Safety versus Affordability as Targets of Insurance Regulation in an Opaque Market: A Welfare...
Transcript of Safety versus Affordability as Targets of Insurance Regulation in an Opaque Market: A Welfare...
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ICIR Working Paper Series No. 10/12
Edited by Helmut Grundl and Manfred Wandt
Safety versus Affordability as Targets of Insurance Regulation
in an Opaque Market: A Welfare Approach
Rayna Stoyanovaand Sebastian Schlutter
Abstract
Insurance regulation is typically aimed at policyholder protection. In particular,
regulators attempt to ensure the financial safety of insurance firms, for example,
by means of capital regulation, and to enhance the affordability of insurance, for
example, by means of price ceilings. However, these goals are in conflict. Therefore,
we identify situations in which regulators should be more concerned with safety
or, alternatively, affordability. Our model incorporates default-risk-sensitive in-
surance demand, capital-related frictional costs, and imperfect risk transparency
for policyholders.
Keywords: Insurance Regulation, Regulatory Targets, Welfare, Opaqueness
Corresponding author. Goethe University Frankfurt, Faculty of Economics and Business Admin-
istration, Department of Finance, International Center for Insurance Regulation, House of Finance,Grueneburgplatz 1, 60323 Frankfurt, phone: +49 69 798 33680, fax: +49 69 798 33691, e-mail:
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1 Introduction
In attempting to meet their overall objective of protecting policyholder interests,
insurance regulators employ different techniques aimed at two subordinate objectives. First,
insurance regulators expend significant effort to ensure that insurance companies are
sufficiently solvent to meet policyholder claims. In this context, the future regulatory regime
Solvency II in the European Union, for example, contains risk-based capital requirements,
qualitative requirements regarding insurers risk management practices, and transparency and
disclosure standards for insurer risk profiles.1
Second, regulators frequently employ measures
aimed at making insurance more affordable. For example, in some U.S. states, rate regulation
is in force for workers compensation, automobile, and medical malpractice insurance. Even
though the insurance markets in the European Union were deregulated in 1994, there is also
some degree of price regulation in the EU: in Germany, for example, private health insurers
are required to offer a basic tariff (Basistarif) whose premium is limited in accordance with
the maximum rate in the statutory health insurance.
At first sight, these two regulatory objectivessafety and affordabilityappear to
be in conflict, and there is sparse theoretical work on how insurance regulators should act so
as to effectively protect policyholder interests. Empirically, Klein et al. (2002) demonstrate
that stringent price ceilings induce insurers to attain higher leverage ratios and thus reduce
their safety level. This finding is in line with the (not insurance-specific) theoretical argument
that firms use debt as a strategy to influence the regulator to increase the regulated price.2
In
the context of insurance, there is another, simpler explanation for this observation: since the
regulated premium influences the insurers expected profits per insurance contract, it affects
1
A global overview of the introduction of risk-based capital standards is provided by Eling and Holzmller(2008).2 See Taggart (1981), Spiegel and Spulber (1994), and Dasgupta and Nanda (1993).
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their incentive for attracting customers with a strong financial position (Schltter, 2011). A
significant price ceiling therefore is accompanied by relatively high insolvency risk. Vice
versa, there are theoretical arguments that stringent solvency regulation might increase
insurance premiums. First, solvency regulation affects the insurers default put option, which
is reflected by insurance premiums.3
Second, to attain a higher safety level, insurers face
additional risk management costs, such as costs of reinsurance or frictional costs of equity
capital (cf. Froot, 2007), that may be passed on to the consumer in higher insurance
premiums.
This article investigates how regulatory requirements designed to meet the objectives of
safety and affordability influence an insurers optimal capital and pricing strategy, and
how these decisions affect policyholder welfare. Based on these results, we investigate in
which situations regulators should focus either more on safety or, alternatively, on
affordability. Throughout our analysis, we employ a model with an inhomogeneous group
of policyholders whose preferences are represented by an insurance demand function,
depending on the insurance premium and the insurers safety level.4
The insurer decides on its
shareholder-value-maximizing equity-premium combination by anticipating the consequences
for insurance demand. Insurer safety level is not necessarily perfectly transparent to
policyholders and the insurers equity endowment may be subject to frictional costs, such as
corporate taxes.
In a benchmark case, we first derive the insurers optimal strategy in the absence of
regulation. We determine the insurers optimal safety level by balancing its incentives
resulting from demand reaction against the default put option and the frictional costs of
equity. Next, we analyze the influence of risk-based capital requirements. Here, the regulator
3
See, e.g., Doherty and Garven (1986), Grndl and Schmeiser (2002), and Gatzert and Schmeiser (2008).4Our model design is similar to the setups of Cummins and Danzon (1997), Zanjani (2002), Froot (2007), Yow
and Sherris (2008), and Schltter (2011).
