Russia’s aRctic Policy...prominent in Russia’s Arctic policy but neither the perception of the...
Transcript of Russia’s aRctic Policy...prominent in Russia’s Arctic policy but neither the perception of the...
Russia’s aRctic Policy
Pavel K. Baev BRiEFiNG PaPER 73, 17 December 2010
73
GEoPolitics, MERcaNtilisM aND iDENtity-BuilDiNG
• Russiahasre-evaluatedtherisksofgeopoliticalcompetitionintheFarNorthandnowprefersapatternofbalancedcooperativebehaviour,asexemplifiedbythemaritimeborderagreementwithNorway.
• This cooperative track fulfils Russia’s ambitions only to a degree, soMoscowwill try to limitglobalizationoftheArctic,insistingontheprivilegesofthelittoralstatesandprioritizingtiesamongthe‘Arcticfive’.
• Development of the hydrocarbon reserves, particularly off-shore, requires the engagement ofWesternpartners,whoremainreluctanttoinvestduetoapoorinvestmentclimateandconsiderableuncertaintyoverdemand,whileGazpromandRosneftarealsoinnohurrytolaunchnewprojects.
• ThemainfactorundercuttingRussia’splansandambitionsfortheArcticinthemid-termwouldbethescarcityofresourcesdeterminedbytheslowrecoveryfromthemassiveeconomiccrisis.
Russia’s aRctic Policy
Pavel K. Baev
Research Professor
Peace Research institute, oslo (PRio)
Briefing Paper 73
17 December 2010
GEoPolitics, MERcaNtilisM aND iDENtity-BuilDiNG
the international Politics of Natural Resources and the Environment research programme
the Finnish institute of international affairs
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The maritime border delimitation deal betweenRussia and Norway sensationally announced byPresidentDmitriMedvedevinOsloon27April2010andsignedinMurmanskon15September2010war-rants a re-appraisal of Russia’s Arctic policy.Thepenchant forsensationalismoftenspillsover fromthemedia intopolicyanalysis,whichrecyclesper-ceptionsofthe‘struggleforresources’reachingtheintensityofa‘greatArcticgame’andescalatingintoa‘newColdWar’.1Inreality,however,Moscowhasnotoversteppedtherulesof international lawandhas remained committed to the ‘club regulations’ofseveralArcticinstitutions,so2010mightsetthetrendtowardsade-escalationoftensionsintheHighNorth.Itwouldhavebeentoosimplistictoexplainaway thepronounced emphasis on cooperation inRussia’sforeignpolicywithreferencestotheimpactoftheeconomicrecession,whichhasundercutthepreviousriseofambitiousself-assertiveness.Rather,theArcticpolicyisshapedbyadynamicinterplayofpoorlycompatibleRussianinterestsandintentions,andthispaperseekstodemonstratethatthisinter-play cannot be reduced to an equation of securityimperativesandeconomicdriversbecauseimmate-rialideasaddtoitscomplexity.
The softening of ‘hard security’
Thegeopolitical perspective on theArctic interac-tions typically passes for a ‘scientific approach’in Moscow and remains popular among Western
1 Themost cited anticipationof ‘an armedmaddash for its
resources’isBorgerson(2008).
adherents to traditional ‘realism’ (Howard, 2010).Thereisindeedacertainallureindrawingfrontiersand fault-lines, but the solid foundation for suchexercises could only be provided by constructingbalances of military power, and the High Northprovides rather unpromising data.The infrequentflightsofRussianstrategicbomberssincemid-2007have succeeded in capturing media attention, asdida fewCaribbeanandMediterraneancruisesbytheNorthernFleet,buttheplainfactisthatRussiaisfirmlysetonthetrendofArcticdemilitarization,albeitwithoutadmittingit.
