S v Malumo and 24 Others Supreme Court Judgment 2

8/8/2019 S v Malumo and 24 Others Supreme Court Judgment 2

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period of fourteen days of the passing of any sentence as a result of such conviction or within

such extended period as may on application (in this section referred to as an application for

condonation) on good cause be allowed, apply to the judge at the trial or, if that judge is not

available, to any other judge of that court for leave to appeal against his or her conviction or

against any sentence or order following thereon (in this section referred to as an applicationfor leave to appeal), and an accused convicted of any offence before such court on a plea of

guilty may, within the same period, apply for leave to appeal against any sentence or any order

following thereon.

The relevant part of sec 316A reads as follows:

316A. Appeal from High Court by Prosecutor-General or other prosecutor.

(1) The Prosecutor-General or, if a body or person other than the Prosecutor-General or his or

her representative, was the prosecutor in the proceedings, then such other prosecutor, mayappeal against any decision given in favour of an accused in a criminal case in the High Court,

including

(a) any resultant sentence imposed or order made by such court;

(b) any such order made under section 85(2) by such court, to the Supreme Court.

(2) The provisions of section 316 in respect of an application or appeal by an accused referred

to in that section, shall apply mutatis mutandis with reference to an appeal in terms of

subsection (1)

[22] It was common cause between the parties that the ruling of a Court on the

admissibility of evidence was interlocutory. There can be no doubt that that is so.

(See, inter alia, S v Melozani, 1952 (3) SA 639 (AD) at 644D-G; R v Musekiwa and

Others, 1965 (3) SA 529(SR) at 530H -531A and Priday t/a Pride Paving v Rubin

1992 (3) SA 542 (C) at 544H-545B, 547H-I.) From this it follows that the answer to

question (b) of the letter dated 10 May 2010 is that the issue before the Courtconcerning the confessions and admission statements by the respondents is

interlocutory and not of final effect.

[23] With reference to cases such as Van Streepen & Germs (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal

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Provincial Administrator, 1987 (4) SA 569 (AD), Marsey v Dilley, 1992 (3) SA 944 (AD)

and Moch v Nedtravel (Pty) Ltd. t/a American Express Travel Service, 1996 (3) SA 1

(AD), Mr. Gauntlett submitted that the important distinction which formerly existed

between simple interlocutory orders, and orders with a final effect, was now of lesser

importance in the context of appeals from the High Court and that, under the

currently operative statutory provisions, an increasingly flexible approach to a right of

appeal has been adopted. Counsel submitted therefore that the classification of the

trial Courts rulings as interlocutory was of limited assistance when determining

whether or not to grant the petition.

[24] I must however point out that, as was stated in the Van Streepen -case, supra,

at p. 584A-D, that the distinction between simple interlocutory orders and orders

having a final and definitive effect was of less importance, was brought about by

amendments to the relevant sections of Act 59 of 1959 by the Appeals Amendment

Act 105 of 1982, which now requires that in all appeals in civil proceedings from

Provincial Divisions or Local Divisions to the Appeal Court, leave to appeal is

necessary. The amendment brought about by Act 105 of 1982 is not part of our law

and in terms of the provisions of Act 16 of 1990 the distinction between simple

interlocutory orders and orders with a final and definitive effect remains important, not

only to determine which orders are appealable, but also in which instances leave to

appeal is necessary or not necessary.

[25] However, I agree with counsel that the answer to the question, as posed inpara. (c) of the question set out by counsel, will determine whether the rulings of the

Court a quo are appealable in terms of sec. 316A of the Act prior to the conclusion of

the trial proceedings, and if so, under what circumstances. In this regard the fact that

the statements are interlocutory may be relevant to their admissibility.

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[25] Mr. Gauntlett referred to the wording of sub-sec (1) of sec. 316A and submitted

that the section allows the Prosecutor-General to appeal against any decision given

in favour of an accused person. Counsel submitted that the words used were of the

widest import and included any decision in favour of an accused person. If I

understood counsel correctly the meaning of the word decision in the sub-section

should be construed to include judicial pronouncements in criminal proceedings that

is not appealable on the Zweni test but one which the interests of justice require

should nevertheless be subject to an appeal before termination of such proceedings.

(See S v Western Areas Ltd., 2005 (5) SA 214 (SCA) at pa. 28) The Court in this

instance held that it was in accordance with the South African Constitution to

construe decision as used in sec. 21(1) of Act 59 of 1959 of South Africa, as set out

above. Counsel commended this interpretation and submitted that, seen against the

legislative background and statutory interpretation by the Courts it had to be

presumed to have been the intention of the legislature to return to a position where

interlocutory appeals were allowed in criminal proceedings at the instance of the

Prosecutor-General, subject only to leave to appeal being granted in certain

instances. That then was the true meaning of the words any decision where it

appeared in sec. 316A (1) of the Act. The requirements to be appealable in terms of

sec 316A(1) are therefore threefold, namely (1) a decision of any nature (whether

final, dispositive and definitive or otherwise); (2) given in favour of an accused; and (3)

given by a High Court.