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can specify the insurers safety level, to which the insurer reacts by adjusting the insurance
premium. We find that the regulator cannot enhance welfare by means of solvency regulation
as long as policyholders are perfectly informed about default risk.5 However, when
policyholders cannot perfectly monitor the insurers safety level, capital regulation can
enhance consumer welfare, even though it causes an increase of insurance premiums. Based
on numerical examples, we demonstrate that the effectiveness of capital regulation increases
with the degree of opaqueness, with the level of capital-related frictional costs and with the
severity of underwriting risks. Finally, we study the consequences of regulatory price ceilings.
We demonstrate that the net effect of enhancing the affordability of insurance, on the one
hand, and reducing the insurers optimal safety level, on the other hand, can be either positive
or negative for policyholder welfare. Our numerical examples indicate that price ceilings will
be effective when the market is transparent and when frictional costs are low. Thus, markets
in which price ceilings are effective have characteristics contrary to markets in which capital
regulation is appropriate.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
framework and introduces the objective functions. Section 3 derives the insurers optimal
strategy in the benchmark case without regulation. Section 4 studies the effectiveness of
solvency regulation. Section 5 explores the consequences of price ceilings. Section 6
concludes.
5 This result is in line with the model of Rees et al. (1999).
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2 Model Design2.1 Actors and Timing
Our one-period model is based on models proposed by Zanjani (2002) and Schltter
(2011). We consider an opaque insurance market with a homogeneous product and three
stakeholder groups: insurance buyers, an insurer, and a regulator.
Insurance Buyers
The insurance buyers are offered an insurance product at a certain price and default risk.
Their buying decisions are a reaction to these characteristics. Cumulative consumer reaction
is modeled by an aggregate demand function, which depicts the representative preferences of
an inhomogeneous group of insurance buyers and sums to the number of customers for whom
purchase of the offered insurance product is advantageous.
We utilize a two-parametric demand function , where denotes the unit price ofthe insurance product and is the default ratio that the insurer communicates to consumers.We define the default ratio as the ratio of the arbitrage-free value of unpaid claims to the
value of nominal liabilities, that is, liabilities without default risk. The default ration is used in
the model as a measure of risk. To keep the model tractable, we apply a specific form of the
demand function:
AB C D E FA, (1)
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where D is a scale parameter and andA are the sensitivity factors with respect to price and
default ratio.6
The demand function has the following properties:AB
C E
AA C A E , that is, policyholders react negatively to increases in price anddefault risk. This exponential form of an insurance demand function was recently derived by
Zimmer et al. (2011) from an experiment in which the participants were confronted with
insurance contracts subject to default risk. The experimental results show participants
willingness to pay for a household insurance contract with a certain default risk level. The
demand function is imperfectly elastic with regard to price and default risk, that is, because of
switching and information costs, small changes in price and default ratio do not reduce the
demand to zero.7
Insurer
The second party in the model, the limited liability insurer, maximizes its shareholder
value () and makes decisions as to its risk management strategy and underwriting activityin the presence of regulatory constraints, that is, it decides on its default ratio andinsurance price .
The insurers objective function is the present arbitrage-free market value of the end-of-
period equity capital ! minus the initial equity endowment ",
C ! " (2)
# is the arbitrage-free valuation function. Equity funds are used as a risk management toolto ensure the realized solvency level. Owing to corporate taxation, agency costs, and
6
The sensitivity parameters andA depict only the aggregate preferences of consumers and do not accountfor any opaqueness effects in the market.7 See DArcy and Doherty (1990), Cummins and Danzon (1997), Zanjani(2002), and Yow and Sherris (2008).
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acquisition expenses, equity endowment is assumed to imply up-front frictional costs, which
are modeled by a proportional charge $ % .8 Considering the insurers limited liability, thefinal payoffs to shareholders at time 1 are given by the future value of the available assets&!minus the nominal claims '! plus any unpaid losses above the available assets, that is, theshareholders default put option ()*! C +,-./'! &!0 1. To develop asset and liabilityvalues over time, we assume a geometric Brownian motion process. At time 0, the arbitrage-
free value of the final shareholder payoffs is then 2 C &2 '2 3()*!. The insurersinitial assets are denoted by&2 C E 3 4 $ E ". Furthermore, 5 C '2 6 denotes thearbitrage-free initial value of the nominal liabilities per contract, C ()*2 '26 denotes thedefault ratio, and 7 C &2 '26 denotes the initial asset-liability ratio. Using the option pricingformula, the default ratio can be determined as follows:
9
7 8 C 9: 7 E 9: 8
.............8 C ;8= ?@8
.............: C . 3!= 8
(2)
where 9 is the distribution function of the standard normal distribution, 8< and 8> are thevolatilities of the assets and liabilities, respectively, and @ is the correlation between them.Since
7 8is a continuous and strictly decreasing function in
7 8, there is a unique
inverse function 78.
