Russian Security Doctrine

7/27/2019 Russian Security Doctrine

1/8

In 2004 Russia launched thedrafting process of its newnational security strategy. InJune 2008 and especiallyafter the August war withGeorgia, President Medvedevurged the finalization of thedocument. In late March 2009the security doctrine wasalmost ready to be issued buta delay occurred once againdue to Medvedevs request forsome further refinement.Finally, on May 13, 2009 apresidential decree endorsed

Russias overdue newNational Security Strategy upto 2020, replacing theprevious Conception draftedin 1997 and updated in 2000(note the different definitionattributed to the twodocuments in Russian Strateghiya and Konchep-tchiya).

As both international anddomestic scenarios haveradically changed since late1990s-early 2000, when theprevious doctrine1 was issued,Russias political classcommitted itself to work out anew doctrine in line with currentreality. The document followsthe orientation of majordeclarations and projects putforward by President

1 The full text of the previousNational Security Conception isavailable at: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/1.html.

Medvedev in his first year ofpresidency (July 2008 newRussian Foreign PolicyConception, the proposal for anew security architecture inEurope, the proposal toreform the internationalfinancial system, and thelatest one on a new energysecurity architecture). Further-more, the new Security Strategyis expected to form the basis ofother national doctrines suchas the Military Doctrine (to beapproved by the end of 2009),

the Doctrine on Developmentof the Secret Services and thePolicy of Russia in the ArcticRegion until 2020 and after.

From the 2000 Conceptiontowards the 2009 Strategy:main trends in securitypolicy

The new Security Strategy2

was welcomed in Russia asinnovative, useful documentclarifying domestic andforeign policy guidelines andthe nature of the strategicenvironment the country ispresently facing. The documentwas even called a sort of aConstitution of the countrys

2 The full text of the NationalSecurity Strategy is available at:http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html.

N. 144 - JUNE 2009Tomislava Penkova

Abstract

In May 2009 Russia issued i ts newNational Security Strategy up to2020, which was welcomed asinnovative, realistic and usefuldocument clarifying domestic andforeign policy guiding principles.

Its most salient feature is theapproval of a holistic approach tosecurity, i.e. comprising bothdefence and socio-politicalpriorities.

The doctrine emphasizes Russiasplans to become a regional state

and to enter the club of the fiveleading w orld economies, andaffirms that control over energyreserves may lead to the use offorce. NATO and the US are sti llperceived as major threats tonational security although they areoffered a conditional partnership.

Tomislava Penkova is a ResearchAssistant at ISPI Program on Russiaand EU Eastern Neighbours.

Russias New Security Doctrine: Security through Stable Development
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.htmlhttp://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.htmlhttp://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.htmlhttp://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html


2/8

ISPI - Policy Brief

2

security3. It shows a certaindegree of continuity andconsistency with Russiaspolitical and economic prioritiesas laid down in the Putins Plan4and the Conception of Socialand Economic Development upto 2020. In other words, theStrategy can be encompassedamong the first major results ofthe transitional process kickedoff with the presidencies ofPutin and still underway inRussia. The Preamble of the

doctrine outlines as keydirections of national securitythose strategic priorities(determined by social, politicaland economic transformations),which will create the necessaryconditions for implementation ofRussian citizens constitutionalrights, attainment of sustainablenational development andpreservation of territorial integrityand sovereignty. In general, the

document signals that thecountry has reached aqualitatively new, long-termstrategic level of development5,which entails its survival onlyupon a successful maintenanceof sovereignty and societymodernization (a recurrentendeavour, at least since Peterthe Great)6. Here are the maintrends indicating this new phaseof Russias resurgence.

3 B. IASHMANOV - J. GAVRILOV,112 zapovedei bezopasnosti, http://www.rg.ru/2009/05/19/strategia.html.4 N.N. PETRO, The GreatTransformation: How the PutinPlan Altered Russian Society,ISPI Policy Brief, 132, March2009.5

G. BOVT, The Doctrine and thePractice, May 19, 2009, EU-Russia

Centre.6 E. KOLESNIKOV, Russias NewNational Security Strategy, inRussia Profile Weekly ExpertsPanel, May 22, 2009.

