Safety Service - Risk Evaluation - Example

� (In accordance with Regulations UNI EN ISO 14121-1 and EN 415-4:2006)

SAFETY SERVICE – RISK EVALUATION

Customer:

Date:

Referent (customer):

Machinery:

Recording technician (safety service):

Technical manager (safety service):

Safety Service manager:


Contents

1. Foreword ............................................................................................................................... 3

1.1 Definitions ..................................................................................................................... 3

1.2 Risk assessment criteria ................................................................................................ 5

1.3 Safety level assessment criteria .................................................................................... 5

1.4 Criteria for determining the performance level required (PLr) ..................................... 7

1.5 Criteria for determining the safety integration level (SIL) ........................................... 8

1.6 Criticality analysis ........................................................................................................ 10

2. Analysis of current criticalities ............................................................................................ 12

2.1 Palletizer ...................................................................................................................... 12

2.1.1 Passage of output PALLETS ......................................................................................... 14

2.1.2 Passage of output non-palletized loads ....................................................................... 18

2.1.3 Access to the pallet warehouse ................................................................................... 20

2.1.4 Access to the shelters from the front side ................................................................... 26

2.2 Safety signs ................................................................................................................. 31

2.3 Further remarks ........................................................................................................... 32


1. Foreword

This document includes a technical report containing criticalities present onboard the machine and the

consequent technical measures to be taken to remove them.

1.1 Definitions

Damage: Bodily injury or damage to health.

Danger: Potential source of damage. The word “danger” may be qualified in order to define its origin (e.g.

mechanical or electric danger) or the nature of potential damage (e.g. risk of electrocution, risk of cutting, fire

hazard).

Risk: Combination of the probability of occurrence of a damage and the severity thereof.

Residual risk: Risk that remains after taking protection measures.

Protection measure: measure intended to achieve risk reduction, implemented:

• By the design engineer by means of guards and additional protection measures;

• By the user, by means of the provision and use of additional protective equipment.

Criticalities: Danger not removed in the design stage and only detected afterwards, i.e. after the equipment has

been out into service/made available on the market.

Risk assessment: Comprehensive process including both risk analysis and weighting.

Category: Classification of the safety-related parts of a control system with regard to their resistance to failures

and their consequent behaviour under fault conditions, obtained through the structural arrangement of the parts

and/or reliability thereof.

Safety of control systems: Capacity of the safety-related parts of a control system to perform their safety

functions over a given time, according to their specified category.

SRP/CS (Safety-Related Part of the Control System): Safety-related parts of the control system, i.e. part of

a control system which responds to safety-related input signals generating safety-related output signals.


Note 1: the SRP/CS jointly start at the point where the safety-related input signals are generated (including, for

instance, the drive cam and the position switch roller) and end at the output of the power control elements

(including, for instance, the main meter contacts).

Note 2: if monitoring systems are used for diagnosis, these too are considered as SRP/CS.

PL (Performance Level): Reasonable levels used to specify the capacity of the safety-related parts of the

control system to perform a safety function under conditions foreseeable. The performance level (PL) expresses

the probability of hazardous failure for each hour of operation of the SPR/CS system.

Safety function: Function of a machine whose failure may cause immediate risk(s) increase.

SRCF (Safety-Related Control Function): Safety function intended to keep the safety condition of the

machine or to prevent immediate risk increase.

SIL (Safety Integrity Level): Safety integrity for each SRCF function.


1.2 Risk assessment criteria

In the following document is used a so-called “three-phase” iterative method as illustrated in Regulation UNI EN

ISO 12100-1, through which the manufacturer or its authorized representative:

- determines the limits of the machine, which include the intended use and the reasonably foreseeable misuse;

- detects the dangers hat may be generated by the machine and the hazardous situations arising therefrom;

- assesses the risks according to Regulation UNI EN ISO 14121-1, taking into account the severity of the

possible injury or damage to the health and the probability of its occurrence, according to the following ratio:

R = G x F x P x A

G (severity of the damage): 1 (slight and reversible), 2 (serious and reversible), 4 (fatal);

F (frequency of exposure): 1 (rare or infrequent), 2 (frequent or continuous);

P (probability of occurrence of the event): 1 (low), 2 (medium, 4 (high);

A (possibility to avoid the damage): 1 (yes), 2 (no);

- assesses the risks in order to determine whether a risk reduction is required in conformity with

the goal of this directive my means of different types of intervention.

