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Transcript of Ryan Reilly Ferguson arrest jurisdiction filing
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IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS
EASTERN DISTRICT
STATE OF MISSOURI, ex rel. )
RYAN REILLY )
)Relator, )
)
v. ) No. _______________
)
HON. CRAIG CONCANNON, )
JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF )
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, 21ST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, ) From the Municipal Court
) of Saint Louis County
Respondent. ) No. 15247691
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, MANDAMUS
COMES NOW Relator Ryan Reilly, pursuant to MO. SUP. CT. R. 84.24, 94, and 97,
and requests that this Court issue a Writ of Prohibition or, Alternatively, Mandamus
ordering Respondent to dismiss county ordinance violation charges brought against him
in St. Louis County Municipal Court in connection with his work as a reporter for The
Huffington Post covering the unrest in Ferguson following the shooting death of Michael
Brown. Mr. Reilly has been charged with violating St. Louis County ordinances that
prohibit trespassing and interfering with an officer in unincorporated portions of St. Louis
County. These ordinances have no application within the City of Ferguson, which is the
incorporated municipality where the alleged conduct giving rise to Mr. Reilly’s arrest
occurred. The County’s prosecution of Mr. Reilly violates restrictions on the powers of
county government embodied in the Missouri Constitution, basic due process rights
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guaranteed by the Missouri and United States Constitutions, and the County’s own
charter and ordinances.
The County concedes that it has no legislative authority to extend the ordinances
at issue to conduct that is alleged to have occurred in the City of Ferguson. Nonetheless,
the County argues that the St. Louis County Municipal Court may exercise jurisdiction
over alleged county ordinance violations based on conduct that occurred outside of its
jurisdiction. The County’s attempt to assert extra-jurisdictional powers to prosecute Mr.
Reilly for conduct relating to his work as a reporter is lawless and unprecedented. The
County is prosecuting Mr. Reilly for conduct that it acknowledges occurred entirely
within the geographic borders of the City of Ferguson. In order to justify this
unconstitutional jurisdictional overreach, the County asserts it is acting pursuant to
“emergency powers.” As discussed below and in Mr. Reilly’s Suggestions in Support of
His Petition for a Writ of Prohibition or, Alternatively, Mandamus, filed herewith, the
County’s manufactured “emergency powers” justification has no basis in law or fact.
I. Statement of the Facts
(1) Ryan Reilly was arrested in a McDonald’s restaurant in the City of
Ferguson on August 13, 2014 while performing duties as a news reporter for The
Huffington Post covering the unrest following the shooting death of Michael Brown.
These were events of national and international interest and raised important issues
regarding the manner in which the government interacts with its citizens in a democracy.
(2) Following his arrest, Mr. Reilly was transported to the Ferguson Jail, along
with Wesley Lowery of The Washington Post , another reporter who was arrested at the
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trespassing and interference ordinances to unincorporated areas of St. Louis County. Mr.
Reilly’s motion further argued that the County exceeded its authority under the Missouri
Constitution, which restricts a county’s power to regulate conduct in incorporated
municipalities. Because the county ordinances that Mr. Reilly is charged with violating
have no application to alleged conduct that occurs within incorporated municipalities,
including the City of Ferguson, St. Louis County Municipal Court has no jurisdiction in
the present case.
(7) On November 18, 2015, the County filed its response to Mr. Reilly’s
motion to dismiss. The County conceded that it did not have legislative authority to
charge Mr. Reilly for alleged St. Louis County ordinance violations that are based on
conduct that occurred in the City of Ferguson. The County, however, contends that its
lack of any legislative authority to charge Mr. Reilly is “irrelevant.” Ex. 3, St. Louis
County’s Mem. in Opp. to Def’s Mot. to Dismiss, at 3. The County argues that it has
“emergency powers” that give the County Counselor the authority to charge individuals
with St. Louis County ordinance violations even when the St. Louis County Municipal
Court has no jurisdiction. Id.
(8) On November 23, 2015, Mr. Reilly filed his reply in support of his motion
to dismiss. Mr. Reilly’s reply argued that the County’s attempt to rely on “emergency
powers” to cloak the County Counselor with the power to prosecute Mr. Reilly in St.
Louis County Municipal Court should be rejected. The County Counselor has no
authority to confer jurisdiction upon the St. Louis County Municipal Court. Ex. 4, Reply
in Supp. of Ryan Reilly’s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.
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(9) Respondent heard oral argument on Mr. Reilly’s motion on November 23,
2015.
(10) In an order dated January 11, 2016, and received by mail by Mr. Reilly’s
counsel on January 19, 2016, Respondent denied Mr. Reilly’s Motion to Dismiss. The
order stated only that the motion to dismiss was denied “for the reasons outlined in St.
Louis County’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.” Ex. 5,
January 11, 2016 Order.
(11) This matter is not currently set for trial, but Mr. Reilly has filed his jury
trial demand and intends to seek a speedy trial. Ex. 6, Demand for Jury Trial.
II. Relief Sought
(12) Mr. Reilly seeks an order: (1) directing Respondent to vacate the January
11, 2016 Order denying his Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; (2) directing
Respondent to dismiss the charges against Mr. Reilly; and (3) barring Respondent from
taking any further action in this case.
III. Reasons Why the Writ Should Issue
(13) The Court should issue a remedial writ because Respondent has abused his
discretion and acted in clear excess of his jurisdiction by allowing the County to proceed
with an unconstitutional and extra-jurisdictional prosecution of a news reporter who was
exercising First Amendment rights that are at the very core of our democracy. “Where,
as here, the court is wholly wanting in jurisdiction to proceed in the case, appeal is not an
adequate remedy because any action by the court is without authority and causes
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unwarranted expense and delay to the parties involved.” State ex rel. T.J.H. v. Bills, 504
S.W.2d 76, 79 (Mo. Banc 1974).
