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RULE 77 ALLOWANCE OF WILL PROVED OUTSIDE OF PHILIPPINES ANDADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE THEREUNDER

RUL 78 LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND OF ADMINISTRATION, WHENAND TO WHOM ISSUED

RULE 79 OPPOSING ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY. PETITIONAND CONTEST FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

RULE 80 SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR

RULE 81 BONDS OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORSRULE 82 REVOCATION OF ADMINISTRATION, DEATH, RESIGNATION, AND

REMOVAL OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORSRULE 83 INVENTORY AND APPRAISAL; PROVISION FOR SUPPORT OF

FAMILYRULE 84 GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF EXECUTORS AND

ADMINISTRATORSRULE 85 ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPENSATION OF EXECUTORS AND

ADMINISTRATORS

1. TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA MARIA VENTURA,MIGUEL VENTURA and JUANA CARDONA vs. GREGORIA VENTURA and HERHUSBAND, EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, MERCEDES VENTURA and HER HUSBAND,PEDRO D. CORPUZ, G.R. No. L-26306, April 27, 1988

Facts:

Maria Ventura illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio VenturaMiguel Ventura son of Gregorio Ventura; brother of Maria Ventura

Juana Cardona saving spouse of Gregorio Ventura; mother of Maria Ventura

Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's legitimate children with hisformer wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano but the paternity of appellees was

denied by the deceased in his will.

Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not

include the appellees. In the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an

illegitimate child, was named and appointed by the testator to be the executrixof his will and the administratrix of his estate.

In due course, said will was admitted to probate. Gregorio Ventura died onSeptember 26, 1955. The appellant Maria Ventura filed a motion for her

appointment as executrix and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her

favor. Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and the corresponding letters

testamentary was issued in her favor. Maria Ventura submitted an inventory of

the estate of Gregorio Ventura.

She filed her accounts of administration for the years 1955 to 1960, inclusive.

Said account of administration was opposed by the spouses Mercedes Ventura& Pedro Corpuz and by Exequiel Victorio & Gregoria Ventura. Both oppositions

assailed the veracity of the report as not reflecting the true income of the estate

and the expenses which allegedly are not administration expenses.

But on January 25, 1961, Maria Ventura filed a motion to hold in abeyance the

approval of the accounts of administration or to have their approval without theopposition of the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz and GregoriaVentura and Exequiel Victorio on the ground that the question of the paternity

of Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura is still pending final determination

before the Supreme Court and that should they be adjudged the adulterouschildren of testator, as claimed, they are not entitled to inherit nor to oppose the

approval of the counts of administration.

Spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz filed their opposition to the

motion to hold in abeyance the approval of the accounts of administration on

the ground that Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura had already been declared by

the Court of First Instance as the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, hence,

they have reason to protect their interest. The motion to hold in abeyance the

approval of the accounts was denied.

Four motions were filed by Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura, namely:

(1) motion to remove the executrix Maria Ventura;

(2) motion to require her to deposit the harvest of palay of the property underadministration in a bonded warehouse;

(3) motion to render an accounting of the proceeds and expenses of

Administration; and

(4) motion to require her to include in the inventory of the estate certainexcluded properties.

An opposition to said motions was filed by the heirs Juana Cardona and Miguel

Ventura and by the executrix Maria Ventura herself.

On motion of counsel for Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura the jointmotions to require an Up-to-date Accounting and to Require Executrix Ventura

to Include Excluded Properties in Her Inventory were ordered withdrawn. The

other two motions were however set for hearing.

The grounds of aforesaid joint motions to remove the executrix Maria Ventura

are:

(1) that she is grossly incompetent;

(2) that she has maliciously and purposely concealed certain properties of theestate in the inventory;

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(3) that she is merely an illegitimate daughter who can have no harmonious

relations with the appellees;(4) that the executrix has neglected to render her accounts and failed to comply

with the Order of the Court requiring her to file her accounts of administration

for the years 1961 to 1963 and the Order of June 11, 1964, reiterating aforesaid

Order of December 12, 1963; and

(5) that she is with permanent physical defect hindering her from efficiently

performing her duties as an executrix.

The executrix Maria Ventura finally submitted her accounts of administration

covering the period 1961 to 1965 which were again opposed by the spouses

Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura and by the spouses Mercedes Venturaand Pedro Corpuz. On June 2, 1965, the executrix filed her supplemental

opposition to the aforesaid four motions, and prayed that the joint

supplemental motion to remove the executrix be denied or held in abeyanceuntil after the status of Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as heirs of the testator is

finally decided. On June 3, 1965, the Court, finding that the estate taxes have not

been paid, ordered the administratrix to pay the same within 30 days.

On September 13, 1965, the lower court denied the suspension of the

proceedings and deferred the resolution of the joint motion to remove executrix

Maria Ventura until after the examination of the physical fitness of saidexecutrix to undertake her duties as such. Also, it ordered the deposit of all

palay to be harvested in the next agricultural year and subsequent years to be

deposited in a bonded warehouse to be selected by the Court and the palay sodeposited shall not be withdrawn without the express permission of the Court.

Spouses Exequiel Victorio & Gregoria Ventura and Mercedes Ventura & Pedro

Corpuz filed their oppositions alleging among others that said accounts do not

reflect the true and actual income of the estate and that the expenses reportedthereunder are fake, exhorbitant and speculative.