Appling the above relationships, we represent the shareholder value function as follows:
8
This is a common approach in the literature; see Zanjani (2002), Froot (2007), Yow and Sherris (2008), andIbragimov et al. (2010).9 For explanation, see, e.g. Myers and Read (2001), p. 553.
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C.......................C . E 5 E 4 $"
.......................C E G 5 E 4 H!H 5 E 78 I
(3)
(4)
Therefore, the insurers decision problem is to find the optimal and legally allowable
combination of default risk level and insurance price that maximizes its shareholdervalue.
Regulator
The regulator uses two instruments to achieve its safety and affordability targets. It
has the option of introducing solvency regulation, in the sense of capital requirements, as a
way of improving the safety of insurance companies. The second tool is price restriction,
which is used to make insurance products more affordable by setting a maximum allowed
price. The regulators objective function is consumer surplus maximization, which is
calculated as the sum of the differences between the reservation price, that is, the maximum
price a consumer would pay for the insurance product, and the offered price over all
policyholders:
J C K L (5)
To study the effectiveness of the two regulatory tools and be able to compare them, we
bring in an effectiveness variable that measures the percentage change of consumer surplus,
defined as the absolute change in consumer surplus divided by the consumer surplus in an
unregulated market,MNOPMNQRQSOP
MNQRQSOP. Additionally, we look at the percentage change of
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shareholder value,NTUOPNTUQRQSOP
NTUQRQSOP , to study the regulatory impact on the insurers
shareholder value.
2.2 Modeling OpaquenessMarket opaqueness is formalized by introducing a deviation parameter V, V W 0 4,
which measures the divergence between promised default ratio and realized default ratio. We
distinguish between the default ratio.A , which the insurer promises and communicates tothe consumers, and the default ratio AXYZ, which it realizes after the contract has beensigned. In a perfectly transparent market, the deviation parameter equals zero: V C .Furthermore, if the insurer can deviate from its promise, that is, V [ , it always does so tothe fullest extent possible and realizes the highest possible default ratio because this raises its
shareholder value.10
Therefore, we introduce the following relations between the realized and
promised default risk:
A C AXYZ4 V\ C AXYZ A C AXYZV
(6)
Consumer Surplus in an Opaque Market
As mentioned, consumer surplus measures the cumulative utility for policyholders of
buying the insurance product. However, in the case of an opaque market, different aspects of
the calculation must be considered.
Calculation of consumer surplus in both a transparent and an opaque market is illustrated
in Figure 1. Assume that the insurer realizes the default ratio AXYZ. The dashed line in Figure
10 For a detailed explanation, see Section 3.
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1 shows for how many consumers it is advantageous to buy insurance. Given that the insurer
decides on the premium ]AXYZ, the dark shaded area below the dashed curve gives theconsumer surplus in the transparent market. In an opaque market, the promised default ratio
A deviates from the realized one. The solid curve in Figure 1 represents the number ofconsumers who actually purchase insurance observing the default ratio A. Since the actualdefault ratio is higher than A, consumers overestimate the utility they will derive frominsurance, and there are some consumers whose utility is reduced by purchasing insurance.
The black area in Figure 1 measures the loss of consumer surplus resulting from this effect.
Under the premium ]AXYZ, the consumer surplus in an opaque market is the dark greyarea minus the black area. Formally, consumer surplus is calculated as:
JAXYZ V C K AXYZL] ^YAb.cAY.YAXY
] d E A ] K AXYZ]
d ^eZYfb.YAXY
(7)
Here, d is defined by AXYZ d C A ].
Figure 1: Insurance demand function and welfare loss in a nontransparent market
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3 Optimal Solutions in an Unregulated MarketAs a benchmark case and comparison basis for the different regulatory approaches, we
consider an unregulated insurance market in which the insurer can decide on its SHV-
maximizing equity-premium combination without regulatory constraints. Here, the insurers
maximization problem is:
ghiA .AXYZ. C
C AXYZ E 4V E G 5 E 4AXYZ H
!H 5 E 7AXYZ 8 I
(8)
In an opaque market, the insurers realized safety level will deviate from the level
promised: the insurer can increase demand by communicating a lower default risk level than it
actually ensures. The actual default risk level corresponds to a lower equity endowment and
therefore incurs fewer frictional costs.
