Russia and US NI Final Web

8/3/2019 Russia and US NI Final Web

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Task Foc o Russia ad U.S. Naioa Iss Rpo

Grhm Allion nd Robert D. Blckwill, Chairs

Dimitri K. Sime, Project Director

Pul J. Sunder, Senior Advisor and Editor

October 2011

Russia and U.S.

National Interests

Why Should Americans Care?


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3/52

Tas F Rssa a U.S. Naa Iss Rp

Grhm Allion nd Robert D. Blckwill, Chairs

Dimitri K. Sime, Project DirectorPul J. Sunder, Senior Advisor and Editor

Russia and U.S.National Interests

Why Should Americans Care?

Center for the Ntionl Interet Belfer Center for Sciencend Interntionl Air


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Belfer Center fr Sene n Interntnl Ar

Hrvrd Univerity

79 JFK Street

Cmbridge, MA 02138

617-495-1400

htt://belfercenter.kg.hrvrd.edu

Center fr the Ntnl Interet

1615 L Street, NW, Suite 1250

Whington, DC 20036

202-887-1000

www.cni.org

2011 Belfer Center for Science nd Interntionl Air nd Center for the Ntionl Interet.

All Right Reerved.

Russia and U.S. National Interests: Why Should Americans Care?

A Report of the Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests


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B C o Scic ad Iaioa Aais

e Belfer Center i the hub of the Hrvrd Kennedy School reerch, teching, nd trining in

interntionl ecurity ir nd dilomcy, environmentl nd reource iue, nd cience nd

technology olicy. Grhm Allion i the Center director.

e Center h dul miion: (1) to rovide lederhi in dvncing olicy-relevnt knowledge

bout the mot imortnt chllenge of interntionl ecurity nd other criticl iue where cience,

technology, environmentl olicy, nd interntionl ir interect; nd (2) to rere future

genertion of leder for thee ren. Center reercher not only conduct cholrly reerch, but

lo develo recrition for olicy reform. Fculty nd fellow nlyze globl chllenge from

nucler rolifertion nd terrorim to climte chnge nd energy olicy.

e Belfer Center i grteful to the Stnton Foundtion nd the Nucler ret Inititive for their

uort of it work on the nucler ecurity nd rm control ect of U.S.-Ruin reltion.

C o Naioa Is

e Center for the Ntionl Interet i Whington-bed non-rtin foreign olicy reerch

intitute committed to the rgmtic nlyi of U.S. foreign nd ecurity olicy oortunitie,

chllenge nd otion. Murice R. Greenberg i the Center chirmn; Henry Kiinger i it

honorry chirmn.

In ddition to U.S.-Ruin reltion, Center rogrm focu on U.S. foreign olicy, Chin, Jn,

the Middle Et, nd Mexico well rm control nd non-rolifertion, energy nd climte

chnge, terrorim, nd immigrtion. e Center lo ublihe the rominent foreign olicy

mgzine e Ntionl Interet.

e Center for the Ntionl Interet i grteful for the uort of the United Stte Intitute of Pece

for it uort of it work on rm control nd non-rolifertion in the U.S.-Ruin reltionhi.

e Center lo recite the uort of Crnegie Corortion of New York for it wider U.S.-

Ruin dilogue rogrm.


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Gaa AsBelfer Center for Science nd InterntionlAir, Hrvrd Kennedy School

R BaCouncil on Foreign Reltion

Cas BCenter for the Ntionl Interet

Ra BMcLrty Aocite

Jas CsCrnegie Endowment forInterntionl Pece

J DMchuett Intitute of Technology

Ra FaaCherto Grou

Tas GaaKiinger Aocite, Inc

Ma GCenter for Strtegic nd Interntionl Studie

Ma GC.V. Strr & Co., Inc.

Fa HBrooking Intitution

K JsWrburg Pincu

Zaa KaaKhlilzd Aocite LLC

Jas JsJone Grou Interntionl

Ra MsKn Stte Univerity

Sa NNucler ret Inititive

Pa J. SasCenter for the Ntionl Interet

D SsCenter for the Ntionl Interet

As TsCrnegie Endowment forInterntionl Pece

J. Rs WsPFC Energy

D ZaCenter for Strtegic ndInterntionl Studie

Pp ZUniverity of VirginiCorcorn Dertment of Hitory

Simon Srdzhyn of Hrvrd Univerity Belfer Center for Science nd Interntionl Air erved conultnt during the rertion of thi reort.

Task Force on Russia and U.S.

National Interests

Tk force member endored the generl olicy thrut nd judgment reched by the grou, though

not necerily every nding nd recommendtion. ey rticited in the tk force in their

individul, not intitutionl, ccitie. Intitutionl lition re for identiction uroe only.


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Contents

E Sa 2Rssa a U.S. Naa Iss 8

Introduction 8Americ Vitl Ntionl Interet 8Why Rui Mtter to the United Stte 9Cn nd Should the United Stte Seek to Work with Rui? 10Rui Ntionl Interet 16Recommendtion for U.S. Policy towrd Rui 18e United Stte, Rui, nd Nucler Prolifertion 19Arm Control nd Miile Defene 23e United Stte, Rui, nd Geoolitic 25e United Stte, Rui, nd Energy Security 27e United Stte, Rui, nd Counter-Terrorim 30e United Stte, Rui, nd Centrl Ai, including Afghnitn 31e United Stte, Rui, nd Trde nd Invetment 32e United Stte, Rui, nd Democrtic Vlue 34e Conequence of Filure 37

Tas F Ms 38


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2 Rui nd U.S. Ntionl Interet Why Should Americn Cre?

Executive Summary

Two decde er the colle of the Soviet Union nd Rui emergence n indeendent tte,

Mocow i no longer Americ trtegic rivl. Yet, while Rui i not our enemy, neither h it

become friend. Whington nd Mocow hve ucceeded in overcoming Cold Wr confronttion,

but hve not develoed utinble cooertive reltion. A better-mnged bilterl reltionhi i

criticl for the dvncement of Americ vitl ntionl interet.

Prime Miniter Vldimir Putin deciion to return to the Kremlin Rui Preident next yer

doe not chnge U.S. ntionl interet with reect to Rui or, for tht mtter, Rui ntionl

interet with reect to the United Stte. Still, t minimum, Rui rhetoric vi--vi Americ

nd the Wet my become tougher under Putin. Under the circumtnce, mintining the roer

focu in U.S.-Ruin reltion will likely require rticulr cre nd determintion from U.S.

olicymker.

i reort, the reult of delibertion by ditinguihed working grou of former enior ocil

nd militry ocer, buine leder, nd to exert, nlyze the U.S.-Rui reltionhi through

the len of Americn ntionl interet; rgue tht Rui i ivotl country in romoting theeU.S. ntionl interet; nd oer recrition for U.S. olicy towrd Rui in the eriod hed.

We believe Rui mut be to riority for the United Stte becue it conduct cn hve

rofound imct on Americ vitl ntionl interet:

Nucler weon

Non-rolifertion

Counter-terrorim

Geoolitic, including mnging Chin emergence globl ower

Afghnitn

Energy

Interntionl nnce, in the G8 nd the G20

Strtegic geogrhy

Reviewing thee re mke cler tht Rui choice nd ction imct the full rnge of vitl U.S.

ntionl interet ignicntly nd directly. Few other ntion re imortnt to the United Stte.


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3Tk Force on Rui nd U.S. Ntionl Interet Reort

e Obm Adminitrtion reet olicy h contributed to ignicnt imrovement in the U.S.-

Ruin reltion. Unfortuntely, the reet i till frgile nd wht remin to be done i likely to be

much more dicult thn wht h been ccomlihed o fr. Twice before, under the Clinton nd

George W. Buh Adminitrtion, the U.S.nd Rui moved in the direction of new nd dierent

reltionhiyet both time, the eort tlled.

In ome reect, the diculty in utining imrovement in the U.S.-Rui reltionhi h hd

le to do with ecic dierence nd more to do with n inbility to brek down lting mutul

ditrut. i uicion of one nother motive my in fct be greter obtcle to cooertion

thn ometime divergent ntionl interet nd vlue.

Dometic olitic in ech country mke thi even more chllenging. When U.S. nd Ruin

leder eek to ortry their imroving reltion imortnt dilomtic uccee, their oliticl

oonent nturlly tke contrry view.

More generlly, even in the bence of rtin oliticl dierence, U.S. leder hve oen fueled

unrelitic execttion bout the U.S.-Ruin reltionhi nd develoment in Rui. i led

inevitbly to diilluionment nd frutrtion tht weken ny dminitrtion bility to conduct

utinble olicy in ervice of U.S. ntionl interet.

Becue U.S. nd Ruin interet nd vlue re not ligned, nd erective nd trtegie re oen

even frther rt, Whington nd Mocow t bet will mke rogre in ome re nd ee etbck

in other relity tht mke mutul trut even more imortnt for mnging dierence.

Finlly, given the diritie between U.S. nd Ruin interet nd governnce, lting cooertion

i unlikely if not imoible without determined lederhi from fr-ighted leder in the executive

nd legiltive brnche, rticulrly the Preident. And even uroeful U.S. olicy i in itelf

inucient to enure utinble cooertion in the bence of Ruin eort to mke cooertive

reltionhi ucceed. Hving worked with Rui over the t two decde, member of thi grou

re infully wre of how dicult Ruin olicy nd ction cn ometime be.

Scd Poicy Pscipios om Rpo

e United Stte hould engge Rui to develo nd imlement jointly roduced

nd concrete rodm with rm timeline to ttining the highet oible tndrd

of ecurity for ll tock of weon, weon-uble lutonium, nd highly enriched

urnium (HEU) everywhere in the world.


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e United Stte hould engge Rui to orchetrte interntionl conenu tht there

will be no new ntionl HEU enrichment or lutonium reroceing.

e United Stte hould exlore with Rui new trtegic tbility concet tht reect

the fct tht Whington nd Mocow re no longer enemie rered to detroy ech

other, but rther otentil rtner.

e next round of U.S.-Ruin nucler rm reduction hould combine deloyed nd non-

deloyed weon to lower the ceiling of trtegic wrhed to 1,000 or fewer.