Security cannot beachieved by force alone

The most salient feature ofthe Strategy is the adoption ofa broad definition of nationalsecurity including both theexternal dimension (USsecurity strategy, for example,refers exclusively to foreignpolicy and defence) and theinternal one7. Hence securitypriorities imply also:development of democracy and

civil society8, raising citizens

7 Hramchihin observes that in acomplex and interdependent worldit seems logical that the concept ofsecurity comprises activities notexplicitly related to military affairs.On the contrary, it is the militarydoctrine that should determine thegoals and assignments of militaryforces aimed at offsetting foreignmilitary threats and providing aguide on how the military

apparatus should develop.Hramchihin also points out that thedraft of the new Russias MilitaryDoctrine foresees that militaryforces will be in charge ofcounteracting economic, infor-mational, and socio-politicalthreats, i.e. sectors which do nottraditionally belong to militaryaffairs. See A. HRAMCHIHIN,Sovbez ozabotilsia natchionalnoibezopasnostiu, January 16, 2009,http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2009-01-16/1_sovbez.html.8

It is interesting to note theimportance the document attachesto human rights. The Preamble tothe section on State and domesticsecurity includes among itsobjectives the protection of thefundamental rights and freedoms ofman and citizen. Russian securityservices are expected to suppressany criminal assault on humanrights, freedoms and property. Thatsection is followed by anotherdedicated to Improving Russiancitizens quality of life, which

apparently entails improvingnational human rights protectionsystems through the developmentof the judicial system andlegislation.

living standards, defeatingdemographic decline, supportfor the middle class, shrinkingthe gap between poor and rich,improvement of the health-caresystem, economic growth andcompetitiveness (to be deliveredthrough transforming thecommodity-driven economy intoan economy based oninnovation), reducing thewidespread phenomenon ofcorruption, scientific andtechnological advancement,

environmental protection andresource conservation. Thisaspect attributes to security anew, strategic dimensionovercoming its traditional(defence-oriented) contentand means of implementation.Such an approach recognizesthat the major challenges toRussian security belong to itsdomestic sphere. PresidentMedvedev has summarized

this concept into the formulasecurity through stabledevelopment. What does thismean? Russia hastraditionally relied on a hardpower vocabulary whenconstructing its doctrines andstrategies, and thereforemuch more emphasis wasalways placed on the needs ofthe military-industrial complexthan that of civil society.[Today,] social, economic andhumanitarian condition is noless important for providingsecurity than the size of itsarmy [and] much moreattention is given to theanalysis of domestic problemsthan to the search for externalenemies

9. In other words,security can be achieved bycombining both nationalstrategic priorities (defence,

9F. LUKYANOV, A Positive but

Confusing Security Strategy, May20, 2009.
http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2009-01-16%20/1_sovbez.htmlhttp://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2009-01-16%20/1_sovbez.htmlhttp://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2009-01-16%20/1_sovbez.htmlhttp://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2009-01-16%20/1_sovbez.html


3/8

ISPI - Policy Brief 3

state and populationssecurity) and socio-politicalpriorities aiming at stabilizingthe countrys progress andlegitimizing federal authoritiesgovernance. It is a decisiveacknowledgment bearing some-what democratic connotations.Yet the link betweendevelopment and resultingsecurity refers to that peculiarpolitical regime of sovereigndemocracy, which stillshapes Russian politics.

Less aggressive tone andno prioritizing list o f threats

The focus on social and socio-political elements explains theoverall less aggressive, moreconciliatory tone of thedocument (with the exceptionof the use of force forsafeguarding national natural

reserves see below) and, atthe same time, also its vaguelanguage. Moreover, thedocument often features acontinuous swing betweencooperation and confrontationwith some internationalplayers (for example with theUS, see below).

