Russell Problems Key Ideas

7/31/2019 Russell Problems Key Ideas

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1. Is any knowledge so certain as be beyond reasonable doubt?

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2. Philosophy attempts to answer ultimate questions, by approaching them critically

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3. Our present experiences seem the obvious starting point for enquiry4. But immediate experience can be doubted, unless it is described with great precision

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5. For example, my table appears to vary in colour, because ofangles ofreflected light

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6. Painters study appearances, which may therefore differ from reality

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7. The colour of a table varies with viewing conditions, and depends on the observer

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8. Colour is defined for normal conditions and observers, but this is favouritism9. Texture varies from smooth (with the naked eye) to rough (with a microscope)

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10. Even shape is not directly seen, but is inferred from multiple angles ofviewing

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31. But there is no reason to think we are dreaming, and common sense is a simpler view32. Ifthe cat exists, that explains why it changes between one observation and another

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33. Similarly, unobserved thoughts are the best explanation ofother humans behaviour34. We also have an instinctive beliefin reality, especially where sight is concerned

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1135. We conclude that the external world does exist, but with a slight element ofdoubt36. Knowledge is built on instinctive beliefs, but philosophy examines their hierarchy andconsistency

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37. Science suggests that real tables (behind the sensedata) consist ofmotions

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38. But a blind man could understand wavemotions, but not light itself

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39. Similarly space is an experience through sight or touch, though scientific space isneutral

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40. Coins look oval in our private space, but are round in real public space

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50. Berkeley argued that sensedata are mental, so only mental events can be known51. Everything consists ofideas, such as sensedata, memories, or imagined things

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52. To be is to be perceived, and the continuity of existence depends on Godsperceptions53. In fact, our perceptions are participations in Gods, which explains the similaritybetween individuals

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54. Berkeley seems to have (simply!) confused things being in minds with ideas ofthem inminds55. We have shown that colours depend on minds, but they neednt exist in them

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56. Berkeley seems confused by the ambiguity ofidea (as both an act and a thing)

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57. Saying knowledge is in the mind is either tautological, or absurdly limiting

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58. It is claimed that anything beyond our acquaintance is unimportant and even unreal

221But matter affects us even ifwe only suspect its existence2We can know the truth ofsomething while lacking knowledge ofit by acquaintance3If I know a thing by description it may be that nobody is acquainted with it4This indirect knowledge is reached by inference from general principles5Knowledge is oftruths, or ofthings (either by acquaintance or by description)6Knowledge by acquaintance is direct awareness (e.g. ofsensedata like colours)

7A table is known by description, built up from truths connected to acquaintance8Our acquaintance is not limited to sensedata, but extends to the past, and to truths9We are acquainted with our memories, which appear to us as being the past10We are acquainted with experiences and feelings, by introspection or selfconsciousness11We deduce selfconsciousness in other people (not animals) by analogy with ourselves12We may lack permanent personal identity, but seem to know our selves as observersby introspection13We are also acquainted with universals (general ideas), which we are aware ofasconcepts14We are not acquainted with physical objects or other minds, which need descriptions15We know things by definite description, in the singular form ofthe soandso

16We have merely descriptive knowledge ifthere is no acquaintance (e.g. the man in theiron mask)17Reference to the soandso also says that it is unique and it exists18Many common words (even proper names) have the logical form ofdefinite descriptions19The same thought may require different descriptions for different people20Bismarck is acquainted with himself, but his body and mind are known to others bydescription21The bundle ofdescriptions by which we know Bismarck will reduce to particularacquaintances22All particularjudgements reduce to acquaintance, though we also know universals23References to what actually exists reduce to acquaintance (but not what might or could

be)24We can communicate because we believe in the propositions the descriptions support25There are stages ofcloseness in our acquaintance with particulars (and universals)26Every understandable proposition containing descriptions is reducible to acquaintance27The meaning ofall our language must involve acquaintance to be significant (evenJulius Caesar)28Descriptions can extend our knowledge beyond immediate experience29How can we make inferences beyond acquaintance with our selves and our sensedata?30What general beliefs couldjustify our claim that the sun will rise tomorrow?31We think the laws ofmotion will keep the earth rotating, but why?