The ambitious document ‘The Foundations of theRussianFederationStatePolicyintheArcticto2020’,approvedbyPresidentMedvedevinSeptember2008,prescribes‘buildinggroupingsofconventionalforcesin the Arctic zone capable of providing militarysecurity in differentmilitary-political conditions’,butRussianofficialshaveclarifiedthatnoincreasesin any component of military might are planned(Keffrpütz,2010).ThebrutallyradicalreformoftheRussianArmedForcesexecutedsinceautumn2008by Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov involvessignificant downsizing and dismantling of the oldinfrastructureformassivemobilization(Baev,2010).
The central problem for theNorthern Fleet in theshort term remains the introduction of the newBorey-class generation of strategic submarinesarmedwiththeBulavaSLBM.TheBulavaprojecthasbeen in serious trouble since themid-2000s, andwhile the test inOctober2010was successful, theriskoffailureremainshigh.Ifthemissileweretobeapprovedfordeployment,themajorpartofthenavalbudgetfortherestofthedecadewouldgotowards
an encounter in the arctic: polar bears meet with the attack submarine USS honolulu that
surfaced close to the North Pole. Photo: alphonso Braggs / US Navy.
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nuclear weapons, which could still be reducedthroughunilateralinitiatives.Overall,MoscowhasdiscoveredtherisksofgeopoliticalgamesintheHighNorthandwillmostprobablyseektodemonstratesoberlybalancedbehaviour.
The devaluation of resource riches
TheperceptionoftheHighNorthasa‘treasurechest’ofnaturalresourceshasbecomethegospelinbothpolicy-makingforandpublicattitudetowardsthedevelopment of Russia’s vast northern periphery.While visiting a research station in Yakutia lastAugust, Prime Minster Vladimir Putin informedscientists that ‘According to rough estimates, thereservesdiscoveredtodateareworthapproximately$5trillion,includingoil,naturalgas,coal,goldanddiamonds.’ (Putin, 2010). The problem with thisstatementisnotthattheseestimatesareunverifiable,butthattheteamofRussianandGermanscientistsinvestigating climate change did not see any rel-evanceinthese‘data’.Infact,thereisnominimallyreliable Russian assessment of mineral resourcesbeyond the Arctic Circle, so all speculations takeastheirpointofdeparturethefiguresfromtheUSGeologicalSurvey,typicallygrosslymisinterpreted.2
Russian energy ‘majors’, in particular the state-owned Gazprom and Rosneft,which by law haveexclusive rights when it comes to developing
2 Thedefinition‘undiscovered’ isusuallyomitted inRussian
referencestothesedata,whichareavailableat(http://pubs.us-
gs.gov/fs/2008/3049/).
modernizationofthestrategiccapabilities.Thebestoption is that by 2025 sixBorey-class submarineswould enter service,while all Delta III-class andDeltaIV-classsubmarineswouldberetired,sothatthe numerical strength of this ‘armada’would bereducedbyahalf.TheworstoptionisthattheBorey-classsubmarineswouldberetrofittedforadifferentmissile,withtheresultthatby2015onlysixDelta-IVclasssubmarineswouldbeoperational,andfurtherprospectswouldremainunclear(Myasnikov,2010).
ThecostsoftheBorey/Bulavaprogrammearecertaintobeevenhigherin2010-2015thantheywereinthelate2000s,sothemodernizationoftheconventionalcapabilities and the infrastructure of the North-ernFleetwouldbe severely reduced.Further, themuch-debatedpurchaseoftheMistralamphibiousassaultshipwillnotaddtotheNorthernFleet’slistof ships (there is nomaintenance facility for heli-copters),andifmoreshipsofthisdesignarelaidupinRussianshipyards,Severodvinskishardlygoingtowin this contract.The only element of Russianmaritimepowerwhichhasbeenstrengthenedinthelast decade is the icebreaker fleet, but its deploy-mentforsecuringnavigationalongtheNorthernSearouteisprohibitivelyexpensiveincommercialterms(Zhurenkov,2010).
