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Russia As A Regional Power in East Asia

Tsuneo Akaha

Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California

Introduction

Historically, East Asian countries have generally seen Russia as a “distant neighbor,” with a distinct

civilization – neither European nor Asian – and political and strategic interests at odds with their own.1

Since the end of the Cold War, however, Russia has undergone sweeping and often tumultuous changes,

politically, economically, and socially, and its foreign and security relations with the neighboring countries of

East Asia have improved substantially. Today, as Putin and Medvedev look to stabilize national politics and

modernize the nation’s economic foundations, Moscow is paying greater attention to Russia’s role in

regional integration in East Asia,2 hosting the APEC summit in September 2012 in Vladivostok, the largest

city in Russia’s Far East. Moscow is reported to have invested $15 billion in the Primorsky region ahead of

the summit, the amount being 60 times Vladivostok's annual city budget.3

Does Moscow have a realistic strategy for taking advantage of its Asian neighbors’ economic

dynamism by further expanding bilateral political relations and become part of the development of

multilateral cooperation and integration in East Asia? Does Moscow have a realistic vision and effective

strategy for turning its Far Eastern territories, long a front-line fortress against foreign threats, into a “bridge

to East Asia”? The Russian government is investing tens of billions of dollars in large-scale infrastructure

development in this long-neglected part of the country. Russia’s growing engagement with Asia is also

evident in its participation for the first time, along with the United States, in the East Asia Summit (EAS)

held in Indonesia in November 2011. Many obstacles remain, however, to Russia’s constructive and

effective participation in the deepening regional integration in East Asia.

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Geographically, Russia is very much a part of East Asia. In other aspects, however, Russia’s

position in this region is not as definite today. Politically, Russia has more or less normal relations with all

East Asian countries, both small and large, developed and developing, although the depth, the scope, and

the nature of those relations vary widely. Its bilateral trade and economic relations with the regional

neighbors vary from somewhat significant, as with China and Japan, to virtually negligible, as with most

Southeast Asian countries. Russia’s impact on the international relations of the region has long been based

largely on its ideological and military interests vis-à-vis the other major contenders for influence in

Northeast Asia, i.e., Japan in the first half of the 20th century and the United States and China during the

second half of the 20th century. However, with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union

came the end of ideological and military rivalries among the regional powers and the precipitous weakening

of Moscow’s political influence in the region. Most importantly, post-Soviet Russia virtually disappeared

from the strategic radar of the United States, the lone superpower in the world and the dominant political

actor in post-Cold War East Asia, forcing Moscow to reach out to Beijing in forging a “strategic partnership”

to counter the dominance of the United States in the regional political landscape. Moscow’s cooperation

with Beijing, both bilaterally and multilaterally, e.g., through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),

has helped Russia maintain its relevance to regional politics. Moscow has also retained a modicum of

influence in the region through its participation in the Six-Party Talks over the nuclear development in North

Korea. Today, however, none of the big powers in the region considers Russia a major security factor,

positively or negatively.

One area where Russia is an important and growing factor is the energy sector. The nation has the

potential to exploit its energy resources – namely oil and natural gas – not only for its economic

development but also as a source of political influence in the region, particularly vis-à-vis the energy-hungry

Northeast Asian countries, China, Japan, and South Korea. Energy is no longer simply an economic asset

but also holds important implications for Russia’s strategic position in the region and beyond. With some of

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the world’s largest oil and natural gas reserves within its territory, Russia has developed an active energy

diplomacy wooing foreign energy trade partners and foreign investment in the exploration and exploitation

of its rich reserves.4 Elsewhere Moscow has attempted to exploit foreign partners’ dependence on its

energy supplies in its foreign policy.5 Today, one cannot describe Russia’s role in international relations

without reference to the energy dimension. One may go so far as to suggest that energy has become one

of the essential parts of Russia’s identity vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

What are the implications of Russia’s unbalanced presence in East Asia for its role in the region’s

future, which will be characterized by deepening market integration and institutionalized multilateralism for

facilitating and managing regional integration? This brief analysis will look at Russia’s position in East Asia,

examine its relations with the region’s major powers in political, economic, social, and military-defense

spheres, and explore its prospects as a constructive partner in regional integration.

Key Indicators of Russia’s Power

One of the key indicators of a nation’s relative power is its population size. Russia’s population in

2013 was 142,470,272 persons, the third largest among the East Asian countries, after China

(1,355,692,576) and the United States (318,892,103), and ahead of Japan (127,103,388). However,

demographic trends in Russia (along with Japan) indicate a declining vitality, with the population growth

estimated at -0.03 percent (- 0.13% in Japan), compared with the estimated growth rates of 0.77 percent in

the United States, and 0.44 percent in China. (See Table 1.)

Table 1. Key Indicators for Selected East Asian Countries, 2013 Population Pop growth

(%) GDP (PPP) (in US$ million)

GDP per capita (PPP) (in US$)

Defense spending (in US$ million at 2013 prices)

Russia 142,470,272 - 0.03 2.55 18,100 87.8

China 1,355,692,576 0.44 13.37 9,800 188.5

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Japan 127,103,388 - 0.13 4.73 37,100 48.6

DPRK 24,851,627 0.53 0.04 1,800 No figures available

ROK 49,039,986 0.16 1.67 33,200 33.9

US 318,892,103 0.77 16.72 52,800 640

Source: CIA World Factbook, 2013. Military expenditures are from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4

Russia’s GDP in PPP (purchasing power parity) terms in 2013 stood at $2.55 trillion, far smaller

than the United States’ $16.72 trillion, China’s $13.37 trillion, and Japan’s $4.73 trillion. Russia’s GDP per

capita at $18,100 compared favorably with China’s $9,800 but lagged far behind the United States’ $52,800

, Japan’s $37,100, and South Korea’s $33,200. (Table 1)

Russia’s weight in East Asia has long been based on its military might and its military presence in

the region, and the nation still remains a formidable military power. Its defense spending, estimated at 87.8

billion in 2013, was the third largest in the region, after the United States ($640 billion) and China ($188.5

billion) and exceeded Japan’s $48.6 billion and South Korea’s $33.9 billion.6 (Table 1)

Russia’s Political Relations with the Major East Asian Powers

With its population shrinking, its economic performance wanting, yet its military capacity remaining

substantial, Russia’s political performance in East Asia has been very limited. As the processes of regional

integration around the world have social, economic, security, and political dimensions, the prospects for

Russia’s potential role in regional integration in East Asia are mixed.

Russia’s most important political partner in East Asia is China.7 However, the relationship, defined

as “strategic partnership,” has its limits.8 Moscow and Beijing share a common interest in denying the

United States monopoly on the regional political agenda. They have resolved their long-standing border

dispute, enjoyed frequent reciprocal visits by their leaders, and been united in opposition to U.S. political

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interests, such as with respect to the US-led invasion of Iraq, the nuclear development in Iran, the “Arab