(14) The trespassing ordinance Mr. Reilly is charged with violating, § 716.150,
appears within a chapter of the St. Louis County municipal code that explicitly states:
“[t]he provisions of sections 716.040 through 716.180 shall apply to the area of St. Louis
County outside incorporated cities, towns, and villages.” Ex. 7, Excerpt of Chapter 716
of the Revised Ordinances of St. Louis County, § 716.020 (“Scope”) (emphasis added);
id., § 716.150. There is no dispute that County’s charges are based on conduct alleged to
have occurred in the incorporated City of Ferguson, an area where the trespassing
ordinance does not apply.
(15) The interference with an officer ordinance, § 710.110, does not contain a
provision specifically addressing its geographic scope because it was enacted at a time
when it was unconstitutional for the County to legislate within incorporated
municipalities. The County’s interference with an officer ordinance was enacted on
November 4, 1968, at which time Article VI, § 18(c) of the Missouri Constitution
explicitly limited the County’s legislative power to “the part of the county outside
incorporated cities.” Ex. 8, Excerpt of Chapter 710 of the Revised Ordinances of St.
Louis County, § 710.110 (emphasis added); Ex. 9, MO. CONST. art. VI, § 18(c) (pre-1970
amendment version). Because the County had no authority to enact legislation applicable
to incorporated municipalities when § 701.110 was enacted, the application of that
provision is necessarily limited to unincorporated areas.
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Municipal Court with the authority to proceed with an extra-jurisdictional prosecution.
R.S.Mo. § 44.090.
(18) The implication of the County’s emergency powers argument is that the
County Counselor, through the unilateral exercise of “emergency powers,” has the
authority to expand and constrict a court’s jurisdiction. This attempted distortion of
Missouri judicial authority in favor of expansive County Counselor powers should be
rejected.
(19) The County’s unconstitutional prosecution of Mr. Reilly has broader
implications than the present case because Mr. Reilly was only one of a number of
citizens against whom St. Louis County filed unconstitutional charges in August 2015 for
alleged conduct occurring within the incorporated City of Ferguson in August 2014.
Undersigned counsel represent two other such individuals, Wesley Lowery and Matthew
Giles. Mr. Lowery has contemporaneously filed a Petition for a Writ of Prohibition or,
Alternatively, Mandamus based on Respondent’s denial of his own motion to dismiss.
A. Writ of Prohibition
(20) A writ of prohibition “will lie where there is a usurpation of power because
the trial court lacks either personal or subject matter jurisdiction” or “to remedy a clear
excess of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion such that the lower court lacks the power to
act as contemplated.” State ex rel. Chassaing v. Mummert, 887 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Mo.
1994); see also State ex rel. St. Charles Cty. v. Cunningham, 401 S.W. 3d 493, 495 (Mo.
2013), as modified (Apr. 30, 2013). In addition, the Missouri Supreme Court “has
repeatedly held that ‘prohibition may be appropriate to prevent unnecessary,
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inconvenient, and expensive litigation.’” State ex rel. Coca-Cola Co. v. Nixon, 249
S.W.3d 855, 860 (Mo. banc 2008) (citation omitted).
(21) A writ of prohibition is appropriate because Respondent’s denial of Mr.
Reilly’s motion to dismiss was an abuse of discretion in excess of Respondent’s
jurisdiction. “When a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot take any other
action besides its inherent power to dismiss.” Bacon v. Dir. of Revenue, State of Mo.,
948 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); see also Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 37.51 (“Lack of
jurisdiction or the failure of the information to charge an ordinance violation shall be
noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding.”).
(22) The St. Louis County Municipal Court does not have jurisdiction to hear
county ordinance violation charges based on conduct alleged to have occurred within the
incorporated City of Ferguson. The jurisdiction of the St. Louis County Municipal Court
is limited to “violations of [St. Louis County] ordinances.” See R.S.Mo. § 66.010.1
(“Any county municipal court established pursuant to the provisions of this section shall
have jurisdiction over violations of that county’s ordinances . . . .”). The County
ordinances at issue apply only within unincorporated areas of St. Louis County, and
therefore the information filed against Mr. Reilly fails to state a violation of a county
ordinance.
(23) A writ of prohibition is also required to prevent unnecessary, inconvenient,
and expensive litigation. This case has been pending for seven months. Mr. Reilly filed
his jury trial demand five months ago and has been told that any trial date remains at least
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several months away. He will then be subjected to a jury trial in which he will face up to
one year in jail on unconstitutional charges in a court that has no jurisdiction.
(24) Prohibition is also appropriate to remedy violations of Mr. Reilly’s due
process rights under the Missouri and United States Constitutions. “‘Elementary notions
of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair
notice . . . of the conduct that will subject him to punishment . . . .’” City of St. Peters v.
Roeder, 466 S.W.3d 538, 548 (Mo. 2015), quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 574 (1996). Mr. Reilly could not have possibly had fair notice that any alleged
conduct within the City of Ferguson would subject him to punishment under St. Louis
County Ordinances, as the County itself admits the ordinances (absent the County
Counselor’s self-proclaimed “emergency powers”) do not apply within incorporated
municipalities. Allowing a prosecutor – and court – to selectively determine that an
ordinance has application in a geographic area where it does not is a violation of the fair
notice required by the due process clause of the Missouri and United States Constitutions.
(25) In addition, because the County took the unprecedented step of filing
charges against Mr. Reilly in St. Louis County Municipal Court, Mr. Reilly faces greater
penalties and has fewer due process rights than he would have in state court, where
charges in connection with arrests by county officers within incorporated municipalities
should be filed. The County’s trespassing ordinance charge against Mr. Reilly is
punishable by up to one year imprisonment while the comparable charge under state law
is punishable by up to six months imprisonment. Compare Ex. 7, § 716.180 (providing
penalties for violation of § 716.150) with R.S.Mo. § 569.140.2 (trespass in the first
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degree); R.S.Mo. § 558.011.1 (sentence of imprisonment, terms). Even more
significantly, there is no charge under state law that criminalizes the same conduct as the
county’s overbroad interference with an officer ordinance, which makes it unlawful to
“interfere in any manner with a police officer . . . or to obstruct him in any manner
whatsoever while performing any duty.”1 Ex. 8, § 701.110. Mr. Reilly has also been
refused basic discovery, such as depositions of the officers who arrested him, that he
would be entitled to in state court. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 25.12; State v. Scott, 647 S.W.2d
601, 606 (Mo. App. W.D. 1983) (“Rights of discovery provided criminal defendants by
Rule 25 have constitutional underpinning rooted in due process.”).