Compared to the previousConception, the Strategy doesnot envision a clear-cut orderof threats. The Conceptioncontained a special sectionlisting an order of threats tonational security with theeconomic situation beingplaced at the forefront. TheConception recognized thatthreats in the economicsphere had a complexcharacter and were mainlyprovoked by a significant GDPdrop, decrease of foreign

investment, innovation activities,and the technological potential.Negative processes in

Russian economy wereprimarily due to separatistdrives in the country. Indeed,the 2000 Conception waswritten against the backdropof the second Chechnya war,identifying terrorism as one ofthe main threats to nationalsecurity. Another threat wasthe lack of conformity ofregional legislation to thefederal one and even to theConstitution (this problem wassubsequently solved through

the principle of powerverticalization). What is more,the 2000 doctrine warnedagainst the possibility ofassociation of the executiveand legislative powers withcriminal structures, whichwere exerting influence overthe banking sector and theindustrial complex. As for thethreats in the foreign realm,they did not differ substantially

from the new doctrine (NATOeastward enlargement, thecreation of foreign militarybases near Russias bordersand consequent weakening ofthe countrys political,economic and military power).This time, the extensive list ofthreats has been replaced bya threat part in every singleissue examined. The absenceof a prioritizing section onthreats points to Russiasruling elite self-confidence,which allows to have a moredetailed and upgradeddocument10.

10

Vneshniya politika Rossii:interesai, instrumenai, strateghii,May 11-17, 2009, Issue 20, Centrpoliticheskoi koniunkturai Rossii, p.9.

A long-term Russian regional state model

Russias security foreignpolicy is built on the principleof the end of blocconfrontation, search forcreating a multipolar world,and a multivector diplomacybased on pragmatism andrationality. The declining USpower has allowed Russia toput forward the model ofregional centre or regional

state11 (not a hegemonicstate) referring to itsrelationship with the post-Soviet space. The goal is tofurther consolidate theregional and sub-regionalintegrationist potential of thestates located in the post-USSR area12. Thus Russiasprimary concern is to createan independent centre ofpower as this is the only

chance to build andstrengthen its position13.Certainly, committing itself toabide by the rules of globalclubs cannot provide it with

11 Strateghiya natchionalnoi

bezopasnosti RF gotova,http://www.gzt.ru/politics/2009/04/29/222502.html.12 Paragraph 8 of the Strategystates that the establishment of

new centres of economic growthand political influence hasdetermined a new geopoliticalsituation, within which regulation ofcrisis on regional level should becarried out without participation ofnon-regional forces. Paragraph 41adds that the main threats toRussias interests and security onits borders is the possibility ofescalation of military conflicts aswell as the incompleteness of theinternational legal regulation offederal borders with someneighbouring states.13 C. BELTON - I. GORST, WTOtries to make sense of Russias bigrethink, in Financial Times, June13, 2009.
http://www.gzt.ru/politics/2009/04/29/222502.htmlhttp://www.gzt.ru/politics/2009/04/29/222502.htmlhttp://www.gzt.ru/politics/2009/04/29/222502.htmlhttp://www.gzt.ru/politics/2009/04/29/222502.html


4/8

ISPI - Policy Brief

4

the same power and influenceit can enjoy being a regionalstate and coordinating aregional club of its own basedon already existing economic,political and military groupings(such as EurAsEc, CIS,CSTO, SCO14). Securingstable economic (energyincluded), defence (i.e.defence of national bordersand protection there of thecurrent balance of power),and political relations with its

neighbours is the ultimaterepresentation of Russiasexternal security. However, asthis policy has often clashedwith the Western agendaregarding the area as well aswith the one of some formerUSSR republics (Georgia,Ukraine), it becomes clearwhy Russian security is stillbound by the (reaction of the)West and is accordingly more

Westward looking than China-oriented.

With regard to China, manyanalysts have noted itsabsence in the Strategy, anomission that leaves(seemingly) unanswered thequestion on how Russia isgoing to react on this risingeconomic power next to itsEastern borders. China isindeed often perceived as a

threat because interested inacquiring as much ofhydrocarbon reserves aspossible (including thereserves of Central Asia) andoften seeking to expand itseconomic influence overRussias Eastern areas

14EurAsEC stands for Eurasian

Economic Community; CIS stands

for Commonwealth of IndependentStates; CSTO stands for CollectiveSecurity Treaty Organization; SCOstands for Shanghai CooperationOrganization.