Through the use of bars, the result achieved is highlighted by means of the risk assessment,

considering the risk acceptable (1, 2, 4) as zero risk:

Risk acceptable Risk controllable Risk NON-acceptable

1 …….. 2 …… 4 ………….. 8 …………………………….. 16 ……. 32 ……………….. 64

1.3 Safety level assessment criteria

The choice of the safety category for the design of the different safety-related parts of a control

system is performed using a simplified method based on Regulation UNI EN 14121.

The method consists in assessing the severity of the injury (indicated by S) and the frequency of

occurrence, using auxiliary parameters aimed at improving the assessment, such as:


- The frequency and time of exposure to the danger (F);

- The possibility to avoid the danger (P).

Experience has shown that these parameters can be combined as indicated in the figure below

(Regulation UNI EN 954) so as to provide a bottom-to-top risk scale. It should be noticed that this is

a quality process which only provides a risk assessment.

WARNING - the safety categories outlined in this document concern only the part to be

implemented, so if the safety category of the whole safety circuit is lower, this will also

invalidate that of the newly installed part. The determination of the safety category with

regard to the safety circuit as a whole – and consequently of the compatibility with those

indicated in this technical report – is to be provided by the customer.

In the same figure the preferred category/ies is/are indicated by a large, full circle.

Starting point for the risk assessment for the safety-related parts of the

control system (see 4.3, step 3)

S Severity of the injury S1 Slight injury (usually reversible) S2 Serious injury (usually irreversible), including death F Frequency and/or time of exposure to the risk F1 From seldom to quite often and/or short exposure time F2 From frequent to continuous and/or long exposure time P Possibility to prevent the hazard

P1 Possible under certain circumstances P2 Scarcely possible

Choosing the category Categories B, from 1 to 4 for the safety-related parts of control systems Preferential categories for the reference points (see 4.2) Possible categories which may require additional measures (see B.1)

Measures which may be oversized due to the risk in question

Category


A smaller, full circle is used to countermark the categories requiring the implementation of further

accident prevention measures, while a large, empty circle is used to indicate the categories providing

the highest guarantees (justified in case of high or not perfectly defined hazards).

1.4 Criteria for determining the performance level required (PLr)

The level of resistance to failures “PLr” that the SRP/CS system must guarantee can be deduced

either from the standard of type “C” concerning the machine under examination or – if the machine

has not yet been provided with a specific product standard – it is obtained using a simplified method

based on Regulation UNI EN 14121 and applying the tree diagram present in the figure below (…from

Regulation UNI EN ISO 13849-1):

S Severit y of the injury

S1 Slight (injury usually reversible)

S2 Serious (injury usually irreversible or fatal)

F Frequenc y and/or durat ion of the exposure to the risk

F1 From rare to not very often and/or short time of exposure

F2 From frequent to continuous and/or long time of exposure

P Possibilit y to prevent the risk or limit the damage

P1 Possibility under specific conditions

P2 Scarcely possible

The factors taken into consideration are:


- Severity of the injury (indicated by S) the person might suffer in the event of an accident

- Frequency and/or time of operator’s exposure to danger (F)

- Possibility to avoid the danger (P).

The purpose of Regulation UNI EN ISO 13849-1 is in any case to define a Performance Level (PL) of

the SRP/CS system in terms of hazardous failures, which during the planning stage shall be compared

with the performance level required (PLr) based on the extent of the risk (PL≥PLr), according to the

following table:

Performance

Level

(PL)

Fields of the probability of hazardous failures per hour

(PFHD)

(1/h)

From: Up to:

a ≥10-5 <10-4

b ≥3· 10-6 <10-5

c ≥10-6 <3· 10-6

d ≥10-7 <10-6

e ≥10-8 <10-7

Table: Performance Levels (PL) provided for by Regulation UNI EN ISO 13849-1

WARNING – Since Regulation EN 13849 is a standard of type B1, if the machine is covered

by a standard of type “C”, this latter is the one to be held valid; therefore, should this

latter still refer to the “old” category classification, this is the one to be considered.