In dicuing tcticl nucler weon with Rui, the United Stte hould focu rt on

negotiting conolidtion, trnrency nd veriction meure rther thn reduction.

e United Stte hould roceed with develoing nti-miile ytem in Euroe ndgloblly, in line with the relitic ement of exiting nd future thret nd vilble

technologie nd fund.

e United Stte hould be rered to lunch genuine nd ubtntive dilogue rt

with it NATO llie nd then with Rui bout new incluive Euroen ecurity ytem

tht would give Rui meningful voice nd tht would include n eective rid

reone mechnim of conict revention, interdiction nd reolution.

In mking mjor interntionl olicy deciion, the United Stte hould conider whether U.S.

ction could conolidte Ruin-Chinee cooertion t the exene of wider U.S. gol.

A long it er feible, chieving broder U.S. objective vi--vi Rui hould hve

riority over exnding NATO memberhi in wy tht could undermine cooertion on

greter U.S. rioritie.

e United Stte hould rie the riority of the U.S.-Ruin energy dilogue nd focu

on removing obtcle to bilterl invetment, trde, nd reerch.

e United Stte hould re Rui to imrove invetment condition in the energy

ector nd in Rui overll economy nd mke cler to Mocow tht mitreting U.S. nd

Wetern comnie dmge Rui invetment climte nd interntionl imge, nd i n

obtcle to imroving reltion with the United Stte.

e United Stte hould trengthen joint cbilitie with Rui to collect nd nlyze

intelligence on terrorit thret, including nucler, biologicl, nd conventionl cttrohic

terrorim thret to the two ntion nd their llie.


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e United Stte hould eek to hrmonize U.S. nd Ruin government lit of terrorit

orgniztion ubject to nction.

e United Stte hould engge Rui in reing Pkitn to end ncturie nd

uort for grou ghting in Afghnitn nd for romoting dilomtic ettlement of

Afghnitn-Pkitn dierence.

e United Stte hould intenify dicuion of the end-gme in Afghnitn with the

Ruin government, including militry-to-militry tlk.

e United Stte nd Rui hould ridly comlete the U.S.-Ruin greement on

Rui WTO cceion.

e United Stte hould work with the Euroen Union to re Rui to negotiteeriouly with Georgi to comlete Georgi-Rui WTO greement, while encourging

Georgi to limit tlk to iue tht re within the coe of the WTO work.

e United Stte Congre hould grdute Rui from the Jckon-Vnik Amendment

retriction nd develo new legiltion on Ruin corrution nd humn right.

In reviewing the Mgnitky bill, the U.S. Congre hould focu on dicourging lrge-

cle corrut rctice nd mjor humn right violtion in Rui by identifying thoe

reonible nd lying rorite enltie, while enuring due roce to the ccued,

roviding good fegurd, nd llowing ucient exibility for the executive brnch.

e United Stte hould revive eort to ign the bilterl invetment trety negotited

in the mid-1990, in order to ddre ome of the rimry concern U.S. invetor fce in

Rui nd to rovide them with recoure in the event of ntionliztion of U.S. comnie

invetment in Rui, or other ction tht re tntmount to ntionliztion.

When Rui violte interntionl commitment or it own lw through it dometic

rctice, the United Stte hould exre U.S. concern while voiding tronizing tone.

U.S. leder hould lo void ering to endore Ruin dometic rctice tht conict

with bic Americn vlue nd Rui interntionl obligtion.

e United Stte hould ccet tht democrtic oliticl chnge within Rui will likely

occur grdully nd need not necerily led to Americn-tyle democrcy.

e United Stte hould uort Ruin-led eort t democrtic nd mrket reform

when they occur, but hould void te likely to be viewed interference in Rui

dometic olitic, which re oen counterroductive.


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In view of the vitl Americn interet t tke in the U.S.-Ruin reltion, nd

Whington limited leverge over Rui low dometic trnition, the United Stte

hould not llow democrcy romotion to dominte it roch to Rui.

T Cosqucs o Faiu

Jut the United Stte hould exect Rui to djut mny of it olicie to chieve utinble

cooertive reltionhi, Whington hould recognize tht Mocow i unlikely to uort U.S.

olicy gol if the U.S.-Ruin reltionhi ignicntly deteriorte. A reult, the filure to

etblih n ongoing working reltionhi with Rui would be quite cotly for the United Stte.

A rcticl mtter, even tlled reltionhi could be roblemtic. e United Stte nd Rui

re both motivted to imrove reltion lrgely on the bi of hoe for wht tronger reltionhicould roduce. If the roect for relizing thoe hoe become too remote, it i uncertin whether

wht h been ccomlihed o fr i ucient to revent our ubtntil remining dierence

from tering the U.S.-Ruin reltionhi rt.

U.S. ocil mut crefully weigh not only the Americn ntionl interet in working more cloely

with Rui, but lo the cot nd benet of filing to do o, keeing in mind Mocow ccity

to ct oiler in number of re nd on number of iue tht re of vitl ntionl interet

to Whington. In our conidered judgment, the choice i cler: the United Stte hould urue

utinble cooertive reltionhi with Rui to dvnce vitl Americn ntionl interet, but

do o without illuion regrding either Mocow ometime neo-imeril mbition, or the ce of

democrtic chnge in Rui.


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Russia and U.S. National Interests

Ioducio

Two decde er the colle of the Soviet Union nd Rui emergence n indeendent tte,

Mocow i no longer Americ trtegic rivl. Yet, while Rui i not our enemy, neither h it

become friend. Whington nd Mocow hve ucceeded in overcoming Cold Wr confronttion,

but hve not develoed utinble cooertive reltion. A better-mnged bilterl reltionhi i

criticl for the dvncement of Americ vitl ntionl interet.

Prime Miniter Vldimir Putin deciion to return to the Kremlin Rui Preident next yer

doe not chnge U.S. ntionl interet with reect to Rui or, for tht mtter, Rui ntionl

interet with reect to the United Stte. Still, t minimum, Rui rhetoric vi--vi Americ

nd the Wet my become tougher under Putin. Under the circumtnce, mintining the roer

focu in U.S.-Ruin reltion will likely require rticulr cre nd determintion from U.S.

olicymker.

i reort, the reult of delibertion by ditinguihed working grou of former enior ocil

nd militry ocer, buine leder, nd to exert, nlyze the U.S.-Rui reltionhi through

the len of Americn ntionl interet; rgue tht Rui i ivotl country in romoting thee

U.S. ntionl interet; nd oer recrition for U.S. olicy towrd Rui in the eriod hed.

Amicas Via Naioa Iss

Although oliticin nd undit routinely invoke the concet of vitl ntionl interet to jutifyvirtully ny deired coure of ction, we hold to nrrow view of U.S. vitl interet. Seciclly,

vitl ntionl interet re condition tht re trictly necery to fegurd nd enhnce

Americn urvivl nd well-being in free nd ecure ntion.

From thi erective, we cn identify ve Americn vitl ntionl interet:

Preventing the ue nd lowing the red of nucler weon nd other weon of m

detruction, ecuring nucler weon nd mteril, nd reventing rolifertion of

intermedite nd long-rnge delivery ytem for nucler weon;


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Mintining blnce of ower in Euroe nd Ai tht romote ece nd tbility with

continuing U.S. lederhi role;

Preventing lrge-cle or utined terrorit ttck on the Americn Homelnd;

Enuring energy ecurity; nd

Auring the tbility of the interntionl economy.

Wy Russia Mas o Uid Sas

In view of Rui dicult hitory, ometime troubling behvior, reltively mll economy, nd

reduced interntionl role ince the colle of the Soviet Union, it i reonble to k whether the

United Stte need Mocow rtner.

We believe Rui mut be to riority for the United Stte becue it conduct cn hve

rofound imct on Americ vitl ntionl interet:

Nler Wen. Preident Brck Obm nd former Preident George W. Buh ech

identied nucler terrorim the number one thret to Americn ntionl ecurity. e

United Stte nd Rui together oe 95% of the world nucler weon nd mot

of the world weon-uble mteril, nd both re mjor ulier of civilin nucler

technologie round the world. Alo, Rui i the only ntion tht could detroy Americ we know it in thirty minute. Rui meningful itnce nd uort i criticl to

reventing nucler wr.

Nn-Prlfertn. Rui ly key role in U.S.-led interntionl effort to inhibit

the red of nucler weon, weon-uble mteril nd technologie, which re

ought not only by ntion tte, but lo by non-tte ctor. Mocow h generlly

uorted Americn inititive to combt nucler terrorim nd hred intelligence

on l Qed with Whington. Without Rui itnce, the United Stte will fce

coniderble dditionl difficultie in eeking to low down nucler rolifertion nd

revent nucler terrorim.

Gelt. Rui i n imortnt ntion in tody interntionl ytem. Aligning

Mocow more cloely with Americn gol would bring ignicnt blnce of ower

dvntge to the United Stteincluding in mnging Chin emergence globl

ower. Ignoring Ruin erective cn hve ubtntil cot. Rui vote in the

United Ntion Security Council nd it inuence elewhere i conequentil to the ucce

of U.S. interntionl dilomcy on hot of iue.


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Afghntn. Al Qed oertive hve engged in terrorit ttck gint the United

Stte nd hve encourged nd uorted ttck by dometic terrorit grou in Rui.

Rui h rovided the United Stte with cce to it irce nd territory criticl

lterntive uly route for U.S. force in Afghnitn, omething tht h grown in

imortnce Americ reltion with Pkitn hve deteriorted. Mocow h lo hred

intelligence on Afghnitn nd l Qed, hel to trin Afghn lw enforcement ocer,

nd ulie hrdwre to them nd to the Afghn Ntionl Army.

Energ. Rui i one of the world leding energy roducer nd i the to holder of

nturl g reerve .Rui thu h ubtntil role in mintining nd exnding

energy ulie tht kee the globl economy tble nd enble economic growth in the

United Stte nd round the world.

Fnne. Rui memberhi in the G8 nd the G20 give it et t the tble for the mot

imortnt nncil nd economic meeting nd delibertion.

Strteg Gegrh. Rui i the lrget country on Erth by lnd re nd the lrget in

Euroe by oultion. It i locted t trtegic crorod between Euroe, Ai, nd the

greter Middle Et nd i Americ neighbor in the Arctic. A reult, Rui i cloe to

trouble-ot nd criticl trnit corridor for energy nd other good.

Reviewing thee re mke cler tht Rui choice nd ction imct the full rnge of vitl U.S.ntionl interet ignicntly nd directly. Few other ntion re imortnt to the United Stte.

