Saving Identity in Postmodernism

Original Article

Saving identity from postmodernism?

The normalization of constructivism in

International Relations

Nik Hyneka,* and Andrea TetibaInstitute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1, Czech Republic.

E-mail: [email protected], web: http://www.iir.cz/display.asp?ida=441&idi=427bDepartment of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen, Edward Wright

Building, Dunbar Street, Aberdeen AB24 3QY, UK.

E-mail: [email protected], web: www.abdn.ac.uk/Bpol244

*Corresponding author. Institute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1,

Czech Republic.

Abstract International Relations’s (IR’s) intellectual history is almost alwaystreated as a history of ideas in isolation from both those discursive and politicaleconomies which provide its disciplinary and wider (political) context. Thispaper contributes to this wider analysis by focusing on the impact of the field’sdiscursive economy. Specifically, using Foucaultian archaeologico-genealogicalstrategy of problematization to analyse the emergence and disciplinarytrajectories of Constructivism in IR, this paper argues that Constructivismhas been brought gradually closer to its mainstream Neo-utilitarian counterpartthrough a process of normalization, and investigates how it was possible forConstructivism to be purged of its early critical potential, both theoretical andpractical. The first part of the paper shows how the intellectual configuration ofConstructivism and its disciplinary fortunes are inseparable from far-from-unproblematic readings of the Philosophy of Social Science: the choices made atthis level are neither as intellectually neutral nor as disciplinarily inconsequen-tial as they are presented. The second and third parts chart the genealogies ofConstructivism, showing how its overall normalization occurred in two stages,each revolving around particular practices and events. The second partconcentrates on older genealogies, analysing the politics of early classificatorypractices regarding Constructivism, and showing how these permitted thedistillation and immunization of Constructivism – and thus of the rest of themainstream scholarship which it was depicted as compatible with – againstmore radical Postmodernist/Post-structuralist critiques. Finally, the third partfocuses attention on recent genealogies, revealing new attempts to reconstructand reformulate Constructivism: here, indirect neutralization practices such asthe elaboration of ‘Pragmatist’ Constructivism, as well as the direct neutraliza-tion such as the formulation of ‘Realist’ Constructivism, are key events in

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Constructivism’s normalization. These apparently ‘critical’ alternatives that aimto ‘provide the identity variable’ in fact remain close to Neo-utilitarianism, buttheir successful representation as ‘critical’ help neutralize calls for greateropenness in mainstream IR. Rather than a simple intellectual history, it is thiscomplex process of (re)reading and (re)producing that counts as ‘Constructivism’,which explains both the normalization of Constructivism and the continuedmarginalization of Postmodernist/Post-structuralist approaches in mainstreamIR’s infra-disciplinary balance of intellectual power.Contemporary Political Theory (2010) 9, 171–199. doi:10.1057/cpt.2008.49

Keywords: Constructivism; international relations theory; Foucault; Philosophy ofSocial Science; Postmodernism/Post-structuralism

Introduction

Reviewing two decades of debates over Constructivism in InternationalRelations (IR) suggests that few such interventions since have shifted the field’scentre of intellectual gravity away from the Neo-Realist/Neo-Liberalconvergence. These debates, however, taken as pivotal events are woven intothe field’s intellectual history, and unproblematically conflated with IR’sevolution as a field. Undoubtedly useful, these histories remain nonethelesslimited insofar as they ignore other factors that affect disciplinary fortunes,from the discursive and political economies of knowledge production, to widerintellectual trends and political contexts. Responding to calls for existingaccounts to be supplemented or questioned (Deibert, 1997; Waever, 1998),this paper focuses on IR’s discursive economy: it analyses the links between theintellectual histories of Constructivism in IR and the field’s broader discursiveeconomy, analysing how Constructivism has come to be thought of ascompatible with the Neo-Realist/Neo-Liberal convergence, and the consequentimpact on IR’s balance of infra-disciplinary power. To do this, debates aboutConstructivism are approached as discursive practices within an existingdiscursive economy: these practices – ultimately imposed upon events –produce that ‘principle of regularity’ (Foucault, 2002 [1969], p. 191) uponwhich IR’s ‘intellectual history’ is built. A ‘strategy of problematization’, willhelp retrieve both the synchronic rules according to which the discourse aroundConstructivism operates (its ‘archaeology’) and their diachronic evolution(its ‘genealogy’; Foucault, 1992 [1984], pp. 11–12). This, in turn, enables ananalysis of the intellectual and disciplinary political impact of those particularconstructions.

The paper first outlines basic positions in Philosophy of Social Science(PoSS) in order to clarify both Constructivism’s and mainstream IR’s

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intellectual commitments. These discussions then enable an analysis of howselective readings of those terms of reference were deployed in debates overConstructivism’s classification, and over its compatibility with ‘social scientific’IR. Viewed in this light, debates over taxonomies and over Constructivism’srelations with Realism and Pragmatism reveal a series of ‘blind spots’ and aconvergence with Neo-utilitarian IR which cannot be explained purely interms of intellectual history but suggest a process of normalization ofConstructivism’s radical potential, a process which must in turn be read inthe context of wider relations between Neo-utilitarianism and Postmodernist/Post-structuralist IR.1

Positions and Boundaries: Constructivism(s) in Philosophy of SocialScience and International Relations

The ‘Philosophical Turn’ has made serious IR scholarship impossiblewithout reference to PoSS: at once grounding and legitimizing theoreticalarguments, the selectivity/partiality of borrowings helps untangle how adiscursive economy of IR within which Constructivism can be normalized isarticulated.

Constructivism(s) and Philosophy of Social Science

Most Constructivists embark upon the obligatory journey to philosophicallegitimacy arguing that understanding Constructivism requires a grasp of basicPoSS positions (for example Adler, 1997, 2003; Wendt, 1999; Guzzini, 2000;Jørgensen, 2001). This section outlines those positions, how they have beenrepresented and appropriated, and the disciplinary effects of these readings(cf. Hynek and Hynek, 2007).

As Table 1 indicates, there is no single constructivist position in PoSS, butrather a multiplicity of ontological and epistemological constructivisms.2

Ontologically, a distinction is usually made between mind-independenceand mind-dependence: proponents of the former argue objects existindependently of observation, their counterparts suggest they exist at leastpartly as a result of observers’ beliefs. There are two main mind-independent positions: empiricism and scientific realism, with logicalpositivism (or ‘logical empiricism’) less frequently mentioned. Empiricismoccupies positions (1A) and (1B). This monist position accepts that socialand natural sciences are both based on objects with analogous ontologicalproperties, and on the neutrality of observation, emphasizing that impartialobservation is not only possible, but necessary, insofar as value biases

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threaten the entire research programme. Furthermore, empiricists arguescientific knowledge can be closely connected to direct evidence by testingall theories and hypotheses against direct observations. The differencebetween naıve and constructive empiricism (1A and 1B) is epistemologicaland lies in scientists’ role both in knowledge translation/production and indifferent understandings of verification: unlike naıve empiricists defendingsimple induction and maintaining that ‘immediate sense experience is byitself sufficient to provide the foundations for knowledge’ (Uebel, 1992,p. 205), constructive empiricists emphasize the importance of scientists inknowledge production, with scientific theories being both semantically literal andempirically exact as a result (van Fraassen, 1980, pp. 10–11). As forverification, whereas naıve empiricists take individual scientific statementsas the basis for knowledge verification, for constructive empiricists, theoriesas a whole are the basis for verification or refutation: an untenable theorywill be replaced by a more literal and adequate theory (van Fraassen, 1980,pp. 35, 78).3 Both positions concur that observational evidence is animportant source for knowledge, although logical positivists acknowledgeits limits (Kolakowski, 1972) and assert that knowledge also includeselements not derived from direct empirical observation (Russell, 1978[1924]; Schlick, 1978 [1932]), arguing that some propositions are knownonly by intuition and deduction (for example logical inferences from‘protocol sentences’) (Ayer, 1978; Carnap, 1978 [1931]; cf. Popper, 1959).