1.5 Criteria for determining the safety integration level (SIL)


The safety integrity level (SIL) to be assigned to the safety control functions (SRCF) which shall

ensure the reduction of the risks on the machine resulting from any hazardous situations can be

deduced either from the standard of type “C” concerning the machine under examination or – if the

machine has not yet been provided with a specific product standard – it is obtained from the following

matrix: ±

To complete a process which in the first analysis leads to carry out the risk assessment for each source of

danger or hazardous event adopting a method based on Regulation UNI EN 14121 which uses the

following relation (…from Regulation CEI EN 62061):

R = Se x (Fr + Pr + Av) = Se x Cl

Se (severity of the damage):

Fr (frequency and duration of the exposure):

Irreversible: death, loss of an eye or arm Irreversible: fracture of one or more limbs, loss of one or more fingers Reversible: requires the intervention of a doctor

Consequences Consequences Consequences Consequences


Pr (probability of occurrence of the event):

Av (possibility to avoid the damage):

WARNING – Since Regulation EN 62061 is a standard of type B1, if the machine is covered

by a standard of type “C”, this latter is the one to be held valid; therefore, should this

latter still refer to the “old” category classification, this is the one to be considered

1.6 Criticality analysis

In the first section of the document are detected all the dangers present for the machine considered,

for which solution (shelters, safety equipment, etc.) intended to reduce the risks – until reaching an

acceptable residual risk – are found through a iterative analysis.

Frequency and duration of the exposure (Fr)Frequency and duration of the exposure (Fr)Frequency and duration of the exposure (Fr)Frequency and duration of the exposure (Fr)

Frequency of the exposureFrequency of the exposureFrequency of the exposureFrequency of the exposure Duration Duration Duration Duration

≤ 1 h From > 1 h to ≤ 1 day

From > 1 day ≤ to 2 weeks From > 2 weeks to ≤ 1 year

> 1 year

Probability of the hazardous event Probability of the hazardous event Probability of the hazardous event Probability of the hazardous event Very high Likely Possible Hardly likely Negligible

Probability to avoid of limit the damage (AProbability to avoid of limit the damage (AProbability to avoid of limit the damage (AProbability to avoid of limit the damage (Av)v)v)v) Impossible Hardly likely

Likely


In this phase are indicated – besides some solutions to be adopted – examples of specific safety

components to be used along with possible safety categories.


2. Analysis of current criticalities

Following the inspection carried out in your plant in order to execute a criticality analysis of the

machine present on site, for the palletizer classified by Regulation EN 415-4 as a “palletizer with load

stacking from above with top layer grouping”, it was possible to highlight the results described below.

2.1 Palletizer

For the “one-position” pelletizing machine, which is partly covered by the standard of type “C” UNI EN

415-4:2006 – Safety of packaging machines. Palletizers and depalletizers, operating both in the

automatic mode with automatic loading and unloading and in the semi-automatic mode with manual

unloading, and intended for handling and palletizing paperback and hardcover books, glued and sewn

book blocks, magazines, catalogues and phone books, shrink-wrapped or tied up piles of any product

and boxes.


Supplementary photographic d ocumenta tion :

We report the following conclusions:


2.1.1 Passage of output PALLETS

1. The operator’s access through the pallet output point is protected by means of multiple-beam

photoelectric barriers with inhibition function. These barriers – placed at a distance of 270 mm from the

danger zone – are intended to protect an access passage 1,140 mm wide, on top of which is installed a

muting lamp.

Supplementary photographic documentation :

Regulatory references:

� Presidential Decree № 459 of

24/07/1996 Annexe I,

� UNI EN 12100-1 and 2

Further references:

� Regulations UNI EN ISO 415-4, UNI EN

Dangers / risks detected:

Dangers of mechanic nature which can cause SHEARING,

CRUSHING of limbs and KNOCKING against a fixed

object.


999, UNI EN 954-1 and UNI EN 13849

G(2)xF(1)xP(2)xA(2)=R(8)


1 ……. 2 … 4 …………. 8 …………………………….. 16 …. 32 ……………….. 64

Residual risk assessment


Protection m easur es: Technical

The solution adopted to prevent free access of the operator during the operation of the machine has to

be reviewed first of all because the relevant standard provides that during the inhibition of the barriers –

in order to prevent the operator from entering the shelters – the maximum distance “A” between the

machine and the loaded pallet is 200 mm, against 245 mm distance – which in some cases may even

be greater – you may have currently;

Figure 1

Furthermore, the safety distance “B” between the optical barrier and the danger zone which is presently

approx. 270 mm should be raised at least to 1,200 mm if you want to go on using hybrid barriers

(currently in use on the machine), since according to Regulation EN 999 these are considered multiple-

beam barriers. If, on the contrary, barriers with 35 mm resolution are used, this distance “B” may be

reduced to approx. 600 mm (for a more precise distance, you will need to assess the response time of

the barrier used and the stopping time of the machine). In both cases, however, the muting function

and a barrier height of 1,600 mm shall be confirmed.