ThesumtotalofRussia’sdeployablemilitarycapa-bilitiesintheNorthern‘theatre’isstillgreaterthanthecombinedforcesofitsneighbours,butMoscowhasgood reason to feelvulnerable,particularly asfar as its strategic ‘bastion’ on theKola peninsulaisconcerned.HencethepronouncedreluctancetointeractwithNATOonArcticmatters;hencealsothenegativeattitudetowardsopeningtalksontactical
the change in the Northern Fleet order of battle. source: Military Balance, IISS, 1980-1981, 1989-1990, 2000-2001, 2010.
1980 1990 2000 2010
Strategic submarines 49 38 14 8
Attack submarines 126 120 23 22
Principal surface combatants 73 77 12 10
Patrol and coastal combatants 76 40 26 12
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offshoreoil andgasfields, presumablyoperate onthebasisofmorepreciseestimates.Theyare,how-ever,innohurrytoinvestincostlyprojectsontheArcticshelfandhaveevencutexplorationbudgets,withYuriTrutnev,ministerfornaturalresourcesandecology, arguing for reforming the legislation andopeningtheoffshore‘green-fields’toforeigninves-tors (Melnikov, 2010). Gazprom and Rosneft caneasilyblocksuchinitiatives,buttheycannotmakeaconvincingplanfordevelopingthelicencesthattheyhaveamassed.Speakingatthegasindustryconfer-ence inOctober 2010, Putin set a goal to increaseproductionfrom650bcmto1,000bcmayear,butGazprom’strackrecordprovesthatthegiantcom-pany is chronically unable to build its ‘upstream’base(Putin,2010b). Intheearly1990s, itsaverageannualproductionwasabout550bcm,and in themid-2000sitmanagedtoclimbtothesameplateau,beforeplungingto460bcmin2009andmakingapartialrecoveryat500bcmin2010.3
AttheheartofGazprom’sstrategicplanisthedevel-opment of Yamal, principally the giant Bovanen-kovskoegasfield.Fromthecompany’sperspective,thismovetotheArctic fromitscorebaseatNovyUrengoi just below the Arctic Circle makes littledifference in termsof technologyorworkingcon-ditions, and the fragile tundra ecologywill sufferjustthesamedevastatingdamage.Whatmakesthisprojectsohardistheneedtobuildbasicinfrastruc-ture,andeverydelaypushesthecostestimatesevenhigherasunfinishedworkdeteriorates.Thesituation
3 SeeInozemtsev(2010)foracriticalanalysisofGazprom’sper-
formance.
isverydifferentwiththeShtokmanproject,whichforGazpromisanexperimentalenterprisegenerat-ing valuable ‘know-how’ on the offshore produc-tion. Total and Statoil have good reason to doubtthe organization of this joint venture, since theconditionsthatlookedattractiveinthemid-2000shavebecomerather lessso in thesaturatedglobalgasmarket.Delaysovertheinvestmentdecisionareaperfectlyrationaltacticinanuncertainsituationwherepoliticalrisksremainafactor,despitePutin’spersonalcommitment.
The inflated perceptions of Arctic hydrocarbon‘treasures’aredisconnectedfromthepracticalitiesoftheRussianenergypolicy,whichgrantsamonopolyonexploitingtheseunder-researchedreservestotwostate-controlled companies that show little inter-est in tapping into them.What ismore, therehasbeenmuchspeculationthatMoscowwasmotivatedprimarilybyoilandgasinterestswhenstrikingthecompromiseborderdealwithNorway,butoncloserinspection it is hard to find any ‘hidden agenda’(Socor,2010).Indeed,GazpromkeepsreshufflingtheteamdealingwithShtokmanandremainsambivalentaboutfurtherstagesoftheproject,whileRosneftiscontenttoletStatoilcarryoutalltheinitialexplora-tion.GreedmaybeafactorinRussia’sArcticpolicyaimed atpreventingothers fromgaining access toresourcesthatRussiaisunabletodevelopinthefore-seeablefuture,butprofitmaximizationclearlyisnot.
