Sanders 1997

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

1/31

!"#$%&'()*+$,*-#'$.%!/'0.-1&23(45%%(67(8#%9*-&8./-:*3(;.+$'$:#+(.+7(?@=(A.7(B(1C/%7=(DEEF2=(GG7(BHFIBFJ;/,+$&0*9(,53(Sage Publications, Inc.8'#,+*(KL43(http://www.jstor.org/stable/191984 .

!::*&&*93(MENMBN?MDD(??3@O

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Theory.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sagehttp://www.jstor.org/stable/191984?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sagehttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/191984?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sagehttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

2/31

AGAINSTDELIBERATION

LYNNM.SANDERSUniversityof Chicago

ADMITTEDLY,opposingdeliberationseemsirrational.'Acommitmentto deliberationis, after all, a commitmentto finding a way to addressconcerns,resolve disagreements,and overcome conflicts by offering argu-ments supportedby reasons to ourfellow citizens. Deliberativedemocracypromises legitimate-that is, morallyjustifiableandrationallyproduced-solutionsto vexing political problems.Especiallywhen these problemsaredifficult, affording no clear way to arrive at unequivocally satisfactorysolutions,deliberationrecommendsitselfbecauseit relies onabroadconsid-erationof alternativesolutions,increasingthe likelihoodthattheperspectivesheldby all membersof aheterogeneouscommunitywill be givenvoice. Anddeliberationis alsoclarifyingandenlightening,highlightingthe moralissuesat stakein politicaldebatesandallowingcitizens to elucidatethese issues forthemselves.

Argumentson behalf of deliberationcontinue to proliferate,and thissteadystreamof endorsementsof deliberationreinforcesthesuppositionthatdeliberationenhancesdemocracy.Democratictheorists now take delibera-tion to be theexemplarypracticeoractivityfordemocrats,andthey geartheirargumentstowardits realization.Hencedeliberationhas become a standardfortheaccomplishmentof democracy:it is whatdemocratictheoristsaim for,ourideal and ouraspiration.Whendemocratictheoristssuggestremodelingourpolitics,it is in thedirectionof makingthemmoredeliberative(GutmannandThompson1996).

What,then,could bewrongwithdeliberation?Tobegin,onemightsimplybe suspiciousof the nearconsensusamongdemocratictheoristsonits behalf.It isn't clear,afterall, thatthis wide endorsementhas itself emergedthrougha genuinelydeliberativeprocess:democratictheoristsare a selectgroupwhocannotanddo notclaim in anyway to representtheperspectivesof ordinaryPOLMTICALTHEORY,Vol.25 No.3,June1997347-3760 1997SagePublications,Inc.

347

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

3/31

348 POLMCAL THEORY/ June 1997

citizens.Althoughordinarycitizensconstitutethedemos on whosebehalfargumentsaboutdeliberationaremade,therecommendationofdeliberationis not,typically,justifiedbyarguments,especiallynotsubstantiveorempiri-calones,thatdeliberativedemocracyis whatordinarycitizenswouldthem-selvesrecommend.2Theabsenceof this(deliberative)justificationforrecommendingdelib-erationdoesnotbyitselfmakedeliberationobviouslyantidemocratic.Butitdoes,I think,justifyanexplorationof thepossibilitiesforarguingagainstdeliberation.So that is my enterprisehere.I attemptto articulatesomereasonswhydeliberationmightnotappealtoordinarycitizens,or atleastnot to manyresidentsof the UnitedStates,at least notgiventhewaywelive now.And,correspondingly,I suggestthatthese observationsprovidesomereasonswhy deliberationshouldnot necessarilyandautomaticallyappealtodemocratictheorists,either.

THE TROUBLEWITHDELIBERATIONThe deliberativeidealmighttroubleproponentsof democracyfor anumberof reasons.Foronething,it carriesconservativeorantidemocraticconnotationsusuallyoverlookedby well-intentionedtheorists.Appealstodeliberation,I will argue,have oftenbeenfraughtwithconnotationsofrationality,reserve,cautiousness,quietude,community,selflessness,anduniversalism,connotationswhichinfactprobablyunderminedeliberation'sdemocraticclaims.Moreseriouslythanthis,however,is thatappealingto

deliberation,ortakingit forgrantedasanappropriatedemocraticstandard,mayhavea destructiveeffect.Democratictheoristshavearticulated,informalterms,theprerequisitesof deliberation;they have sketchedwhatconditionswould have to beachievedfordeliberationtoproceed.Foremostamongtheseconditionsis theachievementof mutualrespect:citizenswhodeliberatemustaddresseachotherasequalsandacknowledgethisstatusby offeringreasonable,morallyjustifiableargumentstoeachother.The(careful)articulationoftheseformalstandards,however,is a farcryfromanassessmentof theprobabilityofmeetingthem.Intheabsenceof suchanassessment,appealstodeliberationdonothingtochallengeanundesirablestatusquo.Most perniciously,even thoughthe requirementof mutualrespectisassumed,notinvestigated,anotherexpectationassociatedwithdeliberationis probablyrealizedin ourpoliticalculture.Somecitizensarebetterthanothersat articulatingtheirargumentsin rational,reasonableterms.Some

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

4/31

Sanders/ AGAINSTDELIBERATION 349

citizens,then,appearalreadytobedeliberating,and,giventhetightlinkbetweendemocracyanddeliberation,appearalreadyto beactingdemocratically.If we assumethat deliberationcannotproceedwithoutthe realizationofmutualrespect, and deliberationappearsto be proceeding,we may evenmistakenlydecidethatconditionsof mutualrespecthavebeenachievedbydeliberators.Inthisway,takingdeliberationas asignalof democraticpracticeparadoxicallyworksundemocratically,discreditingonseeminglydemocraticgroundstheviewsof thosewhoarelesslikelytopresenttheirargumentsinways thatwe recognizeas characteristicallydeliberative.In ourpoliticalculture,thesecitizensarelikelyto bethosewhoarealreadyunderrepresentedin formalpoliticalinstitutionsandwho aresystematicallymateriallydisad-vantaged,namelywomen;racialminorities,especiallyBlacks;andpoorerpeople.Myinitialclaimaboutdeliberation'shistoricalconnotationsdependsona reviewof how andwhypoliticalthinkershaveappealedto it. Thisreviewwill show thatdeliberationhas at least a few suspiciousantidemocraticassociations.Mysecondandlargerclaim,concerningdeliberation'spoten-tiallycounterproductiveeffects,dependsonattentiontoparticularfactsaboutwhathappenswhenAmericancitizensactuallyget togetherto deliberate.Althoughthese facts areperhapsdisheartening,lookingat whatactuallyhappensindemocraticdiscussions,andnoticingwhentheyseemtogo best,alsosuggestswaystoimprovedemocraticdiscussionintheUnitedStates.The facts aboutdeliberationin Americansettings,at least as I havegatheredthem,showthatwhathappenswhenAmericancitizenstalktoeachotheris oftenneithertrulydeliberativenorreallydemocratic.Thisis partly,

butnotonly,becausethematerialprerequisitesfordeliberationareunequallydistributed.Itispartly,butnotonly,becausesomeAmericansaremorelikelyto bepersuasivethanothers,thatis, to be learnedandpracticedinmakingargumentsthatwouldberecognizedbyothersasreasonableones-no matterhowworthyortruetheirpresentationsactuallyare.It is alsobecausesomeAmericansareapparentlylesslikelythanotherstobelistenedto;evenwhentheirargumentsarestatedaccordingtoconventionsof reason,theyaremorelikely to be disregarded.Althoughdeliberatorswill always choose to disre-gardsome arguments,when this disregardis systematicallyassociatedwiththe argumentsmade by those we know alreadyto be systematicallydisad-vantaged,we should at leastreevaluateourassumptionsaboutdeliberation'sdemocraticpotential.Deliberationrequiresnotonlyequalityinresourcesandtheguaranteeof equalopportunityto articulatepersuasiveargumentsbutalsoequality in "epistemologicalauthority,"in the capacityto evoke acknowl-edgementof one's arguments.

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

5/31

350 POLMCALTHEORY/ June1997

Theseareinsidiousproblems,noteasilyaddressedwithintheconfinesofargumentsaboutdeliberation,whichdependcruciallyontheaccomplishmentby democraticcitizensof mutualrespectfor eachother,but arebereftofevaluationsofwhetherthisisarealisticpossibility.Becausetheachievementof mutualrespectis practicallyremote,democratictheoristsshouldaskwhetherargumentson behalfof deliberationdoanythingtobringabouttheachievementof trulydemocratic,or indeedtrulydeliberative,discussions.Perhapsa model of democraticdiscussionotherthandeliberationwouldattendmoredirectlyto theseinsidiousproblems.SoIconcludethisessaybysuggestingthatweforgetdeliberationforthetimebeing,andtryto imaginea model for democraticpoliticsthat moreplausiblyencouragesmutualrespect-somethingthatadvocatesof deliberation,afterall, reallywant.

