinzai Zen masters trained many of theofficers and civilians associated with it andeven defended their domestic acts of terrorismin their writings and in the courtroom.

Although still a few years in the future in 1934,during the Nanking Massacre of December1937 General Yanagawa served as commanderof the Yanagawa Imperial Army Corps. Soldiersin the units comprising this corps subsequentlytestified to having committed some of mostheinous atrocities perpetrated against theresidents of Nanjing, especially against Chinesewomen, extending over many days and weeks.

In 1948 the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunalexecuted General Matsui Iwane for his role assupreme commander during the NankingMassacre. Shortly before his death, Matsuidescribed the attitude of his subordinateofficers, including Yanagawa, as follows:

Prince Asaka was there [at theStaff Officers Meeting] as well astheater commander GeneralYanagawa. I told them that theenhancement of imperial prestigewe had accomplished had all beendebased in a single stroke by theriotous conduct of the troops.Nevertheless, after I finishedspeaking they all laughed at me.7

Be that as it may, a second question raised bythe previous quotation concerns Sawaki’sunwillingness to spy for the Imperial Army. Yet,what would have prompted Sawaki to suspectthis in the first place?

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The answer is that in the aftermath of WW I,the Imperial military, both the Army and Navy,were well known for employing real as well asfake Buddhist priests to spy for them in China.These spies had been particularly effectivewhen Japan attacked Germany’s colonialenclave in Qingdao. It was a combination of areal Buddhist priest-spy on behalf of the Navy,and a fake Buddhist priest-spy from the Army,whose robes gained them entry to that closelyguarded enclave. They told the German borderguards they had come to conduct memorialservices in the colony’s small, but strategicallylocated, Japanese Buddhist cemetery. In realitythey had both been sent to draw detaileddiagrams of German fortifications on behalf oftheir military patrons.

Given Sawaki’s military background, he wouldhave been well aware of the Imperial military’suse of Buddhist priests as spies, and it is toSawaki’s credit that he indicated hisunwillingness to be used in this manner. Yet,why would Yanagawa have issued hisinvitation, an invitation that according toJapanese custom meant he would arrangepayment for Sawaki’s trip?

A likely answer lies in a further description ofSawaki’s lengthy trip. First we learn that it wasthe Japanese consulates in Shanghai and otherChinese cities that made all of Sawaki’s travelarrangements including providing aninterpreter.8 Further, in Nanjing, the Japaneseconsulate provided him with lodging in theconsulate itself.9 But why would both theImperial Army and the Japanese governmenthave been so solicitous towards Sawaki?

One possible reason is contained within thefollowing sentence in the narrative: “My visitcame after the outbreak of the ManchurianIncident. The feelings of ordinary Chinesetoward Japan had worsened.”10

There was, in fact, more than ample reason forordinary Chinese to be filled with hostilitytoward Japan. Following a fake “anti-Japanese”

incident carried out in secret by a group ofImperial Army officers in September 1931, theJapanese military had occupied all ofnortheastern China, i.e., Manchuria and InnerMongolia. Following this, the Japanesegovernment established the puppet state ofManchukuo in March 1932. In the aftermath,the question for the Japanese military andgovernment became one of how to mollifyChinese anger toward Japan.

One pol icy adopted by the Japanesegovernment and military in response was tostress the importance of the religion, i.e.,Buddhism, which both peoples shared. Whobetter to remind the Chinese people of theirshared religious heritage than an ideologicallytrustworthy Japanese Buddhist priest likeSawaki? In fulfilling this role there was no needfor him to act as a spy. His extended travelthroughout China, including Japanese-controlled Manchuria, would be sufficient.

In this connection it should be noted that theJapanese government also paid for D.T. Suzukito travel to China to meet influential Buddhistleaders over a forty-day period beginning inMay of the same year. It is for good reason thatSuzuki’s admirers claim he visited China “in asemi-diplomatic capacity” but provide no hintof what “semi-diplomatic” activities he wasinvolved in.11 I suggest that both men likelyplayed s imi lar ro les in the Japanesegovernment ’ s e f for ts to secure theacquiescence of Chinese Buddhist leaders tothe Japanese occupation of one part of theircountry.

Another noteworthy aspect of Sakai’s book isits abrupt end, i.e., a short six pages afterSawaki’s return from China in August 1934.Thus, there is no description of Sawaki’sactions during the subsequent full-scaleinvasion of the remainder of China beginning inJuly 1937 and through Japan’s defeat in August1945. Nor is there any discussion of Sawaki’spostwar life despite the fact that he lived until

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December 1965, dying at the age of 85. Therewas, however, one notable exception to Sakai’ssilence about both Sawaki’s wartime andpostwar life.

A Brief Chronology of Sawaki’s life,

The exception consisted of an appendixincluding a chronology of Sawaki’s life listingmajor events that occurred before, during andafter the war.12 Here we focus on the wartimeera. Although brief, there is much to learn fromthis chronology.

Sawaki made two additional visits to Manchuriaduring the war years. The first was in May of1941 and the second was in May of thefollowing year. Significantly, the chronologynotes that in both years he received invitationsfrom two major Japanese companies operatingin Manchuria, i.e., Kokusai Unyu (InternationalTransport) in the first instance and, a yearlater, Manshū Dengyō (Manchuria ElectricIndustry).

Manshū Dengyō was headquartered in Tokyoand enjoyed monopoly control over allelectrical generation in Manchuria. KokusaiUnyu was a large transportation companydirectly connected to the military in that ittransported both soldiers and their equipment.Both companies had numerous branchesthroughout Manchuria where Sawaki wouldhave lectured. Yet, why would either companypay a Buddhist priest to come to Manchuria?

On the one hand, this question cannot beprecisely answered in the absence of writtenrecords of Sawaki’s presentations during hisvisits. Yet, it can be said with confidence thathis presence was deemed sufficiently valuableto the war effort that he received multipleinvitations.

However, when the question of Sawaki’sManchurian presentations is framed differently,we come up with a much more likely answer.That is to say, thanks to his wartime writings as

noted above, we know the pro-war messageSawaki delivered in Japan proper. This messagewould surely have resonated with Japaneseemployees stationed in Manchuria.

