Sagit Bar-Gill Tel Aviv University - hse.ru

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Equilibrium Long-Tailed Sales in a Search Model Sagit Bar-Gill Tel Aviv University

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Equilibrium Long-Tailed Sales in a Search Model

Sagit Bar-Gill

Tel Aviv University

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What is the long tail phenomenon?

Long tailed markets are markets where the aggregate sales of obscure or

niche products constitute a significant portion of total sales.

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Motivation: The Long Tail is a Significant Phenomenon

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Motivation: Why is the long tail interesting?

� Long tails in the online book, music and video industries (Brynjolfsson, Hu and

Smith, 2006; Anderson, 2006).

� A change of business models � market of niches.

� Amazon’s tail (Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith 2010):

� Books outside the top 100,000 accounted for 36.7% total sales in 2008.

� Consumer surplus generated by the availability of niche books is between

$3.9-$5 billion.

The long tail is a significant phenomenon, with implications for both firm profits and consumer welfare.

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Related Literature Explaining the Long Tail

� Supply-side explanations do not tell the whole story (Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee

2008; Brynjolfsson, Hu and Simester, 2011)

� Recommendation systems � longer tail + lower sales concentration

(Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan 2009; Brynjolfsson, Hu and Simester, 2011).

� Effects of online reviews (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Ehrman and Schmale,

2008; Duan and Zhou, 2009).

� Bar-Isaac, Caruana and Cuñat (AER 2011) – endogenous product design.

� Recent working papers: Hervas-Drane (2010), Yang (2011) – LT driven by

heterogeneous preferences.

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This work: A theoretical demand side explanation based on consumers’ search strategies

“Infinite” supply

(online)

Effective search

(online)

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This work: A theoretical demand side explanation based on consumers’ search strategies

This work provides:

� A demand side explanation

to the Long Tail, in a search

framework.

� Conditions for a market

equilibrium with long tailed

sales.

� The functional form for the

equilibrium sales

distribution as a function of

consumers’ search strategies.

“Infinite” supply

(online)

Effective search

(online)

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Outline of the Model

Consumers:

� K consumers. Unit demand.

� Consumers know the general formof the sales distribution, �.

� Cannot learn market shares without conducting search.

� First choose a search strategy, then make a purchase decision.

Firms and the sales distribution:

� N firms, one product each, �� � 0.

� Firm � sets price ��.� � - firm �’s market share, � - the

sales distribution (determined

endogenously in equilibrium).

� Firm � set price �� given �, �, and

consumers’ search and purchase

behavior.

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� K homogeneous consumers: ∈ �1. . ��� Consumers know �.

The model: Consumers

��,� � ��,� � �� � ��

� + expected prices Purchase decisionSearch procedure

Utility based� Recommendation

� Aggregator

Consumer utility:

Match value Price Search cost

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The model: Consumers

��,� � ��,� � �� � ��Consumer utility:

��,� � ����. �. �����. �. ��1 � ���0�. �. �1 � ���1 � ���Match value:

Perfect match

Good match

No match

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The model: Consumers

��,� � ��,� � �� � ��Consumer utility:

��,� � ����. �. �����. �. ��1 � ���0�. �. �1 � ���1 � ���Match value:

Perfect match

Good match

No match

� One perfect match per consumer, independent across consumers and products.

� � gives the probability that � is a good match for all.

� Correlation w.r.t. good matches but not for perfect matches.

� � represents the distribution of the "general taste“.

� (Good and perfect matches are not mutually exclusive).

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The model: Consumers’ Search and Purchase Behavior

Each consumer chooses one of two search procedures:

Sampling a recommendation: Searching the online aggregator:

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The model: Consumers’ Search and Purchase Behavior

Each consumer chooses one of two search procedures:

Sampling a recommendation:

� Product � is sampled w.p. �.� Consumer learns � , �� , �� ≡ ��,� �"

��= �� �� # 1 � �� ���

� Free: ��$ ≡ 0� Purchase decision: �� � �� % 0� buy

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The model: Consumers’ Search and Purchase Behavior

Each consumer chooses one of two search procedures:

Searching the online aggregator:

� Full product info.

� Consumer learns ��,� , �� ∀�, .

� Cost: ��'~�')�, �̅". �' known to firms.

� Purchase decision:

Buy �∗: �∗ � ,-./,0� ��,� � �� � Only if non-neg.

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The model: Consumers’ Search and Purchase Behavior

Each consumer chooses one of two search procedures:

Sampling a recommendation:

� Product � is sampled w.p. �.� Consumer learns � , �� , �� ≡ ��,� �"

��= �� �� # 1 � �� ���

� Free: ��$ ≡ 0� Purchase decision: �� � �� % 0� buy

Searching the online aggregator:

� Full product info.

� Consumer learns ��,� , �� ∀�, .

� Cost: ��'~�')�, �̅". �' known to firms.

� Purchase decision:

Buy �∗: �∗ � ,-./,0� ��,� � �� � Only if non-neg.

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max ��,� � �� % ��' �,, otherwise �-

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The model: Consumer and Firm Strategies

We proceed to define market equilibrium

Search strategy: 4��, ��'� ∈ �-, ,�(purchase rule corresponds to search strategy)

Pricing: 5 � , �, 4, �' � �� ∈ )0,∞�

Consumers:

Firms:

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The model: Market Equilibrium

Definition 3: Market equilibrium is a triplet �, 5, 4 such that:

1. 5�� , �, 4, �'� is optimal given � and 4 (and the corresponding purchase rule).