Figura 2 – Distanze con devices con minimo 2 fasci Figura 3 – Barriers risolution 30mm

Distance “A” = distance between the loaded pallet and the machine guard or barrier.

Distance “B” = distance between the machine danger zone and the barrier.

Palletized load


Category of the components to be implemented :

• Category 4 of the photoelectric barriers.

Products / solutions :

• Installation of photoelectric barriers with hand resolution

(35mm) [mod. TGR SB4-1650]

G(2)xF(1)xP(1)xA(1)=R(2)


1 ……. 2 … 4 …………. 8 …………………………….. 16 …. 32 ……………….. 64



2.1.2 Passage of output non-palletized loads 1. The area which allows the exit of piles in “functional” emergency conditions (e.g. if the books are not stacked properly) is

equipped with guards but does not allow the operator to access the moving parts of the machine.


Regulatory references :

� Presidential Decree № 459 of 24/07/1996

Annexe I,

� Regulations UNI EN ISO 12100-2, UNI EN 999,

UNI EN 954, EN 953 and UNI EN 12622

Dangers / risks detected: Danger of MECHANICAL nature which may cause CRUSHING,

SHEARING, CUTTING of the upper limbs

G(2)xF(1)xP(2)xA(2)=R(8)


1 ……. 2 … 4 …………. 8 …………………………….. 16 …. 32 ……………….. 64


FREE AREA


Protection measures: technical

The opening which allows the exit of books measures approx. 630 mm (in width) x 475 mm (in height), so it is below the

maximum size allowed by Regulation UNI EN 619:2004. However, it is necessary to check that the distance from the danger

zone is placed at a distance of at least 1,000 mm as required by Regulation UNI EN 13857.


• None


• Possible extension of the existing guard to reach a safety

distance of at least 1,000 mm

G(2)xF(1)xP(1)xA(1)=R(2)


1 ……. 2 …… 4 ………….. 8 …………………………….. 16 ……. 32 ……………….. 64



2.1.3 Access to the pallet warehouse 1. The lateral zone of the machine which allows the operator to lean into the pallet warehouse is enclosed within mobile

guards interlocked with safety microswitches. The locking of the guards (signalled by the red warning light) is only activated

during some phases of the cycle, e.g. during the handling of the pallets (software management).




Annexe I,


EN 13849-1, EN 953 and EN 13857

Dangers / risks detected: Danger of mechanical nature which may cause CRUSHING,

SHEARING e ENTRAPMENT of the lower limbs and upper

G(2)xF(1)xP(2)xA(2)=R(8)


1 ……. 2 … 4 …………. 8 …………………………….. 16 …. 32 ……………….. 64


M



a) The mobile guard has a slit-shaped opening “M” of size greater than 10 mm used by the operator to open

and whose dimensions allow accessing the danger zone with one’s hand. Since it is impossible to place the

shelter at a distance included between 120 and 850 mm, are required by Regulation UNI EN 13857, from

the danger zone, this opening must be limited to 6 mm, i.e. you must close the opening using a retractable

handle of commercial type.

b) The analysis of the risk and of the safety category leads to obtain, for this safety function, a PLr = b. It is therefore

necessary to use a circuit-based solution like the one currently adopted and further below proposed with indication in the

technical file of the frequency of checks on the proper functioning of the safety function:

You should therefore use a safety device such as the existing safety microswitch as well as a safety module (currently missing

but replaced with a functional PLC), besides the monitoring represented – in the case in point – by the automation PLC.

