€¦ · S ECTION I INTRODUCTO RY “WHA T a piece of work is man ! how n oble in reason ! how in...

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT

By L. S . WOOL?

TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL

GOVERNMENT

By J. A. Hoason

CHOICE BEFORE U S

By G. Lowea Dxcx mson

FUTURE OF

CONSTANTINOPLE

By L . S . WOOL?

PERPETUAL PEACE

By I. KANT

TH E FRAMEWORK

ofa LAST ING PEACE

ED ITED BY

LEONARD S. WOOLF

LONDON : GEORGE ALLEN‘ UNW IN LTD .

RU SKIN HOU SE 40 M U SEUM STREET, W.C . l

INTRODUCTION BY L. S. WOOLF

SCHEMES

I . LEAGUE To ENFORCE PEACE

II . M INIMUM P ROGRAMME OF THE CENTRAL ORGANI Z ATION FOR A DURABLE PEACE , THE HAGUE

III . THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS SOC IETY

IV. PROPOSALS OF LORD BRYCE’S GROUP

V. THE FAEIAN SOC IETY DRAFT TREATY

VI. THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS .

VII . P RELIM INARY DRAFT OF A GENERAL TREATY FOR

THE PAC IFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONALD ISPUTES, BY A DUTCH COMM ITTEE

19 09 611

INTRODUCTION 1

BY L. S . WOOL:

This In troduction was o riginally published as the March ( 19 17)n umber of Wa r a nd P eace. I have to thank the ed i tor for

gran ting permission to reprin t i t.—L. S . W .

SECTION I

INTRODUCTORY

“WHAT a piece of work is man ! how n oble in reason !how in fin i te in faculty !” If publ i cists, po l i t i cian s and

plain men,when acting or thinking pol i ti cal ly

,would on ly

keep these words of H amlet in min d and heart, the worldwould be saved from much pol i t i cal fo l ly and man y

pol i tical catastrophes . Upon man,whether soli tary or in

masses,there act reason and an in fin i te n umber of“ tacul

t i es such as desires,impu lses, dreams, i deals, lusts and

passion s . Great pol i ti cal problems,therefore

,such as that

ofmain tain ing war in the world or ofwaging peace, aren ot simple : they are as compl i cated as man h imself

,and

can on ly be ful ly an swered by an equal ly compl i catedexplanat ion and solution . Bu t

,l ike al l human problems

,

that ofwar and peace can on ly be studied and though tabout piece-meal and in compartmen ts, and there is n o

danger in doing this provided that we Cl ing l ike l impetsto the fact that each p i ece is a p i ece and n o t the who lemeal

,that each compartmen t is a s ingle compartmen t and

n ot the who le train .

The piece or compartmen t wh ich we shal l here bedealing with is the creation o r developmen t of po l i ti ca lin ter-State in sti tution s for main tain ing peace and preven ting war. To gain admittan ce you must go to a booking

9

10 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEoffice grimly label led Logic and Reason

,and take a

first-class t icket,for here we shal l be deal ing with men as

pre-emin en tly n oble in reason,and our on ly mean s of

locomotion are logi c and reason . Bu t the very fact thatwe are iso lating part of a compli cated problem may lead

us away down one of two side-tracks, each of whichi s equal ly false . Upon on e of these side-tracks you

wil l find congregated a certain n umber of people whobelieve in panaceas

,who

,by con cen trat ing upon a frag

men t of the problem,s l ip in to the error of seeing the

whole con tain ed in the part . War wi l l n ever be slain byreason or pol it i cal in sti tution s and organ s alon e, by arbitration or arbitration courts, by con ci l iat ion or coun sels ofcon ci l iation

,by H oly Al l ian ces or Leagues to Enforce

P eace. Bu t the crowds who throng the other side-track,who, because they see th is, l eap to the opposite con clusion

that reason and pol i ti cal in sti tutions can do n oth ing to

preven t war,are equally wrong . I t may be true that

war wi l l exist so long as the wi l l to war ex ists, and

that there can be no peace withou t the wi l l to peace,but the absen ce or presen ce of in tern ational organ iza

t i on,such as coun ci ls and tribun als, i s 15t cause of the

existen ce of th e wi l l to war or the wi l l to peace. At

the presen t momen t a min or pol i t ical in sti tution , material

ized in the form of the vi l lage pol i ceman , can be seen

from my win dow cross ing the path that skirts thepaddock. The influen ce of that rather bucol i c and slowwitted pol i ti cal organ— red-faced Mr. Fun nell h imself

hardly real izes that he is,l ike the P rivy Coun ci l, a pol i t i

cal organ— has very l itt le in fluen ce upon my action s and

impu lses or those ofmy n eighbours ; yet there can be n o

doubt that ifMr. Funn el l did not exist, or ifh is fun ction swere differen t

,and sti l l more if the pol iti cal organ ization

to which he i s attached did not exist or were differen t, the

INTRODUCTORY 11

l ife ofth is vil lage, even our desires and impulses, would be

profoun dly modified. Nobody is thought to be absurd ifhe suggests modification in the pol i ti cal in sti tution s of avi l lage or State

,giving reasons for bel ieving that the resul t

wi l l react upon the l ives of the inhabitan ts . There i s n oground for den ying to in tern at ional pol it i cal organ i zationthe same kin d of power an d fun ction .

The groun d which we propose to survey— namely,in ter

n ation al pol i t i cal organ ization for preven t ing war—has

already been broken up by the plough ing ofmany competen t th in kers and groups of th in kers. We do not propose

merely to drive an other furrow through the field . The

groun d is ready for the seed,but that very fact baffles and

puzzles man y plain men who would l ike to take a han d inthe sowing. I t is so broken up that at first sigh t we can

on ly see a mass of Clods of all shapes and s izes,in numer

able du ll and confl i ct ing detai ls,such as tribunals, con

teren ces,coun ci ls

,arbi tration

,mediation

,con ci l iation , etc .

Every one has some “ scheme,

” or plan,

" or league,”and

al l seem to differ profoun dly,so that the plain man is

in cl in ed either to lose h imself in bewi ldering detai ls, or toturn away in despair wi th the remark that Where doctorsdisagree I

" We propose, therefore, to in sist upon thesamen esses rather than the differen ces in these schemes, toshow

,ifpossible

,that the differen t p loughs

,guided uncon

sciously, often by man“n oble in reason ,

” have followedtwo or three broad

,gen eral furrows, and that in those

furrows the seed of peace must, if ever, be sown .

We propose,in fact

,to take some half-dozen of the

schemes of respon s ib le th in kers and groups, n amely ‘

1. League to Enforce P eace , I I . M in imum P rogramme of

the Cen tral Organ ization for a Du rable P eace, I II . The

League ofNation s Society,I V . P roposals ofLord Bryce

'

s

Group, V . The Fabian Society Draft Treaty, V I . The Com

12 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEmun i ty of Nat ion s

,VI I. P rel imin ary Draft of a Gen eral

Treaty for the P acific Settlemen t of In tern ation al D isputes,by a Dutch Committee— broadly to en visage thei r proposalsmaterial ized in and app l i ed to the world of in tern ation alfacts

,and so

,if possible

,to trace the logi c of actual facts

wh ich have led to a substan t ial amoun t ofagreemen t in theproposals ofmen widely scattered over the troubled earth .

Adequately to do th is i t is n ecessary to begin almost

a b and the egg is in vari ably a cluster of tru isms . The

problem ofwar and peace is a problem of the relation s ofhuman groups . If th ere were n ot relation s between thegroups called States or n ation s

,th e question ofwar would

n ever arise. P ract i cal ly,the on ly human group with which

the B ri t ish Emp i re has not had to wage or at l east to feara war

,is the inhabi tan ts ofMars

,and the reason i s that

,

perhaps fortun ately,we are divided from them by so

effective a n atural buffer State that we can n ot get in to any

kin d of relat ion sh ip at all with them . Bu t if ever we did

get in to any kin d of relation s with the group in Mars,

from that momen t,we kn ow

,Mr. Maxse an d m an y others

would welcome the Marti an s wi th Open arms in to the

Comity ofNation s as poten tial ly our foes and en emiesMartian armamen ts would be man ipulated del i cately in

first one and then the other scale of the Balan ce ofP ower

and in a year or two we migh t sudden ly be awaken ed (by

the dai ly papers) to the fact that the Martian s had always

been our“ hereditary foe .

”

In th is we see man,n oble in reason

,at work . For war

is on e method of regulating relation s between human

groups . Wherever you have in dividuals or groups ofin di

v iduals in relation sh ips with on e an other, whether thoserelat ion s are social or sexual, or spat ial or fin an cial or com

m ercial, occas ion s wil l ari se when some method of regu

lating them becomes n ecessary,and when the n ecessi ty

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14 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEt ions, from clubs and Churches to trade un ion s and

,fin ally

,

laws ; are al l examples of governmen t in th is broad sen se— i .e . th ey have th is Characterist i c

,that they are gen eral

rules,the obj ect of which is to regulate the relation s of

human beings or groups of human beings . We spen d acon s iderable part of our ch i ldhood in being taugh t these

gen eral rules— for example,the ru le as to taking off your

hat, if you are a male, on en tering certain kinds of bui ld

ings, or the ru le as to what kinds ofmaterial Obj ects you

may or may not appropriate to your own use . These ru lesd iffer on ly in three importan t ways : they regulate differen t kinds of relation s, they are made or formulated indifferen t ways, they are enforced by differen t mean s. Bu t

though they may differ in any ofthese three ways, they are

all al ike in th is— that they are examples of man ’s on ly

altern ative to the regulation of hi s relation s by force, andthat al tern ative i s the regulation by gen eral rules embody

ing the gen eral con cept ion ofwhat is right, and the appli

cation o i such rules to part i cular cases— i .e. governmen t .Any ration al understan ding of the corn er of in ter

national relation s wh ich is here isolated for investigat ion

i s impossible un less we con t in ual ly keep before ourminds th e fact that regulatio n of relation s according togen eral rules i s an immen sely widespread phen omenon ,and man's on ly alternative to regul at ion by force . Court

sh ip and marriage among primi tive men were regulatedlargely by force ; to-day in th is coun try courtsh ip isregulated by custom or gen eral social rules

,and marriage

both by such rules and by the gen eral ru les oflaw . Again ,when ever a person says : “ The man is no gen tleman ;he did so and so, he imp l ies the con sciousn ess that

social relation s are regulated by gen eral ru les . Everymerchan t

,banker

,and bus in ess man is daily con scious

ofdozen s ofgen eral ru les, which are n o t laws, bu t withou t

INTRODUCTORY 15

which trade would be impossible, and he da i ly con sciously

appl ies and conforms to them in h is business relat ion s .

The men who open the gates between the cars on theTube in Lon don very soon learn t that travell ing on the

electri c rai lway would become impossible un less theyestabl ished a gen eral rule that those on the platformmust wai t to en ter the train un t i l al l those al igh ting haveleft i t ; and upstairs at the t icket office passengers themselves have been compel led to regulate their relat ion s by

two wel l-recogn ized gen eral ru les : “ F i rst come, firstserved,

"

and Wai t your turn .

"

And the whole bodyof law con sists of precisely s imi lar ru les, except that they

are made and enforced in a parti cular way.

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

And in in tern ation al re lation s,which are the relation s

of specific human groups,the same phen omen a are

observable . The altern at ive to regulation by force is

regu lation by gen eral rules. Th is latter form ofregulationi s already high ly developed . Every day every ForeignOffice of the world is recogn i zing and app lying suchru les . H undreds of thousands of Bri ton s have in thelast two years met death in defen ce of them . You maycall them I n tern ation al Law ,

or you may refuse them thatdign ified n ame

,but you can no t alter the fact of thei r

existen ce and infl uen ce, or the fact that if they were not

un con sciously and consciously recogn ized dai ly and

appl ied dai ly,

n in e- ten ths of in tern at ion al in tercourse

and n in e-ten ths ofin tern ational commerce would in stan tlybecome imposs i ble.The foun dation ofevery scheme of in tern at ional govern

men t to preven t war is a recogn i ti on ofthese facts . The

framers ofthese schemes recogn ize the fact that the on ly

16 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEaltern ative to war is some kin d of regulation Of in tern ation al relat ion s in accordan ce with gen eral rules . They

are con struct ing the skeleton offuture peace, j ust as theWar M in ister

,when he asks for so many army corps and

so man y big gun s, i s con structing the skeleton offuture

war . The former are laying down the min imum con dit ion s

un der which a system ofpacifically regulat ing in tern at ion al

relation s in accordan ce with gen eral rules can work ; thelatter i s laying down the min imum con dit ion s underwhich the regulation of in tern at ion al relations by warcan work. The former says : “ If you wish for peace,prepare the con dit ion s of peace the latter : “ If you

wish for war, prepare the co n dit ion s ofwar”

and bothare right .The problem of al l governmen t can be reduced to aproblem of establish ing gen eral rules

,gen eral ly accepted,

an d appl i cable to al l the relat ion s between the relatedin dividuals or groups . H en ce i t must always con sis t oftw o distin ct parts— first

,the establishmen t of gen eral

rules ; and, secon dly, the app l i cation of them to parti cular

cases . Th is i s as true of in tern ation al governmen t as i tis of any o ther governmen t

,an d the fact accoun ts both

for the samen esses and for the d ifferen ces in the various

schemes for preven t ing war. For in so far as the framers

of those schemes agree in providing for on e or both

parts ofthe problem,there i s substan t i al agreemen t in thei r

con clus ion s ; but where on e scheme con cen trates i ts

atten t ion on providing a so lu t ion for the first part and

n eglects the secon d,wh i l e an other con cen trates upon the

secon d and n eglects the firs t,there is immediately an

obvious superficial d ivergen ce in the con clus ion s . We

propose n ow to Show th is by coming to grips with

detai ls.

SECTION I I

JU STICIABLE D I SP UTE S

IF you examin e al l the schemes propounded you wi l lfind that in on e po in t at least they al l agree : they all,wi thout exception

, provide for the submission of at leas t

certain kinds of disputes, disagreemen ts, or question s toa j udicial tribunal . I t wi l l be useful to quote the wordsin which the schemes make th is provision .

The League to Enforce Peace provides that

All j usti ciabl e question s arising between the signatory

Powers,not settled by n egotiation , shal l , subj ec t to the

l imitation s of treaties, be submitted to a j udicial tri bun alfor hearing and j udgmen t, both upon the meri ts and uponany issue as to i ts j urisdiction of the question .

Mi n imum P rogramme of the Cen tra l Orga n iza tion for a

Dura ble Pea ce.

The States shal l agree to submit al l their disputesto peacefu l settlemen t. For th i s purpose there Shal lbe created

,in addit ion to the existen t H ague Court

of Arbi tration,

a perman en t Court Of I n tern ation al

j u sti ce .

18 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEThe League ofNa tions Society.

All disputes aris ing out of question s of In ternationa lLaw or the In terpretation of Treat ies Shal l be referredto the H ague Court ofArbi tration

,or some other j udicial

Tribun al,whose decis ion s shal l be final

, and shal l b e

carri ed in to effect by the parti es con cern ed.

Proposa ls ofLord Bryce'

s Group.

ARTICLE 2 .— The sign atory P owers to agree to refer

to the Court ofArbi tral Justice proposed at th e secon d

H ague Conferen ce, or to the exist ing P erman en t Court

Of Arbi tration at The H ague, or to some other arbi traltri bun al , al l disputes between them ( in cluding thoseaffecting hon our and vi tal in terests) which are of a

j usti ciable Character and which the Powers con cern edhave fai led to settle by dip lomati c methods .

ARTICLE 4 .

“ D isputes of a j ust i ciable character to

be defined as“ D isputes as to the in terpretation of a

treaty, as to any question of in tern ational law

,as to the

existen ce of any fact wh ich , if establ ished, would con

stitute a breach of any in tern ation al Obl igation , or as toth e n ature and exten t of the reparat ion to be made for

any such brea ch .

”

The Fabia n Society.

ARTICLE I 3 .— The In tern ation al H igh Court Shall deal

on ly with j usti ciable quest ion s, as defin ed in these

Arti cles, at issue between the n ation al Governmen ts of

independen t Sovereign States .

ARTICLE 16.-The Con st i tuen t States several ly un der

take and agree to submit to the I n tern ational H igh Courtfor trial and j udgmen t every questi on , differen ce or dispute

coming with in the defin i ti on of a j ust iciable q uestion as

JUSTICIABLE DISPUTES

laid down in these Arti cles that may arise betweenth emselves and any o ther in dependen t Sovereign Stateor States .

The Commun i ty ofNa tions Pamphlet.

For th is purpose‘( in tern at ion al co-operation ) i t is

n ecessary to supp lemen t the exist ing in ternationalmach in ery in various ways, and in parti cular by con

s titu ting and establ ishing on a defin i te bas is the fol lowingbodies

(a )

(b) Courts ofArbi tration and j usti ce to wh i ch po in ts

ofd ifferen ce con cern ing the in terpretation of treat ies and

o ther matters of a j urid i cal character in dispute between

n ations can be referred for decis ion .

Draft Trea ty of the Du tch Commi ttee.

In order to ensure the main ten an ce of P eace, the Con

tracting States undertake to submit al l their differen ces

to the decis ion of the I n tern ation al Court ofArbi tration ,

The un i versal i ty and striking s imi lari ty in these proposals

go at'

on ce to the roots of the problem which we are

studying . The altern ative to force is governmen t :

governmen t is the regulation of relation s according togeneral ru les . A n ecessary condi t ion for the regulation

of in tern at ion al re lations otherwise than by w ar is a

system for applying in particu lar cases those ru les wh i ch

do exis t for the regulat ion ofthe relat ion s . All the authors

of these clauses are payi ng homage, con scious ly or

un co n scious ly, to the inexorable logi c ofreaso n and facts,whether in H ol land, Britain , or the New World ; hen ce

20 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEthe Dutchman agrees with the Bri ton and th e Bri ton with

the American . The foun dation s of th i s agreemen t can bered uced to two propos i t ions : (1 ) Where gen eral rules as

to in tern ation al re lat ion s have been establ ished by con sen t,n at ion s are boun d to regulate their relat ions in accordan cewi th those rules ; (2 ) in pract i ce th is is n ot possibl e un l ess

provision is made whereby al l disputes,the subj ect ma tter

ofwh i ch is covered by exist ing rules or which is con cern edwith the in terpretat ion of such ru les, Shal l be submittedfor sett lemen t to a regular in tern at ional j ud icial tribunal .U pon th is some few addit ion al remarks are n ecessary .

The authors of these c lauses are con cen trat ing their attent ion on ly upon the applica tion of ex isting rules to relation s

and disputes covered by those rules . That is the mean ing

and the reason for the u se of such words as j usti ciable

quest ion s,” “

questi on s of I n tern ation a l Law or the I n ter

pretation ofTreati es,” etc . The defin i t ion of j ust iciable

may vary in the d ifferen t schemes,but the vari at ion i s

purely formal : the in ten t ion of the author always is thata “ j ust i ciable quest i on Shal l in clude every in tern at ion al

question covered by an existing gen eral rule . H en ce the

in clus ion of al l quest ion s covered by treati es, n ot because

they are covered by treaties,but because they are covered

by the gen eral and fu ndamen tal rule of in ternation al lawthat a n ation is boun d to conform w i th its treaty obl i

gation s. The actual defin i t ion s vary on ly because theirauthors have attempted in differen t ways to make th is

in ten t ion exp l i ci t.

The appl i cation of an exist ing gen eral rule to a part ien

lar case or disagreemen t is the foun dation of al l law and

j udicial proceedings. The reason , and the on ly reason ,why the j udge and the cou rt have been so widely adoptedby human beings as a ration al method of governmen t, is

that the sphere of the j udge or court i s stri ctly l imited to

22 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEmun i cipal law vague and un satisfactory, and i t i s precisely

in the courts,where i t has to be appl i ed to parti cular

cases,that much of i ts vaguen ess and un satisfactorin ess

is dai ly taken out of i t . There i s,in fact

,a vast body

of well-establ ished in tern at ion al law covering a greatex ten t of in tern ation al re lation s, and certain ly th e fun damen tal relation s upon which in tern at ional society rests

to-day. P eop l e who deny th is often do not see that they aredenying a large part of the case for our in terven t ion in th iswar . For if there are no well-es tabl ished rules of in tern at ional law

,what is our quarrel with Germany Ifwe did

no t en ter th is war to uphold the obl igation ofin tern ation altreat ies and the obl iga tion to abide by certai n clearly

defin ed rules of right and wrong embodied in establ ished

in tern at ion al law,th en thousan ds upon thousands of

Engl ishmen have been lured by the false statemen ts of

our statesmen,our po l i t ician s and our P ress to sacrific e

thei r l ives for a fiction and a delus ion .

Take the case of the violation of the n eutral i ty and

t erri tory of Belgium by Germany. Ifwe con tin ual ly layst ress Upon the h ideous i l legali ty of Germany's action ,

how can we den y that there are establ ished rules of in tern ational law regulating the relation s ofStates ? But everyo ne rea l ly kn ows that the rules or laws exist

,and that they

were broken by Germany ; that i t i s a fun damen tal rule of

in tern ation al law and of any system of regu lat ing in tern ation al re lation s according to righ t and n ot force thatStates are boun d to comp ly with their treaty obl igation sand to respect the in dependen ce and territorial in tegri ty

of smal l and great States . If the quest ion between Ger

many and Belgium were n ow or had been remitted to theH ague tribunal or to any other in tern at ion al j udicial tribun al

,n o matter when or where con sti tuted

,i t is absolutely

certain that that tribunal would unan imously decide that

JUSTICIABLE DISPUTESGerman y had broken those two gen eral rules of in tern ation al law . Or, take aga in the far more difficult and,from a legal poin t of view, un certain case ofAustria and

Serbia. Even here there are wel l- established rules of in tern at ion al law defin ing the respon s ib i l i ty of States for theact ion s of their ci tizen s who are p lan n ing or taking host i l emeasures again st the peace or in tegri ty Of a n eighbouringState . IfAustria and Serbia had really been anxious thattheir relation s as to Bosn i a

, as to the Narodna Odbran a,

even as to the murder at Seraj evo,should be regulated in

accordan ce with law and righ t,there is absolutely n o

doubt that a properly con stituted in tern ation al tribun alwould have been able to admin ister, and actual ly wouldhave admin istered

,substan tial j usti ce wi thout goi n g outside

the orbi t ofthose existing in tern at ion al laws .

The people who deny the existen ce of in tern ation a l law,and therefore of the poss i bi l i ty Of pac ifically settl ing byj udicia l decis ion al l disputes— and on ly those dispu tesac tual ly covered by the existing law, are in fact the peopl ewho do no t wish the relation s of States to be regulatedin accordan ce with right an d law. 80 long as the world

agrees with them,or so long as i t accepts thei r l eadersh ip

or authori ty,so long wi l l in tern ation al law and right be

impoten t,and men be lu red to destruction i n defen ce of

righ t by the very men who den y the existen ce of right .That

,however

,is n o reflection upon the wisdom and in

s ight of the framers of the schemes prin ted in th is volume,who have correct ly seen and correctly defin ed the cond i ~

ti on s that are n ecessary for the regulation of in tern ationalrelation s in accordan ce with righ t if ever the world shal l

rebel again st the authori ty and leadersh ip of such m en,

and shal l determin e that the relation s of States m ust be

regulated in accordan ce with law and right ,

24 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACE

WHAT “

jusTICIABLE MEANS .Before fin al ly leaving this question of a j udi cial tri bun al

,

i t is n ecessary to n otice on e other poin t which has alreadybeen touched ‘upon . The schemes differ to some exten tin their defin i t i on s of “ j ust i ciable d isputes— Le. those

disputes which i t i s reason abl e to ask n ation s to submitto the decision ofa j udicial body. The defin i t ion s fal l in totwo wel l-marked Classes . The first seeks to make “ ju st ic i

able ” in clude al l those d isputes the subj ect matter ofwhichis covered by exist ing rules ofin ternation al law or by treatyObl igation s. Of these perhaps the Simp lest i s that ofTheLeague ofNation s Soci ety

All d isputes aris ing out of questi on s of i n tern ationallaw or the in terpretation oftreat i es .”

The logical foundation of th i s class of defin i t ion s hasbeen sufficien t ly ex plain ed in the preceding paragraphs

,

but there is a second Class,an un derstanding ofwhich wi l l

l ead u s n aturally to a further importan t compartmen t in

the problem of in tern ation al governmen t . The Draft

Treaty of the Dutch Committee starts off by defin ingj usti ciable d isputes in the ordin ary way as “ al l disputes

con cern ing the . in terpretat ion of treaties and prin cip les of

in tern at ion al law,

" etc . Bu t by a very ingen ious, origin al ,and in teresti ng suggest ion

,which i t would take too long

to explain in detai l,the Commission subsequen t ly n arrows

down its defin i tion in such a way that a j usti ciable ques ti on

which a State i s boun d to submit to the decision Of aj udicial tri bun al is real ly defin ed as one wh i ch belongs to

any class ofquesti on s which a n at ion has actual ly bounditse lf by treaty to submit to j udicial decis ion . In effectth i s i s equivalen t to holding that the regulation of in tern ation al relat ions through a j ud ic ial system in accordan ce

with existing ru les of in ternat i onal law should be con fined

JUSTICIABLE D ISPUTESto quest ion s wh ich a State has boun d itself by treatyexpressly to submit to j udicial decis ion .

Th is suggest ion of the Dutch Commiss ion is due,we

bel ieve, prin cipally to a distrust Of and un easin ess abou t

in tern ation al law,an d to a deep ly rooted feel in g that any

kin d ofin tern at ion al governmen t mu st be based in a morethan ordin ary measure upon con sen t . H ere we touch the

secon d great departmen t of the problem Of in tern ation al

governmen t. The essen ce of all governmen t is,we repeat,

the regulat ion of relation s in accordan ce with gen eral rules .

H en ce there are two d ifferen t n ecessary con di t ion s of

governmen t : ( I ) the existen ce or establ ishmen t of the

gen eral rules,and (2 ) thei r app l i cat ion to parti cular cases .

So far we have been con cern ed on ly wi th proposals based

on the n ecessi ty of providing for some mean s of applyingthe ru les wh i ch exist to parti cular cases of dispute, n ow weare faced with a differen t question— n amely

,the establ ish

men t of the ru les themselves .