Spring,” and the impending civil war in Syria. The generally strong political ties between Russia and China

are limited, however, by a number of bilateral issues. Bilateral trade has been growing at a much slower

pace than their leaders had hoped. Moscow’s ambiguous position on the supplying oil and gas to China via

pipeline has frustrated China’s aggressive energy import policy, confounding the Sino-Japanese

competition for the energy resources in Siberia and the Russian Far East.9 The presence of Chinese

traders, workers, and tourists in Russia’s Far Eastern territories has also complicated bilateral policy

coordination, exposing different interests and priorities between the two countries’ central governments and

their regional leaders.10 Although earlier fears of China’s “creeping expansion” or “peaceful invasion” into

the Russian Far East have dissipated as a result of improvement in bilateral migration management

between Moscow and Beijing since the mid-1990s, such fears may be easily rekindled as the balance of

economic power between the two countries continues to grow in China’s favor.11 Even the notable

progress Russia and China have made in forging multilateral cooperation through the SCO is unlikely to

help the two sides overcome the effects of the mutual suspicion and changing balance of economic power

between Russia and China.12

Russia has expanded bilateral trade and economic relations with Japan to their highest level since

the end of the Cold War, but they are far from reaching the full potential indicated by their geographical

proximity and the complementarity of their economic assets and needs.13 Although Russia’s political

relations with Japan are potentially as important as those with China, the long-standing sovereignty dispute

between the two countries over the southern Kuriles/Northern Territories remains a formidable barrier to

building a relationship of mutual trust.14 Recent events have elevated the political salience of the territorial

dispute. The leadership in Moscow has intensified its appeal to patriotism and used the islands issue to this

end. On July 7, 2010 the Russian Duma passed legislation establishing September 2 as the day to

commemorate the end of the Great Patriotic War, that date in 1945 being the day when Japan signed the

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instrument of surrender. On September 28, President Dmitry Medvedev and Chinese President Hu Jintao

issued a joint statement commemorating the 65th anniversary of the war and pledged further deepening of

the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. This was followed by Medvedev’s visit to Kunashiri Island on

November 1, 2010, which prompted Prime Minister Naoto Kan to criticize it “an unforgivable outrange.” An

ultranationalist group in Japan desecrated the Russian national flag in its anti-Russian demonstration near

the Russian embassy in Tokyo.

Ironically, Medvedev’s visit to the disputed island is a demonstration of Moscow’s interest to

develop the economic infrastructure of the Russian Far East, including the southern Kuriles, for which

Russia sees Japan as an important economic partner. Japan also sees mutual benefits in closer economic

ties with Russia to diversify its energy supplies, particularly after the March 2011 nuclear reactor meltdown

in Fukushima and the subsequent shutdown of all 64 of the nation’s nuclear reactors pending safety

checks. For example, Japan has indicated interest in cooperating with Russia in building a liquefied natural

gas (LNG) plant in Vladivostok. The project is designed to further diversify sources of LNG supplies to

Japan and reduce its current heavy reliance on Asian and Oceanic sources. In fiscal 2009, Russia

accounted for 6.5 percent of Japan’s LNG import, but the planned project will boost the level above 10

percent.15 We will turn to this aspect of Russia’s policy in East Asia below.

Following the resumption of presidency in May 2012, Vladimir Putin expressed readiness to

resolve the island dispute if Japan was willing to compromise. With nationalist sentiments mounting on both

sides, however, the prospects for a resolution of the territorial impasse are very dim. In addition, the fragile

political leadership in Japan severely constrains Tokyo’s maneuverability on this issue.

Russia’s relations with the United States are important on their own merit as well as for the

influence they exert on Moscow’s relations with both Beijing and Tokyo. During the early years of the Cold

War Russia and China were ideological allies opposed to the United States but the political rift and border

disputes between the socialist giants led to a split in the socialist camp and paved the way for Sino-

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American rapprochement in the 1970s. The end of the Cold War seemed to remove any ideological

sources of division between Moscow, Beijing, and Washington, but the United States’ emergence as the

sole superpower after the demise of the Soviet Union brought the former socialist allies closer. The

resolution of Sino-Russian border disputes in the 1990s also brought Russia and China closer.16 Similarly,

Russia’s ideological conflict with the United States defined its political relations with Japan during the Cold

War, but the end of the superpower conflict slowly led to the development of Russo-Japanese relations.

This seemed to raise hopes for a territorial resolution between Russia and Japan but, ironically, it also

elevated the political salience of the island dispute in Japan. The Korean crisis, namely North Korea’s

nuclear weapons and missile development, has also brought Moscow, Beijing, and Tokyo into closer

cooperation, although their differences remain. Until North Korea’s repeated nuclear weapons tests and

missile launches in 2009, Moscow and Beijing rejected Washington and Tokyo’s call for sanctions against

Pyongyang. Following North Korea’s threatening behavior – and its declaration not to return to the Six-

Party Talks, however, Russia and China have come to accept the need to use sanctions to induce a more

conciliatory policy from Pyongyang. All said, however, Moscow’s influence in the Six-Party Talks is very

limited, especially in comparison with that of China and the United States.17 Russia’s opposition to U.S.

hard-line policies toward North Korea, as well as toward Iran and Syria, is likely to continue under Putin’s

leadership.

Russia’s engagement with the Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a fairly recent

phenomenon and its influence at present is marginal.18 On November 29, 2004 Russia acceded to the

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia of 1976 (Bali Treaty) and has been a Dialogue Partner

since 1996. In November 2011, Russia, along with the United States, joined the East Asia Summit for the

first time, indicating the growing acceptance of Russia by the ASEAN countries. Russia also participated for

the first time in the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting in October 2010, along with the ten ASEAN

members, China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand. Russia long

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wanted to join ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) since the multilateral dialogue forum began in 1996.19 Foreign

Minister Sergei Lavrov’s participation in ASEM in Brussels in October 2010 marked Russia’s first

appearance at the forum. The question of whether Russia should be considered a European country or an

Asian country stood in the way of Russia’s participation in ASEM. Having failed to join as a European

country (because technically Russia is not a member of EU), Russia was able to join ASEM as a “Eurasian

country.”20

Russia’s Place in the Northeast Asian Economy

How important is trade within Northeast Asia to Russia? In 2011, Russia’s trade with its Northeast

Asian neighbors, including the United States, constituted 14.31 percent of its worldwide trade. Clearly,

Russia finds most of its trade partners elsewhere in the world. By contrast, China (excluding Macao and

Hong Kong) conducted 39.30 percent of its global trade and Japan’s intraregional trade accounted for

45.87 percent of its total international trade. South Korea conducted 46.42 percent of its global trade with

the other Northeast Asian countries. (See Table 2.)

Table 2. Northeast Asian Countries’ Intra-regional Trade as % of Their Global Trade, 2001 and 2011 (%) 2001 2011 China 37.16 39.30 Macao 66.52 57.70 Hong Kong 61.38 64.97 Japan 49.98 45.87 ROK 40.84 46.42 DPRK 54.67 75.78 Mongolia 82.60 87.31 Russia 12.38 14.31 USA 21.90 24.27 Source: Calculated from data in International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2012.

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How important is Russia to the other Northeast Asian countries in terms of international trade? In

2011, Russia’s two-way trade with Japan represented a mere 1.93 percent of Japan’s global trade, and the

comparable figures for the other countries of the region were 2.19 percent for China, 2.03 for South Korea,

1.53 for North Korea, 15.94 percent for Mongolia, and 1.17 percent for the United States.21

In short, Northeast Asia is a small part of Russia’s global trade and Russia is a small part of the

other Northeast Asian countries’ world trade. That is, Russia is the least integral part of regional trade in

Northeast Asia.

However, Russia’s potential role in regional trade is substantial, particularly in the energy sector.

