A R V I N D S H A R M A

S A N K A R A ' S A T T I T U D E TO S C R I P T U R A L A U T H O R I T Y

AS R E V E A L E D BY HIS G L O S S ON B R A H M A S I A T R A 1.1.3

Brahmastatra 1.1.3 is a brief one and runs: kdstra-yonitvdt. 1

This satra is generally 2 taken as capable o f two interpretations according

to the two translations possible:

From its being the source of Scripture

o r

From the Scripture being the source (of its knowledge))

These two possible interpretations go at least as far back as Saflkara, as is

clear from the following consolidated account o f his gloss:

If the compound S~strayoni be treated as .Sast.hftatpuru.sa and be dissolved as 'S~strasya yonil). ', then the meaning of the Sfitra is that the Brahman is the source o f the Sruti; but if the compound is treated as Bahuvr~i and is dissolved as 'S~strarfi yonil) Kfiranarfi pram~narh yasya', then the meaning will be that the Sruti is the means o f the knowledge of Brahman.

The Sruti, i.e. the .Rgveda and other branches o f study, is a mine o f knowledge and light; nevertheless, it comes 'as a breath' (B.r. 2, 4, 10) from the omniscient and omnipotent Brahman, just as grammar comes from Pg.nini. Where else can we seek for the source o f this omniscient quality of the Sruti? Or the Sfitra may

be interpreted to mean that the knowledge of the Brahman as the cause of the world is possible only through Sruti, as has been shown by quoting a passage in the preceding S~tra. But as there was some room for doubt in the preceding Sfitra, whether or not there was in it a reference to inference, the present SQtra is intended to remove that doubt and explicitly state that the Sruti is the means o f knowing that Brahman is the cause o f the Universe .4

Journal o f Indian Philosophy 10 (1982) 179-186. 0022-1791/82/0102-0179500.80. Copyright © 1982 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.

180 ARVIND SHARMA

This twofold semantic possibility seems to have implications which have

not been futly recognised and which may account for differences in the statement about ~a/lkara's attitude to Scriptural authority directly or indirectly. The two possible meanings of the satras become clear, along with the perhaps subtle differences between them, if the following question is formulated in terms of the satra:

Is Brahman the source of Scripture or is Scripture the source of (the knowledge of) Brahman?

It will be obvious that so far as the issue of Scriptural authority (~abda- pramd.na) in Hindu thought is concerned, the first statement is less restrictive

than the latter in at least three ways. Firstly, if Brahman is the source of the Scripture, as well as of the world (Brahmasfitra 1.1.2), then at least on that

basis alone Scripture cannot claim to be a higher source of authority than the

other ones. Secondly, the word used for Scripture in the satra is kgstra, which even Safikara interprets to include "the four Vedas, the epics, the purS.nas and

other branches of learning vidydsthdna".s Inasmuch as ~abda-pramdna is

often equated with ~ruti-pramd.na, obviously here a wider range of literature than krut/is included as authoritative. Finally, if Brahman is the source of

~dstra it could as well be a source of other manifestations which could equally

well serve as avenues of approach back to Brahman. On the other hand, the second interpretation, in clearly but not solely it

would appear, identifying the Scripture as the source of the knowledge of

Brahman, comes out more unequivocaUy in favour of Scriptural authority.

II

It will now be suggested that this equivocality of the satra arising out of the possibility of analyzing the compound kdstrayoni in two ways has been of significance in interpreting Safikara's position on Scriptural authority.

T. M. P. Mahadevan, relying on Safikara's glosses on Brahmasfitra 1.1.1 and II.1.4 states:

That which is accepted or believed in without proper inquiry, observes Saflkara, prevents one from gaining the final good and leads to evil consequences. The ultimate court of appeal is the

plenary experience (anubhava). Scripture is valid because it

gAlqKARA'S GLOSS ON BRAHMASI)TRA 1.1.3 181

reveals the nature of that experience. The end or goal o f Scriptural inquiry, says Safikara, is experience.6

In other words, it is the experience o f Brahman which is the source o f Scriptural authority on this view. This is more consistent with the interpreta- tion of~dstrayoni as Brahman (i.e. experience o f Brahman) being the source of ~gstra. While commenting on Brahmasfitra 1.1.3 Radhakrishnan, although he does not state this view, seems to imply it by remarking, on the basis o f

