Sangalang v CA 25Aug89

8/3/2019 Sangalang v CA 25Aug89

1/12

Sangalang v. IAC, G.R. No. 71169, August 25, 1989, 176 SCRA 719.

[G.R. No. 71169. August 25, 1989.]

JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG, petitioners, FELIX C. GASTON

and DOLORES R. GASTON, JOSE V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES, and BEL-AIRVILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., intervenors-petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATECOURT and AYALA CORPORATION, respondents.

[G.R. No. 74376. August 25, 1989.]

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATE COURT, ROSARIO DE JESUS TENORIO, and CECILIA GONZALVEZ,respondents.

[G.R. No. 76394. August 25, 1989.]

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, andEDUARDO and BUENA ROMUALDEZ, respondents.

[G.R. No. 78182. August 25, 1989.]

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DOLORESFILLEY and J. ROMERO & ASSOCIATES, respondents.

[G.R. No. 82281. August 25, 1989.]

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VIOLETAMONCAL, and MAJAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

[G.R. No. 60727. August 25, 1989.]

NEMESIO I. YABUT, Municipal Mayor of Makati, ARTURO R. GABUNA, Secretary to theMayor for Administration, Makati; JOSEFO S. LINGAD, Acting Municipal Engineer; NELSONERASGA of the Municipal Engineer's Office, Makati; and RUPERTO ACLE; StationCommander, Southern Police District, Makati, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS andBEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondents.

J. Cesar Sangco and Renato L. Dela Fuente for G.R. No. 71169.

Funk & Associates for G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182 & 82281.

Sergio L. Guadiz, Gruba, Tanlimco, Lamson & Apuhin Law Office; Tee Tomas & Associates andCastillo, Laman, Tan & Associates for G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182 & 82281.

D E C I S I O N


2/12

SARMIENTO, J p:

I

Before the Court are: (1) two motions for reconsideration (G.R. No. 71169) of our Decision,

promulgated on December 22, 1988, the first one having been filed by Atty. J. Cezar Sangco onbehalf of the spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang, and the second, by Atty. Raul Sison, counselfor Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA); and (2 ) a motion for reconsideration and/or motion forclarification filed by Atty. Richard Funk (G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281) of the saidDecision.

The motion for reconsideration (G.R. No. 71169), filed by the Sangalangs, is anchored on twogrounds: (1) that contrary to our decision, Jupiter Street is for the exclusive use of Bel-AirVillage residents; and (b) that the Ayala Corporation did contrive to acquire membership at theBel-Air Village Association (BAVA) purposely to bargain for access to Jupiter Street by thegeneral public. Subsequently, BAVA informed the Court that it was adopting the Sangalangs'

motion for reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration (in G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182,and 82281) raises more or less the same questions and asks furthermore that we delete the awardof damages granted by the Court of Appeals.

The Court: (1) DENIES the motions filed by both the Sangalangs and BAVA with finality, nonew arguments having been presented to warrant reconsideration, and (2) DENIES Atty. RichardFunk's own motion for the same reason, with the further word that the grant of attorney's fees hasbeen deemed to be just and proper under Article 2208, par. II, of the Civil Code.

II

The lone issue in G.R. No. 67027 is whether or not the Mayor of Makati could have validlyopened Jupiter and Orbit Streets to vehicular traffic. The facts, as stated in the assailed decisionof the respondent court, in CA-G.R. No. 11803-SP, entitled, "Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,Petitioner, vs. Hon. Celso L. Magsino, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,Branch XX, Pasig, Metro Manila; Mayor Nemesio Yabut, Municipal Mayor of Makati, MetroManila, Arturo R. Gabuna, Secretary to the Mayor for Administration, Makati, Josefo S. Lingad,Acting Municipal Engineer, Nelson Erasga, of the Municipal Engineer's Office, Makati; andRuperto Acle, Station Commander, Southern Police District, Makati, Respondents," are asfollows:

In its chronological sequence, the petition avers as follows: On October 24, 1979, petitioner

instituted a petition for prohibition and damages with preliminary injunction with the respondentCourt docketed as Civil Case No. 34948. On October 25, 1979, the respondent court issued anorder directing respondents to answer and denying the issuance of a temporary restraining order.Petitioner filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the denial of its prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, adding as new ground the continuation of the commission of actsof dispossession by the respondents. The said urgent motion was denied.