THELASTINGMARRIAGEOFDELIBERATIONANDDEMOCRACY

Democratictheoristsarguethatdeliberationcultivatesdemocracy,forgoodreason.Deliberationhasa badside:itsconservativeconnotations,itsunfortunatemanifestationsin Americanpractice.Yetdemocratictheoristsbelievethatdeliberationmakesdemocracypregnantwith twodistinctbutrelatedoffspring:increasedautonomyandanexpandedsenseofcommunity.Tocontemporarytheorists,enhancingautonomymeans,in part,educatingcitizensto considerpolicyandbroaderpoliticalquestionsratherthanleavingthesethingsup to a specialized,technicallyinformedelite. Democratictheoristswantdeliberationfor everyone,not for some particularrepre-sentatives.Theyopposepluralistconceptionsof democracy,especiallyitsinterest-groupvariants,becausethey"placenopremiumonpoliticalpartici-pation"(Sunstein1988,1546).So advocatesofdemocraticdeliberationwanttoinvolveordinarycitizensin theprocessof rationaldecision-makingthatpluralistsleaveto experts.3Sometimesdeliberationis recommendedfor its educationaleffects,for itspromisetomakecitizenssmarter,alongthelinesofMill'ssuggestionin OnLiberty.Forexample,BernardManinsaysthat"politicaldeliberationandargumentation... constituteprocessesof educationandtraining.... theyspreadlight.... thepeopleeducatethemselves"(1987,354).Thistrainingisnot a simplematterof intellectualimprovement:"Onlypublicdeliberationandpoliticalactionallowcitizenstorealize-bothtomakerealandto becomeawareof-their dignityandpowersasresponsibleagentsandjudges"(PitkinandShumer1982,44).Deliberation,atleastin itsmostpromisingformula-

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

6/31


tions,teachescitizenstoseethingstheyhadpreviouslyoverlooked,includingtheviewsof others,andthereforeto becomebettercitizens.Thisis clearlythe kindof thingAckermanhopesforwhenhesuggeststhatbaseprejudiceswill be transformed,andworthyintuitionslikehatredof racismvindicated,throughrationalcriticismanddialogue(1980,353).Autonomyis a civicorpolitical,notindividualistic,project,anditisquiteusualtofinddemocratictheoristsalsoadvocatingdeliberationforitspoten-tial to uncovera communalidentity.Again,thistendencyseemsdirectlylinkedto thequestforanalternativeto interest-groupliberalism.So, forexample,SheldonWolin,in thefoundingissue of thenow-defunctjournaldemocracy,announcedthatthestateof affairsatthedawnoftheeightieshadbroughton acrisisof identity,a needtofigureout"whoweareasapeople"(Wolin1981,10).AndCohenandRogers,whose1983bookOnDemocracybegan"Thesearedarktimes,"foundthatin themidstof a lot ofwhatmightbe calledpolitickingwas a totalabsenceof democraticcommunity:

Attemptsatcoalition-buildingproliferate.Debatesandprogramsof actionabound.Thinktanks and policy research institutessteadily multiply.New corporatepolitical actioncommittees andprivatenewslettersareborn each day.... But if those who occupy thecommandingheightsof privatepoweraremobilizingtheirforces,thosewholive beneaththem are in startlingdisarray... there is no commonvoice (CohenandRogers 1983,16-17).

Thepursuitof a commonvoiceis specificallyposedhereasaremedyto theaccumulationof privatepowerandspecialinterests.Soin its bestortruestform,deliberationisaprocessofpoliticaldiscussionthatexcludesno one. Itimprovesall citizensintellectually,by heighteningtheirabilityto considerpolicyandpoliticalproblems;personally,by allowingthemto realizetheiruntappedcapacitiesforobservationandjudgment;andmorallyorcivically,by teachingthemaboutthepoliticalconcernsof othercitizensandby encouragingmutualrespect.Modernadvocatesofdemocraticdeliberationaim to developcommunalsensibilitieswithoutrequiringapotentiallyoppressiveeducationin civic virtue.They aspireto replaceafacelessandpossiblycorrupttechnocraticelite with informed,considerateandjust,reasoningandreason-givingcitizens.

REASONSFORA DIVORCEEven on thistruest,bestversion,deliberationstill providesno solutionfor,andpossiblyexacerbates,thehardestproblemfordemocrats,andthere-

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

7/31

352 POLMCALTHEORY/June1997

foremissesbyits own standards.Americandemocratictheoristswhowantto discourageelitism,expandcitizenparticipation,improvetheabilityofcitizensto discusspolicyquestions,andevaluatepoliticalcandidates,andbeforeall this,heightencitizenrespectfor eachother,need to takeoneproblemasprimary.Thisproblemis howmoreof thepeoplewhoroutinelyspeakless-who, throughvariousmechanismsor accidentsof birthandfortune,areleastexpressivein andmostalienatedfromconventionalAmeri-canpolitics-might takepartand be heardand how those whotypicallydominatemightbemadeto attendto theviewsof others.Contemporarydemocratictheoristsare,to besure,awareof theserious-ness of thisproblemof disenfranchisement.So, forexample,whenCassSunsteinmakesthecasethatthe bestthingaboutrepublicanthoughtis itscommitmentto deliberativedemocracy,he hastensto pointout what'sbadaboutit:deliberation,he says,cannotneatlybe separatedfromrepublicanpracticesof exclusionof women,Blacks,andthoselackingproperty(Sun-stein1988,1539).BernardManinarguesthatdeliberationis worthpraisingbecausea trulydeliberativeprocessissuinginlegitimatepoliticaldecisionsutterlyrequirestheparticipationof "all"(1987,esp. 352, 359).KnightandJohnsoncarefullyemphasizetheimportanceof "freeandequalaccess todeliberativearenas"(1994).Fishkin'srecentproposalto revitalizeAmericandemocracythrougha "deliberativeopinionpoll"makesequalconsiderationofeveryone'spreferencesanessentialpreconditiontodemocracy(1991,30).Further,somedemocratictheoristsnotonly mentiontheimportanceofformalequalizationof access but also advocatestructuralor economicreformsto guaranteethat all citizenshave the resources-time, money,education,skillatarguing-requiredfordeliberation.Forinstance,CohenandRogers(1983)notice that"theabsenceof materialdeprivationis apreconditionfor free andunconstraineddeliberation"(p. 157) and that"materialinequalitiescansubverta structureof freeandequalpublicdelib-erationby translatingintosharplyunequalcapacitiesforpoliticalaction"(p. 158).Theyurgetheeliminationof gross materialinequitiesand alsorecommendfreepubliceducationandstate-financedchildcare.Educationensuresthedevelopmentof deliberativecapacities,andchild careon thisviewguaranteesthatwomencanparticipateinpoliticsaftertheyhavelearnedhowto deliberatebygoingto school.JohnsonandKnighthavesystematicallyaddressedtheseproblemsandattemptedto specifythe(formal,notinstitu-tional)natureof theremediesto inequitythatmustprecededeliberation(1996).Theseacknowledgementsof theprerequisitesto deliberation,andtheseattemptstoinstilldeliberationwithaparticipatoryandinclusiveimpulse,arefarfromtrivial.Theyin fact mustbe madeif deliberationis to qualifyas

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

8/31

Sanders/ AGAINSTDELIBERATION353

democratic.Yettheydo not,I think,fullyaddressproblemsof exclusion,becausethereis too greata disjuncturebetweenthe hardestproblemsthatdemocracy'sproponentsmustgrapplewithandtheformalityof theacknow-ledgmentsandrecommendationsthatdemocratictheoristsmake.Somecriticshave noticedthe manifestationof thisdisjuncturein theabstracttalkof democratictheorists.Indeed,thisabstractionmaybeabsolutelynecessaryfor proponentsof deliberativedemocracy,because acknow-ledgmentof thehardestproblems,thatis, thesystematicdisregardofascrip-tivelydefinedgroupssuchaswomenandBlacks,wouldviolatethedeliberativetenetto attendto theforceof argumentratherthantheinterestsofparticulargroups(Phillips1995,155ff.). Indeed,democraticcitizensas describedinthesetheoriesseemto live on anotherplanet(quiteliterally,in the caseofAckerman1980):they are devoidof race, class,andgenderand all thebenefitsandliabilitiesassociatedbyAmericanswiththesefeatures.Abstrac-tionfromtheseascriptivecharacteristics-theirdisregard-clearlyassistsattemptstoenddiscriminationbaseduponthem;aswell, however,abstrac-tiondeprivestheoristsof awayto noticesystematicpatternsof exclusion.A deeper,moredifficultproblemthanabstractionlurks.Evenif demo-cratictheoristsnoticetheinequitiesassociatedwithclassandraceandgenderand,forexample,recommendequalizingincomeandeducationto redistrib-ute the resourcesneededfordeliberation-evenif everyonecandeliberateand learnhow to givereasons-somepeople'sideasmaystill countmorethanothers.Insidiousprejudicesmayinclinecitizensto hearsomeargumentsand not others.Importantly,thisprejudicemaybe unrecognizedby thosecitizenswhoseviewsaredisregardedaswellasbyothercitizens.

Proponentsof deliberationareespeciallybadlyequippedto addressthisproblem.Theydependonopenargumentsagainstprejudiceto overcomeit,andonthesusceptibilityofprejudiceto reason.Notonlydotheybelieveintheexistenceof settingswherenothingmattersexceptforanidea'sintellec-tualforceanditscommunalutility,as inHabermas'sidealspeechsituation(Habermas[1962]1992;Calhoun1992)orinAckerman'sinsistencethataspeaker'ssuperioritycanneverbeinvokedas a reasontopreferanidea(1980,4, 11);theyalsoexpectprejudicesto bechallengedindeliberativesettingsandfor othersto "faceup"to them(GutmannandThompson1996).Whendisregardbasedinprejudicegoesunrecognizedbyboththosewhoaresubjecttoitandthosewhoareprejudiced,prejudicescannotpossiblybe challenged.Prejudiceandprivilegedo not emergein deliberativesettingsas badreasons,andtheyarenotcounteredby goodarguments.Theyaretoo sneaky,invisible,andperniciousfor thatreasonableprocess.So worryingaboutspecifyingwhatcountsasa good argument,ortryingto enhancereason-giving either via the formulationof betterrules and proceduresor by

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

9/31

354 POLITICALTHEORY/ June1997

providingthetime,money,andeducationnecessaryto becomearesponsibledeliberativecitizen,doesnotengagesomeof themostseriouschallengestothepossibilityof achievingdemocraticdeliberation.Somepeoplemightbeignoredno matterhowgoodtheirreasonsare,no matterhowskillfullytheyarticulatethem,andwhenthishappens,democratictheorydoesn'thaveananswer,becauseonecannotcounteraperniciousgroupdynamicwithagoodreason.Sometimes,givingreasonsisn'tanythinglike therightprojectandsuggestingthatthedisregardedargueagainstprejudiceor discriminationisoffensivein andof itself.4

THEANTIDEMOCRATICAPPEALOF DELIBERATION

Althoughhe is a somewhatpredictabletarget,JosephSchumpeterneatlyexemplifiesthreeof the time-honoredchargesagainstdemocracy.Thesecharges,whichpersistin differentdegreesto thepresentday,arethatthemassesareboundto getout of controlwhentheygettogether,thattheyareincapableofrationalargument,andthattheycannotseebeyondtheirnarrowselfishconcerns.For thefirst,Schumpeterinvokedthe observationsof Le Bon, who,onSchumpeter'sreading,succeededinshowing

therealitiesof humanbehaviorwhenundertheinfluenceofagglomeration-inparticularthesuddendisappearance,ina stateofexcitement,of moralrestraintsandcivilizedmodesof thinkingandfeeling,thesuddeneruptionof primitiveimpulses,infantilismsandcriminalpropensities-hemadeus facegruesomefactsthateverybodyknewbutnobodywishedto see andhetherebydealta seriousblowto thepictureof man'snaturewhichunderliestheclassicaldoctrineofdemocracyanddemocraticfolkdoreaboutrevolutions.(Schumpeter[1942]1976,257)