As a decorated, and seriously wounded,Imperial Army veteran from the Russo-Japanesewar, Sawaki would have enjoyed instantcredibility and respect from his audiences,especially as he had earlier helped defeat amajor Western power just as Japan was, afterDecember 7, 1941, seeking to do once again.Furthermore, Sawaki was appropriately modestabout his accomplishments: “It was just aquestion of being in the right place at the righttime - a time when a lot of killing was going on.I was lucky – that’s all.”13

Sawaki, however, had a more importantmessage to convey to his audiences in hiscapacity as a Zen priest. As noted in a previousarticle, he criticized his past performance onthe battlefield for having been marred bybravado and a desire to be recognized, if onlyin death, for his bravery in battle. In otherwords, from a Buddhist point of view, hisservice had been marred by self-attachment. Asnoted above, in the following years Sawakicame to recognize what true selflessnessconsisted of, i.e., “Discarding one’s bodybeneath the military flag is true selflessness.”Additionally, “It is in doing this that youimmediately become faithful retainers of theemperor and perfect soldiers.”

If talking about becoming “perfect soldiers” tocivilians, i.e., company employees, seemsincongruous, it is important to note that thoseBuddhist priests like Sawaki who were too oldto become soldiers during the Asia-Pacific Warwere strongly encouraged to provide morale-building lectures to Japanese companyemployees and factory workers. As stated in acall from the multi-sect “Great Japan BuddhistFederation,” (Dainihon Bukkyō-kai) priestswere “expected to provide spiritual trainingand guidance to the industrial warriors” (

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sangyō senshi ).14 In the midst of a losing war itwas ever more critical to instill in civilianemployees the same spirit of self-sacrifice untodeath as the battlefield soldier. In theaccomplishment of this task it is hard toconceive of anyone better qualified thanSawaki.

A Final Note of Interest

There is one final note of interest in Sakai’schronology, namely, in March 1945 Sawakimoved to the residence of MaruyamaTsurukichi. The reference, however, neitherexplains what caused Sawaki to move or whoMaruyama was. March 1945 marked thebeginning of the firebombing of Tokyo by B-29bombers that destroyed the heart of the cityand took more than 100,000 lives, so this mayhave forced Sawaki to move. But who was theman who took him in?

Maruyama Tsurukichi

Briefly, Maruyama Tsurukichi (1883-1956) hadrisen through police ranks to serve as the headof the “Special Higher Police” (Tokubetsu KōtōKeisatsu), the Japanese equivalent of the NaziGestapo, in Kagawa Prefecture and later thehead of the colonial police force in Korea. Thiswas at the time of the Korean independencemovement of 1919. According to researchconducted by Park Eunsik, the bloodycombination of military and police suppressionthat followed resulted in 7,509 people killed,15,849 wounded, and 46,303 arrested.15

Maruyama returned to Japan in 1924, this timetaking charge of suppressing leftwing activitiesat home, especially labor unions and strikes.Maruyama continued to rise through the ranksuntil by 1945 he was tasked with mobilizing theentire northeastern area of Japan inpreparation for the expected Allied invasion.Following the war, Maruyama was initiallybanished from holding public office by theAllied Occupation Forces. However, in 1951 heassumed the presidency of Musashino BijutsuGakkō (Musashino Art School). Be that as itmay, the question remains as to why hadMaruyama had taken Sawaki in?

It is reasonable to assume that it had someconnection to three additional entries in Sakai’schronology. First, from December 23, 1939onwards, Sawaki served on a governmentcommission charged with promoting themartial arts among Japanese school children aspart of their preparation for military service.Second, on November 22, 1941 Sawaki wasappointed to serve on a governmentcommission devoted to enhancing the physicalstrength of all citizens. These and relatedcontributions led the Japanese government’sBureau of Decorations to award a “Medal ofHonor” in the form of a silver cup to Sawaki for“promoting the public interest” on November 3,1943.

Interim Conclusion

It is in the nature of the work of the religious

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historian to develop logical hypotheses basedon available information while simultaneouslyremaining prepared to modify or even rejectthese hypotheses when confronted withadditional information. The process of ongoingdiscovery makes the religious historian’s workboth interesting and challenging.

In Sawaki’s case it is clear I have reached sometentative hypotheses about the nature of hiswartime activities based on solid if incompleteinformation.

At this point, Sawaki’s wartime actions, like hiswords, appear to be entirely congruent withthose of a strong if not fervent supporter ofJapan’s military aggression. The onlyinformation we have to the contrary is that hedeclined, if only half in jest, to become a spy forthe Imperial Army. Yet, like D.T. Suzuki, heaccepted the largesse of the Japanesegovernment in undertaking a four-month tripthrough China at a time when China-Japanrelations were severely strained.

Nevertheless, I have yet to prove myhypotheses concerning the nature of Sawaki’swartime activities. I have merely provided anintroduction to those activities coupled with aplausible explanation of their significance.There is, however, additional informationconcerning Sawaki’s wartime activities.

Part II

The focus of Part II is on Sawaki’s wartimeactivities as presented in the writings of yetanother of his disciples, a layman namedTanaka Tadao. Tanaka wrote a two-volumetribute to Sawaki entitled: “ Sawaki Kōdō –Kono Koshin no Hito (Sawaki Kōdō – Heart ofan Ancient Man).16 Tanaka was a respectedmember of Sawaki’s long-time disciples. Hewas so respected that Sakai invited him towrite a preface to his own book on Sawaki, theonly one of Sawaki’s disciples so honored.

Tanaka’s book consists of two volumes, totaling

946 pages, indicates that it contains a muchmore detailed picture of Sawaki than the 283pages of Sakai’s book. However, references toSawaki’s activities during the Asia-Pacific Warare contained almost entirely in the secondvolume.

In his preface Tanaka notes that he wrote hisbiography based on his own recollections aswell as the recollections of others who knewSawaki well. Tanaka attended severalgatherings of those who knew Sawaki where herecorded their reminisces with his taperecorder. He frequently includes thesereminisces in his book, placing quotation signsaround the recorded material. However, heseldom identifies who or where something wassaid, making it difficult for the scholar tounravel events.