SECTION I I I

NON-JU STICIABLE D I SP UTE S

WE have already had to deal wi th the quest i on of the

existen ce and status Of in tern ati on al law,and we have

Said many complimen tary th ings abou t i t ; we shal l nowhave to look in to i ts status a l i ttle more closely

,and

we shall be forced to say some rather un compl imen tary

things about i t There is n oth ing con tradictory in that,

n oth ing more con tradictory than in the statemen t,u nfortu

n ately SO Often true,th at M iss ! has a very pretty face

but p lays the p ian o abomina bly. Metaphori cal ly,indeed

,

we may say that in tern ation al law has a very pretty face,

bu t i t p lays the in tern ation al p ian o abomin ably. The

existing gen eral ru les of in tern at ion al law have beenestabl ished prin cipally by custom ; some of th em can be

deduced or inferred from treati es some of them have beendeclared to be in tern at ion al law by the respon s i bl e repre

sen tatives of a large n umber of States at in tern ationalconferen ces ; a few have been made del iberately and

consciously by practi cal ly al l the civi l ized States of the

world at conferen ces cal led for the express purpose of

in tern ational legis lation,and in such cases they have been

embodi ed in treat ies . I t wi l l be seen at on ce that there is

n o regular organ for in tern ation al legislat ion , n o organ

which can decide what the gen eral rules ought to be96

NON-JUSTICIABLE DISPUTES 27

or defin e and determin e what the existing gen eral rulesare .I t is by n o mean s n ecessary for the existen ce ofgovernmen t in our sen se

,n amely

,the regulation of relation s in

accordan ce wi th gen eral rules,that those rules should be

con sciously defin ed,determin ed

,or “ made

,

” or that thereshould be some Specific organ for establ ish ing them . A

large n umber ofhuman rel ation s are in almost every sphereofl ife regulated by rules which have n ever been

“made in

th is sen se . Thus man y,poss ibly most, of the gen era l rules

appli ed as law in Engl ish courts have n ever been“ made ” or

defin ed by a n y l egislat ive organ they are customary gen era lru les of exactly the same k in d as many of the ru les of

in tern at ion al law . B ut a system un der wh i ch the gen es isof the ru les is un con sciou s a nd there is n o con scious provis ion ofmach in ery for determin ing or altering the rulesis on ly suitable for a s impl e society in which the relation sare few and comparat ively un changing . Again

,the more

con sciou s individuals or groups are of thei r relation s, themore n ecessary does i t become to have some method

for determin ing con sciously what are the gen eral ruleswh i ch are to regu late these relation s . In tern ation alrelations exist between Specific groups of individuals, whoare at t imes extremely con scious of the relation s bothbetween the in dividuals ofthei r ow n group (patriotism) and

between the d ifferen t groups of individuals (n ational ism) .Un der these circumstan ces i t is in evi table that much Of

in tern ation al law i s un satisfactory, because i t i s vagu e a nd

undefin ed and because there is no regular method avail

able of defin ing and determin ing i t. Moreover, l ike al lsystems of rules and law

,i t on ly covers a part of the

field of relation s,and there are wide and importan t

spheres of in tern at ion al re lationsh ip for wh i ch there are

no gen eral ru les at al l ,


DISPUTES NOT COVERED BY LAW .

I t fo l lows from th is that in ou r presen t imperfect stateofcivilization and developmen t on ly a part of in tern at ion a l

relatio n s are covered by exi st ing ru l es, that man y of

the exist ing rules are i l l -defin ed and un certain,and there

fore that it is n either poss i bl e n or reason able for al l in tern ation al disputes or quest ion s to be submi tted to j udicialtribu n als for decis ion in accordan ce wi th exist in g gen eralrules .

War resu l ts from in tern ati onal disputes . We haveseen how agreemen t is practi cal ly un i versal that no rat ional

or civi l ized in tern ation al system is poss ible un less i t provides for disputes covered by exist ing rules to be submitted

to a parti cu lar kin d of settlemen t,a j udicial decis ion .

Bu t n ow what abou t disputes wh i ch are n ot covered byexist ing rules ? H ere clearly there are two d ifferen t l in es

wh i ch you may take : you may ei ther try to exten d the

scope and improve the rules or in tern at ion al law so thatmore disputes when they arise wi l l be su itable for

j udicial settl emen t,or you may con cen trate your atten t ion

upon providing methods for settl ing disputes n ot coveredby in tern ation al law. All the authors of these schemes

recogn ize the n ecessi ty Of the secon d altern at ive, but no t

al l of them recogn ize the immen se importan ce of thefirst ; we shall, therefore, first con sider the secon d alter

n ative .The problem may be stated thus. Suppose it beadmitted that where in tern ation al relation s have been

defin ed by treaties or by in tern at ion al law, disputes as

to those relation s should be submit ted to j udicial decis ion ,i s there any system which i t is reason abl e and fair to ask

States to adhere to for settl ing other disputes as to relatio n s

not defined by treat ies and in ternational law ?‘

And i t is


Serbian Governmen t for al leged host i le acts ofi ts n ation als,or of o ther person s l ivin g in Serb ian terri tory

,again st

the Austrian Governmen t and the in tegri ty of the

Au stri an -H ungarian Empi re was a legal quest ion coveredby in tern at ional law it w as also an acu te pol it i cal question .

On the other han d,the question of the Bagdad Rai lway

w as a pol i ti cal question wh i ch was n ot a legal question ,and could n ot therefore have been made amen able toj udic ial decis ion

,because the con ten t of the dispute was

n ot covered by any treaty or any rules of i n tern at ion al

law. S imi larly,the dispute between Russ i a and Austria

i n the Balkan s, which paved the way to the war, w as a

pol it i cal qu estion to which no exist ing general rules of

in tern ation al law appl i ed . Yet bo th of these quest ionswould have been “ legal,

”

as w ell as“

po l i ti cal, if therehad been

,say

,a Russ ian -Austrian treaty defin ing the

relation s of the two States towards Serbia, an d if therehad been a gen eral treaty defin ing the commercial andother relat ion s ofEuropean States i n the territori es of the

O ttoman Empire in the same way as thei r re lation s have

been defin ed in some other parts of the world, e.g.

Afri ca .

ARB ITRATION OR CONC IL IATION ?The o lder pacifists of the n in eteen th cen tury are often

l aughed at,even by their sp iri tual descen dan ts of the

twen ti eth cen tury, for their bel i efin arbitrat ion and j udicial

settlemen t. The bel i efw as exaggerated and they did n ot

see the true sphere of the in tern ation al court. But thei rin stin ct to seize upon arbi tration was soun d : they had

vaguely grasped the fun damen tal prin cip l e upon whi chalon e a civi l ized in tern at ion al society can be based— a

regulati on of relat ion s in accordan ce wi th gen eral ru les,and the appl i cat ion of the gen eral ru les in parti cular


cases of dispute by an in dependen t j udicial body. And

the ru le must be appl ied in al l cases where it exists,

whether pol i ti cal or n ot pol i t ical.But we are sti l l left with question s of relat ion s towhich no existing treaty or ru le of in tern ation al lawappli es . And so long as in tern ation al law remain s asvague and fragmen tary as i t is to-day

,many disputes

of th is n ature wi l l always arise. How are they to besettled ? Now

, there are two methods in which a san eand sober m an migh t reason ably try to Settle a d isputeof th is kin d . Remember always that th is kind of disputei s specifical ly differen t from one wh i ch would be remittedto a j udicial tri bun al . I t is n ot covered by any gen eral

ru le of law or righ t and wrong : therefore to decide i trightly, you would to all in ten ts and purposes have firs tto make your gen eral rule yourself

,a very d ifficult th ing

for the most unprej udiced of human beings to do in an

unprej udiced man n er. In a question of th is sort,there

fore, both s i des wi ll almost certain ly be both a good dea lrigh t and a good deal wrong. On e way

,then

,to proceed,

is not to attempt to decide the dispute on gen eral con

sideration s ofright and wrong, but to try to get a Solutionby compromise wh i ch wil l at least be accepted by both

parties . Th is method of attempt ing to settle i n tern at ion aldisputes has for a very long time had a recogn ized p lacein diplomacy under the n ame of good offices and mediation

,and perhaps con ci l iat ion . All the authors of these

schemes propose on ly to extend, develop, and regularizeth is exist ing method through some in ternation al bodywhose obj ect Shal l be con ci l iation . B ut there i s anothermethod wh i ch is essen tial ly differen t from th is . You may

hand the question over to some independen t body whose

obj ect is n o t to find a solution wh i ch wil l be accepted by

both s ides,n o t, in fact

,to con ci l iate both Sides, but as a

32 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEbody of reason able and un prej udi ced peop l e to say whatappears to be a j ust and fair decis ion of the question .

Th is method is also n o t the mere vapouring of peacecran ks : i t has already foun d a place in the actualmach in ery of diplomacy and foreign poli cy. The H ague

Conven t ion for th e P acific Sett lemen t of in tern ation aldisputes provided for the con st i tu tion of I n tern at ion al

Commission s of I nquiry, impartial bodies to which Statesmight submit disputes, n ot settled by dip lomacy, for in vesti

gation offacts an d for a report . I t w as to a commiss ion

ofth is kind that the Dogger Ban k in ciden t between Great

B ri tain and Russ ia,a cris is of the most acute an d

dangerous n ature,w as submitted

,and th e report of the

commiss ion w as accepted as a settl emen t by both P owers .But the P eace treati es which the U n i ted States con cluded

i n 19 14 an d 19 15 , with fifteen other States,have developed

th is system of commission s con s i derably. These treatiesdiffer in minor poin ts, but the gen eral resu lt of them is

as fol lows . They provide for the con sti tution of per

man en t in tern ation al commiss ion s, and the sign atory

P owers bind themselves to refer al l disputes, n ot settledby the ordin ary methods, for in vestigat ion and report to

the Commiss ion . The S ign atory States “ agree n ot todeclare war

,or begin hosti l i t i es durin g the in vestigation

,

an d before the report is submitted,

” though th ey reserve“ the righ t to act in depen den t ly on the subj ect matter ofthe dispute after the report of the Commission shal l havebeen submitted .

"

I t is most importan t to recogn ize that there is here areal distin ction between the methods of attempt ing to finda settlemen t of dispute because, as we Shal l subsequen tly

see,the d ifferen ce may have importan t effects upon the

righ t way to con sti tute the organ to wh i ch the settlemen ti s en trusted. The first method aims at con ci l iat ion

,at

NON-JUSTICIABLE DISPUTESfinding a compromise wh i ch w ill be sufficien t ly sat isfac

tory to be accepted by both parties, at exten ding and

develop in g in fact the d iplomat i c mach in ery ofmed iation .

The secon d aims at Obtain ing an impartial in vest igationof the subj ect of the dispute and an un biased opin ion of

five or more hon est men upon the subj ect matter of thedispute, in the hopes that the disputing parties wi llaccept that Op in ion as a settlemen t or the bas is of asettlemen t. Now let u s turn to the schemes and seehow these ideas and prin cip les material ize there .

The League to Enforce Pea ce.

All other (i .e . n on -ju stifiable) question s aris ing between

the s ign atori es and n ot sett led by n egotiation ,Shal l be

submitted to a coun ci l of con ci l iat i on for hearing, con

sideration,and recommendation .

M in imum Programme of the Cen tra l Orga n iza tion for a

Dura ble Pea ce.

The States Shal l agree to submit al l their disputes topeaceful settlemen t . For th is purpose there Shall becreated

,in addition to the existen t H ague Court of

Arbitration, (a ) a perman en t Court of in ternational j ust i ce,

(b) a perman en t in tern at ion al Coun ci l of investigation and

con ci l iat ion . The States shal l bin d themselves to takeco n certed action

,diplomati c, economic, or mi l i tary, in

case any State shou ld resort to mi l i tary measures instead

of submitting the dispute to j udicial decis ion or to the

mediation of the Coun ci l of in vestigat ion and con ci l iat ion .

P roposa ls ofLord Bryce’

s Group.

The signatory P owers to agree that every party to a

d ispu te, n ot of a j ustic iable character, Zthe existen ce of

which might u ltimately endanger friendly relations with

3


an other S ignatory Power or P owers, and which has not

been settled by diplomati c methods, wil l submit its case

to the Coun ci l (i .e. the perman en t Coun ci l ofCon ci l iat ion )with a Vi ew to con ci l iat ion .

U n l ess through the good offices of the Coun ci l or

otherwise,the dispute shal l have been previous ly settl ed

between the parti es,th e Coun ci l to make and publ ish ,

with regard to every dispute con s idered by i t, a reportor reports con tain ing recommen dation s for the amicable

settlemen t of the dispute.

The League ofNa tions Society .

All other d isputes ( i .e. n ot aris ing out of in ternation allaw or the in terpretation of treaties) shal l be referred to

and invest igated and reported upon by a Coun ci l ofinquiry

and con cil iat ion ; the Coun ci l to be represen tative of theStates wh ich form the League .

Draft Trea ty of the Du tch Comm i ttee.

ART. 98 .—The Coun ci l has j urisdi ction to take cogn i

zan ce of disputes between States

1 . On the request ofal l the parties.

2 . On the request of one of the part ies,if the I n ter

n at ion al Court ofArbitration has declared the caseto be outs i de i ts j urisdiction ; if, accord ing to theop in ion Of the parti es

,the dispute is n ot on e

subj ec t to Arbi tra t ion ; or, if i t does n ot admit ofdoubt that the case is outs i de the j urisdiction of

the Court ofArbi trat ion .

ART. 105 .— Decis ion s are taken by the maj ori ty ofvotes.

The Fa bia n Society .

Wh en any question , differen ce or dispute arising between

two or more con sti tuen t States is not j usti ci able as defin ed

NON-JUSTICIABLE D ISPUTES

i n these Art i cles,an d is n ot promptly brough t to a n

ami cable settlemen t i t Shall be the du ty of each pa r tyto the matter a t issu e to su bm i t the ques tion ,

d iffe ren ce or d ispute to the I n tern at ion al Coun ci l with a view

to a satisfactory set t lemen t bei ng a rrived at. Th e

I n tern ation al Coun c i l may appo in t a perman en t Board of

Con ci liators for dealing wi th all su ch qu estion s, differen ces

or d ispu tes as they arise,and may con st i tu te the Board

either on the n omin ation of the several con sti tu en t Statesor otherwise . When any question ,

differen ce or d ispu te ,n ot of a j u st i ciable character is submi tted to or takenin to con s ideration by the I n tern ation al Coun ci l as afore

said, the Coun ci l shall take action,either ( I ) by

referring the matter at issue to the perman en t Board of

Con ci l iators, or ( 2 ) by appo in ting a specia l committeeto enqu ire in to the matter a nd report, or (3) by

appoin t ing a Commiss ion of en qu i ry to in vestigate themat ter and report, or (4) by itself tak ing the matter in tocons idera t ion .

The Commu n i ty ofNa ti ons P amphlet.

A Cou n ci l Of con ci l iat ion to wh i ch cases of d i ve rgen tin terest between n a tion s n o t of a j uridi cal character canbe referred for Con s idera t ion a nd recommendation .

It wi l l be seen that a ll these schemes recogn ize the

n ecess i ty of prov id i ng tha t a ll n on - j u sti ciable quest i o n s

and d i spu tes sha ll be referred to a n on - j udi cial body ;bu t they do n o t a ll clearly d i sti ngu ish be tw een the tw o

a ltern a t i ve a nd poss i ble bases of th is body ’s ac t ion . All

of them do n o t make i t clear whe ther th is COLI IICII sha llproceed by w ay ofmed ia tion , con ci lia t io n , a nd compromise ,or whether i t shall aim at impartial in ves t igat i on and an


impartial report as to the fai r settlemen t of th e dispute .The Leagu e to E nforce P eace and the League ofNation sSociety are n ot ex pli ci t, though the fact that each callsi ts body a Cou n ci l of Con ci liat ion wou ld poin t to its

fun ct ion being on e of m ed iat ion . On the o ther hand,

the fact that the fun ct ion is defin ed by the League to

Enforce P eace as“ hearing, con s iderat ion and recom

m endation ,and by the Leagu e of Nation s Socie ty as

“ in vest igat ion and report, seems to po in t to i ts fun ctionbeing on e of impartial in quiry and report . The M in imum

P rogramme clearly con templates on ly a body wh i ch shal l

proceed by way of med iation an d con ci l iation,for i t

describes the fun ction of the Co un ci l as solely that of

mediation . The Dutch Committee’s Cou n ci l is to in

vest igate and give a decis ion wh i ch is bin ding upon the

parties, although provis ion is made whereby in certain casesi t can merely “ give an op in ion . The proposals of Lord

Bryce’s group recogn ize the distin ction between the two

fu n ct ion s, for they seem to con templa te that their Coun ci lshal l , first by i ts good Offices, seek to mediate between the

two parties, and that then if the mediat ion is un successfuli t Sh al l proceed to make an in vestigation , report and

recommen dation for sett lemen t . Lastly, the Fabian Societymakes the clearest d ist in ct io n and provis ion for the twodifferen t fun ction s . I t provides for the appoin tmen t by

the Coun ci l of a perman en t Board ofCon ci l iators . The

Cou n ci l wou ld have the power of handing the d ispute

over to th is Board, wh i ch wou ld t ry to se t tle i t bymedi atio n an d con ciliat ion : if th is fai led

,the who l e

quest ion cou ld th en be referred to a qu i te d istin ct body,

ei ther a committee or commiss ion of inquiry, or to the

Coun cil i tselffor impartial in vestigati on and.

report .


qu est ion is referred to an in dependen t and impartial personor body wh i ch in vestigates an d recommen ds a fair settle

men t . Bu t S ir George Askw i th does n ot arbitrate in astrike, and an in du str ia l arbi trator does n ot mediate orcon ci l iate ; the tw o processes are d ifferen t, are recogn izedas requiring d ifferen t bod i es, and are kept distin ct .

THE DOGGER BANK .

SO,too, in in tern ati on al affairs i t i s at l east doubtfu l

whether a body wh i ch would be su i table for mediationand con ci l iat ion would at the same time be the best forun der tak ing an impartial inqu iry an d mak ing an impartial

report . F or i nstan ce,the I n tern at ion al Commiss i on of

I nqu i ry wh i ch settled the Dogger Ban k in ciden t w as

admirably adapted for arrivin g, after an in vestigat ion,at

a correct decision as to the facts of the attack upon the

Bri t ish fish ing boa ts by the Russ ian fleet,and a lso for

mak in g a report a nd recommen dation wh i ch the world

gen erally wou ld recogn ize as impartia l. Tha t is the obj ectof th is k in d of in vest iga t i on— to ob tain

,after an in terval

long en ough to allow pass ion s to cool , an Opin ion upon

the meri ts of the d ispu te wh i ch the world wi ll recogn ize

as impartial an d wh i ch,th erefore

,the coo led d isputan ts

wi ll fin d i t d iffi cult to refu se . But though a Commission

formed of expert admirals w as admirably adap ted for th ispurpose, i t wou l d obviously have been quite unsuited

to proceed by w ay of media t ion or con ciliation . An d

imagin e the imposs ibl e pos i t ion of the poor admirals if

they had first tri ed to brin g the two part ies togetherby way of mediat ion and compromise , a nd th en had

sudden ly had to Chan ge th ei r method and make an

impart ial i n vest iga tion an d report upon the in ciden t .

Further,i t Shou ld be observed that th is Dogger Ban k


in ciden t was clearly one which almost certain ly could not

have been sett led by mediation and con ci l iation alon e .No on e could have by mediation suggested a so lutionwh i ch both Russi a and Great Bri tain would have acceptedand i t is absolutely certain that if

,when F ran ce offered

her good services, She had gon e on by w ay ofmediationto suggest as a sett lemen t the terms even tually recom

mended by the In tern ation al Commission,they would have

met with a blan k refusal by Russi a . Yet when theyappeared as the Op in ion of an impart ial commission of

inquiry after in vestigation , Russia accepted them .

THE BAGDAD RA ILWAY.

On the other han d, con s i der for a momen t the quest ion

of the Bagdad Rai lway, a qu estion of in ternation al poli cy

ofa n on - j ust iciable n ature . I t belonged to a class ofin tern ation al problems wh i ch i t is most des i rable to settle

,and

most dangerous to allow to S immer un settled for years.I t was

,however

,n ot the kind of question wh i ch i t i s

possible to con ceive as amen able to settl emen t by way of

an impartial investigat ion and report . One can n o t imagin ethat any good would have resulted from five of the mostimpartial men s i tting down and making a report

“on the

facts,

”

and then going on to say : “We th in k that Germany ough t to do SO-and-so

,and Great Britain ought to

do so-and-so .

”On the other hand, the greatest good in

the world migh t have resulted from the whole question beingreferred to a smal l body wh i ch wou ld have proceeded byway ofmediation and con ci liation . As we know , i t was

even tually settled by compromise , bu t one can no t doubtthat i t would have been set t led long before i t had producedan acerbi ty in German and Brit ish relat ion s if i t had been

early en trusted to the mediation ofa Board ofConci liators,


composed, for in stan ce, of the P res iden t of the Un i tedStates and the P rime M in ister ofNorway .

DIPLOMATISTS OR LAWYERs ?

These two n ames bring u s to the last po in t conn ectedwi th th is compartmen t of the problem . The person n el of

a Board ofCon ci l iators Should in most cases be d ifferen tfrom that of a Commiss ion of I nqui ry. For settl ing a

quest ion l i ke that of the Bagdad Rai lway you wan t a kin dof smal l conferen ce in which German y and Britain wouldbe represen ted by thei r respon s i ble min isters

,and the work

of con c i l iat ion,suggestion

,and mediat ion would be don e

by the respon s ible min is ters, who would have the weight

and authori ty of represen t in g impartial States disin terestedin th e particular question , but deeply in terested in fin ding

a solut ion of i t . On the other hand,for a Commission

of Inquiry you do n ot require respon s ible min isters , buton ly men of weight and distin ct ion and un impeachableimpartial i ty

,who have some in tern at ional experi en ce and

some experi en ce in weigh in g eviden ce .

To sum up : if there i s to be any kind of pacific regulat ion of in tern at ion al affairs, some provision must be

made , as these schemes agree, for settl in g non -j usti ciab le

disputes between n at ion s. There are two methods whichhave been developed by dip lomatists in the past, and

which admit of great developmen t in th e future . Thesetwo methods are distin ct, and wh i l e some schemes con

cen trate their atten t ion upon one, others con cen trate theiratten t ion upon the other ; and some, again , ten d to con

fuse the two methods . Both methods should be given a

defin i te p lace in any organ ized system of settl ing in ter

nation al disputes and of in tern ation al governmen t .

SECTION I V

AN INTERNATIONAL LEG I SLATURE

WE n ow have to turn to an other and on e of the mostd ifficult parts of the problem— that ofmaking the gen eralrules for the regulation of in tern ation al in tercourse . P ro

bably becau se ofi ts difficulty,and because ofthe extremely

deli cate question s involved in i t, i t does not find a promin en t p lace in most of these schemes

,and in some i t is

ignored altogether . Bu t i t i s of immen se importan ce, and

we suggest that precisely because i t is SO difficul t and

del icate, i t must be faced with hon esty and boldn ess byany one who holds that i n tern ation al governmen t and thepacific regulation of in tern ation al relat ion s are n ot on lydesirable but practi cal .We propose first

,as in previous cases, to indicate how

and to what exten t the several schemes make provis ion

for establishing , making, or altering the gen eral rules

which are to regulate the relation s of States ; in otherwords

,for the in tern at ional l egislati ve fun ction .

The League to Enforce Pea ce.

Conferen ces between the s ign atory P owers Shal l be held

from time to time to formu la te and codify ru les of in te rn ational law ,

wh i ch,u n less some s igna to ry Shall s ign ify

its dissen t with in a stated period, shal l thereafter governi i

42 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEin the decision s of the j udicial tr ibun al men tion ed inArt i cl e I .

The M i n imum P rogramme of the Cen tra l Organ iza tion for

a Dura ble Pea ce.

The work of the H ague Conferen ces,with a Vi ew to the

peaceful organ ization of the Society ofNation s, Shal l bedeveloped. (The M in imum P rogramme also lays down

certain part icu lar n ew rules of in tern at ional law which i t

main tain s Should be made by the n at ion s .)

The League ofNa tions Society

Makes no provision at al l for deal ing with in ternati on allaw or gen eral rules.

Proposa ls ofLord Bryce’

s Group.

The Coun ci l to be at l iberty to make and submit for thecon sideration of the s ign atory P owers suggestion s as tothe l imitat ion or reduct ion Of armamen ts, or any other

proposal whi ch in i ts Op in ion would lead to the avoid

an ce ofwar or the diminut ion Of i ts evi ls.

Draft Trea ty ofthe Du tch Comm i ttee.

Does n ot provide for deal ing with in tern ational law or

gen eral rules .

The Fa bia n Society.

ART. 5 .—The I n tern at ion al Coun ci l Shal l be a con

t in uou sly exist ing del iberative and legis lat ive body com

posed of the represen tat ives of the con st i tuen t States .

ART. 8 .-It shal l be with in the competen ce of the

In tern ation al Coun ci l to codify and declare the I n ter

AN INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATURE 43

n ation al Law existing between the several indepen den tSovereign States of the world ; an d any such codifyingen actmen t, wh en and i n so far as ratified by the Constituen t States, shal l be app l ied and enforced by the I n tern ation al H igh Court .It Shal l be with in the competen ce of the I n tern ation al

Coun ci l from time to time,by specific en actmen t, to am en d

I n tern ation al Law , wh ether or n o t th is has been cod ified,

and any such en actmen t, when and so far as ratified by theseveral Con st i tuen t States

,Shal l be app l i ed and enforced

by the I n tern ation al H igh Court .When ever any Con sti tu en t State n otifies its refusal torat ify as a who le any en actmen t made by the In tern ation al

Coun ci l, i t Shall at the same time n otify i ts ratification of

such part or parts of such enactmen t as i t wi l l con sen tto be bou n d by : and the I n tern ation al Coun ci l shall

thereupon re-en act the parts so ra t ified by all the Con

stituen t States,and declare such en actmen t to have been

so ratified,and such en actmen t Shal l thereupon be appl ied

and enforced by the I n tern at ion al H igh Cour t .When any su ch enactmen t of the I n tern ation al Coun ci lmak ing any n ew gen eral ru le of law has been ratified

whol ly or in part by any two or more Consti tuen t States,but n ot by al l the Con st i tuen t States, i t shall, so far as

ratified,be deemed to be binding on the ratifying State or

States, but on ly in respect of the rela t ions of such S ta teor States with any o ther ratifyi ng State or Sta tes ; and i tShall be appli ed and enforced accordingly by the I n ter

n ati on al H igh Cou rt .