Lowly passions,citizens'lack of restraintwhenset loose in public-notanythingso loftyorprincipledas a desireforautonomy,forexample-arethe truesourcesof inspirationforthegreatdemocraticrevolutions.Publicassemblyseems,onSchumpeter'sview,arecipeforextractingonlythebasestperformancesof whichhumansarecapable.Inaddition,accordingtoSchumpeter,mostcitizensaren'tthatsmart.Fortheaveragecitizen,"mereassertion,oftenrepeated,countsmorethanrationalargument."Schumpeterhadnoshortageof catch-phrasesforconveyinghisgenerallackof esteemfor theintelligenceof themany.Theaveragecitizen"isimpatientof longorcomplicatedargument,"possesses"weakrational

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

10/31


processes,"is "not'allthere.'" "People,"Schumpeterannounces,"cannotbe carriedup the ladder."Sinceaveragehumansarelikelyto yieldmorereadilyto prejudiceandmanipulationthan to rationalargument,not tomentiontheinvitationto crudeexcess thatis riskedwhenthey assemble,Schumpeterconcludesthatthetypicalcitizen"dropsdownto a lowerlevelof mentalperformanceassoonas he entersthepoliticalfield.Hearguesandanalyzesin a waywhichhe wouldreadilyrecognizeas infantilewithinthesphereof his realinterests.He becomesa primitiveagain"(Schumpeter[1942] 1976,257,262).Finally,Schumpeteralsowasconvincedthataveragecitizenscouldbarelydiscerna commoninterest.If politicalmattersresembledtheconcernsofdailylife in thehomeorinbusiness,theremightbe somehopeforminimalcomprehensionof civicaffairs-so localpoliticsmightbe lessafflictedbytheignoranceoftheaveragecitizen.ButSchumpeterallowsthat"eventherewe find a reducedpowerof discerningfacts,a reducedpreparednessto actuponthem,a reducedsenseofresponsibility."Andwhenit comesto nationalandinternationalaffairs,thereis nobasisforhopingthatcitizensmightseeanythinglike a commongood,becausetheseaffairs"lacka directandunmistakablelink with . . . privateconcerns."Citizens aren'tcapable ofapprehendinganyinterestbeyondone thatimmediatelyandobviouslycon-cernsthemselves(Schumpeter[1942] 1976,260, 261).It is quitecommontoput Schumpeter'scomplaintsaboutdemocracyinperspectiveby recallingthe contextin which he wrote,withits specifichistoricalprovocations.Forinstance,DavidHeld,in makingthe pointthatSchumpeterwashardlyanoriginalthinker,remarksthatSchumpeter'shighlycriticalaccountof moreparticipatoryschemesof democracy...echoedcloselytheopinionsof manyWesterncommentatorsandpoliticiansat thetimewhofelt "excessive"participationmightproducethemobilizationof thedemoswithhighlydangerousconsequences:amongtheexperiencesuppennostin theirmindswasno doubttheBolshevikrevolutionandthemassrallieswhichsignaledtheadventofNaziGermany.(Held1987,165)

Creditforsensitivityto the historicallessonsof massexcessis frequentlyextendedto the Americanpoliticalscientistswho followedand in somemeasureechoedSchumpeter,suchas theauthorsof Voting(Berelson,Lazar-feld,andMcPhee1954)andRobertDahl(1956).YettheantidemocraticsentimentsthatSchumpeterexemplifiesarebothtoo old-fashionedandtoopersistentto be linkeddirectlyto the historyoftwentiethcenturyEurope.Schumpeter'sviewsof themassesweresolidlyinplaceinSirPhilipSidney'sArcadia,thebestsellingbook,aftertheBible,in

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

11/31

356 POLITICALTHEORY/ June 1997

seventeenthcenturyEngland(Herzog1989). Sidneysketchesa zealousmultitudeincapableofanyconstantopinion,bothatthemercyofmanipulat-iverulersandin needof skillfulleadership.There'snohopeof a discussionof commoninterestsinSidney'saccountof democraticassembly:

But whenthey beganto talk of theirgriefs,never bees made such a confusedhumming:the town dwellersdemandingputtingdown of imposts;the countryfellows, laying outof commons:some would have theprincekeep his courtin one place, some in another.All cried out to have new counselors,but whenthey shouldthinkof any new, they likedthem as well as any otherthatthey could remember.... At length they fell to directcontrarieties.(Sidney 1984, 383)

Not only predatinghim,views like Schumpeter'sfollowedAmericanpoliticalscience intothe sixties, appearing,for instance,in AlmondandVerba'sTheCivicCulture(1963).Similarly,PhilipConverse'squestforideasamongtheAmericanmasspublic,leadinghimthroughrevisionsandrefine-mentsof surveyinstrumentation,concludedwiththelamentthat"whatneedsrepairis notthe[survey]itembutthepopulation"(1963,176).TheviewsthatSchumpeterpublishedin 1942werehardlynovel;neitherwasSchumpeterthe endof them.I wanttosuggestthattheappealtodeliberationhasofferedsomethingofanall-purposesolutionto eachof theproblemsnamedby Schumpeterandothers.Paradoxically,thissolutionissatisfyingto bothelitistsanddemocrats.Becauseof itsconnotationsofcautiousnessandorder-becausedeliberationis by definitionnothasty-it establishesa standardto invokeincomplaintsaboutunrulyorexcessivebehavior.Deliberationalso connotesthoughtful-ness. Appealsto deliberationamountto demandsfor a certainkindofdiscoursein democraticpoliticalsettings:reasonable,foresighted,steady,andorientedtoacommon,notsectarian,problem.The aristocratic(orantidemocratic)use of these standardshasbeentoclaim thatthe manyfail to be deliberate:thatis, they are too hasty,orinsufficientlythoughtful,especiallyaboutproblemsnotof immediatecon-cernto them.Butdemocratsalso subscribeto them:manydemocratshavetriedto meet the aristocraticobjectionsto democracyby adoptingtheseobjectionsas standardsforhowdemocraticpoliticaldiscussionsshouldrangeor be restricted.So democratsendup sayingthatthemanyshouldbeinvolvedinpoliticsbut thattheyshoulddeliberateaboutit. Bothdefendersandenemiesof themasseshave advanceddeliberationas theperfectantidoteto democracy.Democracy'sstaunchsupportersdonot celebrateit asa placefor themanyto gatherandexpressintemperateviews:instead,eagerto offsetcriticismsof democracyas short-sightedandineptmobrule,they suggesthow it can

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

12/31


be mademorerational,slow-paced,andcommunallyoriented.Inthefollow-ing sections,I exploretheresonancebetweenapparentlyconservativeandapparentlydemocraticdiscussionsofdeliberation.

DELUBERATIONANDTHEAVOIDANCEOF INTEMPERANCEANDINEPTITUDEEdmundBurkewasavociferousadvocateof a moretranquilpoliticsand

the authorof some of the morecolorfulimagesof popularexcess in thehistoryof politicalthought.Burkefoundthe FrenchNationalAssemblyanythingbutdeliberate;infact,heconsideredit a sham,playingthefarceof deliberationwithas littledecencyasliberty.Theyactlikethecomediansofa fairbeforea riotousaudience;theyactamidstthetumultuouscriesofamixedmobofferociousmen,andof womenlostto shame,who,accordingto theirinsolentfancies,direct,control,applaud,explodethem,andsometimesmixandtaketheirseatsamongstthem,domineeringoverthemwitha strangemixtureof servilepetulanceandproud,presumptuousauthority.(Burke[1790]1987,60)

AlthoughBurkewas hardlya democrat'sbest friend,he didn'tfind themultitudeentirelywithoutredemption:if it couldjustslowdown,it mightnot be completelyoutlandish.'Themultitude,for themoment,is foolish,"he said,butonlyfor themoment,"whentheyactwithoutdeliberation"(asquotedin Pitkin1967,181).Unfortunately,however,thoughhe admittedthattheywereendowedwithdeliberativecapacities,Burkeconsideredthedelib-eratesenseofthemultitudetooremoteandtoolongincomingto makeitsafeforthemtodirecttheirownpolitics.Betterthattheyavoidtheoverstimulatingatmosphereof the politicalassemblyand leavepoliticsto someonelessinclinedto rashness.Burkeis,ofcourse,theexemplaryconservative.Butself-styleddemocratsalsosketchdemocraticexcessinlanguagethatcloselyapproximateshis.TheAmericanpoliticalscientistDonaldDowns,forexample,echoesBurkein hisaccountof thepoliticalextremismsurroundingattemptsby radicalfeministstopassantipornographylegislationinMinneapolisandIndianapolis.Downsreportsthat"manyknowledgeableleadersexpressedstrongreservationsaboutthe lack of deliberation,theone-sidedness,andthesurrealsenseofmoralemergencythatprevailed"inMinneapolis.IndescribingthehearingsonpornographyheldbytheCityCouncil,Downs,bothin his ownwordsandinquotingothers,refersto the "antics"of supportersof theantipornographyordinance,their"emotionalism,"their"rantandrave"asopposedto "precise