The oddity of identity-building
Both‘hardsecurity’andmercantilismarecertainlyprominent in Russia’s Arctic policy but neither
the perception of the high North as a ‘treasure chest’ is
partly exaggerated, as estimates of the arctic hydrocarbon
reserves are unverifiable. Photo: Gazprom.
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provides an adequate explanation for its remark-able intensity.Putin’svisits toYamalclearlyserveGazprom’sinterests,butsomethingelseismotivat-inghimtotraveltoplaces likeFranzJosefLandorTiksi.Thepersistentdesireto‘GoNorth’cannotberationalizedintermsofcost-efficiencyorstrategicinterests, butmakes good sense in the context ofimages,discoursesandother‘intangibles’.
Russia’s state identity remains shaky twentyyearsinto its post-Soviet history, and the loudly pro-claimedintentiontoexpanditsNorthernbordersbysecuringcontroloveramillionsqkmoftheArcticshelfisbestunderstoodasanattempttoconsolidateit. Strictly speaking, the claimon this inaccessibleseabeddoesnotsignifyanyterritorialexpansionbutreferstotheratherhypotheticalexclusiveeconomicrights. Moscow first submitted it without muchpoliticalfanfaretotheUNCommissionontheLimitsof the Continental Shelf (CLCS) back in December2001 andwasnot reallydisappointedwhen itwasreturnedwitharequestformoredatahalfayearlater.
The claim was indeed rather poorly prepared astheattachedmapillustrates.Immediatelyafterthesensationalflag-plantingexpeditioninAugust2007,
Putinorderedthedocumenttobere-submitted,buttodatethepaperworkisstillnotready.4Thereareanumberoftechnicalproblemsrangingfromthelackofsamplesofdeep-waterdrilling(thereisnoequip-ment)tothelackofgoodmaps(theyremainmilitarysecrets),butthemainissueconcernstheobjectionsfrom theUS and Canada.Moscow had pinned itshopesontheratificationof theUNConventionontheLawof theSeaby theUS Senate,whichcouldhavepaved theway for thefinal settlementof themaritimeborderquestion,buttheObamaadminis-trationhasobviouslymisseditschancetogatherthenecessaryvotesforthistreaty.5
International recognition of Russia’s ‘ownership’ofahugechunkof theArcticshelf isnotgoingto
4 Anoverviewof the52claimssubmitted in the last sixyea-
rscanbefoundontheCLCSwebsite(http://www.un.org/Depts/
los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm).
5 Visiting Vietnam in July 2010, US State Secreta-
ry Clinton confirmed that the Convention ‘has strong
bipartisan support in the United States, and one of our dip-
lomatic priorities over the course of the next year is to se-
cure its ratification in the Senate’; see Clinton (2010).
the map that Russia used when submitting its claim to the uN commission on the limits of continental shelf.
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happenanytimesoon,soMoscowhastotonedownitsmessage of ‘conquering theNorth’,which stillresonates with the electorate.There is no simpleexplanationforthispositivepublicattitudephenom-enon,whichisrootedinsubconsciousperceptionsof‘Northernness’asakeyfeatureofRussia(Medvedev,2001).The leadership isclearly trying toexploit it,combiningStalinistpropagandamethodswithmod-ernPR technologies;hencePutin’spatronageoverthe‘NorthPole–38’expeditionlaunchedinOctober2010–andhencealsohispoint‘Tobehonest,Russiaisanortherncountry’attheArcticForuminMoscow(Putin,2010b).Theproblemisthatgreaterpoliticalattention to theHighNorth inevitablybrings intofocustheproblemsofenvironmentalpollutionanddecayinginfrastructure,andtheabilitytochanneltheinvestmentsaccordinglyinatimeofprotractedrecessionisdoubtful.