The court a quo, finding that the executrix Maria Ventura has squandered the

funds of the estate, was inefficient and incompetent, has failed to comply with

the orders of the Court in the matter of presenting up-to-date statements of

accounts and neglected to pay the real estate taxes of the estate, rendered toremove Maria Ventura as executrix and administratrix of the estate and in her

place Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura were appointed joint a tratrices

of the estate upon filing by each of them of a bond of P 7,000.00. Letters ofadministration were issued to Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura upon

their qualification.

Issue:

WON the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified.

Ruling:

This issue has, however, become moot and academic in view of the decision of

this Court in related cases.

Aside from the instant special proceedings, there are two other civil cases

involving the estate of the deceased Gregoria Ventura filed by herein appellee

Gregoria Ventura against the other appellees herein Mercedes Ventura and theirfather, Gregorio Ventura. Later Mercedes Ventura joined cause with GregoriaVentura. Gregoria and Mercedes Ventura claimed that they are the legitimate

children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife Paulina Simpliciano, who died in

1943, and asked that one-half of the properties described in the complaint bedeclared as the share of their mother in the conjugal partnership, with them as

the only forced heirs of their mother Paulina.

Subsequently, civil case was filed by Alipio, Eufracia and Juliana, all surnamed

Simpliciano, against Gregorio Ventura and the two sisters, Mercedes and

Gregoria Ventura, before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch I.

They alleged that as the only children of Modesto Simpliciano, sole brother of

Paulina Simpliciano, they, instead of Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura, whom

they claimed are adulterous children of Paulina with another man, Teodoro

Ventura and as such are not entitled to inherit from her, are the ones whoshould inherit the share of Paulina Simpliciano in the conjugal Partnership with

Gregorio Ventura.

The lower court rendered its judgment declaring Mercedes Ventura and

Gregoria Ventura to be the legitimate daughters of Paulina Simpliciano and

Gregorio Ventura; declaring that as such legitimate daughters of Paulina

Simpliciano they are entitled to 1/2 of the properties.

Thereafter, Mercedes Ventura filed a motion to annul the provisions of the willof the deceased Gregorio Ventura in Special Proceedings No. 812, which motion

was opposed by Miguel Ventura and Juana Cardona and later by Maria Ventura.

They claimed that the decision in said civil cases was not yet final.

The court annulled the institution of the heirs in the probated will of Gregorio

Ventura. The motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order filed by

executrix Maria Ventura was denied.

Accordingly, Maria Ventura appealed the orders of the probate court in Special

Proceedings No. 812 before the Supreme Court, this Court, through then

Associate Justice Antonio P. Barredo, ruled that order of approval is an

appealable one, and inasmuch as no appeal has been taken from the same, it is

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beyond dispute that the decision in controversy has already become final and

executory in all respects. Hence, the case at bar has become moot and academic.

Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, "the pretention or omission of one, some, or

all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the

execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the

institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are

not inofficious," and as a result, intestacy follows, thereby rendering theprevious appointment of Maria Ventura as executrix moot and academic. Thiswould now necessitate the appointment of another administrator, under the

following provision:

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

When and to whom letters of administration granted.- If no executor is

named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse

the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, a petition shall be

granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or

both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving

husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such personas such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have

appointed, if competent and willing to serve;"

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is

Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and

Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin"has been defined as those personswho are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property. It

is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is morepreponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. Among members of a

class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of

interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred."

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes

and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his

wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of GregorioVentura they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of

Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the

aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons

to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or

Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and

Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to

represent both interests.

The appeal interposed by appellants Maria Ventura, Juana Cardona and Miguel

Ventura was dismissed.

2. ROWENA F. CORONA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMARICO G. VITUG,

AVELINO L. CASTILLO, NICANOR CASTILLO, KATHLEEN D. LUCHANGCO,GUILLERMO LUCHANGCO, JR., ANTONIO LUCHANGCO, RODOLFO TORRES,REYNALDO TORRES and PURISIMA T. POLINTAN, G.R. No. L-59821, August30, 1982

Facts:

On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York, U.S.A.,leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will dated October 3, 1980, which

excluded her husband, respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as one of her heirs, and

the other, a formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about three weeks

thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico "for reason of

his improper and immoral conduct amounting to concubinage, which is a

ground for legal separation under Philippine Law"; bequeathed her properties

in equal shares to her sisters Exaltacion L. Allarde, Vicenta L. Faustino andGloria L. Teoxon, and her nieces Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way; and

appointed Rowena F. Corona, herein petitioner, as her Executrix.

Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills before the Court of First

Instance of Rizal, Branch VI and for the appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as

Administrator because she (Rowena) is presently employed in the United

Nations in New York City. Upon Rowena's urgent Motion, the Probate Courtappointed Nenita P. Alonte as Special Administratrix, upon a P100,000.00 bond.

The surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an "Opposition and Motion" and

prayed that the Petition for Probate be denied and that the two Wills be

disallowed on the ground that they were procured through undue and improper

pressure and influence, having been executed at a time when the decedent wasseriously ill and under the medical care of Dr. Antonio P. Corona, petitioner's

husband, and that the holographic Will impaired his legitime. Romarico further

prayed for his appointment as Special Administrator because the SpecialAdministratrix appointed is not related to the heirs and has no interest to be

protected, besides, the surviving spouse is qualified to administer.