Positions (2A) and (2B) encapsulate scientific realism, which requiresmind-independence ontologically, and shares empiricism’s trust in law-likegeneralizations. The ontological difference between them stems from differ-ences concerning what can be observed and thus researched: althoughempiricism claims only observable entities can be objects of scientific inquiry,scientific realism makes causal statements about underlying structures,including unobservable ones (Harre and Madden, 1975; Sayer, 1998) – whatmatters are objects’ real, internal and manipulable mechanisms (Bhaskar, 1979;Archer, 1998). Scientific realists give structures causal powers, arguing that

Table 1: Main ontological–epistemological positions in PoSS

ontology epistemology

non-constructivist (naıve) Constructivist

mind-independence 1A. naıve empiricism 1B. constructivist empiricism

2A. naıve realism 2B. constructivist realism

mind-dependence 3A. naıve constructivism [non-sequitur] 3B. social constructivism

Based on Sismondo (1996, pp. 6–7, 79) and Sayer (1992, pp. 39–84).

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positing their existence provides the best explanation of behaviour (Lipton,1991). As with empiricism, scientific realism is epistemologically divided intonaıve (common-sense) (2A) and constructivist (critical) (2B) variants (Varelaand Harre, 1996).4 Whereas the former largely brackets the impact of scientistsupon knowledge creation, the latter acknowledges the importance ofperception and cognition, and the active role scientists play (Sellars, 1970;Outhwaite, 1998). The epistemological axis emphasizes differences betweenempiricist and scientific realist perspectives on truth. Although constructivistempiricists (van Fraassen, 1980) argue that science’s aim is to produceempirically adequate theories and that this adequacy should determine atheory’s acceptance, scientific realists aim to portray reality ‘as it is’, acceptinga theory only if it is believed to be true (Sayer, 1992; Sismondo, 1996).

Before the third position is outlined, the distinction between fundamentalphysical reality and social reality will be addressed. Here, Kuhn and Searleboth affiliated themselves with constructivist realism (2B). Describing himselfas an ‘unconvinced realist’, Kuhn (1979, p. 415) argues for the coexistence ofsocial worlds constructed by scientists and the fundamental material world:transformations in social worlds leave the fundamental world unaffectedbecause ontology is mind-independent. Analogously, Searle argues that ‘[w]elive in exactly one world, not two or three or seventeen’ (1995, p. xi),undermining a monist stance by distinguishing between fundamental materialreality and social realities. Searle’s affinity to constructivist realism is clearin his defence of scientific realism and the correspondence theory of truth(ibid., Chapter 9).

In the final position, social constructivism (also ‘constructivism’ or‘constructionism’, 3B), actors are argued to have both ontological andepistemic influence, with more radical versions verging on the ‘epistemicfallacy’ conflating the two. Because the existence of both physical and socialobjects depends on thoughts and linguistic structures (ontological mind-dependence), scientists cannot construct knowledge about these outside theirown ontological representations. The point is not to deny the existence ofmaterial reality, as critics sometimes suggest, but to focus on the consequenti-ality of representations of that reality. Here, social constructivism differsfrom both Searlian and scientific realism: its anti-essentialism and anti-foundationalism means truth cannot be ‘discovered’, but is created (Sayyid andZac, 1998, pp. 250–251).

Intellectual roots

Although roots of IR Constructivisms are richer than this account can render,its inspirations can be divided into two major tracks: one ‘internal’ to



Anglophone IR, and the other ‘external’, drawing on Continental philosophyand linguistics (cf. Hynek, 2005).

‘Internal’ inspiration emerged autonomously from external developmentsduring the late 1980s. The reason for this isolation, as Ashley (1987;cf. Hoffman, 1987) suggests, was the belief of (mainly US) (neo)realist and(neo)liberal IR scholars in the unique position, value and exclusivity of theirapproaches for policy makers, enhanced by their aim to provide technicalknowledge (manipulation and control) and practical knowledge (scripts fortackling ‘real’ situations). Despite his behaviouralist commitments, the scholarwhose study of transnational security communities transcended this produc-tion was Karl Deutsch (1957). His insights into the formation of NorthAtlantic collective identity influenced early self-declared Constructivists (forexample Adler and Barnett, 1998). One of his students, Hayward Alker,influenced several scholars in Constructivism’s ‘first wave’, from Katzenstein,to Ashley and Onuf (who introduced the term ‘Constructivism’ in IR in 1989).Comparably important was Ernst Haas’ (1958) liberal/neo-functionalistanalysis of complex social learning and of supra-national organizationsand their bureaucracies and cultures in (re)producing the fabric of worldpolitics. Haas’ work profoundly influenced his student, John Ruggie, who,with Kratochwil (for example Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986), challenged thelack of reflexivity and the incompatibility of ontology and epistemology inregime theory. Ruggie (1998), Kratochwil (1989) and Onuf (1989) also madeimportant contributions in overcoming IR’s intellectual isolation, drawing onauthors such as Weber, Wittgenstein, Searle and Giddens.

The most significant contribution to contemporary Constructivism as adistinct approach was made by Alexander Wendt, a representative of the‘Minnesota School’. Wendt wrote several papers in the late 1980s and 1990s,further elaborated in his Social Theory (1999; see also 1987, 1992). His systemicapproach represented ‘a kind of structural idealism’ (Wendt, 1999, p. xiii), andhas become, criticism notwithstanding, a benchmark for IR Constructivism.We emphasize the multiplicity of Constructivisms because Wendt’s version,drawing on an eclectic literature, primarily Giddens’s and later Bhaskar’s, isvery different to Onuf and Kratochwil’s approach. Indeed, Onuf (2001, p. 10)acknowledges that neither his nor Kratochwil’s founding texts much influencedIR Constructivism.

Constructivism’s ‘external’ inspiration was rooted in critical social andpolitical theory, and found its way into IR during the so-called Third Debate(the 1980s and early 1990s). Although critical social and political theory ishighly diverse, it can be subdivided into a minimal foundationalist currentdrawing on cultural Marxism, and an anti-foundational and anti-essentialistcurrent drawing on ‘Continental’ philosophy and linguistics (cf. Hoffman,1991; Price and Reus-Smit, 1998). Andrew Linklater (1990) and Robert Cox

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(1983) are prominent scholars drawing on the Frankfurt School and Gramsci,respectively. The second, more radical current is epitomized by Ashley (1986),Der Derian (1987, with Shapiro, 1989), Campbell (1998 [1992]) and Walker(1993).

The end of the Cold War and the ‘Neo-Neo Synthesis’’ inability to accountfor this macrostructural change provided a symbolic point of convergencebetween internal and external strands’ attempts to debunk the myth ofobjectivism (Hoffman, 1987). In the early 1990s, however, little indicatedConstructivism’s future intellectual preponderance. Scattered patches ofConstructivist thought were largely ignored: the ‘Third Debate’, a set ofexchanges directing attention to metatheoretical questions, did not involveConstructivism. Rather, Constructivism’s distinct identity was created inthe wake of the ‘philosophical turn’: the rest of this paper sketches keypractices and events through which the discourse over Constructivism wasshaped, particularly in relation to mainstream Neo-utilitarian IR.

