Sample - Saudi Compound Security Compliance Guide€¦ · • Concrete barriers and approach...

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Saudi Expat Compound Security

Compliance Guide

Document Number: AEIC039D005

Issue Date: 25th

May 2013

Version: 2.4

25/05/2013 AEIC039D005v2.4

Expat Compound Security

Compliance Guide

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Expat Compound Security

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1. Introduction

The following report has been compiled as a guideline to routine approaches to security provision at Saudi

residential compounds housing foreign (non Saudi) nationals. This document should be seen as a guideline

to “best practise” as of May 2013, it is not a definitive description of actual legislation nor can compliance

to this guideline guarantee compliance to Saudi government requirements.

However this document does provide one of the best informal insights available at the current time into

the Saudi process of approving security installations for expat compounds, including a real world worked

example of multiple villa compound located in Riyadh that has had a Saudi government security review.

1.1. Outline Process

The process of approving security provisions of a residential compound is currently performed as a single

review by the Saudi government post compound build. No formal guidelines nor legislation exist for the

checks carried out yet it is mandatory to implement the recommendations made as a result of the review.

It has been recognised that this approach (akin to shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted from

the compound builder’s perspective) does not give compound developers an appropriate nor timely insight

into security provisions required. To resolve this, the Higher Commission for Industrial Security (HCIS) have

recently undertaken to issue a requirements document for compound builders to use during the design

stage. Note: This will put residential compounds under HCIS remit, along with their existing remit for all

critical national infrastructure in Kingdom. Hence the future process will be:

• Phase A (Pre Build): A HCIS regulation document will be released in the near future to support

compound designers prior to compound construction.

• Phase B (Post build): The Ministry of Interior (MoI) will continue to review completed compounds.

However the standardisation of security provisions should improve as a result of the new Phase A.

AEI also believe that there is likely to be a relaxation of current security approaches which can be

externally perceived as overly aggressive. For instance visible exterior razor wire may no longer be

required nor armed guards / vehicles be provided by MoI (or other Ministries) at entry points.

1.2. Future Legislation

Legislation surrounding the Saudi government requirements for security provision at expat compounds and

subsequent enforcement of these requirements is not currently well defined. However as above, there

does appear to be a concerted effort by the Saudi government in consultation with predominantly US

government consultants to rectify this.

The American bias of this consultancy stems from the deployment of jointly funded US / Saudi Office of

Progamme Management (OPM) within the Kingdom, particularly within the critical national infrastructure

space. Hence it is likely that over the coming year, legalisation will be ratified and released based on:

• Relevant US Federal Policy (State Dept. Foreign Service and US Department of Defence Unified

Facility Criteria UFC).


2. Compound Security Requirements

Expat compounds provide expats of all nationalities the privacy and security to live a normal life (within

reason) in KSA without disturbing, offending or corrupting the Saudi community within which they live.

Saudi nationals and the religious police (Mutawwa) are often prohibited from entering (or living in) western

compounds due to the perceived corrupting influences they might encounter.

These compounds typical apply the following approach to compound security, which is likely to also

influence the future standardisation of requirements issued by HCIS.

Note: Many expats including western nationals also live within the community where residential properties

with their high boundary walls provide sufficient privacy but not necessarily the desired security. These

properties are not bound by these requirements.

2.1. Summary Approach to Compound Security

Saudi compounds typically have three layers of security:

1. The Outer Cordon – Provided by the government through the provision of armed Saudi security

personnel. (As described earlier, this requirement may be reduced in future).

2. The Inner Cordon – Non Saudi personnel provided and managed by the compound

management. Special licenses are required to arm these staff.

3. Physical Measures – Installation of barriers, car stoppers, chicanes, CCTV etc. Further details of

this layer is given below.

2.1.1. Outer Cordon - Government Security Force

Although the general environment in Riyadh is quite benign the Government has a commitment to provide

adequate protection for western expat compounds. The size of the force will depend on the size of the

compound and number of occupants. The force will be of sufficient size to provide 24/7 security with

weapon mounted vehicles at some locations. The total force may be up to 30 personnel with a command

structure. The personnel may rotate periodically with other compounds.

The size and type of security force will also be influenced by the type of occupant and the sensitivity of the

activity (if any) conducted in the compound. For instance the BAE Systems compound attracts significant

Government security effort. This size of force requires significant support and infrastructure and they

would expect/demand the following:

2.1.1.1. Guard Force General Support Facilities

• Office space for the commander and administration staff.

• Prayer room, ablutions, parking, eating and rest area.

• Provision of meals can be included as a requirement but this appears to be a negotiable.

2.1.1.2. Guard Force Security Infrastructure

• Sentry Post with a/c and spot lights.

• Vehicle check area with shade and lighting.

• Shade for the weapon mounted vehicle/s.

• Concrete barriers and approach chicanes.

• CCTV system including motion detection.


• Single C&C centre.

• Perimeter security lighting.

These facilities should be provided outside the inner cordon to avoid the Government Security Force

entering the compound.

The Government Security Force’s responsibility is to provide a secure perimeter, therefore they check and

search vehicles and scrutinise visitor IDs, however they do not control the access to the compound, that

duty is carried out by the compound management staff.

Due to the relaxing of security measures it is quite possible that the Government will not provide armed

security forces in future. If this is the case then a full security risk assessment should determine the level of

security required and additional private security personnel may need to be employed.

2.1.2. Inner Cordon - Compound Access Control Staff

The inner cordon of security is provided by the compound management who are responsible for

determining who and how people enter the compound. These staff are typically non-Saudi (allowing them

free access inside the compound perimeter) with a good level of spoken English. Their duties (24/7) can

include:

• Access control.