Oppositions to probate with almost Identical arguments and prayers were also

filed by respondent (1) Avelino L. Castillo and Nicanor Castillo, legitimatechildren of Constancia Luchangco, full blood sister of the decedent; (2)

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3. NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE GABRIEL,ROSEMARIE GABRIEL, MARIBEL GABRIEL, CYNTHIA GABRIEL, RENATOGABRIEL, GERARDO GABRIEL, JOJI ZORAYDA GABRIEL, DANIEL GABRIELand FELICITAS JOSE-GABRIEL vs. HON COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUELE. YUZON, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, and ROBERTODINDO GABRIEL, G.R. No. 101512, August 7, 1992

Facts:

Nine months after the death of Domingo Gabriel, Roberto (son) filed with the

RTC Manila a petition for letters of administration alleging, among others, that

he is the son of the decedent, a college graduate, engaged in business, and isfully capable of administering the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel.. The court

below issued an order setting the hearing of the petition. The court further

directed the publication of the order in Mabuhay," a newspaper of generalcirculation, once a week for 3 consecutive weeks.. No opposition having been

filed despite such publication of the notice of hearing, Roberto was allowed to

present his evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the probate court appointed Roberto

as administrator of the intestate estate on a bond of P30,000.00.

Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims against the estate of

the decedent was published in the "Metropolitan News." As a consequence, AidaValencia, mother of private respondent, filed a "Motion to File Claim of (sic) the

Intestate Estate of Domingo P. Gabriel" alleging that the decision in a civil case

between her and the deceased remained unsatisfied and that she thereby hadan interest in said estate.

Private respondent filed for approval by the probate court an "Inventory and

Appraisal" placing the value of the properties left by the decedent atP18,960,000.00, which incident was set for hearing on January 16, 1989.

Petitioners Nilda, Eva, Boy, George, Rosemarie, and Maribel, all surnamed

Gabriel, filed their "Opposition and Motion" praying for the recall of the letters

of administration issued to Roberto and the issuance of such letters instead to

petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter of the deceased, or any ofthe other oppositors who are the herein petitioners.

Petitioners alleged that:(1) they were not duly informed by personal notice of the petition for

administration;

(2) petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, should be preferred

over Roberto;

(3) Roberto has a conflicting and/or adverse interest against the estate becausehe might prefer the claims of his mother; and

(4) most of the properties of the decedent have already been relinquished by

way of transfer of ownership to petitioners and should not be included in thevalue of the estate sought to be administered by Roberto.

The probate court denied the opposition of petitioners on the ground that they

had not shown any circumstance sufficient to overturn the order of July 8, 1988,

in that:

(1) no evidence was submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to prove that she is alegitimate daughter of the deceased; and(2) there is no proof to show that the person who was appointed administrator

is unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust as to make his

appointment inadvisable under these circumstances.

The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise denied.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

Said court rendered judgment dismissing that petition for certiorari on the

ground that the appointment of an administrator is left entirely to the sound

discretion of the trial court which may not be interfered with unless abused;

that the fact that there was no personal notice served on petitioners is not a

denial of due process as such service is not a jurisdictional requisite and

petitioners were heard on their opposition; and that the alleged violation of theorder of preference, if any, is an error of fact or law which is a mistake of

judgment, correctible by appeal and not by the special civil action of certiorari.

Issue:

WON Felicitas Jose-Gabriel should be disqualified from appointment as

administratrix of the decedent's estate

Ruling:

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court prescribes the order of preference in the

issuance of letters of administration, categorically seeks out the surviving

spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to beobserved in appointing an administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion

for the probate court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that

directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor.

In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the

principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to

be appointed as administrator. This is the same consideration which Section 6

of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in theappointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption

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5. PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO,and ISABELITA MANALO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONALTRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M.TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO,ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA MANALO, G.R. NO.129242, January 16, 2001

Facts:

Troadic Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died

intestate on February 14, 1992, was survived by his Pilar and his 11 children, all

are of legal age. The deceased left several real properties in Manila and Tarlac,including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop. In

November 1992, herein respondents, 8 of the surviving children, filed a petition

with RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father andfor appointment of their brother Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof.

Hearing was set on February 11, 1993 and the herein petitioners were granted

10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition.

Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through

counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion on July 23, 1993

seeking:(1) to set aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993

which denied the motion for additional extension of time file opposition;

(2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds fordismissal of the case;

(3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of

the oppositors; and

(4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.

On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order which resolved, thus:

A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July

20, 1993, only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;

B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their

affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, saidaffirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue of

the present proceeding;

C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of theoppositors;

D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding

Judge;

E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular

administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearingon September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court with the Court of Appeals, but petition was dismissed.

Issue:

WON the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders

of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright

dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure ofthe petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromiseinvolving members of the same family have been made prior to the filling of the

petition but that the same have failed.

Ruling:

No.

Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually

an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. Consequently,

according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16,

Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to

dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for

filling the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners thereinfailed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts

toward a compromise have been made involving members of the same family

prior to the filling of the petition pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines.