Currently, therefore, the existing control circuit can be schematized as follows:

dove:

Single Channel with Monitoring

Cat. 2


I = Input, i.e. safety microswitch with high MTTFd and DC

PLC = Logics and monitoring, i.e. automation PLC with low and zero MTTFd and DC, respectively

KM = output, i.e. functional switch or solenoid valve which inhibits the operation of the engines or pneumatic actuators “M” with

low MTTFd

From Annexe K to Regulation EN 13849-1 it can be deduced that it is possible to perform the safety function “opening of

guards to access to the inside of the machine” with PL ≥ b if the overall MTTFd of the function is ≥ 7.5 years .

To achieve the same result, you can use a safety circuit of category 3, like the one described below:

Which ses, for instance, components with double contact and monitoring performed by a safety module, with no indication in

the technical file on frequency of checks for the proper functioning of the safety function.

From Annexe K of Regulation EN 13849-1 it can be deduced that it is possible to perform the function safety “opening of

guards to access to the inside of the machine” with PL ≥ b if the overall MTTFd of the function is ≥ 3.9 years .

Double Channel

Cat. 3



• Safety category 2 for the interlocking devices,

i.e. MTTFd of the safety function greater than

or equal to 7.5 years.

• Safety category 4 for the interlocking devices,

i.e. MTTFd of the safety function greater than

or equal to 3.9 years.


• Leaving the safety circuit unchanged, in category 2, you must

check the MTTFd of the safety function; if this later does not

meet the value found, it is necessary to modify the operational

logic by inserting a safety PLC or a safety module with high

DC (diagnostic covering).

• Installation of encoded safety magnetic switches not in

contact to detect movements of the axes when the guard is

opened in case you want to use a safety circuit belonging to

category 3 [mod. F3S-TGRNSMC-20-05]

G(2)xF(1)xP(1)xA(1)=R(2)


1 ……. 2 …… 4 ………….. 8 …………………………….. 16 ……. 32 ……………….. 64



2. In the work cycle phases where the locking of the guards of the pallet warehouse is inhibited, the operator can access the

operating area through an opening on the right side.




Annexe I,

� Regulations UNI EN ISO 12100-2, EN 953 and

EN 13857

Dangers / risks detected: Danger of mechanical nature which may cause CRUSHING and

SHEARING of the upper limbs.

G(2)xF(1)xP(2)xA(2)=R(8)


1 ……. 2 … 4 …………. 8 …………………………….. 16 …. 32 ……………….. 64


C

D



To prevent an operator from accessing the moving parts of the machine it is advisable to prohibit the access to mobile parts by

means of a special fixed guard of metal material or clear lexan.

It is possible either to completely repair the area “C” or just to limit the area “D”; the above-mentioned areas are shown in the

figures above.

Category of the components to be imple mented :

• None


• Insertion of a (transparent) lexan guard suited to close the

existing opening. The shelter shall be fastened by means of

screws with special profile removable only using specific

equipment.

G(2)xF(1)xP(1)xA(1)=R(2)


1 ……. 2 …… 4 ………….. 8 …………………………….. 16 ……. 32 ……………….. 64



2.1.4 Access to the shelters from the front side 1. The front side is provided with three doors with as many safety microswitches which, on opening the guard, send a signal

to the PLC. If the doors are opened during the handling (lifting and translation of the axes) of the pile, there will be a drop in

the power – with a delay of 0.5 seconds – thanks to the intervention of a magnetic switch; the doors can also be opened

with the axes in the resting position, with no power interruption. The position is in any case signalled by a micro magnetic

switch.




Annexe I,


EN 13849-1, EN 953 and EN 13857

Dangers / risks detected: Danger of mechanical nature which may cause CRUSHING,

SHEARING of the lower limbs and upper.


G(2)xF(1)xP(2)xA(2)=R(8)


1 ……. 2 … 4 …………. 8 …………………………….. 16 …. 32 ……………….. 64


The analysis of the risk and of the safety category leads to obtain, for this safety function, at least a PLr = c. In order not to use

very high-performance devices and provide any indication in the technical file on the frequency of checks of the proper

functioning of the safety function, we recommend adopting a circuit solution circuit like the one proposed below:

Which means the use of two single-contact safety components or by means of a single double-contact component, besides a

(logic) safety module and double-contact (output) contactors.

The components described above can then be connected in series with those situated on the other axes.


• Safety category 4 for the interlocking devices.