B. Writ of Mandamus
(26) A writ of mandamus is appropriate “where a court has exceeded its
jurisdiction or authority and there is no remedy through appeal.” State ex rel. Poucher v.
Vincent, 258 S.W.3d 62, 64 (Mo. Banc 2008) (internal quotation omitted).
(27) For the reasons stated above, the St. Louis County Municipal Court has
clearly exceeded its jurisdiction. As the County concedes, its county ordinances do not
reach conduct that is alleged to have occurred within incorporated municipalities.
(28) In addition, as stated above, appeal is not an adequate remedy where, as
here, the municipal court wholly lacks jurisdiction. In addition, Mr. Reilly is being
1 At the same time Mr. Reilly filed his jurisdictional motion, he filed a motion to dismiss
the interference charge because the County’s interference ordinance is unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad. That motion remains pending.
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subjected to protracted and expensive litigation on charges that violate basic principles of
due process and could result in one-year of imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, Mr. Reilly prays that this Court issue its preliminary order in
prohibition, or, alternatively, mandamus; grant an immediate stay of all proceedings in
this action for so long as this writ proceeding is pending; and, ultimately, that the Court
issue a permanent writ directing Respondent to vacate the January 11, 2016 Order
denying Mr. Reilly’s Motion to Dismiss and to dismiss the charges against Mr. Reilly,
and barring Respondent from taking any further action in this case; and grant such other
relief as the Court deems just and proper.
March 24, 2016 Respectfully submitted,
DOWD BENNETT LLP
By: /s/ Gabriel E. Gore
Edward L. Dowd, Jr., MO #28785
Gabriel E. Gore, MO #45416
Lisa S. Hoppenjans, MO #63890
7733 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1900
St. Louis, Missouri 63105
(314) 889-7300 (telephone)
(314) 863-2111 (facsimile)
Counsel for Defendant Ryan Reilly
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IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS
EASTERN DISTRICT
STATE OF MISSOURI, ex rel. )
RYAN REILLY )
)Relator, )
)
v. ) No. _______________
)
HON. CRAIG CONCANNON, )
JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF )
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, 21ST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, ) From the Municipal Court
) of Saint Louis County
Respondent. ) No. 15247691
RELATOR’S SUGGESTIONS IN SUPPORT OF HIS PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR, ALTERNATIVELY, MANDAMUS
Relator, Ryan Reilly, a reporter for The Huffington Post, seeks relief from St.
Louis County’s unconstitutional and lawless prosecution of him based on conduct alleged
to have occurred in the City of Ferguson in August 2014, while Mr. Reilly was covering
protests related to the death of Michael Brown. Mr. Reilly seeks a Writ of Prohibition or,
alternatively, a Writ of Mandamus from this Court pursuant to Mo. R. Civ. P. 94 and 97
to require Respondent, the Honorable Craig Concannon, to dismiss the charges filed
against Mr. Reilly in St. Louis County Municipal Court.
These charges should be dismissed because the St. Louis County Municipal Court
has no jurisdiction over county ordinance charges that are based on conduct that is
alleged to have occurred in the City of Ferguson, and the information fails to state an
ordinance violation. The County’s information charges Mr. Reilly with violating county
ordinances that prohibit trespassing and interference with an officer in unincorporated
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areas of St. Louis County. These two ordinances have no application to conduct alleged
to have occurred within the City of Ferguson, which is an incorporated municipality. The
trespassing ordinance states in unambiguous language that it does not apply within
incorporated municipalities, and the interference with an officer ordinance was enacted at
a time when the Missouri Constitution did not permit a county to enact ordinances that
applied within incorporated municipalities.
The County admits that the trespassing and interference with an officer ordinances
that it has charged Mr. Reilly with violating have no application within the City of
Ferguson. The County also concedes that it lacks the legislative authority to enact a
trespassing or interference with an officer ordinance that would apply within the City of
Ferguson. The County, however, argues that the St. Louis County Municipal Court may
exercise jurisdiction over alleged county ordinance violations based on conduct that
occurred outside of its jurisdiction under purported “emergency powers.” The County’s
unprecedented assertion of “emergency powers” to expand the municipal court’s
jurisdiction in furtherance of its misguided pursuit to prosecute Mr. Reilly has no basis in
law. It also contravenes the St. Louis County Charter and ordinances, the Missouri
Constitution’s restrictions on counties’ powers to regulate conduct within incorporated
municipalities, and basic principles of due process.
Respondent’s denial of Mr. Reilly’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
subjects Mr. Reilly to potential imprisonment on unconstitutional and lawless charges
pending in a court without jurisdiction and violates his fundamental due process rights
that are guaranteed by the Missouri and United States Constitutions. Mr. Reilly
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respectfully submits that Respondent’s failure to dismiss the County’s ordinance
violation charges is an exercise of extra-jurisdictional power that should be corrected
through an extraordinary writ.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Relator, Ryan Reilly, is a reporter for The Huffington Post who was in Ferguson,
Missouri on August 13, 2014, to cover the protests following the shooting death of
Michael Brown. Mr. Reilly was engaged in constitutionally protected newsgathering
activities when he was arrested by St. Louis County and Ferguson police officers in a
McDonald’s restaurant at 9131 West Florissant Avenue, in the City of Ferguson. Mr.
Reilly and another reporter arrested in the restaurant, Wesley Lowery of The Washington
Post ,1 were turned over to the custody of the Ferguson Police Department and transported
to the Ferguson jail. Shortly thereafter, the Ferguson Chief of Police, Thomas Jackson,
ordered that Mr. Reilly and Mr. Lowery be released without charges. The next day, both
President Obama and then-Attorney General Eric Holder commented on the serious
constitutional issues raised by the reporters’ arrests. The City of Ferguson never filed
any charges against Mr. Reilly.