On November 6, 1979, the parties were directed to submit their affidavits and counter-affidavits


3/12

as well as memoranda as basis for resolving the application for preliminary injunction. In duetime, the parties complied. On December 11, 1979, respondents filed their answer to the petition.

On March 4, 1980, the respondent Court denied the application for preliminary injunction. OnNovember 14, 1980, an order was issued denying the motion for reconsideration.

It is alleged by petitioner that by its orders of March 4, 1980 and November 14, 1980, therespondent Court has unlawfully deprived the petitioner of its right to due process to which it isentitled under the Constitution, and that respondents' acts are tantamount to grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction.

In their comment, respondents allege that prior to January, 1977, upon the instructions of respondent Mayor Nemesio T. Yabut of Makati, Metro Manila, studies were made by the otherrespondents on the feasibility of opening streets in Bel-Air Village calculated to alleviate trafficcongestions along the public streets adjacent to Bel-Air Village. The studies revealed that thesubdivision plan of Bel-Air Village was approved by the Court of First Instance of Rizal on

condition, among others, that its major thoroughfares connecting to public streets and highwaysshall be opened to public traffic. Accordingly, it was deemed necessary by the Municipality of Makati in the interest of the general public to open to traffic Amapola, Mercedes, Zodiac, Jupiter,Neptune, Orbit and Paseo de Roxas streets. On January 28, 1977, a meeting was held betweenrepresentatives of the Municipality of Makati and petitioner.

At this meeting, respondents claim that the representatives of petitioner, particularly Rufino R.Santos, president of petitioner, had agreed to the opening of Bel-Air Village streets. RegardingJupiter Street, the Municipality opened it because public welfare demanded its opening whichallegation the petitioner never questioned. With respect to Orbit Street, whose opening wastemporarily suspended until the flood control project from Buendia Extension up to the mouth of

the Pasig River, was about to be completed, it was opened only after another meeting attended byRufino R. Santos who agreed to the opening of the street from J.P. Rizal Avenue up to ImeldaAvenue and later up to Jupiter Street, subject to certain conditions.

To bolster their side, respondents cite: specifically, Section 44 of the Land Registration Act No.496, as amended, the deeds of donation of Jupiter and Orbit streets executed by and between theAyala Corporation and the petitioner, Presidential Decrees No. 957, Secs. 22 and 29 thereof, andNo. 1216, Sec. 2 thereof, and Municipal Ordinance No. 17 of the Municipal Government of Makati, Metro Manila, as amended by Resolution No. 139, dated November 21, 1948, andcontend that the opening of the two (2) streets was demanded by public necessity and in theexercise of its police powers, and, ultimately on the argument that petitioner has not shown aclear legal right to the writ of preliminary injunction.

With leave of court, petitioner filed a reply to the respondents' comment. They assert that thestreets mentioned in the comment, other than Jupiter and Orbit streets, have always been keptopen voluntarily by the Association, that Rufino R. Santos, president of petitioner, has neveragreed on the opening of Jupiter and Orbit streets, and that the Torrens titles covering thesestreets do not contain similar conditions as those titles for the other street lots.


4/12

Petitioner relies on its ownership of the streets of which it should not (be) deprived without dueprocess of law, and without just compensation, Article 539 of the Civil Code, an existingOrdinance of the Metro Manila Commission No. 2, Sec. 14 thereof, and the concurrence of allthe requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. 1

The Court of Appeals found that the certificates of title (Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. S-76020, S-76021, S-76022, S-76024, and S-76055, for Jupiter Street, and 206824, for OrbitStreet) do not contain the restrictions imposed by Section 44 of Act No. 496, now, Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, for which reason, and so the Appellate Court held, the Mayor of Makati did not have the legal right to open them up to traffic.

In Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 2 we held that Ayala Corporation, the formerowner of the Bel-Air subdivision, can not be held responsible for the opening of Jupiter Street,among other things, because it was the Mayor of Makati who ordered such an opening. 3 Theissue herein, as we indicated, is whether or not the Mayor could legally have done it. Withrespect, specifically, to Jupiter Street, Sangalang avers: llcd

Among other things, there is a recognition under both Ordinances Nos. 81 and 81-01 that JupiterStreet lies as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and Ayala Corporation's commercial section.And since 1957, it had been considered as a boundary not as a part of either the residential orcommercial zones of Ayala Corporation's real estate development projects. Thus, the Bel-AirVillage Association's articles of incorporation state that Bel-Air Village is "bounded on the NE.,from Amapola St., to de los Santos Ave., by Estrella St., on the SE., from Estrella St., toPedestrian Lane, by E. De los Santos Ave., on the SW., from Pedestrian Lane to Reposo St., byJupiter Street.." Hence, it cannot be said to have been "for the exclusive benefit" of Bel-AirVillage residents. 4

Sangalang also had occasion to invoke Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank andTrust Co. 5 We reiterate Ortigas herein:

xxx xxx xxx

2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractualobligations assumed by the defendant-appellee referring to the restrictions incorporated in thedeeds of sale and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee it should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionallyguaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people." Invariably described as "themost essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and mostpowerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into andcorrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. As this Court heldthrough Justice Jose P. Bengzon in Philippine Long Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et. al.,police power "is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not confinedwithin narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past condition; it must follow the legal


5/12

progress of a democratic way of life." We were even more emphatic in Vda. de Genuino vs. TheCourt of Agrarian Relations, et al., when We declared: 'We do not see why public welfare whenclashing with the individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the state'sexercise of its police power."

Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E. de los SantosAvenue (EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial andcommercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in theexercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order andgeneral welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the conditionsprevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves notonly front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place.EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the MetroManila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollutionare hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having beenexpressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the

municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution. 6

The Bel-Air Village Association can not therefore rightfully complain that His Honor, the Mayorof Makati, in opening up Jupiter Street, had acted arbitrarily.

In connection with Orbit Street, the Court reaches the same conclusion. We repudiate, therefore,that part of the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it held that the conditionimposed by Section 44, of Act No. 496, now Section 50, of Presidential Decree No. 1529, 7 that"no portion of any street or passageway .. shall be closed or otherwise disposed of by theregistered owner without approval of the court of first instance (being first) had . . ." 8 does not

apply for lack of an annotation of such a condition on the certificate of title (Transfer Certificateof Title No. 206824). To begin with, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 206824 does contain theannotation in question:

. . . subject to such of the encumbrances mentioned in Section 39 of said Act as may besubsisting, and the condition that the above lots are subject to the conditions imposed byRepublic Act 440. 9

Furthermore, the very Deed of Donation executed by the Ayala Corporation 10 covering Jupiterand Orbit Streets, amongst others, and so we found in Sangalang, effectively required bothpassageways open to the general public. We quote:

The alleged undertaking, finally, by Ayala in the deed of donation (over Jupiter Street) to leaveJupiter Street for the private use of Bel-Air residents is belied by the very provisions of the deed.We quote:

xxx xxx xxx

"IV. That the offer made by the DONOR had been accepted by the DONEE subject to the


6/12

condition that the property will be used as a street for the use of the members of the DONEE,their families, personnel, guests, domestic help and, under certain reasonable conditions andrestrictions, by the general public, and in the event that said lots or parts thereof cease to be usedas such, ownership thereof shall automatically revert to the DONOR. The DONEE shall alwayshave Reposo Street, Makati Avenue, and Paseo de Roxas open for the use of the general public.