It wi ll be seen that of these s ix schemes o n ly two ,the

Leagu e to En fo rce Peace and the Fabia n Soci ety, m akea ny ser ious attempt to provide fo r the mak i ng or a lterat io nofI n tern ation al Law . The proposals ofLord Bryce

'

s Group


merely provide for the suggesti on or in i t iat ion of in tern ation al legislat ion by the Coun ci l ; l those suggestion s

migh t or might n ot be followed up by the S ign atory Statesin any part icular case, and i t is Clear that i t wou ld in eachcase depen d upon n egot iation wh ether a conferen ce should

be cal led to con s ider the suggest ion . We kn ow from the

past that un der such circumstan ces th e process of determin ing Or alterin g in tern ation al law is bo th S low and

un satisfactory . The M in imum-P rogramme has on ly a

rather vague referen ce to the developmen t of the work of

the H ague Conferen ces,and the other two schemes ign ore

the matter completely .

THE DANGERS OF A S TATUS Qua .

We have said that the quest ion i s of the first importan ce ,and we must how

,in face of th is rather th in harvest of

suggestion s,make good th is assertion . P erhaps the clearest

way of proving i t is in con n ection with an obj ection often

taken again st any kin d of scheme for the in tern ation alorgan ization and the pacific regulation of d i sputes . The

Obj ect ion could n ot be more clearly stated than in a letter

wh ich appeared some l i ttle t ime ago in the Westm i n ster

Gazette by a writer, Mr. B isgood, who was argu ing again s t

some ofthe sch emes which we have been examin ing . Mr.

In the in troduc t ion to the Proposals, however, the n ecessi ty for a

regula r o rgan for codifying and develop ing in tern a tion al law i s clea rlyrecogn ized, and the hope i s expressed tha t such an organ w i ll be foundin the Hague Conferen ce (ai de page 83 below). It Should also be

remarked tha t formally the scope of the Coun c i l in these P roposa ls i sw ider than tha t of the Conferen ces of the League to Enforce P eace.

The Conferen ce ofthe League to Enforce P eace i s rest r icted to “ for

mulating and codify ing rules of in terna t ional law the Coun c i l inLord B ryce’

s P roposals i s to make suggest ion s as to “ the lim i ta t ion or

reduc tion of a rmamen ts or any o ther proposa l which in i ts op in ion

would lead to the avoidance ofwar or the dim inu t ion ofi ts evils.


with which w e are faced are n ot that of mak ing warimposs ibl e and comp l ete res ign ation an d despair ; the

rea l altern at ives are between making war probable, u n derthe existin g system

,and mak ing i t improbable by a

league of n ation s . Bu t war,j u st l ike civi l war, or smal l

pox , or po l i t i cal in telligen ce, remain s poss i ble even when

you have made i t improbable .

Bu t we are st ill l eft wi th the quest ion of the sta tu s

quo : a quest i on in t imately con n ected with that of themaking or altering in tern ation al law . Th is wil l appear

clearly if we try to imagin e con cretely the society of

States based upon the prin cipl es which we have so far

traced as un iversal in the schemes for in tern ation alSociety. The foundation of that society would be the

regulation of relation s in accordan ce with gen eral ru lesand laws : and th is prin cip le appears in a more developedand con crete form in the provis ion s that in tern at ion al

disputes covered by gen eral rules or laws shou ld always

be referred for decis ion to a j udicial body, wh i le d isputes

not so covered shou ld be referred for con ci l iat ion or

Settlemen t to another k in d of body or bodi es. Th is is a

pol i t ical ideal, and the kern el of that ideal is the app l i cation to in tern ation al relat ion s ofthe rule oflaw. P u t i t in toother words and you get Mr. Gladston e ’s famous sen ten ce,ren dered sti l l more famous because Mr. Asquith adoptedi t as a defin i t ion ofou r Obj ect in th is war “ The en thron emen t of the idea of publi c righ t as the govern ing idea

of European po l i t i cs. You can on ly en thron e the ideaof publi c righ t by extendin g and defin ing the rule of

in tern at ion al law,for the thron e of publi c righ t can on ly

be bu i l t ou t of gen eral rules embodying the con cept ion

of what is righ t . The en thron emen t ofpu bli c righ t is

on e of those fin e phrases wh i ch prove that the m an who

used i t or quoted i t must be a statesman ; but when we


come down from statesmansh ip to facts,we have to

tran sl ate th is fin e Sen ten ce in to some such ugly words as

these : “ the defin ing, determin ing and develop ing of the

gen eral rules of in tern at ion al law with the obj ect ofmaking as many in tern ational disputes as poss ible

,when

they do arise,j ust i ci able. For if there is n o rule of

in tern ation al law appl i cable to a d ispute when i t arises,if the dispute is not j usti ciable

,then i t means that so far

as th e quest ion involved in that dispu te i s con cerned,

the world has not yet evolved any publi c righ t to been thron ed . P ubli c right is, in fact

,very much l ike a

hare : you can n ei ther cook the hare un ti l you have

caught i t, nor en throne publ i c right un ti l you have de

fin ed i t.

E! TEND ING THE RE IGN OF LAW.

The idea which is impl i cit in the minds of Mr. G lads ton e, Mr. Asquith , and the framers ofthese schemes

,is

the exten sion of the field of gen eral ru les of in ternation allaw to cover

,if poss ible

, the whole field of in ternati on alrelation s. In other words

,our aim Should be to make

every dispute j usti ciable, so that every d ispu te aris ingbetween States could be

,and would be

,referred to a

ju dicial tri bun al for decis ion i n accordan ce with a

previously establ ished gen eral rule of in ternation al law .

That is an i deal which wi ll p robab ly n ever be complete lyatta in ed, bu t that does n o t mea n tha t we shou ld n o t aimat i t. Mr. Gl adston e and Mr. Asquith have to ld u s

defin i tely that we should aim at i t,the latter addi ng that

i t i s the main obj ect for wh i ch we are fight ing th is war ;P res iden t W i lson has told u s that we Shou ld a im a t i t

,

and so has Mr. Lloyd George , and H err von Bethman n

H ollweg, and Mr. Balfour, and Lord Grey, a nd a ll

the authors of these schemes . Bu t if we are to take

48 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEth is as our practi cal pol i ti cal ideal

,then we must face

the pract i cal con sequen ces involved in the i deal.The first con sequ en ce is th is . If we are to aim atexten ding the field of publi c righ t or in tern at ion al lawas mu ch as poss ible

,we require some mean s of defin ing

an d determin ing what the law is . Or looked at froman other angle, if we establ ish a system under whichin tern ation al d isputes covered by gen eral ru les wi l l besettled by j udic ial tribun als

,there must be clearly defin ed

gen eral ru les for the tribun als to app ly. In man y casesthere are such rules

,but in an en ormous number ofmost

importan t cases there are n on e,and very often the rules

wh ich do exist are vague and i l l-defined. Therefore,

from every po in t of Vi ew,i t becomes of the h ighest im

portan ce, if the ru le of publi c righ t is to be appl ied to

in ternation al relation s,that some mean s of defin ing and

determin ing the gen eral ru les embodying publ i c righ tshould exist . At the presen t momen t n o effective mean sfor performing th i s fun ction exist .Bu t th is l eads u s to a secon d poin t where we areconfron ted with the riddle ofthe sta tus quo. Ifth e system

of publ i c right or law,or the regulation of relation s in

accordan ce with gen eral rules,be app l ied to in tern ation al

relation s,certain con sequen ces inheren t in such a system

fol low. When ever man appl i es th is system ofgovernmen t to h is relat ion s— and he is always ex ten ding it to

n ew fields of human relat ion ship— he always and inevit

ably sets up over the l ivin g the tyran ny of the dead . I t

is often forgo tten that even i n the most democrat i c coun try

imagin able men would n ot ru le themselves ; they wouldbe ruled for the mos t part by the dead . At any particu lar

momen t of t ime governmen t mean s the regulati on of

relation s by certain exist ing gen eral rules. Those ru les

are fixed,establ ished : they are the framework of society


as i t exists they were made by m en,n ow dead

,embody

i ng thei r idea l ofwhat society Should be, and i t is throughthei r power that society as i t exists i s protected fromsufferin g change.In a certain sen se

,and to a certain degree

,there i s

j ust ification in Mr. Bisgood’

s Obj ection to a league of

n at ion s wh i ch seeks to en thron e the i dea of publi c righ ti n Europe . I n tern ation al law regu la tes the fundamen ta lrelation s of States— cg . the who le of in tern at ion al law is

based upon the doctrin e of the sovereign ty,in depen den ce

and terri torial in tegri ty of States. I n tern ation al law is,

therefore, the great bulwark of the in tern ation al sta tu s quo,j ust as mun i cipal law is a powerful bu lwark of the Social

sta tus quo. Treaties,again , are an other bu lwark of the

same k ind : their whole mean ing and in ten tion is to

s tereotype the sta tu s quo in so far as they defin e the

con st i tu tion of in tern a t i on al society or the relation s of

States. If,then

,a league of n ation s effectual ly succeeded

in impos in g upon the world a system wh i ch regulatedin tern at ion al relation s rigidly in accordan ce with exist ingin tern ation al law an d exist ing treati es, and provided n o

mean s ofaltering the laws or making n ew laws an d treaties,then the effect of the l eague would be to stereo type the

sta tus quo, and the on ly method of varying the sta tus qu o

would be to resort to force . An d the more fragmen tary

a nd i l l-defined in tern ation al law is,the more certain ly

would an y su ch system lead ei ther to gross in j u st ice or

to early and complete fai lu re .

I t should be n oted that people who , l ike Mr. B isgood,

take th is obj ect ion ofthe sta tu s quo to any l eague ofn a tion smis in terpret the leagu e

’

s mode of Operation . Of the

schemes examin ed by u s, ifyou Choo se ou t the o n e w h ich

makes l east provis ion for a l ter i ng i n tern at ion a l law a nd

wh i ch con cen trates the fullest force beh ind the sta tu s quo

4

50 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEas embodi ed in treaties and in tern ation al law

,you wi l l

find on reflection that i t by n o mean s stereo types thesta tus quo to the exten t wh i ch Mr. B isgood foretel ls. On lywhere in tern ation al re lat ion s are covered by existingrules ofin tern at ion al law or by exist ing treaties does i t actin that way— i .e. by making those laws and treat ies bin dingan d by providing n o mean s of varying or amen ding them .

Bu t for al l re lat ion s n ot so covered, i t provides a method

of regu lat ion wh i ch would admit ful ly ofprogress, change ,and the variat ion of the sta tus qu o. Any quest ion con

n ected wi th such relation s would be referred to a coun ci l

of con ci l iat ion or a commissi on of enquiry in which ,ex hypothesi , the settlemen t would n ot depend upon l awor treaty obl igation s . Thus

,for in stan ce

,if the Bagdad

Rai lway quest ion had been submitted to a coun ci l ofcon ci l iat ion

,the solut ion would most certain ly have

involved a variat ion of the sta tus quo.

I t can n ot be admitted that the Obj ection as usual lyformu lated is val id . Yet n o on e who kn ows anyth ing

ofmodern in tern ation al h istory can dismiss i t as en ti rely

groundl ess, or can Vi ew with equan imity the foun dation of

in tern at ion al so ciety upon a rigid basis of in tern at ion al

law as i t exists” to -day, un l ess those foun dation s in cludesome system of develop in g an d improving and altering

the law i tself. B ecause,though i t i s true that a large part

ofthe field of in tern ation al relat ion s is n ot covered by thelaw

,and would be subj ect to the more elast i c treatmen t of

con ci l iation and inquiry, n early all the fun damen tal relat ion s Of States, as we have had to remark, are covered byin tern at ion al law

,and i t is precisely with regard to those

relat ion s that the n eed for change and developmen t i smost often and most acutely fel t . I t fo l lows that there isa serious and dangerous lacun a in any scheme wh i ch does

n ot provide for defin ing, altering and developing the

AN INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATURE 5 1

gen eral rules of law wh i ch form, an d are to form, the

bas is of i n t ern at ion al society.

A PRACTICABLE PROPOSAL .

There are obvious difficult ies i n the way of meetingth is requ i remen t : but we bel ieve that they are exaggeratedin the imagin ation of n early eve ry on e. What we requireis some regular process of in tern ation a l legisla t ion , and

the very words “ in tern at ion a l legislation ” are suffic ien tto scare the wits out of any ordin ary person who has

been hag-ridden by the bogey of utop ian ism . Bu t in ter

n ation al l egis lat ion in the sense in wh i ch we u se thewords

,a n d in the sen se in wh i ch the world to-day

requ ires i t, does not involve any su ch revolu tion as world

parliamen ts and world-federation s. The world has alreadyevolved in the last cen tury a system Of in tern ationall egislation through conferen ces wh i ch , if regu larized and

developed,would an swer all the n eeds of the presen t

day . The mass of i n tern at ion al legislation wh i ch has

already resulted,

and the wide and importan t fie lds

of relation sh ip wh i ch have thus successfully been brough tunder the regulat ion of n ew ru les of in tern a t ional law

,

have been treated in Several books recen t ly published .

The on ly two schemes,therefore, wh i ch at tempt to

provide for what we may call the in tern at ional legislat ivefun ction righ tly proceed by develop ing th is system of

in tern ational conferen ces . U nder the Leagu e to E nforce

P eace the work of formu la t i ng and cod ifying ru les of

i n tern ation al law wou ld be en tru s ted to regu lar con

feren ces : wh ile the I n tern at ion al Cou n c i l of the P ahla r.

scheme wou ld be in effect on ly a perma n en t in tern a t ion alconferen ce

,of the type of the H ague Conferen ces or the

Posta l U n ion Conferen ce, for gen eral leg islat i ve purposes .


THE PLACE OF FORCE .

We have n ow deal t with the three main prin cip leswh i ch u n derl i e these schemes

,and we have tried to Show

how th ey exist already in the world offacts an d foreign

po l i cy, an d how the attempt to app ly and CO-Ordin ate themhas led to the resemblan ces and differen ces in the variousschemes . There are st i l l on e or two other poin ts wh i ch

require men tion . The first i s the mu ch -debated qu estion

of the enforcemen t of the gen eral rules wh i ch are toregu late the rela t ion s of States . Nearly al l the schemes

quo ted h ere provide that States shal l u se their armedforces col lectively to en sure comp l i an ce with some of the

obligat ion s wh i ch the schemes w ou l d impose upon s ig

n atory State‘

s. Bu t the schemes,as we have Shown

,create

a vari ety of obliga tion s,an d they do n ot al l agree as to

those beh in d wh i ch the san ction offorce shal l be p laced.

The Commun i ty ofNa tions pamph l et defin i tely rej ects the

san ction of force . The Leagu e to E nforce P eace and

the proposals of Lord B ryce’

s Group wou ld p lace the san ction beh in d on ly the obligation to u se the pacific mach in ery

of set tlemen t,the obligat ion to submi t disputes either to

a jud ici al tr ibu n al or to a cou n ci l of con ci liat ion . The

Leagu e ofNa t ion s Society goes a step farth er, and in addit ion wou ld bin d S tates to u se force

,if n ecessary

,to compel

complian ce W i th the decis ion s ofa j udi cial tribun al (though

n ot,apparen tly, with the decis ion s of a coun cil of in qu iry

and con ciliat ion ) . The provis ion s of the scheme of the

F abian Society are substan t ia l ly the same elaborated, an d

with the add i t ion that certain decis ion s ofthe In tern ation a l

Cou n cil are enforceable.Th ese d ifferen ces are irrelevan t to the main prin cip l es

wh i ch u n derly the schemes. The question wh ether human

relation s shal l be regulated by gen eral rules of righ t an d

5 4 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACElaws, have al l in i solat ion reached a con siderable degreeof developmen t at th e hands of diplomatists during thelast hundred years . Bu t thei r poss ib i l i t i es have beenseriously impaired

,and much of their uti l i ty has been lost

,

because there has been l i tt le or n o attempt to co-ordin atethem . Th is has had two resu lts . F i rst

,the real and

reason able fun ct ion ofeach method of settlemen t has beenblurred

,and d ip lomatists have fai led to see that differen t

kinds ofdisputes are amen able to differen t kinds of settle

men t . Secondly,wh en disputes have on ce arisen , i t has

been extremely d ifficult to apply any of the methods of

settl emen t wh i ch do exist,because there has been n o agree

men t beforehand as to how and when they shal l be used,

and,therefore

,the question as to what method shall be

tried is almost a lways i tself an addit ion al subj ect of dispute . I t is a sign of the great developmen t ofin tern ation al

governmen t, that in recen t years, wh ere dangerous in ter

n ation al disputes have arisen— e.g. the Morocco ques tionand the Seraj evo murder— the quest ion ofhow the d isputeshould be settled

,whether by conferen ce or tri bun al or

other pacific mach in ery,has i tself been a most promin en t

part of the con troversy . Th i s shows what progress theworld has made in the kin d of in ternat ional regulation and

governmen t and machin ery wh ich these schemes embody,

and also how n ecessary is that co-ordin ation ofthe differen tmethods which the schemes seek to create. In a sense, i t

would be stri ctly correct to say that the schemes do abso~

lu tely n othing but aim at defin ing by in tern ation al agreemen t how exist ing methods of settlemen t shal l be broughtin to operat ion when differen t kinds of disputes haveactually arisen

,and what steps dip lomatists shal l take to

make the best u se of the exist ing machin ery alreadydeveloped by dip lomacy. I t shou ld, however, be remarked

that this raises a question wh ich has hardly been touched


by any of the au thors of these sch emes . As soon as you

have a co -ordin at ion of the mach in e ry ofpacific se t tlemen tand in tern at iona l organ izat ion

,i t is a question whe ther

some in te rn at io n al body an swe r in g to an execu tive is n ot

required. I t m ay be argu ed with some force tha t somecen tral mo tive power for pu tt i ng the mach in ery— and the

righ t mach in ery— ofsettlemen t in to motion is essen tial ; and

certain ly,if,as some of the schemes con template, a deci

sion wi ll have to be made in certain cases as to what mean sare to be taken to compel a State to comply with i ts obl igation s, some in tern ation a l cen tral body must be providedwh i ch can come to that decis ion an d see that i t is carriedou t. I t is tru e that the Fabian scheme con templates these

execut ive fun ction s being performed by its I n tern ationa lCoun ci l

,but the cou n ci l seems rather a cumbersome and

s low-moving body to be en tru sted wi th execu t ive fun ct ion s. I t may be suggested that what is wan ted is a sma ll,

perman en t, cen tral body whose sole du ty would be towatch over and promote the operat ion and fulfilmen t of

the obliga t ion s as regards pacific sett lemen t of the sign atory Pow ers .

MEMBERSH IP OF THE LEAGUE .

A word shou ld be said as to the extremely importan t

practical question of what States are to be admitted to

the League wh i ch all the schemes postu late . There aretwo en t irely differen t poin ts con n ected w i th th is question .

Two kinds of restri c t ion u pon the membersh ip ha ve beensuggested and d iscu ssed . The first is i n tended to avo id

some ofthe d ifficu l t i es wh i ch beset the H ague Conferen ces .

The n umber of small States , parti cu la rly the So u th Am eri

can Repu bli cs , adm i tted to those Co nferen ces , n o to rio us lyinterfered with thei r efficien cy. They n ot o n ly in creased


the d ifficul ty, always con s iderabl e, of obtain ing any kin dof agreemen t between Sovereign States . Bu t the presen ceof an overwhelming maj ori ty of smal l States

,able to out

vo te al l the Great P owers,at on ce raises the extremely

del icate problem of vo ting power . Some of the schemes,

therefore, in order to meet th is obj ect ion , propose a l imi tat ion on the righ t of admiss ion to the League. Thus LordB ryce’s Group suggests the in clu sion , as of r igh t, on ly ofthe Great P owers and of any o ther European State thatmay wish to adh ere

,while in the in troduction the sugges

t i on is made that “ later on,if the arrangemen t were found

to work wel l in practi ce,i t migh t be thrown open to al l the

States of the world . On the o ther han d the FabianSoci ety

,wh i ch deals fu l ly with th is s ide of the question ,

in i ts draft trea ty gives the righ t of adm i ss ion to practically

al l the in depen den t, sovereign Sta tes of the world,bu t

attempts to meet the d iffi cu lt i es,descri bed above

,by

elaborate provision s as to separate In tern at ion a l Cou n cils

and as to voting power .The secon d poin t i n regard to membersh ip issues ou t of

the circumstan ces of the presen t w ar . I t is n atu ral thatman y peop l e find i t imposs ib l e to con ceive of an y co

Operation i n the n ear fu tu re betw een the Al l i es and the

Cen tral P owers . Bu t every on e of these schemes pre

supposes the ful lest and fairest co-operation between the

s ignatori es of the treaties . W Ithou t a n ew sp i ri t of co

operation the League migh t as well d isso lve straight away

with a ll the clauses ofits treaty in to the waste paper-basket .

H en ce the suggestion has been made by some peop l e that

the Cen tral Powers should be excluded from the Leagu e .I t i s n o table that n on e of these sch emes adopts or cou n

ten an ces th is proposal . They al l,in so far as they deal

with admiss ion,leave i t open to Germany and Austria to

adhere to the treaty ifwi lling to do so The argumen ts in


favour ofdo ing th is appear to me u n an swerable . A leagu ewh i ch excluded German y wou ld in evi tably appear to beand ten d to become a leagu e d i rected again st Germany .

Bu t in that case the whole obj ect and in ten t ion of theseschemes would be frustrated . No n ew form of in tern ation al relation sh ip, governmen t, and co-operation wou ldissu e ou t of them,

bu t on ly the o ld,d isastrous system of

hosti l e al l ian ces disguised very th in ly un der a n ew n ame .H en ce an essen t ial cond i t ion of the su ccess of theseschemes is that at l east a ll the Great P owers should adhereto them .

THE BOGEY OF UTOP IA .

F in al ly,we may en d by referring to a subj ect wh i ch has

more than on ce cropped up in our con s ideration of thesevarious prOposals . The most common cri t icism of any

scheme of th is sort i s that i t is U top ian . F rom experts onin tern at ion al law

,l ike Mr. Bowles in the Ca ndid Review

,

down to the j ourn alist who is as ign oran t of in ternat ion a l

law as he is abou t h istory, geography, peace, war, and

everyth ing else except the filling of eighty-four colums of

marketable prin t between sun set and su n rise— there are a

whole hos t of people w ho con sider that they have finallydisposed ofany idea by calling it U top ian . Bu t i t is worth

wh ile examin ing for a momen t th is te r r ifying ad j ective . If

i t is mean t tha t these schemes wou ld n o t work in p ract i ceif they were adopted by the n a tion s of the wo rld, then

h istory proves th is to be ex tremely improbab le. I n tern ation al tribuna ls have worked adm irably in scores of

cases ; con c i l i a t ion an d commiss io n s of i nqu i ry havewo rked admirab ly w hen ever they have been tried ; co nferen ces have over and over aga i n wo rked admirab ly, whe therfor the settling of d ispu tes or for defi n ing the ru les fo r

the regulation of in tern ation al relatio n s. Th is is the on ly

5 8 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACE

mach in ery which these U top ian schemes propose to use ;

an d i t is a cu rious th ing if a scheme wh i ch merely co

ordin ates existing practi ca l mach in ery and en deavours toimprove i ts workin g should prove more U top ian an d

unpract i cal than the un co -ordin ated and obviously faultymach in ery . The fact is

,of cou rse

,that every n ew i dea and

proposal is U topian . Everything is U top i an un t i l i t i s tr ied .

The world may elect that n at io n s shall n o t regulate thei rrelation s i n accordan ce wi th gen eral rul es, but by mutual

destruction . In that case Europe at least, than ks to man’s

ingen uity in devising mean s of destroying and torturin g

h imself and h is fellows, wi l l s lowly or qui ck ly relapse in tocomp lete barbarism . And in that case, too, the descend

an ts ofthe ed i tor ofthe Ca ndid Review, , con temp lat ing from

a bomb-proof cel lar or tren ch the brief existen ce wh i chthey en joy before finally being blown to pieces in the

Great War,which will then have become a perman en cy,

may hug themselves wi th satisfaction to see that theseschemes have

,after al l

,proved U top i an . In other words

,

man , noble in reason , can and must choose the method onwhich he is going to regulate h is own relations . H e can

choose that marked out in these sch emes ; or, on the other

hand,he can choose the method offorce and frightfuln ess .

But ifhe chooses the lat ter, i t does n ot prove that the first is

U top ian— though i t certain ly wi l l prove h is own destruction .

SCHEMESTHE fo l lowing is a l ist of the schemes

, quoted in the

I n troduction,and prin ted in full in the succeeding pages .

Part iculars as to pri ce and publ ication have been added

where avai lable . No . V I I , the Draft Treaty by a DutchCommittee

,has been tran slated for the con ven i en ce of

English readers,as the origin al is publ ished in F ren ch .

I . League to Enforce Peace . 507, sth Avenue, NewYork Ci ty, U n i ted States ofAmerica .

I I . M in imum P rogramme. Cen tra l Organ ization for aDurable P eace , Theresiastraat 5 1, The H ague, H olland .

I II. The League ofNat ion s Society. Room 195 , Cen tralBui ldings

,Toth i l l Street

,Westmin ster, London , S .W . I .

League ofNa tions Publica tion , No . 2 .

IV. P roposa ls for the Preven tion of Fu ture Wa rs, byViscoun t B ryce and others. George Al len and U nwin .

I S. n et.

V . Articles of a Trea ty esta blishing a Supern a tiona l

Au thori ty tha t w i ll preven t Wa r, by a Fabian Committee,publ ished in In terna tion a l Governmen t, by L. S . Woolf.

George Al len and Unwin,and the Fabian Bookshop .

63 . net.

V I . The Commun i ty ofNa tions Pamphlet. Dr. H odgkin,

7 , Old P ark Ridings, Win chmore H i l l , N. St. Clemen t'

s

P ress. 1d.