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

13/31

358 POLITICALTHEORY/June1997

thinking,"their"hysteria,"and the way the activists"applauded,booed,hissed,andcried."Andinfact,Downssaysthata senseofmoralemergencyandone-sidednessare"preciselythequalitiesthatthepoliticallymatureandtolerantsocietyaspiresto tame"(Downs1989,66, 82-3,86-7,italicsadded).Tobeclear,thepointhereis notabouttheextentto whichDonaldDownsdecriesrestrictionsonpornography.Instead,itis thatbothDownsandotherswhoseviewshe reportscondemntheantipornographyactivistsby sayingthattheywere,innosmallmeasure,insufficientlydeliberate.AndthoughDowns(1989)makesthiscondemnationinthenameofdemocracy(forexample,hesaysthat"theextremepositionstakenduring... thenewattackonpornog-raphyhavedemeanedthequalityofpublicdiscourse... andjeopardizedthequalityof democraticdebate"(p. xvii),his appealsto deliberationclearlyresonatewith Burke'sconservativeemphasison the needfor containmentandthe avoidanceof excess.Unqualifieddistrustof theself-controlandreasonablenessof themanymayseem outof placein ourrelativelydemocraticage,but ajudiciouslyexpressedskepticismis notat allforeigntomodernpolicythinkers.Worriesaboutthecontradictionbetweendeliberationanddemocracy,aboutpublicdiscussionsspinningintochaos,areregardedas legitimateconcernsforpolicymanagers.Thetaskof thesebureaucratshasbecome,onthe modernAmericanview,notjustthemanagementof publicpolicyandpublicissuesperse,butthemanagementof thepublicdiscussionitself.Forinstance,morethana thirdof theessaysin a collectioneditedbyRobertReich,The Powerof PublicIdeas, areexplicitlydevotedto thequestionof how policy makersmightdeveloppublic debateon policymatters.Butit'sclearthatthis is trickybusiness,evenforthosestudentsofpublicpolicy,likeReich,whoclearlyendorsethegoalofdemocraticinvolve-ment.A certainwarinessaccompaniesallof Reich'srecommendationsthatpublicmanagersbringpolicymattersunderthepublicpurview.Reichwarns:"publicdeliberationwilltakeupinordinatetimeandresources... andit caneasilycycleoutofcontrol"(Reich1988,154).Evenwell-intentionedpublicmanagersneedtoknowjusthowmessythingscanbecome.Closelyaffiliatedwiththeobjectionthatthemassesareinclinedto beoverwhelmedbymobpsychologyinthepoliticalassemblyis the worrythattheyaren'tsufficientlyrationaltothinkstraight.Thistoo is anold-fashionedobjection.Forexample,intheseventeenthcentury,SirThomasPopeBlountannouncedthat "thenumerousrabble"were "butbrutesin theirunder-standing.. . havingnothingbuttheiroutsidestojustifytheirtitlesto ration-ality"(as quotedinThomas1983,43-4).Buttheviewhasnotentirelyfadedfromthescene.Notsolongago,CharlesLindblomwasnearlyasunflattering

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

14/31


asSirThomas:"mostpeoplewantpolicymakinggenerallytobe democratic.Buttheyalsowantit to beintelligent"(Lindblom1980,6).Theideathatdeliberationshouldbe restrictedto experts-to thosepar-ticularlyequippedwith the skills for rationaldiscourse-is an idea thatpervadesothermodemtheoriesthatat leastformallypurportto be demo-cratic.If themassesarelacking,theirtrueinterestscanbestbepursuedbysomeonebetterequippedat managingpoliticalaffairsthantheyare.Thesecond chapterof C. B. MacPherson'sTheReal Worldof Democracyis along attempttojustifytheideathatthe"vanguardstate. . . maybe calleddemocratic":if the massesthemselvesexhibitno tastefor thestruggleforhumanequality,then an elite groupmaydirectthemto it, pursuingthepeople'strueinterestsbetterthantheythemselvescan(MacPherson1965,22).An alternativeto ruleby expertsis, however,availableto democrats.Ifthe massesarelacking,they mightbe improved.Andit maybe exactlyinvolvementin publicaffairsthatwill educatethemto thecapacitiesforcitizenship.Themostfamousexemplarof theeducativeeffectsof politicaldeliberationis Mill.Althoughhe wassuspiciousenoughofaveragecitizensto suggestin RepresentativeGovernmentthat theirvotes shouldbe out-weighedby theirbetter-educatedfellows,Mill still locatedsomeupliftingpotentialinpoliticaldiscourse,forinstanceinOnLiberty.Averagepeoplecan be improvedin a numberof ways throughtheirinvolvementin politics.Notonly mighttheydevelopbasiccompetencyatcitizenship,theyalsoarelikelyto becomebetterhumanbeings,acquiringboth individualautonomyanda sense of commoninvolvement.Manycontemporarydemocratsextendthishopeto allcitizens:theywanteveryoneinvolvedinpolitics,buttheyalsowanteveryoneto bedeliberateaboutit.

DELIBERATIONFOREVERYONEModemdemocratictheoristswantpublicdeliberationto be commonintwoways.Theyhopethatallcitizenswilldeliberatetogether,becausetheir

activityofparticipatinginadiscussionofcommonproblemsshouldinspireasenseofautonomy.And,incontrasttoantidemocrats,likeSirPhillipSidneyandJosephSchumpeter,who doubttheaveragecitizen'sabilityto compre-hendanythingbutaprivateinterest,modemdemocratictheoristsbelievethisbroaderorientationcan be reachedby the massesandrecommendwideinvolvementinpoliticaldeliberationas a courseto it.Publicdiscussionsarecommonformodemdemocratictheoristsinasecondsense,then,in termsof

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

15/31


theirsubjectmatteror orientation.A normof findinga commonvoice, ofresurrectingsome form of a communalinterest,pervadescontemporarydemocratictheory.Includingeveryonein thepursuitof a commoninterestoridentityseemsdemocratic:it'sagoalfoundedonexpandedparticipation,andit containstheaspirationthatsomethingworthwhile-asenseofempowermentanda stakein the community-willcomeout of thisparticipation.Yetthisdemocraticaimcarriescertainantidemocraticimplications.Boththepursuitof a com-monvoiceandthe vehicle-deliberationforeveryone-usedin thatpursuitmaybefundamentallyantagonistictoimportantdemocraticaims.Thereareprobablylimitstotheextentto whicheveryonecandeliberatetogether,whichI will discusslater.But thepursuitof a commonvoiceitselfis, somewhatparadoxically,an exclusiveaim.Althoughmoderndemocratictheoristsdidnotdecidetofocuson a communalidentitybecausetheythoughtthemassesneededspecialurgingto seebeyondtheirnarrowandselfishconcerns,in theend this focusendsup resonatingwith conservativeindictmentsof masspoliticsinpotentiallytroublingways.WhenJaneMansbridgedefinesdeliberation,she alsorevealsthecontem-porarydemocraticinclination toward the pursuitof commonality.Mansbridge,however,is carefulto allow for a form of deliberationthatadvocatesthearticulationof difference:deliberationmay"shapethecharac-terof thosewhoengageinit,in thedirectionof morehabituallyrecognizingconflictsof interest."If patternsof oppressionmakeit unlikelythatsomegroupswillsucceedinarticulatingthesedifferences,theyneedto retreatfromthemoregeneraldiscussionanddeliberateamongthemselves,to discovertheir trueinterests.Ultimately,however,commonalityis the goal: "thepresenceof othersencourages'we'ratherthan'I'thinking....whenasocietyneedstodiscourageindividualself-interestandencouragealtruism,delibera-tioninpublicwill oftenservethatend"(Mansbridge1991,7-8).OthercontemporarytheoristsshareMansbridge'srecognitionthattheprojectof mutualdeliberationneedsto preservesomespacefor acknow-ledgingconflictsanddifferences.HannaPitkin,forinstance,pointsoutthatdistributivejustice-presumablyone of the aimsof deliberation-requiresacknowledgingindividualselvesinthecommunity(Pitkin1981).PitkinandShumernotonly acknowledgethepossibilityof conflictindemocraticdiscussionsbut considerconflictintegralto them:"conflict-handledindemocraticways,withopennessandpersuasion-iswhatmakesdemocracywork,what makes for the mutualrevisionof opinionsandinterest"(Pitkinand Shumer1982, 47; see also GutmannandThompson1996).Yetclearlythere'sa priorityhere,anexpectationof arrivalatsomekindof consensus.Specialinterestsareto berevised,modified,orshiftedin

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

16/31


the nameof discoveringsomethingcommon.Inaddition,commonlife notonlyemergesin deliberationbut is expectedto assistit. CharlesLarmore,alongwith JohnRawls,suggeststhatdisagreementsmaybe resolvedorbypassedwhen citizens can refer to the "beliefsthey still share"or to"commonground"(Larmore1996,referringtoRawls1971).Pitkin andShumer,Mansbridge,andLarmore,representattemptsbycontemporarydemocratictheoriststo acknowledgeconflictanddifferencewithina broaderprojecttouncover,andrelyupon,acommunalorientation.These approaches,however,carrya risk thatparticularperspectivesandinterestswill beeffaced,especiallyintheinterestsof minoritiesoroppressedgroups.Neitherperspectivesuggestsa waytoidentifywhenorif particularinterestsshouldbepubliclyhonored.Neithersuggestsa standardfordecidingwhenthecommunityas a wholemustattendtoveryparticularperspectives,or whethersuchattentionhasanyplaceindeliberation.Yetsurelythereareoccasionswhendemocraticassembliesshoulddonothinglike pursuethe commongoodbut insteadshouldjust listenandrespondto particularcomplaints.The testimonyof JapaneseAmericansrelocatedduringWorldWarII beforeCongresswas, forexample,such amoment.Thefirstmajorproblemwiththedemocraticpursuitof acommunalorientationthroughdeliberationis thisriskofdiscreditingparticularinterests.Oneof themorepromisingapproachesto thinkingabouthonoringpar-ticularitycomesfromacknowledgingtheneedfordemocratstolistenas wellas to talk in theirdeliberations.BenjaminBarberannouncesthis need inStrongDemocracy:

Theparticipatoryprocessofself-legislationthatcharacterizesstrongdemocracyattemptsto balanceadversarypoliticsby nourishingthemutualisticartoflistening."Iwilllisten"meanstothestrongdemocratnotthatI willscanmyadversary'spositionforweaknessessandpotentialtrade-offs,noreven(asaminimalistmightthink)thatIwilltolerantlypermithimtosaywhateverhe chooses.Itmeans,rather,"Iwillputmyselfin hisplace,I willtrytounderstand,I willstrainto hearwhatmakesusalike,I will listenfora commonrhetoricevocativeofa commonpurposeor a commongood.(Barber1984,175)Yetwhatis acknowledgedbythelisteneris onlywhatcanbeincorporated,whatis identifiablysimilar.Whilewhatis different,distinctive,unique,oruncommonmaybearticulated,it is not,onthemodeloflisteningdetailedbyBarber,attendedtooracknowledged.Preferredattentiontowhat'scommonincreasestherisksofoutrightdenialof theperspectivesofminorities.Iftheseperspectivesareunsettling,discomfiting,or if membersof the dominantgrouphavean interestinignoringthem,thentheriskscontainedinseekingacommonvoiceincrease.Forexample,Whitefeministshavetendedto thinkin termsof a genericcategoryof woman,anapproachwhichmayusefully