• Issuing resident passes and car passes.

• Processing visitor requests from residents.

• Checking ID.

• Gate, barriers and car stopper control.

• Monitoring CCTVs.

• Searching delivery vehicles and workers on entry and departure.

• Limited patrolling within the compound.

2.1.3. Physical Measures

These include; barriers, car stoppers, gates, chicanes, CCTV, concrete barriers (Jersey Blocks), screens, razor

wire etc. Ideally there should be sufficient space at the main entrance approach area to put an initial

vehicle search and ID check area with barrier access control and staff shade and sentry box. Sentry boxes

should have ballistic resistant class fitted.

Note: It is helpful to provide adequate parking for visitors who may not be permitted to take their cars into

the compound.

The next check point is the access control to the compound with gate, barriers and car stoppers should be

installed. This is where ID is confirmed and residents are permitted to enter with their car and visitors are

processed and if they are expected, allowed to walk in. The level of access control for visitors varies from

compound to compound and may consist of simply checking names against the submitted list and

exchanging a passport or Iqama for a visitors pass or it may involve a full electronic body scan and the issue

of photo pass in exchange of a passport or Iqama.

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The first vehicle check point should be sufficient distan

and barriers to be closed in time in the event of an incident. There should also be a parking area with

sufficient stand off from the compound wall/fence for visitors.

It is also important for the main entrance to be screened so that external passers

into the compound when the gate is open. This helps to maintain the residents’ privacy and limits visibility

for prying eyes.

Perimeter wall heights vary and range from 2.5m to 5m at

wire provides an excellent barrier and deterrent it does give the impression of a fortress. Hence high walls

with good CCTV and motion detection are increasingly being used to provide similar deterrence with a

less aggressive look and allowing them to blend in with local infrastructure.

Note: Real world examples of boundary walls are included in the Appendix.

2.1.3.1. Compound Approach Design

The following shows a standard compound approach design, which fits with

This is only an example layout. Space available (both in and outside the compound), local approach roads,

proximity of other buildings etc will all influence the compound entrance layout

25/05/2013 AEIC039D005v2.4

The first vehicle check point should be sufficient distance from the main entrance to allow the main gates


sufficient stand off from the compound wall/fence for visitors.

ntrance to be screened so that external passers


Perimeter wall heights vary and range from 2.5m to 5m at the most recent constructions. Although razor


with good CCTV and motion detection are increasingly being used to provide similar deterrence with a

less aggressive look and allowing them to blend in with local infrastructure.

Note: Real world examples of boundary walls are included in the Appendix.

Compound Approach Design

The following shows a standard compound approach design, which fits with current MoI review appraisals:


proximity of other buildings etc will all influence the compound entrance layout.

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ce from the main entrance to allow the main gates


ntrance to be screened so that external passers-by are not able to see


the most recent constructions. Although razor


with good CCTV and motion detection are increasingly being used to provide similar deterrence with a far

current MoI review appraisals:



2.2. Worked Example

2.2.1. Multi Villa Compound Within Built-Up Residential Area (Riyadh)

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH REMOVED FOR SECURITY REASONS .

This compound located in central Riyadh had an MoI security review performed on it, post build, in 2012.

The compound had initially been built intended for Saudi national use, hence virtually no security

provisions were in place. A large number of rectifications were applied as a result of the security review and

with the new intended inhabitants (western expats) arriving as the provisions were installed.

The review was performed over the course of a single day where MoI survey staff attended site. MoI staff

came well prepared and had previously studied satellite imagery of the compound and investigated traffic

flows around the compound, immediately suggesting changes to road layout (by introducing obstructions).

Note: When the road layout was changed this resulted in local Municipality officers attending as passing

traffic had found their cut through impeded and made complaints to the local police. Municipality officers

withdrew upon evidencing the alterations had been made on the authority of the MoI.

The translated output of the review is shown over the next two pages along with some commentary on the

subsequent “negotiation” of the review results that occurred.

2.2.1.1. Ministry of Interior Review Recommendations

Page 1 of the translated security review output:

REVIEW REMOVED FOR SECURITY REASONS .

Following the review compound government relations officers were able to negotiate with MoI staff to

remove some of the requirements. Requirements 2a (REMOVED) and 2e (REMOVED) were removed in

agreement with the MoI.

Page 2 of the translated security review output:

REVIEW REMOVED FOR SECURITY REASONS .

2.2.1.2. Security Installation Work Performed Post Review

The following items were installed as a result of the recommendations (the numbers below correspond to

the red numbers on the image over the page):

1. REMOVED

2. REMOVED

3. REMOVED

4. REMOVED

5. REMOVED

6. REMOVED

7. REMOVED

8. REMOVED

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH REMOVED FOR SECURITY REASONS .

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3. Appendix

3.1. New Compound Perimiter Walls

Many current compound perimeter

panels less than 5m high and approximately

These walls are combined with large Jersey concrete blocks for

well as fencing up to 10’ with cloth screening

Residential buildings should not form part of or b

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New Compound Perimiter Walls

perimeter walls, (new builds or recent constructions), use reinforced concrete

and approximately 40cm thick.

large Jersey concrete blocks for exterior road traffic flow management as

screening to block visual access.

Residential buildings should not form part of or be attached to the perimeter wall.

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walls, (new builds or recent constructions), use reinforced concrete

traffic flow management as

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3.2. Older Compound Perimeter Walls

Older compound wall construction typically uses the original

with aluminium panels and additional chain

channel the approach road.

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Older Compound Perimeter Walls

wall construction typically uses the original concrete block walls, upgraded and extended

additional chain link fencing topped with barbed wire and Jersey blocks to

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s, upgraded and extended

topped with barbed wire and Jersey blocks to

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