Tanaka Tadao’s Political Background

Before examining the war-related content ofTanaka’s two volumes, it is important toexamine Tanaka’s political orientation, for itclearly has an impact on his view of Sawaki. AsTanaka explains (p. 159),17 he had beenimprisoned from 1937-39 under suspicion ofbeing a member of the leftwing popular frontmovement. However, while in prison heunderwent a process known as tenkō, i.e.,coerced ideological conversion in whichprisoners rejected their previous leftwing viewsand pledged loyalty to the emperor and state.In postwar Japan he went on to become a majorultra-nationalist. To give but one example of hislater political views, consider Tanaka’s eulogyoffered at the time of the suicide of the famouspostwar ultra-nationalist novelist and actor,Mishima Yukio.

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Mishima Yukio

On November 25, 1970, Mishima, accompaniedby four members of his private army, addressedsoldiers of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces inTokyo, urging them to rise up, launch a coupd'état, and restore political power to theemperor. The assembled soldiers, however,only laughed at Mishima’s call to arms. Deeplydisappointed, Mishima committed traditionalritual suicide by disemboweling himself, i.e.,seppuku .

For Tanaka, Mishima’s call for a militaryuprising was of no concern. He wrote:

Mishima has carried out thewishes of our ancestors by neverceasing to pray for the defense ofthe sacred nature of the emperor. .. .Since Mishima’s death, there hasbeen a continual increase in theinfluence of Japan’s communistforces together with an increasewithin conservative politicalparties of the influence of thosecu l t i va t ing a human i s t i c ,

ambiguous awareness of nationalidentity. It is necessary for thosewho uphold the lofty ideal of loveof country to unceasingly cling toMishima’s spirit.18

It is through this ultra-nationalist prism thatTanaka's view of Sasaki's wartime record needsto be assessed.

Tanaka on Sawaki

The first thing to note is that Tanaka is verymuch aware of the need to address both thewar itself as well as Sawaki’s relationship to it.We see this as early as the second page of thepreface to his book. Addressing his Japanesereaders, Tanaka writes:

Impertinent Japanese intellectualsclaim that it was reckless to fight awar with an enemy like the UnitedStates when it was clear to all thatJ a p a n w o u l d l o s e . T h e s eunrepentant, idle spectators statethat Japan’s defeat was only to beexpected. That is to say, theseimpertinent intellectuals treat theJapanese people with contempt.They have gone in a worthlessdirection, masochistically andmeekly echoing the viewpoint thatseverely criticizes the Japanesep e o p l e a s c r i m i n a l s o n aworldwide-scale.

Tanaka then contrasts Sawaki with thesemasochistic intellectuals: “The entire body andmind of [our] master was brimming with aspirited bravery.”

Tanaka identifies one of the impertinentintellectuals (p. 459). In a section entitled,“Rats, Too, Form an Unbroken Line” (i.e., in afashion similar to the Imperial family), Tanaka

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introduces Professor Ichikawa Hakugen whotaught at Rinzai Zen sect-affiliated HanazonoUniversity in Kyoto.

Ichikawa was certainly an intellectual, but hewas a l so a R inza i Zen pr i e s t . Whatdistinguished Ichikawa from his peers was thatin 1970 he had written a book entitled The WarResponsibility of Buddhists ( Bukkyō-sha noSensō-sekinin ). In 1975 he wrote a companionbook, Japanese Religion under Fascism ( NihonFashizumu ka no Shūkyō ). In his first bookIchikawa both admitted and repented his ownwartime support of Japanese aggression.However, for the first time in postwar Japan, healso identified those many, many other Zenfigures, including both Sawaki and D.T. Suzuki,who had said and written similar things duringthe war.

Tanaka could not abide Ichikawa for havingcriticized Sawaki, in particular, Sawaki’sadmonition to “Invoke the Power of the MilitaryBanner” (Nenpi Gunki-riki) instead of thetraditional Mahāyāna invocation: “Invoke thePower of Kannon (Skt., Avalokiteśvara)” (NenpiKannon-riki). Tanaka rebuked Ichikawa asfollows:

Professor Ichikawa Hakugen ofHanazono University has ridiculedand made fun of Sawaki Kōdō forhis “Invoke the Power of theMilitary Banner,” asking if this isall that a famous Zen master iscapable of. Ichikawa heaped abuseon him implying this was somekind of strange superstition. SinceIchikawa wrote this in his bookthere is no doubt that he meant itseriously.

However, if it is appropriate to callthis a superstition, then theKannon Sutra itself must be asuperstition as well. The KannonSutra . . . states that when an

unlimited number of sentientbeings, facing various forms ofdistress, wholeheartedly call on thename of Kannon Bodhisattva, thenKannon wil l graciously andimmediately deliver them fromtheir distress. For example, even ifsomeone is thrown into a greatfire, they will remain unburned.Further, if someone attacksintending to kill you, if you but callon the name of this Bodhisattvathen the attacker’s sword willbreak into little pieces. There aremany other examples from thissutra that could be given, butaren’t they a l l examples ofsuperstition?

Hey professor, how do you explainthis superstitious writing?

Note that Tanaka does not deny that Sawakiwrote the admonition calling on soldiers toinvoke the power of the military banner duringthe war years. Instead he takes Ichikawa totask for the criticism of Sawaki. Namely, ifinvoking the power of the Imperial military’sbanner is superstitious then so must be theinvoking of Kannon’s power. In Tanaka’s mindthere was no difference between the two.

Was Sawaki a Militarist?

Just how deeply concerned Tanaka was withSawaki’s wartime reputation is furtherdemonstrated by a section in Chapter Elevenentitled, appropriately, “Was [Sawaki]Complicit in Japanese Militarism?” Tanakaacknowledges (p. 357) that Ichikawa was notthe only one to have criticized Sawaki’swartime conduct:

There are those whom Nietzschehas described as shallow minded,i.e., frivolous, who attached such

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things as a label of militarism [toSawaki] or claimed that he severedhis relationship with Zen Buddhismor opportunistically went alongwith the times. However, aspreviously noted, the wartimeactions of Sawaki Kōdō show notraces of his having been cut offfrom the Buddha-dharma or simplygoing along with the times. Insteadhe went straight ahead, lookingneither to the left nor right,constantly at one with the Buddha-dharma.