Ca ad Soud Uid Sas Sk o Wok wi Russia?

Some cknowledge tht Rui mtter to the United Stte, but rgue tht the Ruin government

foreign nd dometic conduct revent the U.S. from cooerting eectively with Mocow. Hving

worked with Rui over the t two decde, member of thi grou re infully wre of

how dicult Ruin olicy nd ction cn ometime be. Neverthele, we believe trongly tht

Americ cn engge eectively with Mocow in wy tht dvnce U.S. ntionl interet nd vlue.

Where bet eort by the United Stte re rebued, Whington hould ct to chieve wht it cn

nd continue to engge towrd further rogre.

oe who dimi eort to collborte with Mocow tyiclly rgue tht the U.S. cnnot

collborte with Rui becue:

Americn nd Ruin ntionl interet diverge o ubtntilly tht cooertion iimrcticl nd unlikely to chieve ubtntil reult.


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Americn nd Ruin vlue dier o ignicntly tht cooertion i imoible without

cricing key U.S. rincile.

e oible benet to the United Stte will not jutify the eort, either becue Rui

i too dicult or unrelible n interlocutor or, lterntively, becue Mocow i not ble todeliver on imortnt iue.

Tis section briey responds to each of these objections.

Firt, U.S. nd Ruin ntionl interet do indeed diverge in mny re. Deite thi, however, the

United Stte nd Rui hre mny common interet, including ome which re vitl: lowing the

red of nucler weon; combtting interntionl terrorim; romoting relible interntionl

energy ytem; nd utining roerou world economy.

Of coure, Americn nd Ruin ntionl interet, rioritie, nd erective will likely lwy

dier in ignicnt reect. u U.S. leder mut recll clerly tht their obligtion i to dvnce

Americn ntionl interet rther thn U.S.-Ruin reltion. Sutinble cooertive reltion

with Mocow re n intrument to chieve key U.S. gol, not n end in themelve, nd Whington

mut be rered to confront Rui when U.S. ntionl interet require it.

Second, the fct tht the United Stte nd Rui hve dierent oliticl ytem, nd tht mny

Americn ee coniderble w in how Rui i ruled, hould not revent cooertion with

Mocow to dvnce Americn ntionl interet. e rt reonibility of the U.S. government i

to enure the ecurity nd roerity of the Americn eole. Becue mny ntion imortnt to

the United Stte re governed dierently, the U.S. government continue to hve no lterntive but

to work with undemocrtic government when imortnt ntionl interet re t tke. In thi

context, there i no rel ubtitute for deling with Rui, in rticulr on countering rolifertion,

combting interntionl terrorim nd enhncing energy ecurity.

Finlly, concern bout Rui reent unrelibility or long-term roect re not entirely

milced. Rui i not n ey rtner. Moreover, while Rui h coniderble trength,

including it nucler renl, vt energy reerve, till-coniderble militry ower in Euri, nd

highly develoed cientic etblihment, it lo fce enormou chllenge, including hrinking

oultion, low life exectncy, dilidted infrtructure, nd mive corrution. e chrt on

the following ge illutrte thee enduring contrdiction.


18/52

CtegrR fr the eretve fU.S. nteret

USA fr the eretve fRn nteret

Deloyed trtegic nuclerweon

No. 2 (1,537) No. 1 (1,800)

Oil roduction No. 1 (9,934 thound brrel

er dy)

No. 3 (9,141 thound brrel

er dy)Nturl g roduction No. 2 (21,545 billion cubic feet) No. 1 (21,577 billion cubic feet)

GDP (dollr exchnge rte) No. 11 ($1,479,819 million) No. 1 ($14,582,400 million)

GDP (PPP) No. 6 ($2,812,383 million) No. 1 ($14,582,400 million)

Globl exort No. 10 ($ 400,100 million) No. 3 ($1,289,000 million)

Globl imort No. 18 ($ 248,700 million) No. 1 ($1,936,000 million)

Bilterl trde No. 24 on the lit of U.S. trdingrtner

No. 11 on the lit of Ruitrding rtner

Poultion No. 9 (141.7 million) No. 3 (309.7 million)

Totl re No. 1 (17,098,242 q. km.) No. 3. (9,826,675 q. km.)

Life exectncy No. 161 (66 yer) No. 50 (78 yer)

Source: U.S. Dertment of Stte, 2011; U.S. Energy Informtion Adminitrtion, 2009; CentrlIntelligence Agency, 2010; Oce of the U.S. Trde Rereenttive, 2011; Federl Cutom Service ofRui, 2011; World Bnk 2010.

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2000

Num

berofUnits

Russian Federation United States

Deployed and non-deployedlaunchers of ICBMs, deployedand non-deployed launchers ofSLBMs and deployed andnon-deployed Heavy Bombers

Warheads on deployedICBMs, on deployed SLBMs,and Nuclear Warheadscounted for deployed HeavyBombers

Deployed ICBMs,deployed SLBMs, anddeployed Heavy Bombers

New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers o Strategic Ofensive Arms

Source: U.S. Dertment of Stte


19/52

0 500,000 1,000,000 1,500,000 2,000,000 2,500,000 3,000,000

China

India

USA

Russia

France

UK

Personnel

Total Armed Forces Personnel (2009)

Source: World Bnk.

Natural Gas Exports, 2009

Russia 20.28%

Norway 11.20%

Canada 10.62%

Qatar 7.72%Netherlands 6.30%

Algeria 5.96%

Indonesia 4.04%

Malaysia 3.49%

USA 3.44%

Australia 2.29%

Others 24.66%

Source: U.S. Energy Informtion Adminitrtion.

Crude Oil Exports, 2009 Saudi Arabia 12.02%

Russia 10.27%

Iran 4.24%

Nigeria 3.96%

UAE 3.70%

Iraq 3.55%

Angola 3.44%

Norway 3.35%

Canada 2.82%

Others 50.00%

Kuwait 2.55%

USA 0.08%

Source: U.S. Energy Informtion Adminitrtion.


20/52

Russian Demographic Data, 19902009

Source: Centrl Intelligence Agency.

138,000,000

140,000,000

142,000,000

144,000,000

146,000,000

148,000,000

150,000,000

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Year

BirthsandDeathsper1000People

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Population Births per 1000 people Deaths per 1000 people

GDP Growth o BRIC Countries, 2000-2009

Source: World Bnk.

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

G

rowth(Annual%)

Brazil Russia India China


21/52

0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000

USA

China

Japan

India

Germany

Russia

UK

Brazil

France

Italy

Billions of USD

GDP (PPP) in 2010 USD (2010 est.)

Source: Centrl Intelligence Agency.

Freedom House Rankings, Russia 2010

Transparency International - Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, Russia

Civil Libertie core: 5

Politicl Right core: 6

Sttu: Not Free

Level of oliticl right nd civil libertie re cored on cle from 1 (motfree) to 7 (let free). Deending on the rting, the ntion re then clied Free, Prtly Free, or Not Free.

Level of freedom nd editoril indeendence enjoyed by the re re coredon cle from 1 (mot free) to 100 (let free).

Score: 81

Rnk: 175

Sttu: Not Free

e 2010 Corrution Percetion Index rnk countrie on cle from 10(highly clen) to 0 (highly corrut).

Score: 2.1


22/52


Americn oen tend to focu on either Rui trength or it weknee without eeking n

integrted undertnding of the rel Rui. i i roblemtic, becue it led to dngerou

umtion bout Rui motive nd conduct. For exmle, thoe who focu on Mocow

trength frequently ee n ertive nd dngerou rivl without recognizing Rui rofound

inecurity. Converely, thoe who concentrte on Rui hortcoming ee defeted ower

ill-rered to reit Americn reure or reference. While thee decrition re clerly

cricture, view like thoe decribed bove cn roduce dmging mijudgment.

Rui i grling with the contrdiction between imeril notlgi, on the one hnd, nd the

drmtic decline in it ower er the Soviet colle, on the other. e Ruin government

filure to reent credible ln to revere Rui decline or to develo ucceful foreign

olicy trtegy tht trengthen the country interntionl role mke thi only more dicult ndcontribute to ene of inecurity. Neverthele, the United Stte h the oortunity to mnge

it reltion with n evolving Rui in mnner tht dvnce Americ vitl ntionl interet.

e tke re high. Rui i more thn uciently owerful to crete hot of cotlynd even

devttingroblem for the United Stte if Ruin leder believe tht Whington h hotile,

or cul, diregrd for Ruin ntionl interet nd rioritie. i i true even though mot in

Rui elite recognize tht tody Rui i not uciently trong to chllenge Americn globl

lederhi without the uort of other mjor ower.

Russias Naioa Iss

Develoing U.S. olicy towrd Rui require n undertnding of Rui objective nd it likely

rection to rticulr Americn ction. i in turn neceitte n ement of Rui ntionl

interet they re dened by Ruin leder in Mocow. Unfortuntely, it i not lwy ey to

identify Rui interet clerly, due to diering erective within the Ruin elite, Mocow

le-thn-trnrent oliticl roce, nd the Ruin government tendency to focu on

immedite tcticl iue t the exene of trtegic thinking.

Vldimir Putin lmot ured return to Rui reidency next yer i likely to end the dulity in

Rui lederhi nd, reult, to mke Rui foreign olicy more coherent nd redictble.

ough Mr. Putin h clerly uorted the bic outline of Preident Dmitry Medvedev

dilomcy, hi unologeticlly tough nd keticl tyle could ect how Mocow oition re

reented well hi government exibility in tlk with the United Stte.


23/52


e Ruin lederhi er to conider the following to be mong Rui rincil ntionl interet:

Preventing the ue of nucler weon or other weon of m detruction gint Rui nd

reventing rolifertion of nucler weon nd delivery ytem in the ot-Soviet ce;

Mintining Rui nucler deterrent cbility gurntor of Rui overeignty nd

gret ower ttu;

Preventing mjor terrorit ttck in Rui;

Sutining Ruin inuence in the ot-Soviet ce nd denying cometing ower or

llince the bility to dominte the ot-Soviet ce;

Auring continued revenue ow from Rui energy exort nd enuring tht other

tte re not ble to exercie leverge over Rui energy exort;

Protecting the ecurity nd tbility of Rui current oliticl ytem, omething mde

more dicult becue it doe not derive it legitimcy from either trdition or democrtic

rocedure; nd,

Protecting nd dvncing the economic interet of mjor oliticl-buine llince

within Rui elite.

