Sanctions Implementation andthe UN Security Council:The Case for Greater Transparency

MARCH 2014ASTRID FORBERG RYAN

While it is the responsibility of member states to ensure that sanctions adoptedby the United Nations Security Council are implemented, the council plays anequally important role in facilitating and promoting effective implementation.This paper discusses the role of the Security Council with a view to providingguidance for those involved in the council’s work, making the case for greatertransparency. It briefly reviews current council practices and procedures relatingto the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran sanctionsregimes, including the working methods of the 1718 and 1737 Committees, andit identifies possible options for the council aimed at enhancing sanctionsimplementation through transparency-related measures. Transparency and outreach have long been identified as key issues that needto be addressed by the United Nations Security Council to improve theimplementation of sanctions. Indeed, previous studies focusing on effectiveimplementation of UN sanctions more generally have argued that increasedtransparency of all aspects related to the sanctions processes at the councillevel—from imposition, through implementation, to lifting—is one of themost critical components for improved sanctions implementation.2

Promoting trans parency is important for several reasons that seem particu-larly relevant in the context of the DPRK and Iran sanctions regimes. One ofthe most obvious is that greater transparency helps to ensure that memberstates have access to the information required to effectively implementcouncil-mandated sanctions measures. Perhaps equally important, improvingtransparency in the work of the Security Council and its committees can alsocontribute to raising awareness about the sanctions measures, their objectivesand why implementation is required and thus to fostering greater engagementamong member states. Finally, transparency is closely linked to whethersanctions are seen as legitimate. The imposition of sanctions is a sensitivepolitical issue. In this context, greater transparency in all stages of thesanctions process, including when designing sanctions and drafting councildecisions, can help ensure that sanctions are seen as necessary and legitimatein a given situation. Transparency is here understood in the broadest possible sense as it relatesnot only to Security Council transparency in its interaction with non-councilmembers or other stakeholders, but also within the council and in the work ofthe panels of experts (PoEs) assisting the sanctions committees. This does not

This issue brief serves as a supple-

ment to the sanctions implementa-

tion manual for frontline actors

produced by IPI and Compliance

and Capacity Skills International

(CCSI) as part of a joint project

funded by the Govern ment of

Canada.1

Astrid Forberg Ryan is a senior

research analyst at Security Council

Report (SCR). She writes regularly

about the activities of the 1718 DPRK

and 1737 Iran sanctions committees

of the Security Council through

SCR’s Monthly Forecast as well as its

online service What’s in Blue

(www.whatsinblue.org).

The views expressed in this publica-

tion represent those of the author

and not necessarily those of the

International Peace Institute.

The author would like to express her

appreciation to peer reviewers

Christine Lee, George Lopez, Peter

Scott, and Christine Wing, for their

insightful and valuable comments.

IPI would like to thank Kristen Boon,

visiting senior advisor, for her

integral contributions to the project.

IPI, SCR, and CCSI would like to

thank the government of Canada for

its support of this project.

1 Enrico Carisch and Loraine Rickard-Martin, "United Nations Sanctions on Iran and North Korea: AnImplementation Maual," New York: International Peace Institute, March 2014.

2 Peter Wallensteen, et al., eds., Making Targeted Sanctions Effective: Guidelines for the Implementation of UN PolicyOptions, Stockholm: Uppsala University, 2003.

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imply, of course, that greater transparency is alwayspossible or even desirable. In particular with regardto the investigative work of the PoEs, memberstates must have assurances that their dealings withthe PoEs will be held in the strictest confidence andthat sensitive information will not be made public.Many other aspects of the work of the SecurityCouncil on sanctions also require confidentialityfor political or other reasons. The aim musttherefore be to strike the right balance betweenthese sometimes competing objectives. In the following sections, we will first brieflyreview the mandates of the 1718 DPRK and 1737Iran Sanctions Committees and then describe inmore detail council practices and proceduresrelated to both sanctions regimes with a focus onconcerns raised by member states during thecourse of consultations conducted as part of thisproject. The consultations confirmed that lack oftransparency is seen as having a negative impact onimplementation. Based on our assessment ofcurrent practices and procedures, we will thereforesuggest options for increased transparency andinteraction with member states aimed at strength-ening the council’s role in supporting sanctionsimplementation.