Genealogies of Normalization I: Classification, Distillation andImmunization

Foundational elements of IR Constructivism were presented above as they arein the literature: a straightforward, if complex, intellectual history. Theremainder of this paper considers a series of debates around which thenarrative of Constructivism and its relation to mainstream and to Postmodern/Post-structural scholarship have been built, analysing the way those debateswere articulated, and how their results provided the backbone of whatConstructivism is now commonly held to entail. This analysis suggests that themodalities and implications of this process are broader than an intellectualhistory identifies, effectively leading to the immunization of Neo-utilitarianIR against Postmodern/Post-structural critiques, and thus Constructivism’snormalization (see Figure 1).

This section analyses the taxonomical debates over Constructivism’sontological, epistemological and methodological commitments. These arecrucial to what is accepted as Constructivism: despite being highly problematicin terms of PoSS, the accepted solutions to these debates, through a series of‘blind spots’, help skew IR’s discursive economy against radical critiques,effectively ‘immunizing’ mainstream IR. Once Neo-utilitarian IR appropriateda certain understanding of Constructivism, it could also claim to have dealtwith the reflexivist challenge: Constructivism, after all, ‘provides the identityvariable’. Nowhere is this clearer than in debates about Constructivism’scompatibility with Pragmatism and Realism.



Figure

1:GenealogicaltopographyofConstructivisms.

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Given the similarities between Constructivism’s and Postmodernist/Post-structuralist ontological foundations (Table 1; 3B), simply deploying late-1980sConstructivism alongside Neo-utilitarianism (1A-B, 2A-B) would be impos-sible. The proliferation of debates over the nature of Constructivismthroughout the 1990s was integral to its reconciliation with mainstreamscholarship. This ‘construction of Constructivism’, took place in two stages:in the first, what appeared to be a purely taxonomical exercise was inextricablylinked to a ‘distillation’ of Constructivism, which ‘immunized’ Neo-utilitarian-ism by effectively delegitimizing Postmodern/Post-structural critiques. Attimes, the intention of many Constructivists – particularly ‘Wendtian’ – to‘save identity from postmodernism’ was openly declared (for exampleCheckel, 1998). Classifying Construcitivism, securing what scholarshipmay be so labelled, was essential to this process. The second stage involveddebates over building particular theoretical formulations upon thesefoundations – for example, ‘Pragmatist’ or ‘Realist’ Constructivism – broadlysecuring the ‘neutralization’ of Constructivism’s radical potential by locating itfirmly within the social scientific consensus.

Disciplinary politics of taxonomy

Ruggie’s (1998, pp. 35–36) seminal paper identifies three kinds of Constructi-vism: neo-classical, post-modernist and naturalistic. ‘Neo-classical’ Construc-tivism, language-oriented but committed to social science, is identifiedwith authors such as Onuf, Kratochwil, Finnemore, Adler and so on. ‘Post-modernist’ Constructivism supposedly builds on Nietzsche, Foucault andDerrida, and rejects the idea of social science. Finally, ‘naturalist’ Con-structivists such as Wendt, use Bhaskar’s scientific realism to defend a ‘deeprealism’ which might legitimize ‘scientific’ approaches. In Ruggie, thePostmodern/Post-structural critics of mainstream IR still feature clearly,although the sequence of Constructivisms suggests a dialectical overcoming ofthese critiques that ‘saves’ social science for mainstream IR.

Another hugely successful taxonomy distinguishes between conventional andcritical Constructivism (Hopf, 1998).5 Rooted in the ‘internal’ strand outlinedabove, the former has largely been considered by Constructivists themselves aresult of seeds sown during the Cold War. By identifying CriticalConstructivism with a ‘postmodernism’ with which dialogue is supposedlyimpossible either epistemologically or indeed morally, however, this ‘bipolar’taxonomy delegitimizes Postmodern/Post-structural scholarship. Hopf arguesConstructivism was miscast ‘as necessarily postmodern and antipositivist’,because conventional Constructivism, despite sharing ‘many of the founda-tional elements of critical theory, [adopts] defensible rules of thumb, or



conventions, rather than following critical theory all the way up thepostmodern critical path’ (1998, p. 181) and that ‘to the degree thatconstructivism creates theoretical and epistemological distance between itselfand its origins in critical theory, it becomes ‘conventional’ constructivism’(ibid., p. 181). This representation of Postmodern/Post-structural scholarshipimplies that work which rejects rationalist ‘rules of thumb’ is indefensible, andrecreates an opposition between ‘social scientific’ Neo-utilitarianism andPostmodernism/Post-structuralism which, since the epistemic criteria adoptedto adjudicate the viability of Constructivism are ‘rationalist’, delegitimizes non-positivist scholarship (for example Keohane, 1986; Katzenstein et al, 1998;cf. Smith, 2003, p. 142).

Drawing a distinction within the broad body of Constructivism betweenvariously named ‘critical’ and ‘conventional’ approaches immediately raises thequestion of the relation of each to IR’s mainstream – indeed, the terminologyitself only makes sense taking Neo-utilitarian IR as its point of reference.Unsurprisingly, whereas ‘critical’ or ‘postmodern’ Constructivism was attackedfor supposed incompatibility with social science, Constructivism’s emphasis onthat very ‘identity’, which Neo-utilitarianism was unable to account for,motivated many to argue that a Constructivism existed, which criticized ‘notwhat [mainstream] scholars do and say but what they ignore: the content andsource of state interests and social fabric of world politics’ (Checkel, 1998,p. 324). Thus, Checkel defends a ‘conventional’ Constructivism compatible withsocial science (ibid., p. 327), whereas Wendt (1999, p. 75) distinguishes between‘thick’ linguistic and ‘thin’ social scientific Constructivism.

Although these classifications may be more accurate in terms of somescholars’ self-identification – Walker or Ashley would hardly considerthemselves Constructivists – they are also more intellectually loaded, implyingConstructivism should not be understood as Postmodern/Post-structural in anyguise (Campbell, 1998 [1992], Epilogue). As such, Neo-utilitarianism’s repre-sentation of the field not only suggests that no Postmodern/Post-structuralapproaches can qualify as interlocutors, as they reject the idea that the study of(international) politics can be ‘scientific’ (Keohane, 1986), but also marginalizesnon-Wendtian Constructivisms incompatible with a Neo-utilitarian mould.6

By excluding Postmodern/Post-structural scholarship per se, ‘critical’Constructivism becomes limited to Onuf, Kratochwil and their followers.But such a ‘bipolar’ representation also neutralizes the radical potential of thelatter, as it must either accept the bounds of social science, moving towards‘conventional’ approaches, or reject them, thereby disqualifying itself from‘inter-paradigmatic’ dialogue.7 This polarization therefore has the disciplinaryeffect of de-legitimizing ‘postmodern’ critiques as unscientific if not downrightunscholarly,8 and reduces other potentially critical Constructivist voices toa ‘loyal opposition’, providing at best a ‘thick’ description of norms backing up

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‘thinner’ versions. Rooted in the elision of ontological differences betweenConstructivism and Neo-utilitarianism, the demarcation between modern/critical and postmodern/critical Constructivism polices the boundary ofacceptable research, contributing to the ‘immunization’ of mainstream IRagainst Postmodern/Post-structural critiques.