[26] Mr. Botes referred the Court to sec. 14(1) of the Supreme Court Act, Act 15 of

1990, and submitted that only a judgment or order was appealable and that would

exclude interlocutory orders which did not have a final and definitive effect. Counsel

pointed out that a ruling by a Court concerning the admissibility of evidence was

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purely interlocutory and could be altered by the Court during the trial. Counsel further

pointed out that during a lengthy trial a host of rulings and decisions were made by

the Judge. On the interpretation of the petitioner it has an unfettered right to appeal

any decision at any time. This not only puts the State in a much more favourable

position than the accused, who must patiently wait until there was a conviction and

sentence, but can also lead to an abuse of the process of the Court. Such

interpretation would also mean that the words any decision would carry a more

extended meaning than the requirement laid down by sec. 14(1) which only allows

appeals against a judgment or order. Counsel referred the Court to the Full Bench

decision of the High Court in S v Strowitzki, 1995 (2) SA 535 (Nm) (1994 NR 265 (HC)) where the Court, at p 271, stated that sec. 316A did not place the Prosecutor-

General in a more advantageous position than an accused person. This is so

because of the application of the provisions of sec. 316 mutatis mutandis to that of

sec. 316A. Counsel further referred to the rule against piece-meal appeals and

submitted that the interpretation of the petitioner will not lead to a more speedy and

cost effective completion of a trial.

[27] Mr. Kachaka, on behalf of the 21 st and 22 nd respondents, stressed the fact that

the proceedings in the Court a quo, concerning the admissibility of the statements of

the respondents, were incomplete and interlocutory and should therefore not be

entertained on appeal unless there were special circumstances, which were not

present in this instance. Counsel also submitted that the interpretation put on sec

316A by the petitioner would only cause further delays and costs.

[28] Because of the conclusion to which I have come I do not find it necessary, at

this stage, to decide the meaning of the words any decision in sec. 316A of the Act.

The contention that sec 316A (1) creates for the Prosecutor-General an unlimited right

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of appeal where a decision is given by the High Court in favour of an accused is, on

the argument by Mr. Gauntlett, not subject to the application of the provisions of sec.

316 where that provision would put any constraint on the wide meaning of the words.

Consequently Counsel argued that the provision, that an accused person could only

appeal after sentence was pronounced by the Court, should not be read into the

section by application of the words mutatis mutandis.

[29] Counsel submitted that because the words any decision appear in the section

without any limitation the Legislator did not intend that the wide meaning of the words

should be narrowed down. This must further be seen against the role played by theprosecutor in a criminal trial and the interest of the Prosecutor-General in criminal

prosecutions in general. Counsel submitted that sec. 316A(3), which provided for a

cost order against the State in appropriate circumstances, would put a curb on any

notion to abuse the process of the Court. Counsel further found support for this

interpretation in the case of S v Delie (1) 2001 NR 178 (HC).

[30] I do not agree with Counsel that the words any decision stand to be read

without any qualification. In my opinion the Legislator has clearly laid down the

procedure in terms of which also the Prosecutor-General must act in bringing an

appeal before this Court. This was done by applying the provisions of sec 316 mutatis

mutandis, that is with the necessary changes, (in points of detail) to the provisions of

sec 316A. (See Touriel v Minister of Internal Affairs, Southern Rhodesia, 1946 AD

535). So applied, the words convicted or conviction or sentence, where theyappear in sec. 316 (1), must be changed as far as sec 316A(1) is concerned, to reflect

the position of the State vis--vis appeals. The States interest in appeals will arise

when there is an acquittal of an accused and for purposes of sec. 316A(1) the above

words are to be replaced by the word acquittal. This means that the States right of

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appeal against any decision given in favour of an accused must be launched within

fourteen days after the acquittal of an accused. In my opinion this change is not in

conflict with any of the provisions of sec.316A. Nor is there anything repugnant or

arbitrary in such change and the change brought about by the words mutatis mutandis

find effectual application in the provisions of sec 316A.