U.S. nd Ruin interet clerly overl in everl re, including their hred deire to void

nucler wr, revent rolifertion, nd limit terrorim. However, U.S. nd Ruin interet lo

dier in imortnt wy, rticulrly with reect to the ot-Soviet ce nd in the commitmentof Rui leder to mintining their country current ytem of government nd to rotecting the

economic interet of grou in Ruin elite.

More generlly, Rui determintion to be treted like gret ower cn contribute to tenion

with the United Stte. For exmle, Ruin leder er to ee their deire to mintin n

unquetioned nucler deterrent cbility being t odd with Whington nd NATO miile

defene ln. Similrly, Rui need for trong voice in inuencing UN Security Council

deciion oen conict with Americ eort to win Security Council uort in dvncing it

foreign olicy objective nd vlue.

e United Stte nd Rui cn overcome the g between their ntionl interet in the nme

of cooertion to dvnce more imortnt or vitl interet, but their dierence re eriou

nd rel. And mny of thee dierence re likely to endure long Rui current oliticl

rrngement remin in lce nd oibly beyond. erefore, even uroeful U.S. olicy i

in itelf inucient to enure utinble cooertion in the bence of Ruin eort to mke

cooertive reltionhi ucceed. e United Stte cn nd hould work to encourge thoe

eort, but cnnot gurntee them.


24/52


Rcommdaios o U.S. Poicy owad Russia

e Obm Adminitrtion reet olicy h contributed to ignicnt imrovement in the U.S.-

Ruin reltionhi. Unfortuntely, the reet i till frgile nd wht remin to be done i likely to

be much more dicult thn wht h been ccomlihed o fr. Twice before, under the Clinton

nd George W. Buh Adminitrtion, U.S.-Ruin reltion moved in the direction of new nd

dierent reltionhiyet both time, the eort tlled.

In ome reect, diculty utining imrovement in the U.S.-Rui reltionhi h hd le to do

with ecic dierence nd more to do with n inbility to brek down lting mutul ditrut. i

uicion of one nother motive my in fct be greter obtcle to cooertion thn ometime

divergent ntionl interet nd vlue. Some of the mot chllenging roblem, like miile defene,

re quite hrd to mnge without mutul condence, but filure to mnge them only crete further

doubt in the mind of leder in both citl. Addreing thee dicult iue require roce of

dilogue tht work imultneouly towrd building more trut nd towrd develoing rcticl olicy

olution. Shred ucce in tckling hrd roblem cn crete it own momentum.

Dometic olitic in ech country mke thi even more chllenging. When U.S. nd Ruin

leder eek to ortry their imroving reltion imortnt dilomtic uccee, their oliticl

oonent nturlly tke contrry view. Politic cn ly coniderble role in hing U.S.-

Ruin reltion, omething tht becme rent during the 2010 debte over the New START

Trety in the United Stte.

More generlly, even in the bence of rtin oliticl dierence, U.S. leder hve oen fueled

unrelitic execttion bout the U.S.-Ruin reltionhi nd develoment in Rui. i led

inevitbly to diilluionment nd frutrtion tht weken ny dminitrtion bility to conduct

utinble olicy in ervice of U.S. ntionl interet.

Becue U.S. nd Ruin interet nd vlue re not ligned, nd erective nd trtegie re oeneven frther rt, Whington nd Mocow t bet will mke rogre in ome re nd ee etbck

in other relity tht would mke mutul trut even more imortnt for mnging dierence.

Finlly, given the diritie between U.S. nd Ruin interet nd governnce, lting cooertion

i unlikely if not imoible without determined lederhi from fr-ighted leder in the executive

nd legiltive brnche, rticulrly the Preident. To tke the dicult te necery to build

foundtion for utinble U.S.-Ruin reltionhi, the White Houe mut not only diciline

the executive brnch nd focu it eort, but lo end oliticl citl in the U.S. Congre.

Preoccution with dometic rioritie in highly olrized dometic oliticl environment cnnot


25/52


but limit the dminitrtion bility to build birtin conenu on controveril toic like

Americn olicy towrd Rui.

T Uid Sas, Russia, ad Nuca Poiaio

e overriding riority of U.S. ntionl ecurity olicy mut be to revent the ue nd red of

nucler weon. i tk i extremely dicult without Rui cooertion.

e fct tht the United Stte nd Rui continue jointly to oe the vt mjority of the world

nucler weon, nd cbility to nnihilte one notheror ny other ntionmny time

over, ut nucler iue t the to of the bilterl gend. Unlike the Cold Wr er, however, tody

U.S.-Ruin nucler wr eem lmot inconceivble. e United Stte fce much greter rik

from hotile tte with mll nucler renl nd from terrorit grou eeking nucler weon.

In the ecurity environment of the erly twenty-rt century, Americ h four ecic vitl ntionl

interet relted to countering nucler rolifertion tht Rui cn hel to dvnce:

Securing ll nucler weon nd nucler weon-uble mteril to gold tndrd-

beyond the rech of terrorit nd thieve;

Limiting the red of nucler weon, weon-uble mteril nd technologie globlly;

Mintining nd trengthening trict Ruin government control over nucler weon,

weon-uble mteril, nd technologie inide Rui; reventing them from flling

into the hnd of thoe who could threten the United Stte; nd voiding ccidentl or

unuthorized ue of nucler weon; nd,

Puruing further U.S.-Ruin nucler force reduction nd working with Rui to involve

other nucler weon tte in tlk on reduction.

e future of the globl nucler order will be determined to lrge extent by whether Whington

nd Mocow gree on the dignoi of the thret nd jointly develo nd ly remedy. A the

world leding nucler weon tte, the United Stte nd Rui hve unique bility, nd

unique reonibility, to cooerte to mnge the thret of nucler rolifertion.

e United Stte nd Rui re lredy lying led role in building nd mintining n

interntionl counter-rolifertion regime. Whington nd Mocow hve decde of exerience

cring requirement nd erfecting method of enuring nucler ecurity, including the ecuring

of tockile nd dioing of decommiioned weon nd mteril, tht cn be ued

model by other countrie. Mocow h lredy heled imortntly in denuclerizing Ukrine,

Kzkhtn nd Belru.


26/52


Rui cbilitie n exorter of nucler ower lnt nd relted equiment nd technologie

nd roceor of nucler fuel nd nucler wte re lo centrl to globl non-rolifertion.

Finlly, further conolidtion of tockile remin necery in Rui, which till h the world

lrget number of fcilitie contining nucler weon nd weon-uble nucler mteril.

Irn eort to cquire nucler weon re nd hould be of ecil concern to the United Stte

in view of the otentil miile thret to U.S. force nd U.S llie in the Middle Et nd Euroe,

well the dnger of further rolifertion in the Middle Et or nucler terrorim. Rui

geogrhic loction, regionl inuence, role veto-wielding ermnent member of the United

Ntion Security Council, nd reltionhi with Irn mke it n imortnt otentil rtner in

mnging thee roblem. However, while Rui hre mny U.S. concern bout Irn, Rui

ercetion, rioritie nd trtegie re not fully in lignment with Americ.

In the United Stte, reventing Irn from obtining nucler weon i one of our highet foreign

olicy rioritie, becue ome believe tht Irn might ue nucler weon gint U.S. trget

in the region or gint U.S. lly nd tht Irn oeion of nucler weon would chnge the

regionl blnce of ower, emboldening Tehrn, deterring Whington, nd intimidting U.S. llie

nd friend. Mny Americn re lo concerned tht if Irn hould develo nucler weon, other

tte in the region might lo eek them.

In Rui, the emergence of nucler Irn i een eriou thret to Rui vitl interet, but

mny re keticl tht Tehrn drive for nucler weon cn be toed. Ruin recognize tht

Irn cn ect other vitl Ruin interet, including extremit Ilmit terrorim in Rui North

Cucu region, tbility in the South Cucu, Centrl Ai nd Afghnitn, nd energy interet

in the Cin. Like Chin, Rui ee the benet of trde in technology nd rm more

immedite thn n Irnin nucler weon, rticulrly given it judgment tht the only trtegie

the United Stte i willing or ble to imlement re unlikely to chnge Irnin behvior. Deite

dierence, the Ruin government h been more uortive of Americn olicy towrd Irn

thn Chin, uully when the United Stte, in concert with Euroen llie, h demontrted the

benet of cloer U.S.-Ruin cooertion or when Irn ction hve rovoked Ruin concern,

when Irn deliberte eort to concel enrichment fcilitie were exoed. Senior Ruin

ocil hve exlicitly tted tht Rui could work more cloely with the United Stte on Irn

if Americ nd Rui were genuine rtnerin other word, if the benet of the overll U.S.-

Ruin reltionhi oet the oible dmge to Ruin interet reulting from deteriortion in

Mocow tie to Tehrn. i ugget tht the United Stte doe hve ome inuence over Rui

hierrchy of rioritie.


27/52


While Whington hould continue to exlin it erective eruively oible, U.S.-

Ruin dierence of oinion over Irn eem unlikely to chnge ubtntilly in the bence of

new fct or chnge in Irn behvior. With thi in mind, eort to ecure greter nd more

conitent Ruin uort for Americ roch to Irn re likely to ucceed to the extent tht

they occur in the context of n imroving U.S.-Ruin reltionhi tht ddree not only U.S.

rioritie but lo Rui im. For exmle, Ruin concern bout the imct of unilterl

U.S. nction gint Ruin rm tht re oberving UN Security Council nction on Irn

could become n obtcle to further Ruin cooertion, rticulrly when the United Stte

hold Euroen comnie to dierent tndrd.

In ddition to Irn, North Kore i the world other mjor tte-driven nucler rolifertion

chllenge. Needle to y, North Kore dier fundmentlly from Irn in tht Pyongyng lredy

oee nucler wrhed. Unfortuntely, while Rui h limited inuence over Irn, it eem

to hve even le inuence over North Kore. Both the United Stte nd Rui er in ome

reect to hve ceded lederhi in deling with North Kore to Chin. But fering intbility in

North Kore, Beijing h been reluctnt to ly reure to the world lt totlitrin communit

tte. Still, Pyongyng economic trouble nd rticulr interet in Ruin energy my rovide

Mocow with ome leverge. Furthermore, ermnent member of the UN Security Council,

rticint in the ix-rty tlk nd North Kore neighbor, Rui cn do more to encourge the

DPRK to mke del tht would reduce the nucler thret emnting from it edgling renl in

trnrent nd verible wy.