On the one hand, in light of Tanaka’s politicalorientation, it is not surprising to find himdismissing Sawaki’s critics as he does. Yet, onthe same page Tanaka does level the followingcriticism against what he calls “Japanesereligion”:

Japanese religion, especiallyBuddhism, has never been thedriving force behind conflicts withother nations. However, up to thepresent time, it has failed to exertitself to transcend such conflicts.Therefore, when war comes andthe people rise up to fight as amatter of life and death [Japanesereligion/Buddhism] ends upcooperating with the war-makingcapacity of its own country.

This is, I think, a rather strong criticism.Whether Tanaka’s criticism was, if onlyobliquely, meant to apply to Sawaki as well, isup to the reader to decide. In any event,Tanaka does not attempt to defend Sawaki byclaiming that critics missed the subtlety of hismaster’s thought or that he was opposed toeither war in general or the Asia-Pacific War inparticular.

Another missed opportunity

With more than 900 pages in two volumes, onemight think that Tanaka would have seized theopportunity to respond to Sawaki’s “shallow-minded” critics by setting the record straighton his master’s wartime stance, both in wordand deed. Yet, the title of Chapter Elevenmakes it clear this is a false hope, namely:“Immediately Before the Great War andImmediately After It.” As with Sakai’s book, thewar years draw yet another yawning blank. Inshort, two of Sawaki's most ardent defendersboth sidestep his record during the war years.

Nevertheless, when read closely, Tanakaincludes bits and pieces of information thataddress aspects of Sawaki’s wartime actionsalbeit not his wartime writings. First of all, heconfirms what we already know and adds topatterns of conduct first described by Sakai.For example, Tanaka introduces Sakai’sdescription of Sawaki’s wartime Dharma talks(p. 455) given at the lay-oriented Zen trainingcenter attached to Daichūji temple:

In Sawaki’s lectures on Zen MasterDōgen’s writings, you will findsuch phrases as “the eight cornersof the world under one roof” and“the way of the gods” scatteredthroughout. At that time we alltruly believed in such things as“one hundred million [citizens] ofone mind” and “self-annihilationfor the sake of one’s country.” Wewere consumed with the thought ofrepaying the debt of gratitude weowed the state, and we incessantlyfeared for the destiny our nation.

The importance of the above quotation is that itconfirms Sawaki’s incorporation of the mostimperialistic and deadly elements of Japanesewartime propaganda into his lectures on thewritings of Zen Master Dōgen. For example,

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the Shinto-derived slogan, “the eight corners ofthe world under one roof” (hakkō ichiu), wasclosely connected to the belief that Japan was adivine land ruled by a divine emperor. Thisserved as the basis for Japan’s claim to havebeen divinely anointed to rule all of Asia. It alsomeant that Japan was engaged in a “holy war”(seisen).

Additionally, the phrase “self-annihilation forthe sake of one’s country” was perhaps themost deadly of all of Japan’s wartime slogans. Itdemanded that every Japanese citizen, militaryor civilian, be prepared to die in the war effort.If this claim sounds extreme we need only lookat many similar exhortations. For example, inMay 1944 Zen Master Kumazawa Taizen, chiefabbot of Eiheiji, the temple where Sawakitrained, wrote:

When the invasion comes, all menand women must become soldiersto ward off the enemy. Our sloganmust be, “One person kills oneperson,” meaning that if onehundred thousand of the enemycome, then we will kill all onehundred thousand, each personkilling one. I hear that militarypractice with bamboo staves hasalready begun. This is exactly thespirit and practice we need. . . .This is unquestionably the timethat all the people of this nationmust rouse themselves to action.Now is the time to truly face theproblem of death.

And Kumazawa added: “In the presentemergency we must resolutely fight to the end.In this effort Zen faith and practice are of greatimportance.”19

Although these are not Sawaki’s words, butthose of his ecclesiastical superior, theynevertheless give concrete expression to such

slogans as “one hundred million [citizens] ofone mind” and “self-annihilation for the sake ofone’s country.” And while it is true that statesand their militaries throughout the world havelong used religious leaders to promote theirwars, seldom, if ever, have religious leaderscalled on all citizens of their country to carryout actions tantamount to mass suicide.

A key piece of information

The argument can be made that in Sawaki’scase his embrace of wartime Japanesepropaganda had little influence beyond hisclerical and lay disciples. However, Tanakaprovides significant information that indicatesthe importance of Sawaki’s wartime activities,including his writings, visits to Manchuria andJapanese prisons, etc. Tanaka writes (p. 357),“[Sawaki]-rōshi was also active both inside andoutside [of Japan] as a lecturer for the ‘People’sSpiritual Culture Institute’ ( Kokumin SeishinBunka Kenkyūjo ).” In other words, Sawaki wasa lecturer for an institute established in 1932by the Japanese government’s Ministry ofEducation for the express purpose ofcountering leftist thought among students,particularly Marxism and other foreignideologies, while at the same time promotingloyalty to the emperor and state.

Whether Sawaki was paid for his services wedon’t know though it is likely that he was sincethis institute was directly funded and controlledby the Ministry of Education. In any event,Sawaki had a formal role in the government’swar effort through the Institute. We mayspeculate that Sawaki was invited to lecturecompany employees in Manchuria, as well asprison inmates, as an extension of his duties.

Sawaki’s Travel to China in 1934

Tanaka provides further information about thefunding for Sawaki’s four month long tour ofChina in 1934. Tanaka notes (p. 75) that theMinistry of Foreign Affairs of the Japanesegovernment paid for one half of the cost of

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Sawaki’s four-month visit. Tanaka states (p. 73)that Sawaki received an additional five hundredyen from Imperial Army Lt. General YanagawaHeisuke. Tanaka states, however, there areconflicting stories about whether Sawakireceived the latter sum directly from Yanagawaas well as how close the two men were.Nevertheless, this is one indication of the closerelationship that existed between Buddhistleaders and the Japanese government andmilitary during the expansion into Manchuria.