• Installation of encoded safety magnetic switches not in

contact to detect movements of the axes when the guard is

opened [mod. F3S-TGRNSMC-20-05]


Double Channel

Cat. 3


G(2)xF(1)xP(1)xA(1)=R(2)


1 ……. 2 …… 4 ………….. 8 …………………………….. 16 ……. 32 ……………….. 64



2. The front area is provided with three doors with as many safety microswitches which, on opening the guard, send a signal

to the PLC. If these doors are opened during the handling (lifting and translation of the axes) of the pile, there will be a drop

in the power – with a delay of 0.5 seconds – thanks to the intervention of a magnetic switch; the doors can also be opened

with the axes in the resting position, with no power interruption. The position is in any case signalled by a micro magnetic

switch; with the doors opened and the axes in position, the back area where the layers of books are formed and stored

upon the pallet, remains operational.




Annexe I,

� Regulations UNI EN ISO 12100-2, EN 953 and

EN 13857

Dangers / risks detected: Danger of mechanical nature which may cause CRUSHING and

SHEARING of the upper limbs.

E

D


G(2)xF(1)xP(2)xA(2)=R(8)


1 ……. 2 … 4 …………. 8 …………………………….. 16 …. 32 ……………….. 64


To prevent an operator from accessing the moving parts on the back side of the machine, it is advisable to prohibit the access

through the opening “E” means of a special fixed guard of metal material or clear lexan.

Opening “D” has already been treated under par. “4”


• None


• Insertion of a (transparent) lexan guard suited to close the

existing opening. The shelter shall be fastened by means of

screws with special profile removable only using specific

equipment.

G(2)xF(1)xP(1)xA(1)=R(2)


1 ……. 2 …… 4 ………….. 8 …………………………….. 16 ……. 32 ……………….. 64




2.2 Safety signs

It is necessary to install appropriate signs as well to provide information essential to ensure the

workers’ safety to be placed near the control station (operator’s panel) and intervention area (pallet

input and output zone), such as:

Here is an example of plates to be placed near the keyboard:

On the electrical cabinet or near electrical equipment, where there must be the following signs:

MAKE SURE THE PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT AND GUARDS ARE

SUFFICIENT

IT IS COMPULSORY TO READ THE MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

FOR USE BEFORE OPERATING THE MACHINE

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO USE THE MACHINE

BY UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS

DO NOT REMOVE THE SAFETY DEVICES AND GUARDS

IT IS COMPULSORY IN CASE OF MAINTENANCE TO ISOLATE AND PLACE PADLOCKS TO ALL ENERGY

SOURCES

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO ACT ON

EQUIPMENT OR POWER LINES BY UNAUTHORIZED PERSONNEL

DO NOT USE WATER HERE TO

EXTINGUISH FIRES

WARNING! IT IS FORBIDDEN TO CARRY OUT WORKS ON LIVE

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT • .ANY EXCEPTIONS MUST BE AUTHORIZED BY THE HEAD OF MAINTENANCE

RESPONSIBLE • UNDER PARTICULARLY HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS, THERE MUST BE ANOTHER

PERSON BESIDE THE ONE WHO CARRIES OUT THE WORK

START WORKING ONLY AFTER THE SECURITY MEASURES HAVE

BEEN IMPLEMENTED


2.3 Further remarks

1. During the assessment of the criticalities the operating and maintenance manual produced by you

was reviewed, finding out that information is a little insufficient, as specified under paragraph

1.7.4 of Annexe I to Directive 98/37/CE on machinery matters and Regulation EN 415-4, and

further specified below:

…each machine must be accompanied by instructions for use providing at least the following

information:

- Intended conditions of use (intended and non-intended use)

- Mode of transport of the machine

- Mode of installation

- Indications on the noise produces by the machine

- Indications on marking

- Indication of possible residual risks

- Indication of the workstation(s) which can be occupied by the operators

2. During the inspection, 3 different labels for the EC conformity marking were identified, of which


one on the machine itself and another two on the rollers. This implies for the purposes of the Machinery Directive,

respectively, a CE conformity marking, with technical file and manual, for the machine we define as a Palletizer or

Palletizing machine and two statements of incorporation for the rollers, along with technical documents, i.e. assembly

instructions and list of the RES applied.

In order to avoid all this, it is advisable to certify the machine and the rollers together, as though they formed one machine,

therefore providing a single EC label.

The Recording Technician : The Technical Manager : Safety Service Manager : ______________________________

______________________________

______________________________

Safety Service - Risk Evaluation - Example

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