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32Without past experiences guaranteeing future probabilities, we cant be sure ofanything33Expectations result from habits (even in chickens being fattened) but is this rational?34Is it true that there are no exceptions to the uniform laws ofnature?35Most ofour expectations do have exceptions, but what ofthe laws ofmotion andgravitation?36Physical laws seem to lack exceptions so far, but what about the future?37So far each future time has resembled past time, but what about future futures?38We have the same uncertainty with the remote past and remote space

39The best we can hope for is increasingly high probability with repetition (but rememberthe chicken!)40We cant even be sure there are laws (or whether a law fits a particular case)41We hope for the increased probability ofboth events and the laws behind them42A thing can remain probable even ifexceptions are found (so induction cant bedisproved this way)43Experience cant prove induction right, because knowledge ofexperience depends oninduction44Ordinary life, as well as scientific causation and laws, must depend on unprovedinduction45An even more basic assumption than induction is logical inference or implication

46Among selfevident laws those ofidentity, contradiction and excluded middle aretraditionally basic47The Rationalists were right that logic is selfevident, unprovable and takes us beyonddirect experience48The Rationalist beliefin innate knowledge is wrong, but logic is a priori (independent ofexperience)49The Empiricists are right that knowledge ofexistence must depend on experience50Nothing logically has to exist; experience (perhaps with additional a priori inferences) isneeded51Knowledge ofwhat has value is known a priori (though it is not logical)52Experience elicits the unprovable beliefthat happiness, knowledge and goodwill aredesirable53111. Empiricists are wrong to base maths on experience, because general principles gobeyond 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 sense ofnecessity about maths is not increased by fresh examples from experienceWe can easily imagine a possible world containing immortals, but not where 2 + 2 = 5


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Deduction starts from general principles, and induction from particularsDeduction does give new knowledge, as when arithmetic applies to particular objectsThe traditional Socrates syllogism should be inductive, and omit all men are mortalThus empirical generalisations should be based on induction, not deductionBefore Kant it was held that all a priori knowledge must be analytic (true by mereanalysis)Hume discovered many cases (especially causation) which were synthetic, not a priorianalytic

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4451Kant claimed that even arithmetic is synthetic, as 7+5=12 adds new knowledge2121. Clearly maths is not empirical as that would rely on induction, and experiencewould reinforce itffd8ffe000104a4649460001020100c800c80000ffe2ffff4943435f50524f46494c45000102000191b24b434d53020000006d6e74725247422058595a2007d500050010000e002e0006616373704d5346540000000048502020323354210000000000000000000000000000f6d5000100000000d32c4b4f4441000000000000000000000000000

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727665642e0058595a2000How can we know maths a priori, when it gives general truths that apply to the world?Kant sees sensedata as part ofthe world, with the mind supplying space, time,comparison and causeKant says we have a priori knowledge, but it is part ofus, not ofthe worldBut Kant is wrong, because we ourselves might change, so knowledge would change withusKant also fails to show how arithmetic has universal truth, beyond experienceThe law ofcontradiction is a beliefabout things, not about our own minds (that beechisnt a tree)Similarly arithmetic and relations like in assert something separate from our own minds


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Entities such as relations are universals, not mental or physical (like Platos forms)A universal is shared by many particulars and is their essence or common natureMost words denote universals, and every sentence (and truth) must contain at least oneUniversals denoted by verbs and prepositions are overlooked, and cause confusionSpinoza, Leibniz and others denied relations, and ended in monism or monadismRelations are more basic than qualities, as we cant identify qualities without themBerkeley and Hume rejected abstract ideas (qualities), but overlooked the problem ofrelations

Relations (e.g. is north of) are part ofthe world, not part ofour mindsA relation is timeless and spaceless, and not material or mental (although we do think ofit)If a universal was an act ofthought, it would lose its universalitySince universals are timeless they subsist or have being, rather than existThere are two worlds (equally important in philosophy), ofbeing, and ofexistenceSensible qualities are universals known to us by direct acquaintance with sensedataRelations in space and time, and resemblance, are universals taken from acquaintancewith sensedataWe can also abstract universals (greater than) from acquaintance with other universalsAll a priori knowledge (e.g. arithmetic) deals with relations ofuniversals

Numbers may seem to refer to particulars, but this is unnecessary for understandingWe can not know anything about experience a priori, only about the universals involvedThe meaning ofall men are mortal involves universals, but the evidence for it is particularEvidence might establish a general inductive relation between all men and mortals (notan a priori one)We may reach a priori knowledge via inductive generalisations (e.g. observing geometricalfigures)We can also reach a priori knowledge where no instances have been experienced(x*y>100)Knowledge ofthe physical world (and other minds) consists of a priori inferences withoutacquaintanceIntuition takes us beyond acquaintance to knowledge oftruths, but where does error arise?Reason and proofrest on selfevident principles ofinduction and deductionSome selfevident principles (e.g. arithmetic) can be deduced from others (e.g. logic)Particular examples (e.g. ofcontradiction) are more selfevident than general principlesThere are selfevident truths in perception (but they are not the actual sensedata)Wejudge the existence ofsensedata, and analyse their properties and relationsWe also intuitivelyjudge memories, not as images, but as objects seen as pastFalse memories show how easily intuitive selfevidentjudgement leads to errorThe reliability ofmemory seems to vary with its vividness and closeness in timeCases offirm beliefin a wholly false memory are probably not real memories (George IVat Waterloo)Memory shows that all selfevidence and intuition has degrees ofcertaintyPerception and logic seem highly selfevident, but induction, memory and complex mathsless soAlthoughjudgements ofethical and aesthetic value seem selfevident, they are weakThere may be a mixture ofinfallible selfevidence, and a variable intuitionTruth must be distinguished from its opposite, error, but first they need definitionA theory oftruth must refer to falsehood, belief, and external criteriaExternal criteria encourage a correspondence theory, but truth then seems unattainableThe alternative coherence theory might allow two completely coherent rival sets oftruthsAlso coherence depends on laws oflogic (e.g. contradiction) which cant take the