As noted at the outset, Russia holds huge reserves of oil and natural gas. In 2013, Russia was in 8th place

among the countries with the greatest proved crude oil reserves. Russia (with 80.0 billion barrels) followed

Venezuela (297.6 bb), Saudi Arabia (267.9 bb), Canada (173.1 bb), Iran (154.6 bb), Iraq (141.4 bb), Kuwait

(104 bb), and United Arab Emirates (97.8 bb). Its proved natural gas reserves (1,688 trillion cubic feet)

ranked Russia in first place on the list of the countries with the largest natural gas reserves, ahead of Iran

(1,187 tcf), Qatar (890 tcf), the United States (308.4 tcf), Saudi Arabia (287.8 tcf), Turkmenistan (265 tcf),

United Arab Emirates (215 tcf), Venezuela (195.1 tcf), Nigeria (182 tcf), and Algeria (159.1 tcf).22

If successfully developed, these resources can boost Russia’s economic profile to unprecedented

levels. This has several implications. First, to the extent that Moscow relies on its ability to develop and

export its energy resources for pursuing some of its foreign policy goals, global energy prices will have a

major impact on Russia’s ability to leverage those resources. Second, the development of the resources in

question requires substantial investment in infrastructure development, including pipelines and other

transportation facilities as well as refineries and petro-chemical production facilities. This in turn calls for

investment from foreign partners. Third, the nation’s energy reserves may also be exploited to fuel political

rivalry between their potential importers, such as China and Japan. Indeed, there is already much written

on this aspect of Russia’s international behavior. 23

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Fourth, while Russia enjoys unprecedented energy export revenues, the nation also needs to

diversify its economy, gradually reducing its dependence on that very lucrative sector. Does Moscow have

the wisdom and the political will to allocate a growing portion of its revenue to non-energy sector? In

contrast to the modern and postmodern economic structures of its East Asian neighbors, will Russia remain

largely an exporter of primary commodities and importer of high-value-added products? President

Medvedev answered this question in the negative when he stated in his speech “Go Russia” in September

2009:

The global economic crisis has shown that our affairs are far from being in the best state. Twenty

years of tumultuous change has not spared our country from its humiliating dependence on raw

materials. Our current economy still reflects the major flaw of the Soviet system: it largely ignores

individual needs. With a few exceptions domestic business does not invent nor create the

necessary things and technology that people need. We sell things that we have not produced, raw

materials or imported goods. Finished products produced in Russia are largely plagued by their

extremely low competitiveness (emphases added).24

The Russian leader went on to point out that contemporary Russia is plagued by three “social ills” and that

the nation needed to overcome them if it is to regain its great power status in the increasingly competitive

world. One of the “social ills,” as he put it, is “[c]enturies of economic backwardness and the habit of relying

on the export of raw materials, actually exchanging them for finished products (emphasis added).”25

We will return to this question when we discuss the role of the Russian Far East in the nation’s

relations with the neighboring Asian countries.

The Social Dimension

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Evidence of the social dimension of Russia’s relations with other Northeast Asian countries is much

harder to come by than indicators of the economic dimension. An in-depth analysis of the social dimension

is beyond the scope of this study. What follows are statistics on the number of students from each

Northeast Asian country and the United States who are studying in Russia and other countries of the region

and Russian students who are studying in the other countries in 2001-2011.

Table 3 shows the number of students from Mongolia, Russia, North and South Korea, and Japan

studying in China in 2001-2011. The number jumped from 39,093 in 2001 to 100, 854 in 2011. Together,

these students accounted for 34.46% of all international students studying in China. The largest number

came from South Korea (62,441), representing 21.33% of all international students studying in China that

year, followed by Japanese students (17,961; 6.14%) and Russian students (13,441; 4.56%).

Table 3. Students from Selective Northeast Asian Countries Studying in PRC (excluding Hong Kong and Macao), 2001-2011

Total Number of Selective Northeast Asian Country Students in PRC

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Mongolia 664 968 1,060 128 156 2,715 4,774 5,684 6,211 7,112

Russia 1,056 1,492 1,224 819 983 5,035 8,939 10,596 12,481 13,340

DPRK 565 671 638 17 92 715

ROK 22,116 36,093 35,353 43,617 54,079 57,504 66,806 64,232 62,957 62,441

Japan 14,692 16,084 12,765 19,059 6,941 18,363 16,733 15,409 16,808 17,961

TOTAL 39,093 55,308 51,040 63,640 62,251 84,332 97,252 95,921 98,457 100,854

Selective Northeast Asian Country Students in PRC as % of Total International Students in PRC

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Mongolia 1.07 1.13 1.36 0.12 0.11 1.67 2.14 2.39 2.34 2.43

Russia 1.71 1.74 1.57 0.74 0.70 3.09 4.00 4.45 4.71 4.56

DPRK 0.91 0.78 0.82 0.02 0.07 0.44

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ROK 35.75 42.05 45.49 39.35 38.33 35.34 29.89 26.97 23.75 21.33

Japan 23.75 18.74 16.43 17.19 4.92 11.29 7.49 6.47 6.34 6.14

TOTAL 63.19 64.44 65.68 57.41 44.12 51.83 43.51 40.27 37.14 34.46

Source: Data from the China Association for International Education unless otherwise indicated

Japan has also been a popular destination for Northeast Asian students studying abroad. As Table

4 shows, students from China, North Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, Russia, and the United States in Japan

doubled between 2001 and 2011, growing from 51,504 students to 112,521 students. Together, they

accounted for 81.5% of all international students studying in Japan in 2011. Chinese students, numbering

87,533, represented 77.8% of the students from those six countries and 63.4% of all international students

studying in Japan in 2011. They were followed by students from South Korea, numbering 17,460 and

representing 15.5% of the students from the five countries and 12.6% of all international students in Japan

that year.

Table 4. Students from Selective Northeast Asian Countries Studying in Japan, 2001-2011

Total Number of Selective Northeast Asian Country Students Studying in Japan 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

China 3,1955 41,180 51,656 77,713 80,592 74,292 71,277 72,766 79,082 86,173 87,533

ROK 1,7905 1,8899 1,9062 1,5533 1,5606 1,5974 17,274 1,8862 1,9605 2,0202 17,460

Taiwan 297 353 433 4096 4134 4211 4686 5082 5332 5297 4571

Mongolia . . . 806 924 1006 1110 1145 1215 1282 1170

Russia 281 319 332 366 346 334 337 315 304 358 331

US 1,066 1,156 1,175 1,456 1,646 1,790 1,805 2,024 2,230 2,348 1,456

TOTAL 51,504 61,907 72,658 99,970 103,248 97,607 96,489 100,194 107,768 115,660 112,521

Selective Northeast Asian Country Students in Japan as % of Total International Students in Japan (%)

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

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China 50.2 55.0 59.7 66.3 66.2 63.0 60.2 58.8 59.6 60.8 63.4

ROK 28.1 25.2 22.0 13.2 12.8 13.5 14.6 15.2 14.8 14.2 12.6

Taiwan 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.5 3.4 3.6 4.0 4.1 4.0 3.7 3.3

Mongolia . . . 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8

Russia 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2

US 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.1

TOTAL 80.9 82.7 84.0 85.2 84.8 82.8 81.4 80.9 81.2 81.6 81.5

Selective Northeast Asian Country Students in Japan as % of Total Northeast Asian Students in Japan

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

China 62.0 66.5 71.1 77.7 78.1 76.1 73.9 72.6 73.4 74.5 77.8

ROK 34.8 30.5 26.2 15.5 15.1 16.4 17.9 18.8 18.2 17.5 15.5

Taiwan 0.6 0.6 0.6 4.1 4.0 4.3 4.9 5.1 4.9 4.6 4.1

Mongolia . . . 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0

Russia 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3

US 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.3

TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Note: . indicates data not available.

Source: OECD (2001-2003); Japan Student Services Organization (2004-2012)

Table 5 shows the number of students from selective countries/area of Northeast Asia, including the United States, who were studying in South Korea in 2001-2011. The 47,477 Chinese students studying in South Korea in 2011 far outnumbered students from other counties and accounted for 75.8% of all international students in South Korea that year. They constituted 90.0% of all students from the five countries and one area listed in the table. There were 1,190 Japanese students studying in South Korea in 2011, representing 1.9% of all international students and 2.3% of the five source countries and one area shown in the table that year.