[31] I am, for the following reasons, also satisfied that it is necessary to bring about

this change. It must firstly be accepted that the Legislator was aware of the principle

against piece-meal appeals and wanted to give effect thereto. If that was not the

intention one would have expected the Legislator to say so in clear language and notto leave it to some extended interpretation of the words any decision. This principle

is of longstanding and is a salutary one and was expressed by Innes, CJ, more than a

hundred years ago in the matter of Smith v James, 1907 TS 447 as follows on p. 448:

It appears to me that the magistrates decision is not a final order from which an appeal will

lie to this court. It only disposed of the first exception, and the magistrate ought to have gone

on and decided the matter on the merits. Otherwise, there might be two or three appeals from

a magistrates decision in the same matter. The defendant might file several special pleas

and might appeal seriatim from the decision of each of them leaving the merits still open. But

such decisions are really not final orders. A final order is one settling the dispute between the

parties.

[32] Mr. Gauntlett is confident that allowing an appeal before the proceedings are

terminated will not cause undue delay and will be cost effective. This argument is at

best speculative. If the State must apply for leave to appeal within fourteen days after

a decision was given in favour of an accused it will, especially in long protracted

cases, inevitably lead to delays, as has happened in the present case, to allow the

State to bring its application, and, if unsuccessful, to petition the Chief Justice.

Furthermore, where the State is of the opinion that a matter will detrimentally affect its

case it may ask for a postponement of the case until a decision is obtained from this

Court.

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[33] A second reason why the words mutatis mutandis must apply to the provisions

of sec 316A in the way as set out above, is because to allow an appeal in

unterminated proceedings might have been unnecessary and in the end only of

academic interest. This is so where the accused is in any event convicted

notwithstanding any decision in his or her favour by the Court and against which an

appeal is pending or was decided in favour of an accused. It is trite law that a Court

of law will not involve itself in issues which are moot or only of academic interest.

(See, inter alia, Attorney-General, Transvaal v Flats Milling Co (Pty) Ltd, 1958 (3) SA

360(AD) p.370B-374 and Attorney-General, Transvaal v Raphaely, 1958 (1) SA 309

(AD). It seems to me that the only occasion on which the State will be able to appeal

where it has secured a conviction is when the accused has been acquitted on a main

charge but convicted of a lesser charge. (See S v Zoko, 1983 (1) SA 871(NPD)).

However, I need not decide this issue in this matter.

[34] The third reason concerns the issue that there is not a final order by the Courta quo and that the rulings by the Court in connection with the admissibility of the

confessions and admissions by the respondents are alterable by the Court itself. Any

cogent evidence now placed before the Court a quo may have a result different from

that when the learned Judge decided to exclude the evidence in the statements.

With the majority of the respondents not having testified before the Court, this is not

merely a vague possibility but is a very real one. The question then arises, if this

Court should decide to hear the appeals, whether any decision that this Court may

come to, in regard to the admissibility of the statements on appeal, is or is not final,

and may be altered by the Court a quo as evidence emerges which causes the

learned Judge to change his mind. The answer to such a problem may not be so

clear cut and may give rise to issues concerning jurisdiction and competency of the

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various Courts. I agree with Mr. Botes that in view of the provisions of sec. 14 of Act

15 of 1990 no appeal lies against rulings which are alterable by the Court a quo itself.

In my opinion this was also not sanctioned by the provisions of sec. 316A.

[35] However, the general rule that an accused may not launch an appeal before

sentence, as set out in sec. 316(1), is not immutable. In S v Majola, 1982 (1) SA 125

(AD) at 132F, G and 133A the following is stated, namely:

That provision reflects, of course, the general rule that a convicted accused cannot

appeal against his conviction until he has also been sentenced. That rule is enforced

to avoid piecemeal appeals and to induce expeditious finality in criminal litigation.

Page 132G:

But, that notwithstanding, it will be immediately observed that the provision merelyregulates the time limits within the application for leave to appeal is to be made. It

does not expressly and absolutely prohibit the convicted accused from applying for

leave to appeal, or the trial Court from granting it, before he is sentenced.

Page 133A:

Of course, the general rule that no appeal should lie to this Court, whether by meansof a special entry, reserved law question or in the ordinary way unless the accused

is first sentenced, should only be departed from in exceptional circumstances for the

reasons already given.

(See further Wahlhaus and Others v Judicial Magistrate Johannesburg and Another,

1959 (3) SA 113 (AD) and S v. Harman, 1978 (3) SA 767 (AD)).

[36] A reading of the cases shows that in exceptional circumstances leave to

appeal can be given before sentence is passed on an accused. If that is true of sec

316(1) then I can see no reason why that should not also be true of section 316A(1).

After all sec. 316A(1) is a reflection of 316(1) and what 316(1), in relation to an

appeal, is for an accused person, sec. 316A(1) is such for the State, in matters where

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the State wishes to appeal.