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

17/31


encouragesomeformofsolidaritybutalsodeniesWhitewomen'scomplicitywithracism.Thispointhasemergedclearlyin the criticismsthatBlackfeministshavemadeof theuniversalizingtendenciesinWhitefeministtheoryandpolitics(Smith1982;hooks1981;JosephandLewis1981;Dill 1983;Spelman1988;Collins1990).Giventhe difficultiesofacknowledgingandcreditingparticularinterestsin themidstofa broadpursuitofcommonality,it is notsurprisingtofindthatdemandinghonorof a highervaluethanoneselfcan also workto discreditsocialmovementsforgedaroundtheparticularinterestsofoppressedgroups.Thelanguageusedby AlbertMartin,a husbandabandonedin his wife'spursuitof her own individualityandthe authorof One Man, Hurt is anextremeexample:Martincomplainsof "theenshrinementof individuality,thefreedomof self,at theexpenseofmaritalunionandsocialcompromise"(quotedin Klatch1987,128).When someonelike Martincalls for socialcompromise,we readilyidentifythisappealwithanattempttoresurrectastateofaffairscharacterizednotonly byunitybutalsobydominanceandinequality.Yetsuchanappealis not readilydistinguishablefromostensiblymoremoderateperspectives(compareBellahet al. 1985).Insettingswheretherearegrossinequitiesinpowerandstatus,callingforcompromisemaybe perilouslyclose to sup-pressingthechallengingperspectivesofmarginalizedgroups.Suchsuppres-sion,whenitoccurs,is notdemocratic.Andavoidingitrequiresanabilitytonoticewhichindividualsregularlyhavemorepowerthanothers,andwhoseperspectivesregularlydominate.The appealto democraticdeliberationdoesn't,at leastby itself,provideawayto takenoticeofandrespondtosuchimbalances.Learningto deliberateinAmericamightbeinseparablefromindoctrina-tion in familiarroutinesof hierarchyanddeference,becausethe settingswhereAmericansdeliberatearen'tisolatedfrom statusinequalities.Theextentto which theseconcernsaretroublingwill be clearerfollowingareviewof someof theapparentfactsaboutdeliberationcollectedin socialscientific studiesof juries.

THEPOSSIBILITIESFORDELIBERATIONIN THE UNITEDSTATESThequestionof whetherdemocratscanachievedemocraticgoalsthroughdeliberationmaybeaddressedbylookingathowdeliberationactuallyseemstoproceedinsettingswhereAmericancitizenstalktoeachother,facetoface.

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

18/31


Statusinequalitiesandregularpatternsof socialoppressionmightintrudewhenAmericansdeliberatesufficientlyto makedemocraticgoals,suchasenhancingcommunityandautonomy,remoteandunlikely.Dependingonhow pernicioustheseproblemsare,they maypersistevenwheneveryoneknowshow to deliberateandhas thetime,money,andinformationfor it.Promotingbroadparticipationindemocraticdiscussionsmayrequiremorethanguaranteeingthematerialprerequisitesto deliberationorsuggestingthepursuitof a commonvoice.If Americanpoliticsis ever consideredreallydemocratic,it is in theinstitutionof thejury:juriesaresupposedto capturewhat'sbest aboutAmericandemocracy.Whenindividualcitizensparticipatein theadministra-tionofjustice,law seemslessremote,lessmagisterial.Citizenparticipationhelpssecurethereputationof legalinstitutionsas at leastpartlybuttressedbypopularsovereignty.Andjuriesalsoseema bulwarkofindividualliberties,sincejurorsareinclinedto fendforthosewhostandaccused.ThemassiveempiricalstudyofAmericanjuriesbyKalvenandZeiselcomparedverdictsdeliveredbyjuriesin criminaltrialstothedeterminationsjudgeswouldhaverenderedhadthe casesbeenheardwithoutjuries.Almostfour-fifthsof thetime,judgesandjuriesagreed,butwhentheydiffered,jurorsweremorelikelythanjudgesto findin favorof the defendant(Kalvenand Zeisel 1966).Further,becausecitizensareinvolvedintheadministrationofjustice,albeitthroughthelens of a particularcase, theyareencouragedto considerthequestionsbeforethemfromabroader,socialperspectiveandto leaveaside,at leasttemporarily,theirimmediateandpersonalconcerns.Participationon ajuryseemsto involveexactlytheskillsandcapacitiesthatdemocratshopeAmericansmightpracticein othersettings:thedelibera-tivejuryis supposedto becomposedandconsiderate,exactlynot anangrymob. In thejury,citizenscall on theirrationalfacultiesand consideracommon,orat leastimpersonal,notpersonal,problem.Juriesappearto besomethinglike schoolsfordemocrats,asTocquevillesuggestedtheywere.Butof courseTocquevillehadparticularlessonsin mind,not necessarilythoseadmiredbycontemporarytheorists.TocquevilleconsideredAmeri-cans in needof remindersaboutstatusanddeference,whichhe thoughtwere ideally communicatedthroughthe mechanismof the civil jury.Unlike criminaltrials,whereTocquevilleanticipatedmodernsocialscience by suspectingthatjurorswouldsympathizewithdefendants,civil trials on his view could encouragejuries to look to judges forexpertiseandguidance. Andparticipationonjuries was furtherlaud-able, in Tocqueville'seyes, becauseeachjuror"comesinto daily contactwiththebest-educatedandmost-enlightenedmembersof theupperclasses."

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

19/31


Tocquevillethoughtlawyerscountedas a "classapart"fromthepeople,resembling"Egyptianpriests,being,astheywere,theonlyinterpreter[s]ofan occultscience"(Tocqueville1969,275, 267).AlthoughTocquevillefoundmuchto recommendin thehumblingaspectsof thecourtroom,he assumeda basicallyhomogenousjuryinferiorinclassandstatustojudgesandlawyers.Hedidn'texplorethepossibilitythatcitizensmightdefertoeachother.Yetcontemporarysocialscientificevidencesug-gests thatexactlythathappens,in waysthatareentirelyunsurprisingandpredictablegiven the inequalitiesfamiliarin the broadersociety.WhenAmericansassembleinjuries,theydonotleavebehindthestatus,power,andprivilegesthattheyholdin theoutsideworld.Mostjurydeliberationsbeginwiththeselectionof groupleader,a fore-person.Farmoreoftenthannot,thepersonselectedis aWhitemalewithacollege degree.Postgraduatework,a high-statusoccupation,andpreviousjury experiencefurtherenhancethechancesof beingselected.Womenarechosentoheadjuriesmuchlessfrequentlythantheirrepresentationonjuriessuggeststheyshouldbe(HansandVidmar1986).Gender,racial,andeconomicprivilegedonotdetermineselectionasjuryleaderin a director immediatesense,however.Instead,they increasethelikelihoodof behaviorthatleadsto selectionasheadof thejury.Speakingfirstandsittingattheheadof thetableincreasetheprobabilityofbeingchosenas foreperson,andhigh-statusmenengagein thesebehaviorsmoreoften(HansandVidmar1986).Anaccountof thewaythatthejuryforemanwasselected in the trial of John De Loreancapturesthese dynamics:"Thefirstitemof businesswas to selecta groupleader.VernLahr,a formerhighwaypatrolman,mentionedtheissue first andstoodcapablyat theblackboardaskingfor nominations.Notsurprisingly,hewas chosenforthejob"(HansandVidmar,1986, 16).Anotherimportantenhancerof thechanceto beselectedasforepersonisa claimof somekindofpriorexperience,thoughnotnecessarilyexperiencewithjury service.In a studyof mockjuries, PhoebeEllsworthand hercolleagues found that, thoughalmosttwo-thirdsof thejurorsstudied werewomen,men werechosento headjuriesnearly90 percentof the time.Ellsworthreportsthat

Forten of theeighteenjuries,theprocessof foremanselection canbe summedup by thephrase"choosea man who says he has experience.". . . Since we knew which of oursubjectshadactuallyserved on realjuries,we were able to findoutwhetherthe peoplechosen as foremanwere actuallymorelikely to have hadpriorjuryexperience that theotherjurors.Theywerenot moreexperienced:39 percentof the foremenhadserved on

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

20/31


juries,ascomparedwith36percentof theotherjurors,aninsignificantdifference.Thus,a foremanis someonewho claimsexperience,notnecessarilysoneonewhohasit.(Ellsworth1989,213)

Selectionof theforepersonencapsulatespatternsrepeatedthroughthecourseof thejury'sdeliberations.Studiesconductedoverthelastfourdecadeshaveconsistentlyreinforcedthebasicfindingthatmentalkmoreinjuries;juryleaders,alreadymorelikelyto bemen,arealsoinclinedtoparticipatemorethanotherjurymembersin deliberation.Evenwhentheforemanisexcludedfromthecalculationsof whogenerallytalksmostduringdeliberations,menstilldominatethediscussionby significantamounts(HansandVidmar1986;Marsden1987;Hastie,Penrod,andPennington1983).Thesimplefactthatmentalkmorethanwomeninjurydeliberationsmightgive pauseto democratsinclinedto holdstrictlyto a standardof equalparticipationin groupdiscussions.If it's demonstrablethatsome kindsofpeopleroutinelyspeakmorethanothersindeliberativesettings,asitis, thenparticipationisn'tequal,andonedemocraticstandardhasfallen.Butdemo-cratsneedn'tgive upsoeasily.Onemightrelinquishthe standardof strictlyequalparticipationandsayinsteadthataslongas mostor allviewsavailableto thegrouparesomehowexpressedandconsidered,it doesn'tmatterwhosays whator whethersomepeopletalkmorethanothers.Yetstudiesofjuriessuggestthatwhetheranideais expressedinthefirstplace,whetherit is apprehendedby thegroup,andwhetherit prevailsindeliberations,alldependon whetherthe ideahasa talkativepromoter.Forinstance,themerepropensityto talkalotappearstoincreasethechancesthatonewill be viewedaspresentingcompellingarguments.Studiesofjuriesandothersmallgroupsindicatethatindividualswhospeakthemostarelikelytobe viewedas mostpersuasiveby othergroupmembersand thatit is thequantityof remarks,nottheirquality,thatseemstodrivetheseperceptions(Marsden1987).Inprinciple,eachjuror'sperspectiveshouldbegivenequalweightin groupdeliberations,butsimplyincreasingthevolumeof one'scommentaryseemstoincreasethechancesthatone'sopinionswillprevail.Studiesof the behaviorof interracialgroupsin Americanclassroomssupportthegeneralfindingthatemergesfromstudiesofjuries,thatmembersof the dominantgroupin societyalso tend to dominatein small groupsworkingonacommonproblem.Dominanceis showninthesestudiesnottobe attributableto anygreaterskill on thepartof thedominantgroup.Oneearlystudyfoundthatwheninterracialgroupsworktogetheron acollectivetask,Whitestudentsaremoreactiveandinfluential.

