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The Origins of the European Union’s Policy on Membership and Democracy Ryan Phillips
Government & International Relations Department, Connecticut College, 270 Mohegan Avenue, New London, CT 06320, USA E-mail: [email protected]
Abstract Explanations of the European Union’s policy on democracy and membership conditionality are split between a constructivist account that emphasizes democracy as a norm of political legitimacy and a rationalist account that emphasizes member states’ economic and security interests. The existing research, however, has only a weak empirical basis. A systematic consideration of evidence leads to a novel understanding of EU membership conditionality. The main empirical finding is that whereas the constructivist argument holds true when de facto membership criteria were first established in the 1960s, the rationalist argument more closely aligns with the evidence at the end of the Cold War when accession requirements were formally codified as part of the Copenhagen Criteria (1993). To explain why the normative rationale underpinning the EU’s policy on democracy and membership changed over time, I demonstrate the influence of ‘securitization theory’. The core of my explanation that while securitization theory was originally developed to understand the European security environment at the end of the Cold War, it came to change that environment through influencing the EU’s membership policy. Keywords: Copenhagen School, democracy promotion, conditionality, enlargement, European Union, membership, securitization theory Word Count: 8423 * PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT THE AUTHOR’S PERMISSION *
Submitted August 30, 2016
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Introduction On October 12, 2012 in the Norwegian capital of Oslo, Thorbjørn Jagland declared, ‘The
Norwegian Nobel Committee has decided that the Nobel Peace Prize for 2012 is to be awarded
to the European Union. The Union and its forerunners have for over six decades contributed to
the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe’ (Jagland
2012). In awarding the EU the Nobel Peace Prize, Prime Minister Jagland voiced a common
view of the EU, namely that it has a major force for the advancement of democracy throughout
Europe.
Membership conditionality – that is, the explicit linking of a country’s membership status
to domestic democratic reforms – is frequently cited as the EU’s most potent instrument in the
promotion of democracy. The effectiveness of EU membership conditionality can be overstated
(Pravda 2001; 10; Pridham 2005: 1; Grabbe 2006: 207-208), but researchers have repeatedly
concluded that EU conditionality played a significant role in the democratization of central and
eastern Europe (Pravda 2003; Pridham et al. 1994: 1; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006;
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). Indeed, it is frequently asserted that no other
international organization can match the EU’s democratizing influence. The economic and
political benefits of membership are thought to give the EU unparalleled leverage over countries
hoping to join (Dimitrova and Pridham; Pridham 2005, 28; Pravda 2001: 12; Smith 2003).
But why does the EU promote democracy through membership conditionality? Existing
research has focused on the normative rationale for EU membership policy – i.e., the good
democracy promotion is intended to achieve. Existing research is split between a constructivist
explanation that emphasizes the principled basis of the EU’s enlargement policy and a rationalist
view that emphasizes the expected economic and security benefits for EU member states. As I
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discuss below, however, neither explanation is built on strong empirical foundations.
Additionally, neither provides an adequate explanation of why the EU formalized democratic
conditionality at the beginning of the 1990s and not earlier. Based on original archival research,
this contribution seeks to fill these empirical and theoretical gaps.
The paper draws two primary conclusions. First, my empirical research demonstrates that
the EU has become less of a ‘normative power’ over time. Whereas in the early 1960s EU
membership policy was driven by a moral commitment to the intrinsic legitimacy of democracy,
by the 1990s spreading democracy was seen more as a way to ensure regional security and
economic development. This conclusion runs counter to the constructivist view that EU policy
became increasingly infused with ethical considerations at the end of the Cold War, while
affirming the rationalist view on the significance of member states’ interests (Manners 2002).
Second, some scholars have suggested that membership conditionality should be seen as an
evolutionary process that was articulated in an inchoate version at the founding of the European
Economic Community (1957) and was subsequently solidified in a concrete fashion in the early-
1990s (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011; Pridham 2005: 5). This narrative is misleading.
Rather, I argue that the adoption of democratic conditionality as part of the Copenhagen Criteria
in 1993 reflected the influence of a new theory of European security that was developed in the
mid-1980s by the Copenhagen School of International Relations. Borrowing from Copenhagen
School usage, I label this theory ‘securitization theory’, though as I detail below I use the term
with a modified meaning. ST does not explain all of the ins and outs of the decision to require
countries to consolidate democracy as a precondition for membership. But what it does explain is
why member state leaders believed that the spread of democracy eastward was essential to
regional security and economic well-being.
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In sum, this contribution sheds new light on the origins of the EU’s membership policy. It
demonstrates that the normative rationale for requiring applicant countries to be democratic
changed over time and explains that change by tracing its origins to ideas developed by the
Copenhagen School.
The overall structure of the paper is organized in a two-step fashion. After some essential
background and discussion of existing literature, I carry out an empirical test of the constructivist
and rationalist theses regarding why the EU promotes democracy through membership
conditionality. After finding that the normative beliefs that informed EU policy changed over
time, I turn to explaining the origins of this change. Section two provides an overview of
political conditionality and the development of the EU’s membership policy as well as reviews
existing research. Section three describes the empirical basis of the paper and the analytical
techniques employed. Section four discusses the empirical findings. Section five explains why
the European Council believed that democracy would advance member states’ economic and
security interests. The final section summarizes the primary findings and discusses some
potential critiques and limitations of the argument.