Yet the question lingers, i.e., what did theJapanese military and government hope to gainfrom a trip like the one undertaken by Sawaki(or, as previously mentioned, by D.T. Suzuki forthat matter)? Although Tanaka never directlyaddresses this question, he does repeatedlymention the increasing tensions between Japanand China. Tanaka quotes Sawaki (p. 97) asfollows:

Despite the fact that anti-Japanesefeelings grew stronger day by day,I felt the continental [Chinese]people remained as calm andcollected as before. I imagine thatwhen [Chinese] visited Japan theym u s t h a v e h a d s o m e b a dexperiences. Nonetheless, theyspared no effort in guiding atraveler from Japan like me. Well, Ithink this must be because I camein the shape of a Buddhist priest.There is a long tradition [in China]in which it is natural to harborgood feelings toward priests. I amgrateful for that.

I think it can be safely said that in this instancethe Japanese government and military got itsmoney’s worth.

Sawaki’s wartime visits to Manchuria

Still further new information concerns Sawaki’s

trips to wartime Manchuria, the first of whichtook place in June 1941 (although Sakai wroteit took place in May). Tanaka explains thatbeginning in 1941 (p. 301) Sawaki gavelectures in various parts of that country for thenext few years. But what did Sawaki say?Tanaka explains:

At the time of his first preachingtour (junshaku), [Sawaki] made along trip to Harbin where headdressed some three thousand[Japanese] agricultural pioneers onthe outskirts of the city. He toldthem that they should act humblytoward the Manchurians. Althought h i s w a s a t i m e b e f o r eloudspeakers, his voice was asstrong as always, and everyonecould hear him.

Tanaka provides further details (p. 341):

While in Manchuria, Sawakiaccepted invitations for lecturesnot on his original schedule. One ofthese was an invitation from thepresident of the ManchuriaColonial Development Company.Sawaki got in a truck and went tothe outskirts of the city of Harbinin Manchuria’s interior.

Some three thousand agriculturalpioneers were there carrying rifleson their shoulders, undergoingmilitary training.

These pioneers used this monthevery year to engage in militaryexercises since they couldn’tengage in planting before the endof May. The assumption of theirtraining was that they might haveto defend Manchuria from an

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invasion from the north [i.e., fromthe Soviet Union]. A platform theheight of the second floor of ahouse had been built on thetraining grounds. Kōdō climbed upthe ladder and spoke from theplatform.

Although Tanaka doesn’t mention it, there areseveral questions that need to be addressedconcerning these so-called agriculturalpioneers. The first and foremost of these is howlandless farmers in Japan suddenly becamelandowners in Manchuria? In an articleentitled, “Japan in Manchuria: AgriculturalEmigrat ion in the Japanese Empire ,1932-1945,” Kevin McDowell writes:

Often, rather than pioneeringuncultivated land, many of thecolonists, aided by the heavy-handed methods of the [Japanese]Kwantung Army, the East AsianDevelopment Company, and theManchukuo government, simplytook over Chinese farms. Thus,while lip-service was paid to thenotion of opening new land forcultivation, a large percentage ofthe fields acquired by the colonistswere simply taken over fromChinese peasants, who werepressed into selling their propertyat rock-bottom prices, and thengiven the choice of either movingout or working for the newJapanese owners. 2 0

Second, it is not surprising that militarytraining was important to these emigrantfarmers for by 1941 they were fast becomingthe object of ever more frequent armed attacksby bands of Chinese and Korean partisansseeking to end the Japanese occupation, not tomention bands of roving bandits. In addition,

this training was equally if not more importantto the Japanese Imperial Army stationed inManchuria, known as the Kwantung Army. AsKobayashi Kōji notes:

The Army expects that colonialemigrants along the frontier willbe of great value. In wartime it isabsolutely necessary to haveJapanese villages and Japanesenat ionals on the border. . ..Emigrants will defend militaryfacilities, safeguard the border,and supply foodstuffs to the army.21

Finally, it is important to understand theoverall nature of the colonial enterprise theseagricultural pioneers were a part of. KevinMcDowell concludes his article, “Japan inManchuria: Agricultural Emigration in theJapanese Empire, 1932-1945” as follows:

As the emigration movement grewfrom a small-scale trial emigrationprogram in 1932 to the massmigrat ion pro ject in 1937,e c o n o m i c o b j e c t i v e s a n dideological conceptions lost force,as imagery and idealism clashedwith realities on the ground andmilitary might and the unevenpower balance shaped contact andconflict between the agriculturalcolonists, Chinese, and other localinhabitants. In the process, theemigrants acted as an instrumento f J a p a n e s e i m p e r i a l i s m ,s u p p r e s s i n g t h e C h i n e s epopulation and fortifying theManchurian-Soviet border.22

Of course, it can be argued that Japanesecolonists in Manchuria were doing no morethan what colonists have always done, e.g. the

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British in India or Africa, the Americans in thePhilippines, the French in Indochina, etc. Whiletrue, this does not change the basic immoralityof the enterprise, i.e. it is an act of theft. Atleast in theory, all religions oppose theft.

In the case of Buddhism, the second preceptthat all Buddhists, lay and cleric, pledge tofollow is, “Refrain from stealing.” This includes,of course, taking someone else's property. As apriest, Sawaki had pledged to uphold thisprecept even as he travelled throughoutManchuria in support of Japan’s colonialefforts. It strains credibility to the breakingpoint to believe that Sawaki’s only message toJapanese colonists was to “act humbly towardthe Manchurians” even as the latters’ landswere being taken from them.

Even should Sawaki have called for Japaneseco lon i s t s to ac t humbly toward theManchurians, it wouldn’t change the fact thathe supported acts of theft on a grand scale. In apostwar statement concerning Japan’s wartimeactions, Sawaki as much as admitted this. Hestated:

With the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), weenlarged Japanese territory andannexed Korea. We believed that itreally happened. . . . I myself was asoilder [sic] during the Russo-Japanese War and fought hard onthe battlefield. But since we hadlost what we had gained, I can seethat what we did was useless.”

Sawaki clearly recognized that Japan hadattempted to “gain” through war what had notbeen theirs. His statement suggests that it wasJapan’s failure to hold on to these gains thatmade the war effort “useless.”