Based on the first-order condition of Equation (8), we can determine the insurers
optimal premium for a given default ratio AXYZ:
]AXYZ C hjkghi AXYZ..
C 5 E 4AXYZ^Arb. free value oflmnopqr.qplsm
3 $ E 5 E 7AXYZ 8 5 E 4AXYZB^ Transfer of frictional cost of equity
3 !tProfitspounv
. (9)
The optimal price is calculated as the sum of the arbitrage-free value of claim payments,
plus frictional costs transferred to policyholders, plus a profit loading. Note that the
transparency level influences the insurers optimal default risk level, but has no direct effect
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on the premium: the optimal premium ]AXYZ depends only on the insurers actual defaultrisk level, not on the promised level.
Let AXYZ] C hjkghiA ] . denote the insurers SHV-maximizing(actual) default ratio. Solving the insurers maximization problem (Equation (8)), the first-
order condition for the optimal choice of AXYZ] ], given that the price is optimallyadjusted, implies that
!w
E
!
!x C y
xz
!x E
{AO|}
{A. (10)
The left-hand side of Equation (10) represents the marginal change of insurers benefits due to
demand reaction when the default ratio is marginally changed. The right hand side measures
the marginal change of default put option and frictional costs of equity. Rewriting Equation
(10) enables us to present the insurers SHV-maximizing asset-liability ratio 7] using aclosed-form solution:
11
7] C ~ H 4 V !HH . (11)
with i C i E ! ! = and ! denoting the quantile function of the standard
normal distribution. One can easily verify that i is a strictly increasing function in x.Therefore, the insurer will optimally avoid default risk by holding a high capital level if, c.p.,
demand reacts strongly to default risk, weakly to price, frictional costs are low and the
insurance market is rather transparent than opaque.
11 The derivation is analogous to Schltter (2011), Proposition 2.
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We then have the following equations for the maximal shareholder value and resulting
consumer surplus in the unregulated market:
AXYZ] E 4V ] C AO|}] E!w]B!H . (12)
JAXYZ] E 4V ] C AO|}] E!w]B!AO|}] wB
. (13)
These equations illustrate that shareholders benefit from a greater degree of opaqueness,
whereas consumers suffer: in Equation (13), 4 AAXYZV represents the consumersurplus loss resulting from market opacity. In the numerical examples, we measure the
consequences of opaqueness for safety level, insurance premium, shareholder value, and
consumer surplus in an unregulated market.
Numerical Example
Throughout our analysis, we illustrate our results with a realistically calibrated
numerical example. We set the following risk parameters: 5 C ?, 8< C , 8> C ?,
and @ C ,12.g. 8 C = 3?= #??#. We further assume a frictionalcost ratio of. $ C .13 For. simplicity, we set. C #. The demand-function-related
parameters are as follows:
14
12 These numerical assumptions are consistent with the market-based calibrated model of Yow and Sherris
(2008).13Zanjani (2002) reports that the frictional costs for the reinsurance industry can be approximated with 5%.
14 These parameters are consistent with the regression results estimated by Zimmer et. al (2011).
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Demand-function-related parameters
0.015 14
10 000
Table 1: Demand-function-related parameters
In our benchmark scenario, the numerical input variables result in the following optimal
combination of price and default risk, shareholder value, and consumer surplus for the three
transparency levels /0#0#1:
Opaqueness level A
C B
C #C
C #]] 271.81 269.99 268.95]
0.1606%
0.1606%
0.2632%
0.1842%
0.7036%
0.2814%
]] 6 485.90 4 583.44 623.557 165.79 167.21 170.15 11 634.11 11 734.05 11 940.16 11 052.41 11 024.11 10 672.67
Table 2: Numerical results in an unregulated market for three transparency levels
Table 2 compares the perfectly transparent case V C with two levels of opaqueness,V C # and V C #. Interestingly, both the promised and the actual default risk level clearlyincrease with level of opaqueness. Therefore, according to Equation (9), the premium
decreases with opaqueness level. Regarding insurance demand reaction, the premium
reduction overcompensates the higher (promised) default risk in the opaque market and,
therefore, more insurance contracts are sold. While this increases shareholder value, the
higher actual default risk level reduces consumer surplus. The resulting combinations of
consumer surplus and shareholder value are illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: CS and SHV for insurers optimal combination of default risk and price under no regulation for three
transparency levels
4 Effectiveness of Capital RegulationWe next analyze the situation in which the regulator restricts the insurers risk level by
means of risk-based capital requirements, but prices remain unregulated. This situation is
more or less the actual regulatory environment in the European Union ever since insurance
markets were deregulated in 1994.15
In our model, the regulator implements risk-based capital requirements by restricting the
insurers (actual) default ratio at a level AXc, forcing the insurer to hold a sufficient level ofcapital. The restriction is binding when the regulatory default ratio
AXc falls below the
shareholder-value-maximizing level AXYZ] . For the opaque market, we assume that theinsurer can still communicate a better default risk level than AXc.