V I I . Du tch Comm i ttee. Cen tral Organ ization for a

Du rable P eace. Avan t-P roj et d'u n Trait! General relatif

au Reglemen t Pacifiqu e des Confl its I n tern at ionaux par

la Commission N! erlandaise d'

Etudes. Martinus Nijhoff,

The H ague, H olland,

THE FRAMEWORK O LASTING PEACE

Fou rth Conferen ces between the s ign atory Powers

shall be held from time to t ime to formulate and codifyrules of in tern at ion al law

,whi ch , un less some s ign a

tory shal l s ign ify i ts dissen t with in a stated period,shal l thereafter govern in the decis ion s of the Judicial

Tribun al men t ion ed in Arti cl e On e.

M INIMUM PROGRAMME OF TH E CENTRALORGANI Z ATION FOR A DURABLE PEACE

I . No an n exation or tran sfer of territory shal l be madecon trary to the in terests and wishes of the populationcon cern ed . Where poss ible, their con sen t shall be obtain edby plebisci te or otherwise .The Sta tes shal l guaran tee to the vari ous n ation ali t i esin cluded in their boun daries

,equal i ty before the law

,

rel igious l iberty, and the free use of thei r n at ive lan

guages .

2 . The States shal l agree to in troduce in their colon i es,

protectorates, and spheres of influen ce,l i berty of com

merce,or at least equal treatmen t for al l nation s.

3 . The work of the H ague Conferen ces with a view to

the peaceful organ i zat ion of the Society ofNation s shal lbe developed .

The H ague Conferen ce shall be given a perman en torgan i zation and meet at regular in tervals .

The States shall agree to submit a ll thei r d ispu tes to

peaceful settlemen t . For th is purpose there sha ll be

created,in add i t ion to the existen t H agu e Cou rt ofArbi

tration (a ) a perman en t Cou r t of I n tern a t ion al justi ce

(b) a perman en t I n tern ation al Coun ci l of I n vestigat io n

and Con ci l iation . The States shal l bind themselves to take53

64 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEcon certed action— diplomati c, econ omic, or mi l i tary— in

case any State should resort to mil itary measures

in stead of submitting the dispute to j ud icial decis ion orto th e mediation of the Coun ci l of I n vestigat ion and

Con ci l iat ion .

4 . The States shal l agree to reduce their armamen ts . In

order to faci l i tate the reduction of n aval armamen ts,the

right of capture shal l be abolished and the freedom of the

seas assured .

5 . Foreign pol i cy shal l be un der the effective con trol of

the parl iamen ts of the respect ive n ation s .

Secret treaties shal l be void.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS SOC IETY

I . That a treaty shal l be made as soon as possible,

whereby as many States as are wi lling shall form a Leagu e

b inding themselves to use peaceful methods for deal ingwith al l d isputes aris ing among them .

2 . That such methods shall be as fo l lows

(a ) All disputes aris ing ou t of question s of I n tern ation al Law or the I n terpretation ofTreaties shal l bereferred to the H ague Court ofArbitration , or someother j udicial Tribu n al, whose decision s shall be fin al

,

and shall be carried in to effect by the parties con

cern ed .

(b) All o ther d ispu tes shal l be referred to and in vest igated an d reported upon by a Coun ci l of I nquiry andCon ci l iat ion : the Coun ci l to be represen tative of the

States wh i ch form the Leagu e.

3 . That the States wh i ch are members of the League

shal l u n i te in any action n ecessary for i n suring that everymember shall abide by the terms of the Treaty .

4 . Tha t the S tates wh i ch are m embers of the Leagu e

shall make provis ion for Mu tual Defen ce —d iploma t ic,5 so

66 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEeconomic

,or mil i tary— i h the even t of any of them being

attacked by a State,n ot a member of the League

,which

refuses to submit the case to an appropr iate Tribun al or

Coun ci l .

5 . That any civi l ized State desiring to j oin the League

shall be admitted to membersh ip .

IV

PROPOSALS FOR THE PREVENTIONOF FUTURE WARS

BY V ISCOUNT BRYCE AND OTHERS

INTRODUCTION.

THE hope and in ten t ion that one outcome ofthe presen t war shal l be an in tern ation al

agreemen t to subst itute for war methods of

peaceable agreemen t has been expressed bypromin en t statesmen of the En ten te and em

phati cal ly en dorsed by P residen t W i lson,who

has offered the co-operation of the U n i tedStates . The Al l ied Governmen ts have n ow

defin i tely in cluded some such plan amongthe obj ects for which they are con tending .

They say in thei r n ote to P residen t W i lson I

that they “ declare thei r wholehearted agreemen t with the proposal to create a League of

Nation s wh i ch shal l assure peace and j usticethroughout the world . They recogn ize al l theben efi ts which w i ll accrue to the cause of

human i ty and civi l izat ion from the in sti tution

of in tern ation al arrangemen ts design ed to preven t violen t confl i cts between the n ation s, and

so framed as to provide the san ction s n eces

sary to thei r enforcemen t, l est an i l lusorysecuri ty should serve merely to faci l i tate fresh

acts of aggressi on .

”

These aspiration s, we bel i eve, are shared

by the peop les of all the States at war, and the

support they have thus publ icly received from

January, 19 17 .

67

Object of theproposa ls.

FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACE

governmen ts should bring them at on cein to the region ofpracti cal pol i ti cs . Bu t toembody them in an acceptable form wi l l beno easy task.I t i s clear that the reforms to be in troducedmust be drasti c if they are to be effective .On the o ther han d

,there must be con t in uity ;

for proposals involvmg too vio len t a breachwith the establ ished order are n ot l ikely to beseriously con s idered . What is attempted here

is to put forward a scheme which,wh i l e i t

involves a real an d radical advan ce upon thepresen t organ ization of in tern at ion al relation s

,

yet does n o t break so violen tly with the courseof h istori cal developmen t as to be fairlydescribed as U top ian .

W i th the deep underlying causes ofwar wedo not here con cern ourselves . Those causes

,

main ly con n ected,in the modern world

,with

false ideas and wrong feel ings about the moral,

pol i ti cal,and econ omic relat ion s of States

,of

classes,and of in dividuals, can on ly be gradu

al ly dissipated by the spread of in tel l igen ce,

kn owledge,and goodwi l l . An d un t i l they are

dissipated there can be n o comp lete securi ty

for peace . Mean t ime,however

,we th in k i t

possible, by such an arrangemen t as we sug

gest,to dimin ish very con s i derably the risk

ofwar, and so to give t ime for the developmen t of that educative process upon whichwe main ly rely.P rOposals for the reform of in tern ation alrelation s vary in range and exten t from

complete schemes for a World-State, to im


The terms ofthetrea ty.

suggestion in Clause 1 of the presen t draftis for the in clus ion

,as of righ t

,of the Great

P owers , and of any o ther European State

that may wish to adhere . Bu t th i s parti cularselection of States is n ot of th e essen ce of

the scheme . What i s importan t i s,that the

membersh ip should n ot be so n arrow and

exclus ive that the Un ion shal l appear to bea mere al l ian ce directed again st other States .For th is reason i t seems essen tial that at l eastall the Great P owers should be admiss ible asof righ t, whether or n o they al l choose tocome in at the begin n ing. And there areothers of the l esser European S tates, such as

H ollan d,Belgium

,the Scandin avian coun tr ies

an d Switzerlan d,wh ich should obviously be

in cluded,as well as some of the chief South

American States . Later on,ifthe arrangemen t

were found to work wel l in practi ce, i t migh t

be thrown open to al l the States of the world .

In formulating the con dit ion s of the U n ion,

we have taken as our starting-poin t the seri es

of treaties recen t ly con cluded between the

U n i ted States of America and a n umber of

other States. The essen ce of these treati es isthat the con tracting part ies agree n ot to haverecourse to forcib le measures un ti l the matter

in dispute between them has been submitted

to a perman en t Commission ofIn quiry. Thus,

un der the treaty rat ified in 19 14 between the

U n i ted K ingdom and the U n i ted States, the

parties agree “ that al l disputes between them,

ofevery n ature whatsoever, other than disputes

the settlemen t ofwhich is provided for and in

PROPOSALS OF LORD BRYCE ’S GROUPfact ach i eved u nder existing agreemen ts betweenthe H igh Con tracting P arties

,

Ishall

,when

diplomati c methods of adj u stmen t have fa iled,be referred for in vestigation and report to aP erman en t I n tern ation al Commission

,to be

con st i tuted in the man n er prescribed i n the

n ext succeeding artic le and they agree no t todeclare war or begin hosti l i ties during such investigation and before the report is submitted .

"

What we propose is, briefly, to gen eralizean arrangemen t of th is kind

,impos ing a

moratorium before recourse shal l be had to

war ; and to add san ction s to en sure thefulfi lmen t of the treaty. We bui ld thus uponexisting facts and ten den ci es

,and may fairly

claim to be advocating n ot a revo lutionarychange

,but an orderly developmen t.

The dispu tes excep ted by thesewords are ofthe kindcalled by us justic iable. The pr in c ipal t rea ty dealingw i th them i s that ofApr il 14 , 1908, which provides tha t

Differen ces which may ar ise of a legal na ture, orrela t ing to the in terpreta t ion oft rea t ies ex is t ing betw eenthe two con t racting P ar ties, and wh ich i t may n ot havebeen possible to set tle by diplomacy , shall be referredto the permanen t Cou r t of Arbi tra t ion established at

The H ague by the Con ven t ion ofj uly 29 , 1899 , p rov idednever theless tha t they do n ot affec t the vi tal In terests,the independen ce, or the honou r of the two con tract ingSta tes, and do not con cern the in terests ofth i rd par t ies.

There is also a t rea ty in force (ofj anuary 1 1, 1909)wh ich provides for the referen ce of dispu tes aris ingbetween the U n i ted Sta tes and the Dom in ion ofCanadato a P erman en t Comm ission for exam ina t ion and repor t .The Comm ission may also offer con clu sion s and recom

mendation s. And there i s also a trea ty (ofJan uary 2 7,1909 ) prov iding for the reference to a rb i tra t ion of

d i spu tes about the Nor th Atlantic F isheri es,


The members, then , of our proposed U n ionwould bin d themselves by treaty

( 1) To refer al l disputes that migh ta rise between them

,ifdip lomatic methods

of adj ustmen t had fai led,either to an

arb i tral tribun al for j udicial decision,or

to a coun ci l of con ci l iat ion for in vest i

gation and report (Clauses 2 and

(2 ) Not to declare war or begin hos

ti lities or host i l e preparat ion s un t i l thetribun al has decided or the coun ci l has

reported (Clause

(3) To take con certed action , econ omicand forcible

,again st any s ign atory Power

that should act in violat ion of the preceding condit ion (Clause

(4) To take s imi lar act ion again st anyn on -s ign atory P ower that should declarewar or begin host i l i t i es or host i le preparation s again st a s ign atory P ower

,without

first submitting the dispute to peaceablesettl emen t by the me thod in dicated in ( 1)(Clause

°f Coercive action by the members of the

Un ion would be a treaty obl igation on ly inthe case where a State had resorted to forcebefore submit t ing the dispute to peaceablesettlemen t. For the purposes of such actioni t i s n ot proposed to abol ish n ational armamen ts and substi tute a force un der in tern ation alcon tro l . Bu t i t migh t prove des irable and

practicable that the members of the U n ion

should create, concurren t ly with the sett ing up

PROPOSALS OF LORD BRYCE ’S GROUPofthe Coun ci l ofConci liat ion

,an in tern ation al

executive authority with pow erto cal l in to actionthe forces of the Leagu e

,when the occas ion

should arise,and to direct operation s in its n ame.

M i li tary operat ion s, however, are n ot the

on ly form of coercion possible, and the agree

men t con temp lates also econ omic pressu re . In

some cases th is migh t be as effect ive as armedforce an d as easy of appl i cat ion . A wholeseries of su ch measures can be con ceived

,

d iffering in thei r severity an d in their appli

cabi lity to differen t cases : e .g. an embargoon the sh ipp in g of the recalci tran t State ; a

proh ib it ion of loan s to i t ; cuttin g i t off fromrai lway

, postal , telegraph i c, and telephon i ccommun i cation ; proh ib i tion of exports to orimports from i t , supported ifn ecessary by whatin tern ation al lawyers cal l a “

pacific blockade ."

Appl ied again st a small P ower, su ch measuresas these wou ld be l ikely

,by themselves

,to be

effective . App l ied to a Great P ower, theymight be met by armed force

,wh i ch wou ld

have to be repell ed by force. Bu t the possibility ofa con certed u se of the boyco tt shou ldbe seriously con sidered

,when the case arises,

by the s ignatories to such a U n ion as we are

suggesting .

P assing from th is quest ion of the san ction

to the mach in ery for peaceable settlemen t,o ur prOposal is that dispu tes between the

trea ty Powers should be referred ei ther to

arbitration or to con ci liat ion . We d istinguish ,

therefore,two c lasses of disputes and two

processes of settlemen t,

FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACE

( 1 ) The fi rst c lass of d ispu tes we cal lj u st i ciable.” They are such as arecapable of settlemen t by j udi cial determ in ation for example, the in terpretationofa trea ty

,or any quest ion either ofin ter

n ation al law or offact,where the fact in

dispute i s on e wh i ch,if proved

,would

con st i tute a breach of in tern at ion al duty

(Clause In case ofdisagreemen t as towhether a dispute is j usti ciable or n ot

,the

arbitral tribun al is to decide (ClauseAll disputes of a j usti ciable character

,

in cluding those that involve hon our and

vital in terests,are to be referred to the

H ague Court,as i t n ow is

,or may in

future be con sti tuted,or to some other

arbitral court .

In framing treat ies of arbitrat ion i t has beenusual for States to exclude from the scope

of the treaty cases in volving “ honour ” orvi tal in terests .

” We have not excluded them

in our draft, part ly because we propose to

determin e by th is j udicial procedure those cases

on ly wh i ch are properly susceptible of suchprocedure

,leaving to co n ci l iation cases to

wh i ch legal prin cip les and methods cann ot be

app l i ed, and which wil l comprise at any rate the

great bulk of those in volving “ vital in terests

or “ honour part ly because i t seems essen t ialto an in tern ation al order that, w here law is

recogn ized,i t should be app l i ed, whatever the

con sequen ces . A State,for in stan ce, ought to

be compell ed to submi t to judicial process

PROPOSALS OF LORD BRYCE ’S GROUPan y dispute about terri torial boun daries in

volving treaty righ ts, however importan t i t

may con sider the possess ion of the p i ece of

territory affec ted to be to i ts “ vital in terests.

”

As to “ hon our,in any reputable sen se of

that term, i t can n ever be to a n at ion ’

s honourto repudiate a legal obl igat ion .

( 2 ) The other class ofdisputes,and

,of

course,the class most l ikely to lead to war,

comprises those wh i ch are n ot j ust iciable ;such as

,for in stan ce

,those wh i ch arise

out ofthe gen eral economic and pol it i calrivalry ofStates

,or

,i t may be

,from the

discon ten t of n ation al i t ies with in a State,where such discon ten t commands the

sympathy of a kindred peop l e . For the

settlemen t of such disputes a j udicialtribun al i s n ot the best authori ty. I t is

proposed, therefore, to in st i tute for th is

purpose a n ew in tern ation al body wh i ch

we cal l the Coun ci l of Con ci l iat ion .

The fun ction s of the Coun ci l would be

s imi lar to those h i therto performed by the

dip lomati c represen tatives of the P owers

wh en they meet in con cert to d iscuss

difficu lt question s ; bu t i t is in tended

that the composi t ion of the Cou n ci lshould en able i ts members to take amore impart ial, comp rehen s ive, and in tern ation al view than d iplomatists haveh itherto shown themselves in cl in ed to

take,and to suggest a rad ical settlemen t

rather than a mere temporary compro.

Non -justiciabled i spu tes.


The Counc i l ofConcIlIat Ion .

mise,l ikely to be broken as soon as some

P ower is ready to risk war .

The difficulty,of course

,will be to secure

the appoin tmen t ofh igh ly qual ified impartialmen . Each P ower must appoin t its ow n repre

sen tative,or represen tatives, and determin e the

method ofappoin tmen t . But i t i s prescribedin our draft (Clause 7) that the appoin tmen tsshal l be made for a fixed term of years

,the

Cou n ci l being thus always compl ete and in

being .

I The obj ect of th is provis ion is,that

th e members shal l n ot be exposed to the sus

picion ofhaving been appoin ted for the pur

poses of a parti cu lar dispute, and because of

their supposed vi ews upon i t . Noth ing furtheron th i s subj ec t i s lai d down in the draft. Bu t

i t wou ld seem des irable, if n ot essen tial, thatthe members shou ld n ot act un der con stan tin struct ion s from their governmen ts

,but should

del iberate and vote freely according to thei rbest j udgmen t

,in the in terests of the whole

soci ety of n at ion s . On the other han d, i t is

to be presumed that the members wi ll be,and remain

, sufficien t ly in touch with publ i cop in i on in their ow n coun try n ot to be l ikelyto assen t to prOposals violen t ly in confl i ct withthat op in ion ; and also wil l be of sufficien tcapacity to have influen ce wi th the Coun ci l

,

and of sufficien t weight in their own coun tryto en sure a fair con sideration there of any

A n on -signa tory P ower sending a rep resen ta t iveunder Clause 8 would, ofcourse, appoin t i ts represen tative ad hoe only.

i

FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEP owers would have a larger n umber ofmen

qual ified to be members, th ey might be givena greater represen tat ion say three to each of

the Great P owers, and on e at least to each

of th e rest .The Coun ci l

,as has been explain ed

,wi l l

mediate between the disputan ts and en deavourto arrange a settlemen t wh ich shal l n ot be a

mere compromise but shal l rest upon in tell igible and accepted prin cip les and have ini t some guaran tee ofperman en ce. Sometimes

i t may be able to arrange such a settl emen t

privately with the parties. But in every case

where i t fai ls to do th is i t should publ ish a reportor reports dealing with the whole s i tuationand setting forth its recommendation s and the

groun ds on which they are based (ClauseThese reports and recommen dation s would

then form the subj ect of debates in n ation alLegislative Assemblies

,an d of discussion at

publ i c meetings an d in the press . And sufficien t

t ime being al lowed for th is (Clause 17) i t is n otun reason able to hope that the bes t publ i cOp in ion of al l coun tries would support the

Coun ci l in pressin g for an amicable solutionon the l in es suggested

,and that the disputan ts

would yield to that pressure . Shou ld th is hopen ot be fulfi l led

,then i t must be clearly un der

stood that n o P ower would be un der treatyobl igation ei ther to accept the recommenda

t ion s of the Coun ci l or to put pressure upona P ower refusin g to accept them . The States

would retain on these poin ts al l their l iberty

ofaction . All that the treaty would prescribe

PROPOSALS OF L ORD BRYCE’S GROUP 79

is, that if such a s i tuation arises

,the P owers

should meet in conferen ce to con sider whetheror n ot i t is pract i cable or desi rable for them to

take col lective action (Clause Th is conferen ce would be composed of the diplomati c re

presen tatives ofthe P owers, and would proceedin the ordin ary way of such conferen ces

,al l

the governmen ts being ultimately free to takewhat action they th in k expedien t or right .I t i s poss ib le then

,that from such a s i tua

tion war might, in the last resort,arise. I t i s

n ot claimed that the U n ion would make warimposs ible . Bu t i t is beli eved that the en

forced period ofdelay,the con s iderat ion by an

impartial Coun ci l, and the publ i city given to

i ts recommen dation s would be very likely topreven t war by ral lying the publ i c op in ion

of the world in favour of peace ; and that,in the worst case, the area of w ar wou ld bel ikely to be restri cted ; for a P ower mak ingwar in defian ce of the recommen dat ion s oftheCoun ci l cou ld n o t rely on support from the

o ther s ign atory P owers .

I t wi l l be observed that our p lan impl ies and

presupposes such a measure ofpopu lar con tro lover in tern ation al relation s as is in volved in

the publ i cat ion of the resu lts of impartia l

inquiry, an d thei r discu ss ion in represen tat iveassemblies and in the press . W i thou t p retending that publi c op in ion is always and everywhere pacific, w e beli eve that, w hen i t is

properly in stru cted, and when t im e is g i ven for

pass ions to coo l, i t i s more li kely to favou r peacethan do the secret operatio n s ofdip lomacy .

Popu lar con tro l .


The d i stinctionbetw een theproposed Un iona nd the Con certofEurope.

Hosti lepreparations.

I t may be worth whi le to emphas ize thedifferen ce between the U n ion we are pro

pos ing and what has been kn own as the

Con cert of Eu rope. In the first p lace,the

U n ion would n ot be con fin ed to EuropeanP owers . In the secon d p lace, i t would bin d

the s ign atory P owers,un der the san ction

,in

the last resort,offorce

,to submit their disputes

to peaceable settlemen t,before having recourse

to mi l itary measures . In the th ird p lace , i twou ld create for the discussi on of the mostd ifficult and con ten t ious quest i on s an im

partial and perman en t Coun cil, wh i ch would

have some advan tages over the presen tmach in ery of the Con cert . We attach muchimportan ce to the creation of such a per

man en t in tern at ion al organ,and believe that

i ts u lt imate an d indi rect effects may be even

more importan t than its operation s in par

ti cu lar cases .

Such,in outl in e

,is the scheme proposed .

A few words may n ow be said as to some of

the more obvious and serious obj ection s thatmay be taken again st i t .

1 . The essen ce of the proposal is to impose

a period ofdelay before recourse can be had to

host i l i t i es, the period to be devoted to attemptsat peaceable set t lemen t . Bu t what exactly is

to be accoun ted “ recourse to hosti l i ti esThe phrase in our draft is “ declare war orbegin host i l i t ies or host ile p repara tion s again sta s ign atory P ower ” (Clauses 17 an d We

are wel l aware that the term “ hosti le prepara

t ion s ” i s a vague on e,and in some cases

PROPOSALS OF LORD BRYCE ’S GROUP 81

would be d ifficu l t to in terpret . Quest ionsmay arise as to whether a mobi l izat ion is

directed aga in st a pa r ti cu lar P ower, and as

to what,short of mobilization

,is a hosti le

preparation again st a part i cu lar Power . The

circumstan ces wh i ch would con sti tute a host i lepreparation do n ot seem capable of exactdefin i t ion ,

and we have been urged, for th isreason , to omi t the term from our scheme .Bu t i t is obviou s tha t a strategical d isposit i on of

‘

forces on a parti cular fron ti er migh tgive

,in certain cases

,the P ower having

recou rse to i t an advan tage,as great as i t

could attain by the actual invasion of the

terri tory of a n eighbouring State . We feel,

therefore, that we must in clude the case of

hosti l e preparation s again st a s ign atory P oweras on e of the even ts aga i n st wh i ch some

san ct ion mus t be provided, even though a

precise defin i t ion of the term can not beformu lated .

If an agreemen t l imit ing armamen ts were

arrived at,a breach of the agreemen t would ,

prima fa cie, be regarded as a host i l e preparation . For th is reason , apart from any other,such an agreemen t wou ld appear to beh igh ly des irable

,and the draft gives power

to the Cou n ci l to make and submi t to the

P owers suggestion s in tha t sense (ClauseWe th in k that the comparative secu ri ty wh i chthe U n ion . wou ld gu aran tee to i ts membe rs

,

as well as the econ om i c exhaust ion fo l lowingthe presen t war, and the determin ation of the

peoples to reduce this tremendous burden,

6

82 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEshould make i t poss i ble for such an agreemen t

to be en tered in to,i n sp i te of the well-kn own

difficult i es i t mus t en cou n ter .

2 . In case any P ower declares war or beg in s

host i l i t ies or hosti l e preparation s again st a

sign atory P ower,without first referring the

dispute to peaceable sett lemen t and await ingthe prescribed period

,the s ign atory P owers are

under obl igat ion to apply coercive measures,both economic and forcible

,again st the P ower

so actin g (Clause Bu t they would have toagree upon what those measures shal l be

,an d

by whom an d how they are to be carried out .I t may be urged

,therefore

,that d ifficult ies are

l ikely to arise ; s in ce ei ther the P owers must beun an imou s

,in wh ich case action may be pre

ven ted by the refu sal of a s ingle P ower,or a

maj ori ty must decide,in wh i ch case P owers

that are l iable to less risk or respon sib i l i ty may

outvote P owers that are l iable to more . The

difficulty i s real,but i t has n ot been though t

n ecessary to compl i cate the draft by en teringupon the detai ls of a poss ib le solut ion . I t is

the kin d ofdifficulty the P owers mus t settle forth emselves

,either by common sen se round thei r

coun ci l- table,or by forming some k in d ofcon

stitu tion in volving a graduation ofvot ing power.And s in ce they w ould be un der treaty obligation to take immediate measu res

,the n ecess i t i es

ofthe case would compel a prompt so lut ion .

3 . A more fu n damen tal obj ection aims atthe whole scope of our scheme . “ If you aresuccessful

,

” i t may be said,

“what you wi l l real ly

do is to stereotype the status quo, as i t may be

PROPOSALS OF LORD BRYCE’S GROUP 83

establ ished after th is w ar. Bu t n o statu s can

be perman en t ly satisfactory in a changingworld. What is requ ired is a mach in ery foraltering in tern ation al relation s as circumstan ces change

,bu t for altering them in a

peaceable way .

”To th is we rep ly, first, that

our scheme,though i t delays war, does n ot

attempt to proh ibi t i t . I t leaves war as a lastescape from an imposs ibl e s i tuat ion . Second ly,that the recommen dation s of the proposed

Coun ci l ofCon ci l iat ion wil l serve as sugges

t ion s to the Powers for a peaceable alteration

ofthe sta tus quo. Th ird ly,that the draft g ives

the Coun ci l power, even when there is n ot adispute, but the poss ib i l i ty of on e is foreseen ,to make suggest i on s for dealing with the who les i tu at ion out ofwh i ch su ch disputes may arise

(Clau se 1 2 ) and,gen erally

,to make proposals

wh i ch may lead to the avo idan ce of war

(Clause These are very wide powers and

ifthey were used, the Coun ci l migh t becomethe origin ator of n ew in tern ation al arrange

men ts and ru les.The developmen t of in tern ation al law, both 1

13133

1

3531

53;0!

in scope and in precis ion , is one of the most "W

essen t ial n eeds of the future ; and the ques

t ion by what body i t may best be developed

is a very importan t on e. The most obvious

body is the H agu e Conferen ce. And i t is to

be hoped and expected that after the w ar

the Conferen ce wi l l be given a pe rman en torgan izat ion

,will meet at regular in tervals, and

will address itself to the codification and de

velopment of international law. On the other

FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEhand, if a U n ion such as we suggest shouldbe formed an t . should n ot in clude al l theStates represen ted at The H ague

,i t would

seem poss ibl e and des i rable that the States

participating should adopt ru les oflaw bindingon thei r members and the American League toEnforce P eace makes th is on e ofthe obl igatoryfun ction s of the proposed league . Such rulesof law migh t afterwards be endorsed by theH ague Conferen ce. We are n ot at al l opposedin prin cipl e to th is procedure, though we haven ot though t i t n ecessary to embody i t in our

proposals .