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Table 5. Students from Selective Northeast Asian Countries/Area Studying in South Korea, 2001-2011

Selective Northeast Asian Country Students Studying in South Korea 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

China 1,645 2,407 4,025 6,462 10,093 15,288 23,097 30,552 39,309 45,757 47,477

Japan 697 721 938 914 1,106 1,212 1,235 1,062 989 1,147 1,190

Mongolia 82 112 172 251 305 539 903 1236 1621 2190 2508

Russia 65 100 153 166 185 254 243 248 252 346 340

Hong Kong 4 2 7 4 6 7 6 14 16 68 39

US 171 200 406 337 371 487 553 619 758 988 1,170

TOTAL 2,664 3,542 5,701 8,134 12,066 17,787 26,037 33,731 42,945 50,496 52,724

Selective Northeast Asian Country Students in South Korea as % of Total International Students in South Korea (%)

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

China 42.7 48.6 51.3 60.0 65.1 68.7 72.3 75.8 78.6 77.3 75.8

Japan 18.1 14.5 12.0 8.5 7.1 5.4 3.9 2.6 2.0 1.9 1.9

Mongolia 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.7 4.0

Russia 1.7 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5

Hong Kong 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1

US 4.4 4.0 5.2 3.1 2.4 2.2 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.9

TOTAL 69.2 71.5 72.7 75.5 77.9 79.9 81.5 83.7 85.8 85.3 84.1

Selective Northeast Asian Country Students in South Korea as % of Total Northeast Asian Students in South Korea (%) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

China 61.7 68.0 70.6 79.4 83.6 86.0 88.7 90.6 91.5 90.6 90.0

Japan 26.2 20.4 16.5 11.2 9.2 6.8 4.7 3.1 2.3 2.3 2.3

Mongolia 3.1 3.2 3.0 3.1 2.5 3.0 3.5 3.7 3.8 4.3 4.8

Russia 2.4 2.8 2.7 2.0 1.5 1.4 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6

Hong 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1

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Kong

US 6.4 5.6 7.1 4.1 3.1 2.7 2.1 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.2

TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: OECD

Some additional statistics on Russia or Russian students also indicate the small presence of Northeast Asian students studying in Russia, with the exception of Chinese students, who numbered 11,867 and 11,736 in 2009 and 2010, respectively (see Table 6).

Table 6. Percentage of Northeast Asian Tertiary Students Studying in the Russian Federation, 2001-2011 (%)

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  

Total number of NEA

students 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11,867 11,736 0 0  

China 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 77.4 77.2 0.0 0.0  

Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.0 0.0 0.0  

North Korea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 1.0 0.0 0.0  

South Korea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 5.9 0.0 0.0  

Mongolia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.7 14.1 0.0 0.0  

United States 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.0  

Notes: China includes Macao and Hong Kong; 0.0% indicates either no students, unavailable data, or percentage value is too small.

Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics

In summary, Northeast Asian countries are attracting increasing numbers of students from within the region, with Chinese, South Korean, and Japanese students being the largest national contingents in their neighboring countries. Again, Russian students represent a much smaller presence in the educational institutions in the other countries of the region. Similarly, the number of Northeast Asian students studying in Russia is very small.

16    

The Military Dimension

As already noted, Russia’s weight in East Asia, particularly in Northeast Asia, has long rested on

its military might and its military presence in the region. The nation still remains a formidable military power.

Military power is less significant as an integrative factor in East Asia because military security

policy divides some countries of the region while it unites others. Moreover, although Russia’s military

power is an important factor in Russia’s growing defense cooperation with China, it is highly unlikely that

the two countries’ militaries will reach the level of integration seen among the NATO allies, or even the level

of defense cooperation and coordination that exits between the United States and its allies in East Asia,

namely Japan and South Korea. Given the strong – if not trouble-free – security ties among the latter three

countries, Russia’s ability to affect the overall alliance pattern in the region is very limited unless Russia

and China form a clear alliance against the U.S.-led alliances in the region, which is not likely if not

impossible in the foreseeable future.

On the contrary, the North Korean problem is likely to sustain – even elevate – the level of bilateral

and multilateral consultations seen among the four powers. This is clearly in Russia’s interest, for a failure

to remove or contain North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats will likely trigger a very destabilizing arms

race between Japan, the country that feels the most threatened by North Korea, and China, which stands

to gain from Japan’s self-constrained defense policy within the U.S.-Japan alliance.

In the meantime, Russia is gradually expanding its defense cooperation with Japan, primarily as a

confidence-building measure and for limited joint rescue operations at sea.

Russian Views

Culturally and civilizationally, Russia is a “distant neighbor” to most East Asian societies and most

Russians are oriented more toward Europe. The post-Soviet search for national identity among the Russian

17    

elite says much about their ambivalence toward the international community, including East Asia. This does

not necessarily mean that there is no possibility of Russians developing social and cultural ties with other

peoples of the region. The presence of Asians in Russia, including in its Far Eastern territories, as well as

the growing number of Russians resident in the neighboring Asian countries will no doubt contribute to the

growth of transnational networks of individual and professional linkages involving Russian nationals. For

the networks to become a significant integrative force in East Asia, however, tens of thousands, even

hundreds of thousands of Russians need to join those networks, but this is not a likely prospect in the

foreseeable future. On the contrary, the population in the Russian Far East has dropped from the peak of

around 8 million in the late 1980s to about 6.5 million today, a consequence of internal migration from the

region to European Russia in the post-Soviet years of economic stagnation and social instability in the

Russian Far East.

How do the Russians themselves view their own country and its relations with the neighboring

countries of Asia? Some recent public opinion polls in Russia offer interesting answers to this question.

According to a 2009 public opinion survey by Levada Center,26 Russians tend to view their own

political evolution as a unique experience and not readily comparable with the experience in the West

(Table 7). Nor do they have any illusions about the state of their economy, with one-third of the people

thinking their country is a backward country with a primitive raw material-based economy (Table 8), echoing

President Medvedev’s concern mentioned earlier.

Table 7. Levada Center 2009 Survey: “Do you agree or disagree with the opinion that Russian democracy should not copy Western examples?” (%) Full agree/tend to agree 72 Tend to disagree/completely disagree 17 Difficult to answer 11

Source: Levada Center, Moscow, http://www.levada.ru/press/2009092402.print.html (accessed December 1, 2009)

18    

Table 8. Levada Center 2009 Survey: “Do you agree or disagree with the opinion that Russia now is a backward country with a primitive raw material economy?” (%) Full agree/tend to agree 36 Tend to disagree/completely disagree 60 Difficult to answer 4

Source: Levada Center, Moscow, http://www.levada.ru/press/2009092402.print.html (accessed December 1, 2009)

According to a Levada Center’s public opinion survey in Russia in early June 2014, Russians see

China as Russia’s closest friend and ally in Asia, second only to Belarus (Table 9). In comparison, Japan is

in 19th place on the same list and South Korea in 20th place. The United States does not even appear

among the top twenty countries on the list; on the contrary, it is considered by far the most hostile and

unfriendly country toward Russia, followed by Ukraine. Japan appears in 12th place on the list of hostile and

unfriendly countries, North Korea in 16th place, and South Korea in 20th place.