From boundaries to bridges

Attempts to find a ‘unity of Constructivism’ have therefore involved presentingit as homogeneous, and substantially continuous with (and complementary to)mainstream IR. Conducted under the rubric of several devices – mostsignificantly the metaphor of Constructivism as a bridge between IR socialscience and its critics – this quest enables a simultaneous distillation of a certainkind of Constructivism, and the immunization of mainstream IR through itspurported compatibility with this Constructivism, erecting a fence betweenConstructivism ‘proper’ and everything beyond its margins, that is, criticalConstructivism and especially Postmodernism/Post-structuralism.

Given early Constructivism’s ontological commitments (3B), it should beclear that whether this distillation is at all possible is far from obvious. Oneexplanation for how this might have occurred lies in what Foucault callsthe ‘principle of commentary’. Foucault (1984, pp. 76–100) distinguishesbetween the ‘principal discourse’ and the ‘mass of commentaries’: the principaldiscourse – a new speech act – is always original and inventive, whereascommentaries claim to repeat and gloss what has allegedly been pronounced inthe principal discourse. However, this ‘repetition’ can be rather different fromwhat might have originally been intended. In this case, if commentaries aretaken as accurate representations of primary sources and these aresimultaneously dropped from debate, commentary limits interpretive possibi-lities, channelling discourse in certain directions whereas precluding others.This took place at several junctures in Constructivism’s case, with a series ofsupposedly crucial references – Giddens, Searle, Wittgenstein, Foucault, Rortyand so on – being notably absent from the debates they supposedly inform savein their earliest days, and very marginally even then (see Figure 2).

Coupled with the disciplinary politics of taxonomy described above, thebridge metaphor facilitated such a swap. The original principal Constructivistdiscourse represented by Onuf, Kratochwil and Wendt, particularly its ‘doublehermeneutic’ implications, faded into the background through exposure toConstructivism as presented by commentaries – secondary sources (forexample Adler, 1997, 2003; Checkel, 1997, 1998; Hopf, 1998; Katzensteinet al, 1998; Smith, 2001) that eventually supplanted primary discourse. Itwas through precisely such commentaries that Constructivism came to be



understood as an unproblematic continuation of ‘social science’, that it hasrepeatedly been judged by objectivist criteria, and that everything lying fartherthan modern ‘critical Constructivism’, with its role of separating the acceptablefrom the unacceptable, has been marginalized (cf. Price and Reus-Smit, 1998;Guzzini, 2000).

The metaphor of Constructivism-as-bridge between Neo-utilitarianism andPostmodernism/Post-structuralism facilitates this distillation of Constructivismin three moments: first, the mainstream definition of knowledge as scienceduring the Third Debate and the predication of ‘inter-paradigmatic dialogue’in ‘rationalist’ epistemologies effectively silences radical critiques, Constructi-vist or otherwise (for example Campbell, 1998). Second, the combination ofdichotomizing taxonomies of Constructivism with its location as potentialinter-paradigmatic bridge ‘distills’ it, emptying it of critical potential, andforegrounds continuities with Neo-utilitarianism (epistemic and methodo-logical commitments, the state’s ontological privilege and so on).

Finally, this definition of ‘knowledge’ also enabled the development of‘bridges’ compatible with Neo-utilitarianism such as Pragmatist or RealistConstructivism. In this sense, mainstreaming Constructivism ‘immunizes’Neo-utilitarianism from both Postmodernist/Post-structuralist critiques andfrom Constructivism’s own ontology.

Genealogies of Normalization II: Neutralizations by New Reconstructions

Whatever their intellectual merits, these debates effectively neutralized theradical potential entailed by Constructivism’s ontologico-epistemological

Figure 2: Principal discourses and commentaries (based on Foucault, 1984).

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commitments (Figure 1; 3B). A discursive economy rooted in these readings of‘social science’ could not but de-legitimize a non-positivist scholarship thatrejected the possibility of quests for ‘timeless wisdoms’.

But this balance of blindnesses remained delicate. What stabilized it andlegitimized the bridging function to which Constructivism was assigned was theelaboration of theoretical constructs upon these mainstreamed foundations.Two notable efforts in this direction were the invocation of Pragmatism toemphasize the compatibility between Constructivism and social science(Cochran, 2002) and defend Wendtian commitments to states (Haas andHaas, 2002; Widmaier, 2004), and the theorization of a ‘Realist Constructi-vism’. Reading philosophical Pragmatism as an epistemic stance bypasseddangerous debates over Constructivist ontological foundations: ‘Pragmatism’spragmatism’ effectively rendered Constructivism’s ontological compatibilitywith Neo-utilitarianism unproblematic. And ‘Realist Constructivism’ silencedPostmodernist/Post-structuralist critiques by ‘providing the identity variable’.

Pragmatist constructivism as an indirect neutralization

That Pragmatism was concerned with ‘practical’ interventions is straight-forward: why and how this entails Constructivism’s compatibility withNeo-utilitarianism is less so. A considerable component of this appropriationrelies simply on the association – if not conflation – of Pragmatism andpragmatism, associating Pragmatism with practicality, claiming Pragmatism-as-pragmatism as philosophical legitimization of mainstreamed readings ofConstructivism. This conflation, or at least resemblance between terms ispresent in Widmaier (2004), where Pragmatism supposedly corrects theabstract excesses of both Neo-utilitarianism and Postmodernism/Post-struc-turalism for the explicit purpose of policy relevance. Both Widmaier andMillennium’s 2002 special issue use the lower case when referring both toPragmatism-as-philosophy and to pragmatism-as-practicality, giving rise toambiguity concerning what is meant (Pragmatist? pragmatic? both?). Widmaierdoes this arguing that Dewey’s and Galbraith’s strength was that they wereboth worldly and scholarly, ‘engaged in theoretical debates while also pursuingpolicy agendas’ (2004, p. 443), emphasizing Pragmatism’s potential forpractical political engagement. Albert and Kopp-Malek (2002) explicitly arguefor a ‘non-capital-p-pragmatism’. Haas and Haas (2002) carefully distinguishbetween ‘international relations’ and ‘International Relations’, but ambigu-ously label their approach simply ‘pragmatic constructivism’, whereas Bohman(2002) and Owen (2002) declare this association of meanings in their titles:‘How to make Social Science Practical: Pragmatism, Critical Social Science andMultiperspectival Theory’ and ‘Re-Orienting International Relations: OnPragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning’ (emphasis added).



Haas and Haas (2002) and Widmaier (2004) provide archetypical examplesof the appropriation of Pragmatism supporting mainstreamed Constructivism.Widmaier calls for Pragmatism as an underpinning for Wendtian Constructi-vism,9 calling Dewey ‘a pragmatist proto-constructivist’ (2004, pp. 428, 432,436, 438). Yet, these appropriations are themselves if anything more pragmaticthan Pragmatist. Widmaier’s (2004) ‘pragmatist-constructivism’ and Haas andHaas’ (2002) ‘pragmatic constructivism’ sound similar, but the latter proposalfor Pragmatist Constructivism seems barely nominal, based merely on passingreferences to Rorty and Menand. Neumann (2002) shifts the emphasis evenfurther, never invoking Pragmatism (aside from a solitary footnote mentioningPeirce), never claiming to contribute to that intellectual tradition, and focusingentirely and explicitly on the virtues of practice-grounded analysis. The veryinclusion of this paper in a special issue about ‘capital-p-Pragmatism’ impliesthat Pragmatism and pragmatism are one and the same.