Background and existing research
Conditionality is one of several policy instruments that the EU employs to promote democracy in
countries around the world (Börzel and Risse 2009). What distinguishes political conditionality
from these other instruments is the use of ‘carrots-and-sticks’ to promote political change.
‘Political conditionality entails the linking, by a state or international organization, of perceived
benefits to another state (such as aid), to the fulfillment of conditions related to the protection of
human rights and the advancement of democracy’ (Smith 1998: 256). For the sake of simplicity,
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I use the terms ‘political conditionality’, ‘membership conditionality’ and ‘democratic
conditionality’ interchangeably to refer to the EU’s policy of linking membership to democratic
reforms in applicant states.
Democracy promotion did not become a formal, legally codified goal of EU membership
policy until the 1990s (Börzel and Risse 2009; Olsen 2000). Although the preamble to the Treaty
of Rome (1957) stated that an aim of the European Economic Community (EEC) was to
‘strengthen peace and liberty’, democracy was neither a requirement for membership nor was it a
stated goal of the EEC. It was not until the Single European Act (1986) that democracy
promotion was explicitly incorporated into the treaties as a goal of the European Community.
Only in 1993 at the Copenhagen Summit of the European Council did EU member states
formally declare that only countries which possessed a stable democratic regime were eligible
for membership. Following the establishment of the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’, the European
Commission was entrusted with evaluating the democratic credentials of applicant states and
reporting its findings to the other EU institutions. From 1997, the Commission produced annual
regular reports on the progress of applicant countries in meeting the requirements of
membership.
Though democracy was only formally adopted as an entry requirement in 1993, its
practical application to considerations of membership dates to the 1960s, when the authoritarian
regimes of southern Europe first applied for entry into the EEC (Pridham 2005: 11–22; Smith
1998: 258; Whitehead 1986). Spain applied in 1962, but membership negotiations did not
commence until after the death of General Franco and the beginning of democratic reforms in the
mid-1970s. Greece completed an association agreement with the EEC in 1962, but following the
‘colonel’s coup’ in 1967, relations were frozen until the military regime collapsed in 1974.
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Similarly, negotiations with Portugal did not enter into a steady stream of progression until the
military regime fell in 1974.
Most research on EU membership conditionality has focused on the issue of its
effectiveness. Researchers have addressed whether, under what conditions, how, and to what
extent membership conditionality has supported democratic consolidation (Dimitrova and
Pridham 2004; Grabbe 2002; Grabbe 2006; Haughton 2007; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011;
Noutcheva 2016; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). It is
widely accepted that membership conditionality gives the EU unparalleled influence over states
wanting to join the Union (Pravda 2003: 12).
Given that researchers have repeatedly concluded EU membership conditionality has
made a significant contribution the consolidation of democracy in central and eastern Europe,
one might expect similarly rigorous studies of the origins of EU policy. A review of the existing
literature leads to the conclusion that this is not the case. Further, the research that exists lacks
the empirical rigor or theoretical attention that has been devoted to the study of the effectiveness
of membership conditionality.
Existing research on the origins of EU membership conditionality has focused on the
policy’s normative rationale – i.e., the interest or values it is intended to achieve. While not all
authors adopt the rationalist or constructivist labels, their substantive arguments largely track the
rationalist/constructivist divide in International Relations. Constructivists argue that EU policy is
guided by the belief that liberal democracy is a foundational element of political legitimacy.
Rationalists view the EU’s democratization efforts as a means of achieving member states’
economic and security interests in the region. Less frequently, scholars argue that the EU’s
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policy reflects a mixture of these two views (Pravda 2003; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006;
Torreblanca 2001: 1).
Ian Manners has put forward a particularly influential account of the constructivist view
(2002; 2006a; Manners 2006b; 2008; see also Kreutz 2015; Pridham 2005: 5, 25;
Schimmelfennig 2001: 48; Smith 2003; Weber 1995). According to Manners, the EU is a
‘normative power’ in world politics. Rather than aspiring to the status as a great power, its
primary role is one of ‘shaping conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations’ (2002: 239).
Democracy is a ‘core norm’ of the EU (2002: 242) and a fundamental element of its conception
of political legitimacy. Importantly, the commitment to democracy constrains its relations with
non-EU countries. The EU’s rules on membership reflect the EU’s belief that liberal democracy
is a fundamental element of political legitimacy.
If constructivists view the EU’s policy on membership and democracy as a reflection of
the EU’s cosmopolitan values, rationalists view membership conditionality as a means for
member states to advance their economic and security interests (Börzel and Risse 2009; Laïdi
2008; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). Zaki Laïdi (2008: 40) agrees with Manners that the EU
‘seeks the integration of a world order based on the legitimacy of rules’, but criticizes Manners
for idealizing norms (2008: 44). For Laïdi, promoting democracy is a way to weaken state
sovereignty and the threat it poses to regional security without abolishing it. Similarly, according
to Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse the EU follows ‘a world cultural script according to which
democracy is good for international security and development’ (Börzel and Risse 2009: 35).
