Technical Meeting on Safety Culture during Pre-Operational Phases – Practical Methods to Increase Safety Cape Town, South Africa, 26-30 November 2012

SAFETY CULTURE WITHIN THE NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

Ovidijus Šeštokas, State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) Republic of Lithuania

2012

Content of the presentation

Introduction. Understanding of safety culture

Regulation and supervision of safety culture (Lithuanian experience)

Safety culture within the regulatory authority

The role of the international cooperation for the improvement of safety culture

Conclusions

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Nuclear Facilities in Lithuania

Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant • Unit 1 (RBMK-1500), operation during 1983-2004 • Unit 2 (RBMK-1500), operation during 1987-2009

Nuclear facilities on the site of Ignalina NPP

• Interim spent fuel storage facility • Radioactive waste storage facility • Liquid radioactive waste storage facilities • Construction of new interim spent fuel storage facility • Construction of solid radioactive waste management facility • Construction of SLVLLW radioactive waste storage facility • Preparatory activities for construction of other different type

radioactive waste management facilities (disposal, storage facilities and also repositories)

Maišiagala radioactive waste storage facility Preparatory activities for construction of the new ABWR type (Hitachi-GE design) nuclear power plant (Results of referendum in September 2012 – NO for construction of the new Visaginas NPP) 3

Understanding of safety culture

Personal definition of safety culture - Collection of the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, values and behavioral elements of employees and the whole organization that leads to and accumulates appropriate attention and concern to the safety related issues within the organization.

Safety culture (IAEA Safety Glossary, 2007) - The assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, protection and safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.

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Regulation and supervision of safety culture

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Regulation and supervision of safety culture

Safety culture, as an understanding, is based on the

psychosociological features of the employees. This type of features cannot be strictly documented and

measured. Can it be regulated?

Attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and values can not be regulated directly. However, the appropriately selected relevant factors, which influence safety culture, can be regulated.

Indirect measurements can be performed through the questionnairing, the use of relevant data, including statistical data. 6

Which organization or organizations are responsible

for fulfilment of this requirement during pre-

operational stages

what shall the organization do in order “to ensure the high level

of safety culture”?

What does it means the high level of safety culture?

Different approaches for regulation of safety culture

“The high level of safety culture shall be ensured throughout the whole lifecycle of the nuclear power plant”

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Different approaches for regulation of safety culture

Based on the national legislation, cultural aspects and existing experience in a specific country, safety culture can be regulated in different ways, however: General requirements should be presented in the top level legislation. More detailed requirements should be presented in the mandatory

regulatory documents. Much more detailed aspects related to safety culture can be regulated

through the non-mandatory guidance type documents. The IAEA standards can be used as reference requirements or guidance.

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VATESI practice during 2002-2005

Motivation related problems of the Ignalina NPP personnel has appeared due to the commitment of Lithuania to shut down Ignalina NPP (Unit 1 in 2004 and Unit 2 in 2009). It was a political decision and a precondition for accession of Lithuania to EU. This decission has affected about 5000 of Ignalina NPP employees with clear message that majority of these people in the nearest future will lose their jobs.

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Transitional phase from operation to decommissioning

VATESI practice during 2002-2005

VATESI has initiated a separate project to cope with this problem. In the frame of this project: specific safety culture related issues were identified; special inspection was conducted at Ignalina NPP; seminar was organised for both VATESI and Ignalina NPP

specialists; a separate brochure was issued (“Safety culture and organisational

issues specific to the transitional phase from operation to decommissioning of the

Ignalina nuclear power plant”); Guide for management of safety culture issues specific to

the pre-decommissioning phase of the Ignalina nuclear power plant (INPP) was prepared. 10

Transitional phase from operation to decommissioning

Issues related to maintaining a high level of Safety Culture during the pre-decommissioning phase of Ignalina NPP:

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Guide for management of safety culture issues specific to the pre-decommissioning phase of the INPP

The Guide provided description of the safety culture related issues and examples of proper efforts to deal with these issues. The following tools (with examples of good practice), applicable for assessment of the safety culture related issues, were described : - Audit; - Employee surveys, interviews; - Employee surveys, questionnaires; - Incident reporting and evaluation; - Safety performance indicators; - Involvement of employees in - Personnel statistics; safety planning; - External peer reviews; - Periodic reporting.

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VATESI practice from 2010

Safety culture related regulatory requirements are concentrated in VATESI regulations BSR-1.4.1-2010 “Requirements for Management System”. It provides a number of mandatory requirements, for example: The management system shall enhance safety culture of

the organization. In this regard the organization shall: ensure proper understanding of safety culture issues;(…)

Management shall evaluate safety culture based on the employee surveys, monitoring, self-assessment results and effectiveness of the management system.

Safety culture monitoring criteria and evaluation methodology shall be prepared.

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Safety culture within the regulatory authority

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Safety culture within the regulatory authority (1/2)

Regulation and control of the safety culture related issues cannot be separated from the safety culture of the regulatory authority itself. Regulatory and control practice should be based on the proper application of the safety culture understanding in order to ensure that the regulatory authority: 1. is capable to regulate and control the safety culture within the nuclear facility; 2. does not affect safety culture of the licensee negatively because of the unclear regulations or unnecessary bureaucratic burden, created by the incompetent regulatory authority.

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Safety culture within the regulatory authority (2/2)

The following issues in this respect can be highlighted: 1) Competency of the regulatory staff. 2) Properly developed internal management system of the regulatory authority. 3) Clear, consistent regulatory documents. 4) Properly oriented regulatory control.

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The role of the international cooperation for the improvement

of safety culture

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Improvement of regulatory practice

The nuclear safety regulatory authority, within the national context, does not have an additional, higher level regulator, which could supervise and control the conduct of the nuclear safety regulatory and control activities. In this context the international cooperation plays an important role.

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Possibilities based on the international cooperation

1. IAEA safety standards 2. IAEA review missions 3. Training possibilities and forum for exchange of existing experience 4. EU support and enhancement of the nuclear safety regulatory institutions 5. Other bilateral and multilateral cooperation possibilities

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Why ? There are two main elements which force the regulatory authority to create necessary regulatory system and conduct proper nuclear safety, including the safety culture, regulatory and control activities: 1) The Internal Aim - implementation of the state national interest to ensure nuclear safety and to use international assistance in this area; and 2) The External Pressure - responsibility of the state to fulfil its international obligations.

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Conclusions

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Conclusions The following milestones provide basis for proper safety culture regulatory environment: Safety culture of the regulatory authority itself; Proper identification, regulation and supervision

of the licensee’s safety culture related issues; Enhancement of the safety culture regulatory

and control activities through the possibilities provided by and duties derived from the international cooperation.

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Thank you for your attention !

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