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

21/31


Katz, Benjaminand Goldstonfoundthatblackcollege studentsdisplayedmarkedsocialinhibitionandsubordinationtowhitepartnersin acooperativeproblem-solvingsituation,even when subjectswere matchedon intelligenceandmade to display equal abilityatthe task ... Whites initiatedmoreinteractionthanblacks;both blacksand whitestalkedmore to whites dtanto blacks.(Cohen 1982, 210-1).

Importantly,these studies controlledfor factors such as age, height, socio-economic status, and attitudes toward school. Even when students werematchedon these demographicfactors as well as on abilityat the problem-solving task pursuedby the group, high-statusmembers were routinelytreatedas if their contributionto the groupproblemwerebetter.They spokemore during groupdiscussions,andthey were given moreopportunitiestomake suggestions;inpostmeetingquestionnaires,groupmembersperceivedthe high-statusparticipantsas havingbetterideas andas havingdone moreto guide the group.These resultshold whether the racialcomparisonsarebetween Anglo and Mexican Americanstudents,blackandwhite students,Native Americans and whites, or Israelisor EuropeanandMiddle-Easternbackgroundstudents(Cohen 1982).If dominancein groupdiscussions is not attributableto the superiorskillsatreasoning,argument,or deliberationof thedominantgroup,thenit is notlikely thatdistributingthe skills for deliberationmorewidely will solve theproblemsof unequalparticipationor influence. Instead, improvingdemo-cratic discussion seems to requireinterventionsin the structureof groupdeliberations.

Jury studies provide fodder not only for democraticworriesaboutthecourse of groupdeliberationsin the United States but also for suggestionsabouthow discussionsmightbe structuredto makeproblemsof dominanceandhierarchyless pressing.Forinstance,it appearsthatsomestyles of groupdiscussion are morelikely to elicit the views of all groupmembersthanareothers. Social psychologists distinguish between "evidence-driven"and"verdict-driven"deliberationstyles injuries.Verdict-drivenjuriesdecide totakea vote earlyon to see whereeveryonestands.Theytend to arriveattheirfinaldeterminationsrelativelyquickly,with the verdictalmostalwaysreflect-ing thepositionof themajorityinthe initialvote. By contrast,juriesengaginginevidence-drivendeliberationstendtodiscuss themeritsof certainperspec-tives on the evidence withouttakingan initialvote or otherwiseassociatingcertainjurorswith certainperspectives.Whenjury deliberationsarefocused moreon eliciting a rangeof viewsinsteadof on the commonproblemof arrivingat a verdict,they appearlikelytoprovokebothamoreconsideratediscussionandonethatleavesjurorsmoresatisfied with their participation:jurors on evidence-drivenjuries reportthinking they have done a good job more frequently than do jurors on

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

22/31


verdict-drivenjuries(HansandVidmar1986;Brown1986).Further,ifajurydecidestodefervotinguntildiscussingtheevidence,it canapparentlyholdoff the mechanismsthatallowsomeindividualstodominatediscussions:

Inanideallyfairandrationaldeliberationprocess,alltheargumentsofbothfactionswillbe weighedbeforecomingto a decision,whichmaybe requiredto be explicitlyunanimous.Themajority,weknow,hassomepowerto influencetheperceptualjudg-mentsof theminoritybytheforceofconformity,whichhasnothingto do withrationalargument,andit is alsoknownthatsmallminoritiesinjuriessometimesagreeto "goalong"witha unanimousverdictalthoughtheyhavenotbeenpersuadedthatitiscorrect.(Brown1986,286)Verdict-drivendeliberationsreducethe chancesof abroadconsiderationof all views on theevidence,reducethelikelihoodof arationaldiscussion,andincreasethepressurestoconformity.Butverdict-drivendeliberationsaremoreinkeepingwithamalestyleofdiscourseandaremorelikelytooccurwhenmenheadjuries.Somesocial-scientificstudiessuggestthatwomenaremorelikelythanmentoencourageanevidence-drivenstyleofdeliberation.Womenappeartoaccommodatedifferentpointsof viewbetterthanmendo.Instudiesof all-femalegroups,themoreactivespeakerstriedto drawoutthemoresilentmembers,whichisakeycharacteristicofevidence-drivenjuries.Incontrast,inall-malegroups,themoreactivememberseventuallyignoredthelessactivemembers,whichisa keycharacteristicof verdict-drivenjuries.Themendisplayedcompetitivenesswithothermen,whereasthe womenexpressedcooperationwith otherwomen.Inmixedgroups,however,thewomenconsistentlybecamemoresilent.Ifwomenareencouragedtospeakmoreandmenareremindedto listenmore,womenmaybe abletobringtojurydeliberationstheirtendencyto engageinevidence-drivendiscussion.(Marsden1987,603-4;see alsoKanter1979)

If partof whatdeliberationmeansis bringingmoreparticipantsandmoreperspectivesintocommondiscussionsandtoensurethatdifferentviewsareconsideredseriously,it is notlikelyto be increasedjustbydistributingtheskillsfor deliberationmorewidely.Thatis, ensuringparticipationindelib-eration,andguaranteeinga discussionthatcallson allperspectives,is notjusta matterof teachingeveryoneto argue.Tomeettheconcernof equalparticipation,democratsshouldexplicitlyattendto issues of groupdy-namicsandtrytodevelopwaystoundercutthedominanceof higher-statusindividuals.Democraticdeliberationmightalsobe endorsedas a surercoursethandecisionmakingby anelitegroupto a fairorjust decisionaboutissuesofcommoninterest.Inthiscaseagain,however,studiesof juriessuggestthatwhoparticipatesmostin commondeliberationshassomebearingon what

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

23/31

368 POLITICALTHEORY/June 1997

theoutcomeof thosediscussionswillbe,andonwhetherthosedecisionswillbe viewedasfairorjustbyallmembersof thecommunity.Somestudiesofjurieshaveexaminedthequestionof whetherthejuryiscompetentto arriveat a fairorjustverdict.Competencyin manyof thesestudieshasbeenassessedbyexaminingthecorrespondencebetweenverdictsrenderedby judgesascomparedtojuries.Since,as ageneralmatter,judgesandjuriestendoverwhelminglyto arriveat the sameverdicts,by thisstandard,jurydeliberationslookfairor rightin termsof theiroutcome,despitetheapparentlytroublingdynamicsof deliberations(HansandVidmar1986;Hastie,Penrod,andPennington1983).Otherjurystudies,however,suggestthat thedynamicsof deliberation-who dominates,whose perspective is suppressed-might be quite conse-quentialfor the fairness orjustice of the outcomeof deliberations.PhoebeEllsworthand her colleagues found, in studies of "death-qualified"juries(juriescomposedof individualswillingto imposethe deathpenaltyincapitalcrimes),thatthesejuriesaremorelikely to convict thanotherjuries:theyarebiased against the defendant (Cowan, Thompson, and Ellsworth 1984;Fitzgeraldand Ellsworth1984).Ajurycomposedof death-qualifiedjurorsisalso unrepresentativeof thebroaderpopulation.It is morelikely to be madeup of White men who are Christians,Republicans,and wealthy,and lesslikely to be composed of women, Blacks, poor people, Democrats,Jews,atheists,oragnostics.A suppositionwe mightdraw,puttingtogetherthe findings aboutdeath-qualifiedjuriesandwhatwe knowaboutthedynamicsof deliberation,is that,to theextentthathigher-statusindividualsdominatejurydiscussions,juries

mayveer towardconvictingdefendants.Furtherevidencein thisdirectionhasemergedfromstudiesof theresponsesofjurorstotestimonybyexpertson domesticviolence,in trialsof womenwho haveclaimedto havekilledtheirbatterersin self-defense.ReginaSchullerfoundthatmalejurorswere"morelikelytofavorguiltyverdictsandto offerunfavorableinterpretationsof thedefendant'sstateof mindandof herabilityto leave thesituationinwhichshefoundherself'(VidmarandSchuller1989,154).Attitudesaboutcrimeandaboutwhodeservestobeconvictedarenotrandomlydistributedacrossthepopulationofjurors.Instead,conviction-pronenessappearstobeconcentratedin individualswhopossesscharacteristicssimilarto the char-acteristicsof those whotendto dominatediscussions.Thedominanceofhigher-statusindividualsindiscussionsmayshiftnotonly the stylebuttheoutcomeof thesediscussions.Themostimportantdemocratichopefordeliberationis thatdeliberation,in juriesor elsewhere,enhancescitizenshipby inspiringautonomyand asenseofcommunity;in otherwords,itproducesconditionsofmutualrespect.