Safikara's glosses on 1.3.28 and III.2.24:

There is another view of the Veda as dptavacana or sayings o f

the wise, those who had attained to a realisation o f Brahman, brahmaprdpti. This view is supported by S. who makes out

that the Sruti or Scripture is pratyak.sa or records o f the direct experiences of the seers, who are o f a self-certifying character. 7

Some support o f this may also be found in Sa/tkara's gloss on 1.3.30. 8

On the other hand K. Satchidananda Murty takes a view which corresponds more closely to the second explanation o f the compound - that Brahman

is to be known through Scriptural authority. By relying on a sentence in Safikara's gloss on 1.1.4, 9 K. Satchidananda Murty asserts:

According to Sahkara, anubhava of Brahman means the realization of oneself as Brahman (brahmdtrnabhdva). That Brahman is oneself

is not know except from sc r ip tu re . . , lo

Again relying on Safikara's gloss on II.1.311 Satchidananda Murty asserts that "the Vedanta V~kyas a l o n e . . , can lead to liberation". 12 He also remarks elsewhere:

Safikara's position is clear. Everyone thinks himself to be an agent and subject to pain and pleasure. Also, each one, identifying oneself with the body, thinks himself to be separate from others. This empirical 'self' need not be made known through the Veda. The Veda tells us about the true Self, Brahman - which is action- less, immutable and the sole reality. It is pure consciousness, and it has no attributes. When the true nature o f Brahman is thus known and when one's nondifference from it is known, the highest End is realised. This knowledge can be given by the Vedanta alone. 13

182 ARVIND SHARMA

Again, on the basis of Safikara's gloss on 1.1.414 Satchidananda Murty

remarks that "according to Safikara, anubhava is the assured conviction, the clear undoubted awareness that one is Brahman, which is generated by Veddnta Vdkyas" ) s

Thus, in the opinion of Satchidananda Murty:

• . . according to the Advaita Vedanta, the Veda is the only source and criterion of Brahman-intuition. Safikara or his followers nowhere claim to base Advaita on the personal experience of themselves or others. An aspirant for liberation should mould his experience in accordance with the mahdvdkyas by patiently weeding out all ideas contrary to the great truth 'That Thou Art'.

Not even the gods can intuit Brahman without having first known it from the Upanisads. The Advaitins, however, concede that it is possible for some to acquire the intuition of Brahman without

hearing the scriptural sentences in this life, if they had heard them in a previous life. 16

Dr N. K. Devaraja identifies yet another attitude towards Scriptural

authority on the part of Safikara. He writes:

The majority of philosophers in the world seek to prove the

existence of the ultimate reality by inference or reasoning. Both

Safikara and R~m~nuja, however, hold the view that the existence of Brahman or God cannot be proved through inference or

reasoning. According to R~m~nuja God can be known only from gruff or Scripture. Sahkara states that the Atman can be known not only from the Scripture but also by Anubhava (experience or intuition), and also, to some extent, by reasoning. He particularly emphasizes the fact that the .4tman is not dependent on the Pramdnas for being known or revealed, and that it is known through experience and is self-proved. All kinds of experience reveal or prove the existence of.4tman, for no object can be revealed without the light of the Atman. Atman is of the nature of "constant presence", its absence can never be experienced at all. Even during deep sleep, the consciousness or light called Atman is ever present; if its presence is not felt the reason is the absence of an object. Just as light becomes visible only against

SAI~IKARA'S GLOSS ON BRAHMASUTRA 1.1.3 183

the background of an object, similarly the presence of the Atman is felt only during the course of experience of objects. The Atman is proved even before the operation of the pram~.nas; prama.nas are employed to prove the existence of objects other than the self, and not the existence of the self. Since the Advaita Vedanta identifies the Brahman with Atman, the question of proving the existence of the former apart from the latter does not arise at

all. However, the fact that Brahman is the cause of the world can be known only from the Scripture. In order to defend these tenets, Safikara seeks to demolish the views held by rival systems. 17

There thus appears to be some difference in opinion among scholars as to what exactly is Sahkara trying to establish solely on the basis of Scriptural authority.