In any developmen t of an I n tern ation al

Organ with l egis lat ive powers, quest ion s must

arise,at some stage

,as to equal i ty or in equal i ty

ofvoting power, and the bind in g ofa min ori tyby a maj ori ty . We do n ot here discuss or

prej udge these qu estion s ; for, wh i l e recogn iz ing the great value of a Leg islat ive Body tocomplete in tern at ion al organ ization , we doubtwhether the time is ripe for con st ituting sucha Body. The presen t scheme i s pu t forward,n ot as ideal

,but as someth ing wh i ch we

bel ieve to be immediately practi cable,an d

wh i ch wou ld con s t i tute a great advan ce uponthe presen t in tern ation al an archy. The veryrecogn i t ion of i ts defects in practice may and

should lead to i ts developmen t and comp l et ion . M ean time

,we submit it to can did, and,

we hope, fri en dly cri ti cism.

86 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEof a treaty

,as to any question of in tern ational

law, as to the existen ce of any fact which , ifestabl ished, would con sti tute a breach of any

in tern ation al obl igation,or as to the n ature

and exten t of the reparation to be made forany such breach .

5 . Any quest ion which may arise as towhether a dispute is of a j ust i ciable character,to be referred for decis i on to the Court of

Arbi tral j ust ice wh en con sti tuted ; or un t i l i ti s con stituted

,to the exist ing P erman en t Court

ofArbi tration at The H ague .

PERMANENT COUNC IL OF CONC IL IATION.

6. W i th a vi ew to the preven ti on and settlemen t ofdisputes between the sign atory P owers

wh i ch are n ot of a j ust i ciabl e character, a

perman en t Coun ci l of Con ci l iat ion to becon sti tuted .

7 . The members of th e Coun ci l to be

appoin ted by the several s ign atory P owersfor a fixed term of years

,and vacan cies to

be fi l led up by the appoin ting P owers, so that

the Coun ci l shal l always be complete and i n

being .1

8 . In order to provide for the case of disputes between a s ign atory P ower an d an out

s ide P ower wh i ch i s will ing to submit i ts case

to the Coun ci l, provis ion to be made for thetemporary represen tation ofthe latter .

I For some observa t ion s on the me thod of appoin tmen t, the n umber and cha racter of the members to beappom ted by each P ower

,and the method of vo ting ,

see In troduction , p . 76.

PROPOSALS OF LORD BRYCE’S GROUP 87

9 . The signatory Powers to agree that every

party to a dispute, n ot of a j ust i ciable character, the existen ce ofwh i ch migh t u ltimately

en danger frien dly relation s with an other sign atory P ower or P owers, and which has n ot

been settled by dip lomati c methods, wi l l submit i ts case to the Coun ci l with a view tocon ci l iat ion .

10. Where, in the opin ion of the Coun ci l,

any dispute exists between any of the s ign a

tory P owers which appears l ikely to en dangerthei r good relation s with each other

, the

Coun ci l to con sider the dispute and to inviteeach P ower con cern ed to submit i ts case witha view to con ci l iat ion .

1 1 . U n less,through the good offices of the

Coun ci l or o therwise,the dispute shal l have

previously been settled between the parti es, the

Coun ci l to make and publ ish , with regard toevery dispute con s idered by i t

,a report or

reports,con tain ing recommen dation s for the

amicable settlemen t of the dispute .

1 2 . When i t appears to the Coun ci l that,from any cause wi th in i ts kn owledge, thegood relation s between any of the sign atory

P owers are l ikely to be endangered, the

Coun ci l to be at l iberty to make suggestion sto them with a view to con ci l iat ion , whetheror n o t any dispute has actual ly arisen , and, if

i t con s iders i t expedien t to do so,to publ ish

such suggest ion s .

I 3 . The Coun ci l to be at l iberty to makea nd submit for the con s ideration of the s ign a

tory Powers,suggest ion s as to the l imitation

P OWers to subm i t non -just i cab le cases to

the Counci l .

Counci l to con

s ider d isputesand invi te submiss ion ofcases .

Counci l toreport ond isputes con

si dered.

General powerto Counci l tomake anggest ions w ith aview to conc i liation .

Counc i l to havepower to m ake

s ugges t i on s forthe l im ita t ion of

armamen ts .


S ignatoryP ow ers to fur

n i sh Counc i lW i th a ll neces

sary facult i esfor d i scharge of

i ts fun ct ions.Del iberations ofCounCIl.

Comm i ttees ofthe Coun c i l .

or reduction of armamen ts,or any other sug

gestion s wh i ch in its opin ion would lead to theavo idan ce ofwar or the dimin ution ofi ts evi ls .

14 . The s ign atory Powers to agree to furn ishthe Coun ci l with al l the mean s an d faci l it i esrequired for the due discharge ofi ts fun ction s .

15 . The Coun ci l to del iberate in publ i c or inprivate

,as i t th inks fi t.

16. The Coun ci l to have power to appoin tcommittees

,wh i ch may or may n ot be com

posed exclus ively of its own members,to

report to i t on any matter wi th in the scope

of i ts fun ction s.

I

MORATORIUM FOR H OSTILITIES .

17. Every s ign atory P ower to agree n ot to

declare war or begin host i l i t i es or host i le pre

paration s again s t any other s ign atory P ower

(a ) before the matter in dispu te shal l have been

submitted to an arbi tral tribun al,or to the

Coun ci l ; or (b) wi th in a period oftwelve mon thsafter such submiss ion ; or (c), if the award of

the arbi tral tribun al or the report of the

Coun ci l, as the case may be, has been pub

lished with in that time, then n ot to declarewar or begin hosti l i t ies or hosti l e preparation s

with in a period of s ix mon ths after the pub

lication of such award or report.2

I t W i ll be observed tha t i t is n ot proposed to conferany execu t ive power on the Coun ci l.

2 If an agreemen t for lim i ta t ion of armamen ts hadbeen arr ived a t, any depa r tu re from the agreemen tw ou ld presumably be taken to be a

“ hos t ile p reparat ion , un t i l the con t rary were shown . (See In troduct ion , p.

PROPOSALS OF LORD BRYCE ’S GROUP 89

L IM ITATION OF E FFECT OF ALL IANCES .

18 . The s ign atory Powers to agree thatn o s ign atory P ower commen cing hosti l i t iesagain st an other

,withou t first comp lying with

the provis ion s of the preceding Clauses, shal lbe en ti t led

,by virtu e of any n ow existing or

future treaty of allian ce or o ther engagemen t,

to the mi l itary or other material support ofanyother sign atory P ower in such hosti l i t ies .

ENFORCEMENT OF THE PRECED INGPROV I S IONS .

19 . Every S ign atory Power to undertakethat in case any P ower

,whether or n ot a

s ign atory P ow er,declares w ar or begin s

host i l i t ies or hosti le preparation s again st a

sign atory P ower, (a ) without first having sub

m itted i ts case to an arbitral tribu n al , or to

the Coun ci l ofCon ci l iation,or (b) before the

expirat ion of the herein before prescribedperiods ofdelay

,i t wi l l forthwith

,in con ju n c

t ion with the other s ign atory P owers, take su chcon certed measures, econ omic and forcible,again st the Power so acting, as, in their j udgmen t

,are most effective and appropriate to

the circumstan ces of the case .

2 0. The s ign atory P owers to undertake tha tif any P ower shal l fai l to accept a nd g iveeffect to the recommendat ion s con tain ed in

any report of the Coun ci l , or in the awa rdof the a rbi tra l t ri bu n a l

,they wi l l, at a Co n

feren ce to be fo r thw i th summon ed for the

purpose, con s ider, in con cert, the s i tuat ion

FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEwhich has arisen by reason of such fai lure

,

and what co l lective act ion,if any, i t is

practi cable to take in order to make such

recommen dation s operative.

I

I The measu res con templated In paragraphs19, 2 0 would, of cou rse, be taken by the governmen ts of the signa tory Powers ac t ing i n concer t,and n ot by the ,C0unci l ofCon c ilia t ion . (See In t roduct ion , pp. 76 and

TH E FAB IAN SOCIETY DRAFT TREATY

I. —INTRODUCTION.

THE obj ect of the Committee has been l imi ted and

practi cal . I t has sough t on ly to formulate,as a basis

for in tern at ion al discuss i on and in the l igh t of h istoryand experi en ce— especial ly as elucidated by the Memorandum by L . S. Woolf, the h eads of an in tern at ion al

agreemen t by wh i ch future wars may be as far as possible

preven ted . There is at l east a hope that, as a result of

the existing terrible experien ce, a war-weary world maypresen tly be wi l l ing to con struct some n ew in tern ation almach in ery which can be brough t in to play to preven t the

n at ion s from again being stampeded in to Armageddon .

The first difficulty wi l l be to get the Governmen ts ,either of the eight Great P owers or of the forty lesser

States— al l of them n ecessari ly wary and suspicious— to

agree to the creat ion of any such in tern ation al mach in ery .

I t is therefore essen t ial,if we are to be practical, to

l imi t our proposals to that for wh i ch there is at least

some reason to expect con sen t . What is suggested is,

accordingly,n o merging of indepen den t n at ion al u n i ts

i n to a “ world-State,though to th is U top ia futu re ages

may w ell come . No impai rmen t of sovereign ty and n o

sacrifice of independen ce are proposed . Each State even91


remain s quite free to go to war, in the last resort,if

the d ispute in wh i ch i t is engaged proves in tractable .Moreover, n ation al d isarmamen t— to wh i ch at th is momen tn o State wi l l even dream of tak ing the smallest stepis l eft to come about of i tself

,ju st as the in dividual

carrying of arms falls s i l en t ly in to desu etude as an d

when fears of aggress ion die down before the ru le Of

the law .

The n ew world that we have to face at the con clus ion

of the war wi l l, perforce, start from the ru in s of the old .

All that wi l l be immediately practi cable can be presen tedas on ly a more systemati c developmen t of the rapidly

mu l t iplying Arbi tration Treati es of the presen t cen tury ,and the con clus ion s of the two Con ven tion s at TheH ague . On ly on some su ch l in es

,i t is suggested,

can we reason ably hope, at th is j u n c tu re, to get the

Governmen ts of the world to come in to the proposed

agreemen t .The altern ative to w ar is law . What w e have to do

is to find some w ay of deciding d ifferen ces between S tates ,and of securing the same a cquiescen ce in the decis ion

as i s n ow shown by in dividua l ci tizen s in a legal j udg

men t . Th i s in volves the establ ishmen t of a Supern ation alAuthori ty

,which is the essen ce of our prOposals .

What is suggested is,

first,the es tabl ishmen t of an

I n tern ation al H igh Court , to wh i ch the n at ion s shal l

agree to submit,n ot al l their poss ibl e differen ces and

disputes,but on ly su ch as are

,by their very n ature,

l egal or j ust i ciable . Experien ce warran ts the bel ief

that the decis ion s of such a j ud i cial t r ibu n al , confin ed to

the i ssu es wh i ch the li tiga n t Sta tes ha d subm i tted to i t,

would n ormally be accepted by th em . P rovi s ion is made,however

,for a series of “ san ction s o ther than war,

”

pr in cipally econ omic and social in Character, by which

94 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACEas the posit ion of the eigh t Great P owers (AustriaH u ngary, the B ri tish Emp i re, F ran ce, German y, I taly,

japan , Russ ia,

an d the U n i ted States), wh i ch governamong them three-fourths of al l the population of the

world an d con trol n in e-ten ths of i ts armamen ts,differs

so greatly from that of the other two score States,

provis ion i s made both for thei r meeting in separate

Coun ci ls and for rat ificat ion of al l proceedings by theCoun ci l of the Great P owers . I t i s n owh ere suggested

that any on e of the eight Great P owers can— except by

its own express rat ification— be made subj ect to any

en actmen t or decis ion of the I n tern ation al Coun ci l that

i t may deem to impair i ts in depen den ce or i ts terri torialin tegri ty, or to requ ire any alteration of i ts in tern al laws .

I t fol lows,accordingly

,that each State retain s the righ t

to go to war if,after due delay, i t Chooses to do so .

What the several States are asked to bin d themselvesto are— (a ) to submit al l disputes of the “ legal

” or“ j u sti ciable kin d (but n o others) to the decision of

the I n tern ation al H igh Court,un less some special

tribun al is preferred and agreed to ; (b) to lay before

the I n tern ation al Coun ci l, for inquiry, mediation , and

even tual report, all disputes n ot “ j usti ciable ” by theI n tern ation al H igh Court or other tribun al ; (c) in n o

case to proceed to any warl ike operation , or commit anyact of aggression

,un t i l twelve mon ths after the dispute

had been submitted to on e or the o ther body ; (d) to

pu t in operation , if and when required, the san ction s

(other than war) decreed by the I n tern ation al H igh

Court ; and, poss ibly the most essen t ial of all these

proposals, (e) to ma ke common ca use,even to the ex ten t

of wa r, aga in st a ny Consti tuen t Sta te which viola tes this

fundamen ta l agreemen t.

I t remain s to be said on ly that the adoption of this

THE FABIAN SOC IETY DRAFT TREATY 95

p lan of preven t ing war— the establ ishmen t of the proposedSupern ation al Au thori ty— is n ot depen den t o n

,an d n eed

n o t wait for,the adh esion of al l the in dependen t Sovereign

States of the world.

11.— TH E ARTICLES.

The s ign atory States,desi rous ofpreven t ing any future

outbreak ofwar,improving in tern ation al relation s, arriving

by agreemen t at an authori tative codification of in ter

n at ion al law,and faci l i tat ing the developmen t of su ch

jo in t act ion as is exemp l ified by the U n iversal P ostal

U n ion,hereby agree an d con sen t to the fol lowing Art i cl es.

THE E STABL ISHMENT OF A SUPERNATIONALAUTHORITY.

1 . There shal l be establ ished as soon as possible with inthe period of on e year from the date h ereof— (a ) an

I n tern ation al H igh Court for the decision of j ust i ciableissues between in depen den t Sovereign States ; (b) an

I n tern ation al Coun ci l with the double fun ction of

securing,by common agreemen t , such in tern ation al

legislation as may be practi cable, a nd of promoting thesettlemen t of n on - j ust i ciable issu es between indepen den t

Sovereign States ; and (c) an I n tern ation al Secretariat .

The Con sti tuen t Sta tes.

2 . The I n depen den t Sovereign States to be admitted

as Con st i tuen t States, and here i n after so described, shall

be

(a ) The bel l igeren ts i n the presen t war ;

(b) The U n i ted States ofAmerica ;

(c) Such other independen t Sovereign States as have


been represen ted at ei ther of th e P eace Conferen ces a t

The H ague,an d as Shall apply for admiss io n with i n s ix

mon ths from the da te of these Ar ti cl es ; an d

(d) Su ch oth er in depen den t Sovereign Sta tes as may

hereafter be admitted by the I n tern at ion al Cou n ci l .

Covena n t aga i nst Agg ress i on .

3 . I t is a fun damen ta l prin ciple of th es e Art i cles th at

th e Con sti tu en t S tates severally d iscla im a ll des i re orin ten t ion ofaggress ion on any o th er in depen den t Sovereign

State or States , an d th at th ey agree and bind themselves,

under al l Ci rcums tan ces, and withou t an y evas ion or

qual ifi ca tion whatever, n ever to pu rsu e, beyon d the stage

of courteou s represen ta t ion ,any claim or complain t that

any of th em may have again st any o ther Con st i tu en t

S tate,wi th out first submitt ing such claim or complain t,

ei th er to the I n tern ation al H igh Court for adj ud i cationan d decis ion ,

or to the In tern a t ion al Cou n ci l for ex am i

n a t ion an d repo r t, with a view to arriving at a settl emen tacceptable to both part ies .

Covena n t aga i nst Wa r ex cept a s a F i n a l Resou rce.

4 . The Con st i tu en t States express ly bin d themselves

several ly un der n o circumstan ces to address to any Con

stituen t State an u ltimatum,or a threat of mil i tary or

n aval operation s in the n a tu re of war,or of an y act of

aggress ion ; an d u n der n o circumstan ces to declare war,

or o rder any gen eral mobi l ization , or begin mil i ta ry or

n aval operation s of the n atu re of war,or vio late the

terri tory or attack the Sh ips of an other State,o th erwise

than by way of repelling and defeatin g a forcible attackactually made by mili tary or n aval force

,un t i l the matter

in dispute has been submi tted as aforesaid to the I n ter


eigh t Great P owers, or as the Coun ci l for America, or asthe Coun ci l for Europe, each such s i tt ing being restri ctedto the represen tatives of the States thu s in di cated .

There shal l stan d referred to the Cou n ci l of the eigh t

Great P owers any quest ion aris in g between any two or

more of su ch P owers, and also any o ther qu estion in

which any of such P owers formally claims to be con

cern ed,and requ ests to have so referred.

There shall also stan d referred to the Coun ci l of theeigh t Great P owers

,for con s iderat ion and ratification ,

or for referen ce back in order that they may be recon

sidered, the proceedings of’ the Coun ci l for America, the

Coun ci l for Europe, and the Coun ci l of the States otherthan the eigh t Great Powers .

There sha l l stan d referred to the Coun ci l for Europe

any question aris ing between two or more indepen den tSovereign States of Europe

,and n ot directly affect ing

any in depen den t Sovereign Sta te n ot represen ted in that

Coun ci l,provided that n on e of the independen t Sovereign

States not so represen ted formal ly claims to be con cern ed

in such quest ion , and provided that n on e of the eigh t

Great P owers formal ly claims to have i t referred to the

Coun ci l of th e eight Great Powers or to the Coun ci ls itt ing as a whole .There sha l l stan d referred to the Coun ci l for America

any quest ion aris ing be tween two or more indepen den t

Sovereign Sta tes of Ameri ca, n ot d irectly affecting any

in depen den t Sovereign State n ot represen ted in that

Coun ci l, provided tha t n on e of the independen t Sovereign

States n ot so represen ted formally claims to be con cern edin such question , an d provided that n on e of the eigh t

Great P owers formally claims to have i t referred to the

Coun ci l of the eight Great P owers or to the Coun ci ls itt ing as a whole .

THE FAB IAN SOC IETY DRAFT TREATY 99

There shall s tand referred to the Cou n ci l for the Stateso ther than the eigh t Grea t P owers a ny question betw eentw o or more of su ch S ta tes

,n o t di rec t ly affecti ng an y

of the eigh t Grea t P ow ers an d w h i ch n on e of the eight

Great P ow e rs formally claims to hav e referred to the

Coun ci l s i t ting as a w hole .The Coun ci l shall Sit as a whole for

(a ) Gen eral leg is lat ion and an y quest ion n ot stan dingreferred to the Cou n cil of the eigh t G reat P owers, the

Coun ci l of the S tates o ther than the eight Great P owers,the Coun ci l for Europe, or the Coun ci l for America

respectively

(b) The appo in tmen t and al l question s relating to

the condi t ion s of office,fun ct ion s

,and powers of the

I n tern ation al H igh Cou rt, of the I n tern a t ion al Secretariat ,and of the P res iden t and other Officers of the I n ter

n ation al Cou n ci l ;

(c) The set t l emen t ofS tand ing Orders, and al l qu est ion srelating to procedu re an d verification ofpowers ;

(d) The fin an cia l affairs of the I n te rn ation al Coun ci land I n tern ation a l H igh Cou r t, the allocation of the costamong the Con s ti tu en t States , and the issue of precep tsupon the several Co n s t i tuen t S ta tes for the shares due

from them ;

(e) The admission of independen t Sovereign Sta tes as

Co n st i tuen t States ; an d

(7) Any proposal to a lter any of these Art icles,and the

mak i ng of such an a lte ra t ion .

Membersh ip of the Cou n ci l a nd Voti ng.

7 . All the Co n s t i tuen t S tates sha ll have equal r ights

to pa r t i cipa t i on in the deli beration s of the I n terna tion a l

Coun ci l. Any Con s t i tuen t State may subm i t to the I n ter


n ation al Coun ci l S i tt ing as a who l e any proposal for any

alterat ion of I n tern ation al Law ,or for mak ing an en act

men t of n ew law ; and also (subj ect to the provis ion s of

these Art icles with regard to the submiss ion of j usti ciableissues to the I n tern at ion al H igh Court) m ay bring before

the Coun ci l any questi on , d ispute, or differen ce arising

between i t and any other Con sti tu en t State .

When the In tern at ion al Coun ci l is s i tt ing as the Coun ci l

of the eigh t Great P owers or as the Coun ci l of the Statesother than the eigh t Great P owers, each of the Statesrepresen ted therein shal l have on e vote on ly .

When the I n tern ation al Coun ci l i s s i tt ing as a who l eor as the Coun ci l for Europe, or as the Coun ci l for

America, the n umber of vo tes to be given on behalf of

each State shall be as follows

!The sca le of voting strength w i ll requ ire to be prescri bed

in the trea ty !

Legisla tion subj ect to Ra tifica t ion .

8. I t Shal l be wi th in the competen ce of the In tern ation al

Coun ci l to codify and declare the I n tern ation al Lawexisting between the several in dependen t Sovereign Statesof the world ; and any su ch cod ifyin g en actmen t

,when

and in so far as ratified by the Con s t i tuen t States,shal l

be app l i ed an d enforced by the I n tern ation al H igh Court .I t shall also be w i th in the competen ce of the In ter

n at ion al Coun ci l from time to t ime, by specific en actmen t,to amend I n tern at ion al Law , wh ether or n ot th is has

been codified ; an d any su ch en actmen t,when and in so

far as rat ified by the several Con st i tu en t States,shall be

app l ied an d enforced by the I n tern ation a l H igh Cou rt .When ever any Con st i tuen t State n otifies i ts refu sal to

ratify as a whole any enactmen t made by the In tern ation al


The I n tern a tiona l H igh Court sha ll a lone decide whether

a ny ena ctmen t of the I n tern a tion a l Cou n ci l ajfects the

i ndependen t sovereign ty or the terr i toria l i n tegr i ty, or requ ires

a ny cha nge i n the i n tern a l laws of a ny Consti tu en t Sta te ;

a nd every ena ctmen t of the Cou n ci l sha ll be presumed n ot

to affect the i ndependen t sovereign ty or the terr i toria l i n tegri ty,

or to requ ire a ny cha nge i n the i n terna l laws of a ny Con

sti tuen t Sta te u n ti l the I n tern a tiona l H igh Cou rt ha s decided

to the con tra ry .

Fa cu lta tive Enforcemen t by Overwhelm i ng Maj ori ty ofLegis

la tion ca rried by Overwhelm i ng Maj or i ties even if ofP rima ry Importa n ce, a nd n ot ra tified by a Sma ll M i nori tyof the M i nor Sta tes.

88 . When a ny en a ctmen t of the I n terna tiona l Cou nci l

s i tti ng a s a whole ha s n ot received a three-fou rths maj ori tyof the votes given by the represen ta tives presen t a nd voti ng,

or when such ena ctmen t ha s received such a maj or i ty bu t

afiects the i ndependen t sovereign ty or the terri toria l in tegri ty,

or requ i res a ny cha nge i n the i n tern a l laws of a ny Consti tuen t

Sta te, a nd when su ch ena ctmen t ha s n ot been ra tified by

a ll the severa l Consti tu en t Sta tes, i t sha ll n evertheless be

w i th i n the competence of the I n tern a tion a l Counci l si tti ng

a s a whole,by a three-fourths maj ori ty of the votes given

by the represen ta tives presen t a nd vot i ng (query , a dd pro

v ided tha t su ch maj ori ty i n cludes a ll the eight Grea t Powers) ,to refer to the I n tern a tiona l H igh Cou rt for dea sion the

question ofwhether a ny Consti tuen t Sta te ha s, by a ny pos i tive

a ct cha ng i ng the statu s qu o , comm i tted wha t wou ld ha ve been

a con tra ven tion of the sa id ena ctmen t if i t ha d been ejj‘

ectively

m ade law by the Cou n ci l a nd applied by the Court. If the

decision of the Cou rt shou ld be tha t su ch con tra ven tion by

posi tive a ct cha nging the s tatus quo ha s taken place, i t sha ll

THE FABIAN SOCIETY DRAFT TREATY 103

be w i th i n the competen ce of the Cou n ci l si tting a s a whole,

bu t on ly by such specia l maj ori ty a s aforesa id, to i nvi te

the Consti tu en t Sta te comm i tting such con tra ven tion to ma ke

repa ra tion or pay compensa tion a nd the Coun ci l may, ifi t thi nks fit, by the same specia l maj ori ty a s aforesa i d,requ ire a ny or a ll of the Consti tuen t Sta tes to enforce i ts

deci sion i n the same way a s if i t were a decision of the

H igh Cou rt by a ny sa nction other tha n tha t of m i li ta ryor n ava l opera tions i n the n a ture ofwa r.

Non -ffusticiable Issues.

9 . When any quest ion , differen ce, or dispute aris ingbetween two or more Con sti tuen t Sta tes is n ot j usti ciableas defin ed in these Art i cles

,and is n ot prompt ly brought

to an amicable settlemen t,and is of such a character that

i t migh t u l timately endanger fri endly relation s betweensuch States

,i t shal l be the duty of each party to the

matter at issue,i rrespect ive of any action taken or not

taken by any other party, to submit the question ,d ifferen ce

,or dispute to the I n tern ational Coun ci l wi th a

view to a satisfactory settlemen t being arrived at . The

Coun ci l may i tself invite the part ies to lay any such

question , differen ce, or dispute before the Coun ci l , or the

Coun ci l may i tself take any such matter at issue in toi ts ow n con s ideration .