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

24/31


Yetagain,socialhierarchiesandpatternsofoppressionmayhamperthisgoal,afflictingdeliberationsufficientlyso thatparticipationinstillsa sense ofalienationratherthaneitherautonomyorcommunity.Firsthandaccountsby AfricanAmericanjurorsin the trial of RobertChambers(who,beforethejuryhadreacheda finalverdict,pleadedguiltytofirst-degreemanslaughterinthedeathofDawnLevin)reinforcetheviewthatjurorswho areprivilegedin termsof race,economicbackground,orgendertend to haveperspectivesquitedifferentfromthose who arenot,belyingtheexpectationthatdeliberationmightinspire,orhelprecall,a senseof community.Thedistancebetweenjurors'perspectivesmaybesufficientso thatlessprivilegedjurorsfeel thattheirviewsarediscounted,apossibilityclearlynotinkeepingwiththepromotionof a senseof autonomy.RobertNickeywasservingon ajuryfor thethirdtimeinthe Chamberstrial.He testifiedin the 1988publichearingsof the New YorkJudicialCommissionon Minoritiesto his beliefthathis views weresystematicallyunheededby Whitejurors.Nickeyreportedaskingthe otherjurorsif theywouldhaveanydifficultyconvictingChambersof murderwithintentif hewereBlack,andhavinghisinquirymetwithsilence.He alsoexpressedhisdisillusionmentwith the legal system:"Ialwaysfelt and was taughtthatjusticewasblindtorace,color,orcreed.Butthatisnotso hereinNew York"(as quotedin Davis1989, 1569).Indeed,thereactionsto theverdictintheSimiValleytrialof thepoliceofficersaccusedof beatingRodneyKing,andto the criminaltrialof 0. J.Simpson,revealaprofounddistrustof the ideathatAmericansmightresolvetheirdisagreementsbyresortingto a commonground.

Becausedominanceappearstobe a functionofstatusandtheattributionsof superioritythataccompanyit,distributingskillsandresourcesfordelib-erationis unlikelyto ensuremoreegalitariananddemocraticdiscussions.Perhapsmoreobviously,neitheris urgingthediscoveryof a commonvoicelikelyto addresstheproblemsof inequalityingroupdeliberations.Thegoalof democraticdiscussionshouldnotbeteachingeveryonetodeliberate,buttryingto figureout a wayto makesurethateveryoneparticipatesand iseffectivelyrepresentedandtakenseriouslyindiscussions.

AN ALTERNATIVETODELIBERATION?I shouldsaythatI amnotentirelyagainstdeliberation.ButI amagainstit fornow:Ithinkitisprematureas astandardforAmericandemocrats,whoareconfrontedwithmoreimmediateproblems.AndIthinkthestandardhas

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

25/31


perniciousconsequences,to the extentthatit is distractingfrommorebasicproblemsof inclusionandmutualrecognition,andtotheextentthatit favorsa formof expressionanddiscoursethatmakesit likelythatthe talkof anidentifiableandprivilegedsectoroftheAmericanpublicwilldominatepublicdialogue.Modemdemocrats'identificationof deliberationwith thepursuitof acommonvoice stealsattentionfrom the egalitarianconcernto enhanceeffectiveparticipation.Althoughmodemdemocratictheoristsalsowanttohonorthe concernto bringtheperspectivesof thedisenfranchisedintopublicdiscussions,theirappealto deliberationundercutsthisconcern.Theinvitationto deliberatehasstringsattached.Deliberationis a requestfor acertainkindof talk:rational,contained,andorientedto a sharedproblem.Whereantidemocratshaveusedthestandardsof expertise,moderation,andcommunalorientationas a wayto excludeaveragecitizensfrompoliticaldecision-making,moderndemocratsseemtoadoptthesestandardsasguidesfor whatdemocraticpoliticsshouldbe like.Andtheexclusionaryconnota-tionsof thesestandardspersist.Arguingthatdemocraticdiscussionshouldberational,moderate,andnotselfishimplicitlyexcludespublictalkthatis impassioned,extreme,andtheproductofparticularinterests.Thisisonesetofindictmentsof thedemocraticappealto deliberation.Theevidencefromsocialscientificstudiesof delib-erationinjuriesandclassroomssuggestsa furthercriticism.Themodelofdeliberationsimplydoes not takesufficientaccountof thewaysthatstatusandhierarchyshapepatternsof talkingandlisteningto ensurethatallperspectivesareconsidered,thatparticipationin apublicdiscussioninstillsa sense of autonomy,and thatthepursuitof a commoninterestdoes notcoincidewiththepromotionof theviewsof thedominant.An alternativeto deliberationas a modelfordemocraticpoliticshas tobegin by tryingto rule out theproblemsthatthecritiqueof deliberationreveals.Thatis, thealternativeshouldavoidstatedor implicitrequirementsthattalkbe onlyrationalandmoderate,orthatthe only perspectivesworthattendingto areperspectivesthatilluminatewhatis common.Insteadof focusingso exclusivelyondeliberation,Americandemocratscouldcullanalternativemodelfromtheirpoliticalhistory.Theideaofgivingtestimony,of tellingone'sparticularstoryto a broadergroup,hasimportantprecedentsinAmericanpolitics,particularlyinAfricanAmericanpoliticsandchurches(Smithernan1977).Suggestingtestimonyas a potentiallybetterstandardfor democraticdiscussionsthandeliberationdoes not rule out

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

26/31


deliberation,justassuggestingdeliberationdoesnotruleouttestimony.Bothmayhavesomeplacein a broaddemocraticprocess.ButthecurrentstateofAmericanpoliticsis sufficientlyexclusive,sufficientlyafflictedby patternsof dominance,so thatevenhandedgroupdeliberationsareunlikely.Publicdiscussionsinthe UnitedStatesseemlikelytoreplicatethehierarchiesthatareidentifiableindomainsthataren'texplicitlypolitical.Forexample,thequalityof life in the UnitedStatesis vastlydifferentfor BlackAmericansthanforWhites,whetherthesedifferencesaremeasuredintermsof income,employment,health,oreducation(NationalResearchCouncil1989).Buttheepistemologicalproblemis perhapsevenmoredaunting:WhitesandBlackssee differentworlds.Therearefewpolicyorpoliticalissueson whichWhitesandBlacksarewillingto expressevenremotelysimilarviews to surveyinterviewers:onvirtuallyallmattersofAmericanpublicopinion,BlacksandWhitesare dividedby a wide(andof coursestatisticallysignificant)gulf(KinderandSanders1992).Evidenceaboutracialandgenderdifferencesinjurydeliberations,whilenot definitiveby itself, supportsthe sketchofAmericansocietyas a societycharacterizedby importantdivisionsbetweengroupswhethermeasuredintermsofpower,status,qualityoflife,orpoliticalviews.IfweallowthatsomeAmericansaremorealienatedthanothers,thatsomearerelativelydisenfranchised,thenthemodelof democraticpoliticssubscribedto by democratictheoristsshouldtryto remedy,notreinforce,theseproblems.Testimonymightbe a modelthatallowsfor theexpressionof differentperspectivesratherthanseekingwhat'scommon.Thecontrastbetweenthepursuitofcommonality,andthesimpleraimtoincludeandrepresentafullerrangeof criticalvoices,is at thecoreof thedifferencebetweendeliberationandtestimony.Forexample,whereCohenandRogerscomplainof the lackof a "commonvoice"(1983, 17)bell hooksarticulatestheneedforcriticalvoices:

Yearningis the word thatbest describes a commonpsychological statesharedby manyof us, cuttingacrossboundariesof race, class, gender,andsexualpractice.Specifically,in relationto thepost-modernistdeconstructionof "master"narratives,the yearningthatwells in the heartsand minds of thosewhomsuchnarrativeshavesilenced is thelongingfor criticalvoice.... [Rapmusic] beganas a form of "testimony"for theunderclass.Ithasenabledunderclassblackyouthto developa criticalvoice, as a groupof youngblackmen toldme, a "commonliteracy."Rapprojectsa criticalvoice, explaining,demanding,urging.(hooks 1990, 27)

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

27/31

372 POLITICALTHEORY/June 1997

Whatis fundamentalaboutgivingtestimonyis tellingone'sownstory,notseekingcommunaldialogue.Althoughhooksrefersto thedevelopmentof a"commonliteracy,"thisvoiceis commonto agroupthatis usuallyexcludedfromthe discourseof the dominant,and the voice that contributesto a"commonliteracy"isposedbyhooksinoppositionto,andas a criticismof,this dominantdiscourse.There'sno assumptionin testimonyof findingacommonaim,noexpectationof a discussionorientedto theresolutionof acommunityproblem.Testimonyis alsoradicallyegalitarian:thestandardforwhetheraviewis worthyofpublicattentionis simplythateveryoneshouldhave a voice,a chanceto tell herstory.Whatmightrecommendtestimonyrightnowto democratsistheneedtobringmoreperspectivesintodemocraticdiscussionsandtofigureoutawaynotto closeoff theviewsofanybecausetheyaredifferent,not common.Unlikedeliberation,the standardof testi-monydoes notexcludepositionsif theyare voiced in an immoderateoremotionallyladenway.Testimonyencouragesthedemocraticconsiderationof theworthinessof perspectivesnotobviouslyrootedin commongroundandnotnecessarilyvoicedin acalmlyrationalway.Inotherwords,testimonycouldopenthepossibilityofreasonable,collectiveconsiderationofnovel,ifdisquieting,perspectives.Testimonyhassomethingof aprecursorin thethoughtofJohnStuartMill,a writermoreregularlyconstruedasaproponentof democraticdeliberation.ThenineteenthcenturyBritishsocietythatMilltriedto reforminhiswritingwas,likecontemporaryAmericansociety,afflictedbydivisionsandexclu-sions. WhenMill spokeaboutthebenefitsof includinga disenfranchisedgroup,women,in publicdiscussions,he spokeabouttheprimaryaim ofhearingan excludedperspective,notdiscovenrnga commonvoice.In7heSubjectionof Women,Millwrotethatnothingdefinitivecanbe knownofwomen,since"womenthemselveshavegivenbutlittletestimony."Theyhadnot beenallowedto "tellanythingto thegeneralpublic"(Mill 1975,454, 456).NothingthatMillsaidin 1869,orthatbellhookssaystoday,suggeststhatall thatdemocraticpoliticsshouldeverbe aboutis citizenstellingtheirownstories,in theirownways,toeachother.ButbothMill andhooksattendtoimmediateandpressingproblemsof exclusionanddifferencein a waythatcontemporarytheoristsavoid.Whentheperspectivesof some citizensaresystematicallysuppressedin public discourse,then democraticpoliticsshould aim simplyand firstto ensurethe expressionof these excludedperspectives.Insteadof aimingfor a commondiscussion,democratsmight

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

28/31


adopta morefundamentalgoal:to tryto ensurethatthosewhoareusuallyleft out of publicdiscussionslearnto speakwhethertheirperspectivesarecommonornot,andthosewhousuallydominatelearnto heartheperspec-tives of others.