Nearly one year later, on August 5, 2015, St. Louis County filed an information
against Mr.Reilly, charging him with one count of trespassing in violation of St. Louis
County Revised Ordinance No. 8216, § 716.150, and one count of interfering with an
1 Mr. Lowery has contemporaneously filed a Petition for a Writ of Prohibition or,
Alternatively, Mandamus on the same grounds as those asserted in Mr. Reilly’s petition.
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officer in performance of his duty in violation of St. Louis County Revised Ordinance
No. 4866, § 701.110. Ex. 1, Information.
On October 12, 2015, Mr. Reilly filed his motion to dismiss on the basis that the
ordinances at issue have no application to conduct occurring within incorporated
municipalities, such as the City of Ferguson. Ex. 2, Motion to Dismiss. Mr. Reilly’s
motion argued that because the ordinances that Mr. Reilly was charged with violating do
not apply to conduct alleged to have occurred in the City of Ferguson, the St. Louis
County Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction and the County’s information failed to state
an ordinance violation. The motion explained that application of county ordinances to
incorporated areas violated the Missouri Constitution, which restricts the manner in
which a county may exercise power within an incorporated municipality. Id.
On November 18, 2015, the County filed its response. Ex. 3, St. Louis County’s
Mem. in Opp. to Def’s Mot. to Dismiss. The County conceded that the trespassing and
interference with an officer ordinances do not apply within incorporated municipalities.
It also conceded that St. Louis County’s charter limited the County’s legislative power to
enforce its trespassing and interference with an officer ordinances to unincorporated areas
of the county. Id. at 3. The County instead argued that its purported “emergency
powers” justified its unprecedented jurisdictional overreach. Id. at 6. The County claims
that it can award itself jurisdiction over non-offenses wherever it chooses to do so.
Mr. Reilly filed his reply on November 23, 2015. Ex. 4, Reply in Supp. of Ryan
Reilly’s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. The reply reasoned that the legal
authority the County relied on to support its “emergency powers” argument does not
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provide the County Counselor or the St. Louis County Municipal Court with the power to
alter the terms of the County’s ordinances or pursue an extra-jurisdictional prosecution.
The reply further explained that the County’s “emergency powers” argument fails
because there was no declared state of emergency in Ferguson when Mr. Reilly was
arrested on August 13, 2014, and there was no continuing emergency when Mr. Reilly
was charged nearly one year later. Even if there had been a declared state of emergency,
the County cannot simply declare new criminal offenses without notice.
Respondent heard oral argument on Mr. Reilly’s motion on November 23, 2015.
In an order dated January 11, 2016, and received by mail by Mr. Reilly’s counsel on
January 19, 2016, Respondent denied Mr. Reilly’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction “for the reasons outlined in St. Louis County’s Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.” Ex. 5, January 11, 2016 Order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for writs of prohibition and mandamus is abuse of
discretion. State ex rel. Collector of Winchester v. Jamison, 357 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Mo.
banc 2012). An extraordinary writ is appropriate “to prevent an abuse of judicial
discretion, to avoid irreparable harm to a party, or to prevent the exercise of extra-
jurisdictional power.” State ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Dolan, 256 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Mo.
banc 2008). “Where, as here, the court is wholly wanting in jurisdiction to proceed in the
case, appeal is not an adequate remedy because any action by the court is without
authority and causes unwarranted expense and delay to the parties involved.” State ex
rel. T.J.H. v. Bills, 504 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Mo. Banc 1974).
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A writ of prohibition “will lie where there is a usurpation of power because the
trial court lacks either personal or subject matter jurisdiction” or “to remedy a clear
excess of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion such that the lower court lacks the power to
act as contemplated.” State ex rel. Chassaing v. Mummert, 887 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Mo.
1994); see also State ex rel. St. Charles Cty. v. Cunningham, 401 S.W. 3d 493, 495 (Mo.
2013), as modified (Apr. 30, 2013). In addition, the Missouri Supreme Court “has
repeatedly held that ‘prohibition may be appropriate to prevent unnecessary,
inconvenient, and expensive litigation.’” State ex rel. Coca-Cola Co. v. Nixon, 249
S.W.3d 855, 860 (Mo. banc 2008) (citation omitted). A writ of mandamus is appropriate
“where a court has exceeded its jurisdiction or authority and there is no remedy through
appeal.” State ex rel. Poucher v. Vincent, 258 S.W.3d 62, 64 (Mo. Banc 2008) (internal
quotation omitted).
“When a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot take any other action
besides its inherent power to dismiss.” Bacon v. Dir. of Revenue, State of Mo., 948
S.W.2d 266, 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). “Lack of jurisdiction or the failure of the
information to charge an ordinance violation shall be noticed by the court at any time
during the pendency of the proceeding.” Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 37.51; see also R.S.Mo. §
66.010.1 (limiting a county municipal court’s jurisdiction to “jurisdiction over violations
of that county’s ordinances”).
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LEGAL ARGUMENT
Respondent abused his discretion in denying Mr. Reilly’s motion to dismiss and in
continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the county ordinance charges filed against Mr.
Reilly in St. Louis County Municipal Court. Respondent’s order denying Mr. Reilly’s
motion stated only that the motion was denied “for the reasons outlined in St. Louis
County’s Memorandum in opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.” Ex. 5. In
adopting wholesale the County’s arguments, Respondent’s order authorized an
unconstitutional and lawless prosecution in a court that lacks jurisdiction.
In order for conduct to constitute a violation of the County’s trespassing or
interference with an officer ordinance, the conduct must occur in an unincorporated area
of St. Louis County. This requirement is set forth in the plain language of the County’s
trespassing ordinance. The same limitation implicitly applies to the County’s
interference with an officer ordinance, which was adopted at a time when it was
unconstitutional for the County to enact an ordinance that applied to conduct within an
incorporated municipality. It is undisputed that the alleged conduct that forms the basis
for the charges against Mr. Reilly is alleged to have occurred in the City of Ferguson,
which is an incorporated municipality. The County’s information fails to charge an
ordinance violation, and the St. Louis County Municipal Court lacks jurisdiction.