bordering China. Furthermore,China is linked to the shiftingbalance of power toward Asia,which will have a significantimpact on Russias standingin the world. This shift will onlygain momentum in the yearsup to 202015. Such anobservation is certainlycorrect but there can be twoexplanations of thisshortcoming. The first one iswhat has already been said,namely that currently Russias

attention is focussed on theWest, which more directly andvigorously challenges itsplans (see also the recentPrague summit on EUEastern Partnership).Secondly, the issue of Chinasrise is indirectly addressed indifferent paragraphs such asthe one dealing with regionalgroupings of which China is amember (SCO, BRIC) or the

one examining thecompetition for control overCentral Asian energy reserves(see below) or lastly, thoseidentifying the need todiminish the existing socialand economic regional gap inRussia. Furthermore, recentBRIC and SCO summits inRussia16 and the signing of a

15 F. LUKYANOV, A Positive but

Confusing Security Strategy, cit.16 The BRIC summit decided topush for an increase of the fourcountries voting rights in theInternational Monetary Fund, backreforms of the internationalfinancial system and agreed to callfor the creation of a predictable anddiversified currency system. At theSCO summit President Med-vedevs efforts to reach aconsensus on the introduction of aBRIC common currency met littleenthusiasm among SCO members.

However, during the summit Chinadecided to grant US $10 billion forimplementation of various eco-nomic projects within theorganizations framework. See V.

Memorandum of Understandingon Eastern gas programme (acommon system of gasproduction, transportation andsupply in the area of EastSiberia and the Far East,which will respond to the gasdemand of China and otherAsian-Pacific countries) duringthe June Russian-Chinesebusiness forum suggest asignificant impetus on the partof Russia as well as on Chinatoo to boost regional and

bilateral cooperation. Therefore,it will not be wrong to gather thatRussias strategy vis--visChina is to combine themechanisms offered by regionalorganizations and meanwhile tokeep strengthening the internaldimension of security, which inthis case once again acquires acrucial importance for Russiasregional advancement. Finally,it is symptomatic that Russia

does not display a desire tounite with other internationalactors to the detriment ofChina. Quite the opposite,Paragraph 15, dealing withthe SCO, aims atstrengthening mutual respectand partnership withoutimposing any condition, as it isinstead the case of Russia-USand Russia-NATO relationships(see below).

Overall, the Strategyattempts to put an end to thedebates on Russias positionin the world and itsdevelopment model, whichstarted with the dissolution ofthe Soviet Union17. Russiasrole will not be determined byintegration encouraged by theWest into Western structures

SOLOVIOV, Presidentai ne kupilisna reservnuiu valiutu, inKommersant, June 17, 2009.17 E. KOLESNIKOV, Russias NewNational Security Strategy, cit.


5/8


(as many thought the Westshould have done in theaftermath of the USSRcollapse), neither will it berelegated to a role it does notaspires to. On the contrary,Russia seems determined toplay a crucial regional roleand by means of this positionto propose integrationistmodels to the West containingclear-cut vision on thebalance of power in its nearabroad. To confirm this thesis

is the fact that after dealingwith the post-Soviet space,the Strategy goes on with theEU, with which Russiaenvisions creating a commoneconomic and security area(i.e. the pan-Europeancollective security systemadvanced in 2008 byPresident Medvedev).

The above mentioned modelis meant to cover a longperiod of time up to 2020,assuming, as some analystshave warned consideringcurrent economic uncertainty,that the country will not befacing any major turmoil.However, there might beanother explanation: theStrategy is a doctrinaldocument, it refers to thefuture and as such it providesthe key concepts of Russias

security stance. Their finalimplementation may wellundergo adjustments limited,however, to the Strategysgeneral framework.

NATO and the US: fromfoes to conditionalpartners

The new Strategy confirms

Russias traditional negativestance on NATOs eastwardenlargement, on US attempt

to dwarf Russias nuclearpotential by creating anti-missile defence system inCentral Europe, and the fearabout widening the militaryand technological gap with theUS (despite Russias recentdetermination to strengthen itsmilitary apparatus). The textsays: A global securityarchitecture exclusively orientedtoward NATO is bound to failand Russia will not cease itsvigilance with respect to plans

to move NATOs militaryinfrastructure closer to itsborders and efforts to give theAlliance a global character,which breach internationallaw. This equals to a claimthat the deployment of NATOforces in operations aroundthe world should be approvedby the UN Security Council,where Russia has a vetopower. Yet Russia is ready to