Pragmatists clearly always thought the political dimension of philosophyimportant, and to the extent that they realized the intractability offoundational and epistemological questions and ‘side-stepped’ some of them,they were also practical, both academically and politically. But advocatingavoiding dogmatism means little beyond what should be canons of goodscholarship – conversely, being practical does not make one a Pragmatist.Moreover, although there is a legitimate overlap between the two terms rooted inthe origins and political as well as epistemological project of Pragmatism, theirdistinction and its disciplinary politics are equally important. Resolving theambiguity around both uses of ‘pragmatism’ in Millennium’s special issuerequired little effort: adopting lower or higher cases for the two meanings, forexample. Blurring the Pragmatism/pragmatism boundary, whether intentionallyor not, effectively produces a ‘linguistic gambit’: the mainstream – particularlyRealist – infatuation with being ‘pragmatic’ makes the meliorative reform ofPragmatism as an addition to Constructivism difficult to object to, despite itsimplications being potentially far-reaching and indeed not dissimilar to those ofmore explicitly radical Postmodern/Post-structural critiques (Albert and Kopp-Malek, 2002, p. 469, fn. 38). This is the implication of work by Bohman,Cochran, Festenstein and Isacoff. However, this ‘opening’ has also been used byother authors – Haas and Haas, Albert and Kopp-Malek, Owen, Widmaier, andNeumann – to deflect radical critiques by invoking Pragmatism/pragmatism indefence of an only slightly modified mainstream position (for example Wendt orCheckel) thereby indirectly (and at least in some cases, unintentionally)neutralizing Constructivism and bringing it closer to mainstream IR.

Pragmatism is also used by some to argue explicitly for an understanding ofConstructivism, compatible with Neo-utilitarianism and squarely withinWendt’s via media. Millennium’s editorial offered a candid statement echoingmany of Constructivism’s mantras: Pragmatism affords the possibility of

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overcoming the ‘stalemate opposing positivism and post-positivism’, and IR’s‘fixation with absolute and exclusive ontological solutions’ by ‘[encouraging] amulti-perspectival style of inquiry that privileges practice and benefits from thecomplementarity, rather than opposition, of different understandings’ (Haasand Haas, 2002, p. iii). Specifically: ‘Pragmatism explicitly anchors socialscience (and IR) to a notion of community – of inquiry, of agents – and gearsresearch to the idea of its betterment’ (ibid., p. iii). Through Pragmatism,those refusing to ‘follow critical theory all the way up the postmodernpath’ can simultaneously claim a legitimate disregard for ontology and anacknowledgement of the importance of ‘identity’ while having to sacrificeneither social science, nor the objective moral purchase it promises. Severalcontributors echo this stance, such as Haas and Haas, who argue that‘incommensurate ontological and epistemological positions [y] fundamentallyimpair the ability to develop cumulative knowledge about internationalinstitutions and their role in international relations’ (ibid., p. 573). Analo-gously, claiming that Constructivism is in fact a form of constructivist realism(2B), Adler (2003, p. 96) states that one of the four main influences onConstructivism is Pragmatism.

Whether one draws on classical Pragmatists or on Neo-pragmatists,however, this move to associate Pragmatism, Constructivism andNeo-utilitarianism is problematic. Classical Pragmatists – Peirce, WilliamJames, Dewey, Austin – argue ‘truth’ is never a priori, always provisional,always context-specific, and therefore must be judged solely on its usefulness inachieving some purpose. Moreover, Pragmatists do not believe one can talkabout a world external to language, the implication being that agentsbuild knowledge from different standpoints and in order to change the worldin different ways: hence, social ontologies must be ‘fluid’.

Neo-pragmatism builds particularly on Dewey and James, emphasizing thelanguage-dependent nature of claims to ‘knowledge’, that the world can bedescribed correctly from multiple perspectives, and that therefore an idea’s‘truth’ is dependent on its context and usefulness, and cannot indicate anythingbeyond this. Putnam (1990) and Rorty (1979, 1991) conclude that science doesnot and cannot possess a privileged vantage point upon reality. Moreover,although Putnam and Rorty disagree on the extent to which the ‘externalworld’ provides some constraint on truth – Putnam trying to rescue some suchdimension, Rorty opposing this – Neo-pragmatists are committed to the ideathat the social world is changeable, and all Pragmatists remain sceptical oftranscendental claims.

Against this background, some readings of Pragmatism offered inMillennium’s special issue are puzzling. Pragmatism is used to addressontological and epistemological tensions arising from Neo-utilitarianattempts to counter Postmodern/Post-structural critiques by assimilating



Constructivism. Although Pragmatism generally eschews ontological claimswhile arguing that it is possible to proceed accumulating valid knowledge andacting upon the world meaningfully despite this ‘knowledge’ being onlytemporarily valid, it nonetheless sits decidedly ill at ease with conventionalConstructivism. Firstly, Pragmatism rejects that ontological realism character-istic of much Neo-utilitarianism which transpires – declared or otherwise – incriticism of Postmodern/Post-structural theories of power as ‘inadequate’because they do not reflect the ‘realities’ of politics. This anti-realism leadsPragmatists to reject questions of essences – sovereign, anarchic and so on –emphasizing that both questions and essences or indeed foundations areinevitably context-dependent, subjective, programmatic and transformative.There can be no ‘timeless wisdom’, Realist or otherwise. Secondly, Pragmatismalso rejects the idea that Neo-utilitarianism somehow accesses a superior formof knowledge. Most Pragmatists do not believe science ‘succeeds’ because it isin touch with reality in privileged ways, with Rorty (1998, p. 48) arguing thatconcepts of truth, objectivity and reality cannot be invoked to explaininferential references or standards of warrant. Finally, Neo-utilitarian socialscience’s promise to retrieve spatio-temporally invariant and observer-independent law-like generalizations relies crucially on the fixity of theproperties of the objects it analyses: if either Constructivists or Pragmatists areright about the ‘fluidity’ of ontology, this project becomes impossible. This isnot to say social scientific methods cannot generate ‘knowledge’, but espousingPragmatism renders indefensible claims about its spatio-temporally invariantand observer-neutral status.

Given this fundamental tension between Neo-utilitarianism and theimplications of a ‘fluid’ ontology in Constructivism or indeed Pragmatism, itis unsurprising that Pragmatism has been read by some as offering thepossibility of eschewing ontology entirely, and, at an epistemological level, ofrequiring that regardless of their coherence, ideas should simply ‘work’ in orderto legitimize their use. Nonetheless, the use of Pragmatism to grounda reconciliation between Neo-utilitarianism and Constructivism’s radicalimplications remains unsustainable.

Realist (Re)construction as a direct neutralization

As noted above, the taxonomical division between critical and conventionalConstructivisms ‘immunize’ mainstream IR insofar as it raises the question ofConstructivism’s direct relation to Neo-utilitarian IR and sets up the answer bydelegitimizing non-positivist solutions. To the degree this discursive economy isunstable, appropriate ‘interparadigmatic’ theoretical elaborations help maskthe precarious nature of Neo-utilitarianism’s solution. Virtually simultaneously

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to the ‘taxonomical’ debate and the foray into Pragmatism, a considerableinterest in Constructivism’s ‘liberalism’ and a possible convergence withRealism emerged. Following the trajectory which led to ‘Realist Constructi-vism’ is particularly instructive (for example Checkel, 1998; Copeland, 2000;Sterling-Folker, 2000, 2002a, b; Farrell, 2002; Barkin, 2003; Hamlet, 2003;Jackson, 2004; Jackson and Nexon, 2004).