Further, the County’s extra-jurisdictional prosecution of Mr. Reilly violates the
Missouri Constitution. Article VI, § 18(c) prohibits St. Louis County from enforcing
county ordinances within incorporated municipalities, like the City of Ferguson. St.
Louis County has not taken the constitutionally required legislative action necessary to
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extend its jurisdictional reach to conduct that occurs in an incorporated municipality.
Accordingly, its attempt to prosecute Mr. Reilly for ordinance violations premised on
conduct that occurred entirely within the City of Ferguson violates the Missouri
Constitution.
None of the arguments in the County’s briefing, which Respondent adopted as the
basis for his order, overcomes the fundamental defects in the County’s charges against
Mr. Reilly. The County’s reliance on purported “emergency powers” does not confer
jurisdiction on the St. Louis County Municipal Court. Although the County points to a
statute that relates to the ability of emergency responders, such as police and firefighters,
to respond to requests for mutual aid assistance, it is irrelevant. No emergency had been
declared in Ferguson when Mr. Reilly was arrested, nor a year later when he was
charged. Nothing in the emergency responder statute authorizes the County Counselor to
confer jurisdiction on the St. Louis County Municipal Court. The County’s argument
that McDonald’s location along a county-owned arterial road somehow confers
jurisdiction within the municipality also fails. There is simply no basis for such an
extension of the County’s jurisdictional reach.
An extraordinary writ is warranted because the St. Louis County Municipal Court
lacks jurisdiction over the charges against Mr. Reilly and should have dismissed them.
The municipal court has acted, and continues to act, in clear excess of its jurisdiction and
has allowed the County to proceed with a prosecution that violates its own charter and
ordinances, as well as the Missouri Constitution. Mr. Reilly’s continued prosecution
violates his fundamental due process rights and subjects him to expensive and
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inconvenient litigation in a court without jurisdiction. A writ of prohibition or,
alternatively, a writ of mandamus, is warranted to correct Respondent’s abuse of
discretion.
I. The St. Louis County Municipal Court Has No Jurisdiction Over St. Louis
County Trespassing and Interference with an Officer Charges Based on
Conduct Alleged to Have Occurred Within the City of Ferguson.
Mr. Reilly’s prosecution is unconstitutional and has no basis in law because the
ordinances he has been charged with violating do not apply to conduct occurring within
incorporated municipalities. The trespassing and interference with an officer ordinances
apply only in unincorporated areas of St. Louis and have no application to conduct within
the City of Ferguson. The County’s attempt to apply the ordinances to conduct alleged to
have occurred in the City of Ferguson also violates Article VI, § 18(c) of the Missouri
Constitution, which specifically limits the powers of the County to adopt ordinances that
purport to apply within incorporated municipalities.
A. The Ordinances at Issue Do Not Apply to Conduct Alleged to Have Occurred
in Ferguson.
The County ordinances Mr. Reilly has been charged with violating apply only in
the unincorporated areas of St. Louis County. The County admits it has no legislative
authority to apply its trespassing and interference with an officer ordinances to conduct in
the City of Ferguson. This conclusion is evident from the ordinances themselves.
The St. Louis County trespassing ordinance is set forth in § 716.150. Ex. 7,
Excerpt of Chapter 716 of the Revised Ordinances of St. Louis County. Chapter 716
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expressly provides that “[t]he provisions of Sections 716.040 through 716.180 shall apply
to the area of St. Louis County outside incorporated cities, towns, and villages.” Id., §
716.020 (“Scope”) (emphasis added). In charging Mr. Reilly with a violation of the
county trespassing ordinance, the County has ignored the jurisdictional restriction that the
unambiguous language of its own ordinance imposes.
The interference with an officer ordinance, set forth in § 701.110, also is restricted
to conduct in unincorporated areas. Ex. 8, Excerpt of Chapter 710 of the Revised
Ordinances of St. Louis County, § 710.110. When that ordinance was adopted on
November 4, 1968, the County was prohibited from enacting legislation applicable to
incorporated cities. In November 1968, Article VI, § 18(c) of the Missouri Constitution
explicitly limited the County’s ability to exercise legislative power to “the part of the
county outside incorporated cities.” Ex. 9, MO. CONST. art. VI, § 18(c) (pre-1970
amendment version) (emphasis added).2 It follows therefore that § 701.110, which has
never been amended, is necessarily limited to unincorporated areas of St. Louis County.
The chapter of the county code in which the interference with an officer ordinance
is set forth confirms that the ordinance only applies to conduct in unincorporated areas of
St. Louis County. The ordinance appears in Chapter 701, which relates to the
2
It was not until two years later that the Missouri Constitution was amended to allow for
the possibility that a county charter could vest the county council with the ability to
exercise legislative power within incorporated municipalities when certain requirements
are met. See MO. CONST. art. VI, § 18(c).
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“Department of Police.” Ex. 8. This is a subject matter area for which the County’s
charter expressly limits its power to enact ordinances to “the part of the county outside
incorporated cities.” Ex. 10, St. Louis County Charter of 1979, § 2.180.23.
Because the two ordinances at issue do not apply to alleged conduct within the
incorporated City of Ferguson, the County’s information fails to state an ordinance
violation, and the St. Louis Municipal Court has no jurisdiction over the charges.
B. The County’s Attempt to Apply These Ordinances to Conduct Alleged to
Have Occurred in Ferguson Violates the Missouri Constitution.
The County’s prosecution of Mr. Reilly violates the Missouri Constitution. Under
the Missouri Constitution, a county charter may provide for the vesting and exercise of
county legislative power pertaining to services and functions “in the part of the county
outside incorporated cities.” MO. CONST. art. VI, § 18(c) (“Provisions authorized in
county charters—participation by county in government of other local units”). Under a
1970 amendment to Article VI, § 18(c) of the Missouri Constitution, the county charter
may also vest the county with legislative power over matters “throughout the entire
county as well as outside incorporated municipalities,” but only provided that “any such
charter provision shall set forth the limits within which the municipalities may exercise
the same power collaterally and extensively.” Id.; see also Chesterfield Fire Protection
Dist. v. St. Louis Cty, 645 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Mo. banc 1983) (“This provision is designed
to eliminate confusion when the County begins providing a service or function which
may also be provided by a municipality.”).