Table 9. Levada Center 2014 Survey: “Name five countries you consider closest friends and allies of Russia and most hostile and unfriendly toward Russia.” (%) Closest friends and allies of Russia Most hostile and unfriendly toward Russia Belarus 51 USA 69 China 40 Ukraine 30 Kazakhstan 37 Lithuania 24 Armenia 15 Latvia 23 India 13 Estonia 21 Cuba 10 Georgia 19 Azerbaijan 9 Great Britain 18 Bulgaria 8 Germany 18 Tajikistan 8 Poland 12 Moldova 7 Canada 7 Uzbekistan 6 Afghanistan 5 Kyrgyzstan 6 Japan 5 Serbia 5 France 5 Venezuela 5 Iraq 3 Turkey 4 Iran 2 Germany 4 North Korea 2 Israel 4 Israel 2 Syria 4 Romania 2 Japan 4 Azerbaijan 2

19    

South Korea 3 South Korea 2 Source: Levada Center, Moscow, http://www.levada.ru/print/05-06-2014/otnoshenie-rossiyan-k-drugim-stranam (accessed June 16, 2014)

Levada Center’s opinion surveys in 2005 and in 2009 indicates that Russians’ interest in their

cooperation with Japan relates to technological and economic aspects, although their interest in the role of

bilateral relations in the overall political balance in Asia-Pacific is not negligible (Table 10). This somewhat

contradicts Japanese focus on bilateral cooperation in the energy sector and the territorial dispute. While a

majority of Russians pragmatically sees the need to find a solution to the territorial impasse to improve

bilateral relations (Table 11), an overwhelming majority (82% in 2009) is opposed to territorial concessions

to Japan (Table 12).

Table 10. Levada Center 2005 and 2009 Surveys: “Do you think Russia should strengthen its ties with Japan now and if yes, which areas of cooperation should be identified as priority?” (%) Aug. 05 Aug. 09 Energy (extraction, pumping of oil and gas) 16 20 High tech 69 58 Joint development of territories of the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia 28 24 Political balance in Asia-Pacific Region 24 21 Other 0 1 Should not strengthen ties with Japan 3 7 Difficult to answer 10 15

Source: Levada Center, Moscow, http://www.levada.ru/press/2009090402.html (accessed December 1, 2009)

Table 11. Levada Center 2005 and 2009 Surveys: “Perhaps you know that after World War II, Russia and Japan did not conclude a peace treaty. How important do you think it is for Russia and Japan to conclude a peace treaty?” (%) Aug. 05 Aug. 09 Very important 27 16 Somewhat important 46 39 Not very important 12 19 It does not mean much 7 11 Difficult to answer 8 15

Source: Levada Center, Moscow, http://www.levada.ru/press/2009090402.html (accessed December 1, 2009)

20    

Table 12. Levada Center Surveys, various years: “For many years the territorial dispute has been a stumbling block in relations between Russia and Japan. In principle, are you for or against Russia transferring these islands to Japan?” (%)

Nov 91 Aug 92 Apr 93 Oct 98 Dec 02 Nov 04 Aug 05 Aug 09 For 11 11 8 8 7 6 4 8 Against 67 71 77 78 85 87 87 82 Difficult to answer 22 18 16 14 8 8 9 10 Source: Levada Center, Moscow, http://www.levada.ru/press/2009090402.html (accessed December 1, 2009)

The Role of the Russian Far East

If Russia is to be integrated with East Asian countries, bilaterally or multilaterally, the nation’s Far

Eastern territories will be an essential link.27 Russia’s Far Eastern territories represent both an opportunity

and a burden for Moscow. They are an opportunity as the territories’ geographical proximity to Russia’s

neighboring countries promise closer trade and economic ties with them. The Far East also serves as an

entry point for capital, technology, services, and labor from the dynamic East Asian economies. During the

Soviet period, however, Moscow failed to develop the necessary infrastructure and industrial structure in

the Far East to take advantage of these complementarities with the neighboring countries. Although post-

Soviet Russia appears eager to engage China, Japan, Korea, and the United States in economic

transactions based on market principles, its behavior has been characterized by unpredictability and

ambiguity. The “stop-and-go” offshore energy development projects off Sakhalin are the most visible

example. The numerous pipeline projects in Eastern Siberia and the Far East have also suffered from the

lack of consistency and stability in Moscow’s economic strategy vis-à-vis the potential partners of

development, namely China, Japan, and South Korea.

The following lists indicate the real and potential opportunities as well as liabilities that Russia’s Far

East represents for Moscow:28

1. Advantages

21    

a. Abundant natural resources: The rich natural resources in the region are an important part

of the complementary relations between the Russian and East Asian economies.

b. Proximity to Asian markets: The geographical proximity offers Russian exports an

advantage in accessing Asian markets. The export of value-added products in Russia

stands a good chance of improving the nation’s balance of trade vis-à-vis the Asian

economies.

c. Proximity to Asian investment capital: The Russian Far East needs large investment

capital for its industrial modernization and infrastructure development and Asia’s high

savings and capital accumulation might be exploited if Russia could substantially improve

the investment climate in the Far Eastern region.

d. Proximity to Asian technology: The rich technological base of Asian economies offers

substantial promises for industrial modernization in the Russian Far East.

e. Proximity to Chinese labor: The problem of labor shortage in some economic sectors in the

Russian Far East, namely agriculture, construction, and services, can be ameliorated by

the importation of cheap and abundant Chinese labor, provided Moscow and Beijing can

develop a sustainable bilateral migration regime that does not pose a perceived threat to

the social, economic, and political future of the Far Eastern territories.

2. Disadvantages

a. Small and declining population: The small and declining population of the Russian Far

East limits the vitality of the region’s economy in terms of economic output and consumer

market. After peaking at around 8 million in the late 1980s, the region’s population has

been declining due to emigration to the western part of Russia and natural population

losses due to economic dislocation and social problems in the region. The population in

22    

the Far East is estimated at around 7 million today, with further declines expected beyond

2010.29

b. “A raw materials appendix”?: The abundance of natural resources in the region is also a

source of its weakness to the extent that Moscow defines the Far East’s role as a source

of raw materials, for domestic use or for export and the infrastructure development in the

region is limited to that which relates directly to the exploration and development of those

resources to the neglect of modern industrial and social infrastructure needs. A related

problem is the harms the development of natural resources has done and continues to do

to the region’s natural environment and the health of the local populations.30

c. Huge infrastructure needs: The transportation, communication, and other basic

infrastructure of the region needs substantial improvement and expansion if it is to support

the level of economic activity and population growth required to sustain the region’s viable

future in the context of regional integration with the neighboring territories of East Asia.

d. Little local investment capital: The seriously strained economic development in the region

means there is very little indigenous investment capital. Therefore, the region continues to

depend on the “subsidies” from Moscow and investment from foreign sources.

e. Distance from Russia’s center: Given the continuing dependence of the Russian Far East

on financial injections from Moscow, it is crucial that Russia improve the efficiency of

transportation between the eastern and western parts of the country. However, the sheer

geographical distance and the long neglect of the Far Eastern region’s infrastructure needs

will keep the transportation costs quite high. As noted below, foreign investment in

infrastructure development in the region would lighten the burden on Moscow but large-

scale investment is not likely unless and until Moscow shows unequivocal commitment to

23    

the economic development and modernization of the region and stable supply of raw

materials export to foreign partners.

f. Disparate Center-region priorities: The strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing

has not been translated into a stable relationship between the Russian Far East and

China’s northeastern provinces. On the contrary, the visible infrastructure development

and the continuing migration pressure on the Chinese side of the Sino-Russian border

have been a source of serious concern among the political elite in the Russian Far East.31

Does Russia have the political will and commitment to invest the necessary financial resources to

advance the advantages and reduce the disadvantages of its Far Eastern territories? What is required is a

transformative reorientation of Russia’s priorities toward its Far Eastern territories. Will Moscow translate its

recent public pronouncements about mounting investments for the development of modern infrastructure

and facilities in the region in anticipation of the 2012 APEC summit into a sustained development program

long after the photo opportunities at the international meeting are over? Skeptics who have watched

Moscow’s numerous past plans for the region’s development and modernization fail may well be justified

with their continuing doubts. On the other hand, will the neighboring countries, namely China, Japan, and

Korea, commit their public funds into the infrastructure development required even to realize the existing

pipeline projects in Eastern Siberia and the Far East? For this to happen, Moscow must be unequivocal

and fully committed to develop and deliver the promised oil and natural gas supplies to its East Asian

neighbors. Unfortunately, there are as many international skeptics as there are domestic doubters in this

regard.