If ~dstrayoni is interpreted as: Scripture as the source o f . . . then one

must ask, the source of what? It is clear from the context that the Scripture has to be treated as a source of Brahman - but Brahman is self-existence so

Scripture can't be treated as a source of Brahman per se, but of some aspect of it. Three such aspects have been identified by scholars above:

(1)

(2)

(3)

as the source of the knowledge of Brahman as experienced by seers;

as the only source for the experiential realization of Brahman through the brahmavdkyas; as the only source of the knowledge that Brahman is the cause of the world.

III

The purpose of the rest of the paper is to determine the extent to which these positions can be supported by Safikara's glosses on the first four sfttras of the Brahmasfitra.

The differences in the three interpretations turn on the significance of experience (anubhava) in relation to Scriptural authority. In this respect a comment found in Safikara's gloss on 1.1.2 seems to be of considerable significance:

184 ARVIND SHARMA

Scriptural text, &c., are not, in the enquiry into Brahman, the only means o f knowledge, as they are in the enquiry into active duty (i.e. in the Pfirva M fmgafis~), but scriptural texts on the

one hand, and intuition, &c., on the other hand, are to be had

recourse to according to the occasion: firstly, because intuition is the final result of the enquiry into Brahman; secondly, because the object of the enquiry is an existing (accomplished) substance. If the object of the knowledge of Brahman were something to be accomplished, there would be no reference to intuition, and text, &c., would be the only means of knowledge? 8

Satchidananda Murty is aware of this remark 19 but argues that (a)

anubhava of Brahman means realization of oneself as Brahman, (b) this realization can only come through scripture, (c) therefore anubhava cannot be an independent source.2° But Safikara clearly mentions intuitive experience

in its own right as a way of knowing Brahman 21 and elsewhere remarks thus

on the knowledge of Brahman:

The object of desire is the knowledge of Brahman up to its

complete comprehension, desires having reference to results. Knowledge thus constitutes the means by which the complete

comprehension of Brahman is desired to be obtained. For the complete comprehension of Brahman is the highest end of man? 2

In this respect another fact could also be significant. Satchidananda Murty

asks a question which is the crux of the matter under discussion:

Here the critic may point out a difficulty. To know Brahman

is to know oneself truly, for there is no difference between

Brahman and oneself. Brahman is known when one knows himself as pure consciousness untouched by pain and pleasure, action, inaction, or any other attribute. So to be truly aware of oneself (one's own nature or form - svarapa) is to know Brahman. Is this not another way of knowing Brahman, besides knowing him from the Upanisadic sentences? How is it then justifiable to say that Brahman is known solely from the Upanisads? 23

In arguing that Brahman is known solely from the Upanisads from the

SAI~IKARA'S GLOSS ON BRAHMASI]TRA 1.1.3 185

Advaitic point of view, Satchidananda Murty mentions the posit ions o f the

Vivarana school, and o f Suregvara but does not cite Safikara. z4 Is it because

Salkkara unequivocally asserts in his gloss on 1.1.2 that "Scriptural tex t &c.,

are not, in the enquiry into Brahman, the only means of k n o w l e d g e . . . "? 2s

However, Safikara does deny any authori ty , other than Scriptural, for the

s tatement that the world proceeds from Brahman (I.1.2).

IV

A conclusion is now in order. The implicat ion o f Brahmasfitra 1.1.3 in the

context o f the catu.hsatrf for scriptural author i ty according to Sahkara's gloss

is as follows:

(1)

(2)

on a tatpuru.sa analysis o f the compound the term ~dstra is not

restricted to k ru t /bu t includes smrti, a posi t ion supported by the

Brhad~ranyaka Upanis.ad;

on a bahuvrfhi analysis o f the compound, Sankara is prepared

to give pari ty i f not pr ior i ty to anubhava in relation to ~abda

pramg.na;is prepared to concede that Self-realization may be

achieved wi thout recourse to Scripture but insists that the

Brahman as the origin o f the world can only be known through

Scriptural authori ty .