develop a relationship withNATO based on equality andwith a view of strengtheningthe common security in theEuro-Atlantic region if NATOshows respect for Russiaslegitimate interests whenimplementing its military andpolitical setting up. Thestatement clearly refers toRussias near abroadconsidered the foremostpriority of its 2008 Foreignpolicy doctrine. It is a policy ofmaintenance of the status quovis--vis a policy ofenlargement of other actors(NATO, the EU), whichcurrently suffer from a lack ofinternal cohesion. Althoughthe proposal of PresidentMedvedev to create a pan-European security pact is notexplicitly mentioned in theStrategy, the negative vision

on NATOs enlargement isdesigned to stimulate theWest (and in particular the

EU) to engage into a dialoguewith Moscow on its proposal.The position on NATOsuggests also Russiasreluctance to become itsmember (collaboration willcontinue to be developedaccording to the formula ofpartnership) or to acceptNATO decisions, in which ithas not participated.Moreover, according to theStrategy it will be NATOsresponsibility if possible

disagreements with Moscowwere to arise. It is worthnoting that, contrary to theprevious Conception whereNATO was perceived solelyas a threat and Russia did notenjoy any support from insidethe Alliance, during the twopresidential mandates ofPutin, some NATO memberstook Russias part (see 2008and 2009 NATO summits). It

is on them that Moscow cannow count on when promotingits policy of conditionalpartnership.

As for the US, the country isstill perceived as a mainadversary and a source ofmost of the threats to Russiassecurity. However, in aconciliatory tone (or aresponse to the recent hit thereset button political drive),

Moscow admits that it isdetermined to establish anequal and fully-fledgedstrategic partnership with theUnited States based oncoinciding interests

18. Suchcondition can be achieved, inthe first place, by reaching anagreement on strategic armsreduction (START I Treaty

18 The objective of establishing astrategic partnership with the USrecalls the opening of Russia in2001-2002.


6/8

ISPI - Policy Brief

6

expires in December 2009)19,strengthening confidencebuilding measures, enhancingcounter-terrorist cooperation,and regulating regionalconflicts. It is a rather sincereacknowledgement that inRusso-US relations therecould be divergences but theyshould not harm the generalwillingness to cooperate oncommon goals and threats.Furthermore, throughout thedocument one can perceive

Russias awareness andgrowing self-confidence thatthe economic crisis, which isgradually weakening USmight, constitutes anopportunity for Moscow. Thevery request of establishing apartnership with thehegemony, as the Strategyoften indirectly defines theUS, points out to thisassumption. Hegemony

cannot exist any longer whenthe hegemonic country isforced to recognize the equalpower of another state. It is acrucial and strong message toBarack Obama just weeksahead of his first presidentialvisit to Russia in early July,when the two states willsearch for a commonlanguage.

19As Russian Security Council

Secretary Nikolai Patrushev affirmshis country will make all thenecessary efforts at the lowest-costlevel to maintain parity with the USin strategic offensive arms inconditions when the global missiledefence system is deployed, andthe concept of global strike with theuse of strategic carriers in nuclearand non-nuclear versions isimplemented. See interview of N.

PATRUSHEV with Izvestia, Dostoiniuroven zhizni lutchshaya strate-ghiya beozpasnosti Rossij, May 13,2009, http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/article3128359/.

A g loomy vis ion on energycompetition

Paragraph 9 of the doctrinestates: The change from blocconfrontation to the principlesof multi-vector diplomacy andthe [natural] resourcespotential of Russia, along withthe pragmatic policies of usingthem has expanded thepossibilities of the RussianFederation to strengthen itsinfluence on the world arena.

Paragraph 47 links energyand national security: Sourcesof danger to national securitycould become such factors as. the intensification of thebattle over natural resources,among them energy, water andconsumer goods.

Authors of the Strategybelieve that energy issue andthe international competitionfor access and control ofhydrocarbon riches will be aprimary concern in worldaffairs for the foreseeablefuture. The document evenspecifies where the majorenergy geopolitical battle-grounds will take place: in theMiddle East, Barents Sea Shelf,Central Asia and the Arctic. Itdefines energy security as asustainable balance in supplyand demand for standard

quality energy resources andcalls for developing globalenergy markets based onWTO rules (note that Russiais not yet a WTO member andthat WTO does not regulateglobal energy markets),international development andtransfers of energy saving orclean technologies. Somehave emphasised that theposition of the Strategy on the