2. 4��, ��'� is optimal given �and 5.

3. When agents employ equilibrium strategies 5 and 4, the sales distribution is �.

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A Comment on Stability

A pseudo dynamic interpretation of the model:

� A new group of consumers enters and makes purchases in every period.

� �8 is the distribution of all sales accumulated up to the beginning of period 9.� �8:�is determined by �8 and 4.

Definition 4: An equilibrium in the dynamic setting is stable when �8 → �∗.

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Defining the Long Tail in the Model

� The tail of interest is the tail of the sales-rank distribution.

s

( )f s

1 r1

s

1

The sales distribution The sales-rank “distribution”

- <� � Pr < % <� ⋅ @

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The tail

Defining the Long Tail in the Model

� The tail of interest is the tail of the sales-rank distribution.

s

( )f s

1 r1

s

1

The sales distribution The sales-rank “distribution”

- <� � Pr < % <� ⋅ @The tail

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Equilibrium: Firm pricing

Lemma 1: When @ is large and �� is large enough*, the equilibrium pricing strategy:�� � ��Intuition:

� One perfect match at aggregator: probability AB → 0� doesn’t affect pricing.

� Recommendation searchers see monopolistic prices at WTP.

� Assumption *: �� �max� �� % �� � perfect match always chosen at aggregator.

equilibrium pricing � search strategies � �Plan:

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Equilibrium: Consumers’ Search and Purchase Behavior

Definition 5: An C-search behavior is the use of the following heuristic rule:

1. With probability C draw one product from �1. . @� uniformly at random, and

purchase it.

2. With probability �1 � C� copy a previous purchase: sample one product from �1. . @� where product � is sampled with probability �, and purchase it.

Proposition 1: Consumers’ optimal search and purchase behavior is equivalent to an C-search behavior with C � Pr ��' D �� � �� .� Recommendation-based search: � sampled w.p. � and purchased w.p. 1.

� At the aggregator: each product is chosen w.p. ��

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Equilibrium �: C-Search Behavior Implies Equilibrium Long Tail

Proposition 2: When @ → ∞ there exists an equilibrium with long tailed sales. The

tail of the equilibrium sales rank distribution is a power law with exponent 1 � C ,where C � Pr)��' D �� � ��". Furthermore, the equilibrium is stable.

Lemma 2: When consumers’ equilibrium behavior is equivalent to an C-search

behavior then a distribution �∗ which follows a power law for low levels of < is an

equilibrium distribution, and its corresponding sales-rank distribution has a power

law tail.

Specifically: �∗ < � Θ <FGHIAHI for 1 D < D log@, and �∗ 0 � ��:MN/�<∗ - � Θ -F��FM��∗ is the limiting sales distribution when the market is constructed by an C process (adaptation of Yule, 1925; strong convergence result by Kumar et al., 2000).

Intuition – next slide

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Equilibrium Long Tail - Intuition

C-search behavior:

� Copying - preferential attachment mechanism.

� Randomizing - allows unpopular products to gain popularity.

The result: an equilibrium market where most products have low sales, and are considered "tail" or "niche", and a few products are best sellers, or "hits".

When @ is large:

� Consumers find it optimal to act as if they are using the C heuristic.

� The resulting market structure is long tailed.

� This result is stable.

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Equilibrium Long Tail - Intuition

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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=54XxcDqe8Hg

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Equilibrium Long Tail - Simulations

The sales distribution - ��<� The sales-rank distribution - <�-�

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 1800

5

10

15

20

25

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35

40

45

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 180

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

@ � 100:

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 350

100

200

300

400

500

600

0 100 200 300 400 500 6000

50

100

150

200

250

@ � 500:

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Equilibrium Long Tail - Simulations

The sales distribution - ��<� The sales-rank distribution - <�-�

@ � 1500:

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 350

100

200

300

400

500

600

0 100 200 300 400 500 6000

50

100

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200

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@ � 500:

0 10 20 30 40 50 600

200

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800

1000

1200

1400

1600

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 16000

100

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500

600

700

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Decreases in the Online Search Cost Lead to a Longer and Heavier Tail

Proposition 3: Increases in C result in a shift to a new equilibrium sales and sales-

rank distributions with a longer and heavier tail.

s

( )f s

r

Low CHigh C

The sales distribution The sales-rank distribution

1r 1 1

s

1

� Recall: C � Pr)��' D �� � ��"� C ↑ represent changes in �' due to better or cheaper online search.

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Length of the tail(1 D < D 7� Weight of the tail

(0.8@ worst sellers)

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

s h

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.50

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

Number of 0-sellers

For @ � 1500, 4̅ � 7500C: 0.1→0.2 � weight increases by 260%.

Decreases in the Online Search Cost Lead to a Longer and Heavier Tail - simulations

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Conclusion

� A demand side explanation of the long tail phenomenon, based on consumers’

use of both traditional and web-based search procedures.

� Main result: the existence of an equilibrium with long tailed sales.

� In line with empirical evidence of long tailed sales-rank distributions in online

markets.

� As online search tools become "cheaper" or easier to use, the tail of the market

becomes longer and heavier.

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The End

Thank you!

Bar-Gill, TAU, June 2012Equilibrium Long-Tailed Sales