In iting Rui to ecure it own renl, the United Stte h dvnced it ntionl interet

through the Nunn-Lugr Cooertive ret Reduction Progrm. While thi itnce contributed

ubtntilly to Americn ecurity t reonble cotrticulrly in comrion to the otentil

imct of n ttck emloying tolen weon or mterilconcern over decit in the United

Stte, long with Rui economic recovery, h mde it timely to move beyond n economic

itnce hiloohy to jointly funded nd mnged cooertive undertking tht not only

utin current rogrm in Rui, but lo ddree equivlent chllenge in other countrie.

Policy Prescriptions

e United Stte hould engge Rui to develo nd imlement jointly roduced

nd concrete rodm with rm timeline to ttining the highet oible tndrd

of ecurity for ll tock of weon, weon-uble lutonium, nd highly enriched

urnium (HEU) everywhere in the world. In doing o, the two ntion hould ue their

nucler etblihment exerience, technologie, criteri, nd bet rctice bi to

oertionlize United Ntion Security Council Reolution 1540.


28/52


e United Stte hould engge Rui to orchetrte interntionl conenu tht there

will be no new ntionl HEU enrichment or lutonium reroceing, uing trict criteri

for retrining the le of thee technologie, enuring the Nucler Sulier Grou (NSG)

cooerte only with tte tht comly with interntionl lw nd regultion, nd

romoting nucler fuel urnce nd crdle-to-grve fuel cycle ervice.

e United Stte nd Rui hould led interntionl eort to control roduction nd

conolidtion of ile mteril, encourging Chin, Pkitn, nd Indi to nnounce

mortorium on roduction of ile mteril for nucler weon nd reing for

Fiile Mteril Cut-o Trety; hing out ue of HEU in civil commerce nd removing

weon-uble urnium from reerch fcilitie round the world.

e United Stte hould intenify dicuion with Rui on globl nucler energy,

eecilly with reect to rocedure nd technologie to reduce rolifertion rik,

oibly including interntionliztion of the fuel cycle.

e United Stte hould continue to engge Rui in convertion bout lterntive

roche to the Irn chllenge, including oible joint uort for regionl

ecurity ytem tht could crete incentive for Irn to bndon it nucler rogrm or,

lterntively, demontrte to Irn tht uruing nucler weon could undermine rther

thn imrove it ecurity.

e United Stte hould eek to enlit Ruin cooertion in reing Chin to workmore ertively to erude North Kore to urrender it nucler weon, noting the

otentil oitive imct on regionl ercetion of Chinee conduct.

e United Stte hould forcefully dvocte for Ruin itnce vi--vi Pkitn nd

Afghnitn (ee ection on Centrl Ai), not let to enure the ecurity of Pkitn

nucler renl nd to reduce the rik of further rolifertion from Pkitn.

e United Stte hould encourge Rui to enforce UN Security Council nction

gint Irn nd North Kore nd to void ction tht rovide mteril economic uort

to Tehrn or Pyongyng.

e United Stte hould eek to limit the hrmful imct of U.S. economic nction

on Ruin rm tht re oberving exiting UN Security Council nction gint Irn

rt of wider eort to ecure Mocow cooertion in deling with Irn nucler

weon rogrm.

e United Stte hould encourge Rui to continue to oberve Preident Dmitry

Medvedev decree bnning the le of S-300 nti-ircr miile ytem to Irn nd to

void le of other otentilly detbilizing rm or technologie to Irn or North Kore.


29/52


e United Stte hould encourge Rui to oberve trict fegurd conitent with

or exceeding exiting interntionl greement to which Mocow i rty in it le of

nucler ower equiment or technologie.

e United Stte hould ecure the Ruin government conent to extend theCooertive ret Reduction rogrm, which exire in 2013, with view to ttining

Ruin nncing to utin nd interntionlize the rogrm, llowing Mocow nd

Whington to hre bet rctice with other countrie. e United Stte hould lo

encourge Rui to further conolidte it nucler tockile.

Ams Coo ad Missi Ds

e United Stte nd Rui re no longer enemie. Deite thi, both mintin trtegic nucler

force t level tht would, if ever ued, ure detruction of both. e robbility of Ruin nucler

ttck on the United Stte reult of n ccident or fle wrning h decreed comred to the

yer immeditely following the diintegrtion of the Soviet Union. But the otentilly cttrohic

conequence of uch n ccident require more eort to reduce the rik further.

Americ current inventory of trtegic nucler weon i legcy of the Cold Wr; noted by the

Congreionl Commiion on the Strtegic Poture of the United Stte, the U.S. need reltively few

nucler weon to deter Chin or other ntion nd cn reduce it renl if Rui i rered to do

the me. Such reduction cn lo trengthen Whington negotiting oition in eeking to tightenthe globl non-rolifertion regime. Neverthele, while the United Stte nd Rui hve uccefully

concluded the New START trety, further bilterl rm reduction greement er unlikely in the

foreeeble future due to ongoing dierence over tcticl nucler weon nd miile defene.

Eliminting Americn nd Ruin tcticl nucler weon could contribute uefully to nucler

ecurity imly by reducing the number of wrhed to ecure. However, in view of Mocow

relince on thee weon to comente for the wekne of it conventionl force (rticulrly

thoe in the Ruin Fr Et) reltive to Chin, U.S.-Ruin tcticl nucler rm reduction trety

er imrobble in the hort-to-medium term. A U.S.-Ruin greement tht bundle together

deloyed nd non-deloyed nucler weon for reduction nd rovide for ome trnrency for

tcticl renl would be eier to ttin.

e United Stte h imortnt interet in uruing miile defene in Euroe nd elewhere in

order to imrove the ecurity of the United Stte, it deloyed militry force, nd it llie. However,

rotecting gint ttck i not the ole uroe of miile defene. Miile defene could not only

deter nucler Irn from lunching miile ttck, but lo dicourge Tehrn from believing tht the

thret of uch n ttck could deter the United Stte or coerce it neighbor or other.


30/52


Rui rincil concern bout miile defene er to relte to the uroe nd eventul

cbilitie of lnned nd otentil future ytem. Becue mny in the Ruin government

do not ee n imminent miile thret to Euroethey init tht Irn i fr from develoing

nucler device, nd even frther from lcing uble nucler wrhed on miile cble of

reching Euroen trgetthey uect tht the thret from Irn i Americ jutiction for

building miile defene ytem rther thn it reon for doing o. e fct tht the globl ytem

Whington ln could cot hundred of billion of dollr only incree Ruin keticim; why,

they k, would the United Stte end o much for the cbility to hoot down dozen nucler

miile tht do not yet exit?

Becue of thi, mny in Rui militry-oliticl lederhi er eriouly concerned tht

Americ oen-ended miile defene rchitecture my eventully evolve to undermine the

retlitory cbility of Rui trtegic nucler force through future urge in intercetor

roduction. i concern bout the ytem otentil in one to two decde i driving Mocow

deire for gurntee tht exiting or future U.S. miile defene ytem will not trget Rui.

Miile defene cooertion could be one wy of ddreing Rui concern, though uch

collbortion i oliticlly enitive toic in Whington. Preident Obm h romied to the

Sente tht the United Stte will not ccet ny retriction on it miile defene from Rui,

nd thirty-nine Reublicn Sentor hve written to the Preident exreing their ooition to

hring enitive miile technology with Rui or grnting Mocow veto over the U.S. ue of miile defene ytem.

In Euroe, miile defene generte dierent oliticl chllenge. ough Americ NATO

llie er omewht le intereted thn Whington in the concet of miile defene, ome

new NATO member in Centrl Euroe eem to welcome n oortunity to hot U.S. ytem

nd eronnel tht, in their view, trengthen U.S. ecurity gurntee. A reult, once thee

rrngement hve been mde, ome in thee ntion might interret n greement with Rui tht

eliminte or cle bck the lnned fcilitie cricing their interet in fvor of Mocow or,

more trkly, U.S. bndonment.

Given current ln for miile defene nd uncertinty bout it eectivene, it ignicnce

er t time to be overtted for vrying oliticl reon in both the United Stte nd Rui.

Neverthele, eective miile defene on the cle currently enviioned could contribute vlubly

to the ecurity of the United Stte nd it llie without comromiing Rui nucler deterrent

cbilitie. e chllenge for the United Stte lie in nding n roch tht blnce U.S. ntionl

interet, the concern of U.S. llie in Centrl Euroe, nd Rui enitivitie. i hould be

oible through ome combintion of dt-hring, trnrency, nd ecic urnce to Mocow.


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e United Stte hould exlore with Rui new trtegic tbility concet tht reect

the fct tht Whington nd Mocow re no longer enemie rered to detroy ech

other, but rther otentil rtner.

e next round of U.S.-Ruin nucler rm reduction hould combine deloyed nd non-

deloyed weon to lower the ceiling of trtegic wrhed to 1,000 or fewer. e United

Stte hould lo work with Rui to drw other ntion into nucler rm reduction tlk.

In dicuing tcticl nucler weon with Rui, the United Stte hould focu rt on

negotiting conolidtion, trnrency nd veriction meure rther thn reduction.

e United Stte hould trive to negotite recirocl nd verible meure with Rui

to incree the wrning nd deciion time for their nucler miile force.

e United Stte hould roceed with develoing nti-miile ytem in Euroe nd

globlly, in line with the relitic ement of exiting nd future thret nd vilble

technologie nd fund.

e United Stte hould led NATO in comleting joint ement of miile thret

with Rui bi for NATO-Rui greement on miile defene cooertion.

Building on the 1997 Founding Act on NATO-Ruin reltion, thi greement hould

declre tht it igntorie hve no intention, no ln nd no reon to deloy miile

defene et in Euroe in uch wy tht they would trget or intercet trtegic

delivery vehicle of ech other. e greement hould, to the extent feible, rovide for

continuou hring of dt; exchnge of liion ocer, nd joint exercie in detecting

nd interceting miile.

e United Stte hould encourge trnrency regrding Ruin force, ction, nd

ln tht i equivlent to U.S. trnrency towrd Mocow.

e United Stte hould re Rui to refrin from otentilly detbilizing chnge in

it trtegic nucler oture nd ln.