Some, like Copeland, argue that ‘Constructivists focus on the intersubjectivedimension of knowledge, because they wish to emphasize the social aspect ofhuman existence [allowing] constructivists to pose [shared ideas] as a causalforce separate from the material structure of neorealism’ (2000, pp. 189–190).Similarly, Farrell suggests that the realization that identities are causal withrespect to action ‘leads constructivists and culturalists to problematize thatwhich realists and neoliberals take for granted, like identities and interests’(2002, p. 52). Farrell also emphasizes that a ‘common realist misconceptionabout constructivism [is] that it lacks a positivist epistemology but has anormative agenda’ (2002, p. 51). Others explicitly argue that, as a theoreticalframework rather than a substantive theory, Constructivism is compatible withseveral theories, including Realism: Jepperson et al argue that Constructivism‘neither advances nor depends upon any special methodology or epistemology’(in Jepperson et al., 1996, p. 65); Kratochwil and Ruggie add that it is‘compatible with a positivist epistemology’ (ibid., p. 81), soon echoed by Checkel(1998, p. 327), whereas Barkin (2003, p. 338) argues that ‘neither pure realismnor pure idealism [sic] can account for political change, only the interplaybetween the two’ (ibid., p. 337). Sterling-Folker (2002a) goes so far as to arguethat Realism and Constructivism share ‘Darwinian’ foundations. Soon after,explicit suggestions appear that a ‘Realist Constructivism’ should be formulated(Sterling-Folker, 2002a; Barkin, 2003; Jackson, 2004). These analyses prepare thediscursive grounds for the legitimacy of a Realist–Constructivist convergence.

Beyond being possible, such an approach should also be desirable, and it isnot difficult to find arguments that such ‘Realist Constructivism’ couldcontribute to analysis in several ways: Sterling-Folker (2002a, p. 75), forexample, argues ‘Realism and Constructivism need one another in order tocompensate for their worst excesses’. With regard to power, Realist Con-structivism could fill a gap between mainstream and critical theory by ‘includingin any exploration of power, not only postmodern theory’s study of thesubjective text and positivist realism’s study of objective phenomena, but alsoconstructivism’s study of intersubjectivity – norms and social rules’ (Barkin,2003, p. 338). This would involve guiding scholars ‘to think like a classical realistabout the variety of power while guiding [them] to analyze the role of that powerin international political life like a constructivist’ (Mattern, 2004, p. 345). RealistConstructivism would concede that ‘anarchy [may be] a social construction’while remaining sceptical ‘about the degree to which power can be transcended’



(Jackson and Nexon, 2004, p. 339). Moreover, ‘Realist Constructivism’ wouldfurnish Realism with a richer understanding of ‘identity’, ‘change’ and of theinterplay of power and ‘normative change’ (Barkin, 2003, p. 337) while helpingConstructivism compensate for its liberal bias (ibid., p. 326).

This formulation, however, is flawed both logically and in its representationsof Neo-utilitarianism and Postmodernism/Post-structuralism. To ground theRealist–Constructivist convergence, Barkin (2003, pp. 330–331) characterizesNeo-realism as ‘logical positivism’, conflates the latter with ‘Positivism’, thenclaims that Classical Realism is ‘empiricist’, and that as such it is compatiblewith Constructivism. This disregards Neo-utilitarian commitments to theexistence and fixity of a social reality external to and independent of observers,and to the possibility of socio-political spatio-temporally invariant law-likegeneralizations. On these grounds, logical positivism, empiricism and main-stream IR might agree, but these are precisely the positions that Constructi-vism’s ontology are incompatible with. For example, Mattern’s (2004, p. 345)own argument that Realist Constructivism should recognize internationalpolitics’ ‘intersubjectively and culturally constituted’ ontology implies re-opening precisely the question of Constructivism’s ontological difference fromNeo-utilitarian IR, yet she goes on to advocate and develop ‘RealistConstructivism’ untroubled.

If Constructivism is about anything, it is not simply ‘identity’, but about the‘fluidity’ of ontology deriving directly from identity’s mutually constitutedinter-subjectivity. Despite this, the analyses above invariably take Constructi-vism as a methodological or epistemological standpoint. This does not meanthat Kratochwil, Ruggie or others are mistaken about the compatibility of suchan ontology with Neo-utilitarian epistemology or methods (for exampleFarrell, 2002, p. 51). Quantitative methods are not incompatible with ‘anontology that gives causal weight to cultural variables’, but the changeablenature of those cultural variables is incompatible with claims to ‘timelesswisdoms’: it is the status ascribed to the results of enquiry which is the coreof the Neo-utilitarian–Postmodern/Post-structuralist divide. Yet ‘RealistConstructivism’ represents nothing if not the aim of retaining the spatio-temporal invariance of ‘laws’ and observer-neutrality. The possibility andprimacy of these epistemic aims constitutes precisely the Neo-utilitarian–Postmodern/Post-structuralist disagreement, which genuinely challenges thepossibility of inter-paradigmatic dialogue (for example Teti, 2007).

Moreover, in debates about Constructivism this dividing line seems to have‘migrated’ from the demarcation of boundaries between Neo-utilitarian IRand Constructivism per se to a distinction between ‘critical’ and ‘conventional’Constructivism. The importance of this ‘migration’ is that by ‘mainstreaming’Constructivism, it effectively reinforces Neo-utilitarianism rather thanchallenge it, neutralizing precisely Constructivism’s most radical implications.

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That a research programme be capable of incorporating new theses, methodsor research foci is generally a sign of strength, but questions should beasked when those new elements are accepted despite starkly contradictingprogramme’s core.

Nor were these debates over the Neo-utilitarian–Postmodern/Post-structur-alist divide unprecedented upon Constructivism’s emergence in the late 1980s:they were central to the ‘Philosophical Turn’. In fact, recent claims aboutthe importance of social scientific approaches crucial to the quest forConstructivist/Neo-utilitarian convergence strikingly echo Keohane’s (1986)call that ‘scientific’ testing adjudicate between ‘rationalism’ and ‘reflectivism’.

Moving away from questions of foundations, there are several other featuresof the emergence of Realist Constructivism that deserve attention.

Reprising the familiar Realist Leitmotiv of Liberalism – here reincarnated asConstructivism – as a well-meaning but naıve and woolly minded and in anycase analytically inadequate attempt to ‘transcend power’, ‘idealist’ in thederogatory sense, has proven particularly popular. This leads some advocatesof Realist Constructivism to rather odd conclusions. Mattern, for example,infers that ‘postmodernism’ is unable to conceive power except as ‘passivelyenacted through social relationships’, missing those ‘variegated forms ofexpression’ and ‘productive’ dimensions that would allow an understanding of‘power [as] a question to be investigated, not a variable or process to beaccounted for’ whereas Realist Constructivism considers ‘how specific actorswield different forms of power (authority, force, care, and so on) throughdifferent expressions (linguistic, symbolic, material, and so on) to producedifferent social realities’ (Mattern, 2004, p. 345). Attempts to beratePostmodern/Post-structural scholarship on these grounds are rather ironic,because the key criticism levelled at Neo-utilitarianism is precisely its limited,unreflective conception of power.