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The St. Louis County Charter does not purport to extend the County’s legislative
powers “throughout the entire county” such that the County and incorporated
municipalities exercise “the same power” co-extensively. Rather, consistent with the
constitutional limitations described above, the St. Louis County Charter provides the
county council with the authority to “[e]xercise legislative power pertaining to public
health, police and traffic, building construction, and planning and zoning, in the part of
the county outside incorporated cities.” Ex. 10, § 2.180.23 (emphasis added). Notably,
this language is taken directly from the pre-amendment version of Article VI, § 18(c) of
the Missouri Constitution. Ex. 9. The charter does not vest the county council with the
authority to exercise legislative power pertaining to these topics within incorporated areas
of the county. Those matters are reserved for each incorporated municipality to address.
In Mr. Reilly’s case, the relevant municipality, the City of Ferguson, has its own
police force and has enacted ordinances regulating trespassing and interference with
police officers. See Ex. 11, Excerpt of Code of Ordinances of the City of Ferguson,
Missouri, § 29-63 (trespass in the first degree); § 29-64 (trespass in the second degree); §
29-16 (failure to comply with order of police officer); § 29-19 (obstructing government
operations). Ferguson has created its own municipal court to “hear and determine all
cases involving violations of [its] Charter, this Code and the other ordinances of the city.”
Id., § 2-214. The City of Ferguson determined that no ordinance violation charges would
be filed against Mr. Reilly. The County has no authority to second-guess that decision.
The County has never amended its charter to provide for legislative power to enact
police ordinances that would apply within incorporated municipalities or to “set forth the
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limits within which the municipalities may exercise the same power” to regulate the
conduct that the trespassing and interference with an officer ordinances target. St. Louis
County’s failure to enact such a charter amendment makes clear that the application of
the County’s trespassing and interference with an officer ordinances to conduct alleged to
have occurred in the City of Ferguson violates the Missouri Constitution.
II. None of the County’s Cited Authorities Provide a Basis for Jurisdiction.
The County concedes that the trespassing and interference with an officer
ordinances do not apply within the City of Ferguson. Ex. 3 at 3. The County, however,
argues that “the County’s legislative power under Missouri law is irrelevant to the present
case.” Id. Recognizing that its own charter and ordinances fail to provide the County
with the power to enforce the two ordinances at issue within incorporated municipalities,
the County instead points to an assortment of authorities in an attempt to identify some
basis for the St. Louis County Municipal Court’s jurisdiction. All of the County’s
arguments fail.
A. The County’s Claimed Emergency Response Powers Do Not Provide a
Basis for Jurisdiction.
The County contends that the County Counselor may unilaterally confer
jurisdiction on the St. Louis County Municipal Court through his exercise of imagined
“emergency powers.” The County’s view that the County Counselor may create
jurisdiction where there is none has no support and violates the Missouri Constitution,
Article VI, § 18(c). It also violates the basic requirements of due process.
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The County’s “emergency powers” argument has no basis in fact or law. The
County relies on R.S. Mo. § 44.090 to argue that the St. Louis County Municipal Court
may exercise jurisdiction here. The statute plainly states that it applies only “at the time
of significant emergency.” R.S.Mo. § 44.090.3; see also R.S.Mo. § 44.090.1 (“In time of
emergency it shall be the duty of each local organization for emergency management to
render assistance . . . .”); § 44.090.4 (“When responding to mutual aid or emergency aid
requests . . . .); R.S.Mo. § 44.010.6 (defining “emergency” as “any state of emergency
declared by proclamation of the governor, or by resolution of the legislature”). There
was no declared state of emergency in the City of Ferguson on August 13, 2014, when
Mr. Reilly was arrested. But even if, as the County has argued, a “declared” emergency
is not required to invoke powers under § 44.090, there can be no question that there was
no emergency when the County filed its baseless charges against Mr. Reilly nearly a year
after the conduct at issue is alleged to have occurred. Likewise, there is no current
emergency as the case remains pending in St. Louis County Municipal Court.
In addition, § 44.090 does not apply to the County Counselor’s Office or the St.
Louis County Municipal Court. Section 44.090 addresses “[m]utual-aid agreements” and
its provisions relate to actions taken by certain “public safety agencies.” The “public
safety agencies” included within the statute are “fire service organizations, law
enforcement agencies, emergency medical service organizations, public health and
medical personnel, emergency management officials, infrastructure departments, public
works agencies and those other agencies, organizations, departments, and specialized
emergency response teams that have personnel with special skills or training that are
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needed to provide services during an emergency, public safety need, or disaster . . . .”
R.S.Mo. § 44.090.7. The statute plainly applies to emergency responders, not to St.
Louis County attorneys or the municipal court. There is simply no such thing as an
emergency prosecution or an emergency expansion of a court’s jurisdiction.
The emergency responder statute that the County relies on does not apply to the
County Counselor’s decision to charge Mr. Reilly with ordinance violations more than 11
months after any state of emergency had ended. Similarly, the emergency responder
statute does not apply to a St. Louis County Municipal Court Judge’s decision to preside
over an ordinance violation case a year and a half after the Ferguson protests concluded.
B. A County Police Officer’s Authority to Arrest Does Not Confer
Jurisdiction on the St. Louis County Municipal Court.
The County contends that that it would be “illogical” to conclude that its
municipal court lacks jurisdiction over alleged county ordinance violations that are based
on conduct alleged to have occurred in the City of Ferguson because “[l]aw enforcement
necessarily includes both arrest and prosecution.” Ex. 3 at 5. Even if Mr. Reilly’s arrest
was lawful – which Mr. Reilly denies3 – it does not follow that St. Louis County may
charge Mr. Reilly with county ordinance violations. The issue of where St. Louis County
3 Mr. Reilly does not dispute the general proposition that St. Louis County Police may
make arrests in the course of providing assistance pursuant to a mutual aid agreement, but
denies that his arrest was lawful under the circumstances at issue in this case.
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Police Officers may make arrests is entirely distinct from whether a court has jurisdiction
over a charged ordinance violation.
According to the County, the St. Louis County Police officers who arrested Mr.