Understanding the Role ofSanctions Committees

The Security Council’s mandate as it relates to theimposition of sanctions is generally well under -stood.3 There seems to be less clarity, however,about the very important role of sanctions commit-tees in monitoring and enforcing implementationonce a sanctions regime is in place. Sanctions committees are subsidiary bodies ofthe Security Council created for the purpose ofadministering sanctions regimes established underArticle 29 of the UN Charter or Rule 28 of theProvisional Rules of Procedure of the SecurityCouncil. Their membership mirrors the composi-tion of the council, with the chair traditionallybeing a permanent representative from one of theten elected members. Unlike in the SecurityCouncil, decisions by sanctions committees aremade by consensus and there are no official

meeting records. Almost all committee meetingsare informal. The DPRK and Iran Sanctions Committees wereestablished on October 14 and December 23, 2006,to oversee implementation of the sanctionsmeasures in resolutions 1718 and 1737, respec-tively. The mandates of the two committees werelater expanded to oversee implementation ofmeasures imposed in subsequent Security Councildecisions. Both committees are mandated to do thefollowing:• seek from all states, in particular those producingor possessing items, materials, equipment, goodsand technology banned under the relevantresolutions, information regarding the actionstaken by them to implement effectively thesanctions measures imposed by the council andwhatever further information they may consideruseful in this regard;

• examine and take appropriate action on informa-tion regarding alleged violations of the sanctionsmeasures;

• consider and decide upon requests forexemptions to the targeted measures (i.e., assetfreezes and travel bans);

• determine additional items, materials,equipment, goods, and technology to be specifiedfor import/export ban;

• designate additional individuals and entitiessubject to the targeted measures;

• establish guidelines as may be necessary to facili-tate implementation of the sanctions measures;and

• report at least every ninety days to the SecurityCouncil with observations and recommenda-tions, in particular on ways to strengthen theeffectiveness of the sanctions measures.

In addition, the Iran Committee is mandated toseek information from the IAEA regarding anyaction taken by the latter to implement effectivelySecurity Council measures on the prevention ofspecialized teaching or training of Iranian nationalsthat might contribute to Iran’s nuclear program. In both cases, the chair of the committee reportsto the council. In the case of Iran, the chair briefs

3 The Charter of the United Nations, Article 41.

the council in an open meeting, normally followedby interventions by all council members, whereasthe DPRK Committee chair meets with councilmembers in informal consultations. Each committee is supported by a PoE mandatedto do the following: • assist the committee in carrying out its mandate;• gather, examine, and analyze information fromstates, relevant UN bodies, and other interestedparties regarding the implementation of thesanctions measures, in particular incidents ofnoncompliance;

• make recommendations on actions the council,the committee, or member states may consider toimprove implementation of the sanctionsmeasures; and

• report regularly on its work to the council withfindings and recommendations.

As is clear from the above, the committees, withthe support of the PoEs, play a central role insupporting sanctions implementation. While thereis little mention of transparency issues in resolu-tions 1718 and 1737, subsequent resolutions seemto recognize the importance of information andoutreach activities. Resolution 1874 on the DPRK,adopted on June 12, 2009, and Resolution 1929 onIran, adopted on June 9, 2010, directed the relevantcommittee to respond effectively to sanctionsviolations and decided that each committee shouldintensify its efforts to promote the full implementa-tion of council decisions, including through a workprogram covering compliance, investigations,outreach, dialogue, assistance, and cooperation. The internal working guidelines adopted by thecommittees, which are technical and procedural innature and posted on the council’s website, containprovisions that are relevant for an analysis of thecommittees’ role in supporting sanctions imple -mentation. They include a separate section oncommunication and transparency, with the 1737Committee guidelines including an additionalsection on outreach. The committee workprograms, which are not made public, containadditional provisions in this regard. In terms of transparency and dialogue withmember states, the guidelines stipulate that