The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or

proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the

complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful

scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and

Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim

that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petitioncontains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of

estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo

on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time ofhis said death. The facts of death of the decedent and of his residence within the

country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the

administration of the estate rest.

It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purposeof the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late

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Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said

petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting as a probate court,has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral

matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil

action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of

a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the

averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. So

it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.

Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626

were to be considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a

deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis Article 222of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the

dismissal of the same by virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which

provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote theirobject and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive

determination of every action and proceedings.' Petitioners contend that the

term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily include special

proceedings.

The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge

under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify theinvocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of

the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo

inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the

same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a

compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to thelimitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil

actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by oneperson or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the

plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of aninjury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil actionis thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the

enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Besides, anexcerpt form the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the

intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only

to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the

same family.

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being

sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendantwas imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration,

Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special

proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to

establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. The petitioners therein (private

respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and

subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased sothat they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement andliquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special

jurisdiction of the probate court.

The petition was denied for lack of merit.

6. ISABEL V. SAGUINSIN vs. DIONISIO LINDAYAG, ET AL., G.R. No. L-17759,December 17, 1962

Facts:

On November 10, 1959, Maria V. Lindayag died intestate in Olongapo, Zambales.

Her sister, Isabel V. Saguinsin, filed with the Court of First Instance of said

province a verified petition for the issuance in her favor of letters ofadministration over the estate of said deceased, alleging, among other things,

that the latter left real and personal properties situated in the Provinces of

Zambales and Bulacan worth approximately P100,000.00; stating the names,ages and residences of her surviving heirs.

On June 21, 1960, Dionisio V. Lindayag, the surviving spouse, in his behalf and in

representation of the minors Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamedLindayag, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground lack of interest in

the estate, she being neither heir nor a creditor thereof. The motion alleged that

the late Maria V. Lindayag was survived by her husband the movant and

their legally adopted minor children named Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine,

all surnamed Lindayag the decedent having left no legitimate natural or

illegitimate child.

In opposing the motion to dismiss petitioner argued that only the facts alleged

in the petition should be considered in determining its sufficiency.

On July 28, 1960, after due hearing on the motion aforesaid, the Court issued an

order of dismissal.

Petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the above order having beendenied, she took the present appeal.

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Issue:

WON petitioner Isabel V. Saguinsin is "an interested person" in the estate of

deceased Maria V. Lindayag.

Ruling:

No.

According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of

administration must be filed an "interested person". An interested party hasdefined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate, such asan heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. And it is

well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special

proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party th eretomust be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.

Petitioner's interest in the estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag was

disputed, through a motion to dismiss her petition, by the surviving spouse on

the ground that said deceased was survived by him and by three legally adoptedchildren thus excluding petitioner as an heir. In the course of the hearing

held in connection with said motion, evidence was introduced in supportthereof which, according to the lower court, established that said deceased was

survived not only by her husband but by three legally adopted children named

Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag.

Upon these facts which petitioner does not dispute it is manifest that she

is not an heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no material and direct

interest in her estate.

Petitioner's view that when a motion to dismiss a complaint or a petition is

filed, only the facts alleged in the complaint or petition may be taken into

account is not entirely correct. To the contrary, the rule is that at said hearing

said motion may be proved or disproved in accordance with the rules of

evidence, and it has been held that for that purpose, the hearing should beconducted as an ordinary hearing; and that the parties should be allowed to

present evidence, except when the motion is based on the failure of the

complaint or of the petition to state a cause of action. In the present case, themotion to dismiss the petition was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal

capacity to institute the proceedings which, as already stated heretofore, was

fully substantiated by the evidence presented during the hearing.

The order appealed from was affirmed.

7. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION vs. FIDEL P. DUMLAO,Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City,BONIFACIO CANONOY, Judicial Administrator of the Estate of ReginoCanonoy, CARMEN VDA. DE CANONOY, TEODULO CANONOY, REGINOCANONOY, JR., MARIANITA CANONOY GUINTO and GLORIA CANONOYBASA, G.R. No. L-44888 , February 7, 1992

Facts:

Ricardo Gonzales, District Manager of Shell Philippines for Mindanao, filed a

petition entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Regino

Canonoy, Petition for Letters of Administration, Ricardo M. Gonzales, Petitionerwith the RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, praying that he be appointed

as judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased Regino Canonoy.

Judge Echavez Jr. issued an order setting the hearing on the petition and

directing that said order be published and copies of the same be sent by

registered mail or personal delivery to each of all known heirs of the deceased.

The heirs of Regino Canonoy opposed the issuance of letters of administrationfiled by Gonzales alleging that:

Gonzales is a complete stranger to the intestate estate of thedeceased.

He is not even a creditor of the estate but an employee of the allegedcreditor (Shell Philippines Inc.), and so he would not be able to

properly and effectively protect the interest of the estate in case ofconflicts.

He is a resident of Davao City, and thus if appointed as administrator ofthe estate, the bulk of which is located in Butuan City, he would not be

able to perform his duties efficiently.

They propose and pray that Bonifacio Canonoy, one of Reginos sons, "be

appointed administrator of the said intestate estate and the corresponding

letters of administration be issued in his favor."

The trial court, after due hearing, appointed Bonifacio Canonoy as administratorof the estate of the deceased.