Reilly were acting in response to a request for mutual aid from the City of Ferguson. The
investigative report that St. Louis County Police prepared identifies Ferguson as the
jurisdiction for whom the report was prepared. Ex. 4 (St. Louis County Police
Department Investigative Report noting the report is “For Jurisdiction: Ferguson,”
attached as Exhibit 2 thereto). Following Mr. Reilly’s arrest, St. Louis County police
“remanded” him “to an officer of the Ferguson Police Department.” Id. (Excerpt of
Investigative Report, attached as Exhibit 3 thereto). Mr. Reilly was taken to the Ferguson
jail, and the Ferguson Police Chief gave the order to release him from custody without
charges. These facts make clear that the officers involved understood that the City of
Ferguson had jurisdiction to charge Mr. Reilly. It is only the County’s displeasure with
the City of Ferguson’s decision not to file charges against Mr. Reilly that has given rise
to the County’s misguided pursuit to prosecute Mr. Reilly despite its lack of jurisdiction.4
4 More than 50 law enforcement agencies were involved in the police response in
Ferguson between August 9, 2014 through August 25, 2014. See Ex. 4 (U.S. Department
of Justice, After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to the August 2014
Demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri at p. XIII, attached as Exhibit 1 thereto). The
County apparently believes any of these 50 cities or counties would be free to prosecute
individuals arrested within the City of Ferguson by their officers under that jurisdiction’s
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There is no absence of power to prosecute here. Rather, the party with the power
to bring charges for municipal ordinance violations relating to conduct within the City of
Ferguson – the Ferguson Municipal Prosecutor – has declined to bring charges against
Mr. Reilly. Mr. Reilly was released from the Ferguson Police Department at the
direction of the Ferguson Police Chief without ever being booked. Any charging
decision related to a municipal ordinance violation belonged to the City of Ferguson.
The St. Louis County Counselor has no authority to substitute his judgment for that of the
Ferguson prosecutor or apply the county’s ordinances to conduct that occurred within the
City of Ferguson.
C. The Location of the McDonald’s on an Arterial Roadway Does Not
Provide a Basis for Jurisdiction.
The County alternatively argues that the St. Louis County Municipal Court has
jurisdiction because the alleged conduct occurred within a McDonald’s restaurant that is
located along a county-owned arterial road. The County does not claim that either the
trespassing or interference with an officer ordinance applies within buildings located
along arterial roadways within the City of Ferguson. Instead, it vaguely asserts that to
find no jurisdiction here “would prevent the protection of lives and property on anything
but the County arterial road itself.” Ex. 3, at 6. This argument fails.
own municipal ordinances in their own court. Such a result would be absurd, as well as
unconstitutional.
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As the County undoubtedly knows, state law vests law enforcement officers with
“the authority to respond to an emergency situation5 outside the boundaries of the
political subdivision from which such peace officer’s authority is derived,” and St. Louis
County police officers “may arrest persons who violate any provision of state law within
the boundaries of any county of the first classification or of any city not within a county.”
R.S. Mo. § 70.820.1, § 70.820.5. Jurisdictional limitations placed on county and
municipal ordinances do nothing to prevent the County’s officers from protecting lives
and property or making arrests for violations of state law. As explained above, the issue
of where the County’s officers may make arrests is irrelevant to the question of who may
prosecute those arrests under which laws and in which court.
D. The County Charter Does Not Provide a Blanket Grant of Authority to
the County Counselor to Expand the St. Louis County Municipal Court’s
Jurisdiction.
Finally, the County argues that Article I, § 1.030 of the county charter, which
relates generally to the powers of the County, provides a basis for jurisdiction because it
5 An emergency situation is defined as “any situation in which the law enforcement
officer has a reasonable belief that a crime is about to be committed, is being committed,
or has been committed involving injury or threat of injury to any person, property, or
governmental interest and such officer’s response is reasonably necessary to prevent or
end such emergency situation or mitigate the likelihood of injury involved in such
emergency situation.” R.S.Mo. § 70.820.3.
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gives the County “all powers possible for a county to have under the constitution and
laws of Missouri.” Ex. 3 at 4. Section 1.030 is not a blanket grant of authority that
individual county departments may use to seize whatever powers they deem expedient at
a particular moment. Instead, it specifies, “[a]ll powers shall be carried into execution as
provided by this charter or by law, but if no such provision is made then by ordinance.”
Ex. 10, § 1.030. The County identifies no provision in the charter, law, or ordinances that
allows the County Counselor to engage in extra-jurisdictional prosecutions or that
provides the St. Louis County Municipal Court with the authority to act outside of its
defined jurisdiction.
The Missouri Constitution specifies that a county may not exercise its legislative
power within any incorporated municipality unless its charter contains a specific
provision that “set[s] forth the limits within which the municipalities may exercise the
same power collaterally and coextensively.” MO. CONST. Art. VI, § 18(c). It is undisputed
that the St. Louis County Charter contains no provision setting forth the limits within
which the County and its incorporated municipalities may collaterally and coextensively
regulate the conduct that would support charges of trespassing and interference with an
officer.
III. A Writ of Prohibition or Mandamus is Warranted.
The ordinances Mr. Reilly has been charged with violating do not apply within the
City of Ferguson, and the St. Louis County Municipal Court has no jurisdiction over
these lawless charges. Mr. Reilly’s continued prosecution violates the Missouri
Constitution’s restrictions on the manner in which counties may exercise power within
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incorporated municipalities, violates the due process guarantees of the Missouri and
United States Constitutions, and subjects Mr. Reilly to expensive and inconvenient
litigation in a court without jurisdiction. Respondent’s denial of Mr.Reilly’s motion to
dismiss was an abuse of discretion and an unconstitutional exercise of extra-jurisdictional
power that requires the issuance of an extraordinary remedial writ.