Facing capital requirements, the insurer adjusts the premium so as to maximize
shareholder value (see Equation (9)):
15
According the Swiss Solvency Test, a confidence level of 99% for the calculation of the risk measure tail-VaRwas stipulated. Solvency II regulations are even more stringent and define a confidence level of 99.5% for the
calculation of the used risk measure VaR.
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]AXc C hjkghi AXc.
.C 5 E 4AXc^Arb. free value of
lmnopqr.qplsm
3 $ E 5 E 7AXc 8 5 E 4AXcB^Transfer of frictional cost of equity
3 !tProfitspounv
(14)
Equation (14) demonstrates that the optimal insurance premium is negatively related to
the regulatory default ratio AXc. First, a lower value of AXc means that the insurersdefault put option decreases and thus the first premium component increases. Second, the
insurer needs to hold additional equity capital to achieve a lower default ratio and the related
frictional costs are transferred to policyholders with the second premium component. Thus,
stricter capital requirements will lead to a higher premium. When deciding on the welfare-
optimal policy of capital requirements, the regulator needs to balance their positive influence
on the safety level against their negative influence on affordability. Formally, the consumer
surplus in dependence ofAXc and V is given by:
JAXYZAXc VB CAO|}OP E!w]AO|}OP B!AO|}OP wB
(15)
Taking the first-order derivative of JAXYZAXc VB with respect to AXYZAXc enables us todetermine how strict the capital requirements should be. We have
.A JV C
] 4 AAXYZV4 $ E!w!H 3 5
H!H E
#A
V C (16)
Analogous to Equation (10), we can rewrite Equation 16 as
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E 4 V
w!Aw E
!!x C y
xz!x E
{AO|}{A , (17)
and analogous to Equation (11) we arrive at
7AXc] C ~ H 4 V !HH 3
wH!Aw, (18)
Even though Equation (18) is not generally a closed-form representation of 7AXc] (since the
right-hand side depends on ), it can be interpreted by comparing it with Equation (11). IfV C , both equations coincide. In a perfectly transparent market, therefore, the insurer will,based on its own incentives, decide on the consumer-surplus-maximizing safety level.
Consequently, capital regulation is unnecessary in this case. However, if V [ , theconsumer-surplus-maximizing safety level is higher than the SHV-maximizing one, and the
regulator should impose binding capital requirements to enhance policyholders welfare.
Numerical Example and Graphical Representation
We now apply the numerical example from Section 3 to the situation with capital
requirements. Table 3 contains the consumer-surplus-maximizing regulatory default ratios,
the insurers optimal response, and the corresponding welfare levels. The first column of
Table 3 (V C ) illustrates, as discussed above, that the regulator cannot improve policyholderwelfare by capital regulation when the market is perfectly transparent: the consumer-surplus-
maximizing default ratio is equal to the insurers optimal strategy in the absence of regulation
(see Table 1). In the second (V C #) and third columns (V C #), the regulator restricts thedefault ratio below the shareholder-value-maximizing default ratio of 0.1606%. Since the
premium is only affected by the realized default ratio (see Equation (14)), the insurance
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premium is optimally adjusted for all three transparency levels. However, the insurer exploits
the opaqueness to promise higher safety levels and therefore insurance demand increases at
higher levels of opaqueness. Compared to our benchmark case with no regulation, optimal
capital requirements are stricter when there is opaqueness and, hence, such requirements can
increase consumer surplus by 0.25% for V C # and by 3.54% for V C #.