Constructivist and rationalists thus offer competing accounts of the normative rationale
for EU membership policy. As a result, they also tend to hold different interpretations of why EU
democratic promotion took off at the end the Cold War. Both camps recognize that the fall of the
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Soviet empire allowed western states and institutions to seek greater influence over central and
eastern Europe. For constructivists like Geoffrey Pridham (2005: 25-26) the principled
commitment to democracy existed at least since the 1960s, but remained suppressed under the
security logic of the Cold War. The end of the Soviet threat led to a rebalancing of security
interests and the promotion of democracy. Alternatively, rationalists see the collapse of the
Soviet Union as heralding the emergence of new threats to western Europe, namely economic
and social instability in central and eastern Europe and potential spillover effects (Börzel and
Risse 2009: 40–42). Democracy, along with the protection of individual rights and a market
economy, were aimed at ensuring west European interests in the region. Thus in addition to what
values or interests democracy promotion is intended to achieve, rationalists and constructivists
disagree about the timeline for when these beliefs emerged.
What is driving the disagreement between constructivists and rationalists? I suspect that
in part it is the result of the theoretical context in which these analyses emerged. The bulk of the
research was carried out in the early to mid-2000s when some prominent scholars suggested that
the main axis of debate in the field of International Relations would be rationalism vs.
constructivism (Fearon and Wendt 2002; Katzenstein et al. 1998). Convinced that political actors
follow a ‘logic of appropriateness’, constructivists gravitated to the idea that a policy of
democratic conditionality was an example of norm guided behavior. Alternatively, convinced
that actors followed a ‘logic of consequences’, rationalists gravitated to the idea that enlargement
policy must be driven by the self-interests of member states. If this is right, then one implications
of the analysis that follows is a warning about theory-driven research.
Additionally, however, both camps found evidence that supported their theoretical
assumptions. Though perhaps unsurprisingly they rely upon different sources of evidence.
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Manners draws his conclusions about the EU’s normative identity from an analysis of
‘declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and conditions’ produced by the EU or its predecessors
over the past 50 years or ones it signed onto (e.g., the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (2002: 240–241), particular consonant actions (e.g., the pursuit of the abolition of the
death penalty (2002: 245–254), various EU military and police interventions (2006b: 273), and
apparent contrasts with the United States and past histories of European imperialism (2006b:
172–176). By contrast, Börzel and Risse seem to suggest that the fact that the ‘prospect of
membership helped to transform ten former communist countries into consolidated liberal
democracies with functioning market economies in less that 15 years’ speaks for itself. The
stabilizing effect of membership conditionality reflects a stabilizing intent. Laïdi cites the
European Security Strategy document ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ (2003) and the
European Defence Agency’s ‘An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defense Capability and
Capacity Needs”’(2006) as evidence that democracy promotion was part of a broader security
strategy. That is, both constructivists and rationalists selectively draw on evidence that support
their respective theories.
Since there is evidence for both constructivist and rationalist explanations, one might
conclude that this a classic example of mixed motivations? Perhaps, but for scholars who take
this view, the empirical basis is not well researched (Pravda 2003: 9–10; Schimmelfennig et al.
2006: 18; Smith 2003: 33–35). None of the literature reviewed attempts to systematically collect
and analyze the relevant evidence. My view is that conflicting accounts of the origins of the EU
democratic conditionality can be best adjudicated by attempting to do so. In the next section, I
discuss the data sources and analytical techniques used in this study.
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Data sources and analytical approach
Constructivist and rationalist explanations of EU membership conditionality disagree on two
points: (1) whether it reflects a basic belief that democracy is a fundamental element of political
legitimacy or a self-interested belief in the welfare and security benefits of spreading democracy
and (2) whether the value attached to democracy was present from the founding of the European
Communities or is of more recent origin, corresponding to emergent security threats at the end of
the Cold War. On what empirical basis should we assess these claims?
To address these questions, the analysis in section four draws on two sets of documents:
(1) a report produced by the European Parliamentary Assembly (EPA) and accompanying debate
held in the Assembly in the early 1960s and (2) European Council documents for the period
1988-1993. As previously discussed, although democracy did not become a formal requirement
of membership until the early 1990s, it first emerged as a practical requirement in the 1960s.
Previous research has demonstrated the central role the EPA played in establishing a de facto
requirement of democracy for any country seeking membership in the European Communities
(Anaya 2001; Thomas 2006). Daniel Thomas (2006: 1206) concludes that sustained public
criticism by MEPs and civil society groups led member states, including France and Germany, to
drop their initial support for the Franco regime’s application in 1962, thereby establishing an
ongoing precedent for relations with non-democratic states.
Therefore to answer why the EEC began in the 1960s to require states seeking entry into
the Community to be democratic requires accounting for the beliefs of MEPs at the time. In
1961, the Assembly issued the ‘Report on the Political and Institutional aspects of Membership
or Association for the Community’.1 Drafted by Willi Birkelbach (Socialist-FRG) as the Political
Affairs Committee’s rapporteur, the Report is conventionally known as ‘the Birkelbach Report’.
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Subsequently, a parliamentary debate on the report was held in January 1962. The analysis in
section four is based on the report and the parliamentary debate.
At the end of the Cold War, enlargement policy was firmly in the hands of the member
states and decided collectively in the European Council (Schimmelfennig 2003; Smith 1999;
Torreblanca 2001). Thus it is important to understanding the collective reasoning of the
European Council during this period. The second set of documents analyzed were the
‘Conclusions of the Presidency’ and associated annexes issued at European Council summits
from 1988 through 1993. I also included a select number of other documents, all of which were
cited in the Conclusions of the Presidency and judged to be particularly relevant to understanding
the views of the European Council. The period of 1988 to 1993 period was selected because it
covers the beginning of the revolutions in central and eastern Europe to the declaration of the
Copenhagen Criteria for membership.