Sawaki Lectures in Prison

Manchuria was not the only place Sawaki wasactive during the war years. Tanaka describes a1938 lecture (p. 297) Sawaki gave to prisonersin Tokyo’s Kosuge prison. Tanaka notes,“Among the prisoners who listened to Rev.Sawaki’s lectures were those who are known asthought offenders (shisō-han).” Tanakaexplained that these thought offenders includedleftwing figures like Sano Manabu, Chairman ofthe Central Committee of the JapaneseCommunist Party, as well as ultranationalistsimprisoned for their role in the May 1932assassination of Prime Minister InukaiTsuyoshi.

Tanaka then quotes a portion of Sawaki’s talk,“At the time I intended to become a priest [as ayoung man], I was wearing black clothing. As aresult I was suspected of being a thief and putin prison. Therefore I’m just the same as you.”After that, Tanaka notes, Sawaki talked aboutthe way he had been interrogated as well assubjected to torture by the police.

At this point Tanaka quotes an unidentifiedinformant: “Up to then there had never been alecturer who spoke in such a down to earthway. It appears the prisoners thought this wassomeone they could talk to, and they listenedwith interest to the very end [of his talk].”

Tanaka returns to the reasons (p. 261) for thesuccess of Sawaki’s prison talk:

Sawaki, who from childhood hadgrown up in the worst possibleenvironment, was able to begin histalk with his own experience ofhaving been imprisoned. This iswhat Buddhism calls the practiceof “identification [with others]” (dōji ). You begin your talk bycompletely identifying with theother person. When Sawaki was ay o u n g p r i e s t h e h a d b e e nsuspected of being a thief andspent some days locked up in the

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Hyogo Prefectural jail. Sawaki wasgrateful for this experiencebecause, thanks to it, he was ableto overcome the prisoners’antipathy.

Although Tanaka does give the name of theperson who shared the above information, it islikely to have been one of the prison officialspresent at Sawaki’s lecture. This informant wasclearly impressed with Sawaki’s efforts andrecognized that his ability to bond withprisoners was key to the change of attitudenecessary to effect tenkō . Given this, it isreasonable to assume that Sawaki was invitedback on one or more occasions to presentfurther lectures, especially because once“thought offenders” were deemed to have beensufficiently rehabilitated they could be releasedto join the war effort.

Tanaka describes a second group of prisoners(p. 172), or more accurately “ex-prisoners,”Sawaki lectured to. Significantly, this time thegroup was composed entirely of leftwingthought offenders who were no longer inprison. Like Tanaka himself, the assembled ex-prisoners had all done tenkō and repented theirprevious leftwing affiliations.

Tanaka explains the background (p. 257) toSawaki’s lecture as follows:

Around 1937 a law was passedentitled, “The Law to Protect andSupervise Thought Offenders” (Shisō-han Hogo Kansatsu-hō ).Shortly after I arrived in Tokyo[following my release from prison],I was ordered by the head of theTokyo Office for Protection andSupervision [of Thought Offenders]to attend a lecture at Sōjiji Temple,one of the head temples of the SōtōZen sect located in the Tsurumidistrict of Kanagawa Prefecture. . .

. All of the approximately fortyattendees had been sent thereunder this law.

As so often in the past, Tanaka reports Sawakibegan his lecture as follows:

Due to my service at the time ofthe Russo-Japanese War, I receivedthe Order of the Golden Kite. Butthis was not because I had doneanything special. Well, if I were toexplain it I would say that it wassimply a case of getting lucky onthe spur of the moment.

Tanaka’s description once again demonstratesSawaki’s astute involvement in the process ofrehabilitating thought offenders, i.e., politicalprisoners. Sawaki’s earlier lecture in prisonwas definitely not a one-time affair. In addition,the fact that the law enforcement agencyresponsible for supervising thought offendersmade the arrangements for Sawaki’s lectureindicates that the content of his message wascongruent with their ideological agenda.

Although two examples of Sawaki’s lecturing tothought offenders do not prove his continuousinvolvement in this kind of activity, at aminimum they suggest a pattern of behavior.Tanaka further reinforces this pattern when hepraises Sawaki (p. 261) for “having gone to thepolice and prisons.” Sawaki’s assigned rolewas, after all, not only to oppose Marxistthought but also to promote loyalty to emperorand state. Given the above, it is once againreasonable to assume that Sawaki addressedthought offenders with some degree ofregularity.

From 1938 onwards Sawaki found time to givetalks to those “thought offenders” who hadbeen freed from prison following disavowal oftheir previous leftwing, anti-war views but were

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still under police supervision. He also went intoprisons holding such offenders in order toconvince them to cooperate with theprosecution of the war.

Sawaki was viewed as being particularly goodat this kind of work not least because his ownpoverty-stricken childhood had contributed to adown-to-earth ability to identify with offenders.For example, he typically began his talks with adescription of his own one-month imprisonmentat age eighteen when he had been mistakenlyarrested as a thief.

Further police connections

Two additional pieces of evidence suggestSawaki enjoyed a close relationship with thepolice. The first is the regular meditationclasses (zazen-kai) Sawaki held for policemen.Tanaka informs us (p. 157) that Sawaki’scontact with the police began at the beginningof 1936, just at the time of a major uprising byyoung Imperial Way faction-affiliated officersand their subordinates known as the February26 Incident. In fact, Sawaki had to postpone hisfirst lecture to police division heads due to theimposition of martial law that accompanied theuprising.

Sawaki’s lectures and zazen practice becameso popular that he was invited to conduct themon a regular basis at the police academy. Thetwo-hour sessions, consisting of an hour lectureand an hour of zazen , were called “Life is Zen”( Seikatsu soku Zen ). Sawaki personally guidedthe sessions once a month and his disciple,Inatomi Shūyū, led the group on the otherweeks. Tanaka makes it very clear (p. 159) thatthese sessions were directly connected to theneed for the police to “steel body and mind” (rensei) in what was already understood to bethe national crisis facing Japan.