member states, members of the UN Secretariat, andrelevant regional and international organizationsor agencies may be invited to attend committeemeetings. The guidelines also contain provisionsauthorizing the chair to brief interested memberstates and the press following formal committeemeetings or to hold press conferences or issue pressreleases on any aspect of the committees’ work. The 1737 Committee guidelines additionallyallow for NGOs and individual experts to partici-pate in its meetings. In a separate section onoutreach, the committee is directed to assist statesin implementing relevant council measures, parti -cularly with regard to the appropriate disposal ofseized items. The chair is called on to hold openbriefings “to publicize the work of the committeeand enhance dialogue with member states.”According to the guidelines, the committee mayalso consider, as appropriate, country visits by thechair and/or committee members “to discuss waysto effectively implement the measures imposed bythe relevant resolutions. The purpose of such visitsis to encourage member states to fulfill their obliga-tions.”4

Current Council Practicesand Procedures

In reviewing current Security Council practiceswith regard to the 1718 and 1737 sanctionsregimes, we will highlight some of the perceivedchallenges to the effectiveness of the council withregard to sanctions implementation, and we willalso address key concerns raised during our consul-tations with member states both from within andoutside the council. COUNCIL DYNAMICS ANDTRANSPARENCY

The DPRK and Iran are among the most politicallysensitive issues on the council’s agenda. Perhapsmore than for other agenda items, discussions aredominated by the five permanent members of thecouncil (P5). In the case of the DPRK, any signifi-cant new council initiative is typically first agreedto by China and the US before being presented tothe other permanent members and then to thewider council. In the case of Iran, discussions

SANCTIONS IMPLEMENTATION AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 3

4 See 1737 Committee, Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work, available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/ .

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normally begin within the P5 + Germany beforeother council members are involved. AlthoughGermany is currently not a member of the SecurityCouncil, it is included in these discussions becauseof its participation in the talks with Iran on thenuclear file conducted by the so-called P5+1. The lack of involvement of elected members isevident in most of the Security Council’s work onthe DPRK and Iran, and it starts with how resolu-tions are negotiated. Once a draft text has beenagreed upon among the P5, it is most oftencirculated to elected council members with littleadvance notice before a scheduled vote (sometimesas little as twenty-four hours) and with theunderstanding that the text cannot be changed.There is therefore very little scope for electedmembers to influence the outcome. Similar concerns can be seen in the way thecommittees operate. There is a sense that too muchof the work in the committees is being carried outwithout the full knowledge of all council members,despite the fact that the committees mirror thecomposition of the council and are nominallychaired by elected members. While the currentpractice may be the most effective way to makedecisions based on political realities, the lack oftransparency in the decision-making processes isseen as having negative implications for the legiti-macy of the sanctions measures by weakening thesense of ownership among the wider UN member-ship. The selection process for the chairs of thesanctions committees is another area marked bytensions between the P5 and the elected membersrelated to lack of transparency. While SecurityCouncil procedures agreed to in 1998 call for eachcommittee to appoint its own bureau based onconsultations among its members, in practice theselection process has been controlled by the P5with elected members consulted informally andseparately.5

Unhappiness with this approach has led to somerecent attempts to introduce a more inclusive andtransparent method for the annual appointment ofchairs. Following months of discussions in theInformal Working Group on Documentation and

other Procedural Questions, the council issued anote by its president that stated that “to enhancethe efficiency and transparency of the Council’swork” the appointment process for subsidiary bodychairs should be “balanced, transparent, efficientand inclusive” of all council members.6 In practice,however, the P5 still remains firmly in control ofthe process. While there are concerns about the dominantrole of the P5, a more serious issue is the impactthat divisions among council members have on thecommittees’ ability to fulfill their mandates. Sincedecisions in sanctions committees are made byconsensus, it is often difficult for committeemembers to agree on outcomes. This has signifi-cant implications for the committee’s effectivenessin supporting member states through suchmeasures as implementation assistance notices.More transparent practices and changes in thedecision-making process, including taking stale -mated issues to the full council for a vote or discon-tinuing the consensus rule in the committees, couldmake it more difficult for committee members toblock decisions.INTERACTION WITH NON-COUNCILMEMBERS AND TRANSPARENCY