It is also understood that the DONOR SHALL continue the maintenance of the street at itsexpense for a period of three years from date hereof. (Deed of Donation, p. 6, Exh. 7).

xxx xxx xxx

The donation on the contrary, gave the general public equal right to it. 11

As regards Orbit Street, it was stipulated:

1. That the property donated shall be used and maintained as "private roads or streets for theuse of the members of the Donee, their families, personnel, domestic helps and under certain

reasonable conditions and restrictions, by the general public;

2. In the event that the properties covered by this donation are no longer used as such, thesame shall automatically revert to the Donor; and

3. That the Donee shall always have Reposo Street open for the use of the general publicand shall transfer its present gate barrier located in the intersection of Orbit and Jupiter to thesouthern boundary of street Lot 8 of the Plan (LRC) Psd-77820." 12

As we asserted in Sangalang, the opening of Jupiter Street was warranted by the demands of thecommon good, in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience. 13 We also uphold the

opening of Orbit Street for the same rationale.

There is no merit in BAVA's claims that the demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter Streetsamounts to deprivation of property without due process of law or expropriation without justcompensation. 14 There is no taking of property involved here. The act of the Mayor nowchallenged is, rather, in the concept of police power. In the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 15 we said: LexLib

The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order topromote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty

or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition buthas been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the futurewhere it could be done provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditionsand circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the


7/12

Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it toperform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has beencredited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens."

"The police power of the State . . . is a power coextensive with self-protection, and it is notinaptly termed the 'law of overwhelming necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenarypower in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, andwelfare of society."

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted inthe conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations tosafeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensurecommunal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does notpurport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the

greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act accordingly to one's will." It is subject tothe far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number. 16

Unlike the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised without provision for justcompensation:

Art. 436. When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority in the interestof health, safety or security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless hecan show that such condemnation or seizure is unjustified. 17

However, it may not be done arbitrarily or unreasonably. 18 But the burden of showing that it is

unjustified lies on the aggrieved party. 19Our considered opinion is that BAVA has failed to show that the opening up of Orbit Street wasunjustified, or that the Mayor acted unreasonably. The fact that it has led to the loss of privacy of BAVA residents is no argument against the Municipality's effort to ease vehicular traffic inMakati. Certainly, the duty of a local executive is to take care of the needs of the greater number,in many cases, at the expense of the minority.

The next question is whether or not the Mayor, by himself, is vested with the power to order thedemolition so questioned, without the backing of a proper ordinance. On this score, the Mayorsubmitted in evidence Municipal Ordinance No. 17, as amended by Resolution No. 139, dated

November 21, 1948, 20 requiring a Mayor's permit to erect construction anywhere in Makati.The respondent court rejected, however, the Mayor's reliance on the Ordinance. We quote:

Respondents also invoke Municipal Ordinance No. 17, as amended by Resolution No. 139, datedNovember 21, 1948, requiring a Mayor's permit before any construction of any kind shall bebuilt, erected or constructed in any place in the Municipality, and empowering the correspondingauthorities especially the Mayor to remove and demolish any such illegal construction. For along time the gates and fences removed by agents of respondents have been in the sites where


8/12

they were removed. We fail to comprehend why the respondents did not invoke the Ordinancemuch earlier. They cannot pretend ignorance of a condition or situation which was neverconcealed from respondents and their agents. At any rate, the Torrens titles of these street lotswhich bore no restrictions whatsoever was authority for its owner to close them. 21

Quite to the contrary, the Court is convinced that Ordinance No. 17 is a valid justification for thequestioned act of the Mayor. The fact that some time had elapsed before the Mayor acted, can notrender the ordinance uneforceable or void. At any rate, the gate, the destruction of which openedOrbit Street, has the character of a public nuisance, 22 in the sense that it "hinders or impairsthe use of property," 23 which the Civil Code disposes of as follows:

Art. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:

(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or

(2) A civil action; or

(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings. 24

In The Homeowners Associations of El Deposito, Barrio Corazon de Jesus, San Juan, Rizal v.Lood, 25 we held:

At any rate, the decisive point is that independently of the said ordinance, petitioners'constructions which have been duly found to be public nuisances per se (without provision foraccumulation or disposal of waste matters and constructed without building permits contiguouslyto and therefore liable to pollute one of the main water pipelines which supplies potable water tothe Greater Manila area) may be abated without judicial proceedings under our Civil Code. 26