Opaqueness level A
C B
C #C
C #]
0.1606%
0.1606%
0.1602%
0.1121%
0.1589%
0.0635%
]]B 271.81 271.814 271.826 165.79 166.91 168.01 11 634.11 11 712.65 11 790.47\ 0.00% -0.19% -1.2% 11 052.41 11 052.15 11 051.40\ 0.00% +0.25% +3.54%
Table 3: Numerical results under capital regulation for three transparency levels
Figure 3 is a graphic illustration of how capital regulation impacts shareholder value and
consumer surplus. Starting at Point A, the straight line illustrates that a binding regulatory
ceiling on the default ratio decreases shareholder value as well as consumer surplus. For an
opaque market with V C #, the thick curve starting at Point B demonstrates that moderatecapital regulation can improve consumer surplus up to Point B, which refers to optimal
capital regulation (see Table 3). The dashed curve starting at Point C shows that capital
regulation in a heavily opaque market V C # has a bigger influence on shareholder andpolicyholder welfare and that the optimal regulatory policy (Point C) greatly enhances
consumer surplus.
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Figure 3: Combination of shareholder value and consumer surplus under capital regulation for three transparency
levels: fine line C , thick curve C # , dashed curve C #
5 Effectiveness of Price RegulationNext, we investigate the consequences of regulatory price ceilings imposed with the
intent of meeting the regulators affordability target. The price ceiling will be binding when it
lies below the insurers unregulated premium (see Equation (9)). When only prices are subject
to regulation, and there are no capital requirements, the insurer can react to the mandatory
prices by adjusting its safety level.
Therefore, any regulatory price induces a specific insurers optimal default ratio
AXYZ]
AXc
. The insurers maximization problem can be formalized as:
AXYZ] AXc C hjkghiA AXYZ V AXc, (19)
where AXc denotes the regulated premium. The optimality condition for the choice of adefault ratio level, that is, the first-order derivative of the shareholder value with respect to
default ratio when the price is externally determined implies:
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NTUAO|}OP C
AO|}wOPAO|}
AXc 54AXYZ H!H 57#AXc 3 5
...........................5 H!H
#
AO|}C
(20)
The first term is negative and measures demand effects for marginal changes in the default
ratio. The second term is positive and represents the value of the limited liability change. The
third term reflects marginal changes in the frictional costs of equity when the default ratio
varies. The level of opaqueness V has an influence on all three terms because it manipulatesthe demand itself (.
By using price regulation to improve insurance affordability, the regulator aims at
creating maximum consumer surplus. Equation (21) gives the regulators maximization
problem
AXc C hjkghiOP JAXc AXYZ] AXcB.
..........C hjkghiOP K AXYZ]LOP AXc d E A AXc(21)
To study the effect of price restrictions on consumer surplus and to determine the
optimal price ceiling we look at the first-order derivative of the consumer surplus with respect
to price,MN
OP. In the optimum, we obtain
]
AXc 4V4 VB
4V C (22)
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The left-hand side of the equation measures the negative effect to which policyholders
are exposed because of the lower safety level resulting from the lower prices. The right-hand
side represents policyholders additional gain through price decrease. Therefore, as soon as
the welfare gain of lower prices outweighs the loss due to the decreased safety level, the
change in consumer surplus is positive and the regulatory intervention leads to an
improvement in policyholder welfare. Maximum consumer surplus is attained when the
equation holds. Further price reduction results in higher losses due to worse default risk.
Numerical Example and Graphical Representation
Once again, we illustrate our analytical findings using the numerical example introduced
in Section 3. The regulator decides on the consumer-surplus-maximizing price ceiling, AXc].The insurer adjusts its realized default risk, AXYZ] AXc] under the objective shareholder-value-maximization. The resulting shareholder value and consumer surplus are set out in
Table 4. The effectiveness of price regulation is measured by the percentage change in
consumer surplus.
When the regulator introduces a price ceiling, we observe an improvement in consumer
surplus in all three cases. For V C , the regulator should optimally reduce the premium from271.81 in the benchmark case (see Table 2) to 222.35 (Table 4). The insurer subsequently
increases the default ratio from 0.16% to 1.18%, meaning that the DPO per contract increases
by 200*(1.18%-0.16%)=2.04. From the policyholder perspective, the premium reduction of
49.46 overcompensates for the DPO increase of 2.04, and therefore the consumer surplus
clearly increases by more than 80%.
In an opaque market (V C #), the insurer adjusts its default ratio to the price ceilingmore strongly, because policyholders have a weaker influence on the insurance safety level.
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The regulator should therefore restrict the premium relatively moderately by 269.99-
229.63=40.36. Nevertheless, the DPO increases even more strongly compared to the first case
by 200*(1.37%-0.26%)=2.22. From the policyholder perspective, price restriction still
dominates the unregulated situation, however the effectiveness of price regulation is lower in
opaque markets: for the highly opaque case V C #, the consumer surplus change is only18%.