Although the need for dialogue with member statesand other outreach activities has been emphasizedin council resolutions and committee guidelinesinclude some transparency measures, in practiceefforts in this regard have been limited. It seems that neither of the two committees hasever invited any non-council members to attendtheir meetings. Although the guidelines authorizethe chair to brief interested states and the press aswell as holding press conferences or issue pressreleases, such outreach activities remain verylimited. Also, in contrast to other sanctionscommittees, no country visit has yet beenconducted by either the 1718 or 1737 Committee.(The 1737 Committee guidelines refer to such visitsas an opportunity “to discuss ways to effectivelyimplement” the sanctions measures and encouragemember states to fulfill their obligations.)7

One area, however, where there has been somerecent progress in terms of enhancing dialogue

5 UN Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council (October 30, 1998) UN Doc. S/1998/1016.6 United Nations Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council (December 17, 2012) UN Doc. S/2012/937.7 1737 Committee, Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work.

with member states, is with regard to openbriefings. Organized by the committee chairs, thebriefings are open to all member states. Almost sixyears after its establishment, the 1737 Committeeheld its first such briefing on July 9, 2012, under thechairmanship of Colombia, addressing the man -dates and the work of the committee and its PoE. Asecond such briefing was held on June 24, 2013,under the chairmanship of Australia and includedthe PoE coordinator. Four years after its establishment, the 1718Committee held its first open briefing onDecember 20, 2010, under the chairmanship ofTurkey. The briefing, which also involved the PoEcoordinator, focused on the activities of both thecommittee and the PoE, addressing issues such ascooperation with member states, preparation ofSecurity Council documents to assist implementa-tion, and efforts to improve national reportingrequirements. The next open briefing, held on June19, 2013, under the chairmanship of Luxembourg,focused on national implementation reportingobligations and encouraged member states tosubmit reports. In addition to these briefings, the chairs of the1267/1989, 1373, 1540, 1718, 1737 and 1988committees organized a joint open briefing withthe Financial Action Task Force on November 18,2013, focusing on proliferation and terrorismfinancing. While these open briefings are seen as helpful bymember states, some believe they should be morefocused on specific issues and implementationchallenges. There is also a sense that they could bemore transparent in terms of the informationshared, as well as more frequent. There are alsoquestions as to why the 90-day reports of the 1737Committee to the Security Council are presented ina public meeting whereas those of the 1718Committee take place in informal consultations. THE POES AND TRANSPARENCY

Because much of what the PoEs do involvesconfidential and politically sensitive information,there are clear limits to the level of transparency

that can be expected in their work, in particularwith regard to investigations of alleged sanctionsviolations. There are different views, however, as tothe level of confidentiality, and members of theCouncil therefore do not always agree on howmuch of the information received from the PoEsshould be publicly released. There are also specificconcerns related to the PoE appointment process. The lack of transparency surrounding theappointment of the PoEs is a clear concern not onlyfor elected Security Council members, but also forUN member states at large. Equally problematic forsome states is the lack of geographic diversity in thecomposition of the PoEs due to the dominance ofP5 nationals. While some of these concerns applyto PoEs in general, it is worth noting that mostother PoEs are more diverse and that in fact it isonly in the 1267/1989 al-Qaida and 1988 Talibansanctions regimes that there is a similar P5representation among the experts assisting therelevant committee. The DPRK PoE, mandated through Resolution1874 of June 12, 2009, and established on August12, 2009, includes an expert from each of the P5.From the beginning it also had one each fromJapan and the Republic of Korea. (The initialmandate called for the appointment of up to sevenexperts.)8 Although some of the experts have beenreplaced, their nationalities have remainedunchanged through subsequent mandate renewalsand reappointments, save for the incorporation ofan additional expert from South Africa as of June21, 2013, for a total of eight experts.9 Similarly, theIran PoE, mandated through Resolution 1929 ofJune 9, 2010, and established on November 8, 2010,has always included an expert from each of the P5.10From the beginning it has also included one experteach from Germany, Japan, and Nigeria. The secretary-general’s letters informing theSecurity Council of PoE appointments routinelystate that selection is based on prior consultationswith the relevant committee. According to electedcouncil members, however, no substantive consul-tations take place. Also, if a member of either PoE

SANCTIONS IMPLEMENTATION AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 5

8 UN Security Council, Letter Dated 12 August 2009 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (August 12, 2009) UN Doc.S/2009/416.