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coherence testThe correspondence theory is preferable; coherence is a test oftruth, not its meaningBeliefisnt a relation ofmind to object, as false beliefs lack objectsFalse beliefs cant relate the mind to objective falsehoods, so they must be more complexBeliefrelates a mind to several things other than itselfThe beliefrelates to the sense or direction ofthe objects which it isjudgingBeliefs refer to complex wholes ofgroups ofobjects, which must include a relationBeliefs are bound by believing; truths are bound by the ordered relationship ofthe objects

If a beliefis false then the complex unity ofbound objects does not existTruth is correspondence between a complex unity ofmind, and a matching order ofobjectsBeliefs are true ifthere is a corresponding fact (which is not in the mind)

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6781Can we ever really know anything, or only have lucky true beliefs?2A true beliefis not knowledge ifit is deduced illogically, or from a false belief3Derivative knowledge is validly deduced from premises known intuitively

4In practice most derivative knowledge is not logically deduced (e.g. knowledge derivedfrom reading)5Such psychological inference is admissible ifan unperceived logical link exists6The biggest uncertainties surround intuitive knowledge, which has to remain a bit vague7Knowledge by acquaintance comes close to infallible, though, by observing objects andtheir order8Judgement oftruths is less secure, because the ordering is not observed9Facts about mental life (e.g. Desdemonas love) are private and not directly observable10We can be acquainted with universals, and achieve selfevident guaranteed truth11Error becomes possible as soon as the simplestjudgement comes into it12In hearing sounds or comparing colours there are continual gradations ofselfevidence

13Similar gradations are found between very simple and highly complex reasonings14Intuitive knowledge loses reliability as it departs from basic sensedata and logic15Knowledge is firm beliefbased on strong intuition or inference from intuition16Most knowledge is actually probable opinion, based on lower degrees ofselfevidence17Probability is greatly increased by coherence, notably in science and philosophy18Thus dreams are best disbelieved because they are not coherent like waking life19Metaphysical reasoning to prove many grand theories and facts is largely in vain20Hegel says we can logically progress from incompleteness in the world, via antithesesand syntheses21This process converges on the Absolute Idea, and a vision of a unified spiritualAbsolute Reality

22Hegel assumes we can deduce all the truths about a thing's intrinsic nature23But acquaintance with a thing does not include its relations, or its nature (e.g. atoothache)24Thus Hegel cannot deduce from incomplete things the unreality ofspace, time, matterand evil25Philosophers try to prove space and time unreal (as their infinite natures seems tocontradict logic)26But mathematicians (e.g. Cantor) have now proved that infinity is perfectly possible inreality27They have also shown that nonEuclidean space is possible, and reality is simplystrange, not unreal

28Where logic formerly restricted reality, it now presents huge possibilities to experience29A priori knowledge cant reveal reality, unless it offers universals to link experiences30Philosophy, like science, needs experiences, but it also offers criticism ofprinciples31Principles on their own dont bring knowledge, but philosophy endorses most empiricalscience32Extreme scepticism steps outside ofall knowledge, and cant get back in33Descartes is not an extreme sceptic,just a very careful and sensible critic34While science benefits society, philosophy seems to benefit the minds ofthose whostudy it35Philosophical knowledge unifies science, and examines the grounds ofbeliefs


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36Philosophy seems not to advance, and its few real advances get taken over by science(e.g. astronomy)37The biggest philosophical questions (purpose, mind, morality) will probably never beanswered38Philosophy keeps the big issues alive, and examines all approaches to them39Philosophical investigation suggests that proofs ofreligion cannot be found40The very uncertainty ofphilosophy enlarges our thoughts and frees us mentally41Philosophy can free us from our strong desires and weak wills

42Philosophy studies objective truths outside the Self, and so it enlarges the Self43Relativism says truth is manmade and limited to the mind, which devalues philosophy44Philosophy brings a Godlike impersonal view, and impartiality in practical life45This impartiality is desire for truth,justice in actions, and love ofother people46

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GUIDE TORUSSELL'S THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY[THE NUMBERS REFER TO ITEMS ON THE 'KEY IDEAS' SUMMARY SHEET]