Opaqueness level A
C B
C #C
C #
] 222.35 229.63 247.60] ]
1.1847%
1.1847%
1.3733%
0.9611%
1.7241%
0.6896%
301.61 279.12 221.73 6906.94 8655.42 11282.85\ -40.6% -26.24% -5.50% 20107.60 17529.27 12641.00\
+81.93% +59.01% +18.44%
Table 4: Numerical results under price regulation for three transparency levels
The resulting combinations of regulatory price and corresponding shareholder-value-
optimal default ratio lead to specific combinations of shareholder value and consumer surplus,
represented by the bent curves in Figure 4. Every curve represents a different transparency
level. The dashed curve is for when
V C #, the thick curve for when
V C #and the fine
curve represents a fully transparent market. Points A, B and C represent the consumer
surplus optimal positions.
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Figure 4: Combination of shareholder value and consumer surplus under price regulation for three transparency
levels: fine line C , thick curve C # , dashed curve C #
6 Comparison of capital and price regulationThe previous analysis has shown that capital and price regulation could be beneficial for
policyholders. In this section, we compare the effectiveness of the two regulatory tools and
explore what kind of regulation is most appropriate to improve consumer surplus under
different circumstances.
Impact of frictional costs
In the following subsection, we analyze the effectiveness of capital and price regulation
depending on the level of frictional costs. As before, we consider three levels of opaqueness
V C /0 #0 #1 and plot the maximum achievable percentage change of consumer surpluswhen the regulator chooses the consumer-surplus-maximizing AXYZAXc] and AXc] respectively.
Figure 5 illustrates the case of perfect transparency. The solid line depicts the potential
consumer surplus increase with price regulation and the dashed line the effectiveness of
capital regulation. In the transparent market, policyholders force the insurer to choose a
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default risk level that also maximizes consumer surplus. Therefore, irrespective of the level of
frictional costs, capital regulation cannot raise consumer surplus and the dashed curve
remains at 0%. Price regulation, in turn, can significantly enhance consumer surplus, but its
effectiveness decreases with the level of frictional costs. The reason for the decreasing
effectiveness of price regulation is that the insurer will respond with a more drastic reduction
of its safety level when equity capital is subject to high frictional costs.
Figure 5: Effectiveness of price and capital regulation in a perfectly transparent market when the carrying charge of
holding capital changes
In a slightly opaque market V C #, our analysis provides similar results (see Figure 6).Here, the consumer-surplus-maximizing default risk level differs only very slightly from the
shareholder-value-maximizing level, and therefore capital requirements have little influence
on the consumer surplus. Again, price regulation may increase consumer surplus and the
effectiveness of price regulation decreases with the level of frictional costs.
Effectivenessofregu
latory
instruments
Carrying charge of holding equity,
Opaqueness =0
Capital reg.
Price reg.
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Figure 6: Effectiveness of price and capital regulation with opaqueness level of 0.3 when the carrying charge of
holding capital changes
The case of the high level of opaqueness is illustrated in Figure 7. Here, capital
requirements can clearly raise consumer surplus, particularly when frictional costs are high.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of price regulation is lower and more affected by frictional
costs than in the previous scenarios. If the carrying charge is above 11%, capital regulation is
more effective than price regulation. Therefore, regulators should optimally focus on the
safety goal if insurance markets are rather opaque and frictional costs are extreme. Empirical
studies suggest that the opaqueness problem is severe in insurance markets therefore
providing support for this scenario.16
16
Morgan (2002) and Pottier and Sommer (2006) empirically estimate opaqueness for different industries. Usingthe rating disagreement as a proxy for opaqueness, the studies find that insurance and banking are most severely
affected by the opaqueness problem.
Effectiveness
ofregulatory
instrum
ents
Carrying charge of holding equity,
Opaqueness =0.3
Capital reg.
Price reg.
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Figure 7: Effectiveness of price and capital regulation with opaqueness level of 0.6 when the carrying charge of
holding capital changes
Impact of volatility of liabilities
Next, we examine the effectiveness of capital and price regulation for insurance
portfolios of varying volatility. Again, we look at the three levels of opaqueness, V W
/0#0#1. The results are plotted in Figures 8 to 10.