In addition, under Article 701 of the Code, summary abatement may be carried out by the Mayorhimself. prcd

Although estoppel is a valid defense against abatement of nuisance, 27 judicially or summarily,the Mayor is not being condemned for estoppel here, but, rather, for inaction. Under, however,the Civil Code:

Art. 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or private. 28

Other than BAVA's claims that the opening of Orbit Street led to the loss of privacy of BAVA

residents, there is no showing that the Mayor, in carrying out the demolition of the Orbit gate,had acted in disregard of due process or, as the respondent court would put it, with a "show of arrogance". 29 As we said, the gate in question was a nuisance, which could have been legallyabated by summary means. The fact that it was accomplished summarily does not lend to it a"show of arrogance" because, precisely, a summary method is allowed by law. In any event, thereis a showing that the Mayor notified BAVA that Orbit (and Jupiter) Streets would be opened up.30 The Court finds that such a notice is compliance enough with due process. 31


9/12

What has been left unsaid is that the nation today is witnessing profound changes occurring in itsmidst. A decade ago, we were a people of forty or so million. Today, the number is knocking onsixty million. We are reaping the cost that population explosion carries with it. Housing thehomeless has been one of the first casualties. And so has been the transport system. Giving thehomeless homes and bringing them there safely is a formidable burden and the task of the hour.

Parochial concerns can not be an impediment to the greater needs of the greatest number.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 60727 is GRANTED; the motions for reconsiderationsin G.R. Nos. 71169, 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281 are DENIED with FINALITY.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes,Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, Padilla and Grio-Aquino, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, 44-46.

2. G.R. Nos. 71169, 76394, 74376, and 82281, December 22, 1988.

3. Apart from the fact that it did not commit itself to close it up. See supra.

4. Supra, 27-28.

5. No. L-24670, December 14, 1979, 94 SCRA 533.

6. Supra, 545-547.

7. Section 44, Act No. 496, provides in full: "Sec. 44. A registered owner of several distinctparcels of land embraced in a single certificate of title desiring to have in lieu thereof severalnew certificates each containing one or more parcels, may file a petition for that purpose with theregister of deeds, and this officer, upon the surrender of the owner's duplicate, shall cancel it andits original and issue in lieu thereof the desired new certificates. So a registered owner of severaldistinct parcels of land in separate certificates desiring to have in lieu thereof a single certificatefor the whole land or several certificates for the different portions thereof, may file a petition

with register of deeds, and this officer, upon the surrender of the owner's duplicates, shall cancelthem and their originals and issue in lieu thereof new ones as requested.

Any owner subdividing a tract of registered land into lots shall file with the Chief of the General Land Registration Office a subdivision plan of such land on which all boundaries,streets and passageways, if any, shall be distinctly and accurately delineated. If no streets or


10/12

passageways are indicated or no alteration of the perimeter of the land is made, and it appearsthat the land as subdivided does not need of them and that the plan has been approved by theChief of the General Land Registration Office, or the Director of Lands as provided in Sectionfifty-eight of this Act, the Register of Deeds may issue new certificates of title for any lot inaccordance with said subdivision plan. If there are streets and/or passageways, no new

certificates shall be issued until said plan has been approved by the Court of First Instance of theprovince or city in which the land is situated. A petition for that purpose shall be filed by theregistered owner, and the court after notice and hearing, and after considering the report of theChief of the General Land Registration Office, may grant the petition, subject to the condition,which shall be noted on the proper certificate, that no portion of any street or passageway sodelineated on the plan shall be closed or otherwise disposed of by the registered owner withoutapproval of the court first had, or may render such judgment as justice and equity may require.

A registered owner desiring to consolidate several lots into one or more, requiring

new technical descriptions, shall file with the Chief of the General Land Registration Office aplan on which shall be shown the lots to be affected, as they are before, and as they will appearafter the consolidation. Upon the surrender of the owner's duplicate certificate or certificates andthe receipt of proper authority from the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, theregister of deeds concerned shall cancel the old certificates and issue a new one for theconsolidated lot or lots."