Conclusions
Theclimateofinternationalcooperationisdefinitelywarming intheArcticasMoscowisseekingtode-escalate geopolitical tensions and turn the pageon the recent quasi-ColdWar.The engagement ofWestern partners is necessary for developing thehydrocarbon reserves in theHighNorth, but this
plainfactdoesnotimplyanyurgentaction:GazpromandRosneft are innohurry to startnewprojects,andWesternoil‘majors’arenotverytemptedtoputmoneyintocostlyjointventuresthatcouldbesub-jecttopoliticalpressure.ThecooperativetrackfulfilsRussia’sambitionsonlytoadegree,sincethevisionoftheArcticasa‘commonheritage’doesnotchimewiththeprevalentRussianperceptionsof‘conquer-ing’and‘owning’theHighNorth.MoscowwilltrytolimitglobalizationoftheArcticbyinsistingontheprivilegesofthelittoralstatesandprioritizingcoop-erationamongthe‘Arcticfive’,whoshoulddividetheshelfintonationalsectorsandthenjointlyman-agethecross-borderproblems.SustainingthehighArcticprofileisataskthatcannotbeaccomplishedonthecheap,andthe‘scarceresources’cursemightfrustrateRussia’sbestandworstintentions.
Pavel K. Baev
Research Professor
Peace Research institute, oslo (PRio)
isBN 978-951-769-290-8
issN 1795-8059
cover photo: Gazprom
layout: Juha Mäkinen
the Finnish institute of international affairs 2010
www.upi-fiia.fi
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Selected literature:
Baev, Pavel K., 2010. ‘Military reform against heavy
odds’, in anders Åslund, andrew Kuchins and sergei
Guriev (eds), Russia after the Economic crisis.
Washington: Peterson institute for international
Economics.
Borgerson, scott G., 2008. ‘arctic Meltdown’, Foreign
affairs, March/april, pp. 63-77.
clinton, hillary R., 2010. Remarks at the National
convention center, hanoi, 23 July (available at http://
www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145095.htm).
‘The Foundations of the Russian Federation state
Policy in the arctic to 2020’, 2008 (available in Russian
at the security council website at
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html).
howard, Roger, 2010. ‘Russia’s new front line’,
survival, april-May 2010, pp. 141-156.
inozemtsev, Vladislav, 2010. ‘Enemy of
modernization’, Vedomosti, 5 april (in Russian).
Kefferpütz, Roderick, 2010. ‘on Thin ice? (Mis)
interpreting Russian Policy in the high North’, CEPS
Policy Brief no. 205, February (http://www.ceps.eu/
book/thin-ice-misinterpreting-russian-policy-high-
north).
Medvedev, sergei, 2001. ‘Glenn Gould, Finland, Russia
and the North’, international Politics, March , pp. 91-
102.
Melnikov aleksei, 2010. ‘Dog on the shelf’, Gazeta.
ru (in Russian), 5 February (http://www.gazeta.ru/
comments/2010/02/05_a_3320064.shtml).
Myasnikov, Viktor, 2010. ‘No alternative for Bulava’,
Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 15 october (in
Russian).
Putin, Vladimir, 2010a. Meeting with researchers of
the lena-2010 expedition (official translation available
at http://premier.gov.ru/eng/visits/ru/11848/
events/11882/).
Putin, Vladimir, 2010b. Remarks at the conference
on the general scheme for gas industry development
until 2030, Novy urengoi, 11 october (official
translation available at http://premier.gov.ru/eng/
visits/ru/12528/events/12539/)
Putin, Vladimir, 2010c. speech at the international
forum ‘The arctic: territory of Dialogue’, 23 september
(official translation available at http://premier.gov.ru/
eng/events/news/12304/).
socor, Vladimir, 2010. ‘Russo-Norwegian treaty paves
way for joint energy projects in the arctic’, Eurasia
Daily Monitor, 17 september 2010.
trenin, Dmitri and Pavel Baev, 2010. ‘The arctic: a View
from Moscow’, carnegie Report, CEIP: Washington DC,
september, (available at http://carnegieendowment.
org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=41592).
Zhurenkov, Kirill, 2010. ‘Northern illusions’,
Kommersant-ogonyok, 27 september (in Russian).
Photo: tom thiel.