[37] The question is then whether there are exceptional circumstances present in

this matter which will enable this Court to grant leave to appeal at this stage of the

proceedings. I agree that this is not the ordinary run of the mill case which more

frequently takes up the time of Judges. Its sheer magnitude in the number of accused

persons, the number of witnesses and charges, puts it on a different level from cases

normally prosecuted. I do, however, not think that that factor is sufficient to warrant a

departure by this Court from the general rule set out herein before. The complaint by

the State is basically that the learned Judge a quo excluded evidence which,

according to the opinion of the State, should have been allowed. This is no

exceptional matter. It is one which Judges and magistrates face almost daily in

dispensing justice in our criminal courts. I therefore agree with Mr. Botes and Mr.

Kachaka that there are no exceptional circumstances which would warrant a

departure from the provisions of sec.316A(1).

[38] Mr. Gauntlett also referred to sec 316A(1)(b) which provides for an appeal tothe Supreme Court in regard to any orders made under sec. 85(2) of the Act. This

section deals with objections by an accused person to the charge. Sub-sec. (2)(a)

provides that where an objection is well-founded the court may order the prosecution

to amend the charge accordingly or to provide further particulars. Sub-sec. (2)(b)

contains a sanction, namely, if the prosecution fails to comply with the court order it

may quash the charge. It seems to me that the operative part of the section is sub-

sec. (2)(b) because if the prosecution is not able to amend the charge or to provide

the further particulars ordered it would lead to a quashing of the charge which in my

opinion is a final order and therefore appealable at that stage.

[39] The reliance placed by counsel on S v Delie, supra, is in my opinion not

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supportive of counsels submissions in relation to the interpretation of sec. 316(1)A.

The accused in that matter pleaded guilty to a charge of failing to pay maintenance.

When the matter came on review two Judges of the High Court were of the opinion

that the questioning by the magistrate in terms of sec 112 of the Act revealed a valid

defence to the charge. Instead of referring the matter back to the magistrate for

further questioning, as they were required to do in terms of sec. 312 of the Act, they

set aside the conviction and sentence and ordered the release of the accused from

prison. That, in my opinion, was the end to that particular proceedings, and even if the

State could have recharged the accused, they would have had to do so afresh. The

appeal by the State was therefore at the completion of the proceedings and inaccordance with the interpretation of sec. 316A(1) as set out herein before.

[40] These then are the reasons for the orders made by the Court.

[41] As is evident from the reasons for the orders made, the issues raised in this

appeal are both novel and complex. By making its order soon after the conclusion of

argument, the Court intended no disrespect to the cogent and well reasoned

submissions advanced by both counsel but, rather, to facilitate continuance of the trial

in the Court a quo. It is difficult to understand why the trial has been postponed

pending the outcome of this petition and the appeal. If the issues raised in the petition

and the appeal were the only ones relevant to the remainder of the trial, the

postponement apparently granted at the instance of counsel for the defence might

have been justified. However, the Court has been assured that many of the few

hundred remaining witnesses which the Prosecution intends to call will testify on

matters wholly unrelated to those issues.

The Court is not presently in a position to comment on the Prosecutor-Generals

decision to saddle the trial Court with - what must have been anticipated, would be

an unwieldy and colossal trial by indicting so many accused persons in the same

proceedings, each facing more than a hundred charges and the evidence of close

to a thousand witnesses. It is also understandable that a case, with the dimensions

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here involved, will inevitably lead to stoppages resulting in delays during the trial due

to number of people involved and the issues raised during the trial. The Court has

considered the reasons for many of the postponements noted in the Trial Judges

report and, without commenting on each of them or apportioning any blame at thisstage, I must note the concern of all the Judges that this trial is not being driven

forward with the urgency it deserves to bring it to finality. It is in the interest of

everybody, also in regard to the principle on which our State is constituted, namely

the rule of law, and the right of the accused persons to a speedy trial, that this case

be brought to finality as soon as possible.

________________ STRYDOM, AJA.

I agree.

_________________ MARITZ, JA.

I agree.

_______________________ MTAMBANENGWE, AJA.

Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner/Applicant: Mr. GauntlettAssisted By: Mr. Pelser

Mr. D. F. SmallMr. JanuaryMr. T. July

Instructed By: Prosecutor-General Counsel on behalf of 1 st , 2 nd , 5 th, 6 th, 7 th, 13 th, 18 th,19 th and 20 th Respondents: Mr. L. C. Botes

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Assisted By: Mr. Kruger Mr. J. M. B. NevesMr. Samukange

Instructed by: Directorate of Legal Aid

On behalf of 3 rd, 4 th, 8 th, 9 th, 10 th, 11 th, 12 th, 14 th, 15 th,16 th, 17 th, 23 rd and 24 th Respondents: In Person

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S v Malumo and 24 Others Supreme Court Judgment 2

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