T Uid Sas, Russia, ad Gopoiics

Since the end of the Cold Wr, the United Stte, Rui, nd NATO hve been unble to develo

mutully-ccetble Euroen ecurity ytem. Mny in Americ nd Euroe hve tken the view

tht the victor in the Cold Wr, Whington nd it llie lone hould dene the tructure of

Euroen ecurity nd tht ny role for Mocow i conceion to Rui. i i mitke, becue

it will not be oible to etblih enduring ecurity, ece, nd roerity on the whole in Euroe

on the bi of ecurity ytem tht ntgonize Rui. Rui i geogrhiclly within Euroe


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nd it deciion cn hve ignicnt imct on Euroe nd Euroen ecurity whether or not

Rui belong to ny rticulr intitution or rrngement.

While Preident Medvedev rooed ecurity trety i not the olution, refuing to dicu new

ecurity ytem eectively exclude Rui from Euroen ecurity nd encourge Mocow to

blnce gint the United Stte nd NATO. i doe not dvnce U.S. ntionl interet. e

exiting ytem lo leve mny diute nd frozen conict unreolved. Both the United Stte

nd it Euroen llie hould welcome new mechnim of conict revention, interdiction nd

reolution in Euroe, including ot-conict tbiliztion, tht would be le rone to dedlock

imilr to thoe een in the UN Security Council over Koovo, nd tht could be emloyed

in timely mnner to revent conict imilr to the Augut 2008 wr in which Rui ided

with Georgi ertit rovince of South Oeti nd Abkhzi. Integrting Rui into theEuroen ecurity ytem in mutully-ccetble mnner, or even conulting more frequently nd

intenively with Mocow, could contribute vlubly to ecurity nd tbility in trtegiclly nd

economiclly criticl region.

A more eective ecurity rchitecture in Euroe could lo hel win Ruin cooertion in other

re, including vi--vi Chin. Mocow i very unlikely to tke ny chnce with Beijing when it i

imultneouly inecure to the Wet. Yet, Chin rid economic growth, long with it increing

regionl nd globl oliticl inuence, eem likely to be centrl chllenge fcing the United Sttend Rui in the coming decde. Americ criticl tk in mnging Chin rie i to he the

interntionl environment in wy tht will encourge Beijing to work within nd dt to the

exiting globl order rther thn eeking to redene it ubtntilly t Americ exene. i

in turn require the United Stte to work cloely with the world other mjor ower, including

Rui. Needle to y, uruing uch dicuion with Mocow will not be ey; ny eort to work

with Rui to mnge Chin rie will require tient nd creful dilomcy, cler demontrtion

of the otentil benet to Rui, rticultion of n roch tht will not liente Beijing, nd

deeer ene of trut thn currently exit.

Deite ignicnt digreement over olicie nd the roer role of the United Ntion,

Whington h been ucceful t time in winning Mocow uort for U.S. gol in the

UN Security Councilomething tht h generlly fcilitted Chin uort well. i

erve imortnt U.S. ntionl interet by enhncing the interntionl legitimcy of Americn

ction. It lo enlit Mocow nd Beijing in uruing Americn objective nd eek to void the

etblihment of n enduring nti-Americn voting bloc in the UN Security Councilomething

tht would return the body to it Cold Wr er dyfunction.


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A more roctive U.S. roch to dicuion of otentil trouble ot with Rui could ly the

groundwork for ccelerted Security Council delibertion nd imrove roect for U.S.-Ruin

greement in the future, including in re of digreement.


e United Stte hould be rered to lunch genuine nd ubtntive dilogue rt

with it NATO llie nd then with Rui bout new incluive Euroen ecurity ytem

tht would give Rui meningful voice nd tht would include n eective rid

reone mechnim of conict revention, interdiction nd reolution.

In mking mjor interntionl olicy deciion, the United Stte hould conider

whether U.S. ction could conolidte Ruin-Chinee cooertion t the exene of

wider U.S. gol.

A long it er feible, chieving broder U.S. objective vi--vi Rui hould hve

riority over exnding NATO memberhi in wy tht could undermine cooertion on

greter U.S. rioritie.

e United Stte hould dicourge Rui nd Georgi from ny further confronttion

nd work towrd eceful, long-term olution to the ttu of Abkhzi nd South

Oeti, recognizing legitimte interet of ll rtie.

e United Stte hould gree with Rui nd leding Euroen tte on wht dditionl

meure the Mink Grou hould tke to dicourge reumtion of hotilitie between

Armeni nd Azerbijn over Ngorny Krbkh nd work towrd eceful, long-term

reolution of thi conict well the Trndnietrin conict, recognizing the legitimte

interet of ll rtie.

e United Stte hould encourge Rui to refrin from detbilizing rm or technology

le to Chin.

e United Stte hould encourge Rui to urue conulttion nd trnrency

regrding the ctivitie of it conventionl force in Euroe nd Ai equivlent to U.S. eort.

T Uid Sas, Russia, ad Ey Scuiy

A one of the world ingle mot imortnt energy roducer, Rui ly centrl role in

interntionl energy mrket. Rui invetment nd regultory deciion will hve rofound

imct on globl energy ulie in the yer hed, rticulrly in light of it ging energy

infrtructure nd limited invetment in future roduction oortunitie. u, Mocow


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economic choice could ubtntilly ect the rice Americn conumer nd comnie will

y for energy on world mrket in the future. Aide from invetment nd economic deciion,

Ruin oliticl deciion cn ditort mrket, including through eort to ue energy exort for

oliticl leverge.

e United Stte h four ntionl interet with reect to Rui nd energy ecurity:

Exnding Ruin energy roduction nd exort, which will likely require imroved

invetment condition, dotion of new technologie nd mngement technique, nd

reduction of wte nd ineciency;

Avoiding Ruin ue of energy oliticl leverge to retrict the indeendence of other

ntion nd dirut mrket;

Strengthening the overll ecurity environment in Centrl Ai nd the Cin Bin; nd

Enuring fir tretment for Americn comnie in Rui.

Although Rui energy ector i the mot ignicnt in it economy by fr, it outut remin

contrined by oor infrtructure, old technology, nd ineective mngement rctice. Rui

energy comnie re unlikely to be ble to ddre thee roblem on their own nytime oon,

becue they lck the fund, the technology, nd the exerience. Notwithtnding ome new

greement, invetment condition in Rui hve not ttrcted foreign invetment on the cle

necery to overhul the energy ector. In fct, Rui invetment condition re not ucienteven to ttrct lrge-cle Russian invetment.

Poor invetment condition in the energy ector reect the wider wekne of the rule of lw in

Rui well the Ruin government deire to retin coniderble control over energy, which

i een both rincil vehicle for Rui ntionl gretne in the twenty-rt century nd key

intrument of internl oliticl inuence becue of the welth it generte. Lingering mitrut of

mrket mechnim mong ome Ruin ocil neceitte dee tte involvement in the energy

ector in order to roduce deired outcome. Mocow h been imilrly unwilling to cede control

or inuence over it energy olicy to externl ctor. i i rent in Rui lck of interet in

joining OPEC (deite the grou wek enforcement of roduction quot), on the one hnd, nd

it determined nd t time counterroductive eort to revent Ukrine or other trnit countrie

from hving leverge over Ruin energy exort vi ieline, on the other.

Simultneouly, with few other eective foreign olicy tool, rticulrly in Euroe, the Ruin

government h relied hevily on it energy olicy n equlizer in deling with leding Wetern

government nd form of reure on mller ntion. While thi h limited direct imct on


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the United Stte, it h undermined Euroen energy ecurity nd i cue of eriou concern

mong mny U.S. llie.

Since the colle of the Soviet Union, Rui cientic etblihment h fced declining reource

nd retigend lrge-cle emigrtion of tlented reercherbut neverthele Rui continue

to oe coniderble otentil for dvnced reerch in energy extrction, energy eciency,

lterntive energy, nd other high-technology eld. Preident Medvedev h emhized

encourging innovtion centrl olicy gol, though it i uncler whether thi inititive cn

ucceed bent imrovement in the rule of lw nd rogre in deregultion. Rui could become

vluble rtner in reducing conumtion of foil fuel nd greenhoue g emiion from the

United Stte nd Rui, both of which hve very high er cit emiion rte.

u fr, U.S.-Ruin enggement on energy iue h been ordic nd lrgely technicl with

the excetion of the nucler here, where Mocow nd Whington hve been mking uch tride

the U.S.-Rui 123 Agreement. It lo uer from mimtch between Americn nd Ruin

roche to the role of government in the energy ector. Brodly eking, the U.S.-Ruin

energy reltionhi h not received riority roortionte to wht i t tke for the United Stte.


e United Stte hould rie the riority of the U.S.-Ruin energy dilogue nd focu

on removing obtcle to bilterl invetment, trde, nd reerch.

e United Stte hould re Rui to imrove invetment condition in the energy

ector nd in Rui overll economy nd mke cler to Mocow tht mitreting U.S. nd

Wetern comnie dmge Rui invetment climte nd interntionl imge, nd i n

obtcle to imroving reltion with the United Stte.

e United Stte hould continue to uort eventul Ruin memberhi in the

Orgniztion for Economic nd Cooertion nd Develoment nd the Interntionl

Energy Agency men to imrove olicy coordintion nd trnrency.

e United Stte hould incororte dicuion of energy ecurity into dilogue with

Rui regrding key globl energy region, e.g. the Middle Et.

e United Stte hould encourge Rui to reolve energy-relted diute through

dilogue, rbitrtion, litigtion, or other men tyicl in ddreing commercil

digreement rther thn through eort t intimidtion.


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T Uid Sas, Russia, ad Cou-Toism

e United Stte nd Rui hve ech endured mjor terrorit ttck by Ilmit extremit nd

remin under thret of further terrorim. Although ecic grou trget the two countrie for

rticulr reon, there re link between extremit network tht ttck ech country. Al Qed

h dilyed conitent interet in cquiring nucler weon, exloring oortunitie for uch

cquiition in former Soviet Union nd other rt of the world. Terrorit grou bed in Rui

North Cucu tht conduct ttck on Rui hve etblihed tie with nd ought nncing from

l Qed lite. Al Qed oertive hve engged in terrorit ttck gint the United Stte

nd hve encourged ttck on Rui. In ddition, Whington nd Mocow hre concern bout

the otentil imct of terrorim in other region, eecilly in Afghnitn, Pkitn, nd Centrl

Ai Americ nd NATO grdully drw down force in Afghnitn.