subject indicates continuitywith what the 2003 RussiasEnergy Strategy up to 2020says, namely that Russia has

a status of an energy stateand its hydrocarbon resourcesmay strengthen the im-plementation of its domesticand foreign policy20. Whathowever constitutes a noveltyin Russias attitude is thestatement that With theongoing competition forresources, attempts to usemilitary force to solveemerging problems cannot beexcluded and this mightdestroy the balance of forces

on Russias and its alliesborders. While the importanceattached to energy resourcesshould not surprise anyone(energy riches in Russia arecomprised in the list ofnational strategic sectorsruling out any foreignparticipation), the use of forceappears somewhat illegitimate.Its rationale stems from the factthat successive Russian

governments have workedhard to try to ensure that oiland gas pipelines, especiallythose in the post-Sovietspace, remain almost totallyunder Russian control orinfluence. This is why Russiaalways highlights thecentrality of its near abroadand of the organizationsoperating there.

More to the point, the use of

force recalls the 2008 ForeignPolicy doctrine (as summarizedin five principles byMedvedev21), whichlegitimates Moscow tocounterbalance any aggressionto Russian citizens live anddignity as well as to Russian

20R. KUPCHINSKY, Energy and

the Russian National SecurityStrategy, in Eurasia DailyMonitor, 6, 95, May 18, 2009.21

http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/warfare/statement310

808en.htm.
http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/%20article3128359/http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/%20article3128359/http://www.un.int/russia/new/Ma%20inRoot/docs/warfare/statement310808en.htmhttp://www.un.int/russia/new/Ma%20inRoot/docs/warfare/statement310808en.htmhttp://www.un.int/russia/new/Ma%20inRoot/docs/warfare/statement310808en.htmhttp://www.un.int/russia/new/Ma%20inRoot/docs/warfare/statement310808en.htmhttp://www.un.int/russia/new/Ma%20inRoot/docs/warfare/statement310808en.htmhttp://www.un.int/russia/new/Ma%20inRoot/docs/warfare/statement310808en.htmhttp://www.izvestia.ru/politic/%20article3128359/http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/%20article3128359/


7/8


business communitieswherever they are andespecially in the privileged forRussian interests area of thepost-Soviet space (see thefive-day war with Georgia). Ifthis latter element (firstpillar) seeks to preserve thenear abroad from foreignmeddling, the statement onthe use of force to safeguardcontrol over natural resources(second pillar) seeks topreserve the key factor

nourishing Russiasresurgence the hydrocarbonreserves. Still it seems that,the illegitimate use of force ismeant to thwart NATOsrecently voiced readiness todefend its members energysecurity. If this were true, itwill confirm the thesis thatRussias benevolent controlof gas supplies throughout theCentral and East European

gas markets [aims at]neutralization of the roleplayed by these countrieswithin NATO, along with theunending struggle to increasethe profits for Russian

22.

first five world economies

companies

Beyond the economiccrisis: Russia among the

The global economic crisishad a major influence in theformulation of the document,which compares the crisisnegative worldwide effectswith large-scale use of militaryforce. Despite the uncertaintyof world affairs in theaftermath of the crisis, theStrategy advances Russiasmost important economicintention that is to enter the

global financial order23 and

22 R. KUPCHINSKY, Energy and

the Russian National Security, cit.

club of the five mostadvanced world economies inthe next five years anidealistic goal so far.According to the document(Paragraph 55), the mainthreats in accomplishing thisobjective are: preservation ofthe commodity-driven modelof economy, loss of controlover national hydrocarbonresources, uneven regionaldevelopment, and weaktechnological competitiveness

of the Russian economy. Thesolution of seeking aneconomic model based oninnovation and on intensiveregional development appearsa realistic and even necessarygoal. The text recommendsthe development of industrialand military infrastructures inthe Arctic, in East Siberia, theFar East and the Urals areas.Regional development is

perhaps one of the sectorswhere internal security ismostly linked to foreign andenergy politics. A closer lookat the case of the Far EasternRussian regions borderingChina, where the threat of thesteadily increasing Chineseinfluence is getting stronger,clarifies why is so importantfor Moscow to promote andboost regional development.In fact, Russia needs tobalance its territorial units(federal centre versusperiphery) so as to preventthe formation of regionalslowdowns favouring externalactors plans. As for theexternal dimension of itseconomy, Russia still countson the re-organization of

23 This means creating analternative. Rather than makingmerely cosmetic changes as somecountries and perhaps the

the shift of world economiccentres towards the BRIC,RIC region. However, as theBRIC example shows there isno prospect of a formal bloctaking shape. The countriessize, power and assertiveinternational agendas makeco-operation difficult on issuesother than those where theirinterests converge. Moreover,the potential for the fourcountries to share a commonvoice in international politics is

very limited24.