Petitioner Shell filed its claim against the estate of Regino Canonoy and later

amended it but the duly appointed administrator, Bonifacio Canonoy, filed a

Motion to Dismiss the claim of Shell and interposed counterclaim.

Upon joinder of the issues on Shells claim, the trial court set the pre-trial. Themotion filed by the counsel for the administrator alleges that the court did not

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acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature thereof because the

petitioner therein, Mr. Gonzalez, is not the "interested person" contemplated bySection 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court.

Shell filed its Opposition to the Motion on the ground that the trial court had

acquired jurisdiction over the case to issue letters of administration as the

interest of Gonzalez in the estate is not a jurisdictional fact that needs to be

alleged in the petition.

Respondent Judge, finding the motion to be well-taken and meritorious,

dismissed the case. The motion for its reconsideration having been denied by

the trial court, Shell filed the instant petition which it denominated as a petitionfor review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issues:

1. WON the jurisdictional facts that need to be stated in a petition for letters of

administration under Section 2(a), Rule 79 of the Rules of Court include the

specific assertion that the petitioner therein is an "interested person".

2. WON the administration court may properly and validly dismiss a petition for

letters of administration filed by one who is not an "interested person" afterhaving appointed an heir of the decedent as administrator of the latter's

intestate estate and set for pre-trial a claim against the said estate.

Ruling:

1. No.

Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition of letters of administration. A petition for

letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must

show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and

residences of the creditors, of the decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are

prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of

administration.

The jurisdictional facts alluded to are: the death of the testator, his residenceat the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting or, ifhe is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such

province. These facts are amply enumerated in the petition filed by Gonzalez.

Clearly, the allegation that a petitioner seeking letters of administration is an

interested person, does not fall within the enumeration of jurisdictional facts.

Of course, since the opening sentence of the section requires that the petitionmust be filed by an interested person, it goes without saying that a motion to

dismiss may lie not on the basis of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court,

but rather on the ground of l ack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings.

In Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, the dismissal of a petition for letters of administration

was affirmed because the petitioner is not an heir of her deceased sister and,therefore, has no material and direct interest in her estate.

In the said case, this Court defined an interested partyas one who would bebenefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the

estate, such as a creditor; this interest must be material and direct, not merelyindirect or contingent.

However, the Saguinsin doctrine is not without exception. An objection to a

petition for letters of administration on that ground may be barred by waiver or

estoppel.

2. Yes.

Private respondents herein did not file a motion to dismiss the petition filed byGonzalez on the ground of lack of capacity to sue. They instead filed an

Opposition which, unfortunately, did not ask for the dismissal of the petition but

merely opposed the issuance of letters of administration in favor of Gonzalez.

The Opposition also proposed that Bonifacio Canonoy, one of the children of the

deceased Regino Canonoy, be appointed administrator of the latter's intestate

estate.

The failure to move for a dismissal amounted to a waiver of the above-

mentioned ground. Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides that:

A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections

then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.

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By proposing that Bonifacio Canonoy be appointed as administrator instead of

Mr. Gonzalez, private respondents have in fact approved or ratified the filing ofthe petition by the latter.

There can be no dispute that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the

case.

It is be presumed that Bonifacio Canonoy immediately qualified asadministrator because in that capacity, he filed a motion to dismiss petitioner'sclaim against the estate, a Reply to the Opposition to the motion to dismiss and

an Answer to the petitioner's amended claim against the estate wherein he

interposed a counterclaim.

Clearly, not only had the administrator and the rest of the private respondents

voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, they even expresslyaffirmed and invoked such jurisdiction in praying for reliefs and remedies in

their favor.

They cannot now be heard to question the jurisdiction of the trial court. While it

may be true that jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, aparty who has affirmed and invoked it in a particular matter to secure an

affirmative relief cannot be allowed to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction toescape penalty, as held in the case of Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al.

The instant petition was granted and the Order of respondent Judge was setaside.

8. PEDRO DE GUZMAN vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES,RTC BRANCH 58, MAKATI, METRO, MANILA; DEPUTY SHERIFFS JOSE B.FLORA and HONORIO SANTOS and ELAINE G. DE GUZMAN, G.R. No. 78590,June 20, 1988

Facts:

Manolito de Guzman died in Makati and left personal and real properties.

Elaine de Guzman (widow and private respondent) filed a petition for

settlement of his intestate estate with list of creditors, probable value ofproperty, compulsory heirs, and for grant of letters of administration.

She filed a motion for writ of possession over 5 vehicles registered under name

of Manolito but were in possession of Elaine's father-in-law, Pedro. On the same

day, court issued an order directing sheriff to notify Pedro of hearing. Elaine

also filed a motion to be appointed as Special Administratrix, which the court

granted.

Court issued an order to assist Elaine in preserving the estate of Manolito by

appointing sheriffs and military men. Pedro resisted when they tried to take the

vehicles on the ground that they were personal properties and he claims that a

near shoot-out occurred. Pedro alleges that he was not given notice of

appointment of Elaine as administratrix and court orders were patent nullities.

Issue:

WON a probate court may act on and/or grant motions for the appointment of aspecial administrator, for the issuance of a writ of possession of alleged

properties of the deceased person, and for assistance to preserve the estate in a

petition for the settlement of the intestate estate even before the court hascaused notice to be served upon all interested parties pursuant to Section 3,

Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Ruling:

No.