Deite thee common concern, nd hred interet in combting terrorim, the United Stte

nd Rui hve dierent rioritie; unurriingly, ech government i mot focued on immedite

thret to it eole, it territory, nd, in the U.S. ce, it militry force deloyed overe.

Americ nd Rui likewie tke dierent roche to combting terrorim, including in how

they dene the ource of terrorim, how they eek to reduce it, nd how they etblih the blnce

between ecurity nd liberty within their ocietie.

ee dierence hve limited U.S.-Ruin cooertion in ghting terrorim. e United Stte

h been reluctnt to rovide Mocow itnce in combting terrorim in the North Cucu,

rimrily due to concern bout Rui roch to intbility in the region, eecilly it humn

right rctice. At the me time, Rui h been deely keticl of U.S. militry intervention nd

Americn clim tht democrcy romotion cn reduce extremim nd terrorim. Ech government

likely believe tht the other olicie ctully cue rther thn revent terror. Becue neither

government trut the other roch, ech i reluctnt to hre highly enitive intelligence.

e underdeveloment of U.S.-Ruin counterterrorim cooertion hrm U.S. ntionl interet.

In Afghnitn, for exmle, Rui till h ome otentilly imortnt intelligence reource

due to it long reence there nd it ongoing enggement with the country non-Phtun ethnic

grou. ough ubtntive cooertion my develo lowly, it i eentil to ccelerte eort to

ecure Ruin cooertion.


e United Stte hould trengthen joint cbilitie with Rui to collect nd nlyze

intelligence on terrorit thret, including nucler, biologicl, nd conventionl cttrohic

terrorim thret to the two ntion nd their llie. e United Stte nd Rui hould


37/52


lo conider etblihing joint counter-terrorim tem modeled on U.S. nd Ruin

force tht hve conducted counter-nrcotic rid in Afghnitn.

e United Stte hould eek to hrmonize U.S. nd Ruin government lit of terrorit

orgniztion ubject to nction. Begin by encourging Rui to conduct joint U.S.-Ruin globl terrorim thret ement with the U.S., focued on develoing lit of the

world mot dngerou terrorit orgniztion nd their trget.

e United Stte hould urue more extenive joint counter-terrorim exercie with Rui.

T Uid Sas, Russia, ad Ca Asia, icudi Aaisa

Euroe w the centrl region of cometition mong the world gret ower during the

twentieth century. While cometition in Euroe h declined, the contet for influence in

Centrl Ai h intenified. Outide ower eek cce to Centrl Ai energynd unlike

t itertion of the crmble for reource, Chin i key lyer. At the me time, the

United Stte nd thoe in neighboring territorie hre concern bout intbility, terrorim,

nd drug trfficking.

Fortuntely, U.S.-Ruin rivlry in Centrl Ai er to hve receded omewht in the lt

few yer, Mocow nxiety over wht it w U.S.-onored color revolution in the

former Soviet Union h ubided. e United Stte nd Rui cooerted during intbility

in Kyrgyztn in 2010, lrgely voiding the bilterl tenion tht reviou intbility there nd

elewhere hd roduced. Some in Mocow lo er increingly to recite the vlue of the

U.S. reence in Afghnitn.

A the United Stte nd NATO drw down their militry force in Afghnitn, regionl

tte including Rui will only grow in imortnce to Afghnitn tbility. Trnit route

through Rui hve become key comonent the Americn logitic line of communiction to

Afghnitn nd my be even more crucil during the Americn nd NATO withdrwl, in view

of intenied militry logitic requirement nd ongoing worrie bout route through Pkitn.i will require cloe nd utined enggement between Whington nd Mocow. If the U.S.-

Ruin reltionhi deteriorte, Rui my limit it cooertion on Afghnitn, which could

hrm U.S. ntionl interet.


e United Stte hould exnd U.S. brieng of Ruin civilin nd militry ocil

regrding U.S. ln in Afghnitn rt of broder eort to build further cooertion

there, including greter ue of uly route through Rui.


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e United Stte hould engge Rui on reing Pkitn to end ncturie nd

uort for grou ghting in Afghnitn nd for romoting dilomtic ettlement of

Afghnitn-Pkitn dierence.

e United Stte hould intenify dicuion of the end-gme in Afghnitn with theRuin government, including militry-to-militry tlk.

e United Stte hould rooe trtegic dilogue on rule of the rod to void zero-

um roche to Centrl Ai. A rt of thi, the United Stte hould encourge

Rui to reect the overeignty of Centrl Ain tte nd to urue it interet

trnrently nd without the thret or ue of force.

e United Stte hould exlore oortunitie for militry cooertion with Rui bed

on the unique circumtnce tht hve led ech to hve militry be in Kyrgyztn.

e United Stte hould work to incree Rui rticition in counter-nrcotic

oertion in Afghnitn, in rt to give Rui greter tke in U.S. ucce in

Afghnitn.

e United Stte hould eek to conult with Rui on infrtructure nd other invetment

in Centrl Ai, rticulrly thoe connecting Afghnitn with the ret of the region.

T Uid Sas, Russia, ad Tad ad Ism

Rui rnk 24th mong U.S. trding rtner nd 25th on the lit of direct invetment in Americ.

e United Stte i Rui 11th lrget trding rtner nd 10th lrget ource of foreign direct

invetment into Rui. In contrt, Germny i Rui third lrget trding rtner nd h lrget

ource of foreign invetment.

ere re mny reon for the low develoment of U.S.-Ruin economic reltion, including

mot notbly Rui buine environment, which i oor in mny reect due to wek rule of lw

nd widered corrution.

Bilterl U.S.-Ruin trde nd invetment remin oliticlly chrged to degree no longer een

in Ruin trde with Euroe, where economic interction with Ruin comniette-owned or

indeendenter more routine. e continuing liction of the Jckon-Vnik Amendment

to Rui in the United Stte i erh the key exmle. Congreionl reluctnce to grdute

Rui from Jckon-Vnik, trictly ymbolic Cold Wr relic tht imoe no ubtntively

meningful retriction, ugget wider U.S. reitnce to deeer economic enggement to mny inRui. i deter both Americn nd Ruin rm from working with one nother.


39/52


Rui entry into the World Trde Orgniztion nd nlly grnting Rui Permnent Norml Trde

Reltion (thereby removing Mocow from the Jckon-Vnik roce) could rovide n imortnt

boot to bilterl trde nd invetment by clering wy ome of tody ychologicl obtcle.

Moreover, exnding trde nd invetment cn crete their own elf-reinforcing dynmic rm in

ech country become more comfortble in the economic reltionhi, nd the oliticl contituency

for economic enggement in ech country grow nd cquire criticl m.

Of coure, Rui WTO memberhi will require Mocow to conclude n greement with Georgi,

the ole outtnding WTO member er the United Stte without n cceion greement with

Rui. Georgi h ttemted to ue it WTO negotition with Rui to ddre wider iue in

Georgin-Ruin reltion, including the ttu of South Oeti nd Abkhzi. We conider thi

roch more likely to excerbte exiting tenion thn to fcilitte the return of thoe two region

to Georgi control.

While Rui WTO memberhi would erve U.S. ntionl interet, it would not dequtely

ddre hortcoming in Ruin dometic rctice or the interet of Americn comnie trying

to work in Rui corrut buine environment. Rui current inconitent nd ometime hrh

tretment of foreign invetor undermine utinble U.S.-Ruin economic rtnerhi.

Deite thi, bill on Ruin corrution nd humn right before the U.S. Congre re dngerouly

brod. e verion of the Sergei Mgnitky Rule of Lw Accountbility Act under dicuion when

we rered thi reort i intended to imoe vi bn nd et freeze on ocil ocited with

the deth of Sergei Mgnitky, lwyer jiled er ccuing Ruin ocil of mive corrution.

However, it could do ignicnt dmge to the U.S.-Ruin reltionhi by llowing individul

member of Congre to initite roceeding gint Ruin ocil or other whom they ccue

of involvement in Mgnitky deth or other ignicnt humn right violtion. But nrrower

lw with better fegurd could be n ccetble relcement for Jckon-Vnik nd, together with

the Obm Adminitrtion recent deciion to block vi for ome Ruin ocil involved in the

detention nd deth of Mgnitky, would end cler mege tht corrution ecting U.S. nd

Wetern comnie nd their emloyee, both foreign nd Ruin ntionl, h conequence.

e eort to deter corrution nd reinforce the rule of lw in Rui i ultimtely imortnt not only

to U.S. ntionl interet nd vlue, but lo to Rui future. In ddition to it contribution to

humn right in Rui, the rule of lw i eentil to Ruin eort to build diveried economy

tht crete foundtion for utined economic growth. i in turn i likely to exnd Rui

middle cl nd, over time, trengthen the force in Ruin ociety reing for oliticl nd

economic reform.


40/52



e United Stte nd Rui hould ridly comlete the U.S.-Ruin greement on

Rui WTO cceion.

e United Stte hould intenify bilterl conulttion to ddre remining obtcle

to U.S.-Ruin trde nd invetment, rticulrly to romote the rule of lw nd reduce

corrution in Rui.

e United Stte hould work with the Euroen Union to re Rui to negotite

eriouly with Georgi to comlete Georgi-Rui WTO greement, while encourging

Georgi to limit tlk to iue tht re within the coe of the WTO work.

e United Stte Congre hould grdute Rui from the Jckon-Vnik Amendment

retriction nd develo new legiltion on Ruin corrution nd humn right.

In reviewing the Mgnitky bill, the U.S. Congre hould focu on dicourging lrge-

cle corrut rctice nd mjor humn right violtion in Rui by identifying thoe

reonible nd lying rorite enltie, while enuring due roce to the ccued,

roviding good fegurd, nd llowing ucient exibility for the executive brnch.

e United Stte hould revive eort to ign the bilterl invetment trety negotited

in the mid-1990, in order to ddre ome of the rimry concern U.S. invetor fce in

Rui nd to rovide them with recoure in the event of ntionliztion of U.S. comnie

invetment in Rui, or other ction tht re tntmount to ntionliztion.

e United Stte hould endore the Ruin government tted objective of rivtizing

lrge tte-owned rm, including energy comnie.

e United Stte hould urue further liberliztion of the bilterl vi regime with

Rui to foter tourim, eduction nd commerce.