The second event concerns Sawaki’s move inMarch 1945 to the home of MaruyamaTsurukichi, the top police official previouslyintroduced in Part I of this article. We learn

that the dormitory and Zen training centerSawaki ran for Sōtō Zen-affiliated KomazawaUniversity (p. 304) was closed because of thegovernment’s order requiring the evacuation ofTokyo due to the firebombing. By way ofbackground Tanaka explains: “The scale of thewartime chaos gradually increased, and thecitizens of Tokyo were in a miserable state,frantically running around this way and that.”

Tanaka then explains the reason Sawaki choseto move to Maruyama’s residence: “In March1945 [Sawaki] moved to the home of MaruyamaTsurukichi, former police commissioner, whohad been a long time devotee ( shinja ) of Rev.Kōdō.”

Given Sawaki’s decade long relationship withthe police as noted above, it is hardlysurprising to learn of the close relationshipbetween these two men. Nevertheless, Tanakafailed to mention that by this time Maruyamahad been put in charge of preparing all ofnortheastern Japan for the expected Alliedinvasion. Sawaki ’s devotee was nowresponsible for issuing, or at least conveying,the order for the many thousands of women(among others) in his area of responsibility torepel the Allied forces once they landed. Armedwith sharpened bamboo spears, these womenwere expected to make a suicidal attackaga ins t A l l i ed tanks equ ipped wi thflamethrowers, machine guns and well-armedsoldiers.

It was the above information that led me toconclude in Part I of “Zen Masters on theBattlefield” as follows: “Maruyama extendedthis invitation [to stay at his house] because ofSawaki’s longtime cooperation with Japanesepolice officials, part of whose wartime job wasto apprehend and imprison anyone suspected ofbeing opposed to the government and its wareffort.”

In light of the above evidence, it is impossibleto believe that Maruyama, as Sawaki’s devotee,was unaware of the many contributions Sawaki

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had made to police activities.

Conclusion

Although further examples are available, I trustthe basis for my overall conclusions concerningSawaki’s wartime record is now clear. Sawaki’sactions, like his teachings, were those of onewho was totally committed to supporting theJapanese war effort. On the one hand, SakaiTokugen and Tanaka Tadao did their best tosimply ignore, if not erase, Sawaki’s wartimewords and actions. On the other hand, theirown clear sympathies for Japan’s war effort ledthem, in writing for a postwar Japaneseaudience, to provide bits and pieces of asanitized version of Sawaki’s war-relatedactivities even as they downplayed the specificcontent of his war writings.

In Tanaka’s case, when this was not possible,as in the case of Ichikawa Hakugen, he soughtto ridicule this Rinzai priest and professor ofZen Studies for having dared to criticizeSawaki. Nevertheless, it should now be clearthat Sawaki’s wartime actions were entirelyconsistent with his wartime writings, writingsthat were beyond his disciples’ ability to erasefrom the historical record. In short, Sawaki wasbut one of many Zen masters who wrote andacted similarly.

While the actions of these Buddhist leadersmay be described as “patriotic,” what should bea matter of deep concern to followers ofBuddhism is the way in which they twisted andmisappropriated Buddhist teachings to supportJapan’s aggression in World War II, resulting inone of the greatest collective bloodlettings inhuman history. Although referenced onlybriefly, Sawaki even sought to justify theaggression of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.24

If such abuses of Buddhism were no more than‘past history’, the importance of bringing thisissue up yet again might be questioned. Sadly,however, it is the countries of which WesternBuddhists are a part, i.e., the United States and

its European allies, who remain in the forefrontof the ongoing killing taking place in the worldtoday, including the invasion of other countriesunder false pretenses and the assassination ofthe inhabitants of additional countries bydrones, etc. on a truly worldwide scale.

Thus, the question of how Western Buddhistswill react to this carnage is an immediate andongoing challenge, for react they must. Todate, the most obvious reaction has been thecreation of a Buddhist military chaplaincywithin the U.S. military. Although not wellknown, some American soldiers stationed onthe battlefield, e.g., in Iraq, now take part inBuddhist chaplain-led zazen practice beforegoing out on missions to “take out” the allegedenemy.25

It is noteworthy that U.S. Navy Buddhistchaplain and True Pure Land (Shin) priest, Lt.Jeanette Yuinen Shin justified killing the enemyusing rationales similar to those of herJapanese Buddhist predecessors. In a January2008 Dharma talk entitled: “Shakyamuni – TheFirst Warrior,” Shin noted, “SiddharthaGautama (his birth name) was born into thekshatriya varna, or caste, of ancientIndia/Nepal. This was the caste of the warriors,the rulers and aristocrats of ancient India. . ..The Buddha's Enlightenment was described asa ‘battle’ between himself and Mara, theembodiment of death and evil.”

Shin continued:

The ancient texts emphasize theneed for determination, sacrifice,and courage for Buddhists tofollow the path of Buddha-dharma,to bear up under hardships inorder to achieve the highest goal ahuman being can atta in: toconquer death, fear, ignorance,evil, and thereby attain liberation.The qualities of a good warrior areexactly the qualities needed for a

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serious Buddhist practitioner. 26

(Emphasis mine)

According to Buddhist chaplains like Shin,American Buddhist soldiers are merely carryingout Śākyamuni Buddha’s mission to defeat evilas they go about killing America’s enemiesthroughout the world. In that sense, the likes ofSawaki, Yasutani, D.T. Suzuki, et al. havealready won the battle for the “hearts andminds” of America’s Buddhist militarychaplains and the more than five thousandBuddhist soldiers in their care.27 But thequestion must be asked, is this the message ofBuddhism?

The Japanese have a saying that has much toteach us in this regard, i.e., hanmen kyōshi or“teachers by negative example.” In this limitedsense, Sawaki, et al. have much to teach us,most especially about how readily and easilythe Buddha-dharma can be coopted, corruptedand ultimately betrayed in order to justify thedeaths of human beings, aka the ‘enemy’, on atruly massive scale, not to mention the death ofone’s own soldiers. Instead of bringing arelease from suffering, Buddhism becomes, likeother world religions, a tool to rationalize andenhance suffering many times over.