Facts to be alleged in the application before a court may acquire jurisdiction

over the case for probate of will and administration of properties include

residence of the deceased and other indispensable facts and circumstances.

Court had acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings in the instant case upon

filing of Elaine's petition for settlement because she alleged all the jurisdictional

facts, pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 79 ROC.

However, there's a need to differentiate between jurisdiction of the probate

court over the proceedings for the administration of an estate and its

jurisdiction over persons interested in the settlement of the estate of the

deceased person

Probate court must cause notice through publication of the petition after

receiving the same, otherwise the proceeding for the settlement of the estate is

void and should be annulled. The requirement as to notice is essential to thevalidity of the proceeding in order that no person may be deprived of his right

to property without due process of law.

Notice through publication of the petition is jurisdictional, absence of which

makes court orders affecting other persons subsequent to the petition void and

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under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the

estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts,which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule

only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court undisputably had at

least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.

SC reversed the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and

the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originallyfiled by respondents with the Court of Appeals was dismissed.

10. ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS vs. JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38,Court of First Instance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLERGRIMM II and LINDA GRIMM, G.R. No. L-55509, April 27, 1984

Facts:

Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati

Medical Center on November 27, 1977. Survived by his second wife, Maxine

Tate Grimm and two children, Edward (Pete) and Linda, and by Juanita and

Ethel (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce.

He executed on January 23, 1959, two wills in San Francisco, California. One willdisposed of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of

himself and his second wife. The second will disposed of his estate outside the

Philippines.

The two children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will

disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his

property outside this country, the testator said:

I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita

Grimm Morris, or my daughter, Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm

Roberts), because I have provided for each of them in a separate will

disposing of my Philippine property.

The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine in Court of

Tooele County, Utah. Two weeks later, Maxine, Linda and Pete, as the first

parties, and Ethel, Juanita and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the secondparties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a

compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. It was signed the lawyers

of the parties. It was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated

as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm's Philippine estate.

On January 9, 1978, Ethel, filed with CFI Instance intestate proceeding for the

settlement of his estate. She was named special administratrix. On March 11, thesecond wife, Maxine, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate

proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the

probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that she be appointed special

administratrix, She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of

his Philippine estate.

The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine,withdrew that opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine,

Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint administrators. Apparently, this was done

pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The courtignored the will already found in the record.

The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority andapproval of the court, they sold some of the testators properties. Acting on the

declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers

Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two children), Judge

Conrado M. Molina adjudicated to Maxine one-half (4/8) of the decedent's

Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four children or 12.5%. Later,Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their

lawyer.

On April 18, 1980 Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion

for accounting "so that the Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirsand the present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was

notified of that motion.

On September 8, 1980, Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lowercourt a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated

in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside

and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix

and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties

received by them and to return the same to Maxine. Grimm's second wife and

two children alleged that they were defraud due to the machinations of theRoberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that

the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the

partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of

merit in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari

and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed,or alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch

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20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be

heard prior to the petition for probate.

Issue:

WON a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in an

intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be

entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district court).

Ruling:

Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting tolack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss. A testate proceeding is

proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass

either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, CivilCode; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person

who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the

intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judgeassigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an

opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to

dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, whoappeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices

and other papers in the testate case.

The petition was dismissed. The temporary restraining order was dissolved.

11. THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ vs. THE COURT OFAPPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES,MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZand THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG,G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS:

* See page 115 (Herrera)

* Principles:

a. Rule 83, Sec. 3 Allowance to widow and family. Include support even of age

b. Support does not extend grandchildren

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

1. Hilario Ruiz executed a HOLOGRAPHIC WILL naming 3 heirs:

a. EDMOND (son of Hilario) also named as executor

b. Children of EDMOND

c. MONTES (adopted daughter of Hilario)

2. EDMOND distributed the cash component of the estate to the heirs afterHilarios death* Note: Will was not probated

3. MONTES filed petition for PROBATE of the will and for issuance of LETTERSTESTEMENTARY to EDMOND at RTC 4 yrs. after Hilarios death

* EDMOND opposed on the ground of undue influence in the execution of the

will thereafter withdrawn

4. One of the properties (Valle Verde property bequeathed to the grandchildren)

was leased out by EDMOND

* Probate court ordered EDMOND to deposit to Clerk the rents

* EDMOND complied minus amount for expenses and maintenance

5. Probate court granted MONTES petition

6. EDMOND filed Ex parte motion for release of funds (for the release of

previously deposited rent)* MONTES opposed and filed Motion for release of funds to certain heirs (to

the children of EDMOND, named heirs to the Valle Verde property)

7. RTC - MONTES wins.

8. EDMOND filed for Recon.

9. EDMOND manifested at Recon. withdrawal of Motion for release of Funds.

10. Despite EDMONDs manifestation, Probate ordered: a. Release of funds to EDMOND but only such amount as may be necessary to

cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support of his children

(decedents grandchildren)b. Release of the titles bequeathed to MONTES and the Grandchildren held in

abeyance until the lapse of six (6) months from the date of first publication of

Notice to Creditors.

c. To submit an accounting of the expenses necessary for administrationincluding provisions for the support before the amount required can be

withdrawn and cause the publication of the notice to creditors

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11. EDMOND elevated the case to CA alleging his children are no longer minors

and are only decedents grandchildren, hence not entitled to allowance

12. CA affirmed RTC

13. EDMOND filed petition for review on certiorari v. CA at SC

Facts:

Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son,

Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three

granddaughters, all children of Edmond Ruiz and named Edmond Ruiz executor.

Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was

distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance withthe decedents will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond did not take any action for

the probate of his fathers holographic will.

4 years after the testators death, Montes filed before the RTC a petition for the

probate and approval of Hilario Ruizs will and for the issuance of letterstestamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on

the ground that the will was executed under undue influence.

1 of the properties of the estate which the testator bequeathed to Maria

Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline - was leased out by EdmondRuiz to third persons.

The probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court

the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. In compliance, on January 25, 1993,

Edmond turned over the amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of

the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on

the estate.

Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on thereal properties of the estate. The probate court approved the release of

P7,722.00.

Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the

probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters

testamentary to Edmond.

Petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz as executor, filed an Ex-Parte Motion

for Release of Funds. It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited

with the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and

concurrently filed a Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs and Motionfor Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will. Montes prayed for the

release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria

Angeline and for the distribution of the testators properties, specific ally the

Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the

provisions of the holographic will.

The probate court denied petitioners motion for release of funds but granted

respondent Montes motion in view of petitioners lack of opposition. It thus

ordered the release of the rent payments to the decedents three

granddaughters.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his

opposition to respondent Montes motion for release of rent payments whichopposition the court failed to consider

Petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was withdrawing his motion for

release of funds in view of the fact that the lease contract over Valle Verde

property had been renewed for another year.

Despite petitioners manifestation, the probate court ordered the release of the

funds to Edmond but only such amount as may be necessary to cover the

expenses of administration and allowances for support of the testators three

granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in theinheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to

respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months

from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors.

Petitioner assailed this order before the CA. Finding no grave abuse of

discretion on the part of respondent judge, the appellate court dismissed the

petition and sustained the probate courts order

Hence, this petition.

Issues:

WON the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before paymentof the estates debts and obligations, has the authority:

1. To grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the

testators grandchildren;

2. To order the release of the t itles to certain heirs; and

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3. To grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.

Ruling:

1. No.

On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court

provides:

Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. - The widow and minor or

incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the

estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, suchallowance as are provided by law.

Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force atthe time of the testators death, provides that during the liquidation of the

conjugal partnership, the deceaseds legitimate spouse and children, regardless

of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional

support from the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the right

and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond theage of majority.

Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds ofthe decedents estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to widow and

children and does not extend it to the deceaseds grandchildren, regardless oftheir minority or incapacity.

2. No.

As to the order of release of the titles of the bequeathed properties to private

respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors.

Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. - Nothwithstanding a

pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a

decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it maydeem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be

affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or

legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of theseRules.

And Rule 90 provides that:

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the debts,

funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the

widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance

with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or

administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing

upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled

to the same.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations

above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees,or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditionedfor the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.

In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estateproperties can only be made:(1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to

the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or(2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them

gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said

obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to

meet those obligations.

In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle

Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents afterthe lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to

creditors. The questioned order speaks of notice to creditors, not payment of

debts and obligations. The taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid. Theestate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the

estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or

make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their

respective shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was issuedthe properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.

3. As to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the

will.

The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management ofthe real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be

exercised so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and

expenses of administration, Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules ofCourt explicitly provides:

Sec. 3.Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and

to administer estate not willed. - An executor or administrator shall havethe right to the possession and management of the real as well as the

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personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment

of the debts and expenses for administration.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, those portions of the order granting an allowance to the

testators grandchildren and ordering the release of the titles to the private

respondents upon notice to creditors are annulled and set aside.

Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedingsbelow.

12. MAURO P. MANANQUIL vs. ATTY. CRISOSTOMO C. VILLEGAS, A.M. No.2430, August 30, 1990

Facts:

In a complaint for disbarment, Mauro P. Mananquil charged respondent Atty.

Crisostomo C. Villegas with gross misconduct or malpractice committed while

acting as counsel of record of Felix Leong in the latter's capacity as

administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Felomina Zerna.

In 1963, Leong, as administrator of Zernas estate, entered into a lease contract

with the partnership of HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS over several parcels of landincluded in Zernas estate. The said lease contract was renewed several times.

Villegas was both the counsel of Leong and a partner in the partnership of HIJOS

DE JOSE VILLEGAS.

The complainant, Mananquil was appointed special administrator after Felix

Leong died. Mananquil alleged that the lease contracts were executed underiniquitous terms and conditions and were made without the approval of the

probate court.

Issues:

1. WON Villegas should have first secured the probate courts approval

regarding the lease.

2. WON Villegas should be disbarred.

Ruling:

1. No. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial

executor or administrator has the right to the possession and management of

the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessaryfor the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He may,

therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the

court having jurisdiction of the estate. For instance, it has long been settled thatan administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the

properties of the estate even without prior judicial authority and approval.

Thus, considering that administrator Leong was not required under the law and

prevailing jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the probate court in order

to validly lease real properties of the estate, Villegas, as counsel of Leong, cannotbe taken to task for failing to notify the probate court of the various leasecontracts involved herein and to secure its judicial approval thereto.