A the United Stte conduct it mjor review of exort control, it hould conider

control in trde with Rui in mnner deigned to fcilitte exchnge of technology

nd direct invetment in both countrie.

e United Stte hould work with the Euroen Union to re Rui to rotect the

right of foreign rm doing buine in Rui nd hould ertely re Rui to

rotect the right of Americn comnie oerting there.

T Uid Sas, Russia, ad Dmocaic Vaus

Rui oliticl ytem incororte ome element of democrcy, but i certinly not democrtic.

Perh the gretet wekne in Rui governnce i lck of the rule of lw, which undermine


41/52


the ccountbility of the country lederhi to it eole. Election re deely wed nd wek

legiltive nd judicil brnche fil to lce check on executive ower. (A noted bove, the

underdeveloment of the rule of lw lo imede Rui economic develoment.) Rui current

ytem i utined in rt by oultion tht remin leery of chnge er t diointment.

Rui governnce i nd hould be eriou concern to the United Stte nd contrin the

develoment of the U.S.-Ruin reltionhi.

Deite thi, it i imortnt to lce Rui governnce in hitoricl erective. Unlike mny

former Soviet bloc countrie in Centrl Euroe, re-1991 Rui hd very limited exerience with

democrcy. And while Rui leder ber reonibility for their deciion, ot-1991 Rui did

not lwy receive the bet dvice from the United Stte in imlementing oliticl nd economic

reform. Tody, Rui lck the rule of lw, check nd blnce nd meningful oliticl freedom;

neverthele, Ruin citizen enjoy hitoriclly unrecedented eronl freedom nd better

economic roect thn ny time ince Rui indeendence.

Some trend in Rui tody reect in rt ocil rection to the country exerience in the

1990, time of unrelitic execttion in both countrie bout Rui future. Americn hould

recognize tht building modern democrtic intitution i genertionl tk in Rui nd other

countrie in trnition. Indeed, enforced democrtic freedom without trong intitution nd

trdition of comromie nd tolernce could bring nti-Americn ntionlit to ower, which i

not in the U.S. ntionl interet. Lting chnge will be driven by the grdully increing demndof Rui exnding middle cl rther thn by foreign ronouncement.

Vldimir Putin crefully-orchetrted emergence the United Rui Prty cndidterrnged

in dee ecrecy nd voiding ublic dicuion even t the United Rui Prty Congrefurther

vivie tht Rui i nowhere ner Wetern-tyle democrcy. And during hi reviou term

Preident, Mr. Putin howed no interet in externl guidnce on Rui dometic rrngement.

Unfortuntely, while trengthening the rule of lw, democrcy, nd dherence to interntionl

humn right tndrd in Rui erve Americn ntionl interet nd vlue, the United

Stte h limited tool t it diol to fcilitte thi in the bence of ctive brod-bed olicy

enggement with the Ruin government. Americn oliticl nd rhetoricl reure cn t time

contribute to mrginl chnge in the Ruin government dometic rctice; however, it imct

i generlly eriherl nd limited to iolted nd lower-role ce. Rel democrtiztion will not

occur in Rui in the bence of owerful internl force clling for it. oe force re till wek

t thi time. Unfortuntely, viible U.S. uort for ecic individul nd grou cn oen be

counterroductive nd my ut dvocte of oliticl reform within Rui t rik.


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In the decde following Rui indeendence, Americn execttion for Ruin democrcy were

overly otimitic. Still, brodly eking, the Wetern roch to Rui ince tht time h been

correct: the United Stte nd the Wet hve ought to romote economic develoment in Rui

to exnd nd emower the middle cl, bed on belief tht riing execttion mong lrge

middle cl will be key driver of democrtiztion. With thi in mind, Ruin memberhi in the

World Trde Orgniztion hould be high riority, given the WTO rule-etting function nd the

otentil economic benet for the United Stte, Rui, nd other countrie in bringing the lrget

remining economy outide the WTO into it frmework. However, if Rui doe not urue

economic reform, nd eecilly if energy rice fll, Rui could exerience oliticl intbility.

Seriou intbility would be rticulrly worriome, it could be detrimentl to vitl U.S. ntionl

interet, oibly even including the ecurity of Rui nucler renl.

Recognizing the relitie of Ruin olitic nd ociety, Rui governnce generlly doe not

determine it foreign olicy conduct, though Rui t time eem more comfortble intercting

with uthoritrin lederrticulrly on it erihery. i i fundmentl dierence from

the t, when the Soviet Union foreign olicy w nimted by Soviet communit ideology

nd eort to red Soviet-tyle government round the globe. Tody, Mocow i eentilly

rgmtic, eek to cooerte with democrcie nd non-democrcie like, nd h bndoned

Soviet-er meinic im. Recently, Rui collborted with the United Stte in Kyrgyztn

trnition er it 2010 revolution.

However, Ruin ocil hve clerly tted their dee reervtion bout Americn eort to

romote democrcy. Ruin leder mke cler tht their ooition to U.S. democrcy romotion

i not ooition to Americn democrcy or to democrcy er e but inted reect (1) uicion

of Americn motive (rticulrly in the former Soviet Union, where U.S. democrcy romotion h

been viewed fde for eort to undermine Rui role), (2) nxiety bout Americn method

nd the detbilizing imct of oliticl chnge, nd (3) generl dicomfort with the ide tht one

country hould involve itelf in nother internl ir.


When Rui violte interntionl commitment or it own lw through it dometic

rctice, the United Stte hould exre U.S. concern while voiding tronizing tone.

U.S. leder hould lo void ering to endore Ruin dometic rctice tht conict

with bic Americn vlue nd Rui interntionl obligtion.

e United Stte hould ccet tht democrtic oliticl chnge within Rui will likely

occur grdully nd need not necerily led to Americn-tyle democrcy.

e United Stte hould uort Ruin-led eort t democrtic nd mrket reform


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when they occur, but hould void te likely to be viewed interference in Rui

dometic olitic, which re oen counterroductive.

e United Stte hould continue ocil dilogue with Rui on humn right iue.

e United Stte hould mke very cler in rivte dicuion with Ruin ocil tht

Ruin violtion of interntionl humn right norm cn hrm Ruin ntionl interet.

In view of the vitl Americn interet t tke in the U.S.-Ruin reltion, nd

Whington limited leverge over Rui low dometic trnition, the United Stte

hould not llow democrcy romotion to dominte it roch to Rui.

T Cosqucs o Faiu

Jut the United Stte hould exect Rui to djut mny of it olicie to chieve utinblecooertive reltionhi, Whington hould recognize tht Mocow i unlikely to uort U.S.

olicy gol if the U.S.-Ruin reltionhi ignicntly deteriorte. A reult, the filure to

etblih n ongoing working reltionhi with Rui would be quite cotly for the United Stte.

A rcticl mtter, even tlled reltionhi could be roblemtic. e United Stte nd Rui

re both motivted to imrove reltion lrgely on the bi of hoe for wht tronger reltionhi

could roduce. If the roect for relizing thoe hoe become too remote, it i uncertin whether

wht h been ccomlihed o fr i ucient to revent our ubtntil remining dierence

from tering the U.S.-Ruin reltionhi rt.

U.S. ocil mut crefully weigh not only the Americn ntionl interet in working more cloely

with Rui, but lo the cot nd benet of filing to do o, keeing in mind Mocow ccity

to ct oiler in number of re nd on number of iue tht re of vitl ntionl interet

to Whington. In our conidered judgment, the choice i cler: the United Stte hould urue

utinble cooertive reltionhi with Rui to dvnce vitl Americn ntionl interet, but

do o without illuion regrding either Mocow ometime neo-imeril mbition, or the ce of

democrtic chnge in Rui.


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Task Force Members

Gaa As

Director of Hrvrd Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science nd Interntionl Air, Grhm

Allion h for three decde been leding nlyt of U.S. ntionl ecurity nd defene olicy with

ecil interet in nucler weon, terrorim, nd deciion-mking. A Aitnt Secretry of

Defene in the rt Clinton Adminitrtion, Dr. Allion received the Defene Dertment highet

civilin wrd, the Defene Medl for Ditinguihed Public Service, for rehing reltion with

Rui, Ukrine, Belru, nd Kzkhtn to reduce the former Soviet nucler renl. Dr. Allion

h erved Secil Advior to the Secretry of Defene under Preident Regn. He h the ole

ditinction of hving twice been wrded the Dertment of Defene highet civilin wrd, the

Ditinguihed Public Service Medl, rt by Secretry C Weinberger nd econd by Secretry

Bill Perry. He erved member of the Defene Policy Bord for Secretrie Weinberger, Crlucci,

Cheney, Ain, Perry nd Cohen.

R D. BaRobert D. Blckwill i the Henry A. Kiinger enior fellow for U.S. foreign olicy t the Council

on Foreign Reltion. A deuty itnt to the reident nd deuty ntionl ecurity dvier for

trtegic lnning under Preident George W. Buh, Ambdor Blckwill w reonible for

government-wide olicy lnning to hel develo nd coordinte the mid- nd long-term direction

of Americn foreign olicy. He erved reidentil envoy to Irq nd w the dminitrtion

coordintor for U.S. olicie regrding Afghnitn nd Irn. Ambdor Blckwill went to the

Ntionl Security Council (NSC) er erving the U.S. mbdor to Indi from 2001 to 2003,

nd i the reciient of the 2007 Bridge-Builder Awrd for hi role in trnforming U.S.-Indi

reltion. Prior to reentering government in 2001, he w the Belfer lecturer in interntionl ecurity

t Hrvrd Univerity John F. Kennedy School of Government. From 1989 to 1990, Ambdor

Blckwill w ecil itnt to Preident George H.W. Buh for Euroen nd Soviet ir,

during which time he w wrded Commnder Cro of the Order of Merit by the Federl

Reublic of Germny for hi contribution to Germn uniction.


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Cas G. B

Generl Chrle G. Boyd, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), i the Strr Ditinguihed Ntionl Security Fellow

t the Center for the Ntionl Interet. He w Preident nd Chief Executive Ocer of Buine

Executive for Ntionl Security (BENS) from 2002 to 2009. Before joining BENS, he erved

Senior Vice Preident nd Whington Progrm Director of the Council on Foreign Reltion. He i

the former Executive Director of the Hrt-Rudmn Ntionl Security Commiion, which forew

the growing terrorit thret to the United Stte well before the Setember 11, 2011 ttck nd

dvocted ri

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