In May 2014, Russia’s Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation signed a $400

billion gas deal after nearly a decade of negotiation. The largest gas contract for Russia since the collapse

of the Soviet Union will run for 30 years and it envisages the construction of pipelines and other

24    

infrastructure requiring tens of billions of dollars in investment.32 The timing of the deal reveals Russia’s

desire to move closer to China both politically and economically. Politically, Russia wanted to demonstrate

solidarity with China against the United States and its European allies in the face of mounting international

sanctions against Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its alleged support for pro-Russian militia in eastern

Ukraine in the prolonged crisis in Ukraine. Economically, Russia was pressed to secure markets for its

energy resources should it need to reduce natural gas delivery to European markets as a lever against

Europe.

Russia in Multilateral Regional Frameworks Relevant to East Asia

Table 10 lists the main multilateral regional frameworks of relevance to East Asia, in which Russia

has been participating or will be participating soon. Russia joined APEC in 1998 and, as noted earlier, is

hosting the 2012 APEC Summit in Vladivostok. To that end, there is substantial and visible investment in

infrastructure development in and around Vladivostok. The question remains, however, whether Moscow

will sustain such investment far beyond the summit or whether the investment is more a shot in the arm

with only short-term and limited benefits to the region.33

As noted earlier, Russia’s relations with the ASEAN and its individual countries lack the depth and

scope of involvement seen in Chinese, Japanese, or US cases, where their political, economic, and

security interests and concerns overlap in some areas and compete in other.

In Northeast Asia, Russia has been a participant in the Six-Party Talks for addressing the problem

of North Korean nuclear and missile development since 2003, when the four-party framework involving

North and South Korea, China, and the United States that had begun in 1997 was expanded to include

Japan and Russia. Moscow’s influence in the multilateral talks is limited, but it can and has had its influence

felt by coordinating its position with Beijing on the “carrots” vs. “sticks” questions vis-à-vis Pyongyang,

consistently arguing against sanctions against North Korea. It has been suggested that the Six-Party Talks

25    

should or may be turned into a more permanent security framework for Northeast Asia, but the impasse

following the military provocations by North Korea against South Korea against the backdrop of the nuclear

and missile development in North Korea precludes such a prospect in the foreseeable future. Russia has

supported the idea of establishing a more permanent multilateral security framework for Northeast Asia

beyond the Six-Party Talks, but Russia’s marginal influence in the current framework means that it will have

even more limited role in the development of a regional security architecture post Six-Party Talks.34

Russia is a member of G8 and G20. Decisions reached within either of these groupings will have a

bearing on East Asian regional integration in terms of “open regionalism.”

Finally, fourteen regional governments in the Russian Far East are members of the little known

Association of Northeast Asia Regional Governments, which was formally established in 1996 with

participation by regional governments of China, Japan, South Korea, and Mongolia. The association of

includes the Republic of Buryatia, Republic of Sakha, Primorski Territory, Khabarovsk Territory, Amur

Region, Irkutsk Region, Kamchatka Region, Sakhalin Region, Zabaikalsky Territory, Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk

Region, Republic of Tyva, Altai Territory, Magadan Region, along with their counterparts in China, Japan,

North Korea, South Korea, and Mongolia. The association members meet every other year to discuss

regional-level cooperation. It has subcommittees on the economy and trade, the environment, cross-border

issues, tourism, mineral resources development, women and children, education and cultural exchange,

disaster prevention, science and technology, ocean and fishery, and energy and climate change issues.35

Table 10. Russia’s Multilateral Engagement in East Asia

• APEC: Russia joined APEC in 1998 and is hosting the APEC summit in Vladivostok in 2012.

• ASEAN Dialogue Partner: On November 29, 2004 Russia acceded to the Treaty of Amity and

Cooperation in Southeast Asia of 1976 (Bali Treaty) and has been a Dialogue Partner since 1996.

26    

• ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): Russia has been participating in this forum since its inception in

1994, discussing security issues in the Asia-Pacific.

• ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting: On October 11-13, 2010 Russia participated in this meeting

for the first time, along with the ten ASEAN members and China, the US, Japan, South Korea,

India, Australia, and New Zealand.

• ASEM: Russia, along with Australia and New Zealand, was a new participant in this multilateral

dialogue forum when it met in Brussels in October 2010.

• East Asia Summit (EAS): Russia, along with the United States, is scheduled to join the ASEAN-

centered summit in November 2011.

• Six-Party Talks: Moscow has been participating in the multilateral forum to address North Korea’s

nuclear weapons development since 2003 but its influence is limited.

• G8 and G20: Decisions reached within either of these groupings will have a bearing on East Asian

regional integration in terms of “open regionalism.”

• Association of Northeast Asia Regional Governments: The association of regional

governments in Northeast Asia includes the Republic of Buryatia, Republic of Sakha, Primorski

Territory, Khabarovsk Territory, Amur Region, Irkutsk Region, Kamchatka Region, Sakhalin

Region, Zabaikalsky Territory, Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk Region, Republic of Tyva, Altai Territory,

Magadan Region, along with their counterparts in China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and

Mongolia.

Implications for Regional Integration in East Asia

Regional integration may proceed along economic, political, security, and social-cultural

dimensions. As seen above, Russia’s economic link to the region is underdeveloped and the nation’s

impact on the rest of the regional economies is limited. However, the region’s integration as a whole is

27    

progressing faster and more deeply along the economic dimension than any other dimension. In this sense,

Russia’s limited economic presence in East Asia constrains its integrative role in the region.

Bilateralism has characterized the international relations of Northeast Asia over the postwar

decades and Russia’s relations in the region are no exception. Politically, Russia’s relations with the

regional powers have indeed developed mostly bilaterally and even today, with one major exception,

Russia’s regional relations are driven largely by the logic of bilateralism. The exception is the Six-Party

Talks over North Korea’s nuclear development, in which Russia has been participating since the inception

of the multilateral framework.

Turning to Southeast Asia, however, Russia’s engagement with the multilateral institutions in

Southeast Asia has lagged behind other major regional powers, namely China and Japan.36 This is largely

due to Russia’s limited economic ties with Southeast Asian nations and also because of Moscow’s loss of

sustained interest in the region in the aftermath of the Cold War. During the Cold War, Russia viewed

Southeast Asia as a theater of ideological rivalry with Beijing and was deeply engaged in the region,

particularly through its support of Vietnam. The end of the Cold War and the Sino-Russian rapprochement

spelled the end of Russia’s active engagement in this part of Asia. It took nearly a decade before Moscow

began to undertake diplomatic efforts to regain its influence in Southeast Asia. In 1996 Russia became an

ASEAN dialogue partner and in 2004 Moscow signed the Treaty on Amity and Cooperation. The Putin

administration recognized the growing importance of this region and made serious efforts to develop

diplomatic and economic ties with Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam, Malaysia, and

Indonesia. Russia has been holding annual summit meetings with ASEAN since 2005. Russia now

participates in the ASEAN Regional Forum. Russia has also expressed an interest in joining the movement

toward the formation of an East Asian regional framework anchored on the ASEAN, but it has not yet

succeeded in joining the East Asia Summit, one of the key mechanisms moving the regional integration

agenda forward.