The Con sti tuen t States hereby several ly agree and bin dthemselves under n o circumstan ces to address to any

other Con sti tu en t State an u l timatum or anyth ing in the

n atu re of a'

threat offorcible reprisa ls or nava l or mili tary

operation s, or actually to commen ce host i li ties aga i nstsuch State

,or to vio late i ts territory, or to attack i ts sh ips ,

o therwise than by w ay of repell ing and defeating a


before a matter in dispute,if n ot of a j usti ciable character

as defin ed i n these Arti cles,has been submitted to or

taken in to con s i deration by the I n tern at ion al Coun ci l asaforesaid for in vest igation

,modification

,and report

,and

during a period of on e year from the date of such submiss ion or con sideration .

The I n tern ation al Coun ci l may appoin t a P erman en tBoard ofCon ci l iators for deal ing with al l such question s,differen ces, or disputes as they arise

,and may con st i tute

the Board ei ther on the n omin ation of the several

Con sti tuen t States or otherwise,in such man n er

,upon

such condi t ion s,and for such term or terms as the Coun ci l

may decide .When any question , differen ce, or dispute, n ot of aj usti ciable character as defin ed in these Art i cles

,is sub

m itted to or taken in to con s iderat ion by the I n tern at ion al

Coun ci l as aforesaid,the Coun ci l shall

,with the least

poss i ble delay, take action , e ith er ( I ) by referring the

matter at issue to the P erman en t Board of Con ci l iators,or (2 ) by appoin t ing a Special Committee, whether ex

elus ively of the Coun ci l or otherwise, to inquire in to the

matter and report, or (3) by appoin t ing a Commission

of I nquiry to investigate the matter and report, or (4) by

i tself taking the matter in to con s iderat ion .

The Con st i tuen t States hereby agree and bin d themselves

,whether or n o t they are part ies to any such matter

at issue,to give al l poss ible faci l it ies to the In tern ation al

Coun ci l,to the P erman en t Board of Con ciliators, to any

Committee or Commiss ion of I nqu iry appo in ted by either

of them,and to any duly accredited officer of any of these

bodi es,for the su ccessful discharge of their duties.

Wh en any matter at issu e is refe rred to the Board of

Con ciliation,or to a Special Commit tee, or to a Commi s~

s ion of I nquiry, such Board,Committee, or Commiss ion


n ot affect the in depen den t sovereign ty or the territorial

in tegri ty, n or require any change in the in tern al lawsof any State, and where su ch en actmen t shal l have beenassen ted to by a three-fourths majori ty of the votes givenby the represen tat ives presen t and voting (query, a dd :

a nd such maj ori ty i n cludes a ll the eight Grea t P owers) .

The In terna tiona l Secreta ria t.

10 . Th ere shal l be an In tern ation al Secretariat,with

an office perman en t ly Open for bus in ess, with such astaff as the I n tern ation al Coun ci l may from time to t imedetermin e .I t sha l l be the duty of the I n tern ation al Secretariat

to make al l n ecessary commun i cation s on behalf of the

I n tern ation al Cou n ci l to States or indi viduals ; to p lace

before the P resi den t to bring before the Coun ci l any

matter of wh i ch i t should have cogn isan ce ; to organ izeand con duct any inquiri es or in vest igation s ordered by

the Coun ci l ; to main tain an accurate record of the

proceedings ofthe Coun ci l ; to make authen t i c tran s lat ion sof the resolut ion s and en actmen ts of the Coun ci l, the

report of the proceedings,

and other documen ts, and

to commun i cate them officially to al l the Con sti tuen t

States ; and to publ ish for sale a n Official Gazette and

such other works as the Coun ci l may from time to time

direct.Su bj ect to any regulat ion s that may be made by

the I n tern ation al Cou n ci l,the I n tern ation al Secretariat

shall take charge of and be respon s ibl e for (a ) the funds

belon ging to or in the cu stody of the I n tern a t ion al Coun ci land the I n tern a t ion al H igh Court ; (b) the co l lection of

al l receipts due to either of them ; and (c) the making

of al l authorized paymen ts .


THE I NTERNATIONAL H IGH COURT.

I I . The I n tern ation al H igh Court shal l be a perman en t j udi cial tribun al

,con s isting of fifteen judges, to be

appo in ted as herein after provided . Subj ect to theseArt icles i t shall

,by a ma j ori ty of j udges s i tt ing and

vot ing, con tro l i ts ow n proceed ings, determin e its sess ion sand p lace of meeting

,sett le i ts ow n procedure, and

appoin t i ts ow n officers . I t may,if though t fit, elect

on e of i ts members to be P residen t of the Court forsuch term an d with such fun ction s as i t may decide .I ts members shal l receive an an n ua l st ipen d of

wh i lst ifa P res iden t is elected he shall receive an addi tion al

sum of The Cou rt shall hear and decide wi thabso lute in dependen ce the issu es brought before i t in

conformity with these Art i cles ; and sha l l i n each casepron oun ce, by a maj ori ty of votes , a s ingle j udgmen t

of the Court as a who l e,wh i ch shal l be expressed in

separate reason ed statemen ts by each of the judgess i tting and acting in the case . The sess ion s of the

Court shal l be held, if so ordered , n otwithstandi ng the

existen ce ofa vacan cy or ofv acan ci es among the judges ;an d the proceedings ofthe Court shal l be valid, and the de

c ision ofa majori ty ofthe judges sit tin g and acting shal l be

offul l force, n otwithstanding the existen ce ofany vacan cyor vacan cies or of the absen ce of an y j udge or j udges .

(Query, a dd : I n a ny ca se a t i ssue between Consti tuen t

Sta tes the yudge or j udges nom i na ted by one or more ofsuch Sta tes sha ll (u n less a ll the li tiga n t Sta tes otherw ise

agree) take no pa rt i n the ca se. )

The j udges of the Cou rt.

1 2 . The j u dges of the In tern ation a l H igh Cou rt shal l

be appoin ted for a term of five (query, seven ) years by


the I n tern ation al Coun ci l s i tt ing as a who l e,in accordan ce

with the fo l lowing scheme . Each of the Con st i tuen tStates shal l be forma l ly in vited to n omin ate on e can didate

,

w ho n eed n ot n ecessari ly be a ci t izen or a res iden t of

the State by wh i ch he is n omin ated . The eigh t candidatesseveral ly n omin ated by the eigh t Great P owers shal lthereupon be appo in ted . The remain ing seven judgesshall be appoin ted after selection by exhaust ive ballotfrom amon g the candi dates n omin ated by the Con sti tuen tStates o ther than the eigh t Great P owers . On the occurren ce of a vacan cy among the j udges n omin ated by theeigh t Great P owers

,the State which had n omin ated the

j udge whose seat has become vacan t shall be in vitedto n omin ate h is successor

,and the can didate so n omin ated

shal l thereupon be appo in ted. On the occurren ce of avacan cy amon g the other judges, each of the Con sti tuen tStates other than the eigh t Grea t P owers shal l be in vitedto n omin ate a candidate to fill the vacan cy ; an d the

I n tern ation al Coun ci l s i tt ing as a who l e shall,by

exhaustive bal lo t,choose from among the candidates so

n omin ated the person to be appo in ted .

(Query, a dd : bu t so tha t a t n o time sha ll more tha n

on e (or two) of the j udges be the n om i n ees of a ny one

Sta te.)A j udge Of the I n tern ation al H igh Court shal l n o t bel iable to any l egal proceedin gs i n any tribun al in an y

State,and shall n ot be subj ected to any discipl in ary actio n

by any Governmen t, in respect of anyth ing said or don eby him in his capacity as judge ; and shal l n ot durin g

h is ten ure of Office be depr ived of any part Of the em o

lum en ts or privi leges of h is office . A judge of the

I n tern ation al H igh Cou r t may be removed from officeby a reso lut ion of the In tern ation al Coun ci l s i tt ing as a

whole,carried by a three-fourths maj ori ty .


ordin ate admin is trat ion s Of such State,or to i ts n a t ion al

Go vernmen t ; an d a s to the repara t ion to be made , and

the compen sat ion to be pa id, for such loss or damage ;

(d) Any qu esti on as to the t i tle,by agreemen t

, pre

scription ,or occupation ,

to the sovereign ty of any p laceor distr i ct ;

(e) Any question as to the demarcation of any part

of any n ation al boun dary ;

(f) Any question as to the reparat ion to be made, orthe amoun t of compen sa t ion to be paid , in cases in wh i ch

the prin cip l e of in demn i ty has been recogn ized or admittedby all the part ies

(g) Any quest ion as to the recovery of con tract debts

cla imed from the Governmen t ofan in dependen t Sovereign

State by the Governmen t ofan other indepen den t SovereignState

,as being due to any Of i ts ci t izen s

,compan i es

,or

subordin ate admin istrat ion s,or to i tself;

(h) Any quest ion wh i ch may be submitted to the Court

by express agreemen t between al l the parti es to the case .

(Query, a dd : ( i ) Any question n ot fa lli ng w i thin a ny

of the cla sses a bove enumera ted, which may be referred to

the Court by the I n tern a tiona l Counci l by a maj ori ty ofvotes (or by a three-fourths maj ori ty, or by a three-fourths

maj or i ty i nclud ing a ll the eight Grea t

The quest ion of whether or n ot an issue is j usti ciabl ewith in the mean in g of these Art icles sha l l be determin ed

so l ely by the I n tern ation a l H igh Court, wh i ch may de

termin e such a question wh ether or n ot formal obj ect ion

is taken by any of the l i tigan ts .

If any State, bein g a party to any action in the I n tern ation al H igh Cou r t

,obj ects that any po in t at issue is

n o t a ju st ic iable quest io n as herein defi n ed,the Objection

shall be con sidered by the Cou r t ; and the Cou rt sha ll,

whether or not th e obj ect ing State en ters an app ea ran ce,


or argues the matter, pro n oun ce upon the obj ection , and

either set i t as ide or declare i t well fou nded.

I t shal l be with in the competen ce of the I n tern ation al

H igh Cou rt, with regard to a ny j u sti ciable qu estion i n

respect of wh i ch i t may be i nvoked by on e or more of

the parties, summari ly to en j o in any State,whether or

n ot a par ty to the case, to refrain from taking any specified

pos i t ive ac t i on or to discon t in ue a ny specified pos i t iveaction already begun

,or to cau se to be d iscon t in ued

any specified posi t ive action begun by any person , com

pany,or subord in ate admin istrat ion with in or belonging

to such State, wh i ch in the j udgmen t of the Court isdes ign ed or i n ten ded

,or may reason ably be expected

to change th e sta tus quo with regard to the quest ion atissue before the Court, or serious ly to in j ure any of the

parties to the case . Any such in j un ct ion of the In ter

n at ion al H igh Cou rt shall be bin ding,

and shal l be

enforceable, in the same way as a j udgmen t of the Court,

in the mann er hereinafter described .

Immedia te P ublici ty for a ll Trea ties, ex isting a nd fu ture.

15 . No treaty or agreemen t between two or morei ndepen den t Sovereign States shall be deemed to conferany righ t to in voke the I n tern at ion al H igh Court, or shallbe treated as vali d

,or be i n any w ay recogn ized by the

I n tern a t ion al Coun ci l or the I n tern at i on al H igh Cou rt,or shal l be held to confer any righ ts, to impose any

obl igation s,or to change the statu s or l egal righ ts ofany

person , compan y, subord in ate admin i s trat i on,d istri ct

,or

State,u n less a du ly au then t i cated Copy of such Treaty

or Agreemen t has been depos i ted by on e or all of the

States that are parties to i t, in the Registry of the

I n tern ation al H igh Court, with in twelve mon ths from


the date of these Articles,in accordan ce wi th any rules

that may from time to t ime be made by the Court forth is purpose ; or i n the case of a Treaty or Agreemen t

hereafter made,with in three mon ths from the date of su ch

Treaty or Agreemen t .I t shal l be the duty of the officer in charge of the

Registry immediately after the depos i t to al low the duly

accredited represen tative of any Con sti tuen t State toin spect and copy any Treaty or Agreemen t so depos i tedand promptly to commun i cate a copy to the I n tern ation al

Secretariat for publ i cation in the Official Gazette .

Undertaking to subm i t a ll fa sticiable Questions to the

In terna tiona l H igh Court.

16. The Consti tuen t States several ly undertake and

agree to submi t to the I n tern at ion al H igh Court for trial

and j udgmen t every quest ion , differen ce, or dispute comingwith in the defin i t ion ofa j ust i ciable quest i on as laid down

by these Art i cles that may arise between themselves and

any other indepen den t Sovereign State or States ; and at

al l t imes to abstain , in respect of such question s, froman yth ing in the n ature of an u l t imatum ; from any threat

to take unfrien dly or aggressive action Of any kin d with

a V i ew to redress ing the alleged gri evan ce or pun ish ingthe al leged wrong-doing from an y gen eral mobi l ization ;

and from any vio lation of the territory of any other Stateor attack on the sh ips Of such State or other mili tary or

n aval Operation s, or other action l eading or l ikely to lead

to war.

(Query : i nsert these two addi tion a l Articles.)P rovision for Abroga tion ofObsolete Trea ties.

I OA. P rovided tha t a ny Consti tuen t Sta te may a t a ny

time, whether before or after a ny question , dispu te, or d ifier


If the Cou n ci l pa sses su ch a resolu tion a s aforesa id, a nd

if a ny question , dispu te, or dijferen ce, ha s been subm i tted to

the Cou n ci l i n con n ection w i th the subj ect, the Coun ci l sha ll

thereupon promptly dea l w i th the questi on , d ispu te, or

d iferen ce a s a n on -j usticia ble issue i n conform i ty w i th

these Articles.

P rovision for Ca ses i n wh ich I n tern a tiona l Law‘

i s Vague,

Uncerta in, or I n complete.

168 . P rovided a lso tha t when a ny question , dispu te, or

d ifferen ce ha s a ri sen between two or more Consti tuen t Sta tes,

a nd su ch question , d ispu te, or d ijferen ce may be deemed to

be a j usticia ble i ssue a s defined i n these Articles,a ny of the

pa rties i n such issue may, before i t ha s been su bm i tted to

the In tern a tion a l H igh Court, ta ke ex ception to i ts bei ng

so subm i tted,on the ground tha t the I n tern a tion a l Law

applica ble to such issue is so vague, or so u ncerta i n,or so

i n complete a s to render the strict applica tion thereof to the

issue i n question impra ctica ble or i nequ i ta ble. The Consti tuen t

Sta te ta ki ng such ex ception sha ll thereupon immedia tely

submi t the question , dispu te, or dijferen ce to the I n terna tiona l

Cou nci l in stead ofto the I n terna tion a l H igh Cou rt, a nd sha ll

request the Cou n ci l i n thefirst pla ce to consider a nd decide

whether the ex ception is j ustly ta ken .

If the Coun ci l decides by resolu tion pa ssed by a three

fou rths maj ori ty (Query, add i ncluding a ll the eight Grea t

Powers) tha t the ex ception is j ustly ta ken,

n o proceedings

sha ll be taken on the issue i n the I n tern a tion a l H igh Cour t.

The Cou n ci l sha ll thereupon promptly decide by resolu tion

ei ther to formu la te n ew a nd a ddi tion a l prin ciples of I n ter

n a tiona l Law applica ble to the i ssue,which (Query, a dd : it

ena cted by a three-fou rths maj ori ty, or by a three-fourths

maj ori ty i ncluding a ll the eight Grea t P owers) sha ll be


referred to the I n terna tiona l H igh Cou rt w i th i nstructions

to decide the question , d ispu te, or difi’

eren ce i n a ccorda nce

therew i th ; or the Cou n ci l sha ll,i n the a ltern a tive

, promptlydea l w i th the question , d ispu te, or differen ce a s a non

j usticia ble issue i n conform i ty w i th these Articles.

Enforcemen t of the Decrees of the Cou rt.

17 . When in any case upon wh i ch j udgmen t is givenby the I n tern at ion al H igh Cou rt

,the Cou r t finds tha t

any of the part ies to the case has , by act, n egl igen ce,or

default, committed any breach Of in ternation al obl igation ,

whe ther aris ing by Treaty or Agreemen t, or by I n ter

n a tio na l Law,

or by enac tmen t of the I n tern ationalCou n c i l i n acco rdan ce w i th these Arti cles

,the Court may

s imply declare that on e or o ther l i t igan t State is in

default,and l eave such State volun tari ly to make repara

tion ; or the Court may,in the altern ative, i tself d irect

reparation to be made or compen sa tion to be paid for

such wrong,and may assess damages or compen sation ,

an d may,ei ther by way of addi t ion to damages or com

pen sation , or as an a l te rn a ti ve,impose a pecun iary fin e

upon the State declared i n default, herein called the

recalci tran t Sta te ; and may requ ire compli an ce wi th i tsdecree wi th in a specified t ime u nder pen alty ofa pecun iary

fin e,

and may prescribe the app li cat ion of any such

damages,compen sation , or fin e.

In the even t of n o n -complia n ce w i th a ny decis io n o r

decree or i n j u n c t ion of the I n te r n a t i o n a l H igh Co u r t , or

of n on -

paymen t of the damages , c ompen sa t i on ,or fin e

W i th in the t ime specrfied for su ch paymen t , the Cou rtmay decree execu t ion ,

and m ay ca ll u pon the Co n sti tuen tStates

,or upon some or a n y of them ,

to pu t in Operatio n ,

after duly publ i shed n o t i ce, for such period and u n der

116 THE FRAMEWORK oi? A LASTING PEACE

such con ditions as may be arranged, any or al l of thefo l lowin g san ct ion s

,v iz

(a ) To lay an embargo on any or al l ships with in the

j u risdi c t ion of such Con st i tu en t State or States registeredas belonging to the recalci tran t State ;

(b) To proh ibi t any l en ding of cap i tal or other mon eys

to the ci tizen s,compan i es, or subordin ate admin istration s

of the recalci tran t State,or to i ts n ation al Governmen t ;

(c) To proh i b i t the issue or dealing in or quotation on

the Stock Exchange or in the P ress of any n ew loan s,

deben tu res,shares

,n o tes or securit i es of any kind by

any of the cit izen s,compan i es, or subordin ate adm in is

tra t ion s of the recalci tran t State,or of i ts n a t ion al

Governmen t ;

(d) To proh ibi t all postal , tel egraph i c, telephon i c, and

wireless commu n i cat ion wi th the recalcitran t S tate ;(e) To p roh ib i t the paymen t of an y debts due to the

ci t izen s, compan i es, or su bord i n ate admin istrat ion s of the

reca lci tran t Sta te,or to i ts n ati on al Governmen t ; an d

,

if though t fit, to direct tha t paymen t of such debts shal lbe made on ly to on e or o ther of the Con sti tuen t Governmen ts

,wh ich shall g ive a good an d l egally valid discharge

for the same,and shall accoun t for the n et proceeds

thereof to the I n tern at ion a l H igh Cou rt ;

(f) To proh i bi t all imports, or certain Specified imports,com i ng from the recalci tran t State

,or Origin ating wi th in

i t ;(g) To proh ibi t all exports, or certain specified exports,con s ign ed di rectly to the recalci tran t State

,or dest in ed

for i t

(h) To proh i bi t al l passen ger traffi c (o ther than the

exi t of fo reign ers) , whe ther by sh ip, rai lway, can al, or

road,to or from the recalcitran t State ;

( i ) To proh ib i t the en tran ce in to any port of the Con


aggress ion again st a ny or a ll of the States so act ing underthe order of the Court ; and al l the o ther Con st i tuen tStates shal l be boun d

,an d do hereby p l edge themselves,

to make common cause with the State or States, so attacked ,and to use n aval and mili tary force to pro tect such State

or States , and to enforce the o rders of the I n ternation al

H igh Cou rt,by any warl ike operation s that mav for the

purpose be deemed n ecessary.

NOTES.

NOTE To ART ICLE 2 .

The forty’ four Sta tes represen ted at one or o ther of the H ague

Conferen ces were (i .) the eight Grea t P owers— viz. Aus t ria-H ungary,the Bri t ish Empire, F ran ce, Germany, I taly, j apan , Russia, and theU n i ted Sta tes ; ( i i . ) the following fifteen o ther Sta tes ofEu ropeviz. Belgium, Bu lga ria, Denmark, Greece, H olland, Luxembu rg,Mon tenegro, Norway, P ortugal, Rouman ia, Serbia, Spain , Sweden ,Swi tzerland, Tu rkey ; (i ii .) the following eigh teen o ther Sta tes of

America— viz . Argen tina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ch ile, Colombia , Cuba ,Dom in ican Republic, Ecuado r, Gua temala , H a i t i

,Mex ico, Nica

ragua , Panama, Paraguay, Peru , Salvador, U ruguay, Ven ezuela(these, together wi th the U n i ted S ta tes, and also Cos ta Rica and

H onduras, con st i tu te the twen ty-one members ofthe P an -AmericanU n ion ) ; (iv .) the following three o ther Sta tes - v iz . Ch ina, P ersia ,Siam . Thus the on ly exis t ing independen t Sovereign Sta tes whichcould conceivably be brough t in— and some of these may well be

deemed not independen t in respect of foreign rela t ion s— are the

American Sta tes ofCos ta Rica and H ondu ras (which were invi tedto the 1907 H ague Conferen ce, and ac tually appoin ted delega tes,who did not a t tend) ; the African Sta tes ofMorocco, Liberia, andAbyssin ia ; the Asia tic Sta tes ofAfghan is tan , Thibet, and Nepauland the European S ta te of Alban ia (besides Andorra, Lich tenstein , Monaco, and San Mar ino, which have popula tion s of less

thanIt may be suggested that adm ission should be refused to any


S ta te ( i . ) which does not,in fac t

, en ter regularly in to fo reignrela t ion s w i th mo re than on e o ther Sta te ; or (i i .) Of which the

foreign rela tion s are under the con t rol ofano ther Sta te ; or (ii i . ) ofwh ich the popula t ion is less than The adopt ion of theserules wou ld probably exclude all bu t two or three of the abovemen t ioned ou tstanding Sta tes.

NOTE TO ART ICLE 6.

The suggested complex organ iza t ion of the In terna t ional Counc ili s requ ired in order : (a ) To preven t the Coun cil being swamped,when i t is dealing w i th ma t ters n ot affect ing Cen t ral and Sou thAmerica , by the represen ta t ives ofthe twen ty independen t SovereignS ta tes of tha t par t of the world ; and (b) to main ta in un impa iredthe pract ical hegemon y and the respon sibili ty for preven t ing a

serious war which have, in fac t, devolved upon the eigh t Grea tPowers, whose adhesion to these Articles is essen t ial to thei rfull efficacy .The Coun c il for America would consis t exclusively of the repre

sen tat ives of the twen ty -on e independen t Sovereign Sta tes of the

American Con t inen t now associa ted in the P an -American U n ion .

O ther Sta tes having dependen c ies on or n ear tha t Con t in en t (viz.the Bri t ish Empi re in respec t of the Canadian Dom in ion , Newfoundland, the Bri t ish West I ndian I slands, Bri t ish H onduras,Bri t ish Gu iana , and the Falkland I slands ; Fran ce in respec t ofSt . P ierre and M iquelon , Guadeloupe, M ar t in ique, and F ren chGu iana ; H olland in respect ofSu rinam and Curagao ; and Denmarkin respec t of Green land, St . Croix, St . Thomas, and St . j ohn )wou ld be safeguarded by the power to requ i re the t ran sfer of anyquest ion to the Counc il ofthe eigh t Grea t Powers or to the Coun c ilsi t ting as a whole.


The quest ion of the rela t ive vo t ing power in the I n terna t ionalCoun c il of the fo rty or fifty independen t Sovereign Sta tes is on e

of the grea test diffi culty . At The H ague Conference the smallerSta tes successfully ma in ta ined the righ t ofa ll the S ta tes, even the

smalles t , to equali ty of vo t ing power . On the o ther hand, the

eigh t Grea t Powers, wh ich are probably adm in is tering three-fourthsof the total popu la t ion of the world

,disposmg of seven -e igh ths of

its governmen tal revenues, and con trolli ng n ine- ten ths of Its armed


forces, w ill cer ta in ly not subm i t to be ou tvoted by n ine of the

smallest Sta tes ofAmerica or Eu rope.

One sugges ted scale ofrela t ive vo t ing power has the un ique mer itofhav ing been ac tually agreed to at The H ague Conferen ce in 190 7in the form of the rela t ive part icipa t ion of the Judges ofthe severalStates in the proposed In terna t ional P rize Court . Devised for su cha purpose, i t somewha t overvalues cer ta in States having except ionally large mari t ime in terests (such as Norway), and undervaluessome having small mari t ime in terests (such as Serbia) . Otherm inor adjus tmen ts m ight n ow have to be made.

As agreed to by The H ague Conferen ce, the rela t ive posi t ion of

the Sta tes works out in to the following scale ofvo tesAust ria-H ungary, the Bri t ish Empire,F ran ce, Germany, I taly, j apan , Ru ssia ,the U n i ted Sta tes ofAmerica 2 0 votes each .

1 2

The Netherlands 9

Belgium , Denma rk, Greece, Norway,P ortugal, Sweden , Ch ina , Rouman ia ,Tu rkey

Argen t ina, Brazil, Chile, Mex icoSwi tzerland

,Bulgaria, Persia

Colombia, Peru, U ruguay, Venezuela,Serbia, Siam 2

The o ther Con st i tuen t Sta tes 1 vo te(These may in clude Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dom in ican

Republic, Ecuador, Gua temala, H ai t i,H ondu ras, Luxembu rg,

Mon ten egro, Nicaragua, Panama, Salvador, etc.)

As rega rds the Coun c il for America, i t may be u rged tha t theexist ing Pan -American U n ion has equal vo t ing. On the otherhand, the U n i ted Sta tes is n ot likely to allow such a Council tobecome an effec t ive legisla tu re if, wi th fou r-seven ths of the popu

la tion , i t has on ly one- twen ty-first of the vo ting power . The

U n i ted S ta tes may, indeed, in sis t, in this Coun cil, on an evenlarger rela t ive vo t ing P ower than was con ceded for the P rize Cou r t .A possible comprom ise between the two views is sugges ted in

Ar t icle 7— the prin c iple ofequali ty preva iling in the Coun c il of theeigh t Grea t Powers and the Counc il of the Sta tes o ther than the

eigh t Grea t Powers, whilst in the Coun cils for Eu rope and America


bo th these ex ten sion s ofthe legisla t ive au thori ty ofthe In terna t ionalCoun c il ifthe overwhelm ing major i ty requ ired had always to in cludeall the eigh t Grea t Powers themselves .