Another vital aspect of Realist Constructivism’s emergence relates to its rolein the politics of Constructivism’s relations with mainstream IR. Farrell (2002),virtually alone among those advocating the possibility of dialogue withNeo-utilitarianism, explicitly acknowledges the politics of relations between thetwo, suggesting these pivot essentially on what ‘posture’ Constructiviststake viz. Neo-utilitarianism, ‘friend or foe’. For example, in response to Priceand Reus-Smit (1998), who note the shared roots of Constructivist approachesin critical political theory and argue for a ‘rapprochement’ between critical andconventional constructivists rather than with the ‘Neo-utilitarian’ mainstream,Farrell (2002, p. 60) cautions that this risks incurring dismissal rather thanengagement. This is a recognition that the outcome of these debates – which,as Farrell notes, could be crucial to Constructivism’s very survival – has atleast as much to do with perceptions about intellectual and politicalcommitments as with argumentation per se. In the context of a debate which,



although foregrounding the ‘causal importance of ideas’ and their relation withpower, manages to ignore self-reflection on how it goes about constructingitself, this is a welcome exception. However, it cannot lessen the strikingparallel between this (Realist) Constructivist silence and its counterpart indebates about Pragmatism.

This section has examined additional disciplinary consequences of ‘taxono-mical polarization’ in debates on Constructivism, noting how it enables a non-ontological interpretation of Constructivism as ‘focused on ideas’. This impliesa division of labour between Realism’s materialist focus and Constructivism’s‘idealism’, complementarity rather than antagonism, making it virtuallyimpossible for Constructivism to present any substantive challenge. In thissense, the selective articulation of a Constructivist/Neo-utilitarian convergenceresponds to the ‘Constructivist challenge’ by eliding its ontological roots.Having accepted with little substantial modification mainstream epistemicstandards, de-legitimizing non-Neo-utilitarian epistemologies, this ‘conver-gence’ can only subsume Constructivism within the paradigm it sought toundermine, as provider of the ‘identity variable’. This focus on epistemologyand methodology, however, cannot exorcize the implications of the ‘dualityof structure’: in trying to ‘save identity from postmodernists’ (Checkel, 1998,p. 327) the emperor has acquired decidedly ill-fitting new clothes.

Blind spots

The emerging consensus sketched above is far from logically coherent: itinvolves – indeed, requires – ‘blind spots’, such as the lack of reflexivity inanalysing its own ontological, epistemic, methodological and politicalcommitments. These blind spots are themselves integral to the mainstreamingof Constructivism.

Two key ‘blind spots’ are related to the intersubjectivity and co-constitutiveness of Constructivist ontology. The first is a surprising absencefrom the literature. If one of the hallmarks of Constructivism is the notion ofco-constitution agency and structure, Constructivists themselves have focusedon discourse, largely ignoring the material, whereas one might have said thatthe true ‘promise of Constructivism’ was its ‘double co-constitutiveness’,the analysis of the co-constitution of both material and ideational structureand agency. This ‘blind spot’ facilitated branding Constructivism as ‘idealist’both in the limited sense of dealing with ideas alone, and in the pejorative sensetypical of Realism, which notoriously ‘creates a narrative that uses therhetorical device of dichotomization to set itself up as the standard of prudentstatecraft against the utopianism of ‘idealists’’ (Lynch, 1999, p. 59; also: Steele,2007, p. 28). Wendt himself explicitly distinguished Constructivism from

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Liberalism precisely because, since Carr, ‘‘Idealist’ has functioned in IRprimarily as an epithet for naıvete and utopianism’ (1999, p. 33). To the extentthat ‘idealism’ signifies a focus on ideas, this label facilitated an interpretationof its relation to Neo-utilitarianism as one of complementarity rather thanantagonism.

A second ‘blind spot’ is the decreasing concern for Constructivism’s earlyontological claims. During the 1990s, Constructivists seemed to systematicallyshift/de-emphasize ontological commitments: indeed, the debate aboutConstructivism’s relation to mainstream IR – particularly around ‘RealistConstructivism’ – bypasses ontology virtually entirely (cf. Reus-Smit, 2002,p. 493). Wendt, IR’s most influential expounder of PoSS during the 1990s,provides the best example of this: although his earlier work carefully outlinedthe implications of a structurationist ontology for agent-structure co-constitution, he later abandons Giddens’ ontology and its double hermeneuticimplications (3B) for Bhaskar’s scientific realism (2B). Moreover, Wendt’slater commitment to ‘positivism’ (‘I am a positivist’; 1999, p. 39) conflates twoontologically incompatible positions: constructivist empiricism (1B) andconstructivist realism (2B). Simultaneously, his shifting emphasis towardsepistemology obscures ontological discrepancies, highlighting shared epistemiccommitments, implying that a Constructivist ‘scientific’ project is possible.

Similarly, Adler attempts to equate constructivist realism (2B) and IRConstructivism via Searle and the Pragmatists. Despite acknowledgingPragmatism’s ontological ‘agnosticism’ Adler (2003, p. 97) argues that since‘[a]ll strands of constructivism converge on an ontology that depicts the socialworld’ (ibid., p. 100), ‘[s]ome differences between Wendt and his critics may bereconciled by pragmatist realism [y] Contra Smith, we need a realist ontology[y] Contra Wendt, however, we need a pragmatist epistemology’ (ibid.,p. 107), thereby effectively transferring Constructivism from 3B to 2B. Thus,the reconciliation of social science with identity’s constructedness can bepredicated on retaining the latter while taking state identity as given, coherent,non-contradictory and before context (Adler, 1997; Wendt, 1999; cf. Zehfuss,2001): when Checkel indicates what challenges face ‘conventional, andmostly positivist constructivists’ (2004, p. 239) he omits ontology, arguingthat the most important task is to adjudicate whether ‘persuasion’ or‘deliberation’ are key causal mechanisms of preference change (see Figure 3).

Thus, the implications of Constructivism’s structurationist ontology end upneutralized either through some ontological privilege for the state, or byarguing that states behave as if their identity were fixed. Either way, states’ontological fixity or epistemic privilege remains incompatible with claims thatidentities and attendant political practices are spatio-temporally variable.

This neutralization of ontology crucially affects debates about relationsbetween ‘positivism and its others’, specifically whether Constructivism can



provide a via media, because on these grounds, echoing Keohane’s 1986 ISAPresidential Address, it becomes possible to predicate dialogue on those very‘social scientific’ grounds that are the bone of contention. It is thereforeunsurprising that Wendt alone has been taken as watermark of Constructivismin bridge-building attempts (Steele, 2007, p. 30) not because he alone issympathetic to Neo-utilitarianism (cf. Kratochwil, 1988), but because, unlikeOnuf or Kratochwil, his (later) ontological commitments do not raise theissue of the status of the ‘knowledge’ generated through Neo-utilitarianepistemologies applied to changeable ontological foundations.

A third, related ‘blindness’ is the paucity of reflections on how theseanalyses are themselves inextricable from particular normative commitments(and their reproduction). Despite focusing on ‘language games’ and knowl-edge-praxis relations in agents, Constructivists fail to analyse the linkagebetween power, identity and knowledge by reflecting on the process of (theirown) knowledge production. This should be especially surprising givenWendt’s hugely popular use of Giddens (1984, pp. 32–33, 348), who explicitlyargues that a ‘double hermeneutic’ flows directly from the ‘duality of structure’.By contrast, Pragmatists, like Post-structuralists, engage with precisely suchquestions. Rorty (1982) argues that one must ask not ‘What is the essenceof such-and-such a problem?’ but ‘What sort of vocabulary, what image ofman, would produce such problems? What does the persistence of suchproblems show us about being twentieth-century Europeans?’ Pragmatismprovides an unambiguously politicized answer to these questions, recognizingthat observation and knowledge cannot be neutral, fixed or objective,but are always for someone and for something (Bohman, 2002, pp. 500–501,fn 1), both insofar as observers come to a problem from a particularbackground and agenda, and because their actions are transformative of‘reality’. The silence on the politics of knowledge production, despite thesupposed ‘critical turn’ that Constructivism affords mainstream IR, isdeafening.