28    

Russia gained membership in the broader regional framework of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic

Cooperation) in 1998, but this forum’s diminished relevance to regional and global trade severely limits

Russia’s gains (or losses) from multilateral engagement in this mechanism. With bilateral and minilateral

approaches to trade negotiations gaining momentum over APEC and other multilateral processes, Russia

will not be able to leverage its APEC membership for significance gains in trade. Furthermore, the major

trading powers in the region do not see Russia as a promising partner for bilateral FTAs (free trade

agreements) or EPAs (economic partnership agreements). Can Russia change these trends by

successfully hosting the 2012 APEC summit in Vladivostok? Much will depend on whether the United

States, the EU, Japan, China, and other global economic powers can re-invigorate the WTO and turn the

tide of trade negotiations away from bilateralism and minilateralism toward global talks. Also important will

be whether APEC members can revive its “open regionalism” approach to develop regional trade

liberalization and expansion in support of global trade rules.

Elsewhere in Asia, Russia has enjoyed a privileged position. One such area is Central Asia, where

the Soviet-era ties to the region continue to keep the economies of former Soviet republics connected, not

to mention the presence of Russian populations and personnel and cultural ties in the region that have

survived the demise of the Soviet Union.37 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides an important

multilateral mechanism through which Moscow exercises a significant degree of influence, although China

also has been more active in the SCO. Russia and China share the anti-terrorism consensus and the trade

expansion agenda of this organization, although how far the group can move forward on military

cooperation remains to be seen because Moscow and Beijing’s strategic interests overlap but are not

identical. Russia also continues to enjoy a close relationship with Mongolia, the Soviet-era ally with whom

Russia shares a common concern about the growing power of China.

In East Asia or in Northeast Asia, regional political integration remains a long-term possibility at

best and an uncertain prospect at worst. Historical legacies, continuing sovereignty disputes, and likely

29    

future rivalries are likely to sustain the unilateral and bilateral proclivities of the regional powers when it

comes to sensitive political issues. The regional powers are not likely to surrender their sovereignty to an

EU-like supranational authority in the foreseeable future. There is great uncertainty about the prospect of

the Six-Party Talks resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. Even though Moscow has been advocating a

peaceful resolution to the crisis and development of permanent regional security architecture in post-crisis

Northeast Asia, its influence in realizing these goals is very limited. The future of the North Korean nuclear

crisis will depend, first and foremost, on US policy – whether Washington will be willing to commit itself

unequivocally to a non-military resolution of the problem and also recognize the current regime in

Pyongyang in return for the denuclearization of North Korea – and whether Pyongyang will accept these

terms and fully implement its pledge in a verifiable manner. The post-crisis security environment in

Northeast Asia will depend on the strategic interests and priorities of the United States and China, more

than on Russian interests or capabilities.

Culturally and civilizationally, Russia remains a “distant neighbor” to most East Asian societies. The

perennial search for national identity among the Russian elite says much about their ambivalence toward

becoming a full-fledged member of an East Asian community, sharing a sense of common destiny with the

other countries of the region.

In the economic sphere, energy offers Russia the most important link to the other countries of the

region but this area has a very limited impact on regional integration for several reasons. Energy, because

of its strategic importance and Russia’s use of it as an instrument of foreign policy, there is clearly a Realist

characteristic to Russia’s engagement with other regional powers and this is at odds with the largely

market-driven integration proceeding in the region. This is most dramatically evident in the Japanese-

Chinese rivalry for access to energy supplies in Russia. Moreover, there is no framework for integrating

energy policies of the regional countries. Instead, the major energy importing countries are operating in the

global energy market. China, Japan, and South Korea – the three largest energy consumers in the region –

30    

rely far more extensively on energy imports from other parts of the world, namely the Middle East and

Southeast Asia, although the political instability in the Middle East does present promising prospects for

Russia as a provider of oil and natural gas to these economic powers in the future as they try to reduce

their dependence on supplies in the volatile region.

In conclusion, Russia is geographically located in East Asia, politically engaged mostly through

bilateral channels, and economically disadvantaged and lagging behind. Although Russia remains a

formidable military power, regional integration in East Asia is much more likely to be driven by economic

and political factors than by developments in the military security field.

                                                                                                                         

Notes

1 The view of Russia as a “distant neighbor” was particularly acute among the Japanese. See Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Jonathan Haslam, and Andrew C. Kuchins, eds., Russia and Japan: An Unresolved Dilemma

between Distant Neighbors, Berkeley: University of California, 1993.

2 Hiroshi Kimura and Shigeki Hakamada, eds., Ajia ni sekkinsuru Roshia (Russia Moving Closer to Asia), Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido Daigaku Shuppankai, 2007.

3 Sebastian Strangio, “As Asia Rises and Europe Declines, Russia Invests Its Hopes in Its Far East,” The

Atlantic, October 27, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/10/as-asia-rises-and-europe-declines-russia-invests-its-hopes-in-its-far-east/247353/ (accessed May 20, 2012).

4 http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0872964.html (accessed May 15, 2009).

5 For Western analyses of Russia’s energy diplomacy, see A. Jaffe and R. Manning, ”Russia, Energy, and the West,” Survival, Vol. 43, No. 2 (2001), pp. 133-152; Edward L. Morse and James Richard, “The Battle for Energy Dominance,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2002), pp. 16-31; Lyle Goldstein and Vitaly Kozyrev, “China, Japan, and the Scramble for Siberia,” Survival, Vol. 48, No. 1 (2006), pp. 163-178. See also Shoichi Itoh, "Russia's Energy Diplomacy toward the Asia-Pacific: Is Moscow's Ambition Dashed?" in Energy and Environment in Slavic Eurasia: Toward the Establishment of the Network of

Environmental Studies in the Pan-Okhotsk Region, Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2008, pp. 33-65; Shoichi Itoh, “Chu-Ro enerugi kyoryoku kankei” (Sino-Russian Energy Cooperation), in

31    

                                                                                                                         

Hiroshi Kimura and Shigeki Hakamada, eds., Ajia ni sekkinsuru Roshia (Russia Moving Closer to Asia), Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido Daigaku Shuppankai, 2007, pp. 98-117; Tadashi Sugimoto, “Roshia no enerugi shigen to gaiko” (Russia’s Energy Resources and Diplomacy), in Shinji Yokote, ed., Higashi Ajia no Roshia (Russia in East Asia), Tokyo: Keio Gijuku Daigaku Shuppankai, 2004; pp. 225-253; Hongchan Chun, “Russia's Energy Diplomacy toward Europe and Northeast Asia: A Comparative Study,” Asia Europe Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2009), pp. 327-343.

6 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/spending.htm (accessed May 10, 2009).

7 For balanced analyses of Russia’s relations with China, “Russia-China Relations Lose Momentum,” Oxford Analytica, April 23, 2009 http://www.oxan.com/display.aspx?ItemID=DB150651 (accessed November 6, 2009); Richard Weitz, China-Russia Security Relations: Strategic Parallelism without

Partnership or Passion? Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008; Natasha Kuhrt, Russia’s Policy towards China and Japan: The El’tsin and Putin Periods, London: Routledge, 2007; Akihiro Iwashita, “9.11 jiken igo no Chu-Ro kankei” (Sino-Russian Relations since the 9/11 incidents), in Hiroaki Matsui, ed., 9.11 jiken igo no Roshia gaiko no shin tenkai (Post-9/11 Evolution of Russian Diplomacy), Tokyo: Nihon Kokusaimondai Kenkyujo, 2003, pp. 207-230.