NOTE TO ART ICLE 9 .

This provides, as regards non -just ic iable issue, for (i . ) a year’sdelay in all dispu tes, and for their com ing before the In terna t ionalCoun c il ; ( i i .) the u tmost p ossible scope for in ves tiga t ion , con

sidera t ion , and media tion , and the grea tes t possible opportun i ty forult ima te agreemen t between the part ies ; (i i i .) where no volun ta ryagreemen t is come to, the obliga tory set tlemen t of the dispu te bythe In terna t ional Coun cil (a ) ifthe Coun cil is absolu tely unan imou s ;(b) if i t is unan imou s excep t for one of the parties to the case ;and (c) where the Coun c il’s dec ision affec ts nei ther the independence n or the terri torial in tegri ty, nor requ ires any changein the in ternal laws of any Con s t i tuen t S ta te, and if the enactmen t is carried by a three-fou rths majori ty (or by such a majori tyincluding a ll the eight Grea t Powers) . (The ten ta t ively suggestedAr ticles 16A and 168 should be con sidered along w i th th is Art icle. )Beyond tha t poin t, as regards in tractable dispu tes of a non .

just ic iable Charac ter, there seems at presen t no chan ce of get t ingthe Sta tes to agree in advance to be bound by any Superna t ionalAu thori ty .

NOTE TO ART ICLE 1 5 .

I t may perhaps be left to the rules as to regis tra t ion , to be madeby the In terna t ional H igh Cou rt, to prov ide for secu ring that theTrea t ies or Agreemen ts presen ted for regist ra tion by one of the

part ies thereto shall be duly au then tica ted copies and t ran sla t ion s,and accepted as correc t by the o ther par ty or par t ies, in su ch a

way as to preven t any ques t ion subsequen tly arising as to the

validity of the bilateral obliga t ion pu rport ing to be crea ted.

NOTE TO ART ICLE 16A.

I t seems as ifsome such prov iso as is here ten ta t ively sugges tedwere requ ired, if all ex ist ing Trea t ies and Agreemen ts are to be

registered and made the basis for poten t ial legal proceedings beforethe I n terna t ional H igh Cou r t . I t has not always been customaryin Trea ties spec ifically to repeal or abroga te the provision s of

former t reat ies ; and there is hardly ever any limit set to their


enduran ce . There i s no say ing wha t weird cases m igh t not befounded on the va r ious clauses of the Trea ty ofWes tphalia ( 164 8 )or on those of the Trea ty ofU t rech t or on on e or o therof the tens of thousands of un can celled documen ts, all solemn lysign ed and sealed, and professedly pa r t of the “

public law of

Eu rope, tha t m igh t be fished up ou t of the Cka nce/ Z erz’

es ofEu ropefor regis t rat ion and po ten t ial enforcemen t in the In terna t ionalH igh Cou r t . TO enable dispu tes as to Trea t ies to be dec ided bya judic ial t ribunal is the very first objec t ofall proposals of thisna tu re. Yet a vas t n umber of the ex is t ing Trea t ies are, in fac t,wholly obsolete . P rovision ought to be made somehow for

dec iding, o therw ise than by their repudia t ion by one pa rty, wh ichof them must be declared to have become n ull and void ; and i tis sugges ted tha t this is a ma t ter for decision , case by case , by the

I n terna t ional Coun cil represen t ing the S ta tes of the world. An

alterna t ive cou rse— which m igh t, however, so choke the mach ineryas to preven t the Superna t ional Au thori ty even get t ing under way—would be to provide for some impar t ial scru t iny and con sidera t ionof all Trea t ies and Agreemen ts when they are presen ted for

regis t ra t ion , in order to adm i t to regist ra t ion only those deemedto be s till in full force.


I t seems n ecessary to prov ide also for cases which, althoughapparen tly just iciable issues because there ex ists a cer tain amoun tof I n terna t ional Law dealing wi th the subjec t, could not equ i tablyor properly be decided by the I n terna t ional H igh Cou rt upon suchlaw, owing to the vaguen ess, the un cer tain ty, or the in completeness thereof. I t is, therefore, ten ta t ively suggested tha t i t m igh tbe allowed to a Con st i tuen t Sta te to take except ion to a referen ceto the Cour t, and to subm i t the issue to the I n terna t ional Coun c ilon th is ground, asking a t the same t ime for a dec ision of the

Council upon the except ion . The Council cou ld then , by an

overwhelm ing majori ty, dec ide whether the excep t ion is well

taken . In tha t case the Coun c il would then have to dec ide ei therto lay down new or addi t ional prin ciples of I n ternat ional Lawapplicable to the quest ion , and rem i t the question wi th such new

or addi t ional prin c iples to the H igh Cou rt for t rial as a just ic iableissue. In the alterna t ive, if i t does n ot by such overwhelm ingmajori ty decide to enac t new I n terna t ional Law,

the Counc ilshall deal wi th the quest ion as a non -just iciable issue,

THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS

P R I NC I PLES.

I . The healthy in terest ofn ati on s can on ly be securedand developed to-day on a basis of in tern ation al co

operation . For th is purpose i t is n ecessary to suppl emen tthe exist in g in tern ation al machin ery i n various ways , andin parti cu lar by con st i tuting and establ ish ing on a defi n i tebas is the following bodi es

(a ) A Congress of n at ion al represen tatives s i tting

regularly to promote the common in terest ofn ation s .

(6) Cou rts ofArbitration and j usti ce to wh i ch poin ts

of differen ce con cern ing the in terpretation of treaties

an d o ther matters Of a j urid i ca l character in disputebetween n ation s can be referred for decis ion .

(c) A Coun ci l of Con ci l iation to wh i ch cases of

divergen t in terest between n ation s n ot of a j uridical

character can be referred for con sideration and re

commen dation .

At the same t ime i t ough t to be possi ble for the Foreign

Secretaries to meet on e an other at regular in tervals and

at cri ti cal j un ctures for a direct in terchange ofideas instead

ofalways through ambassadors .

124

P RE L IM INARY DRAFT OF A GENERAL

TREATY F OR TH E PACIF IC SETTLEM ENT

OF INTE RNATIONAL D I SP U TE S , BY A

D UTCH COMM ITTE E

I NTRODUCTORY P ROV IS IONS .

ART. 1 .—There shal l be establ ish ed

,wi th th ei r sea t a t

The H ague,an In tern at ion al Cou rt ofArbi tra t ion and an

I n tern ation a l Coun ci l ofCon ci l ia tion .

ART. 2 .—In order to en sure the m ain ten an ce of P eace,

the Con tracting States un dertake to submit all thei r

differen ces to the decis ion of the I n tern at ion al Court ofArbitration or of the I n tern at ion al Cou n ci l ofCon ci l iat ion .

ART. 3 .— The Con tractin g States u n dertake to respect

,

an d con scien tiously to carry ou t, the decis ion s and the

decrees wh i ch i n virtue of Arti cles 5 1 and 106 shal l be

bindin g on them .

CHAPTER I .

THE I NTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARB ITRATION .

TITLE I .Composi tion of the In tern a tiona l Court ofArbi tra tion .

ART. 4 .

—The Court shal l be composed of j udges and

deputy-j udges appoin ted by the Con tracting States .

we

DUTCH COMMITTEE’

S DRAFT TREATY 127

Each of the Con tracting States shal l appoin t at least twoand at the most four j udges

,and the same n umber of

deputy-j udges .

They shall be appoin ted for twelve years.

Appoin tmen ts shal l take effect from the date fixed bythe State wh i ch has made them

,n ot being earl ier than the

day on whi ch they reach the Registry of th e Court .Appoi n tmen ts shal l be made for the first time with in

s i x mon ths after the ratification of th is treaty.

ART. 5 .- (P rovis ion s respecting the qua l ification s of

j udges, supp lemen tary appo in tmen ts in case of decease,etc ., invio labi l i ty, ran k, in compatibi l i ty, etc . )

ART. 6.— The Court shal l appoin t i ts P res iden t and two

Vice-P res i den ts.

They shall be appoin ted for four years .

Appo in tmen ts are made by a maj ori ty of vo tes.

If the secon d scrutiny does n ot Show an abso lutemaj ori ty

,n omin ation s Shal l be made on a s impl e ma jori ty.

If the vo tes are equal ly divided, the decis ion sha ll be

made by lot.

Germany,the U n i ted States ofAmeri ca, Austria-H ungary,

Fran ce, Great B ri tain , I taly, japan , and Russ ia shall haveeach three votes . The other States shal l have on ly on e.

ART. 7 .— The P res iden tial Bureau shall con s ist of the

P resi den t an d Vice- P res iden ts . They sha ll be domic i led

at The H agu e . Their decis ion s Shall be arrived at by a

majori ty of vo tes .

ART. 8 .— The P res iden t, Vice -P res iden ts, and members

of the Cou rt shal l receive an nual salaries of H.


fl . and H. Dutch curren cy, respectively,I

payable every s ix mon ths,the first instalmen t to be

payable six mon ths after the first si tting of the Court.During a s itt ing of the Court, or of one of i ts Com

m ittees,the j udges and th e deputy- j udges who are on the

rota and the members of the Committee shal l receivean al lowan ce of400 florin s a day .These al lowan ces shal l form part ofthe gen eral expen ses,

and shall be paid by the Registry.

ART. 9 .

—Besides the above-men t ion ed paymen ts no

remun erat ion shal l be al lowed to the j udges or deputyj udges

,except

I . Travel l ing expen ses,which Shal l be refun ded to j udges

and deputy- j udges by thei r ow n States, as providedby their mun i cipal laws.

2 . Expen ses of residen ce and of keeping up of thei rofficial state in curred by the P res iden t and ViceP res i den ts

,which shal l be born e by their own

States .

ART. 10.—The S i tt ings of the Court and of i ts Com

m ittees shall be held at The H ague,un l ess preven ted by

vis maj or, or un l ess in the in terests of the inquiry, and

with the con sen t of th e parties,they shal l appoin t some

other place for holding their S i tt ings .

The Court and the Committees shal l n ot hold si ttings

in the terri tory of a th ird P ower without its con sen t .

ART. 1 1 .—The Court Shal l draw up rules ofprocedure

for i tself and its Committees.Votes shall be taken in conformity with the provis i on s

ofArti cl e 6,paragraph 6.

I florin !,I s. 8d.

130 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACE’

to be ofa j ust i ciable character, even ifthey do not fal l with in

the defin i t ion con tain ed in the preceding paragraph ofth is

Art i cl e .

ART. 17.— Ifthe States in confl i ct have sign ed an arbi tral

agreemen t (comprom is) , the Court wi l l decide the case

according to the terms of the agreemen t lodged at the

Registry .

If the States have n ot succeeded in agreeing upon an

arb itral agreemen t (compromis) , they may j oin t ly requestthe Court to prepare a quas i-agreemen t (quasi -comprom is)which shal l take i ts p lace .

The Court shal l prepare the quas i -agreemen t as soon asthe j oin t demand has been lodged at the Registry .

Even if th is request is made by on ly one of the parti es,

the Court shall prepare a quas i -agreemen t, provided the

dispute is with in i ts j uri sdi ction .

ART. 18 .—The Court shall have j urisdi ction to prepare

a quasi-agreemen t at the request of one of the parties inthe fo l lowing cases

I . When a dispute is submitted to arbi tration under th eprovision s of a treaty con cluded or ren ewed afterthe coming in to force of the presen t treaty

(a ) U n less the j urisdiction of the Court has beenexcluded ; or

(b) U n less the oppos i te party declares that th e dispute

is n ot subj ect to arbitration,and that as regards th is

prel imin ary quest ion the j urisdiction of the Courti s excluded by the Arbitration Treaty .

2 . In the case ofa confl i ct con cern ing con tractual debtsdue to the subj ects of a State wh ich deman ds pay

men t of them from an other State,if i t has been

agreed that th is differen ce shal l be settled by mean s

of arbitration .

DUTCH COMMITTEE’

S DRAFT TREATY 131

Th is clause,how ever

,shal l n ot apply if arbi tration wa s

accepted on condi t ion that the quas i -agreemen t shou ld bese ttled in some other way .

ART. 19 .- The Cou r t shal l deal with a request to draw

up a quas i-agreemen t as if i t were a prin cipal deman d .

The provision s of Title I I I . (P rocedure) shal l b eappli cable .

ART. 2 0.— The Court shal l decide th e exten t of i ts ow n

jurisdi ction when th is i s based upon

I . An arbi tral agreemen t or quas i-agreemen t .2 . The jo in t request of the parties to prepare a quasiagreemen t.

3 . The provis ion s of Arti cle 18 and the treaty clausestherein referred to for the preparation of a quas iagreemen t on the request of one of the parti es.

ART. 2 1 .— A Committee of the Court shal l deal with

d isputes submitted to the j udgmen t Of the Court by an

arbi tral agreemen t or a request to prepare a quasi -agree

men t .This Committee shal l be composed of

I . The j udges ( if on ly two) , or the two sen ior j udges,or

,in defaul t of j udges , depu ty- j udges, appo in ted

by each of the li t igan t States in the order of their

appoin tmen t .

2 . A P residen t des ign ated by the l i t igan t States at the

latest wi th in a mon th after the depos i t ofthe agreemen t or the aforesaid request at the Registry of the

Cou rt.If the request comes from on e party o n ly, the Registrar

shall sen d a copy as quickly as poss i ble to the oppos ingparty .


If the n omin ation of a P res i den t has n ot been made

before the exp i ration of the fixed time- l imit,he shal l be

chosen by the P res iden t ial Bureau of the Court.The P res iden t of the Committee shal l be chosen from

among the judges and deputy-j udges of the Cou rt . H e

can n o t be chosen from among the j udges and deputy

j udges appo in ted by the part ies to the disp ute .

ART. 2 2 .—If the P res i den t ial Bureau is cal led upon to

appoin t the P res iden t ofa Committee any of i ts memberswho have been appo in ted ju dges, part ies in l i t igationshal l abstain from tak in g part in the appoin tmen t.Any member thus obl iged to abstain Shal l be replacedby the sen i or j udge (in the order ofappoin tmen t) appoin ted

by a n eutral State .

Deputy- j u dges Shall be cal led upon in accordan ce with aro ta ofStates to be drawn up by the Court .

The voting with regard to th is rota shall be govern ed by

the provis ion s ofArt icl e 6, paragraph 6.

In case a deputy- j udge i s preven ted from discharging hisdut ies

,h is p lace shal l be taken by the sen ior member (in

order of appoin tmen t) of the n ext State according to

the rota.

ART. 2 3 .— If any member of a Committee ( in cluding

the P res iden t) ceases to be a member of the Court, he shallcon t in ue n everth eless to fulfi l the fun ct ion s of a member

of the Committee un ti l j u dgmen t has been pron oun ced.

ART. 24 .— If any member of a Committee ( in cluding

the P res iden t) is preven ted from fulfi lling h is duties, heshal l be rep laced by an other member .

Art icle 2 1,paragraphs 2—4 and Art icle 2 2 Shal l apply

mutatis mutandis to this substi tution .


ART. 29 .—As a gen eral rule

,arbi tral procedure com

prises two distin ct phases : p l eadings and oral discussion s .The p leadings shal l con sist ofstatemen t ofclaim,

statemen t

of defen ce,and

,if n eed be

,rep ly with the commun i cation

by the respective agen ts to the members of the Committeeand the oppos i te party, of cases

,coun ter-cases, and

,if

n ecessary, repl ies ; the parties an n ex thereto al l papers and

documen ts called for in the case. Th is commun i cat ionshal l be made ei ther di rect ly or through the Registry in the

order and with in the time fixed by the arbi tral agreemen t.

The t ime fixed by the arbitral agreemen t may be extendedby mutual agreemen t between the part ies

,or by the Com

m ittee when the lat ter con s i ders i t n ecessary for the

purposes of reach ing a j ust decis i on .

The d iscuss ion s con s ist in th e oral developmen t before

the Committee ofth e argumen ts ofthe parties .

ART. 30.— A certified copy of every documen t produced

by o ne party must be commun i cated to the other party.

ART. 3 1.—Un l ess special ci rcumstan ces arise

,the Com

m ittee does not meet un ti l the pleadings are closed.

ART. 3 2 .—The discussion s are un der the con trol of th e

P res i den t .They are on ly publ i c if i t be so decided by the Com

m ittee,with the assen t ofthe parties .

They are recorded in min utes drawn up by the Secretari es

appo in ted by the P res iden t . These min utes are s ign ed by

the P res iden t and by on e of the Secretari es, an d alon e

have an auth en ti c character .

ART. 33 .— After the close of the pleadings, the Com

m ittee is en t it led to refuse discussion ofal l n ew papers and

DUTCH COMMITTEE’

S DRAFT TREATY 135

al l further documen ts wh i ch on e ofthe parties may wish tosubmit to i t without the con sen t ofth e other party.

ART. 34.—The Committee is free to take in to con sider

at ion new papers or documen ts to which i ts atten tion maybe drawn by the agen ts or coun se l of the parties .

In th is case the Committee has the righ t to require the

production of these papers or documen ts, but is obl iged tocommun i cate them to the opposi te party .

ART. 35 .—The Committee can

,besi des , require from

the agen ts of the parties the product ion of al l papers,and

can demand al l n ecessary explan ation s.In case ofrefusal

,the Committee takes n ote ofi t.

ART. 36.- The agen ts and the counsel of the parties are

authorized to presen t orally to the Committee al l the

argumen ts they may con s ider expedien t in defen ce of

thei r case .

ART. 37.-Th ey are en t i tled to raise obj ection s and poin ts .

The decis ion s of the Committee on these poin ts are fin aland can not form the subj ect of any subsequen t discussion .

ART. 38.— The members of the Committee are en ti t led

to put question s to the agen ts and coun sel of the parties

and to ask them for explanation s on doubtful poin ts.

Nei ther question s put nor the remarks made by members

of the Committee in the course of the discuss ion s can beregarded as an expression of the opin ion of the Committee

in gen eral or ofi ts members in particu lar.

ART. 39 .—The Committee is en t i tled to issue rules of

procedure for the conduct of the case, to decide the forms,order

,and t ime in wh i ch each party mu s t con clude i ts

argumen ts,and to arrange al l the formal i ti es required for

deal ing with the eviden ce .


ART. 4o .-The parties undertake to supply the Com

m ittee,as ful ly as they con s i der poss ibl e, with al l the

information required for deciding the case .

ART. 4 1 .—For al l n oti ces wh i ch the Committee has to

serve in the terri tory of a th i rd Con tracting P ower, the

Committee shall apply direct to the Governmen t of that

P ower. The same rule app l i es in the case of steps being

taken to procure eviden ce on the spot . The requests for

th is purpose are to be executed as far as the mean s at thedisposal of the P ower app l i ed to al low un der its mun i c i

pal laws . They can n ot be rej ected un less the P ower in

quest ion con s i ders them calcu lated to impair i ts own

sovereign rights or i ts safety.The Committee shal l equal ly always be en t i t led to act

through the P ower with in whose terri tory i t s i ts .

ART. 4 2 .—When the agen ts and coun sel of the parties

have submitted al l the exp lan ation s an d eviden ce in sup

port oftheir case,the P residen t shal l declare the discuss ion

closed .

ART. 43.—The Committee con siders i ts decis ions in

private and the proceedings remain secret. All question s

are decided by a maj ori ty of the members of the Comm ittee.

ART. 44.— The award must give the reasons on which

i t is based . I t con tain s the n ames of th e j udges : i t i ssign ed by the P res iden t an d Registrar .

ART. 45 .—The decis ion is read ou t in Open court, the

agen ts and cou n sel of the parties being presen t or duly

summon ed to a t ten d .


Art. 49 .—The parties may reserve in the arbi tral agree

men t the right to deman d the revis ion of a sen ten ce,

pron oun ced without appeal or on appeal .A revis ion must be claimed by sending a reason edrequest to the Reg istry. The Registrar shal l at on ce forward a copy to the oppos i te party.The Committee wh i ch has given the con tested decis iondecides upon the claim for revision .

If there are vacan cies,they wi l l be fi l l ed up . Art icl e 24

appl ies mu ta tis mu ta ndis.

ART. 50.—The request for a revision must be based on

some n ew fact wh ich at the t ime when the case was closedwas un known to the Committee and to the party askingfor rev i sion

,provided that th is fact was such as migh t

have had a decis ive influen ce on the award .

The proceedings in a revi sion shall n ot begin un ti lafter an express decis ion of the Committ ee establ ishingthe existen ce of the n ew fact wh ich attri butes to i t the

character required by the preceding Arti cle, and which for

these reason s declares the claim admiss ible .

ART. 5 1 .—The award is not bin ding except on the parties

to the dispute .If the dispute con cern s the in terpretat ion of a treatywhich also bin ds P owers other than the l i tigan t part i es,these shall inform them al l of i t in good time .

Such th ird P owers are en t i t led to in terven e in the case .

The decision as to the in terpretation of the treaty con

ta in ed in the award shal l be equal ly b in ding on al l the

in terven ing part i es .

ART. 5 2 .

—The parties shal l bear on ly thei r own ex

pen ses.

DUTCH COMMITTEE’

S DRAFT TREATY 139

T ITLE IV .

Arbi tra tion by Summa ry P rocedu re.

ART. 5 3 .—W i th a view to faci l itat ing the working of

arbi tration in disputes admitting of a summary procedure,the Con tracting Powers adopt the fol lowing rules, whichshal l be observed in the absen ce ofother arrangemen ts

,and

subj ect to the reservation that the provis ion s of the lastpreceding Ti t le apply so far as may be .

ART. set — If the part ies stipulate for the resort to sum

mary procedure,the Committee shal l be formed accord

ing to Art icl e 2 1, except that the n umber ofmembers who

s i t for each party shal l be reduced to one .

ART. 5 5 .— In the absen ce of any previou s agreemen t , the

Committee,as soon as i t is formed, settles the t ime with in

which the two part ies must submit thei r respective cases

to i t .

ART. 56.—Each party is represen ted before the Com

m ittee by an agen t, who serves as in termediary betweenthe Committee and the Governmen t which appoin tedh im .

ART. 5 7 .

—The proceedings are conducted exclus ively in

wri ting . Each party, however, has the righ t to ask that

witn esses and experts shal l be cal led .

The Committee has the right to demand, at i ts own

in stan ce,oral exp lan ation s from the agen ts of the two

parties, as wel l as from the e xperts and witn esses whose

appearan ce in Court i t may con sider useful .

140 THE FRAMEWORK OR A LASTING PEACE

T ITLE V .

I n terna tion a l Comm issions of Inqu iry.

ART. 5 8 .

— In d ispu tes of an in tern at ion al n ature involving n either hon our n or v i tal in terests and aris ing from adifferen ce of opin ion on po in ts of fact

,the Con tractin g

P owers deem it expedien t an d desirabl e that th e partieswho have n ot been able to come to an agreemen t by mean sof diplomacy, shou ld, so far as circumstan ces allow

,in sti

tute an In tern ation al Commission of I nquiry to faci l i tatethe solution of these d isputes by elucidat ing the facts bymean s of an impart ial and con sci en ti ous in vestigation .

ART. 59 .

— I n tern at ion al Commiss ion s ofI nquiry are con

st i tu ted by special agreemen t between the parties in dispu te .

The Inquiry Con ven t ion defin es the facts to be exam ined ; i t determin es the mode and t ime in which the

Commiss ion is to be formed, and the exten t of the powers

of the Commiss ion ers .

I t a lso determin es,if n ecessary

,where the Commiss ion

is to si t and wh ether i t may remove to an other p lace, thelanguage the Commiss ion shal l u se and the languages

the u se ofwhich shal l be authorized before i t, as well as

the date on wh i ch each party must depos i t i ts statemen t

offacts, and,gen eral ly speaking, a ll the condition s upon

which the parti es have agreed .

If the parties con s i der i t n ecessary to appoin t assessors,the I nquiry Con ven tion shal l determin e the mode ofthei r

selection and the exten t of their powers .

ART. 6o .— Ifthe In quiry Con ven t ion has n ot determin ed

where the Commiss ion is to S it,i t Shal l Sit at The H ague .

The p lace of meeting, o n ce fixed,can n ot be altered

without the assen t of the parti es.


si t tings ofthe Commission , the preparation of the minutes,

and, while the inquiry lasts, for the charge of the arch ives,which shal l subsequen t ly be tran sferred to the I n tern ational

Bureau at The H ague .

ART. 66.— In order to faci l i tate the con st i tution and

working ofCommission s ofI nquiry, the Con tracting P owersrecommend the following ru les, which Shal l be appli cableto the inquiry procedure in so far as the parti es do not

adopt other ru les .

ART. 67 .-The Commiss ion shal l settl e the detai ls of

procedure not covered by the Specia l I nqu iry Conven t ion

or the presen t Con ven t ion and shal l arrange al l the for

malities required for deal ing with th e eviden ce .

ART. 68.— At the inquiry both part ies must be heard .

At the dates fixed,each party commun i cates to the

Commission and to the other party the statemen ts of

facts, if any, and in al l cases the in strumen ts, papers, anddocumen ts wh ich i t cons i ders useful for ascertain ing the

truth,as wel l as the l ist of witn esses and experts whose

eviden ce i t wishes heard .

ART. 69 .—The Commiss i on i s en t i t led, with the assen t of

the parties, to move temporari ly to any place where i t

con siders i t may be useful to have recourse to inquiry onthe spot or to sen d on e or more of i ts members.P ermission must be obtain ed from the S tate on whoseterri tory i t i s proposed to ho ld the inquiry.

ART. 7o .— Every in vestigat ion and every examination of

a locali ty must be made in the presen ce of the agen ts

and coun sel of the parties or after they have been duly

summon ed.

DUTCH COMMITTEE’

S DRAFT TREATY 143'

ART. 71 .—The Commission is en t i tled to ask from either

party such explan ations and informat ion as i t con sidersn ecessary.

ART. 72 .-The parties undertake to supply the Com

mission of I nquiry, as ful ly as they may th in k poss iblewith al l mean s and faci li t i es n ecessary to en able i t tobecome compl ete ly acquain ted with, and accurately tounderstand the facts in question .

