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Saving Democracy from Politicians. Do We Need Professional Representatives? #LSEdemocracy Valentino Larcinese Professor of Public Policy in the LSE Department of Government Chair: Oriana Bandiera Professor of Economics and Director of STICERD Hosted by LSE Department of Government
Transcript of Saving Democracy from Politicians - LSE Home · Trust in politicianshas beenplummetingin Southern...
Saving Democracy from Politicians. Do We Need Professional Representatives?
#LSEdemocracy
Valentino LarcineseProfessor of Public Policy in the LSE Department of Government
Chair: Oriana BandieraProfessor of Economics and Director of STICERD
Hosted by LSE Department of Government
Saving Democracy from PoliticiansOn populism and inexperienced legislators
Valentino LarcineseInaugural lecture ‐ 6th December 2018
London School of Economics and Political Science
"Indirect despotism occurs when the people
are no longer truly represented or when
the legislative body becomes too unequal
to them”
[Condorcet 1789]
Pietro Chiesa, member of the Italian parliament 1900‐1915
Do you trust the politicians of your country?
Average scores from the European Social Survey where 0=min ‐ 10=max (for GR 2012)
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GER SWE GB FRA ESP IT GR
2002 2016
Trust in politicians has been plummeting in Southern Europe
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Trust in professions in 11 European countries
(Data from GFK‐Verein 2016)
Politicians are the least trusted profession everywhere
Where does the revolt come from?
• Legitimacy of elites is questioned when things do not go well
• Deteriorated economic conditions and emerging demand for protection by losers of globalization & technological innovation
‐ protectionism‐ control of immigration‐ new role for the State in the economy
But economics does not explain..
• why existing political elites are not delivering these policies
• why distrust of mainstream politicians has led to the rise of both populist and technocratic parties
Mainstream parties, Italy 2013
Mainstream parties, Italy 2013
New entrants, Italy 2013
Average ideological positions by group
The political market
• Anthony Downs' economic theory of democracy:‐ demand and supply of policy‐ competition generates responsiveness to demand
• For Downs the politician is a specialist in "discovering, transmitting and analysing popular opinion"
• Advantages of professionalization:‐ labour division
‐ experience ‐ learning by doing
‐ incentives & career concerns
Responsiveness to whom?
(source: Martin Gilens, The Monkey Cage)
The populist view
• Politicians not responsive to the majority of the electorate.
• Elites collude instead of competing: the establishment
‐ the people vs the elite
‐ politicians should be replaced by "common people"
‐ all policy should be directly accountable to "the people"
‐ distance between citizens and policy‐makers should be minimized
Responsiveness ≠ representation
Your representative owes you, not his industry only,
but his judgement; and he betrays, instead of serving
you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion
[Edmund Burke 1774]
Responsiveness ≠ representation
• Representation: the representative acts in the interest of the represented
• A representative often has superior competence and better information than the represented
=> it is possible to act in the best interest of the represented by NOT responding to their demands
• But then how do I know if my representative is working for me?
The technocratic view
• Politicians excessively responsive to the electorate
• they pander to the demands of misinformed/short‐sighted voters
• experts preferable to politicians
• insulation from the electorate is desirable (for some policy areas)
• distance between citizens and policy‐makers is positive
Knowledge and democracy
• Elitist approach (Plato). Knowledge is concentrated. A trade off
between representativeness and competence.
• Information aggregation approach. "There is this to be said for the
Many. Each of them by himself may not be of a good quality; but
when they come together it is possible that they may surpass ‐
collectively and as a body ‐ the quality of the few best" [Aristotle]
Credibility and descriptive representation
Representatives cannot commit to act in the interest of the represented
We want representatives “like us”
Generates demand for descriptive representation
But what is "like us"?
What is "like us"?• Political parties simplify descriptive representation by reducing it to ideological representation
• But when the ideological link between voters and politicians is weak we look for "someone like us" in socio‐demographic dimensions
Representativeness and competence: the Plato trade‐off
representativeness
quality of collective decisions
Representativeness and competence: the Aristotle win‐win
representativeness
quality of collective decisions
Are you Platonic or Aristotelian?
Inexperienced politicians in parliament: Italy 2013‐18
• New MPs usually selected from a pool of potential candidates with substantial political experience
• Founded in 2009, the Movimento 5 Stelle came out as the largest party in the 2013 election.
• M5S candidates selected through online primaries
• Unexpected success propelled into parliament completely unknown MPs with very diverse professional experiences
• Almost none of the M5S MPs had any political or admin experience
• Highly unusual composition of the 2013‐18 Italian parliament
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Left Coalition BerlusconiCoalition
M5S Monti Coalition Other
Political experience of elected MPs (Italy 2013)
Re‐elected Admin & Party None or negligible
05
1015202530354045
Left Right Monti M5S
Profession of MPs in the Italian Parliament (2013‐18)
intellectuals managers/entrepreneurspolitics professionsroutine non‐manual other
Blue collarUnemployed
Out of the labor force & others
Data collected by the author, except 1948‐1992, made available by CIRCaP
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Profession of Elected Legislators
aristocracy manager/entr. profess intell politician routine non‐manual other
Data collected by the author, except 1948‐1992, made available by CIRCaP
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Profession of Elected Legislators: Italy 1861‐2018
aristocracy manager/entr. profess intell politician routine non‐manual other
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Left Coalition Right Coalition Monti Coalition M5S Italian labour force
MPs' occupational status
Party & Unions High Intermediate Low Other
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Italy M5S LN SEL PD PDL SCPI
Mean income of newly elected MPs
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Italy M5S Other new MPs
MPs' gross income: percentiles
p25 p50 p75 p90
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LeftCoalition
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RightCoalition
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New MPs(Monti)
M5S Italy
MPs' education level
Below High School High School University Postgraduate
Unemployment (2008‐13) and M5S voting
Income per capita (2008‐13) and M5S voting
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Low
Intermedi…
High
Low
Intermedi…
High
Voting by occupational status and age
M5S Abstain Other Parties
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Berlusconi PD Monti M5S
Average MPs' legislative activity
(Activity measured using Openpolis productivity index)
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MPs' legislative activity: 20th percentile
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Berlusconi PD Monti M5S
MPs' legislative activity: median
p20 median
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MPs' legislative activity: 80th percentile
p20 median p80
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MPs' legislative activity: 90th percentile
p20 median p80 p90
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Berlusconi PD Monti M5S
MPs' legislative activity: 95th percentile
p20 median p80 p90 p95
Cumulated legislative activity over time
In the first year, M5S lags behind
13 36months
After that, they catch up
New M5S always outperform other new
MPsBy the end they also outperform incumbents
Amateurs‐turned‐politicians: what do the data say?
• Many indicators suggest that the amateurs‐turned‐politicians didn't do too bad as legislators, relative to other parliamentary groups
• However, we do not know if this holds for other roles, in particular the executive
Is populism a threat to democracy?