These two sets of documents, then, allow us to understand the reasoning of the principal
actors during two crucial periods in the development of the EU’s membership policy. They also
allow us to see whether the purpose of the democratic requirement changed over time.
This study adopts an interpretive approach (Bevir 2011; Bevir and Rhodes 2004: 15–44).
Although it draws upon the particular techniques of content and discourse analysis, my
interpretivism should be understood as a philosophical position rather than as a commitment to a
particular method. My approach is interpretivist in the sense that it places at the center of its
analysis the beliefs of actors, rather than material or ideational structures or quasi-structures. The
particular belief that I attempt to account for is the normative belief that democracy should be a
requirement for EEC/EU membership.
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In an interpretive framework, particular beliefs are understood and explained when they
are placed within the web of beliefs to which they belong and which give them coherence and
meaning. An actor’s web of beliefs can be reconstructed both synchronically and diachronically.
I use the techniques of content and discourse analysis to develop synchronic explanations of the
normative beliefs of MEPs and the European Council. Through the analysis of primary
documents, these techniques allow me to demonstrate how the Parliament and the Council’s
normative ideas regarding democracy and membership fit together to form a coherent policy.
Content analysis was used to code the documents analyzed for their explicit views expressed
about membership and democracy (Krippendorff 2013).2 Discourse analysis was employed to
account for tacit or implied views (Milliken 1999). The latter was especially useful in
understanding the Parliament’s justification for the democratic criterion because MEPs did not
explicitly state why democracy should be a requirement. The justification was implied from
other ideas expressed in the documents.
In addition to a synchronic explanation of prominent actors’ beliefs, I also reconstruct
their beliefs historically by pointing to their contingent origins. This is the focus of section five. I
argue that we can explain the value the European Council attached to democracy by reference to
the rise of ‘securitization theory’. By tracing the origins of the normative beliefs that
underpinned the EU’s policy of political conditionality, I explain why the European Council
could think that promoting democracy also advanced its economic and security interests.
In the next section, I summarize the key findings from my analysis of Assembly and
Council documents before turning to explaining why the normative rationale for democracy
changed over time.
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Discussion of empirical findings
In this section I describe the major differences between how the Parliamentary Assembly and the
European Council understood the relationship between democracy, membership and the
purposes or character of the EEC across the two periods of interest. My primary conclusion is
that whereas in the 1960s the Parliamentary Assembly stressed the moral significance of
democracy, at the end of the Cold War the European Council linked democracy to regional
security and economic welfare in addition to a concern for political legitimacy.
The view of the European Parliamentary Assembly in the early 1960s
The Report and five of the ten MEPs who addressed the Assembly explicitly affirmed
that membership was only open to democratic states.3 No speaker opposed the democratic
requirement. According to the Report, ‘The political regime of a country seeking to join the
Community cannot be treated with indifference’. It continues,
Guaranteeing the existence of a democratic form of state, within the meaning of a liberal political organization, is a condition for membership. States whose governments have no democratic legitimacy and whose people do not participate in government decisions directly or by freely elected representatives, cannot be admitted into the circle of people that form the European Communities. (1961: II.3.24–25)
Similarly, speaking as President of the Christian Democrat Party Group, Jean Duvieusart stated
that Birkelbach was ‘quite right to stress’ that the Community could only form a union with
states that were ‘animated by the political philosophy of democracy’ (European Parliamentary
Assembly 1962: 62).
Other than the section of the Report quoted above, no other parts of the Report nor the
MEPs who spoke on behalf of democracy explicitly addressed why the nature of a country’s
domestic political regime was relevant to the consideration of its inclusion in the Community.
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How then should we best account for why MEPs repeatedly opposed closer relations with non-
democratic states? The argument advanced here is that opposition to including authoritarian
states as members is best explained by the widely expressed belief that the Community formed a
‘moral community’. I present it as the most plausible account given what is contained in the
Report and said in the debates.
Evidence in the Report and debate for the belief that the Community does and should
have a moral nature is found in two primary areas: 1) statements regarding the purpose of the
Community and 2) a repeated contrast of the Community’s goals and nature with those of a
‘simple economic association’. First, the idea that the six member states formed a moral
community is evident in repeated claims that a central priority of the Community was to further
European unity and solidarity as well as statements that the Community should prioritize
association agreements with colonies or former colonies. The Report as well as nine out of ten
speakers stated that the goal of the Community was unity and solidarity amongst European
peoples. According to Emilio Battista (It/Christian Democrat), ‘The main purpose of our
Communities is not to solve problems of an economic nature but to achieve political unity’
(1962: 92). Seven of the ten speakers singled our supporting overseas countries and territories as
a priority. For instance, Jean Duvieusart (Bel/President of Christian Democratic Group) stated
that the Community should show a ‘special desire for solidarity’ with ‘the black nations’ of
Africa (1962: 61). The member states had formed a moral community in the sense that they
would act with due regard and care for the legitimate interests and values of others both within
and outside the Community.