9 UN Security Council, Letter Dated 21 June 2013 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (June 21, 2013) UN Doc. S/2013/369.10 UN Security Council, Letter Dated 5 November 2010 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (November 8, 2010) UN Doc.

S2010/576.

resigns, he/she is automatically replaced by anexpert of the same nationality. The general lack oftransparency and diversity in the appointmentprocess seems to have led to growing frustrationamong elected council members. In particular,there are concerns about the impartiality of thePoEs as divisions among the P5 are often reflectedin the views of the experts. Additionally, there areconcerns that the politicization of the selectionprocess has affected the quality of the experts andthat this in turn has weakened the PoEs’ expertiseon critical issues. It is also argued that lack ofrelevant language expertise and cultural knowledgecan negatively impact the PoEs’ effectiveness. According to the Secretariat, new PoE selectionprocedures have been put in place that mightrespond to these concerns. Following the mandaterenewal of the DPRK PoE in Resolution 2094 onMarch 7, 2013, and the expansion of the PoE fromseven to eight members, the secretary-generalannounced on June 21st the appointment of anexpert from South Africa. The selection processwas seen as more transparent and merit-based thanin the past. However, it is still too early todetermine whether this will be the case also forfuture P5 candidates. Additional concerns have been raised regardingthe publication of the end-of-mandate reportssubmitted by the PoEs to the committees. Theyprovide important insights about sanctionsviolations as well as recommendations on how toimprove sanctions implementation, but have notalways been made public. Of the three reportsproduced by the Iran PoE since 2010, the 2011report was never made public. Likewise, the 2011report of the DPRK PoE, which has produced fourreports in total, was never made public. In bothcases, a permanent member blocked publication,but both reports were subsequently leaked to themedia. None of the PoEs incident reports have everbeen made public. A separate, but related question is the sometimeslimited follow-up in response to the PoEs’ reports,in particular with regard to implementation oftheir recommendations. This is mainly the result ofdivisions among council members and is a

question of political will. However, it also becomesa question of transparency as there is nomechanism to ensure a minimum level of account-ability when action on recommendations isblocked in the committees. DESIGNATIONS, DUE PROCESS, ANDTRANSPARENCY

A final area of concern has to do with theimplementation of targeted sanctions againstindividuals (travel bans and asset freezes). Somestates see due process deficiencies as a major flawthat has the potential to undermine the implemen-tation of the targeted measures. In this context aswell, lack of transparency is a key issue. The concerns about due process are similar tothose raised in the context of the 1267/1989 al-Qaida and 1988 Taliban sanctions regimes withregard to listing and de-listing procedures. Whilethe Security Council has instituted reforms for theal-Qaida regime in response to criticism about lackof due process and numerous legal challenges inregional and national courts, most notably throughthe creation of the Office of the Ombudsperson in2009 and subsequent measures to strengthen thisoffice, little has been done to improve theprocedures in other sanctions regimes, includingthose related to the DPRK and Iran. In 2006, theSecurity Council created a focal point to serve as amechanism for receiving de-listing requestsrelating to all sanctions regimes—two requestshave been submitted under the Iran sanctionsregime—but its role is purely procedural asopposed to the more substantive mandate of theombudsperson. Concerns about due process have been promptedin part by recognition that mounting legalchallenges in national and regional courts have thepotential to undermine the implementation of UNsanctions regimes more generally and possiblyunravel the entire sanctions system. Perhaps themost significant legal challenge has come from theEuropean Court of Justice. In 2010, the court ruledin the Kadi case11 that EU regulations enacted toimplement UN sanctions violated the right to adefence and effective judicial protection guaran-teed under EU law, thus requiring the delisting of

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11 European Commission and Others v. Kadi, Judgement on the Appeal against the Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of September 30, 2010 (YassinAbdullah Kadi v. European Commission, T-85/09), case C-584/10 P (joined cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, and C-595/10 P) of the European Court of Justice(Grand Chamber), July 18, 2013.