If Buddhists are ever to free themselves fromthis entrapment, the first step is to recognizewhat has been done, and by whom. Toward thisend, it is time to move beyond the denials andobfuscations that have been such a prominentpart of the current debate on Sawaki Kōdō,among others. Only then can Sawaki’s role asone of many “teachers by negative example” berecognized. Once the appropriate lessons havebeen learned, we can transcend nationalchauvinism and proceed to create a Buddhismthat is truly dedicated to the welfare of allsentient beings.

Brian Daizen Victoria holds an M.A. inBuddhist Studies from Sōtō Zen sect-affiliatedKomazawa University in Tokyo, and a Ph.D.

from the Department of Religious Studies atTemple University. In addition to a 2nd,enlarged edition of Zen At War (Rowman &Littlefield), writings include Zen War Stories (RoutledgeCurzon) and Zen Master Dōgencoauthored with Prof. Yokoi Yūhō of Aichi-gakuin University (Weatherhill). He is a VisitingResearch Fellow at the International ResearchCenter for Japanese Studies (Nichibunken) inKyoto.

Related articles

• Narusawa Muneo and Brian Victoria, “War isa Crime”: Takenaka Shōgen and BuddhistResistance in the Asia-Pacific War and Today

• Karl Baier, The Formation and Principles ofCount Dürckheim’s Nazi Worldview and hisinterpretation of Japanese Spirit and Zen

• Brian Victoria , Zen Masters on theBattlefield (Part I)

• Brian Victoria , Zen Masters on theBattlefield (Part II)

• Brian Victoria, A Zen Nazi in Wartime JapanCount Dürckheim and his Sources—D.T.Suzuki, Yasutani Haku’un and Eugen Herrigel

• Vladimir Tikhonov, South Korea’s ChristianMilitary Chaplaincy in the Korean War -religion as ideology?

• Brian Victoria, Buddhism and Disasters:From World War II to Fukushima

• Brian Victoria, Karma, War and Inequalityin Twentieth Century Japan

Recommended citation: Brian Daizen Victoria,"Sawaki Kōdō, Zen and Wartime Japan: FinalPieces of the Puzzle", The Asia-Pacific Journal,Vol. 13, Issue 18, No. 3, May 4, 2015.

Notes

1 See articles here and here.

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2 Sawaki, “Shōji o Akirameru Kata” (TheMethod of Clarifying Life and Death) in theMay 1944 issue of Daihōrin, pp. 5-7. Availableon the Web here (accessed 29 September2014).

3 Sawaki, “Shōji o Akirameru Kata” (TheMethod of Clarifying Life and Death) in theMay 1944 issue of Daihōrin, p. 6.

4 Sakai Tokugen, Sawaki Kōdō – Kikigaki .Tokyo: Kōdansha Gakujutsu-bunkō, 1984, p.269.

5 Ibid., p. 245.

6 For further background on the “Imperial WayFaction” see: 1) Crosier, Andrew, The Causes ofthe Second World War. Wiley-Blackwell, 1997;2) Buruma, Ian, Inventing Japan, 1854-1964.Modern Library, 2004; 3) Samuels, Richard J.,Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy andthe Future of East Asia. Cornell UniversityPress, 2007; 4) Hane, Mikiso, Modern Japan: AHistorical Survey. Westview Press, 2001; and5) Harries, Meirion, Soldiers of the Sun: TheRise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army.Random House, 1994.

7 Quoted in Victoria, Zen War Stories. London:RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p. 187.

8 Ibid., p. 245.

9 Ibid., p. 254.

10 Ibid., p. 251.

1 1 See the relevant entry in Suzuki ’s“Chronology” on the English homepage of theMatsugaoka website available here: (accessedon 13 November 2014).

12 Ibid., pp. 264-69.

13 Quoted in Victoria, “Zen Masters on theBattlefield, Part I,” available on the Internethere (accessed 11 November 2014).

14 Quoted in Victoria, Zen at War (2nd ed.) .Boulder, Colorado: Rowman & Littlefied, 2006,p. 144.

15 Park Eunsik, The Bloody History of theKorean Independence Movement. Quoted in the“March 1s t Movement,” available on theInternet here (accessed 17 November 2014).See also: 1) Cumings, Bruce, Korea’s Place inthe Sun: A Modern History. New York: W.N.Norton and Company, 1997; 2) Han, Woo-keun,The History of Korea. Hawaii: University ofHawaii Press, 1988; 3) Eugene Kim, ed.,Korea’s Response to Japan. Western MichiganUniversity, 1977; and 4) Baldwin, Frank, TheMarch First Movement: Korean Challenge andJapanese Response. New York; ColumbiaUniversity, 1972.

16 Tokyo: Daihōrin-kaku, 1995.

17 Unless otherwise noted, the page numbersincluded in this article refer to the secondvolume of Tanaka’s book.

18 Originally published in the January 1974issue of the Risō Sekai-shi (Ideal WorldM a g a z i n e ) , a v a i l a b l e o n t h e W e bhere (accessed 15 November 2014).

19 Quoted in Victoria, Zen War Stories, pp. 137.

20 McDowell, Kevin. “Japan in Manchuria:Agricultural Emigration in the JapaneseEmpire, 1932-1945.” Available on the Web here(accessed 30 November 2014).

21 Kobayashi Kōji, Manshū Imin no Mura, 1977,p. 78.

22 McDowell, Kevin. “Japan in Manchuria:Agricultural Emigration in the JapaneseEmpire, 1932-1945.” Available on the Web here(accessed 30 November 2014).

23 The quotation is taken from the Englishtranslation of Section 15, “Loyalty,” included inexcerpts from The Dharma of Homeless Kōdō (

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Yadonashi Hokkusan ) by Uchiyama Kōshō.Available on the Web here (accessed on 26 June2014).

24 See reference to Hitler and Mussolini asrighteous “demons” in “The End of a (Zen)Buddhist Myth” available on the Webhere: (accessed 29 November 2014).

25 For one example of such military-based,

zazen practice in Iraq, see here.

26 The entire article, “Shakyamuni – The FirstWarrior,” is posted on the Website of the“Buddhist Military Sangha” availablehere: (accessed 24 November 2014).

27 According to Jeff Brady in ‘Military BuddhistChapel Represents Tolerance’, National PublicRadio (13 October 2009), as of June 2009 thereare 5,287 Buddhists serving in the US military.