Second, the Report and a number of speakers contrasted the Community with the idea
that it formed a ‘simple economic association’ (Birkelbach 1961: V.88). The nature of an
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economic association is depicted as differing from the Community in one significant respect: in
an economic association states pursue their economic interests without regard for the valid and
vital interests of others. By contrast, in the Community only certain interests were legitimate and
states must pursue their valid interests in ways that take into account the effects on the interests
of other states and their peoples. The Report states that a country that mistakenly believes that
the Community is a simple economic association ‘considers only its own situation and only the
real or imagined trade disadvantages it may suffer as a result of the implementation of the
common customs tariff of the Community’ (Birkelbach 1961: IV.1.88). Similarly, Emilio
Battista, the chair of the Political Affairs Committee and member of the Christian Democrat
Party Group stated,
[W]e cannot think only of creating business relations. We are not here to do business, we are here to do something much more important: we are here to ensure a happier future of peace and tranquility in Europe, improving economic opportunities in order to raise the living standard of the populations of our countries. I believe there is an absolutely fundamental principle that must be believed in order to enter the Community…. They [i.e., applicant states] must also have a commitment to adhere to the political spirit that animates the European Community. (1962: 93)
In sum, the commonly expressed view in the Report and the speeches is that the
Community is a moral community, not just an economic one. It is a moral community because it
is founded on a set of common set of moral aims and values, which include achieving the vital
and legitimate interests of its members and enhancing European and extra-European unity and
solidarity. Given the Community’s moral nature, only democratic states were considered
acceptable members.
The views of the European Council in the late 1980s/early 1990s
Of the twenty European Council documents analyzed, eighteen of the twenty documents
(90 per cent) stated the Community supported – symbolically, materially or both – democracy or
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democratization efforts in other countries. Similar to the earlier period, political legitimacy
remained a justification for why states should be democratic. In the eighteen documents in which
democracy is addressed, five linked democracy to the Community’s moral character (28 per
cent). It is striking to note, however, that there were no statements about democracy contributing
to political legitimacy after 1990. Democratic legitimacy was discussed in five documents up to
and including the Charter of Paris (November 1990), but did not appear in any of the documents
analyzed after this date.
Running alongside and then replacing the belief that democracy is central to political
legitimacy were two other ideas that were absent in the Birkelbach Report and debate: (1)
democracy and security, peace and stability are interlined, and (2) economic development and
democracy are mutually supporting. Fifteen of the eighteen documents that addressed democracy
(83 per cent), linked democracy to security. In four of the documents (22 per cent), peace and
stability are portrayed as contributing to democracy. For instance, the proposed ‘Stability Pact’
to address the status of territorial borders and the treatment of minorities in Hungary, Poland and
Czechoslovakia is said to be a ‘staple component of joint action to promote stability,
reinforcement of the democratic process and the development of regional co-operation in Central
and Eastern Europe’ (The European Council 1993: 24). But in fourteen of the documents (78 per
cent) democracy is portrayed as contributing to peace, security and stability. At the 1988
Rhodes’ summit, for instance, the heads of state and government issued the ‘Declaration of the
European Council on the International Role of the European Community’, stating,
The European Community and its member states are determined to play an active role in the preservation of international peace and security and in the solution of regional conflicts, in conformity with the United Nations Charter. Europe can not [sic] but actively demonstrate its solidarity to the great and spreading movement for democracy and full support for the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. (1988)
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In the Declaration, the Community’s support for the ongoing political reforms in the CEE
countries is justified in terms of regional peace and security. Repeated in across European
Council documents was the belief that democratization would contribute to regional peace and
stability in Europe.
A second new theme was the linking of economic development to democracy. Fourteen
documents (78 per cent) stated that economic development and democracy were conjoined.
Frequently, the relationship was portrayed as recursive and symbiotic. For instance, the
Presidency conclusions for the 1992 Lisbon European Council stated, ‘A political consensus is
growing around the fundamental relationship between pluralistic democracy, respect for human
rights and development’ (1992: 24). The relationship between democracy and economic
development was also portrayed in more directed ways. Democracy was said to contribute to
economic development in seven of the documents (39 per cent). Appearing somewhat more
frequently was the belief that economic development contributed to democracy (11 documents or
61 per cent). But repeated across European Council documents was the idea that economic
progress and democracy stood in a symbiotic relationship.
Summary
In comparing the views of the European Council during late 1980s and early 1990s to the
views of the Parliamentary Assembly in the early 1960s, a significant shift is evident: the value
or purpose attached to democracy changed. In the latter period, the concern for political
legitimacy is not absent, but gaining in prominence is the belief that democracy is linked with
security, peace and stability as well as economic development. Table 1 summarizes these
differences.
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Table 1. The value of democracy 1961-62 (n=11) 1988-93 (n=18) Political legitimacy
6 (55%)
5 (28%)
Economic development
0 (0%)
7 (39%)
Peace, security, and stability
0 (0%)
15 (83%)
How do these conclusions compare to the constructivist and rationalist accounts? First,
the constructivist thesis that EU membership policy was driven by the belief that democracy was
elemental to political legitimacy was more accurate in the 1960s when the Parliamentary
Assembly was influential than in the 1980s and 90s when the heads of state and government
were making decisions about enlargement. While the concern for political legitimacy did not
entirely disappear in the latter period, the emphasis on the security and welfare benefits of
democracy increased in prominence. As noted previously, no reference to political legitimacy
and democracy appears in European Council documents after 1990. The Copenhagen Criteria
were declared in 1993. Secondly, the evidence supports the rationalist explanation of EU
membership policy and the emphasis on security and economic welfare interests at the end of the
Cold War. How should we explain this change in the normative rationale for the EU’s policy on
democracy and membership?