Conclusion

The newly endorsed Strategyappears a realistic doctrine,when it acknowledges thedomestic problems afflictingtodays Russia. It offerscertainly an innovativeapproach when it takes into

account citizens wellbeingand when includes sectionsdealing with science, culture,public health, and even withecology. It is innovative toowhen it recognizes the tightlink between internal stabilityand external security, namelythat there are no purelyexternal or internal threatsand that domestic politicsnecessarily reflect a foreign

content. It also appearscorrect when stressing the

international financial organisationsthemselves might want, Medvedevconcluded thus his [SCO summit]speech: What we need arefinancial institutions of a completelynew type, where particular politicalissues and motives, and particularcountries, will not dominate. SeeM. HUDSON, Washington cannot

call all the shots, in FinancialTimes, June 14, 2009.24

BRIC, but no bloc, TheEconomist Intelligence Unit, June16, 2009.


8/8

ISPI - Policy Brief8

ork in the new

need to undertake acomprehensive economicmodernization. However, itseems idealistic or at least itis too early to predict whetherand how the country willsucceed becoming one ofworlds five leadingeconomies in the mediumterm25, especially in amoment of global economiccrisis26. In this regard, theStrategy fails to assess therisks related to the failures of

capitalism, liberalism andglobalization that we arecurrently facing and to offerthem an alternative viable tosave Russian economy and tobring it among the top worldeconomies. The cardinal, andperhaps rhetorical, question ofwhether the current somewhatstatist, somewhat free-market,somewhat liberal, and clearlyglobalized Russian model of

development espoused in thestrategy will wcircumstances remains un-addressed27.

On the whole, the newSecurity Strategy allows toobtain greater domesticconsensus, which isfundamental for building aviable and stable society afteryears (during Putins twopresidential mandates) when

rightween its internal

nd external dimension.

the country strength seemedhaving only an external reachand the desire to restoreRussias international imagewas the key-guiding factor.After the biggest geopoliticalcatastrophe of the XXcentury, as Putin called thecollapse of the Soviet Union,the country is now graduallyaccomplishing the

La ricerca ISPI analizza ledinamiche politiche,strategiche ed economiche delsistema internazionale con ilduplice obiettivo di in formare edi orientare le scelte di policy.

I risultati della ricerca vengonodivulgati attraversopubblicazioni ed eventi,focalizzati su tematiche diparticolare interesse per lItalia

e le sue relazioni internazionalie artico lati in:

9 Programma Africa9 Programma Caucaso e Asia

Centrale9 Programma Europa9 Programma Mediterraneo e

Medio Oriente9 Programma Russia e Vicini

Orientali9 Programma Sicurezza e

Studi Strategici

9 Progetto Argentina9 Progetto Asia Meridionale9 Progetto Diritti Umani9 Progetto Disarmo9 Progetto Emergenze e

Af far i Umani tar i9 Progetto Internazionaliz-

zazione della PubblicaAmminist razione

ISPIPalazzo Cleric iVia Clerici, 5I - 20121 Milanowww.ispionline.it

Per informazioni:[email protected]@ispionline.it

ISPI 2009

balance beta

25 The Strategy envisions threeperiods to accomplish its tasks:short-term (2012), medium-term(2015) and long-term (2020).26 Some have criticised the timingof the doctrine as the worstpossible to introduce a newstrategy as the politicalconsequences of the globalfinancial crisis are largely unclear.See R. McDERMOTT, Russias

National Security Strategy, inEurasia Daily Monitor, 6, 96,May 19, 2009.27 E. KOLESNIKOV, Russias NewNational Security Strategy, cit.
http://www.ispionline.it/mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]://www.ispionline.it/

Russian Security Doctrine

Documents

Transcript of Russian Security Doctrine