A. A Writ Should Issue Because the Municipal Court Lacks Jurisdiction.
Appeal is not an adequate remedy “[w]here, as here, the court is wholly wanting in
jurisdiction to proceed with the case.” T.J.H., 504 S.W.2d at 79. As explained in detail
above, the county ordinances Mr. Reilly has been charged with violating have no
application to conduct alleged to have occurred within the City of Ferguson. Neither the
County charter nor its ordinances provide the County with the authority to apply the
trespassing and interference with an officer ordinances to conduct within the City of
Ferguson. The County admits this, but claims that the unambiguous terms of its
ordinances are “irrelevant.” The authorities the County cites, however, have no
application here and provide no basis for the County Counselor to expand the jurisdiction
of the St. Louis County Municipal Court. Further, Mr. Reilly’s continued prosecution
violates not only the County’s ordinances and charter, but also the Missouri
Constitution’s restrictions on the manner in which counties may exercise power within
incorporated municipalities.
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B. A Writ Should Issue Because the County’s Continued Prosecution
Violates Mr. Reilly’s Due Process Rights.
The charges in this case have been filed in clear violation of Mr. Reilly’s due
process rights under the Missouri Constitution, Article I, § 10, and under the United
States Constitution. “‘Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice . . . of the conduct that will subject
him to punishment . . . .’” City of St. Peters v. Roeder, 466 S.W.3d 538, 548 (Mo. 2015)
quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996). Mr. Reilly could not
have had fair notice that any conduct that took place within the City of Ferguson would
subject him to punishment under St. Louis County ordinances, as the County itself admits
the ordinances do not apply within incorporated municipalities. Allowing a prosecutor to
selectively determine that an ordinance has application in a geographic area where it does
not is a violation of the fair notice required by the due process clause of the Missouri and
United States Constitutions.
The County’s unprecedented decision to file charges against Mr. Reilly in St.
Louis County Municipal Court also violates Mr. Reilly’s procedural due process rights by
exposing him to greater penalties than available under state law charges while at the same
time depriving him of basic rights to conduct discovery. The St. Louis County
trespassing ordinance violation charge against Mr. Reilly is punishable by up to one year
imprisonment, but a violation of the parallel state trespassing statute is a class B
misdemeanor punishable only by a maximum of six months imprisonment. Compare St.
Louis County Ordinances, § 716.180 (providing penalties for violation of § 716.150)
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with R.S.Mo. § 569.140 (trespass in the first degree); R.S.Mo. § 558.011.1 (sentence of
imprisonment, terms); see also Ex. 11, § 29-2 (Ferguson ordinance violations punishable
by a maximum of three months imprisonment). Even more significantly, there is no
charge under state law that criminalizes the same conduct as the county’s broad
interference with an officer ordinance, which makes it unlawful to “interfere in any
manner with a police officer . . . or to obstruct him in any manner whatsoever while
performing any duty.”6 Ex. 8, § 701.110.
At the same time, the fact that this matter was filed in municipal court rather than
state court has deprived Mr. Reilly of critical discovery to which he would otherwise be
entitled. Respondent has refused to permit Mr. Reilly to engage in basic discovery, such
as taking the depositions of the officers who arrested him. The right of criminal
defendants to depose the government’s witnesses against them is well-established in
Missouri law. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 25.12; State v. Scott, 647 S.W.2d 601, 606 (Mo. App.
W.D. 1983) (“Rights of discovery provided criminal defendants by Rule 25 have
constitutional underpinning rooted in due process.”). Mr. Reilly sought to depose the 6
individuals the County had identified as potential witnesses at trial. The County offered
to allow four depositions. On October 6, 2015, however, Respondent held that discovery
in municipal court was solely in the court’s discretion and denied Mr. Reilly’s request for
6 At the same time Mr. Reilly filed his jurisdictional motion, he filed a motion to dismiss
the interference charge because the county’s interference ordinance is unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad. That motion remains pending.
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depositions in its entirety. Ex. 12, October 6, 2015 Order. This abuse of discretion
compounds the abuse of discretion that Respondent committed in denying Mr. Reilly’s
motion to dismiss.
C. A Writ Should Issue to Prevent Unnecessary, Expensive, and Inconvenient
Litigation.
Mr. Reilly has been litigating this case for more than seven months, with no end in
sight. He filed his demand for a jury trial on October 12, 2015, Ex. 6, but has been
provided no date for a trial and has been told that no trial will be possible within the next
several months. He faces an inconvenient and costly jury trial, and the County has
opposed his efforts to save resources by joining his matter for trial with that of Mr.
Lowery, who: (1) was arrested at the same time and in the same location; (2) has been
provided a witness list and police report by the County that is identical to the list
provided for Mr. Reilly’s matter; and (3) shares the same counsel. Ex. 13, Mot. for Joint
Trial and Mem. In Supp.; Ex. 14, Resp. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Joint Trial. In
addition, just this month, the municipal court erroneously issued a warrant for Mr.
Reilly’s arrest based on a purported failure to appear, placing Mr. Reilly at risk of arrest
and requiring intervention of counsel to have the warrant recalled and withdrawn. Ex.
15, Warrant Notice.
Conclusion
Appeal is not an adequate remedy “[w]here, as here, the court is wholly wanting in
jurisdiction to proceed with the case.” T.J.H., 504 S.W.2d at 79. Mr. Reilly has been
charged with violating county ordinances that have no application within the City of
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Ferguson. The County’s unconstitutional and lawless prosecution of Mr. Reilly in
municipal court had no legal basis from its inception and has dragged on for more than
seven months in a court with no jurisdiction. Mr. Reilly is not alone in facing extra-
jurisdictional charges brought in St. Louis County Municipal Court in connection with
arrests made in City of Ferguson.
Respondent’s denial of Mr. Reilly’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
was an abuse of discretion and constitutes an unconstitutional exercise of extra-
jurisdictional power. An extraordinary writ is warranted to correct this clear usurpation
of judicial power.
March 24, 2016 Respectfully submitted,
DOWD BENNETT LLP
By: /s/ Gabriel E. Gore
Edward L. Dowd, Jr., MO #28785Gabriel E. Gore, MO #45416
Lisa S. Hoppenjans, MO #63890
7733 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1900
St. Louis, Missouri 63105
(314) 889-7300 (telephone)
(314) 863-2111 (facsimile)
Counsel for Defendant Ryan Reilly