The Copenhagen School, securitization theory and democracy promotion
At the beginning of the 1990s the European Council emphasized the economic and security
benefits of democracy promotion. But why did the European Council believe that promoting
democracy in non-member states through conditionality would achieve their security and
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economic interests? The claim I advance is that the views of the European Council were
influenced by ‘securitization theory’
Beginning in the mid-1980s, a group of researchers associated with the Centre for Peace
and Conflict Research in Copenhagen (later to be renamed the Conflict and Peace Research
Institute - COPRI) began to produce a number of works aimed at reformulating the field of
security studies (Guzzini and Jung 2004; Huysmans 1998). Important contributors included
Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Egbert Jahn, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer and
Jaap de Wilde. ‘The Copenhagen School’ (CS), as it came to be called (McSweeney 1996),
developed a theory of European security that synthesized ideas from peace research, neorealism,
German security studies, interdependence theory, security communities, W.B. Gallie’s
conceptual analysis, and J.L. Austin’s speech-act theory. Amongst IR scholars, the CS is perhaps
best known for providing an analytical framework for studying security issues (Buzan et al.
1998). But the contribution of the CS to the study and practice of international security includes
ideas such as the non-military aspects of security, regional security complex and security sectors.
Within the field of International Relations, the term ‘securitization theory’ refers to a
specific analytical framework for understanding how an issue becomes a security problem or
issue (Buzan et al. 1998). I use the term here more broadly to refer to analyses that shifted
attention away from a focus on the military security of the state to the idea of societal security. In
this section, I explain why theorists of securitization broke from the dominant realist paradigm to
develop a theory of societal security. Then I explain how democracy relates to societal security.
Securitization theory (ST) did not reject the realism of E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau and
Kenneth Waltz outright (Buzan 1983).4 In fact, the distribution of military and economic
capabilities remained a core concern. Securitization theory, however, embedded traditional
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realist preoccupations like the distribution of power and the intentions of leaders within a broader
security framework. This framework was developed out of three important criticisms of realism.
First, theorists and practitioners of realism placed an undue focus on military power as
the object and source of state security; the state was primarily metaphysical or ideational rather
than physical. Under certain conditions, superior military forces could protect the political
independence of a state’s governing institutions and its territorial integrity (i.e., sovereignty), but
the state was at its core an idea or an organizing ideology held in common by a group of people
(Buzan 1983: 38–43). The security of any particular state depended to a large extent on how
widely and firmly a particular society accepted the idea of the state. A strong state was one in
which there was general agreement amongst the population (nation) about the purposes of the
state and its legitimacy. Realism’s focus on the material capabilities of the state mistook the
outer expression of the state (governing institutions and territory) with its core (a common idea).
The second criticism was that realism’s policy prescriptions were self-defeating. Given
the dynamics of the security dilemma and the destructiveness of modern weapons technology,
the traditional realist focus on power tended to be self-defeating. Amongst developed states with
developed militaries, national security was put in jeopardy by losing or even fighting a war
(Buzan et al. 1990: 5). Avoiding war rather than winning a war were necessary for achieving
physical security.
And third, the focus on great powers obscured the regional basis of state security
concerns. The growing density of interactions in the political, economic, environmental and
societal sectors and the absence of superpower confrontation, meant Europe had developed into a
regional security complex. Although the borders of Europe were somewhat ambiguous and
developing (Buzan et al. 1990: 5; Wæver 1989: 287–299), the region formed a security complex
21
in the sense that the primary security concerns of European states were linked together
sufficiently closely such that their national securities could not realistically be considered apart
from one another (Buzan 1983: 106). The organizational stability of European states, their
systems of government and legitimating ideologies required meeting both internal and external
challenges to accepted forms of government and policy goals. Achieving and maintaining
acceptable levels of economic welfare, maintaining a societal culture within acceptable levels of
change, and sustaining a local and planetary biosphere necessary for human enterprises depended
on the policies of other states and external societal actors. In general, the intensity and density of
transborder interactions in Europe put into doubt the effectiveness of individual state-centered
national security policies.
In place of the realist view that threats to national security could be met through adequate
military capabilities and that state security could be achieved unilaterally, securitization theory
emphasized that security was multidimensional, effective state policy required international
cooperation and the scope of European security concerns were primarily regional rather than
global. These differences are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Realism vs. Securitization theory Realism Securitization theory Core object of security
Sovereignty
Idea of the State/Identity of
Society Sector(s) of security
Military dominant
Multidimensional and
interconnected Scope
International
Regional
Policy
Balance/Seek hegemony
Cooperate
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How did democracy fit into ST’s view of security? Effectively promoting democracy in
third-states satisfied four primary security goals: (1) it insulated Western democracies from
ideological challengers, (2) it undermined the ideological source of military confrontation, (3) it
ensured societal security in Western Europe, and (4) it established a necessary condition for
building a robust international society organized around common norms and institutions.
First, democracy was both an object and instrument of societal security. In fact, the two
cannot be neatly separated because securing democracy in western Europe was one justification
for promoting democracy in central and eastern Europe. Since security consists a society’s ability
to maintain the independence of their life and their identity, for the countries of western Europe
democracy was constitutive of their security. West European political security consisted in the
stability of democratic forms of government and the ideologies that underpin them (Buzan et al.