8 Weitz.

9 Itoh, "Russia's Energy Diplomacy...” See also Peter Rutland, “Roshia no Ajia ni okeru yakuwari” (Russia’s Role in Asia), in Kimura and Hakamada, eds., Ajia ni sekkinsuru Roshia, pp. 31-48.

10 Elizabeth Wishnick, “Migration and Economic Security: Chinese Labor Migration in the Russian Far East,” in Tsuneo Akaha and Anna Vassilieva, eds., Crossing National Borders: Human Migration Issues in

Northeast Asia, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005, pp. 68-92.

11 See Kim Iskyan, “Selling off Siberia: Why China Should Purchase the Russian Far East,” posted July 28, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2086157/ (accessed November 13, 2009).

12 Bobo Lo, “A Partnership of Convenience,” New York Times, June 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/opinion/a-partnership-of-convenience.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all (accessed June 8, 2012).

13 Valeri O. Kistanov, “Higashi Ajia shokoku to Roshia no keizai kankei” (Economic Relations between East Asian Countries and Russia,” in Yokote, ed., Higashi Ajia no Roshia, pp. 203-224, particularly pp. 209-214.

32    

                                                                                                                         

14 For recent analyses of the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute, see Akihiro Iwashita, Hoppo ryodo: 4

demo 0 demo, 2 demo naku (The Northern Territories Problem: Neither 4 Nor 0, or 2), Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 2005; Akihiro Iwashita, Kokkyo: Dare ga kono sen wo hiitanoka (National Borders: Who Drew Them?), Sapporo: Hokkaido Daigaku Shuppankai, 2006; Hiroshi Kimura, “Hoppo ryodo henkan ni ojinu Roshia” (Russia Refusing to Return the Northern Territories), in Kimura, Gendai roshia kokkaron: Puchin

gata gaiko towa nanika (The Contemporary Russian State: What Is a Putinesque Diplomacy?), Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha, 2009, pp. 263-293. For earlier analyses, see: Hiroshi Kimura, Japanese-Russian

Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000; Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The

Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations, 2 volumes, Berkeley: University of California, 1998; James E. Goodby, Vladimir I. Ivanov, and Nobuo Shimotomai, eds., “Northern Territories” and

Beyond: Russian, Japanese, and American Perspectives, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995; Vladimir I. Ivanov and Karla S. Smith, eds., Japan and Russia in Northeast Asia: Partners in the 21st Century, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999.

15 Yomiuri Online, December 14, 2010, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/business/T101213003043.htm (accessed December 15, 2010).

16 Iwashita, Hoppo ryodo.

17 For a similar assessment, see Hiroshi Kimura, “Roshia no Chosen hanto seisaku” (Russia’s Policy in the Korean Peninsula), in Kimura and Hakamada, eds., Ajia ni sekkinsuru Roshia, pp. 212-244.

18 For a comprehensive discussion of Russia’s relations with ASEAN, see Kato Mihoko, “Russia’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the Process of Asia-Pacific Regional Integration: The Significance of ASEAN for Russia,” in Iwashita Akihiro, ed., Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia: Russia and Its Eastern Edge, 21st Century COE Program Slavic Eurasian Studies, No. 16-2, Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2007.

19 “Speech by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov at the Session of the Russia-ASEAN Postministerial Conference, Phnon Penh, June 19, 2003,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation, no. 1441-19-06-2003 June 19, 2003, http:// www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/273f45b5e07cbd4943256d4c0027aac7?OpenDocument.

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20 http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20101007/160866120.html.

21 These statistics are calculated from data in International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics

Yearbook, 2012.

22 U.S. Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=3&pid=3&aid=6 (accessed June 13, 2014).

23 See, for example, Goldstein and Kozyrev; Shoichi Itoh, “Russia's Energy Policy Towards Asia: Opportunities and Uncertainties,” in Christopher Len and Alvin Chew, eds., Energy and Security

Cooperation in Asia: Challenges and Prospects, Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2009, pp.143-165.

24Dmitry Medvedev, “Go, Russia,” President of Russia Web Site, http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2009/09/10/1534_type104017_221527.shtml (accessed November 13, 2009).

25 Ibid.

26 The English website of Levada Center is available at http://www.levada.ru/eng/.

27 For an earlier exploration of this topic, see Tsuneo Akaha, ed., Politics and Economics in the Russian Far

East: Changing Ties with Asia-Pacific, London: Routledge, 1997. See also Tsuneo Akaha, ed., "Proceedings: Workshop on US-Japan Cooperation in the Development of Siberia and the Russian Far East,” Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California, June 12-13, 1992.

28 For a fuller examination of the advantages and disadvantages of the Russian Far East, see Tsuneo Akaha, “The Russian Far East as a Factor in Northeast Asia,” Peace Forum (Kyung Hee University, Korea), No. 25 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 91-108. See also Pavel Minakir, Kunio Okada, and Tsuneo Akaha, “Economic Challenge in the Russian Far East,” in Akaha, ed., Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East:

Changing Ties with Asia-Pacific, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 49-69; Akaha, ed., Politics and Economics

in the Russian Far East.

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29 Vladivostok News online, Issue No. 560, Special Reports, March 15, 2007, http://vn.vladnews.ru/issue560/Special_reports/Russias_Far_East_population_continues_to_dwindle (accessed November 6, 2009).

30 For comprehensive survey of the natural resource base of the region and its environmental and developmental implications, see Josh Newell, The Russian Far East: A Reference Guide for Conservation

and Development, 2nd edition, McKinleyville, CA, Daniel & Daniel, 2004.

31 See Victor Larin, “Chinese in the Russian Far East,” and Wishnick, “Migration and Economic Security,” in Akaha and Vassilieva, eds., Crossing National Borders, pp. 47-67 and pp. 68-92, respectively.

32 Jane Perlez, “China and Russia Reach 30-Year Gas Deal,” New York Times, May 21, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/22/world/asia/china-russia-gas-deal.html?_r=0 33 Author interviews with several academic researchers in Vladivostok, September 2011 revealed their views are very mixed and tempered. While there are some individuals who are enthusiastic about the ongoing infrastructure development and expect that Moscow’s investment in the improvement of physical infrastructure, such as airport, roads, bridges, and harbor facilities in and around Vladivostok, will have both short-term and longer-term benefits for the region’s economic development and expanded ties with economic partners in the neighboring countries, more individuals are skeptical about the longer-term impact, with some even expressing concern about the skewed distribution of benefits as well as the environmental impact of the large-scale constructions projects in the area.

34 For a recent analysis on Russia’s role and interests, see Stephen Blank, “Russia and the Six-Party Process,” in Tomorrow’s Northeast Asia, Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, Volume 21, Washington, D.C.: Korea Economic Institute, 2011, pp. 207-226.

35 The association’s website is at http://www.neargov.org/app/index.jsp?lang=en.

36 For a succinct analysis of Russia’s presence in Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War, see Leszek Buszynski, “Roshia to Tonan Ajia” (Russia and Southeast Asia), in Kimura and Hakamada, eds., Ajia ni sekkinsuru Roshia, pp. 245-268.

37 For a nuanced study of Russia’s diplomacy in Central Asia in the 21st century, see Takeshi Yuasa, “Roshia no tai-Chuo Ajia seisaku” (Russia’s Policy toward Central Asia), in Matsui, ed., 9.11 jiken igo no

Roshia gaiko no shin tenkai, pp. 123-148.

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