#s 10, 14, 20. Belgica vs Executive Secretary

7/24/2019 #s 10, 14, 20. Belgica vs Executive Secretary

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Eileen Eika M. Dela Cruz POLITICAL LAW

G.R. No. 208566

November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA OSE !. "ILLEGAS R. OSE L. GON#ALE# REUBEN !.

ABANTE $%& 'UINTIN (AREDES SAN DIEGO,Petitioners,

vs.

)ONORABLE E*ECUTI"E SECRETAR+ (A'UITO N. OC)OA R, e $-, Re/o%&e%

(ERLASBERNABE, J.:

G.R. No. 208566- Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For

The Immediate Issuance of Temorary !estraining "rder and#or Writ of Preliminary In$unction see%ing

that the annual &Por% Barrel 'ystem,& resently embodied in the rovisions of the ()) of *+ hich

rovided for the *+ P/)F, and the 01ecutive2s lum-sum, discretionary funds, such as the 3alamaya

Funds and the Presidential 'ocial Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts

constituting grave abuse of discretion. )lso, they ray that the Court issue a T!" against resondents.

ACTS

Before the court are consolidated etitions, ta%en under the !ule 45 of the !ules of Court, all of hich

assail the constitutionality of the Por% Barrel 'ystem.

GENERAL CONCE(T O (OR BARREL

6istorically, the term 7Por% Barrel8 hich is )merican-0nglish in origin, refers to the degrading

ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed ith or% to be fed to blac% slaves by their ell-fed masters. In atechnical sense, 7Por% Barrel8 refers to the aroriation of government sending meant for locali9ed

ro$ects and secured solely or rimarily to bring money to a reresentative:s district.

In the Philiines, The Por% Barrel 'ystem is defined by the court as the collective body of rules

and ractices that govern the manner by hich the lum sum, discretionary funds, rimarily intended for

local ro$ects, are utili9ed through the resective articiants of the ;egislative and 01ecutive branches of

government, including its members.

The Por% Barrel 'ystem has to %inds of lum sum discretionary funds< Congressional Por%

Barrel and Presidential Por% Barrel.

CONGRESSIONAL (OR BARREL

The earliest form of Congressional Por% Barrel is )ct +== or The Public Wor%s )ct of >>* in

hich the utili9ation of funds aroriated ere sub$ected to ost-enactment legislator aroval. This as

discontinued on >?* after 3artial ;a as declared. Under 3arcos: regime in >@*, 'uort for ;ocal

/eveloment Pro$ects A';/P as included in the (eneral )roriations )ct A()) under the article on

ational )id to ;ocal (overnment. This started the ractice of giving lum sum discretionary allocations to

individual legislators, ith each receiving P5++,+++ for their so-called 7hard ro$ects8 hich involved


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ublic or%s such as road construction etc., and 7soft ro$ects8 that fall under the categories of education,

health and livelihood.

Under President Cora9on )Duino, Congressional Por% Barrel as revived in the form of 3indanao

/eveloment Fund ith the allocation of P=@+ 3illion and Eisayas /eveloment Fund ith P*=+ 3illion

budget. /ue to the demand of 'enators and ;u9on legislators, the Countryide /eveloment Fund AC/F

as established and as also integrated in the ()) of >>+ ith the funding of *. Billion to cover 7small

local infrastructure and other riority community ro$ects8

/uring the !amos )dministration, C/F is only released uon the submission of the list of ro$ects

and activities for hich the said fund ill be used by the individual legislators. The Eice President is also

given an allocation in the C/F. In addition to this change, the /eartment of Budget and 3anagement is

directed to reort to the 'enate Committee on Finance and the 6ouse Committee on )roriations of

the released made from funds. )nother form of Congressional Por% Barrel as inserted in the ()),

named Congressional Insertions ACI hich is not easily identifiable and more difficult to monitor as it is

art and arcel of the budgets of e1ecutive deartment.

In the 0strada )dministration, C/F as removed from the ()) and as relaced by three CIs

namely Food 'ecurity Program Fund, ;inga Para sa 3ahihira Fund and !ural#Urban /evelomentInfrastructure Program Fund. These contained a secial rovision hich reDuires the 7rior consultation8

ith the 3embers of the Congress for the release of funds. It as in *+++ that the Priority /eveloment

)ssistance Fund or AP/)F aeared in the ()).

Under the )rroyo )dministration, the P/)F only contained a single secial rovision ordering the

release of funds directly to the agency or local government unit concerned, ithout further Dualifications.

The secific amounts allocated to each legislator are also not indicated. It also began the rogram menu

concet, in hich legislators may choose from a list of general rograms or agencies to hich a P/)F

may be allocated. It should also be noted that it is during this administration that on-(overnment

"rgani9ations A("s are alloed to articiate in the imlementation of government ro$ects.

In the resent )Duino administration, the secific amount of allocations to the individuallegislators is already stated. P?+ 3illion for each !eresentatives, AP=+ 3illion for 7hard ro$ects8 and

P+ 3illion for 7soft ro$ects8, and P*++ 3illion for each 'enator as ell as the Eice President AP++

3illion for 7hard ro$ects8 and P++ 3illion for 7soft ro$ects8

(RESIDENTIAL (OR BARREL

This includes the 3alamaya Fund issued by President Ferdinand 0. 3arcos under 'ec. @ of P/

>+ aimed to intensify, strengthen and consolidate government efforts relating to the e1loration,

e1loitation and develoment of indigenous energy resources vital to economic groth.