2. No. There is no evidence to warrant disbarment, although Villegas should besuspended from practice of law because he participated in the renewals of the

lease contracts involving properties of Zernas estate in favor of the partnership

of HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS. Under Art. 1646 of the Civil Code in relation to Art.1491, lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object

of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession are

prohibited from leasing, either in person or through the mediation of another,

the properties or things mentioned. Such act constituted gross misconduct,

hence, suspension for four months.

13. ANA LIM KALAW vs.. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATECOURT, THE HONORABLE RICARDO B. DIAZ and ROSA LIM KALAW, G.R. No.74618, September 2, 1992

Facts:

It appears on record that Carlos Lim Kalaw died intestate on July 8, 1970. On

June 8, 1972, Victoria Lim Kalaw filed an amended petition for the issuance ofLetters of Administration with the then Court of First Instance of Manila in

Special Proceeding No. 84520 naming Ana Lim Kalaw (63 years old), Victoria

Lim Kalaw (57 years old), Pura Lim Kalaw (53 years old) and Rosa Lim Kalaw

(43 years old) as the surviving heirs of the late Carlos Lim Kalaw.

On April 25, 1974, the trial court issued an order appointing petitioner Ana LimKalaw as special administratrix. Consequently, petitioner filed a preliminary

inventory of all the properties which came into her possession as special

administratrix of the estate of her late father on June 3, 1974. On October 6,1977, the trial court issued another order appointing petitioner as the judicial

administratrix of said estate and a Letter of Administration was issued to the

petitioner after the latter took her oath of office on November 11, 1977.

Thereafter, Jose Lim filed a motion to require petitioner to render an accounting

of her administration of said estate which was granted by respondent Judge

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Ricardo Diaz in an order dated December 8, 1982. Respondent judge issued

another order requiring petitioner to render an accounting of heradministration with the express instruction that said order be personally served

upon the petitioner since the order dated December 8, 1982 was returned to the

Court unserved.

Private respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw together with her sisters Victoria and Pura

Lim Kalaw filed a motion to remove petitioner as administratrix of their fathersestate and to appoint instead private respondent on the ground of negligence onthe part of petitioner in her duties for failing to render an accounting of her

administration since her appointment as administratrix more than six years ago

in violation of Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Respondent judge issued another order requiring petitioner to render an

accounting within 30 days from receipt thereof which she did on March 22,1984. She likewise filed on the same date, her Opposition to the motion praying

for her removal as administratrix alleging that the delay in rendering said

accounting was due to the fact that Judge Carlos Sundiam, who was the judge

where the intestate proceeding was assigned, had then been promoted to the

Court of Appeals causing said sala to be vacated for a considerable length oftime, while newly-appointed Judge Joel Tiongco died of cardiac arrest soon after

his appointment to said vacancy, so much so that she did not know to whom torender an accounting report.

The trial court rendered a decision finding that Administratrix Ana Lim Kalawviolated the provisions of Section 8, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court for not

rendering an account of her administration within one (1) year from date of

receipt of the letters of administration and this constitutes negligence on her

part to perform her duty as Administratrix and under Section 2, Rule 82 of theRules of Court, neglect on the part of the administratrix to render her account is

a ground for her removal as an administratrix.

Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order with

the then Intermediate Appellate Court to annul and set aside the following

Orders removing the Petitioner as Administratrix of the estate of the late CarlosLim Kalaw. The appellate court rendered a decision denying the petition for

certiorari. However, respondent Judge is directed to require private respondent

Rosa Lim Kalaw to post the appropriate administrators bond within ten (10)days from notice hereof. Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this petition.

Issues:

1. WON the petitioner violated Section 8, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court?

2. WON the petitioner can be removed on the ground of Section 2, Rule 82 of the

Revised Rules of Court?

Ruling:

1. Yes.

Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

"SEC. 8. When executor or administrator to render account. Every

executor or administrator shall render an account of his administration

within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of

administration, unless the court otherwise directs because of extensions

of time for presenting claims against, or paying the debts of, the estate, orfor disposing of the estate; and he shall render such further accounts as

the court may require until the estate is wholly settled."

The rendering of an accounting by an administrator of his administration withinone year from his appointment is mandatory, as shown by the use of the word

"shall" in said rule. The only exception is when the Court otherwise directs

because of extensions of time for presenting claims against the estate or forpaying the debts or disposing the assets of the estate, which do not exist in the

case at bar.

Furthermore, petitioners excuse that the sala where the intestate proceedingwas pending was vacant most of the time deserves scant consideration since

petitioner never attempted to file with said court an accounting report of her

administration despite the fact that at one time or another, Judge Sundiam andJudge Tiongco were presiding over said sala during their incumbency.

2. Yes.

Likewise, her subsequent compliance in rendering an accounting report did not

purge her of her negligence in not rendering an accounting for more than sixyears, which justifies petitioners removal as administratrix and the

appointment of private respondent in her place as mandated by Section 2 of

Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.

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the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement. She also had only the

remainder of the period of 4 years from December 1949 within which tocommence her action. Plaintiff Francisco Gerona became of age only on 9

January 1952 so that he was still a minor when he gained knowledge (even if

only constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial settlement on 25 June 1948.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs

against petitioners herein. It is so ordered.