They un dertake to make u se of al l the mean s at thei rdisposal

,under their mun i c ipal law

,to in sure the appearan ce

of the witn esses or experts who are in thei r terri tory and

have been summon ed before the Commiss ion .

If the witn esses or experts are un able to appear beforethe Commission , the parti es shal l arrange for thei r eviden ce

to be taken before the competen t authori ti es of thei r own

coun try.

ART. 73.— For al l n oti ces to be served by the Com

miss ion in the terri tory of a thi rd Con tracting P ower, the

Commission shal l app ly direct to the Governmen t of the

said Power. The same rule appli es in the case of stepsbeing taken to procure eviden ce on the Spot .

The requests for th is purpose are to be executed so far asthe mean s at the disposal ofthe Power appl ied to under i tsmun i cipal laws a l low.

They can n ot be rej ected un l ess the P ower in questioncon s iders they are calcu lated to impair i ts sovereign rights

or i ts safety .

The Commission shal l equally always be en t i tled to actthrough the P ower on whose territory i t s i ts .

ART. 74 .—The witn esses and experts are summon ed on

the request ofthe parti es or by the Commission of i ts own


mot ion , and,in every case

,through the Governmen t in

whose terri tory they are.The witn esses are h eard in success ion and separately

,

in the presen ce of the agen ts and coun sel,and in the

order fixed by the Commiss ion .

ART. 75 .—The examin ation ofwitn ess es i s con ducted by

the P resi den t .The members of the Commission may

,however

,put to

each witn ess question s that they con sider l ikely to eluci

date or comp lete h is eviden ce, or get information on any

poin t con cern ing the witn ess with in the l imits n ecessaryfor arriving at the truth .

The agen ts and coun sel of the parties may not in terrup tthe witn ess when he is making h is statemen t

,n or pu t any

direct quest ion to h im ,but they may ask the P residen t to

put such addit ion al question s as they th in k expedien t .

ART. 76.— The witn ess must give eviden ce without being

allowed to read any written draft . H e may, however, bepermitted by the P res i den t to con sult n otes or documen ts

,

if the n ature of the facts referred to n ecessi tates the i r

employmen t .

ART. 77.—A min ute of the eviden ce of the witn ess is

drawn up forthwith a nd read to the witn ess . The latter maymake such alteration s and addi t i on s as he th in ks n ecessary

,

which wi l l be recorded at the en d of h is statemen t .When the whole of h is statemen t has been read to th ewi tn ess

,he 18 asked to S ign i t .

ART. 78 .—The agen ts are authorized in the course of or

at the c lose of the inquiry to presen t in writing to the

Commiss ion and to the oth er party such statemen ts,

requ is i t ion s, or summaries offact as they consider useful

for ascertain ing the truth .


CHAPTER I I .

THE I NTERNATIONAL COUNC IL OF CONC IL IATION .

TITLE 1.

Composi tion of the In terna tiona l Counci l ofCon ci lia tion .

ART. 86.

— The Coun ci l shal l be composed ofmembersand deputy-members appo in ted by the Con tracting States .

Each ofthe Con tracting States shal l appoin t at l east twoand at the most four members and the same n umber of

deputy-members .They Shal l be appoin ted for si x years . The appoin tmen t

shal l take effect from the date fixed by the State wh i ch hasmade i t

,not being earl i er than the date on which i t reaches

the Registry ofthe Coun ci l .

Appoin tmen ts Shal l be made for the first t ime wi th in Six

mon ths after the rat ification of th is treaty .

ART. 87 .—The fol lowing can n ot be appoin ted

1 . D iplomatists on active servi ce .

2 . M embers of the I n tern ation al Court ofArbi tration ormembers ofthe In tern ation al P rize Court .

Appoin tmen ts are made in each Con tracting State by the

head ofthe State from a l ist presen ted by the Legislative

Body .

ART. 88 .— (P rovis ion s respecting subst i tution s in case of

decease,etc . ,

in violabi l i ty,ran k

,in compa t ibi l i ty, etc . )

ART. 89 .

— The Coun ci l shal l appoin t i ts P res iden t and

tw o Vice-P res iden ts .

They Shal l be appoin ted for four years .

Arti cle 6, paragraphs 3, 4, 5 , and 6 are appl i cable.

DUTCH COMMITTEE'S DRAFT TREATY 147

ART. 90 .

— The P res iden t ial Bureau is composed of

the P res iden t and Vice -P res iden ts.

They shal l be domici led at The H ague .

Their decis ion s shal l b e arrived at by a maj ority of

votes .

ART. 9 1 .

-The P residen t and the Vice-P res iden ts sha l lreceive an nual remunerati on of fl. and fl .

respectively, D utch curren cy, payable every s i x mon ths,the first instalmen t to be payable !s ix mon ths! 1 afterthe first s i tt ing of the Coun ci l .These paymen ts form part of the gen eral expen ses and

shal l be paid through the Registry .

ART. 9 2 .

— Bes ides the above -men tion ed paymen ts n o

remun eration shal l be al lowed to the members or deputy

members,except .

1 . Travel l ing expen ses, which shal l be refun ded tomembers an d deputy-members by their own States

as provided by mun i cipal laws .

2 . The expen ses of res iden ce and of keeping up official

state,wh i ch Shal l be born e by their ow n States .

ART. 93 .— The s i t tings of the Cou n cil and of its Com

m ittees shal l be h eld at The H ague, un less preven tedby vis maj or, or un l ess in the i n teres ts of the inquiry,and with the con sen t of the parties, they shal l appo in t

some o ther place .

ART. 94 .-The Coun ci l shal l draw up ru l es of pro

cedure for i tself and i ts Committees .

Votes shal l be taken in conformi ty with the provision s

ofArti cle 6, paragraph 6.

Not in ser ted, bu t see Ar t ic le 8.

148 THE FRAMEWORK OR A LASTING PEACE

ART. 95 .—The I n tern a t ion a l B ureau to be establ ished

u nder Ar t i cl e 1 1 1 Shal l serve as the Registry for the Coun ci l

and i ts Committees .

The Gen eral Secretary of the Bureau, or one of his

subst i tutes performs the duties of Registrar .

ART. 96.— The P res i den t ial Bureau shal l prepare a

report every year, wh i ch the Registrar shal l sen d to the

Con tracting States , to the members, and to the deputy

members .

ART. 97 .— The Coun ci l shal l meet on the summon s of

the Netherlan ds Governmen t for its first s i tting n ot l ess

than six mon ths after the ratification of th is treaty.AS soon as the P residen t and Vice-P residen ts have

been appo in ted, the Counci l Shal l meet when ever i t issummon ed by the P res i den t ial Bureau .

TITLE I I .

furisdiction a nd P rocedure of the In terna tiona l Counci l ofConci lia tion .

ART. 98 .

— The Coun ci l has j urisd i ct ion to take cogu i

zan ce of d ispu tes between States

1 . On the request of al l the parti es .

2 . On the requ est of one of the part ies, if the I n tern ation al Court ofArbi tration has declared the case

to be outsi de its j urisdiction ; if, according to the

opin ion of th e parties, the d ispute is n ot one

subj ec t to Arbi tration ; or, if i t does n ot admit of

doubt that the case is outs ide the j urisdiction of

the Court ofArbitration .

The Registrar sha ll wi thout delay sen d a copy of the

request to the opposing party .


rep laced by the sen ior member ( in order of appoin tmen t)of those whom a th ird State has appoin ted as membersof the Coun ci l.Such subst i tu tes Shal l be summon ed according to th eorder of the States set out in a l ist prepared by theCoun ci l .The vote relatin g to the l i st takes place in accordan cewith the provis ion s ofArt i cl e 6

, paragraph 6.

If a substi tute is preven ted from atten ding,h is place

shal l be taken by the sen ior member ( in order of appoin t

men t) among those appo i n ted by the State which comesn ext on the list .

ART. 10 1 .

— If a member of the Committee, in cluding

the P res iden t,ceases to be a member of the Coun ci l

after the examin ation in to the dispute has begun , heShal l con t in ue to fulfi l the duties of a member un ti l the

t ime when the decision i s arrived at .

ART. 102 .— If a member of the Committee, in cluding

the P residen t,is preven ted from fulfi l l in g h is dut ies,

he sh al l be rep laced by an other member. In th is caseArt icles 99 and 100 shal l app ly mu ta tis mu tandis.

ART. 103 .—When the P residen t i s chosen , the examin a

t ion shal l be n otified as soon as possible.

The Committee shal l quest ion the represen tati ves of

the parties in each other’s presen ce.

The parties and th ird P owers— if they con sen t— shal l

furn ish al l the information that they are able to produce.

The examin ation Shal l take place according to th e ru les

of procedure .I t Shal l be publ ic, if the Committee, with the con sent

ofthe parties, so prescribe,

DUTCH COMMITTEE’

S DRAFT TREATY 15 1

ART. 104 .-Del iberat ion shal l a lways be in secret .

The Committee decides by decree .Members have on ly on e vote .

ART. 105 .

—Decis ion s are adopted by the maj ori ty of

vo tes .

The ma j ori ty mu st in clude at least one vote of amember of each party.

If the votes are equal ly divided, the P resi den t has thec ast ing vote

,except where the request has n ot come

from al l parti es or when the j o in t requ est l imits the

decision to the members of the Committee .A member of a party is a member; of the Committee

who has been appo in ted member or deputy-member of

that Coun ci l by that party .

ART. 106.-Decrees arrived at under Art icles 104 and

105 shal l be binding upon the part ies .

Decrees shal l be commun i cated to the parti es and

made publ i c .

If a decree has n ot been pron oun ced, the argumen ts

put forth on both Si des may be made pub li c if i t be

so decided by a maj ori ty of votes and with the assen tof the part ies.

ART. 107 .— The Coun ci l shal l be en t itled

,at i ts ow n

i nstan ce , to give an Opin ion on a dispute in the fol lowingcases

I . If a request covered by Art ic le 98 i s n ot settled by

a decis ion of the Committee .2 . If a dispu te, whether or n o t of a j u sti ciable n ature,

has arisen between Con tracting States and has n ot

been submitted ei ther to the Cour t or to the

Counc il,

15 2 THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACE

3 . If there is reason to fear that a dispute,whether or

n ot of a j u st i ciable n ature,may arise between

Con tracting States .

ART. 108.— The P residen t shal l summon the Coun ci l

with in a mon th at the j o in t request of members repre

sen ting at least five States.

ART. 109 .

—The Coun ci l shal l con si der and decide at

a ful l s i tt ing upon the opin i on to be given,un l ess i t

han ds over the decis ion to a Committee .

Del iberation s shal l take p lace in secret,un less th e

Coun ci l or Committee decide otherwise .In the ful l s i tt ing

,each Con tracting S tate has one vo te

,

except that German y, Austr ia-H ungary, Great B ri tain,

F ran ce,I taly

,Russia

, japan , and the U n i ted States of

America have each three vo tes.

In the si ttings of a Commi t tee the vote shal l be

taken according to rules fixed by the Coun ci l .

The Coun ci l an d Committees Shal l del iberate and

decide according to the regulation s fixed by the ru les

of procedure .

ART. 1 10 .—The Opin ion arrived a t by the majority of

votes shal l be n otified to the Con tracting States con

cern ed .

F INAL AND I NTER IM P ROV IS IONS.

ART. 1 1 1 .-An I n tern at ion al Bureau shal l be establ ish ed

at The H ague to serve as Registry to the I n tern ation al

Cou rt of Arbi tration and the I n tern at ion al Coun ci l of

Con ci l iation . I t shal l be the medium of commun ications


of the Court ofArbi tration,the Coun ci l ofCon ci l iation

,

the Admin istrat ive servi ces,and the expen ses .

The report shal l also con tain a summary of the chiefcon ten ts of the documen ts commun i cated to the Bureauby the P owers in virtue ofArt i cle 3, paragraphs 2 and 3 .

ART. 1 13 .— The expen ses of the Bureau Shal l be born e

by the Con tracting P owers in the proport i on agreed upon

for the I n tern at ion al Bureau of the U n iversal P ostalU n ion .

The expen ses in curred by Adhering P'

owers shal l bereckon ed from the day from wh i ch thei r adhesion takeseii ect .

ART. 1 14 .

—The presen t Conven tion duly ratified shal l

replace in the relat ion s between the Con tracting P owersthe Con ven t ion for the P acific Settlemen t of I n tern ation al

D isputes ofOctober 18th,1907 .

Powers which have, before the presen t Con ven tion shal l

come in to force, en tered in to special arbi tration treatieswith each other

,or which have before that date agreed

to an arbi tration clause, shal l be deemed to revoke al lprovisi on s con trary to the presen t Conven tion which

may be foun d in any such treaty or clause and to confer

j urisdict ion upon the In tern ational Court of Arbitrat ionin al l disputes covered by such a treaty or by such aclause

, except for the appl ication ofArti cles 17 and 18.

The presumption of the precedin g paragraph shal l n otapply if the parti es, or one of the parties, declare i tcon trary to its in ten t ion s with in three mon ths after

ratification s of the presen t Con ven ti on are deposi ted .

P ri n ted i n Great Bri ta i n by

pNWIN BROTHERS,LIMITED, THE GRESHAM PRESS.WOKING AND LONDON

After -W ar ProblemsED I TED BY W ILL IAM HARBUTT DAWSON

Demy 7 5 . 6d. net . P ortage 6d.

Thi s importan t volume i s in tended to state some of the more u rgen tna ti onal problems w h ich w ill need to be faced after the War, and tooffer a practicable P rogramme of Recon struction . The chap ters haveall been w r i tten by specialists deep ly concerned in the subjects w i thw h ich they deal

,as W i ll be seen from the follow ing synopsisI M PERIAL FEDERAT ION .

By the late EARL OF CROMER .THE STATE AND TH E C I T I Z EN .

By BISHOP WELLDON.NAT IONAL EDUCAT ION .

By VISCOUNT HALDANE .

THE ORGAN I Z AT ION OF NAT IONALRESOURCES. By the RT. HON. SIR

J. COMPTON RICKETT, M .P .

RELATIONS BETWEEN CAP ITAL ANDLABOUR. ( I . LABOUR ) By GEO. H .

ROBERTS , JP , M P.RELAT IONS BETWEEN CAP ITAL AND

LABOUR. ( 2 . CAP ITAL ) By SIRBENJAM IN C. BROWNE .

THE REHAB IL ITAT ION OF RURALL I FE. By the B ISHOP or Ex ETER.NATIONAL H EALTHBy jAMES KERR , MA M D. , D .P H .

UNSOLVED PROBLE M S OF THEENGL ISH POOR LAW . By SIRWM. CHANCE, Bart . MA .

THE CULTIVAT ION OF PATRIOTIS MBy the EARL OF M EATH .

THE AL IEN QUEST ION.

By SIR H . H . JOHNSTON .THE STATE AND I NDUSTRY.

By Dr. w . GARNETT.

THE STATE I N RELATION TOLABOUR. By PROF. S. J. CHAPMAN .POS IT ION OF WO M EN IN ECONO M IC

L I FE . By MRS. FAWCETT.

THE LAND QUEST ION.

By W . joYNSON H rcx s, M P.HOUS I NG AFTER TH E WAR.

By HENRY R. ALDR IDGE.

THE CARE OF CH ILD L I FE.

By M ARGARETMcMILLAN.NAT IONAL THR I FT.By ARTHUR SHRRWELL, M P .NATIONAL TA! ATION AFTER THEWAR. By PROF. ALFRED M ARSHALL.

The Choice Before U sBY G. LOWES D ICK INSON

Demy 800. 61. net . P ortage 6d.

Th is book descr ibes br iefly the prospect before the w orld, if the armedin ternational an archy is to con tinue, and to be extended and exasperated,after the w ar. I t an alyses and d i scusses the p resupposi tion s w h ichunderlie M i li tar i sm . And havmg argued both tha t in ternational war asi t w ill be conducted in the fu ture implies the ru in of civrlization

, andthat it is not “ inevi table, sketches the k ind of reorgan ization that 18both possi ble and essen t ial ifwar is not to destroy mankind.

P r i n c i ple s of So c i a l

Reconstruction 3RD IM PRESS IONBy BERTRAND RUSSELL,

F .R.S .

Demy 8vo , 65 . net Postage 6d.

Mr. Russell has w r i tten a big and living book .

"—I l; eNa tion,

A Bulwark against GermanyThe F ight of the Sloven es

,the Western Branch

of the j ugoslavs , for Nat ional Existen ce

BY BOGUM IL VOSNJAKLate Lecturer of the Un ivers ity of Z agreb (Croat ia) .

TRANSLATED BY FANNY S. COPELAND

Crown 800. 4r. 6d. net . P ortage 5d.

After the dismembermen t of the Habsburg Emp i re the un ion of the

j agoslav n a tion— the Serbs , Croats , and Slovenes— ih one S tate w i ll be

on e of the most importan t featu res of fu tu re Europe. From the

beg inn ing of the M iddle Ages dow n to the p resen t great war thew estern -most bran ch of th is n at ion , the Slovenes , have w aged a braves truggle again st German imperialism . The “ Bu lw ark ” expla ins the

h istorical, poli tical, social, and econ omical evolut ion of the Slovenes,

w ho w i ll be a strong factor in the bu i lding up of the great Serbia or

jugoslavia of to-morrow .

A Dying EmpireBY BOGUM IL VOSNJAK

W I TH A PREFACE BY T . P . O’

CONNOR, M .P.

Crown 800. 43 . 6d. net . P ortage

In th i s accoun t of the Dying Emp i re ofAustr ia the au thor has triedto describe the sociological factors in the breakdown of the Hapsbu rgEmp ire, and to Show tha t in the fabr ic of a Cen tral Europe i s closelyw oven the i dea of a p redom in atin g P an -German i sm . E i ther German ymust stretch from Hambu rg to Tri este and Salon ika

,or Austria-Hungarymust be di smembered. There i s no alternative.

Practical Pacifism and its

Adversaries : “ Is i t Peace, j ehu ?

BY DR . SEVERIN NORDENTOFT

W ITH AN INTRODUCT ION BY G . K . CHESTERTON

Crown 800. 4r. 6d. net . P ortage 5d.

In addi tion to making defin i te suggestion s as to the lines on w h ich theP eace Movemen t shou ld go to w ork after the w ar— suggestion s w h ich are

both obvious and p ractical— the book con tain s a reprin t of a pamphletw ri tten by an upper-class nat ive ofSchlesw rg , w i th footnote cri tici sms by aP russ ian scholar ofu nbiassed view s, wh ich renders very sen sational andpersonal testimony to the terrible d iscon ten t and bi tter rage

G

Whi ch acon quered n at ion feels in i ts humi lia tin g pos i tion of subject i on—thusproving beyond all doubt tha t the ch iefobstacle tha t the Peace Movemen thas to face is th is unnatural den ial to the conquered people of the R ightsofPeace.

Home Truths about the War

BY TH E REV. HUGH B . CHAPMAN, Chapla in ofthe SavoyCrown 800. ar. 6d. net . P ortage 4d.

An effort to arrive at the psychology of the w ar so far as it affectsordinary people, and to assert w i th humou r

,but w i thou t bi ttern ess,tru th s to wh i ch many are long ing to g ive express ion . The object of

the w r i ter i s to in sist on the fact tha t at th is momen t the combinat ionof patrio tism and p iety is the one lesson of the w ar.

The True Cause ofthe Com

mercial D ifficu lt ies ofGt . Bri ta inBY CEC IL BALFOUR PH IPSON

ED ITED BY MARK B. F. MAJOR AND EDWARD W. EDSALL

Crown 800. ar. 64. net . P ortage 3d.

Th i s w ork discloses an uncon sidered (but surprisingly obvious) factor inthe fiscal con troversy , show ing tha t since the in tern a tionalization of gold

the prin ciples of Free Trade have ceased to operate, and that for thei rres toration Great Bri tain mus t rega in the u se of a pu rely n ational moneys tanda rd , such as she used prior to 1874 , when her commercial prosper i tyw as phenomenal.

Econom ic Conditions1 8 1 5 and 1 9 14

Crown 800. BY H . R. HODGES, E.SC. (Econ .) 2 1. 64. net .

A book offacts concern ing a cen tury’s p rogress in the mater ial w elfareof the people of England, comparing thei r econom ic posi tion and

pow er,occupa tion s and remunerat ion at the en d of on e g rea t European

w ar and the ou tbreak ofa greater.The book , w i th i ts in teresting tables and d iagrams, g ives a clear

p ictu re of the imp rovemen t , and i t Wi ll also refresh the memories of thecondi tions and outlook ofthe peop le in the last days ofpeace.

TheFu tu re ofConstantinopleBy LEONARD S. WOOLF

Crown 800. ar. 6d. net . P ortage 4d.

Th is w ork deals w i th one of the most vi tal problems ofBri tish foreignpolicy , the settlemen t ofthe O ttoman Emp ire after the w ar. I t p roposesand discusses a settlemen t of Constan t i n ople based upon the poli tical,economic, and strateg ic in terests n ot of on e n ation , bu t of all nation s .

The poss i bi li ty of i ts admin is tration by an in ternational organ , modelledon the Eu ropean Comm ission of the Dan ube, i s ex am in ed in deta i l, andthe h i story and achievemen ts of the Danube Comm ission are for the

first time in this book made fully ava i lable for Eng lish readers.

RECENT SOCIOLOGY, ECONOM ICS, SEC.

Subjects of the DayBeing a Selection of Speeches and Wri tings by EARL CURZ ONOF KEDLESTON. Wi th an I NTRODUCTION by the late EARLOF CROMER, O.M. Edi ted by DESMOND M . CHAPMANHUSTON . Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d. net. Postage 5d .

“Wi ll be priceless to the social h istorian . Of profoundlyabsorbing in teres t."—New Sta tesman .

V i ew s on Some Soc ial Subject s By SIR DYCEDUCKWORTH , BT. Demy 8vo, 7s. 6d . net . Postage 5d .

We consult a w ise specialist, and he tells us w i th a gen ial toleranceand dign i ty all that he believes to be true and useful. - Sa tu rday Revi ew.

Econ omic M oralism By JAMES HALDANE SM ITH .

Large Crown 8vo, 55 . n et. Postage 5 d .

A carefully-reasoned treatise —Scotsma n .

The Science ofPeace Being a Study of Educa t ionalCau ses and Efi

'

ects Specially addressed to Women as the

D i rectress ofthe Lifeo Forces. By STANLEY DE BRATH .

Large Crown 8vo, 4s. 6d . net .

Arbi trat ion and Con ci liat ion in Au stralasiaBy MARY THERESA RANK IN , M .A. W i th an I NTRODUCTION byJ. SH IELD N ICHOLSON , M .A.,

B .SC.,F .B .A.

Demy 8vo , 5 5 . net. Postage 5d .

The Australasian experimen ts are a valuable lesson , and the recen ttrend ofour ow n leg islation makes tha t lesson opportune.

"— s es.

European Police System s By RAYMOND B . FOSD ICK.

Demy 8vo, cloth , os. 6d . n et. Postage 5d .

A very importan t and valuable con tr ibu tion to Police scien tific li terapacked W i th new informat ion - Polzce Review.

Ou tlines of In tern at ional LawBy CHARLES H . STOCKTON , Rear-Admiral U .S .N. (Retired) .

Demy 8y o, 105 . 6d . net.

A clear and au thori tat ive summary ofin ternat ional law .

"—Specta tor.

Ocean Traffi c and TradeBy B . OLNEY HOUGH . Demy 8vo , 12 5 . 6d. net.

A book of exceptional importance to bu s iness peop le . I t is a com

plete cyclopaedia ofthe fore ign sh ipping business.

Tow ards a Last ing Set tlemen t

By G. LOWES D ICK INSON , H . N . BRAILSFORD, A. HOB

SON, VERNON LEE,PH IL I P SNOWDEN

, M .P .

,A. MAUD

ROYDEN , H . SIDEBOTHAM, and others . Edi ted by CHARLES

RODEN BU! TON .

SECOND I M PRESSION . Crow n 8vo, Cloth , as. Oct. net. Postage 5d.

The essays are con tribu tion s ofreal help towards the solution ofgreatand inevi table problems.”—PROF . G ILBERT MURRAY in TheNa tzon .

Tow ards In tern at ional Governmen t By !. A. HOBSON.

TH IRD I M PRESSION . Crow n 8vo,Cloth , 2 5 . 6d. net. Postage 4d .

Always lucid, cogen t, and unflinch ing in h is argumen t, andleads us s tep by step tow ards the conclusion tha t the boldestsolution is safest and simplest. —Manchester Guardia n .

The Fu tu re ofDem ocracy By H . M . HYNDMAN .

Crown 8y o, 2 5 . 6d. net. Postage 5d.

Well worth reading .—Marrchester Cou rier.

Wri tten w i th all h is old force and lucidi ty.”—Yorkshi re Post.

The H ealing ofNat ion s By EDWARD CARPENTER .

4TH ED IT ION . Cr. 8vo, Cloth , 2 3 . 6d. net. Paper, 2 3 . n et. Postage 4d .

P rofoundly in teresting . Well w orth most careful atten tion .—Observer.

A w ise and understanding book .

”—T. P .

’

s Weekly .

Above the Bat tle

By ROMAIN ROLLAND . TRANSLATED BY C. K . OGDEN,M .A.

TH IRD I M PRESS ION . Crown 8vo,Cloth , as . Oct. net. Postage 4d .

We must leave unnoticed many fine and penetra t ing though ts and

many s tirring passages in these golden pages . In them,let us say, on ce

for a ll,speaks the finest sp i ri t ofmodern Fran ce.

—The Times Li terarySupplemen t.

The War and the Balkans

By NOEL BU! TON,M .P . ,

and CHARLES RODEN BU! TON .

3RD ED IT ION. Cr. 8vo,Cloth , 2 s . 6d. net. Paper I s . n et. Postage, 4d.

“ Far and away the best sta temen t that has yet appeared of the atti tudeofthe Balkan States .

”— Sir EDW IN PEARS in the Da zly Chron icle.

LONDON : GEORGE ALLEN UNW IN L IM ITED

UN I VERS ITY OF CAL I FORN IA L IBRARYLos Angeles

Th i s book i s DU E on th e la st da te stam ped below .

Form L 9—Ser ies 4 9 3 9

€¦ · S ECTION I INTRODUCTO RY “WHA T a piece of work is man ! how n oble in reason ! how in...

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