A priori knowledge 106, 111, 115, 119, 120, 124, 125, 144, 146, 148, 149, 150, 159, 162, 209Appearance 5, 7, 12, 39, 40, 43, 50, 87, 123

Belief 172, 174, 176, 181, 196

Berkeley 15, 17, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 135

Colour 7, 8, 47, 48, 55, 192

Descartes 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 31, 213

Descriptions 61, 62, 63, 65, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 82, 84, 86

Empiricism 3, 58, 59, 64, 80, 81, 85, 87, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 118, 120, 122, 135, 146, 147, 187, 219

Hegel 200, 201, 204

Idealism 15, 18, 49, 51, 95, 136

Induction 88, 90, 91, 94, 97, 100, 101, 102, 114, 117, 121, 148, 149, 153, 163

Justification 181, 182, 195

Kant 115, 118, 120, 123, 124, 125


38/38

Leibniz 18, 49, 133

Logic 103, 104, 106, 114, 116, 127, 153, 154, 163, 170, 208

Maths 111, 112, 113, 120, 121, 122, 126, 128, 144, 145, 154, 206

Memory 67, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163

Mind 38, 57, 59, 127, 217

Other minds 29, 33, 69, 78, 151, 189

Personal identity 24, 70, 222

Philosophy 2, 20, 26, 36, 2056, 2101, 214225

Rationalism 106, 115, 133, 200

Reality 8, 12, 28, 32, 34, 35, 43, 96, 102, 123, 136, 206, 207

Relations 128, 129, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 203Scepticism 5, 12, 21, 26, 29, 30, 35, 198, 212, 223

Science 37, 39, 89, 92, 94, 98, 102, 123, 207, 211, 214, 216

Sensedata 13, 14, 27, 28, 37, 50, 66, 87, 123, 141, 156, 163, 192

Solipsism 21, 30

Truth and error 63, 152, 156, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 177, 178, 179, 188, 191, 197, 222, 225

Universals 71, 80, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 138, 139, 141, 143, 144, 146, 190, 209

Values 109, 110, 164, 204, 217

KEY TERMS IN 'THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY' Apriori knowledge: knowledge acquiredbypure thought, without reference to

direct experience Acquaintance: the direct relationship of a mind with either a 'sensedatum' or a universal Coherence: internal

consistency among a group ofideas and experiences, such that they are held tobe true as a group Correspondence: a relationship

between groups ofideas in the mind and groups ofobjects in the world, such that they are true Deduction: following consistent

rules ofreasoning to move from a group ofassumptions to a conclusion (pure reason) Description: language which links truths to

build new knowledge from abasis ofacquaintance Idealism: the view ofBerkeley and Leibniz that only ideas canbe said tohave real existence, as 'reality' is unknown Induction: arriving at general rulesby observing regularity in sequences ofevents

Inference: a step in deductive reasoning, in which the laws oflogic lead from one truth to another Intuition: our capacity to

decide that some things are selfevidently true, without any further experience or reasoning Metaphysics: aprocess of apriori

reasoning which is thought to deduce the true nature ofreality, irrespective ofexperiences Monad: Leibniz's concept of abasic

unit ofmental reality, out ofwhich all experience and our idea ofthe world is constructed Other minds: minds apart from our

own, whose existence is difficult to verify, and therefore open to scepticism Public space: the idea ofreality which webelieve is

sharedby everyone, deduced from ourprivate experiences Self: the idea of a single unified entity at the heart of a conscious

mind, which controls and experiences all its thoughts Sensedata: the information coming from thephysical world, which our

minds experience and turn into knowledge Solipsism: the idea that we are trapped in a world ofideas or experiences, and can

know nothing except our own minds Universal:based on Plato's Forms, they are ideas which explain similarities in experience

andprovidebasic ideas for thought

POSSIBLE CRITICISMS OF RUSSELL

He shouldbe more ruthlessly empirical, and reject universals and apriori synthetic knowledgeOr, he should accept innate ideas, apriori synthetic metaphysics, and the rationality ofinductionSensedata do not exist (e.g. light isjustphotons, not 'data'), and the idea leads to an infinite regress in explainingperceptionHe is toopessimistic about induction, which mightbe rationallybased on empirical falsification (Popper)Hebases his realism on 'common sense',but he should accept that there is no escape from scepticismHe treats Berkeley as ifhe is stupid (pt 54),but Berkeley is right in hisphenomenalist/antirealist/idealist theoryRussell's logicism (mathsbased on logic,pt 154) hasbeen shown tobe false (by Gdel,because arithmetic can'tbeproved)His theory is ultimatelybased on intuition, selfevidence and common sense, and these are highly relativeHis idea oftruth as correspondencebetween a mental unity and an order ofobjects (pt 179) hasproblemsYou can't dismiss metaphysics (which relates apriori ideas together)justbecause Hegel makes some mistakes

Russell Problems Key Ideas

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