Under Section 50, Presidential Decree No. 1529, it is stated: "Sec. 50. Subdivisionand consolidation plans. Any owner subdividing a tract of registered land into lots which do

not constitute a subdivision project as defined and provided for under P.D. 957, shall file with theCommissioner of Land Registration or with the Bureau of Lands a subdivision plan of such landon which all boundaries, streets, passageways and waterways, if any, shall be distinctly andaccurately delineated.

If a subdivision plan, be it simple or complex, duly approved by theCommissioner of Land Registration or the Bureau of Lands together with the approved technicaldescriptions and the corresponding owner's duplicate certificate of title is presented forregistration, the Register of Deeds shall without requiring further court approval of said plan,register the same in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act, as amended:Provided, however, that the Register of Deeds shall annotate on the new certificate of titlecovering the street, passageway or open space, a memorandum to the effect that except by wayof donation in favor of the national government, province, city or municipality, no portion of anystreet, passageway, waterway or open space so delineated on the plan shall be closed orotherwise disposed of by the registered owner without the approval of the Court of First Instanceof the province or city in which the land is situated.


11/12

A registered owner desiring to consolidate several lots into one or more, requiringnew technical descriptions; shall file with the Land Registration Commission, a consolidatedplan on which shall be shown the lots to be affected, as they were before, and as they will appear

after the consolidation. Upon the surrender of the owner's duplicate certificates and the receipt of consolidation plan duly approved by the Commissioner, the Register of Deeds concerned shallcancel the corresponding certificates of title and issue a new one for the consolidated lots.

The Commission may not order or cause any change, modification, or amendmentin the contents of any certificate of title, or of any decree or plan, including the technicaldescription therein, covering any real property registered under the Torrens system, nor order thecancellation of the said certificate of title and the issuance of a new one which would result in theenlargement of the area covered by the certificate of title.".

8. Act No. 496, sec. 44, supra.

9. Rollo, G.R. 60627,153, Nota bene: Republic Act No. 440, referred to therein, is anamendment to Section 44, Act No. 496. Prior to the amendment, Section 44 provided as follows:"Sec. 44. A registered owner holding one duplicate certificate for several distinct parcels of landmay surrender it, with the approval of the court, and take out several certificates for portionsthereof. So a registered owner holding separate certificates for several distinct parcels maysurrender them, and, with like approval, take out a single duplicate certificate for the whole land,

or several certificates for the different portions thereof. Any owner subdividing a tract of registered land into lots shall file with the clerk a plan of such land, when applying for a newcertificate or certificates, and the court before issuing the same, shall cause the plan to be verifiedand require that all boundaries, streets, and passageways shall be distinctly and accuratelydelineated thereon.".

10. The Ayala Corporation was the original owner of the property subsequently subdivided asBel-Air Village. See Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra.

11. Supra, 37.

12. Sangalang, supra, 41-42.13. Rollo, id., 267.

14. Rollo, id., 260.

15. G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988.


12/12

16. Supra, 3-5.

17. CIVIL CODE, art. 436.

18. PASEI v. Drilon, supra, 5.

19. CIVIL CODE, art. 436, supra.

20. It does not appear that Orbit Street is covered by Ordinance No. 81-01, reclassifyingvarious areas in Makati for zonal purposes. See Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court,supra.

21. Rollo, id., 50.

22. CIVIL CODE, supra, art. 694, par. (5); Art. 695.

23. Supra, art. 694, par. (5).

24. Supra, art. 699.

25. No. L-31864, September 29, 1972, 47 SCRA 174.

26. Supra, 182; see also CIVIL CODE, supra, art. 701.

27. See II PARAS, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 556 (1975 ed.).

28. Rollo, id.

29. Id., 29-30.

30. Id.

It is to be stated that, with respect to Jupiter Street, in spite of the fact that we held it to be openfor use by the general public, we would have disposed of it in the same way we now dispose of Orbit Street, i.e., that the Mayor can legitimately open it up to the public on the ground that thegate closing it constitutes a nuisance. The gate closing Jupiter Street would also have been anuisance.

Sangalang v CA 25Aug89

Documents

Transcript of Sangalang v CA 25Aug89