As before, capital regulation cannot improve policyholder welfare in a fully transparent
market (see Figure 8), which is the case regardless of the portfolio volatility. Price ceilings
strongly increase consumer surplus when the insurance risks are low, and they have a smaller
effect when the insurance portfolio is highly volatile. The reason behind this finding is that
the insurer needs to hold much more equity capital for the high-risk portfolio and the price
ceiling clearly reduces the incentive to hold a large amount of equity. Therefore, the insurer
with high insurance risks responds to a price ceiling with a severe reduction of its safety level,
leading to a smaller increase of the consumer surplus as compared to the low-risk insurer.
A
Effectivenessofregulatory
instrum
ents
Carrying charge of holding equity,
Opaqueness =0.6
Capital reg.
Price reg.
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Figure 8: Effectiveness of price and capital regulation in a transparent market when the volatility of liabilities changes
Figure 9 illustrates the regulatory effectiveness for different volatility levels in a slightly
opaque market, where we have similar results as for V C . Interestingly, capital regulationstill cannot enhance consumers welfare for all meaningful values of the riskiness of
insurance claims, since the insurers SHV-maximizing safety level is almost identical to the
consumer-surplus-maximizing one.
Figure 9: Effectiveness of price and capital regulation with opaqueness level of 0.3 when the volatility of liabilities
changes
A
B
B
Effectivenesso
fregulatory
instrum
ents
Volatility of liabilities, L
Opaqueness =0
CDEFD
F
A
B
B Effective
nessofregulatory
in
struments
Volatility of liabilities, L
Opaqueness =0.3
CDEFD
F
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Figure 10 depicts the considered effects for the highest opaqueness level, V C #. Now,the dashed line has a clearly positive slope, meaning that capital regulation is effective,
especially when insurers have a high-risk portfolio. The solid line has a clearly negative slope,
and the effectiveness of price ceilings thus decreases with the volatility of insurance risks.
When the volatility of the liabilities exceeds 35%, capital regulation becomes more effective
than price regulation.
Figure 10: Effectiveness of price and capital regulation with opaqueness level of 0.6 when the volatility of liabilities
changes
7 ConclusionThis article investigates how regulatory capital requirements and price ceilings influence
an insurers capital level and pricing decisions and what consequences arise for policyholders
welfare. To this end, we employ a model in which insurance demand is sensitive to default
risk and price, policyholders view of the insurers safety level may be opaque and the insurer
faces frictional costs of holding equity capital. The insurers objective is the shareholder
value, which we measure using the present value of shareholders future cash flows minus
their initial equity endowment. Policyholders welfare is measured using the consumer
A
A
A
B
Effectivenessofregulatory
instruments
Volatility of liabilities, L
Opaqueness =0.6
CDEFD
F
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surplus, i.e. the integral over the differences between their willingness-to-pay and the actual
insurance premium.
To evaluate the consequences of regulatory intervention, we consider the insurers
strategy in a world with no regulation as a benchmark case. Here, the insurer balances its
incentives for safety (resulting from insurance demand reaction) against the frictional costs of
holding equity capital. The insurer also exploits the policyholders opaqueness problem and
promises a higher safety level than that which it actually ensures. According to the safety
level decision, the insurer also determines the SHV-maximizing insurance premium.
By means of risk-based capital requirements, the regulator can force the insurer to attain
a higher safety level. The insurer will react to this type of regulation by adjusting its premium.
We show that capital requirements cannot enhance policyholders welfare when the insurance
market is transparent, since the insurer finds it optimal to attain the exact safety level that
maximizes consumer surplus. If the regulator requires a higher safety level, premiums become
too high such that policyholders are worse off. In contrast, capital requirements can improve
policyholders welfare in the more realistic case of there being an opaqueness problem.17
Our
numerical examples indicate that capital requirements are especially effective when the
market is highly opaque, when equity capital comes at significant frictional costs, and when
insurers face significant underwriting risks. In these cases, the regulator should concentrate on
the safety goal.
If the regulator imposes a binding price ceiling, the insurer has weaker incentives to
attract consumers with a high safety level, and it will reduce its equity position. Nevertheless,
we point out that price ceilings can be beneficial for policyholders, especially when insurance
buyers reaction drives default risk down and frictional costs of equity capital are rather low.
17 Cf. Morgan (2002) and Pottier and Sommer (2006).
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Altogether, our findings suggest that regulators should take both targets, safety and
affordability, into account under the overall objective of policyholder protection. While our
findings on price ceilings do not overrule typical concerns about anti-trust measures, they do
shed light on the insurance-specific interaction between price regulation and safety. Our
sensitivity analyses indicate in which situations insurance regulators should focus their efforts
on solvency regulation in particular, or monitor profit loadings on premiums and create the
basis for antitrust regulation.
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