1990: 4). The existence of an ideological competitor to western democracy in the form of Soviet-
style state socialism posed an ongoing threat to the stability of democratic political organization
in western Europe (Buzan 1983: 76–78). State socialism was the non-democratic competitor for
the political loyalty of society. Supporting democratization was a way of shoring up the
ideological certainty of democratic capitalism.
Second, the military confrontation of the Cold War was at its essence an ideological
confrontation (Buzan 1983). This belief follows directly from the view of the state as primarily
ideational. Since the essence of a state is an ideology – a set of commonly held beliefs amongst
the population about its purposes and sources of legitimacy – the mobilization of military forces
during the Cold War was fundamentally oriented by the goal of protecting different legitimating
ideas about the political economies of western and eastern states. Accordingly, the primary cause
23
of military confrontation – and the physical insecurity that it induced – could be eliminated
through the ideological re-alignment of the former Soviet bloc. Establishing a democratic region
of states would be an effective means of ensuring against a new Cold War (Buzan et al. 1990:
192–196).
Third, successful democratization in central and eastern Europe would address societal
insecurity in the East and West alike. To the extent that the end of the Cold War meant that
traditional military and ideological threats were on the wane, western worries about losing or
fighting a war with the Soviet Union or the penetration of communism appeared increasingly
unlikely. The traditional objects of state sovereignty were no longer in serious doubt: political
independence and territorial control. The principal focus of insecurity in Europe was society
itself. Societal security is achieved through ensuring the sustainability of language, culture,
religious and national identity, and customs with acceptable levels of change (Heisler and
Layton-Henry 1993: 150–152; Wæver 1993: 23–24). For those countries newly emerging from
state socialism, the primary vulnerability to society was the potent combination of nationalism
and economic distress (Buzan 1993a: 2–5). The presence of large numbers of ethnic minorities
and the rise of xenophobic nationalism at a time of massive economic change and reorganization
raised the likelihood of political violence, economic chaos and social fragmentation. Societal
fragmentation in the East threatened societal security in the West. One particular worry was that
the eruption of aggressive nationalism and/or economic collapse could result in the mass influx
of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers to western Europe. The arrival of large numbers of
non-nationals would have destabilizing societal effects by disrupting valued forms of life and
threaten the ability of receiving societies to maintain their essential character. The conflict in the
former Yugoslavia provided ample evidence of this thesis.
24
The solution to societal insecurity in the East (and thus also in the West) lay in addressing
low levels of sociopolitical cohesion. The main problem identified was to develop acceptable
forms of government and stable developing economies (Buzan 1993a: 4). Establishing a
democratic constitution was a way of solving tensions between different ethnic and national
communities and ensuring against the possibility that the state itself would be used to suppress
ethno-national groups (Buzan 1993b: 49–51). Typical elements of western democracy –
government by law, public order, non-violence, non-discrimination, adequate police-protection,
constitutional government, separation of powers, human rights, minority protection,
participation, and the possibility of peacefully changing governments – provided strategies for
ensuring that ethno-national groups did not pose a serious threat to each other or the state to
particular ethno-national groups. Democracy was the form of government most suited for
establishing stable political legitimacy, and the successful transition to a market economy would
deliver economic security.
Finally, the effective management of national military, political, economic, societal, and
environmental concerns depended on the development of a mature international society which
would support the type of cooperative schemes necessary to address various sources of insecurity
(Buzan 1983: 95–101; Buzan et al. 1990: 26–27). Central to the conflict during the Cold War
was the unwillingness of states to recognize and accept the legitimacy of non-allies. The source
of illegitimacy for the West and the East was each other’s fundamentally different organizing
principles – democratic capitalism vs. authoritarian state socialism. Differences in domestic
societal orders gave rise to different principles for organizing international life. To the extent that
order existed in the international system during the Cold War, it was primarily the result of
deference to power rather than the existence of shared norms, rules or conventions for the
25
conduct of their relations. Because of interdependence, state-centered policy responses in the
post-Cold War era were inadequate to address the security concerns of states and societies.
Achieving and maintaining acceptable levels of economic welfare (i.e., economic security), for
instance, depended on establishing durable open markets and fair terms of competition. A strong
international society with common rules and norms of behavior could only be built on the basis
of mutual recognition and acceptance. This could only be achieved by establishing democratic
capitalist states.
In sum, ST s emphasized the metaphysical rather than physical foundations of the state.
This basic difference led to a reformulation of what constituted security for the state and society
and how it could be achieved. For ST, security was primarily regional rather than international or
global in focus: the problems of security lay within Europe. Democracy was promoted as a way
of avoiding militarized ideological confrontation, avoiding intercommunal conflicts and mass
migration, and establishing common values and principles upon which international cooperation
could be based.
The argument I am advancing is that the European Council drew upon ST when it
formulated its policy of democratic conditionality at the end of the Cold War. One can see the
influence of ST is in the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels Summit in 1993, the same year
that the Copenhagen Criteria were defined:
Foreign and security policy covers all aspects of security. European security will in particular be directed at reducing risks and uncertainties which might endanger the territorial integrity and political independence of the Union and its Member States, their democratic character, their economic stability and the stability of neighbouring regions. (The European Council 1993: 2)
As previously discussed, statements like this one were not unique. Thirty-nine per cent of
European Council documents stated democracy contributed to economic development and 83 per
26
cent of documents stated that democratization would contribute to peace, security and stability.