Figure 3: The politics of redrawing boundaries: Re-positioning of constructivism from PoSS to IR.

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How has the debate over Constructivism avoided such issues, and how havesuch ‘blind spots’ been sustained over time? The answer is linked to theportrayal of Constructivism as a Neo-utilitarian undertaking in two ways.First, because the ‘scientific method’ supposedly provides a self-correctingepistemological mechanism, attention to the knowledge production processbecomes ultimately redundant. Second, because the ‘dichotomized ontologicallogic that assumes into reality a distinction between a realm of empiricist ‘fact’and a realm of ‘theorized’ knowledge’ (George, 1994, p. 18), which lies at theheart of mainstream IR and ‘its associated representationalist view of language,[tend] to discourage wider reflection on [y] deep intersubjective beliefs thatorient, shape and constrain’ the production of ideas (Deibert, 1997, p. 169) sothat, contrary to Pragmatists, ‘[n]othing social need enter into questionsregarding the truth of a belief, because truth is a relation determined by asolitary subject standing in relation to an independent reality’ (Manicas inDeibert, 1997, p. 169). Thus, ‘a number of questions not only go unanswered,they are never raised. These include questions of the historical origin andnature of the community-based standards which define what counts as reliableknowledge, as well as the question of the merits of those standards in the lightof possible alternatives’ (Neufeld, 1993, p. 26).

Conclusion

Although it has at times been recognized that the field’s history cannot bereduced to a mere sequence of ideas (Waever, 1998), IR’s intellectual historyhas less often become the object of sustained analysis. This paper has sought tomake a contribution in this direction by analysing one aspect of the field’sdiscursive economy – the emergence and disciplinary trajectories ofConstructivism – by applying Foucaultian archaeologico-genealogical strategyof problematization. This approach reveals how Constructivism has beendrawn gradually closer to its mainstream Neo-utilitarian counterpart, andhow this normalization effectively purged Constructivism of its early criticalpotential.

The paper first showed how Constructivism’s current intellectual configura-tion and its rise to disciplinary prominence are inseparable from far-from-unproblematic readings of basic problems in the Philosophy of Social Science:choices made at this level are neither as intellectually neutral nor asdisciplinarily inconsequential as they are presented. The paper then chartedthe genealogy of early Constructivism, analysing the politics of earlyclassificatory practices to reveal how these permitted the distillation andimmunization of Constructivism against more radical Postmodernist/Post-structuralist critiques. Finally, the paper focused attention on recentevents that enabled the neutralization of this radical critical potential both



indirectly – for example, through ‘Pragmatist’ Constructivism – and directly,through the formulation of ‘Realist Constructivism’. Thus, the overallnormalization of Constructivism occurred in different stages, each revolvingaround particular debates: apparently ‘critical’ alternatives that aim to ‘providethe identity variable’, in fact, remain close to Neo-utilitarianism, but theirsuccessful representation as ‘critical’ helped neutralize Postmodern/Post-structuralist critiques.

A striking implication of this analysis is that Constructivism, as a theoreticalconstruction assessed against its own standards, strictly speaking does notexist. If by Constructivism one means the standpoint absorbed into main-stream IR then, as Sterling-Folker (2002a) argues, one is hard-pressed to findsignificant ontological, epistemological or indeed methodological differenceswith respect to Neo-utilitarianism. If, on the other hand, moving from earlyformulations of its ontology and the double hermeneutics which ensue,one takes Constructivism to entail ontological anti-foundationalism and anti-essentialism, one must recognize that such calls and such formulations arenot new, but are present in more rigorous and complete ways in Postmodern/Post-structuralist critiques. Either way, it is difficult not to conclude thatConstructivism is not all it is made out to be. Yet, if Constructivism does not‘exist’ in these senses, it has certainly had a crucial impact on the field asa discursive practice: the debate over its nature has been crucial to IR’sinfra-disciplinary balance of intellectual power, and thus to the vision ofinternational politics which, from this field, percolates into policy design andpublic debate.

Although these results are necessarily partial, this paper has shown that theintellectual configuration and fortunes of Constructivism are influenced bymore than the straightforward intellectual history through which mainstreamIR usually tells its own story. Specifically, the theoretical moves and ‘blindspots’ outlined above simultaneously produced the normalization of Con-structivism and the immunization of its more radical strands, and the silencingof Postmodernist/Post-structuralist critiques to Neo-utilitarianism. From thisvantage point, calls for Constructivism to ‘save identity from postmodernists’(Checkel, 1998, p. 325) are clearly rooted in a blindness and selectivity in theelaboration of contemporary ‘Social Scientific’ forms of Constructivism,which are themselves built into the very terms through which Neo-utilitarianscholarship understands its remit (for example Keohane, 1986). Thiscomplex process of (re)reading and (re)producing what counts as ‘Constructi-vism’ helps explain not only the normalization of Constructivism itself, but,insofar as it helps explain Neo-utilitarianism’s continued insulation fromPostmodernist/Post-structuralist critiques, also provides an important keyto understanding the reproduction of IR’s infra-disciplinary centre ofintellectual gravity.

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Acknowledgement

We thank Jozef Batora, Theo Farrell, Yale Ferguson, Stefano Guzzini, AudieKlotz and Cecelia Lynch and three anonymous reviewers and the editors forcomments on earlier drafts. Financial support from the Czech Academy ofScience (grant number KJB708140803) is gratefully acknowledged.

Notes

1 Although the division is usually framed in positivist/post-positivist terms, we resort to this

alternative labelling for reasons elucidated further below (see especially ‘Blind spots’ and Figure 3).

2 Capitalized terms refer to IR scholarship, whereas lower-case terms designate PoSS positions.

3 Partially shared key assumptions by empiricists and logical positivists sometimes lead to their

incorrect conflation. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this point.

4 Bhaskar (1997) distinguishes between general scientific-realist theory of science (‘transcendental

realism’) and a narrower version appertaining to social science (‘critical naturalism’).

5 Several earlier formulations echo Hopf’s. Adler (1997) distinguishes between modern, legal,

narrative and genealogical Constructivism, with the first three falling under Hopf’s ‘conven-

tional’ rubric. Adler (1997, 2003) speaks about a ‘weak programme’ designating Neo-Kantian

Constructivism close to (3B) and a scientific ‘strong programme’, encapsulating most IR

Constructivists. Price and Reus-Smit (1998) and Reus-Smit (2002) distinguish between minimal

foundationalist/positivist/modern and anti-foundationalist/interpretive/postmodern currents.

6 Sterling-Folker (2000) consequently argues that functionalist/liberal logic is inherent to all

Constructivism, subsuming under this rubric (neo)Functionalism and (neo)Liberal Institution-

alism.

7 The taxonomies discussed are actually defined in methodological rather than ontological or

epistemological terms, further ‘neutralizing’ ‘thick’ Constructivism, because Postmodern/Post-

structural methods are considered ‘unscientific’.

8 Ironically, the representation of social scientific scholarship as bias-free justifies criticism of

Postmodernists/Post-structuralists on the grounds of their normative commitments (for example

Reus-Smit, 2002, p. 501; Checkel, 2004, p. 236).

9 Widmaier is probably aware of Millennium’s special issue, as he cites Isacoff’s contribution,

although this is the sole piece he refers, ignoring Haas and Haas’ introductory paper.

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Date submitted: 30 April 2008Date accepted: 15 September 2008



Saving Identity in Postmodernism

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