3eanhile, Presidential 'ocial Fund as also issued by President 3arcos under 'ec. * of P/

@4> or the Charter of the Philiine )musement and (overnment Cororation AP)(C"!. It has been

described as a secial funding facility, in hich the source comes from the share of the government in the

gross earnings of P)(C"! instead of the country:s regular budget.


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CONTRO"ERSIES IN T)E ()IL((INES

In >>4, an anonymous source later identified as Former 3ari%ina City !eresentative !omeo

Canda9o revealed that huge sums of government money regularly ent into the oc%ets of legislators as

a form of %ic%bac%s hich uon its circulation, sar%ed a ublic outcry from the eole.

In *++=, some concerned citi9ens sought the nullification of the P/)F for being unconstitutionalbut as denied by the court for lac% of ertinent evidentiary suort.

In *+, the ational Bureau of Investigation began its investigation concerning the allegations

that the government as defrauded of some P5+ Billion for the ast + years by a syndicate using funds

from the or% barrel of legislators and government agencies for scores of ghost ro$ects. By then, si1

histle bloers declared that a certain ; Cororation A; G anet ;im aoles is the one resonsible

for such scheme, using no feer than *+ dummy ("s for its e1ecution.

In the same year, the Commission on )udit reorted that there ere substantial irregularities in

the disbursement and utili9ation of P/)F by the Congressmen under the )rroyo )dministration.

)s for the 3alamaya Fund, histle bloers alleged that at least P>++ 3illion from royaltiesintended for )grarian !eform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy (".

/ue to the findings of Co) and the aoles controversy, several etitions ere filed before the

court, all see%ing that the Por% Barrel 'ystem be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUES

Whether or not the *+ P/)F )rticle and all other Congressional Por% Barrel ;as similar to it are

unconstitutional considering that they violate the rinciles of#constitutional rovisions onH

$4 ... -o$- $o%om7b4 ... /r/oe o% e/$r$o% o /o:er4 ...%o%&e-e;$b-7 o -e;-$ve /o:er

)ELD

$4 +ES. The Court, hoever, finds an inherent defect in the system hich actually belies the avoed

intention of 7ma%ing eDual the uneDual8 APhilconsa, >>=. The gauge of P/)F and C/F

allocation#division is based solely on the fact of office, ithout ta%ing into account the secific

interests and eculiarities of the district the legislator reresents. )s a result, a districtreresentative of a highly-urbani9ed metroolis gets the same amount of funding as a district

reresentative of a far-flung rural rovince hich ould be relatively 7underdeveloed8 comared

to the former. To add, hat rouses graver scrutiny is that even 'enators and Party-;ist

!eresentatives and in some years, even the Eice-President ho do not reresent any

locality, receive funding from the Congressional Por% Barrel as ell. The Court also observes that

this concet of legislator control underlying the C/F and P/)F conflicts ith the functions of the

various ;ocal /eveloment Councils A;/Cs hich are already legally mandated to 7assist the


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corresonding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social develoment, and

coordinating develoment efforts ithin its territorial $urisdiction.8 Considering that ;/Cs are

instrumentalities hose functions are essentially geared toards managing local affairs, their

rograms, olicies and resolutions should not be overridden nor dulicated by individual

legislators, ho are national officers that have no la-ma%ing authority e1cet only hen acting

as a body.

b4 +ES. )t its core, legislators have been consistently accorded ost-enactment authority to identify

the ro$ects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Por% Barrel allocations.

Under the *+ P/)F )rticle, the statutory authority of legislators to identify ro$ects ost-())

may be construed from 'ecial Provisions to and the second aragrah of 'ecial Provision

=. ;egislators have also been accorded ost-enactment authority in the areas of fund release

A'ecial Provision 5 under the *+ P/)F )rticle and realignment A'ecial Provision =,

aragrahs and * under the *+ P/)F )rticle. Thus, legislators have been, in one form or

another, authori9ed to articiate in 7the various oerational asects of budgeting,8 including 7the

evaluation of or% and financial lans for individual activities8 and the 7regulation and release of

funds8, in violation of the searation of oers rincile. That the said authority is treated as

merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the rohibitioncovers any role in the imlementation or enforcement of the la. Toards this end, the Court

must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also oints out that resondents have

failed to substantiate their osition that the identification authority of legislators is only of

recommendatory imort. In addition to declaring the *+ P/)F )rticle as ell as all other

rovisions of la hich similarly allo legislators to ield any form of ost-enactment authority in

the imlementation or enforcement of the budget, the Court also declared that informal ractices,

through hich legislators have effectively intruded into the roer hases of budget e1ecution,

must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac% or e1cess of $urisdiction

and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.

4 +ES. The *+ P/)F )rticle violates the rincile of non-delegability since legislators are

effectively alloed to individually e1ercise the oer of aroriation, hich, as settled inPhilconsa, is lodged in Congress. The oer to aroriate must be e1ercised only through

legislation, ursuant to 'ection *>A, )rticle EI of the >@? Constitution hich states< 7o money

shall be aid out of the Treasury e1cet in ursuance of an aroriation made by la.8 The

oer of aroriation, as held by the Court in Beng9on v. 'ecretary of ustice and Insular

)uditor, involves Aa setting aart by la a certain sum from the ublic revenue for Ab a secified

urose. Under the *+ P/)F )rticle, individual legislators are given a ersonal lum-sum fund

from hich they are able to dictate Aa ho much from such fund ould go to Ab a secific ro$ect

or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. 'ince these to acts comrise the e1ercise of

the oer of aroriation as described in Beng9on, and given that the *+ P/)F )rticle

authori9es individual legislators to erform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been

conferred the oer to legislate hich the Constitution does not, hoever, allo.

#s 10, 14, 20. Belgica vs Executive Secretary

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