the defendant by the EU. Upon appeal, the GrandChamber ruled on July 18, 2013, that despiteimprovements to the delisting procedures,including the strengthening of the Office of theOmbudsperson, effective judicial protection wasnot guaranteed. Although all legal challenges so far have focusedon the 1267/1899 al-Qaida and 1988 Talibansanctions regimes, there are concerns that thecontroversy over implementation and due processcould also have implications for other UNsanctions regimes, including those related to theDPRK and Iran. In particular, there are concernsthat future legal challenges may underminemember states’ sanctions implementation also inthese cases and indeed, there have been courtchallenges against sanctions unilaterally imposedby states. At the UN level, member states arecontinuing to push for a strengthening of the Officeof the Ombudsperson as well as an expansion of itsmandate to cover other UN sanctions regimes.12

Options for GreaterTransparency

The concerns described above confirm that greatertransparency in the broadest sense of the term isconsidered an important element of any effort toenhance UN sanctions implementation. This finalsection therefore identifies potential options for theSecurity Council and its sanctions committeesaimed at improving transparency and interactionwith the wider UN membership as part of an overar-ching strategy to improve implementation. Transparency in sanctions regimes is not a newissue, but it has been part of ongoing discussionsboth inside and outside the council focusing onvarious aspects of sanctions design and implementa-tion. Of particular relevance is the now defunctInformal Working Group on Sanctions, establishedby the council on April 17, 2000, to develop generalrecommendations on how to improve the effective-ness of UN sanctions.13

In its final report submitted to the council onDecember 18, 2006, the working group noted that

“increased information sharing in the sanctionsprocess would enhance transparency and contributeto better implementation of the sanctionsmeasures.”14 In the same report, it also made anumber of recommendations aimed at improvingcouncil working methods. Several have since beenimplemented such as making committee guidelinesand national implementation reports publiclyavailable, announcing committee meetings in TheJournal of the United Nations, or holding publicbriefings. Other recommendations, however, havenot been implemented and may deserve furtherconsideration. It should also be noted that in more recent discus-sions, including open debates on Security Councilworking methods, there has been a continuing focuson the need for greater transparency in the work ofthe subsidiary bodies. An August 28, 2013, notefrom the president of the council expressed acommitment to “encouraging the subsidiary bodiesto enhance the transparency of their activities,including by providing non-members of the Councilwith substantive interactive briefings.”15

Given the high political sensitivity of the DPRKand Iran sanctions regimes, any attempt to increasetransparency in these regimes will likely encounterconsiderable resistance from some councilmembers. Nevertheless, the repeated concernsraised by member states as described above cannotbe ignored when considering sanctions implementa-tion. Based on the input received during our consul-tations with member states and our review of therecommendations of the Informal Working Groupon Sanctions, we have identified the followingoptions aimed at improving transparency andoutreach to enhance implementation of sanctionsagainst the DPRK and Iran. This list is far fromexhaustive; however, we hope it is indicative of thetypes of options the Security Council couldpotentially explore.ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY INPROCEEDINGS AT THE COUNCIL LEVEL

• In the design phase, i.e., when a new resolution isbeing drafted, involve all council members as earlyas possible in the process, allowing enough time

SANCTIONS IMPLEMENTATION AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 7

12 See for example UN General Assembly and Security Council, Identical Letters Dated 7 November 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to theUN addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (November 9, 2012) UN Doc. A/67/557–S/2012/805.

13 UN Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council (April 17, 2000) UN Doc. S/2000/319.14 UN Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council (December 22, 2006) UN Doc. S/2006/997.15 UN Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council (August 28, 2013) UN Doc. S/2013/515.

between the circulation of a draft decision and itsadoption for substantive discussions to take place.

• Invite the chair of the 1718 Committee to presentthe 90-day reports in public council meetings.

REVISING THE WORKING METHODS OFTHE COMMITTEES

• Change the consensus rule in the committees toallow for decisions to be made by a majority vote.

• Include in committee guidelines provisions forregular reviews of and time limits for “holds”placed by members on any proposed actionsimilar to the provisions included in the1267/1989 Committee guidelines.

IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONBETWEEN THE COMMITTEES ANDMEMBER STATES

• Issue committee press releases or use other meansto publicize which states have submitted nationalimplementation reports and encourage otherstates to do so.

• Post committee work programs on the respectivewebsites.

• Post a list of all committee meetings on the respec-tive committee website with a brief description ofthe agenda and, taking into account confiden-tiality concerns, a brief summary of the discus-sions.

• Provide more detailed guidance to member stateswith regard to implementation of sanctionsprovisions, including by intensifying efforts toissue implementation assistance notices in atimely manner.

EXPANDING COMMITTEE OUTREACHAND DIALOGUE WITH MEMBER STATESAND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

• Invite non-council members when relevant toattend committee meetings to discuss implemen-tation challenges, in particular states neighboringthe DPRK or Iran or having reported an intercep-tion.

• Enhance communication between the committeesand relevant specialized international organiza-tions (e.g., World Customs Organization andInterpol).

• Strengthen interaction with relevant NGOs.• Explore options for the committees to consult

with relevant key private-sector actors onsanctions-related issues.

ADDRESSING DUE PROCESSCONCERNS

• Consider ways to strengthen due processprocedures related to UN targeted sanctions moregenerally to guarantee effective judicial protection,while also exploring specific measures for theDPRK and Iran, such as expanding the mandate ofthe Office of the Ombudsperson to include all UNsanctions regimes or strengthening the role of thefocal point.

STRENGTHENING INITIATIVES BY THECHAIRS

• Organize more frequent briefings by the chairs ofthe 1718 and 1737 committees for the wider UNmembership, announcing them well in advance,and ensuring that they are more substantive andfocused on best practices, lessons learned, andspecific challenges related to implementation,such as the disposal of seized items.

• Conduct country visits to encourage relevantstates to implement their obligations.

• Increase media outreach by the committee chairsto provide information on the rationale behindsanctions, the criteria for their lifting, problemsinvolved with monitoring and implementation,and sanctions violations and noncompliance.

• Hold periodic meetings between the two chairs toensure greater coordination and informationsharing about common challenges.

• Institute formal procedures for the handover ofresponsibilities from outgoing to incoming chairsto ensure sharing of relevant information, lessonslearned, and institutional memory.

PROMOTING GREATER TRANSPARENCYIN THE PoEs AND IN THE IMPLEMENTA-TION OF THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS

• Review PoE selection practices to ensure thatappointments are merit- and context-based, takeinto account equitable geographic distribution,and provide for consultations with SecurityCouncil members;

• Support efforts to institute a transparent system ofperformance evaluation of PoE members.

• Consistently make PoE final reports public.

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• Consider ways to share as much information aspossible from PoE incident reports either byissuing the reports in their entirety as publicdocuments or by making edited versions orsummaries excluding confidential informationavailable to member states.

• Encourage greater information-sharing andcooperation between the DPRK and Iran PoEs.

• Include a brief account of the state of implementa-tion of PoE recommendations in the 90-dayreports to the council, including the reasons why arecommendation has not been implemented orexploring other ways to provide an explanation tomember states in the event a recommendation isnot implemented, such as the practice in the1267/1989 and 1988 Committees to routinelysubmit letters to the council explaining committeepositions on the recommendations of theAnalytical Support and Sanctions MonitoringTeam assisting the two committees. A final action aimed at moving the discussion

forward, considering these and other options, wouldbe for the Security Council to re-establish theInformal Working Group on Sanctions to discussemerging and continuing challenges to the effective-ness of UN sanctions and suggest updatedrecommendations to the council. In the period sincethe original Working Group concluded its work in2006, the council has significantly expanded its useof sanctions, both in terms of the number ofsanctions regimes and committees established andin terms of sanctions criteria. These developmentshave made it even more important than before toensure that the council’s approach is consistentacross different sanctions regimes and situations onits agenda. Also, there is a vast amount of newresearch on the effectiveness of sanctions that couldbe usefully considered by council members to learnfrom past experiences. Re-establishing the InformalWorking Group on Sanctions to start a new processto evaluate the Security Council’s practice onsanctions therefore seems very timely.

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