NOTES1. Thefirstdraftof "AgainstDeliberation"waspresentedattheMidwestPoliticalScienceAssociationAnnualMeetingin April1991.SincethenI havepresentedit formallyto othergroups,discusseditwithmany,manypeople,andhave,uponrequest,distributeditin oneversionoranothertostillothers.Thiswidecirculationhasproducedinnumerablevaluablecommentsandreactions,andtoomuchgoodadvicetoincorporatehere.Whilefew of thesereaderswillbeableto locateheremyresponsestotheirspecificsuggestions,Istillwanttoacknowledgethem,alongwithotherswhodidnotreadtheessaybutrespondedtomyrequestsforadviceaboutit.Forthishelp,I amgratefultoElizabethAnderson,RobertCalvert,MichaelDawson,PhoebeEllsworth,JonElster,DonHerzog,StephenHolmes,JimJohnson,JackKnight,BernardManin,MichaelNeblo,RickPildes,StevePincus,FrankSposito,JackieStevens,LauraStoker,Cass

Sunstein,JoanTronto,andmanyothersI'veneglectedin thislist.2.Thisisnottodisregardattempts,suchas thosemadebyRawls(1993)andLarmore(1996)toarticulatetheconditionsthatreasonablecitizensmightagreeuponinordertodevelopmorallyjustifiablesolutionsto theirdisagreements.Instead,my generalizationrefersto thedearthofattemptstoconsiderwhetherordinarycitizensarelikelytoactreasonably,asreasonisconsideredbycontemporarymorl philosophersanddemocratictheorists.3. Thoughonsomeformsof pluralism,rationaldecisionmakingisn'twhatthespecialistsdo,it is cuttingdealsinstead.Inthemostclassicstatement,Bentleydiscussespluralismas aclashof intereststhatis reconciledviaskillsfarremovedfromreason-giving(1908);forarecentvariant,see Becker(1983).Sunstein(1988)castsdeliberation(in part)as theantithesisofinterest-grouppluralism.See alsoMansbridge(1992).4. InFrederickDouglass's1852FourthofJulyOration,heobjectedtotheideathathewouldbeexpectedtoargueagainstslavery(Foner1950).

REFERENCESAckerman,Bruce.1980.Socialjustice in the liberal state. NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress.Almond,Gabriel,andSidneyVerba.1963.Thecivic culture:Political attitudesanddemocracyinfive nations.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.Barber,Benjamin.1984.Strongdemocracy:Participatorypoliticsfor a new age. Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress.

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

29/31


Becker,Gary.1983.A theoryof competitionamongpressuregroupsforpoliticalinfluence.QuarterlyJournalofEconomics98(3):371-400.Bellah,Robert,RichardMadsen,WiliamM.Sullivan,AnnSwindler,andStevenM. lipton.1985.Habitsof the heart:Individualismand commitmentin Americanlife. Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress.Bendey,ArtiurF. 1908.Theprocessof government.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Berelson,B.,P.Lazarfeld,andW.McPhee.1954.Voting.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Brown,Roger.1986.Socialpsychology:Thesecondedition.NewYork:FreePress.Burke,Edmund.[179011987.ReflectionsontheRevolutioninFrance.EditedbyJ.G.A.Pocock.Reprint,Indianapolis:Hackett.Calhoun,Craig,ed. 1992.Habermasandthepublicsphere.Cambridge,MA:MITPress.Cohen,E. G. 1982.Expectationstatesandinterracialinteractionin schoolsettings.AnnualReviewof Sociology8:209-35.Cohen,Joshua,andJoelRogers.1983.Ondemocracy.NewYork:PenguinBooks.Collins,PatriciaHill.1990.BlackFeministThought.Boston:UnwinHyman.Converse,Philip.[1963]1969.Attitudesandnon-attitudes:Continuationof adialogue.InThequantitativeanalysisofsocialproblems,editedbyEdwardR. Tufte.Reprint,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley.Cowan,C.L.,W.C.Thompson,andP.C. Ellsworth.1984.Theeffectsof deathqualificationonjuror'spredispositionto convictandonthequalityofdeliberation.LawandHumanBehavior8:53-79.Dahl,Robert.1956.Aprefacetodemocratictheory.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Davis,PeggyC. 1989.Lawasmicroaggression.YaleLawJournal98:1559-77.Dill,BonnieThornton.1983.Race,class,andgender:Prospectsforanall-inclusivesisterhood.FeministStudies9:131-50.Downs,Donald.1989.Thenewpoliticsofpornography.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Ellsworth,Phoebe.1989.Aretwelveheadsbetterthanone?LawandContemporaryProblems52(4):205-24.Fsshkin,JamesS. 1991.DemocracyandDeliberation.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.Fitzgerald,R.,andP.C. Ellsworth.1984.Dueprocessvs. crimecontrol:Deathqualificationandjuryattitudes.LawandHumanBehavior8:31-51.Foner,PhilipS. 1950.Thelife andwritingsofFrederickS. Douglass.NewYork:InternationalPublishers.Gutmann,Amy,andDennisThompson.1996.Democracyanddisagreement.Cambridge,MA:Harvard,BelknapPress.Habermas,Jurgen.[1962]1992.Thestructuraltransfonrationof thepublicsphere.Reprint,Cambridge,MA:MITPress.Hans,ValerieP.,andNeilJ.Vidmar.1986.Judgingthejury.NewYork:Plenum.Hastie,Reid,S. Penrod,andN. Pennington.1983.Insidethejury.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Held,David.1987.Modelsof democracy.Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress.Herzog,Don. 1989.Happyslaves.Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress.hooks,bell.1981.Ain'tI a woman:Blackwomenandfeminism.Boston:SouthEndPress.. 1990.Yearning:Race,genderandculturalpolitics.Boston:SouthEndPress.Johnson,James,andJackKnight.1996. Whatsort of politicalequalitydoes democraticdeliberationrequire?Unpublishedmanuscript.

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

30/31


Joseph,Gloria,and JillLewis. 1981. Commondifferences:Conflictsin Blackand Whitefeministperspectives.Boston:SouthEndPress.KalvenH.,andH. Zeisel.1966.TheAmericanjury.Boston:Littde,Brown.Kanter,RosabethMoss.1979.Menandwomenofthecorporation.NewYork:BasicBooks.Kinder,DonaldR., andLynnM. Sanders.1996. Dividedbycolor:Racialpolitics and Americandemocracy.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Klatch,Rebecca.1987.Womenofthenewright.Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress.Knight,Jack,andJamesJohnson.1994.Aggregationanddeliberation:On thepossibilityofdemocraticlegitimacy.PoliticalTheory22:277-96.Larmore,Charles.1996.Themoralsof modernity.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.Lindblom,Charles.1980.Thepolicymakingprocess,2ded.EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:PrenticeHall.MacPherson,C.B. 1965.Therealworldof democracy.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Manin,Bernard.1987.Onlegitimacyandpoliticaldeliberation.PoliticalTheory15(3):338-368.Mansbridge,Jane. 1992.A deliberativetheoryof interestrepresentation.In Thepoliticsof

interests:Interestgroupstransformed,editedby MarkP.Petracca.Boulder,CO: WestviewPress.Marsden,Nancy.1987.Note: Genderdynamicsandjurydeliberations.YaleLaw Journal96:593-612.Mill, John Stuart.1975. Threeessays: On liberty,representativegovernment,thesubjectionofwomen.New York:OxfordUniversityPress.National ResearchCouncil. 1989.A commondestiny:Blacks and Americansociety. EditedbyG.D.JaynesandR.M.Williams.Washington,DC:NationalAcademyPress.Phillips,Anne.1995.Thepoliticsofpresence.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Pitkin,Hanna.1967.Theconceptof representation.Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress.

. 1981.Justice:Onrelatingprivateandpublic.PoliticalTheory9(3):327-52.Pitkin,Hanna,andSaraShumer.1982.Onparticipation.Democracy2(4):43-54.Rawls,John.1971.Atheoryofjustice.Cambridge,MA:BelknapPressof HarvardUniversity.. 1993.Politicalliberalism.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Reich,RobertB. 1988.Policymakingin ademocracy.In Thepowerof publicideas,editedbyRobertB. Reich.Cambridge,MA:Ballinger.Schumpeter,Joseph.[1942] 1976.Capitalism,socialism anddemocracy.Reprint,London:AllenandUnwin.

Sidney, Sir Philip. 1984. The countess of Pembroke'sArcadia. Edited by Maurice Evans.Harmondsworth:Penguin.Smith,Barbara.1982.Racismandwomen'sstudies.InButsomeofusarebrave,editedbyGloriaT.Hull,PatriciaBellScott,andBarbaraSmith.OldWestbury,NY:FeministPress.Smitherman,Geneva. 1977. Talkin'and testifyin':The language of Black America. Detroit:WayneStateUniversityPress.Spelman,ElizabethV.1988.InessentialWoman.Boston:BeaconPress.Sunstein,Cass.1988.Beyondtherepublicanrevival.YaleLawJournal97:1539-90.Thomas,Keith.1983.Manandthenaturalworld.NewYork:PantheonBooks.deTocqueville,Alexis.1969.DemocracyinAmerica.Translatedby GeorgeLawerence,editedbyJ. P.Mayer.NewYork:AnchorBooks.Vidmar,Neil,andReginaSchuller.1989.Juriesandexpertevidence:Socialframeworktesti-

mony.Law and contemporaryproblems 52(4):133-76.Wolin,Sheldon.1981.Thepeople'stwobodies.democracy1(1):9-24.

8/7/2019 Sanders 1997

31/31


LynnM. Sanders receivedher Ph.D inpolitical sciencefrom the UniversityofMichiganand herA.B. at MountHolyoke College.AssistantProfessorof Political Scienceat TheUniversityof Chicago,where she teaches and conductsresearch in the areas of U. S.politics, public opinion,race andgender

Sanders 1997

Documents

Transcript of Sanders 1997