University o f Sydney ,

Sydney, N S W Australia

NOTES

1 S. Radhakrishnan, TheBrahma Satra (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1960), p. 240. 2 See Major B. D. Basu (ed.), The Veda-nta-stitras o f Bddardyana with the Commentary ofBaladeva (AUahabad: Panini Office, 1912), pp. 16-17. 3 S. Radhakrishnan, op. cir., p. 240. 4 V.H. Date, Sathkara's Commentary on The Brahma-sfitras, Vol. I (Delhi: Booksellers Publishing Company, 1954), p. 14. For an abbreviated account of ~afikara's gloss see S. Radhakrishnan, ot9. cit., pp. 240-242; for a literal translation see George Thibaut, tr., Vedanta.Satras with the Commentary o f Sahkardcdrya, Part I (Delhi: Motflal Banarsidass, 1973 [first published by Clarendon Press, 1904] ), pp. 19-22. s S. Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 242.

186 ARVIND SHARMA

6 T. M. P. Mahadevan, Outlines o f Hinduism (Bombay: Chetana Ltd., 1960), p. 144. 7 S. Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 243. But see K. Satchidananda Murty, infra, pp. 138-138 8 George Thibaut, tr., op. cir., Part I, p. 213. 9 K. Satchidananda Murty, Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedanta (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 343. lO Ibid., p. 112. 11 Ibid., p. 344. 12 Ibid., p. 136. 13 Ibid. ,p . l l 8 . 14 Ibid., p. 343. IS Ibid., p. 114. One should note, however, that "When it teaches that svarga can be attained through the performance of a certain sacrifice, it is of course true; but the Veda does not thereby vouch for the ultimate reality of either the svarga or anything connected with it. The fact is that the Advaita recognizes a higher, viz. the absolute standpoint from which all pramfinas alike, inclusive of the Veda, lose their relative validity. An exception is made only in the case of Upanisadic statements that teach the unity of all-Being. These statements are pramS., a in the absolute sense, for the knowledge which they convey is never shown to be wrong. But it does not secure for the pramS, a itself ultimate reality, for in m o n a where nothing but Brahman remains, even that pramS, a as such must disappear" (M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of lndian Philosophy [London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1932] ), p. 359. 16 K. Satchidananda Murty, op. cit., pp. 138-139. 17 N. K. Devaraja and N. S. Hirematta,A Source Book ofSahkara (Banaras Hindu University, 1971), pp. vi-vii, emphasis added. 18 George Thibaut, op. cir., Part I, pp. 17-18, emphasis added. t9 K. Satchidananda Murty, op. cit., p. 112. 2o Ibid.; also see p. 118. But as S. Radhakrishnan remarks: "It is difficult to find support in Safikara for the claim that only through the knowledge of the Veda can one acquire a knowledge of Brahman" (infra, p. 617). 2r "Now, Brahma-jijfi~s~ is unlike Dharma-jijfifis~. For while in the latter the ~ruti passages are alone capable of giving us knowledge, in the former, not only these but self-realization also is available as an authoritative source. Brahman as the object of knowledge is already an existing thing, and therefore can be apprehended only through intuitive knowledge. In the case of knowledge of a thing which is to be accomplished, there being no possibility of intuitive knowledge, ~ruti would be the only possible means of proof" (V. H. Date, op. cir., p. 12). 22 George Thibaut, op. cir., Part I, pp. 13-14. "~arhkara admits that while this anubhava is open to all, few attain to it. But the important point is that it is open to all" (S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II [ London: George Allen and Unwin, 1951] ), p. 513. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that when K. Satchidananda Murty quotes ~afikara to the effect: "That Brahman is oneself is not known except through Scripture" (op. cit., pp. 112,343), the word used for scripture is b~stra in the line quoted from ~ahkara's gloss on 1.1.4. But kdstra here does not mean merely the Vedas but also Sm.rti Literature as is clear from ~afikara's gloss on 1.1.3 and the citation from the Br.had~ranyaka Upanisad (see V. H. Date, op. cit., p. 14). 23 K. Satchidananda Murty, op. cit., pp. 118-119. ~4 Ibid. 2s George Thibaut, op. cit., Part I, pp. 17-18.