We can explain the European Council’s normative rationale for membership conditionality in
light of the way ST framed the benefits of democracy.
Conclusion In June 1993 at the Copenhagen Summit, the European Council, announced that ten countries of
former communist Europe were eligible to join the EU. At the meeting, the leaders of the twelve
member states declared that countries wishing to join the Union would have to ‘achieve stability
of institutions guaranteeing democracy’. With a short declaration, a political system long thought
by many to be the essence of anarchy and injustice was embraced as a cornerstone for a stable,
prosperous and peaceful Europe.
This paper has addressed why the EU promotes democracy through membership
conditionality. My analysis of the evidence concludes that EU policy was inspired by different
normative beliefs. In the 1960s, MEPs emphasized the moral desirability of democracy. In the
late 1980s/early 1990s, the European Council focused greater attention on the regional security
and economic benefits of democracy. This conclusion complicates the constructivist view that
the EU has increasingly become a ‘normative power’ over time and adds weight to the rationalist
view that the promotion of democracy through membership conditionality was intended to
advance the security and economic interests of EU member states and their citizens.
But why did member state leaders think that spreading democracy would actually
contribute to regional security and economic well-being? My explanation is that EU leaders
came to accept central tenets of ‘securitization theory’ (ST), a theory of security whose origins
are in the mid-1980s and the work of members of the Copenhagen School of International
27
Relations. Most importantly, ST claims that advancing democracy throughout Europe
ameliorates ideological confrontation, reduces the likelihood of intercommunal conflicts and
mass migration, and establishes common values and principles that can serve as the basis of
international cooperation.
What are some potential limitations of this research? I will briefly discuss three. First, my
empirical and theoretical claims rely upon the soundness of the archival research. One potential
worry is that I rely upon publicly accessible documents and that political actors have various
incentives to hide their true beliefs (Moravcsik 1998). On the one hand, I think further research
would be useful for either supporting or impugning the conclusions I draw. There are, however,
two considerations that support the findings. The first is that they cohere with existing research
that has concluded that member states’ economic and security interests drove EU policy on
enlargement (Grabbe 2002: 251; Higashino 2004; Hyde-Price 2006: 226–227; Schimmelfennig
2001; Torreblanca 2001). Additionally, leaders did not have an obvious incentive to misrepresent
their views. My argument is not that EU leaders were driven by an idealistic commitment to
democracy. Rather they stated that democracy promotion was good because it benefitted their
countries. They were not hiding self-interests behind a façade of idealism.
A second potential criticism is that my identification of securitization theory as the origin
of the normative rationale of EU membership policy at the end of the Cold War is too
speculative. The criticism might be that to demonstrate ideational influence, one should
demonstrate personnel and institutional links. I agree that demonstrating such links would be an
improvement. However, there are two features of my explanation that give me confidence in its
essential correctness. The first is the issue of timing. Major works on securitization theory began
to appear right before or during the revolutions in central and eastern Europe, including Barry
28
Buzan’s People, States, Fear (1983) and Buzan et al.’s The European Security Order Recast :
Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era (1990). The second consideration is one of coherence. The
ideas articulated by the Copenhagen School closely fit statements made by the European
Council. Signficant descrepancies would suggest different ideational origins.
There is, however, one clear limitation of this research. As noted throughout, the focus of
this paper has been the normative rationale for the EU’s policy on democracy and membership
conditionality. That is, I have addressed the purpose, interests or values conditionality is intended
to achieve. The reason for this focus is that it tracks the debate in existing research. What I have
not addressed is why the EU adopted conditionality as a particular technique or technology of
government. As Karen Smith has noted, the shift to a policy of conditionality at the end of the
Cold War marked a significant change in Community policy toward central and eastern Europe.
She states that conditionality was ‘a reverse of the Community’s position during the Cold War,
when trade with communist Europe was a “carrot”, but the Community hesitated before using it
as a “stick”’ (Smith 1999: 43–44). One might describe this as a change from a policy of détente
to conditionality and a reversal in policy orientation. Conditionality promises future benefits in
return for present reforms, whereas détente – in addition to hoping to stabilize East-West
relations in the present – provided immediate benefits with the hope of future reforms. What the
change to conditionality signaled therefore was the advent of a new empirical theory of
democratization, a different set of causal beliefs about how democracy comes about. This
change has not been researched in this contribution, but should be an object of further research
[NB].
1 There is no official English translation of the Report. The original report was translated into the four official languages of the Communities: German, French, Dutch and Italian. Community documents were not widely circulated in English until the UK joined in 1973. The discussion of the Report and associated debates are based on my translation from the French.
29
2 Coding instructions and a list of documents analyzed can be provided upon request. 3 In addition to 10 MEPs, one member of the Euratom Commission and two members of the EEC Commission spoke in the Assembly. Six of the MEPs were members of the Socialist Party Group, two members of the Christian Democratic Group and one member of the Liberal and Allied Group. Mr. Duvieusart is introduced in the transcript of the debate as speaking in his capacity as President of the Christian Democratic Group and on their behalf. This probably explains why no other member of his party spoke, other than Mr. Battista who spoke in his role as Chairman of the Political Committee. There is one other speaker – Jarrosson – whose nationality, party affiliation and gender could not be identified. Mostly likely s/he was one of the few MEPs not aligned with any of the three party groups and thus her or his presence was less well documented. 4 To a lesser extent, peace studies also formed a chief rival (Buzan 1983: 1).
30
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